The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional retirement benefits for her years of service between September 1966 and December 1974.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retired member of the FRS. She began working for the Duval County Juvenile Detention Center (DCJDC) in August 1966. However, Petitioner's name was not placed on the payroll until September 1966 because of the time she was absent. As an employee of the DCJDC, Petitioner was a county employee but also a participant in the FRS. She made contributions in the amount of $1,850.78 to the FRS from September 1966 through December 1974. The FRS became non- contributory for all state and county employees in January 1975. Petitioner terminated her employment with Duval County on June 20, 1977. At that time, Petitioner requested a refund of her accumulated contributions to the FRS. Petitioner acknowledged in her request for refund that she waived her interest in FRS for the refunded service. On or about February 22, 1978, Respondent issued Voucher #273254 and Warrant #0364356 made payable to Petitioner in the amount of $1,850.78. Petitioner's testimony that she never received the refund is not credible. On or about October 16, 1981, Petitioner returned to work at DCJDC. After receiving several promotions, Petitioner transferred to a position at the Department of Health. Petitioner terminated her employment at the Department of Health on November 13, 1998. In August 2000, Petitioner filed an Application for Service Retirement. The application includes the following sworn statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Respondent sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application dated August 10, 2000. The acknowledgment indicated that Petitioner's retirement date was June 2000 and that she could purchase credit for refunded service from September 1966 through December 1974 by paying Respondent $7,918.46. The acknowledgment made it clear that Respondent required written notification if Petitioner did not intend to purchase this service. In March 2001, Petitioner executed an Option Selection for FRS Members. She selected Option 1, which provides her a monthly benefit for her lifetime. In a letter dated March 27, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she did not intend to buy back any time. Additionally, she stated as follows: I would like for my retirement application to be accepted/processed as is. The rate quoted was at $517.00. However, if this amount is incorrect, I would like to know as soon as possible. Based upon Petitioner's statement in the letter, Respondent began paying and Petitioner began receiving her retirement benefits effective June 1, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to any additional retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Veronica P. Holt 230 East First Street, Apartment 1313 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retirement service credit for the time period in which he was not employed with the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Management Services (DMS) is responsible for the administration of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is an agency of the State of Florida whose employees qualify for membership in FRS. Petitioner Richard L. Duley is an honorably discharged veteran. He began employment with DOT in 1991. At the same time, he became a member of FRS. Prior to 2001, then-Governor Jeb Bush directed state agencies to reduce their workforce by 25 percent over a five- year period beginning in 2001. The directive was known as the "Service First Initiative." In response to the Governor’s directive, DOT developed an Agency Organizational Efficiency Plan. On January 18, 2005, Petitioner was notified that his position was designated to be deleted under the Agency’s Organizational Efficiency Plan; his position was abolished on June 30, 2005. As a result, Petitioner was dismissed from state employment and was no longer receiving retirement service credit for FRS. However, Petitioner did not receive a clear point of entry to challenge either his termination or whether he was entitled to a veteran's preference by DOT. After his dismissal, Petitioner was hired by a private firm who had contracted with the State to perform the functions that Mr. Duley had previously provided as an employee of the state. The contract terminated in June or July of 2007, and was not renewed. As such, Mr. Duley became unemployed. On July 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) alleging that DOT had denied him veteran’s preference in retention during the 2005 layoff. The DVA found that Petitioner's complaint had merit. On November 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), which held an evidentiary hearing on the complaint. PERC is the administrative body that has jurisdiction to determine issues and remedies under the veteran's preference statute. In its Final Order issued April 8, 2007, PERC found that Petitioner was an honorably discharged veteran and was entitled to preferential treatment in employment. PERC also found that DOT violated the veteran’s preference law by not affording Petitioner special consideration in finding alternative employment after the layoff. As a remedy for its violation of the veteran's preference law, PERC ordered DOT to make Petitioner an offer of employment to an existing position comparable to that which he held prior to his layoff. PERC also awarded Petitioner attorneys’ fees and costs. However, and most importantly, PERC did not reinstate Petitioner to his former position because it had been abolished. Similarly, PERC did not rescind Petitioner's termination. Finally, PERC did not award back pay or benefits to Petitioner. As a consequence of the Final Order, neither Petitioner nor DOT paid contributions towards the Retirement Systems Trust Fund for the period that Petitioner was not employed with the State. Additionally, Petitioner was offered and hired into a new position by DOT and again began to accrue retirement service credit in FRS when he was hired by DOT in May of 2008. The PERC Final Order was not appealed and became res judicata on the issues litigated therein. Therefore, since Petitioner's termination was not rescinded and Petitioner was not reinstated by PERC and did not pay contributions into FRS, he is not entitled to receive credit for the time he was not employed by the State and this action should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order dismissing this action. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard L. Duley 5432 Pinderton Way Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kristin M. Klein, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Section 121.091, Florida Statutes (2001), authorizes Petitioner to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) beginning on February 1, 2001, or precludes Petitioner from receiving retirement benefits prior to April 1, 2001. (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retired member of the FRS. Petitioner resigned from the Florida Department of Revenue (the Department) on January 19, 2001. On January 12, 2001, Petitioner made her first inquiries regarding her retirement. Between January 12, 2001, and the first week in February 2001, Petitioner made approximately six telephone calls to a Ms. Sherrie Ferrell, the retirement coordinator for the Department. Sometime during the first week in February 2001, Ms. Ferrell promised to mail the documents needed by Petitioner to apply for retirement benefits. Petitioner received the documents sometime during the last week of February 2001. On February 28, 2001, Petitioner mailed an Option Selection Form and application for retirement benefits to the Department at its main office in Tallahassee, Florida. The Department received the documents on March 6, 2001, but lost the documents. Petitioner filed a second application for retirement benefits with the Department at its main office in Tallahassee. The Department forwarded the second application to Respondent on April 10, 2001. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(a), in relevant part, provides that the effective retirement date is the first day of the month following the month in which Respondent receives the member's application. Pursuant to Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(a), Respondent established May 1, 2001, as Petitioner's effective date of retirement. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect as of the date of this Recommended Order). The Department eventually found the first application that the Department received on March 6, 2001. By letter dated May 2, 2001, the Department requested that Respondent establish the effective retirement date as April 1, 2001. Pursuant to Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(a), Respondent correctly changed the effective retirement date to April 1, 2001. April 1, 2001, was the first day of the month following March 6, 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement benefits that begin on February 1, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Claire Janszen 360 Killarney Bay Court Winter Park, Florida 32789-2996 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin B. Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Evelyn S. Day, is entitled to modify her type of retirement benefits from "early service retirement" to "disability retirement."
Findings Of Fact The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 1 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 2 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 3 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 4 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 5 are accepted in part. In that paragraph, the Hearing Officer found as follows: Her memory and thought processes had evidentially [sic] already begun deteriorating because Mrs. Day was unable to ask guestions concerning her retirement rights, responsibilities, and entitlements very well. Because of this condition, Ms. Hobby agreed to accompany her to the offices of the Division of Retirement in order to ascertain what her retirement rights, entitlements, and responsibilities might be preparatory to Mrs. Day electing to retire. The above-quoted findings are rejected as conclusory and not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 6 are rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence, except the finding that Mrs. Day retired and Ms. Hobby filled out her application for retirement. Additionally, the Hearing Officer's findings that petitioner was incompetent and suffering from Alzheimer's disease are rejected as being legal conclusions not supported by any judicial order or by any competent, substantial evidence in the record. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 7 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 8 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 9 are accepted. That portion of the Findings of Fact in paragraph 10 which concluded the petitioner was incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The petitioner has never been declared incompetent or determined to be incompetent by a medical doctor. Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 11 are accepted in part and rejected in part. That portion of the Findings which states that the application for retirement was not filed by Ms. Day is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. In point of fact, the Division has a filed application signed by the petitioner. The portion of the paragraph finding the petitioner incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. There has been no legal or medical determination that the Petitioner is incompetent. Additionally, there is no competent, substantial evidence that petitioner is suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The Hearing officer's finding that the petitioner's application was filed in error is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, according the Petitioner, Evelyn Day, the opportunity to change the status of her retirement benefits from early retirement to disability retirement, effective as of the date her earlier retirement application was accepted by the agency. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 48B-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-2085 PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-8. Accepted. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Accepted. Accepted to the extent that the record establishes that the Petitioner signed the application. Accepted to the extent that it was established that Petitioner has received the retirement checks. It is not established that the Petitioner cashed or deposited those retirement checks by preponderant evidence of record. Accepted insofar as it recites the Respondent's position in this matter. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esq. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Mr. Joseph G. Stokes 911 "B" Street Crestview, Florida 32536 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue Should Petitioner Alma Slocum receive either the Option 3 or Option 4 retirement benefits retroactive to the death of Clyde Slocum in March 1975?