Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner (Randolph) is an African-American female. 2. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on June 2, 1997, and was terminated by Respondent from her employment on September 30, 1997. 3. When initially hired, Petitioner’s official employment class title was Other Personnel Services (OPS) Paralegal Specialist. 4. On July 1, 1997, approximately one month after her date of employment, Petitioner’s official employment class title was changed to Administrative Secretary and Petitioner’s pay plan status was changed from OPS to Career Service. 5. On September 1, 1997, Petitioner's class title was reclassified to Paralegal Specialist. 6. From July 1, 1997, until the date of her termination, Petitioner was employed in a probationary status by DOAH with her primary job responsibilities being that of a proofreader. 7. Probationary employees are not entitled to progressive discipline and can be terminated at will pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. 8. Ann Cole, the clerk of DOAH, interviewed all candidates for the newly created proofreader position. 9. There were several applicants for the proofreader position and after a series of tests and interviews Ann Cole determined that Petitioner was the best applicant for the proofreader position and Petitioner was hired for the job. 10. Approximately one month after Petitioner was hired, a second proofreader (Dr. Rappendelli) was hired. Dr. Rappendeli is a white female. 11. Both Petitioner and Dr. Carol Ripandelli were supervised at DOAH by Ann Cole. ATTENDANCE HISTORY 312. During the first month of her employment Petitioner shared a work area in DOAH’s mailroom with current DOAH employee Elma Moore, an African-American female. 13. Elma Moore typically arrived at work between 7:00 and 7:15 a.m. even though the required start time for employees of the clerk’s office was 8:00 a.m. 14. Elma Moore was able to directly observe the times during which Petitioner arrived at work. Ms. Moore noted that Petitioner reported to work forty-five minutes late on her first day. Ms. Moore further noted that Petitioner would often be late. 15. Elma Moore was relocated to another part of the clerk’s office when Dr. Rappendelli was hired. 16. Elma Moore, even from her new workstation, continued to be situated such that she was able to observe the times at which Petitioner customarily arrived at work. 17. Elma Moore testified that during the four month period that Petitioner worked for DOAH, at least two to three times each week, Petitioner would arrive at work approximately ten to thirty minutes beyond the mandatory 8:00 a.m. start time for employees. 18. The testimony of Elma Moore is further corroborated by the affidavit of Deanna Hartford. 19. Ms. Hartford, who was the Deputy Clerk Supervisor for DOAH during Petitioner’s period of employment, stated that she observed Petitioner arrive to work late, without notice, on several occasions during her OPS employment and during her career service probationary employment. 20. Ms. Hartford stated in her affidavit that around the first week of September 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to observe Petitioner’s attendance. Ms. Hartford noted that during this period of observation Petitioner arrived to work at’ the following times on the dates as indicated: September 8, 1997, 8:20 a.m.j; September 9, 1997, 8:25 a.m.; September 10, 1997, 8:10 a.m.; and September 17, 1997, 8:20 a.m. 21. Ms. Hartford reported to Ann Cole, Petitioner's supervisor, that Petitioner was frequently late for work. 22. This is consistent with Elma Moore’s testimony that Petitioner, at least two to three days per week, was customarily late for work in excess of ten minutes. 23. Petitioner attempted to contradict the testimony of Elma Moore and the affidavit of Deanna Hartford by testifying that she was told by her supervisor, Ann Cole, to make up her tardy time thereby excusing the fact that she was habitually late for work. 24. Ms. Cole stated the importance of proofreaders being punctual to work, and testified that she and Petitioner had at least two meetings where they discussed Petitioner’s tardiness issue prior to her termination. 25. Ms. Cole stated that she spoke with Petitioner about her timesheet and attendance, and the need for Petitioner to tell her when she is late and how she plans to make up her time. 26. Ms. Cole stated that Petitioner’s communication regarding her promptness and plans to make up time never improved. 27. Ms. Hartford stated that she never observed Petitioner disclose her late arrivals to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. On more than one occasion, Ms. Hartford stated, she reported Petitioner’s tardiness to Ms. Cole, who indicated she was unaware of the late arrival. PHONE USE 28. Unlike some of the other jobs in the clerk's office, the proofreader’s duties and responsibilities did not require the utilization of the telephone. 29. Elma Moore stated that during the time that she shared an office with Petitioner, her desk was in close proximity to Petitioner’s desk and that on several occasions she noticed that Petitioner was talking on the telephone. 30. Elma Moore stated that Petitioner was using the telephone for personal calls frequently. 31. Elma Moore further testified that she knew that the responsibilities and duties of the proofreader did not require Petitioner to use the telephone. 32. Deanna Hartford noted in her affidavit that she personally observed that Petitioner was always on the phone. 33. Ms. Hartford also noted in her affidavit that other employees at the Clerk’s office had complained to her about Petitioner’s excessive use of the telephone. 34. Ms. Hartford advised her supervisor Ann Cole about Petitioner’s excessive phone use. 35. In response to the complaint about Petitioner's excessive use of the telephone, Ms. Cole contacted DOAH’s information services department and requested that they audit all of the telephone extensions for the clerk’s office. 36. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 85.5 outgoing phone calls. 37. Petitioner, however, had 294 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this period. Dr. Carol Ripandelli, the other proofreader, had 79 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this same period. 38. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 1.6 outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration. 39. The number of outgoing calls exceeding ten minutes in duration that were attributed to Petitioner's extension during the audit period totaled thirteen. Dr. Carol Ripandelli had only two outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration attributed to her extension during the audit period. 40. Petitioner denied having made the number of phone calls attributed to her extension. Petitioner also charged that it was possible that other employees could have made outgoing calls from the phone on Petitioner’s desk. 41. Elma Moore testified that it was neither the practice nor the custom of employees of the clerk’s office to regularly use the telephone of other employees. INITIATIVE 42. Deanna Hartford, in her affidavit, noted that in July of 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to provide additional training to the proofreaders. 43. Petitioner and the other proofreader were instructed to inform Ms. Hartford when they were caught up with their work so that the additional training could be provided. 44. Dr. Carol Rappendeli, the OPS proofreader, sought and received additional training in several areas including filing, assisting in the quarterly file purge and destruction, outgoing docketing procedures, and maintaining the Florida Administrative Code supplements. 45. Petitioner never sought additional training as requested. 46. Ann Cole observed Petitioner nodding off on at least three occasions while in an important proofreading standards meeting. 47. Ms. Cole observed Petitioner cutting coupons at her desk the morning of September 22, 1997, during business hours. 10 48. Elma Moore also testified to the fact that Petitioner, during business hours would frequently work on a personal book when she wasn’t proofreading. DISRUPTIVE AND RUDE BEHAVIOR 49. Ms. Cole testified that along with the attendance problems and telephone usage, Petitioner also had attitude problems. 50. On two occasions, Petitioner felt the need to apologize for rude comments made to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. 51. Ms. Cole observed rude behavior by Petitioner directed toward Dr. Ripandelli when they were discussing proofreading on a particular order. 52. Ms. Cole stated that when Petitioner gets in one of her moods, teamwork between Petitioner and Dr. Ripandelli is ineffective. 53. Ms. Cole testified that she had to speak with Petitioner about her radio and that it was so loud it caused a disturbance in the break room. 54. Dr. Ripandelli testified that Petitioner’s radio was so loud that she bought herself headphones in order to drown out Petitioner’s radio. i 55. In contrast, Ms. Cole testified that Dr. Ripandelli gets along with all the judges and that Dr. Ripandelli interacts fine with her. TERMINATION 56. Ms. Hartford stated that Petitioner never discussed with her any need to accommodate her for a disability or for her religion. 57. Ms. Hartford further stated that Petitioner never mentioned that she was being discriminated against for any reason. Ms. Hartford never observed Petitioner walk with a limp, or have sores or bandages on her legs. 58. Petitioner was terminated on September 30, 1997, due to her chronic tardiness, excessive use of the telephone, and her general failure to demonstrate initiative.
Conclusions Petitioner: Ms. Audrey Randolph, Pro Se 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209-2431 904-713-9913 For Respondent: Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 850-414-3300 ext. 4650
Recommendation 29 In the present case, Respondent showed a legitimate reason for discharging Petitioner. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon her race, religion, disability or marital status. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against her in retaliation for Petitioner engaging in an activity that was protected by Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4A day of Vabir ; 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, kative Law Judge sd Way, Bin A-0 32398-1703 Filed with the clerk of the Florida Commission of Human Relations this 2" day of December 2003. 30 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Audrey Randolph 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209 Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esq. Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Harry Hooper Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Secretary of Commission Mike Hanson Room 1801, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with the duty and responsibility to regulate the practice of community association management pursuant to the provisions of Sections 455.01 through 455.275, and Sections 468.431 through 468.431, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Hasnain Mehdi Hanif, is a licensed community association manager in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CAM 0020664. On or about March 26, 1997, Respondent filed an application (dated March 5, 1997) with the Department for licensure as a community association manager. Pertinent to this case, item (17)(c)2 on the application required that Respondent answer yes or no to the following question: 2. Have you ever been convicted or been found guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or misdemeanor? Yes ( ) No ( )* This question applies to any violation of the laws of any state, territory or country without regard to whether the matter is under appeal or you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled or pardoned. *If the answer is yes, you must provide the following information [date of offense, date of arrest, date of disposition, case number, charge, city, state, country, degree of felony or misdemeanor, plea, and disposition] for each offense and submit the following documents, as applicable: police arrest affidavit (need not be a certified true copy); the charges (a certified true copy); and plea, judgment and sentence (certified true copies). Attach separate sheets of paper using the same format or copy and complete this page if you have more than one offense. . . . Respondent responded to the question by checking the box marked "No." The application concluded with the applicant's signature immediately below the following affirmation: I hereby certify that all of the information provided in connection with this application is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Consistent with the requirement imposed by Subsection 468.433(1), Florida Statutes, Respondent included a complete set of fingerprints taken by an authorized law enforcement officer with his application. The fingerprint card identified Respondent, Hanif Hasnain Mehdi, as male, Asian, 5' 4" tall, 165 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, Social Security number 589-48-1476, and born in Bangladesh on October 16, 1966. Following the mandate of Subsection 468.433(1), Florida Statutes, the Department submitted the fingerprint card to the Department of Law Enforcement for state processing and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for federal processing. On June 23, 1997, the Department received a report from the FBI which revealed that, based on fingerprint comparisons, Respondent had failed to disclose a criminal history on his application. Specifically, the report revealed that Respondent failed to reveal that he was arrested on August 11, 1988, in Miami, Florida, on a charge of passport