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Clyde Slocum (Slocum), deceased, was a member of the State and County Officers Retirement System (SCOERS) under Chapter 122, Florida Statutes. Slocum was employed by the Suwannee County School Board as a school bus driver until he became physically unable to work in June 1970. Slocum married Alma Sanchez in October 1934, and was continuously married to her until his death on March 30. 1975. By letter dated May 6, 1968, Slocum made an inquiry to the Division regarding the benefits he would be eligible for if he retired from his employment as a school bus driver with the Suwannee County School Board. Slocum noted in the letter that he was not ready to quit work but wanted to know what benefits would be available, if and when he retired. The Division, by letter dated June 20, 1968, notified Slocum of the amount of his contributions on file and the benefits he would be eligible for under Options 1 through 4. It was pointed out that Options 3 and 4 would provide a smaller monthly benefit. However, these options would provide survivor benefits for his wife. It was also stated that proof of age for Slocum and his wife, Alma Slocum, would be required, if he selected Option 3 or 4. The following information was provided to Slocum: (a) Option 1 would provide $43.60 a month, but upon his death, no further benefits would be paid; (b) Option 2 would be 13 cents lower at $43.47, but in the event he died, his beneficiary would receive any balance of the amount of his contribution ($1,006.81) not paid; (c) Option 3 would provide a reduced monthly payment of $35.58 and one-half of that amount ($17.79) to his wife upon his death; and (d) Option 4 would provide for a payment of $30.08 and the same benefit to the wife upon his death. By letter dated August 5, 1970, Lavada Reuthinger, daughter of Slocum, sought information on the three different ways that Slocum could receive his retirement benefits. By letter dated August 7, 1970, Elizabeth Smith, Supervisor, Benefits Section, notified Slocum of the availability of an option election that would provide benefits for his wife after his death. The letter also notified Slocum that proof of his age was required, and if he chose benefits for his wife, then proof of her age was required as well. An estimate, dated September 22, 1970, of benefit amounts, similar to the estimate sent to Slocum in 1968, was prepared by the Division, and sent to Slocum. This estimate of benefits was for Options 1 an 2 only, and did not set forth a benefit amount for Options 3 and 4. The letter stated: "Only the first two options apply in your case." Apparently, the Division assumed that Slocum was retiring under disability. By letter dated October 2, 1970, the Division was notified by Dr. G. L. Emmel that Slocum was disabled and was not able to work. Elizabeth Smith notified Dr. Emmel of the statutory language requirement for an application for disability. Using a form provided by the Division, Slocum, on October 10. 1970, also under the assumption that he was retiring on disability, elected to receive benefits under Option 2. At this point, Slocum had been advised by the Division that neither Option 3 or Option 4 were available to him. Dr. Emmel provided the Department with the requested documentation that Slocum was permanently disabled. On October 26, 1970, Elizabeth Smith requested that Slocum submit proof of his age. By letter dated November 13, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he had failed to furnish proof of his age, but instead he had furnished his wife's birth certificate. Slocum's wife's birth certificate was returned by letter dated November 13, 1970. By letter dated November 21, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he could not retire under disability because he had reached normal retirement age, but that he could retire under Option 3 or Option 4 which would provide monthly payments to his wife upon his death, if he accepted a reduction in the amount of benefits. Smith further advised Slocum that he would need to furnish proof of his wife's age if he selected Option 3 or Option 4. Smith further stated that: "It was thought you were retiring under disability when proof [of your wife's age] was returned to you." Smith also advised Slocum that if he waited until June 30, 1970, he would receive the five-year average. The letter does not indicate what the payment amounts would be for the four different options, and the letter does not indicate that a option election form was included with the letter. Furthermore, the letter does not refer to the Option 2 selection form that Slocum had previously submitted to the Division. Slocum responded to Smith's letter on November 30, 1970, and enclosed a copy of his wife's birth certificate. Slocum also requested "the necessary forms concerning his retirement." Additionally, he notified the Division that since he had not worked since June 1970 he wanted retirement benefits to be paid as soon as possible. The Division did not comply with Slocum's request for the "necessary forms concerning his retirement." A warrant was mailed to Slocum on December 31, 1970, for retirement benefits from July 1, 1970, through December 31, 1970, at $59.17 a month. This benefit amount was the Option 2 retirement benefit amount furnished to Slocum on September 22, 1970, by the Division when it was assumed that he was retiring under disability. No explanation was given to Slocum if, or that, the Division was using Option 2 benefit selection that Slocum had signed and submitted to the Division on October 1970, prior to the time the Division had notified Slocum that he could choose Option 3 or Option 4. Slocum and his wife were both under the impression that since Slocum had furnished the Division a copy of his wife's birth certificate that she would receive retirement benefits after his death. Slocum died on March 30, 1975, five years after he retired. The Division advised Alma Slocum by letter dated May 19, 1975, that her husband had retired under Option 2 and, therefore, no benefits would be paid to her. A copy of his option election and the computation of his monthly benefits were enclosed in the May 19, 1975, letter from the Division. Thereafter, Petitioner repeatedly inquired of the Division why she was not entitled to retirement benefits as Slocum's widow. These inquires were made from the time of Slocum's death in 1975 through the present. In response to each inquiry the Division replied that Slocum had selected Option 2, and no benefits were payable to Petitioner under that option. In February 1999, Petitioner and her granddaughter, Theresa L. Crosby, visited the Division's office in Tallahassee, Florida and reviewed Slocum's file. After they reviewed the file, it was their position that Petitioner was entitled to receive survivor benefits and made a demand on the Division for Petitioner to receive those benefits. At no time prior