fraud, and that he had been convicted on November 17, 1988, of uttering a false statement in applying for a passport. By letter of July 16, 1997, the Department advised Respondent that, given the criminal history received from the FBI, his application was deficient, and requested that he furnish documentation pertinent to the incident reported by the FBI, as well as an explanation of why the incident was not disclosed on his application. The Respondent replied by letter of July 23, 1997, as follows: The undersigned asserts that he was never arrested and never charged with any crime; therefore, there was no reason to enclose any explanation. The undersigned is also waiving the 90-day time requirement for approval and denial of the application, but expects that as soon as a definite determination is made, the applicant is scheduled for the test. The undersigned sincerely expects the Department and the concerned agencies to check their records for accuracy. As far as the applicant is concerned, there is no reason why the Department of Business and Professional Regulation should not process his application. (Emphasis in original.) In August 1997, the Department made its first request that the Clerk, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, provide it with certified copies of the documents related to the criminal matter referenced in the FBI report. That request, as well as numerous subsequent requests, proved fruitless, since the Clerk experienced difficulty in retrieving or locating the records (which had apparently been archived), until on or about August 7, 1998, when certified copies of the records were ultimately provided. In the interim, the Respondent (by letter of April 13, 1998) essentially withdrew his waiver and demanded that his application be processed. In response, the Department (not being in receipt of any official documentation regarding the offense) processed Respondent's application and on May 28, 1998, following successful completion of the licensure examination, issued Respondent a community association manager license. Notwithstanding, the Department continued to pursue documentation related to the incident reflected by the FBI report.1 Ultimately, in August 1998, the Department received the documentation from the Clerk, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida. Those records revealed that Respondent was arrested on August 11, 1988, and charged by a three-count Indictment2 in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 88-0576 CR-NESBITT, as follows: Count I On or about August 1, 1988, at Miami Beach, Dade County, in the Southern District of Florida, the defendant, HASNAIN MEHDI HANIF, in a matter with the jurisdiction of the United State Department of State, a department of the United States, did knowingly and willfully make and use false writings and documents knowing the same to contain false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and entries to wit, a Baptismal Certificate from the Diocese of Wichita #B5135, and a letter from defendant's mother stating he was a United States citizen, when in truth and in fact, and as the defendant then and there well knew, he was not baptized in Wichita, Kansas, and he was not a United States citizen; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001. Count II On or about June 27, 1988, at Miami Beach, Dade County, in the Southern District of Florida, the defendant, HASNAIN MEHDI HANIF, an alien, did falsely and willfully represent himself to be a citizen of the United States, in that he stated he was born in Wichita, Kansas, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 911. Count III On or about June 27, 1988, at Miami Beach, Dade County, in the Southern District of Florida, the defendant, HASNAIN MEHDI HANIF, did knowingly and willfully make a false statement in an application for a passport with the intent to induce and secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United Stated, for his own use, contrary to the laws regulating the issuance of passports and the rules prescribed pursuant to such laws, in that the defendant stated in the application that he was born in Wichita, Kansas, when in truth and in fact, and as the defendant then and there well knew, he was not born in Wichita, Kansas, in violation of Title 18, United Stated Code, Section 1452. The information of record in the criminal case describes the Defendant, Hasnain Mehdi Hanif, as male, 5' 4" tall, 135 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, Social Security number 589-48-1476, and born in Bangladesh on October 16, 1966. Moreover, the Defendant there, Respondent here, were shown to possess identical home phone numbers (305-754-0008); their signatures were in all aspects similar; and their appearances, as evidenced by photographs, were (but for the passage of 10 years and a weight gain of 30 pounds) similar. In all, it cannot be subject to serious debate that the Defendant named in the criminal case and the Respondent in this case are the same person. The Respondent and the United States of America (Government) entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Respondent agreed to plead guilty to Count III of the Indictment and the Government would dismiss the remaining counts. Subsequently, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to Count III, and was found guilty of such offense (making a false statement in obtaining a U.S. Passport). The judgment of the court was, as follows: IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT: the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for confinement for a period of five (5) years and a fine of $1,000.00. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the execution of said sentence of confinement is hereby suspended and the defendant is placed on probation for a period of two (2) years. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as a special condition of probation, that if deported, the defendant shall not re-enter the Untied States without the permission of the Attorney General. Counts I and II of the Indictment were dismissed on the motion of the Government. Following receipt of the documentation regarding the criminal conviction, the Department filed the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding which, as amended, charged that Respondent violated Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, by obtaining a license by fraudulent misrepresentation; Section 468.436(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes, by obtaining a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of material facts; Rule 61-20.001(4), Florida Administrative Code, and, therefore, Section 468.436(1)(b)2, Florida Statutes, by having failed to provide the Department with documentation regarding his criminal record; and Section 468.436(1)(b)3, Florida Statutes, by being convicted of a felony in any court in the United States. At hearing, the Department offered proof, without objection, that its costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, totaled $1,344.94, as of February 24, 1999.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be rendered as follows: Finding the Respondent guilty of violating Sections 455.227(1)(h) and 468.436(1)(b)2, 3, and 4, Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I through IV of the Amended Administrative Complaint; Requiring that Respondent pay an administrative fine of $5,000.00; Revoking the Respondent's community association manager license number CAM 0020664; and Assessing costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, in the amount of $1,344.94. It is further RECOMMENDED that, if the foregoing recommendation is adopted, the Department refer a copy of the record in this case to the State Attorney, Dade County, Florida, for that office to resolve whether the record herein (Respondent's testimony at hearing and affirmation to the Department) supports a charge of perjury against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1999.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Petitioner meets the qualifications for licensure as a real estate salesman and should be allowed to sit for the examination for licensure administered by the Florida Real Estate Commission. The Commission contends that Petitioner is not eligible for licensure on account of several convictions of criminal offenses. Respondent contends that due to the passage of time and subsequent good conduct, the criminal convictions do not render him ineligible for licensure.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a natural person over eighteen years of age and is a bona fide resident of the State of Florida. Except for issues raised with respect to several criminal convictions, there is no issue as to Petitioner's eligibility to take the examination for licensure as a real estate salesman. On August 20, 1962, Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of the offenses of mail fraud and mail fraud conspiracy. He was sentenced to serve consecutive sentences of eighteen months on each of ten counts of an indictment, making a total of fifteen years. On September 20, 1963, Petitioner was convicted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of conspiracy to transport stolen securities in foreign commerce and causing stolen securities to be transported in foreign commerce. He was sentenced to three-year and one- year prison terms on two separate counts of an indictment. The sentences were imposed to run concurrently with each other and with the sentence imposed in the earlier mail fraud conviction. These convictions resulted from guilty verdicts entered subsequent to jury trials. Petitioner ultimately served three years in prison as a result of these convictions and was paroled in 1971. On June 26, 1967, Petitioner was convicted in the criminal court of record in Dade County, Florida, of issuing worthless checks. He was placed on probation for a period of five years and ordered to make restitution. On or about May 29, 1981, the Florida Office of Executive Clemency issued a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights to the Petitioner. By Order entered July 8, 1981, the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida granted specific authority to Petitioner to receive, possess or transport a firearm in commerce. Petitioner has been engaged in various business activities in the Orlando area since 1979. He enjoys a reputation for honesty and integrity among business associates. Since he was released from prison in 1971, Petitioner has lived a law-abiding life. He is active in his church and in various civic activities. It appears that if the Petitioner is licensed as a real estate salesman, he would faithfully and honestly represent clients. Petitioner tends to minimize the role that he played in the activities that led to his criminal convictions. It does appear, however, that Petitioner is generally remorseful, and that he has shown himself capable of living an honest life. More than seventeen years have elapsed since Petitioner engaged in any criminal conduct that resulted in a conviction.
Conclusions In response to the issues raised by the Respondent, SFWMD, the conclusions of law are as follows: Section 11.065(1), Florida Statutes, states: "no claims against the State shall be presented to the Legislature more than four years after the cause for relief accrued. Any claim presented after this time of limitation shall be void and unenforceable" However, because the Legislature has demonstrated that it can and will waive the requirement, as the SFWMD noted, the claim bill has been reviewed on the merits. With regard to the comments regarding the debates over a previous claim bill, the undersigned, having not been the assigned Senate Special Master at the time, has no knowledge and is unable to comment. Concerning the issue of whether the jury verdict was improper and based on emotion, the undersigned, having not had a Special Master's hearing, must determine the merits of the claim based on the documents presented, including the jury verdict form and the appellate court decision. With regard to issues related to the family of the previous Special Master, the undersigned has no knowledge or information. Finally, based on the documents provided and reviewed, the SFWMD failed to warn of a known, inconspicuous dangerous hazard that constituted an unforeseeable trap and was the direct and proximate cause of severe and permanent injuries to the Claimant. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LOBBYIST’S FEES: Attorneys' fees are set at 25 percent of any recovery, as required by s. 768.28, F.S. Costs for publications of notice of the claim bill in thirteen of the sixteen counties of the SFWMD were $195.19, as of October 1, 2007. Costs and lobbyists' fees of 7 percent of any monies paid to Mr. Daiagi are not within the limits set by section 3 of the bill. OTHER ISSUES: The bill should be amended to reduce the amount of the award by $100,000 to reflect the amount of the judgment that has already been paid by the SFWMD. RECOMMENDATIONS: Based on the foregoing, I recommend that Senate Bill 64 (2008) be reported FAVORABLY, as amended. Respectfully submitted, Eleanor M. Hunter Senate Special Master cc: Senator Alex Diaz de la Portilla Representative Anitere Flores Faye Blanton, Secretary of the Senate House Committee on Constitution and Civil Law Michael Kliner, House Special Master Counsel of Record
The Issue The issues in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Chapter 475, F.S., by: Being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. (Subsection 475.25 (1)(f), F.S.) Being confined in a federal prison; (Subsection 475.25(1)(n), F.S.) and Failing to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing within 30 days of his conviction. (Subsection 475.25(1)(p), F.S.)