to February 1999, had the Division advised Petitioner that she was entitled to a formal hearing on the matter. A final agency action letter dated March 26, 1999, was mailed to Petitioner which pointed out that her husband elected and received Option 2 benefits from 1970 until his death in March 1975 and there was no provision under SCOERS, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, to change the option choice at this time. This letter is the first written notice to Petitioner that she was entitled to request a formal hearing if she disagreed with the Division's decision. A Petition for Formal hearing contesting the Division's denial of a survivor's benefit for Petitioner was received by the Division on April 19, 1999. When Slocum made the selection for Option 2 retirement benefits he did so because he was advised by the Division that only Option 1 or Option 2 were available to him since he was retiring under disability. Once Slocum became aware that his wife could receive retirement benefits after his death, it is clear that he intended to select an option which would provide his wife with benefits after his death. Furthermore, after it was determined that he could not retire under disability, which had limited his options, the Division failed to give Clyde Slocum an opportunity to make a selection of the options offered for retirement benefits, either initially in writing or verbally by telephone with a follow-up written option, notwithstanding any testimony to the contrary which, lacks credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order finding Alma Slocum eligible to receive retirement benefits under Option 3 retroactive to Clyde Slocum's death on March 30, 1975, making adjustments for the higher rate paid Clyde Slocum during the years 1970 through his death in 1975, and any adjustments for interest that may be applicable to the benefits paid Clyde Slocum or those benefits that should have been paid to Alma Slocum. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra E. Allen, Esquire 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether a retiree's forfeiture of Florida Retirement System (FRS) benefits authorizes Respondent to seize from unrelated remittals due Petitioner the sum of $18,271.75, which is the amount that Respondent had previously deducted from the retiree's pension benefits and remitted to Petitioner for the payment of the retiree's insurance premiums.
Findings Of Fact Employed by Petitioner in April 1974, Garfield Perry participated in the FRS pension plan. On or about October 31, 2009, Mr. Perry terminated his employment and began receiving his monthly FRS pension benefit. Two months earlier, Mr. Perry had entered into an agreement with Petitioner for it to provide post-retirement life insurance for Mr. Perry and medical and dental insurance for Mr. Perry and his wife with all three policies commencing in November 2009. While these policies were in effect, pursuant to an agreement between Petitioner and Respondent that is described below, Respondent remitted to Petitioner a portion of Mr. Perry's FRS pension benefit equal to $17,429.47 for medical and dental premiums and $842.28 for life insurance premiums, for a total of $18,271.75. Petitioner is a self-insurer for medical insurance, so, on receipt of medical insurance premiums, Petitioner pays a portion of the premiums to a third-party administrator for insurance-related services and reserves the remainder for the payment of claims. For dental and life insurance, Petitioner remits the premiums to the respective insurers. On May 7, 2014, Mr. Perry pleaded guilty to one count of bribery and extortion in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, in connection with his employment in Petitioner's Public Works Department. On or about July 29, 2014, the court adjudicated Mr. Perry guilty. By letter dated August 6, 2014, Respondent advised Mr. Perry that, pursuant to article II, section 8(d), of the Florida Constitution, and sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5), Florida Statutes, his FRS benefits were forfeited due to his guilty plea. Mr. Perry requested an administrative hearing on the forfeiture, and Respondent transmitted the file to DOAH, which designated the case as DOAH Case No. 14-4195. On December 31, 2014, Mr. Perry voluntarily dismissed his request for hearing prior to the final hearing, and, on January 9, 2015, Respondent issued a Final Order of Dismissal that finds, among other things, that Mr. Perry committed the criminal offenses "from in or about 2006 through in or about October 2009." The final order formally declares a forfeiture of Mr. Perry's FRS pension benefits, evidently including benefits already paid. Respondent did not provide Petitioner with a copy of the August 6, 2014, letter, the Final Order of Dismissal, or any of the pleadings in DOAH Case No. 14-4195. The present record does not indicate if Petitioner had actual notice of the forfeiture process. However, this case likely represents the first time that Respondent has attempted to recover insurance premiums that it has remitted to an agency or company following the retiree's forfeiture of retirement benefits, and it is unlikely that Petitioner was aware of its potential liability to repay these amounts until April 1, 2016, as described below. This potential liability arguably arises from a Payroll Deduction Agreement entered into by Petitioner and Respondent. The agreement allows a retiree to authorize Respondent to deduct monthly from his pension benefit an amount equal to his insurance premiums and to remit this sum to Petitioner, so that it can pay the retiree's premiums. In this case, Respondent remitted insurance premiums to Petitioner from November 2009 through October 2012 and allocated them in the manner set forth above in paragraph 2. Three and one-half years after the last remittal that included any sums for Mr. Perry's insurance premiums, almost two years after Mr. Perry's guilty plea, and about 15 months after the final order declaring the forfeiture, Respondent withheld $18,271.75 from Respondent's March 2016 consolidated remittal to Petitioner on the account of other retirees in an attempt to recover the remittals that Respondent had made to Petitioner to pay Mr. Perry's insurance premiums. The Payroll Deduction Agreement is a form prepared by Respondent that is signed by the agency or company seeking to receive remittals for its FRS retirees. Under the agreement, which has a signature line only for the agency or company and not Respondent, the agency or company agrees to preserve the confidentiality of the information, assume responsibility for the accuracy of the premium deductions, and notify Respondent timely of the discontinuation of this payroll deduction service. An employee of Petitioner signed the Payroll Deduction Agreement on April 27, 2009. The Payroll Deduction Agreement requires the agency or company to accept the "Procedures for Admitting Insurance Providers for Retired Payroll Deduction." The procedures document states that Respondent offers the convenience of payroll deduction of insurance premiums as a service to FRS pension recipients. Only two paragraphs of this document address post-deduction adjustments: 11. If a retiree's insurance premium is deducted incorrectly for any reason (i.e.