Findings Of Fact Daniel Reagan Lee is licensed as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida under License No. 0145478. He renewed his non-active salesman license on October 1, 1982, and two years later the license expired. It has not been renewed. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1) On July 1, 1985, in a trial by jury, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Mr. Lee was found guilty of three counts of a Grand Jury criminal indictment. He was found not guilty of one count of the same indictment. (Case No. 84-95-Cr-T-15)(Petitioner's Exhibit #3) The convictions were for importation of marijuana in violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 952 and Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 846; and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 841(a)(1) and (2). (corrected version of Petitioner's Exhibit #3, filed by leave of the Hearing Officer on October 23, 1986.) On July 26, 1985, Mr. Lee was sentenced by U.S. District Judge William J. Castagna to three years of imprisonment and two years of special parole. (Petitioner's Exhibit #3.) On March 25, 1986, the Florida Real Estate Commission received a letter from Daniel Lee's mother, advising them of her son's conviction and incarceration. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5a, transcript, p. 11.) Daniel Lee is now and has been since August 1986, serving his sentences at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lexington, Kentucky. (Respondent's Answer dated July 5, 1986, Petitioner's Exhibit #5a.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Daniel Lee guilty of violations of Subsections 475.25(1)(f), (n) and (p), F.S., and revoking his non- current inactive real estate salesman's license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Daniel R. Lee, 04314-018 Antaeus Unit Post Office Box 2000 Lexington, Kentucky 40512 Daniel R. Lee c/o Elizabeth C. Lee 1025 Hillsboro Avenue Ft. Myers, Florida 33905 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a community association manager by examination should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Miguel A. Torres (Torres), admitted to being sentenced on August 22, 1988, to one-year probation based on his plea of nolo contendere to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. In July 1990 Torres pled guilty to battery on a law enforcement officer and disorderly intoxication. He was sentenced to jail for three days and was given three-days credit for time served prior to the imposition of the sentence. On October 3, 1991, Torres was found guilty of escape, resisting an officer without violence to his person, and criminal mischief based on Torres' plea of nolo contendere to those charges. On October 16, 1992, Torres was adjudicated guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and battery based on his plea of nolo contendere. He was placed on probation for three years. On October 16, 1992, Torres pled nolo contendere to three counts of unemployment compensation fraud and one count of grand theft. The court adjudicated him guilty of those charges, withheld sentencing, and placed Torres on probation for three years. On February 2, 1994, Torres was adjudicated guilty of driving under the influence based on his plea of guilty to that offense. On February 11, 1994, Torres' probation was revoked, and a sentence of three years was imposed for the crimes of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and battery. The sentence was to run concurrently with the sentences for escape, resisting arrest without violence, criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. Torres was incarcerated in the state prison system from April 5, 1994, through June 30, 1995. In his application to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Community Association of Managers (Department), Torres included letters of appreciation that he received in 1976 relating to his performance in the Puerto Rico Army National Guard; a letter of appreciation received from the Board of Directors of the Sunset Villas Phase III, Assn., Inc, in 1989; a recommendation letter from the General Manager of the Collins Plaza Hotel, dated April 11, 1997; a letter of appreciation from the Chairman of COM'IN dated November 1997, relating to his duties at the Collins Plaza Hotel; and a letter of appreciation from the Department of Veteran Affairs for Torres' assistance as a volunteer at the VA Medical Center during Hurricane Andrew. Torres also furnished to the Department a letter from the Board of Directors of Mar Del Plata Condominium Assn., Inc., stating that Torres had demonstrated his professionalism to their satisfaction and requesting that Torres' date of examination be expedited so that Torres could accept the Board of Directors' offer of employment as manager of the condominium association. Torres did not indicate on his application whether his civil rights had been restored after his felony convictions, and no evidence was presented at the final hearing to show that his civil rights had been restored.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Miguel A. Torres lacks good moral character and denying his application for licensure as a community association manager. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward Broyles Executive Director SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1998. Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Thomas G. Thomas Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Miguel A. Torres, pro se 2899 Collins Avenue Apartment No. 1420 Miami Beach, Florida 33140
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Kay McGinn, willfully violated Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2001), when she certified the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete because it failed to disclose an in-kind contribution by Frank Furman for the use of telephones used by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers in offices that Mr. Furman owned.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the Mayor of Pompano Beach, Florida. She ran unsuccessfully for Pompano Beach City Commission in 1996. Her campaigns for the same office in 1998, 2000, and 2002 were successful. The alleged offense took place during the 2002 election campaign. Petitioner is an intelligent, conscientious public servant. She is familiar with the Florida election law and is sensitive to her obligation to follow the law and diligent in her attempt to do so. During the 2002 campaign, Frank Furman, a long-time Pompano Beach business man who enjoys an excellent reputation, offered the use of his business offices to Petitioner for campaign activities. Petitioner chose to use Furman's office on six to eight occasions to make campaign-related local telephone calls. Typically, Petitioner and five or six volunteers would spend about one hour in the early evening calling Pompano Beach voters encouraging them to vote for Petitioner. Mindful of the election law requiring the reporting of "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner asked Mr. Furman the value of the use of his telephones for reporting purposes. Furman advised Petitioner that the use of his telephones had "no value." In reporting "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner's practice was to ask the contributor to provide an invoice reflecting the "fair market value" of the "in-kind" contribution. Armed with the invoice, she would then report the "in-kind" contribution. "Fair market value" is an economic concept used most frequently in reported Florida cases when referring to the value of real property taken in condemnation actions or in determining restitution in criminal cases. Numerous definitions are found. Typically, the definitions involve "a willing buyer and a willing seller, fully informed as to the value of the object of the transaction, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell." Respondent's Statement of Findings, which was analyzed by Petitioner's expert witness, offers an amortized cost to Mr. Furman for use by Petitioner and her volunteers of the telephones. This amortized cost is apparently advanced as evidence of "fair market value" or "attributable monetary value." Mr. Furman pays a fixed-rate of slightly less than $1,500.00 per month for the use of 32 to 33 telephone lines. This means that each line costs approximately $46.87 per month. Assuming 30 days per month, the daily cost per line is $1.56. Assuming 24-hour days, the hourly cost per line is $0.065. Further assuming that six volunteers used one telephone for one hour on eight different days, the result is 48 hours of line use. The resulting amortized use cost, given the known use by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers, is $3.12. Amortized use cost is not fair market value. Neither an "attributable monetary value" nor a "fair market value" of Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones was established. To the contrary, it was established that there was no "market" for access to six to eight telephones for one hour, one night per week. While it is assumed that Petitioner would benefit from telephone calls made by her supporters, whether made from their individual homes or from some group setting, the evidence failed to established that Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones had any "attributable monetary value" or "fair market value." Given that the use of the telephones by Petitioner was during non-working hours when the telephones would normally be idle, it is not surprising that Mr. Furman advised Petitioner that there was no cost associated with the use of his telephones. His monthly telephone bill would be the same whether Petitioner used his telephones or not. Nor is Petitioner to be faulted for relying on the contributor's assessment of the value of the "in-kind" contribution of the use of the telephones. The real value to Petitioner's campaign was the use of Mr. Furman's office as a meeting place. As a practical matter, each volunteer could have taken a list of the telephone numbers of Pompano Beach voters to their respective homes and made the telephone calls from their homes. This was not a professional "phone bank," sometimes used in political campaigns where trained callers use scripted messages designed to elicit voter preferences and where the candidates receives "feed-back" on salient issues. A "fair market value" can be easily established for such services as they are common in the market place. The evidence suggests that campaign volunteers making telephone calls to registered voters from their homes or from someone's office is a common practice in political campaigns in Florida. It is also suggested that this common practice is not reported as a campaign contribution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Kay McGinn, did not violate Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, as alleged, and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stuart R. Michelson, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue This case is presented for consideration based upon a claim by the Petitioner, E. R. Brannon, Sr. against the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, contending that the Respondent, by its employment practices, has unlawfully discriminated against the petitioner Brannon related to an alleged handicap, in violation of Subsection 23.167(1)(a), Florida Statutes. In view of this purported violation, Petitioner Brannon requests money damages in the way of back salary payments and benefits, together with attorney's fees, in keeping with Subsection 23.167(13), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner Brannon declines the opportunity for any reinstatement in his former employment with the Brevard Sheriff's Office. In defending against these accusations, the Respondent has plead certain affirmative defenses and contends that its action dismissing the Petitioner Brannon was lawful in view of the provision, Subsection 23.167(8)(a), Florida Statutes, specifically related to the portion of that provision dealing with taking action based upon the need for an absence of a particular handicap as related to a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary for the performance of the particular employment to which such action or inaction is related."
Findings Of Fact Case History On April 2, 1979, the Petitioner, F. R. Brannon, Sr., executed a form complaint of discrimination with the Petitioner, Florida Commission on Human elations, which challenged his dismissal by the Brevard County Sheriff's Department, which occurred on January 5, 1979. After reviewing the complaint, the Petitioner Commission, by action of September 11, 1980, as filed on September 16, 1980, made its determination of case, i.e., reasonable cause to believe an unlawful employment practice had occurred reference the Brevard County Sheriff's Department's dismissal of the Petitioner Brannon. A separate notice of the determination of cause was forwarded to the complainant Brannon and the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, on September 16, 1980. Efforts were then made to reach conciliation between the contesting parties and these efforts were unsuccessful and notification of this failure of conciliation was forwarded by the Commission on October 21, 1980. On November 21, 1980, counsel for the Petitioner Brannon made known his appearance before the Commission through written Notice of Appearance and filed a Petition for Relief on the subject of the aforementioned claim brought by the Petitioner Brannon. By document dated November 25, 1990, and placed on file November 26, 1980, the Commissioners of the Florida Commission on Human Relations were notified of the filing of Brannon's Petition for Relief from alleged unlawful employment practice. Subsequent to that notification, Brannon's Petition was transmitted to the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration of the claim. This transmittal was made on November 26, 1980, and received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 1, 1980. On December 1, 1980, counsel for the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, filed its answer to the Petition and statement of affirmative defenses. The Respondent also, by motion of that date, moved to dismiss the Petition. The Motion to Dismiss was denied on December 12, 1980. On December 31 1980, the Respondent, in the person of its former counsel, Charles F. Broome, Esquire, wrote to the Hearing Officer to advise that there had been a change in administration in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office and that the newly elected sheriff wished to have a substitution of counsel. There ensued a series of contacts on the part of this Hearing Officer to establish a hearing date which would accommodate the change in administration and substitution of counsel. After consultation with the parties, the month of March, 1981, was tentatively selected as a time for hearing. This determination was made upon consultation with counsel for the parties, to include Catherine Riley, Esquire, the substituted counsel for the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The case was subsequently scheduled for hearing on March 9, 1981. Prior to the time for hearing, a letter was written by counsel for the Respondent on January 16, 1981, to advise that one of her witnesses was unable to attend the hearing until after March 30, 1981. By correspondence dated January 22, 1981, in response to the letter of January 16, 1981, which had been addressed to counsel for the Petitioner, counsel for the Petitioner acquiesced in the continuance of the hearing and asked