-- overpayment of amount, policy cancelled, administrative error, etc.), the Insurance provider company or FRS agency is responsible for refunding the premium amount to the retiree. 13. [1] If a retirement benefit is cancelled by the Division of Retirement, the corresponding insurance premium that was deducted from that same dated payment is recovered from the following month's consolidated insurance payment. Reasons for cancellations include payee deaths, [sic] cancelling retirement. When determining the amount of insurance premiums to be reimbursed to families of deceased members, please note that the Division cannot determine when a death will be reported or when funds will be funds will be returned [sic] from banks (resulting in cancellations). [4] There are occasions when a report of death is received months after a retiree's death. [5] If payments for the deceased are still outstanding, they most likely will be cancelled. A common example follows: Example: Payee dies 1/5/09. Family reports death to the Division on 4/1/09. Retiree was only due payments through the month of January. Since the February and March payments are still outstanding, these paper checks are cancelled by the Division of Retirement. This cancellation action recovers the 2/27/09 and 3/31/09 premium deductions from the 4/30/09 consolidated payment. A credit entry will also appear on the April 2009 report of retiree insurance deductions. Please Note: We recommend that you contact the Division of Retirement to inquire about possible payment cancellations prior to processing premium reimbursements. Paragraph 11 of the Payroll Deduction Agreement requires that an agency or company repay the retiree any excessive premium deduction, so is irrelevant in the case of forfeiture. Paragraph 13 of the Payroll Deduction Agreement applies to the situation in which a premium deduction is unfunded because of the cessation of the pension benefit from which it is deducted. In its proposed recommended order, Petitioner argues that the application of paragraph 13 is prospective only, so it would not apply to a retroactive setoff of the type that has occurred in this case. The first sentence identifies the contingency of the cancelation of a retirement benefit and authorizes Respondent to recover its remittal of any premiums deducted from the cancelled pension benefit, but mentions a recovery or setoff only in the month following the cancelation. This establishes the kind of liability that Respondent seeks to impose on Petitioner, but only for the brief period of one month. Obviously, the willingness of an agency or company to assume this minor liability for the convenience of its retirees does not imply a willingness to assume a much larger liability spanning several months or even years of remittals. The second sentence cites two common reasons for cancelation: the death of the retiree and the cancellation of the pension benefit by the retiree. The use of "includes," as well as the insertion of a comma in place of "and" or "or," suggests that these two reasons are illustrative, not exhaustive. Even so, the second sentence does not add the reason of forfeiture, and, at this point in paragraph 13, the details of the parties' agreement concerning a forfeiture has not been explicitly addressed. The third and fourth sentences address only the contingency of the death of the retiree, in which case Respondent recovers unearned premiums that Respondent intends to remit to the estate of the retiree--in most cases, one assumes, indirectly to the families of the deceased member. Typically, insurers are not exposed to the risk of insured losses after the death of a retiree--even a life insurer's exposure ends after the insured's death and payment of the death benefits--so any premiums paid after death are unearned and should be refunded to the proper party. The warning that Respondent may not learn of the retiree's death for many months suggests a longer period may be available for retroactive adjustments, but this warning applies only to the contingency of death, again, where the insurers are obligated to refund unearned premiums. The fifth sentence also addresses only the contingency of the death of a retiree and seems to provide only that Respondent will cancel any pension benefits or premium remittals still outstanding at the time of the retiree's death. The example illustrates a three-month delay in the receipt of notification of a retiree's death followed by the cancellation of the pension benefits issued in the preceding two months, which presumably could not have been lawfully presented for payment by anyone besides the deceased retiree. In this case, Respondent would issue a corresponding credit entry on the next month's report of premium deductions made on account of the retiree. The procedures document thus fails to address the contingency of forfeiture. The provisions applicable to the contingencies of the death of the retiree and the retiree's cancellation of pension benefits are a poor fit for the contingency of forfeiture. Respondent has previously recovered income tax withheld on paid pension benefits following a forfeiture, but the recovery was limited to the period during which an amended personal income tax return could be filed--the effect being that the amount could be effectively recovered in the form of a tax refund from the Internal Revenue Service, rather than from an agency or company.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order dismissing the Petition Requesting an Administrative Hearing filed on August 17, 2016. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Robert E. Meale Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Veronica E. Donnelly, Esquire Offices of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Joni A. Mosely, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Miami-Dade County Attorney's Office Stephen P. Clark Center, Suite 2810 111 Northwest 1st Street Miami, Florida 33128-1993 (eServed) Elizabeth Stevens, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive survivor benefits from a joint and survivor annuity, under Option 3 of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) defined benefit plan, following the death of her spouse, Anne M. Birch, who, as an FRS member, elected Option 1 in 2012 when Florida law would not allow Ms. Birch to elect Option 3 or 4 and designate the joint annuitant as Petitioner, whom she lawfully married after electing Option 1.