that the matter be set at the first available date beyond March 29, 1981. The correspondence was treated as a motion to continue the case on behalf of the Brevard County Sheriff's office, and the matter was reset for hearing on April 9, 1981. The Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, had also moved to file an additional affirmative defense, and this motion was granted on February 2, 1981. The initial session of the hearing was held on April 9, 1981, and continued until May 29, 1981, allow the hearing to be concluded. The hearing was concluded on May 29, 1981, and this Recommended Order is being entered after such hearing. In the way of argument, the parties have submitted written memoranda through counsel and have suggested proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended disposition in this matter. To the extent that those proposals, conclusions and recommendations are consistent with the Recommended Order, they have been utilized. To the extent that the proposals, conclusions and recommendations are inconsistent with this Recommended Order, they are hereby rejected. Material Facts The Petitioner, E. R. Brannon, Sr., is an individual who was forty- three (43) years of age at the time of the formal hearing. In the course of his adult life he has worked primarily in law enforcement for a period of sixteen (16) to seventeen (17) years, to include service to the Lake City, Florida, police Department; Eau Gallie, Florida, Police Department: Melbourne, Florida, Police Department; two periods of service with the Brevard County, Florida, Sheriff's Office; the Orange County, Florida, Sheriff's Office and the Marion County, Florida, Sheriff's Office. On July 4, 1974, while working for the Marion County Sheriff's Office as a line deputy, the Petitioner Brannon was shot in his left side and left hand in an attempt to apprehend a felon. He was given a period of convalescence by his employer and then returned as an investigator for the Marion County Sheriff's Office. In September, 1976, after being returned to duty, the condition in his left hand was exacerbated by another job related injury, leading to the eventual amputation of his left hand on November 9, 1980, after the hand had become gangrenous. This final treatment intervention followed a series of approximately twenty (20) operations over the period of time following the initial gunshot wound. The Petitioner Brannon left his employment with Marion County and in January of 1977, took employment with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office where he was hired as a Lieutenant in charge of the division dealing with communications and vehicle maintenance. At all pertinent times to this inquiry, his employer, the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, was an employer with fifteen (15) or more persons working for that entity, for a period of twenty (20) weeks or more during the year. While Brannon was working for the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, he was placed in the position of Captain, awaiting pay adjustment to that grade. At the time of his dismissal from the Brevard County Sheriff's Office on January 5, 1979, he was receiving a salary of approximately $1,260.00 per month, with an additional $175.77 per month contributed for the benefit of his retirement. While serving as the Division Commander of the Communications and Maintenance Unit of the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, Brannon had as many as thirty (30) persons under his supervision. Brannon bad been hired by Sheriff Ronald W. Zimmerman and worked for that individual until September, 1978, when Zimmerman was suspended. Following Zimmerman's suspension from September, 1978, until January 5, 1979, the date of his discharge, Brannon worked for Sheriff David U. Strawn. During the course of Brannon's service under the command of Sheriff Strawn, the problem with Brannon's hand caused him mild to severe pain and led to frequent usage of Demerol and Vistaril to accommodate this problem. Although the visits were not made during working hours per se, Brannon made numerous visits to a local hospital during the September, 1978, to January 5, 1979, time frame, for purposes of treatment. The degree of his discomfort and the effect on Brannon was such that by January 30, 1979, his treating physician, Dr. Maurice Hodge, was of the opinion that Brannon was "totally disabled because he is unable [sic] to use his hand for any gainful purpose. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence and attachment identified as Respondent's No. 1. Notwithstanding the physical discomfort, Brannon attempted to perform his role as Deputy Sheriff and supervisor; however, there were numerous absences from duty during the time of the Strawn administration, to include a period December 18, 1978, through December 30, 1978. All of these absences were accounted for as authorized holidays, annual leave or sick leave. James H. Garvin, presently a Captain in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, in the position of Jail Supervisor, was emoloyed with that Sheriff's Office during Sheriff Strawn's tenure. At that time, his office in the Sheriff's complex building was located adjacent to that of Brannon and to the extent that the two officers had contact, Garvin did not have difficulty with work coordination involving Brannon. Other officers who had association with Brannon during the time of Strawn's service as Sheriff, included Johnny L. Manis, who was a Captain in 1978, in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The communication section was included in his area of responsibility and upon Brannon's dismissal, Manis took over the responsibilities which Brannon had fulfilled in the communications section. Upon taking over, Captain, now Lieutenant, Manis, found the morale in that section to be less than acceptable and the turnover rate to be, in his estimation, excessive. Captain Charles Tenvooren who served as a Major in the Strawn administration, had supervisory responsibility for Brannon in that time period and recalls that Brannon was in the hospital at times. Tenvooren knew that Brannon was being treated for the condition related to his arm and hand and observed impairment in Brannon's job function. As supervisor, he spoke with Sheriff Strawn about the medication that Brannon was taking. Tenvooren also spoke with Brannon about the problem of impairment related to the injury to the arm, as described by the witness Tenvooren. Brannon, in talking with Tenvooren, mentioned the pain which he was experiencing. Lieutenant Harmon B. Wisby testified in the course of the hearing. When Strawn was Sheriff, Lieutenant Wisby was the coordinator of the reserve auxiliary group of the Sheriff's Department. During that time sequence, Wisby was aware of the fact that Brannon was under medication, information he gained from conversations he had with Brannon. Brannon indicated ythat he was having pain and that he was to go back to the hospital. Brannon also indicated to Wisby that he had been given medication to assist him in coping with the pain. Wisby recalls several times when Brannon did not seem aware of his surroundings while he was in the office building, in that Brannon would not respond to him when spoken to in the form of a greeting. Alice Alderman who is a Communications Officer with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, who worked in the communications section while Brannon was supervisor during the Strawn administration, testified at the hearing. She admits that she had a personality conflict with Brannon. Nonetheless, she testified that during this time sequence he seemed to be "distant." Another employee within the communications section who testified at the hearing was Debbie Walden who was a Communications Dispatcher in the Brevard Sheriff's Office at the time that Strawn was Sheriff. Brannon was her shift supervisor and she recalls numerous absences by Brannon, who from her recollection worked on the same shift on which she was employed. She also indicated that morale was a problem at the time that Brannon was in charge of the section. On January 5, 1979, through correspondence, Sheriff Strawn dismissed Brannon. A copy of the dismissal may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence. In the course of the hearing, Strawn indicated that his decision to dismiss no basis for the correspondence was premised on evidence gained from other personnel in the Sheriff's Office; the medical reports pertaining to the Petitioner's physical condition related to his hand; the prognosis on that condition; the uses of pain medication; a few personal observations of the Petitioner in which Strawn felt the Petitioner to be "spacey"; the belief that the Petitioner was not capable of line duty, i.e., responsibilities as an armed deputy; the problem which Brannon appeared to have approaching his job with a "clear head"; the high turnover in the communications section, indicating a problem with management by Brannon; a property control problem related to equipment which Brannon had in his charge and Brannon's lack of ability as an administrator and supervisor. All of Strawn's background reasons and observations were an accurate depiction of the circumstance with the exception that there was insufficient proof in the course of the hearing to demonstrate that Brannon had acted inappropriately on the subject of property control of equipment in the communications section. Likewise, reported observations by coworkers are correct. In particular, the use of pain medication for the handicap related to the injured arm and hand was such that Brannon was incapable of performing the duty of a line officer charged with the direct protection of the public and the possibility of use of force to effect that purpose. This medication also compounded Brannon's problems as an administrator. When the dismissal letter was drafted, the prime focus of that letter was to the effect that the Sheriff's Office was concerned about Brannon's return to employment duties because of the belief by the Department that there would be exposure for liability in terms of workmen's Compensation claims by Brannon, in that the Sheriff's office believed that they would be entirely liable for physical disability if Brannon suffered an "industrial accident" while acting in the scope and capacity of his position within the Department. In further explanation, it was stated that the Department believed the health circumstance of Brannon was intense in view of the pain and associated use of special medications. For these reasons, Strawn was concerned that any negligent act by Brannon could result in liability for the Department, apparently from claims by third parties. The letter of dismissal went on to say that his duties were not being performed as well as expected because of Brannon's physical condition and the necessity for taking drugs to cope with those problems and further concern for fellow officers and members of the public. This statement can be related to Brannon's potential abilities as a lane officer and his primary function as supervisor of the communications and maintenance section. (Notwithstanding the fact that Brannon was not serving on a day-to-day capacity as a line officer, as a Deputy Sheriff he could reasonably be expected to be pressed into service in the eventuality of some emergency which called upon all appointees within the Sheriff's Office who are deputies to serve in that capacity, and as Brannon himself stated at the hearing, Sheriff's deputies are technically on duty twenty-four (24) hours a day.) Finally, the impression was created in the hearing process that the Strawn administration had been concerned about Brannon's absenteeism and morale in his section. Although this is not expressly stated in the letter of dismissal, the facts presented in evidence bear out the contention that Brannon was absent an inordinate number of times, notwithstanding the fact that the absences were taken under legitimate leave principles, and there were problems related to morale in the communications section. In addressing Strawn's worries, there was no procedure undertaken for formal evaluation of Brannon's performance. Sheriff Strawn did discuss Brannon's physical condition with him and what the Sheriff perceived to be a problem with the communications equipment inventory control system. On January 8, 1979, Brannon began to look for alternative employment and gained such employment with the Brevard County Public Safety Division, within the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners on march 26, 1979, and was employed by them until January 14, 1981. During the course of his employment, he received $16,812.40 in gross earnings, and was provided life insurance commensurate with his annual salary, as well as health insurance. In addition, this employer "paid-in" at the rate of 9.1 percent of annual salary, into a retirement system. This payment to the retirement system was not made during leave without pay between July 1, 1980, and August, 1980. Following his employment with the Brevard Counts' Public Safety Division, Brannon worked for the Sheriff of Lake County, Florida, eighteen (18) to twenty (20) days, a month maximum. Following Brannon's dismissal from the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, he also requested social security disability benefits in the summer of 1980, and that claim is now pending.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds Real Estate Salesman's License No. 0355517 issued by the Board of Real Estate. Petitioner is employed as a real estate salesman at Norma Star Realty, Key Largo, Florida. During October, 1980, the Respondent applied for licensure as a real estate salesman with the Board of Real Estate. His application was approved, and the Respondent was admitted to the examination, which he passed. The Board of Real Estate issued a real estate salesman's license to the Respondent during December, 1980. In applying for licensure, the Respondent filled out the Board of Real Estate's standard application form. Paragraph 6 of the form sets out the following inquiry: Have you ever been arrested for, or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations) without regard to whether convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled? The Respondent answered "No" to this inquiry. The Respondent has been arrested on several occasions. On July 29, 1964, he was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a charge of sodomy. On August 6, 1964, he was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a charge of rape. On May 22, 1966, he was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on the charge of notorious cohabitation. On January 31, 1969, he was arrested in Miami, Florida, on the charge of board bill fraud. All of these charges were ultimately dismissed. The Respondent was neither tried nor convicted in connection with any of the charges. The Respondent had been licensed as a real estate salesman in the State of Michigan. While in Michigan, he retained counsel, now deceased, who advised him that all of the Las Vegas arrests had been expunged from the Respondent's record, and that the Respondent could respond in the negative to inquiries as to whether he had ever been arrested.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Real Estate, dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, Michael Timothy McKee. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold W. Braxton, Esquire 45 S.W. 36th Court Miami, Florida 33135 Arthur L. Miller, Esquire 9101 S.W. 66th Terrace Miami, Florida 33173 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