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Birch, who was born on September 12, 1950, and Petitioner, who was born on August 26, 1956, fell in love and began to live together in 1992. They jointly owned all significant property, including their primary residence, with a right of survivorship and were jointly liable for household expenses and debt, including the mortgage note on their primary residence. On January 31, 2001, Ms. Birch executed a will that left any remaining property to Petitioner and named her as the personal representative of the estate.1/ Ms. Birch designated Petitioner as her primary beneficiary for employee benefits that authorized such designations. On October 11, 2002, Ms. Birch and Petitioner signed an Amended Declaration of Domestic Partnership, pursuant to the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999, to register themselves as domestic partners under Broward County Ordinance 1999-18. Fully vested and having accrued substantial benefits from having worked for Broward County in an FRS-covered position for nearly 30 years, on October 23, 2012, Ms. Birch entered DROP, effective October 1, 2012. At that time, Ms. Birch elected Option 1 for the payment of her benefits, checking the "no" box in response to the question of whether she was married. As described in the Conclusions of Law, Option 1 is the maximum benefit and is payable for the life of the retiree. Ms. Birch's monthly Option 1 benefit was $3039.25. The monthly Option 3 benefit, which, as described below, is payable until the latter death of the FRS member or her surviving spouse,2/ would have been nearly $1000 less than the monthly Option 1 benefit.3/ Respondent implemented Ms. Birch's election by paying Ms. Birch's Option 1 benefits into her DROP account. In August 2013, Ms. Birch became ill with cancer. She eventually had to quit working and terminated DROP, at which point Respondent paid Ms. Birch her Option 1 benefits directly. On June 16, 2014, Ms. Birch and Petitioner were lawfully married in Massachusetts. Almost two years later, on May 24, 2016, Ms. Birch died, at which time all payments under Option 1 ended. When Ms. Birch and Petitioner registered as domestic partners in Broward County, no state allowed or recognized same- sex marriage, often pursuant to a "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA). Continuously since 1997, Florida law banned the allowance and recognition of same-sex marriage, even if performed in a jurisdiction where such a marriage were legal, and restricted "marriage" to a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" to a member of such a union. § 741.212(1) and (3); Ch. 97-268, § 1, at 4957, Laws of Fla. (Florida DOMA).4/ Massachusetts was the first state to allow and recognize same-sex marriage, effective in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (decision stayed 180 days to allow legislature to enact law consistent with the court's ruling). Three or four years after Goodridge, Ms. Birch and Petitioner visited Massachusetts, but did not exercise their right to enter into a lawful marriage at that time. A series of court decisions invalidated the federal and state DOMAs, including the Florida DOMA. On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), held that the federal DOMA, as applied to federal tax law, was unconstitutional. By order entered August 21, 2014, in Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Brenner I), Respondent was enjoined from enforcing or applying the Florida DOMA, although the court stayed its injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court lifted the stay,5/ as reported by the district court in Brenner v. Scott¸ 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91969 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Brenner II), in which, on March 30, 2016, the court issued a summary judgment on its injunction in Brenner I. Between Brenner I and Brenner II, on June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state DOMAs were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Petitioner testified that she and Ms. Birch would have been lawfully married by October 2012, when Ms. Birch retired, but for the Florida DOMA. This testimony is credited. Long prior to 2012, Ms. Birch and Petitioner organized their financial affairs as though they were lawfully married, sharing assets and liabilities equally. Petitioner testified credibly that she and Ms. Birch always "played by the rules": thus, Ms. Birch and Petitioner would have been deterred from getting married prior to Ms. Birch's retirement, such as when they were visiting Massachusetts in 2007, due to the legal futility of attempting to obtain recognition in Florida of a marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. Less persuasive is Petitioner's testimony that, in October 2012, Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3, if this option had been available to her, and it is impossible to find on this record that she would have done so. There is no evidence that Ms. Birch and Petitioner rearranged their financial affairs to achieve, to the extent possible, an Option 3 election. Household income was $1000 per month greater under Option 1 than Option 3, so life insurance on Ms. Birch or an annuity for Petitioner could have mitigated Ms. Birch's inability to choose Option 3 when she retired. Prior to retiring, Ms. Birch did not attempt to elect Option 3 in writing or orally. Even after retiring, as noted below, Ms. Birch displayed ambivalence about whether she wanted to change her election. As a named defendant in Brenner I, on April 14, 2015, Respondent responded to the injunction against its enforcement or application of the Florida DOMA by issuing Information Release #2015-184 (Release). Sent to FRS members who retired prior to January 2, 2015, and elected Option 1 or 2, the Release states: . . . FRS retirees and . . . DROP participants who were in legally-recognized same-sex marriages at the time they retired or began DROP participation and chose Option 1 or Option 2 will have an opportunity to change benefit payment options in light of . . . Brennan. These retirees will be able to change their retirement payment option from their current selection to Option 3 or Option 4 to provide a continuing monthly benefit to their spouse. The retirees impacted by this change have an effective retirement date or DROP begin date on or before January 1, 2015. The Release provides that an eligible retiree interested in a second election must contact Respondent in writing, identify the retiree's spouse, and certify that the retiree and spouse were married in a state or country that allowed same-sex marriage when the FRS member retired. The Release states that Respondent will respond with an estimate of the new benefit payment under the option that the retiree intends to select and provide the retiree with the paperwork necessary to make the second election. Available on Respondent's website,6/ the Release provides the opportunity of a second election of Option 3 or 4 to any FRS member7/ who retired prior to January 2, 2015; chose Option 1 or 2 when she retired; and was in a same-sex marriage when she retired. The Release places no limit on how far in the past the retirement took place.8/ The thrust of Petitioner's case is directed toward backdating her lawful marriage to Ms. Birch to a point prior to Ms. Birch's retirement. As noted above, the timing of the lawful marriage is a problem under the Release, which requires a lawful marriage at the time of retirement, but another problem under the Release is the fact that the Release provides to the FRS retiree, not her surviving spouse, the opportunity for a second election, nor, as discussed immediately below, is this a technical requirement that can be overcome by Petitioner's serving as a representative of Ms. Birch--the second election is extended only to living FRS retirees. The virtue of the Release for Petitioner is that it confers the opportunity of a second election without any proof that, at the time of the first election, the FRS member would have elected Option 3 or 4. If Petitioner does not rely on the Release, she must also prove that Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3 or 4, which, as noted above, she has failed to prove. By limiting the second election to the FRS retiree, the Release limits the potential of adverse selection in allowing a second election, possibly years after the first election.9/ There are three possibilities at the time of the second election: both spouses are alive, only the FRS retiree is alive, and only the surviving spouse is alive. The Release's restriction of the right to make the second election to the FRS retiree means that the second and third possibilities do not result in second elections: respectively the FRS retiree would not reduce her payment to provide an annuity to a spouse who is already deceased10/ and a surviving spouse has no right to make an election under the Release. The couple may gain a minor financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option several years after the retirement of the FRS member, so that they may be better informed of the health of each of them. But the surviving spouse would gain a significant financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option after the death of the FRS member. Shortly after Respondent issued the Release, Ms. Birch filed with Respondent a Spousal Acknowledgement Form that she had signed on May 8, 2015. This form indicates that Ms. Birch is married, but nothing else. At about the same time, though, Ms. Birch contacted Respondent by telephone to discuss the Release and any choices that she may now have under the Release. By letter dated May 26, 2015, Respondent calculated monthly benefit amounts under Options 1 through 4, but the letter warns: "Your benefit option will not be changed unless you complete and return the required forms noted in this letter" and indicate a choice of repaying in a single payment or installments the excess benefits of Option 1 over the smaller benefits paid under Option 3 or 4. The May 26 letter requires further action on Ms. Birch's part and predicates any right to a second election upon a lawful marriage at the time of retirement. The record provides no basis for finding that any of Respondent's representatives misstated the lawful-marriage condition. To the contrary, in at least one conversation with Ms. Birch, Respondent's representative insisted on verification of a lawful marriage as of October 2012. Additionally, Ms. Birch was not requesting a right to make a second election; at most, she was gathering information to prepare to decide whether to ask to change her election. By June 26, 2015, pursuant to a note documenting a telephone conversation between Ms. Birch and a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch decided to keep Option 1 rather than make a second election of Option 3.11/ In May 2016, Ms. Birch finally made a clear attempt to change her election to Option 3. By letter dated May 12, 2016, Ms. Birch stated that she was lawfully married to Petitioner on June 12, 2012, and asked for "the change in beneficiary for my pension, due to the one time option given" in the Release. Even at this late date, Ms. Birch was not yet ready to elect Option 3 because the letter concludes: "I would like to see the breakdown of monetary options to make an informed decision." However, on May 20, 2016, during a telephone call with a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch provided the date of birth of Petitioner and asked Respondent to expedite her request because she did not have long to live. On the same date, Ms. Birch signed an Option Selection form electing Option 3. By letter dated July 18, 2016, Respondent acknowledged the death of Ms. Birch and informed Petitioner that all pension benefits ended at that time. By letter dated September 22, 2016, Petitioner asked for reconsideration and supplied copies of various documents, the relevant provisions of which have been referenced above. By letter dated October 20, 2016, Respondent denied the request for reconsideration.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under Option 3 from Ms. Birch's FRS account and dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement will make no Findings of Fact relating to whether Petitioner's disability was in-line-of-duty. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned previously, all findings contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, of the recommended order are rejected. However, the Division accepts the remaining Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order. As taken from the order these findings are: Herman Williams was an employee of the Department of Transportation and a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Division of Retirement approved payment of regular disability benefits to Herman Williams. Herman Williams is currently receiving and accepting these benefits. Herman Williams is an illiterate Seminole Indian, 62 years of age. Williams' duties with the Department of Transportation were driving a mowing tractor and cleaning out roadside ditches. Williams worked for the Department of Transportation approximately 21 years 11 months prior to being placed on the retired roles [sic]. On May 1, 1975, Williams was driving his tractor in the course of his regular employment at the Department of Transportation when the power steering of the tractor malfunctioned causing the front wheels to swerve violently, wrenching the steering wheel in Williams' hands and nearly throwing him from the tractor. Repairs had to be made to Williams' tractor by a Department of Transportation mechanic because the tractor was inoperative. The mechanic discovered a loose nut in the power steering assembly when he exchanged the power steering unit in Williams' tractor with another from the maintenance yard. When the new unit was installed in Williams's tractor it functioned normally. When the power steering from Williams' tractor was installed in the other tractor, it also functioned normally. The mechanic stated that the loose nut which he had discovered could cause the tractor to swerve violently in the manner Williams' had described. On the afternoon of May 1, 1975, Williams reported this instant [sic] to his supervisor, David McQuaig. Mr. McQuaig inquired as to any injuries to Williams and the tractor. Williams reported to McQuaig that the tractor had not been harmed and that he was only sore and stiff. No report of injury was prepared by McQuaig whose duty it was to file such reports. Williams' condition did not materially improve after seeking medical treatment by Dr. Albritton. Williams remained on sick leave until August 11, 1975, when it was exhausted. Williams then took annual leave from August 12, 1975 until September 23, 19975, when his retirement became effective. When the Petitioner's sick leave was exhausted, he was contacted by his supervisor in the Department of Transportation. He suggested that Williams could retire on disability if two physicians would state that he was disabled. This letter was read to Williams by his son, Eddie, because Williams is illiterate. Retirement application forms were provided Williams by the Department of Transportation. The physician report forms were completed by Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wilkerson. The statement of disability by employer form was completed by Williams' supervisor, David A. Young, Maintenance Engineer, for the Department of Transportation. Young stated that he completed the Statement of Disability by Employer, indicating that the application was for regular disability benefits because he had determined that no workman's compensation claim had been made by Williams and because Dr. Wilkerson's medical report had stated that the injuries occurred at Williams's home. The determination that the application was for regular disability benefits was solely Young's. The Application for Disability Retirement signed by Williams was prepared by personnel at the Department of Transportation District Office. This form was signed by Herman Williams; however, this form does not make provision for the member to state the nature of the disability benefits sought. Eddie Williams, son of Herman Williams, took his father to sign the forms at the Department of Transportation office. These forms were not explained to Williams, nor did Eddie Williams read them. Herman Williams was also unaware that such a benefit existed. Herman Williams stated he sought disability benefits based upon his injury on the job. Disability retirement was not discussed between Herman Williams and David Young. Based upon the application submitted in his behalf, the Division of Retirement made a determination that Williams was entitled to regular disability benefits. Williams was unaware that he was not receiving the in-line-of-duty benefits until his son inquired as to how much money he was receiving. When he was advised, he told his father that it appeared to be too little money. At this point Eddie Williams discovered that the application had been for regular disability.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the administrator permit the applicant to file an amended application for disability in-line-of-duty retirement, and, further, that said application be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Chalkley, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1793 Ocala, Florida 32670 Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION HERMAN H. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-982 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / FINAL AGENCY ORDER A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Ocala, Florida, on September 15, 1977. The Petitioner requested relief from the Division's determination that Petitioner was not entitled to resubmit an application for disability retirement requesting in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits because he had previously applied for and accepted regular disability retirement. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the factual basis for Petitioner's claim that he should be allowed to apply for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. APPEARANCES AT THE HEARING: Eric E. Wagner, Esquire J. W. Chalkey, III, Esquire Law Offices of Eric E. Wagner, P.A. Post Office Box 1763 Ocala, Florida 32670 For the Petitioner E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For the Respondent The Hearing Officer entered his Recommended Order on December 8, 1977, in which he sustained Petitioner's assertion and concluded, on the basis of the findings made as a result of the hearing, that Petitioner should be entitled to resubmit his application and request in-line-of-duty disability benefits. In addition to this determination, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was in fact entitled to in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. In making this latter conclusion, both as a matter of fact and of law, the Hearing Officer went beyond his scope of authority. As will be developed more fully herein, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Petitioner was in fact entitled to the in-line-of-duty benefits. Therefore, so much of the recommended order as purports to address this issue is of no effect, being the result of a hearing that did not comply with the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact The petitioners, Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, are husband and wife. They have been members of the Florida retirement System (FRS) since their transfer on January 1, 1979. Previously, the petitioners were members of the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) Plan D. In order to transfer to FRS, they moved from TRS Plan D, to TRS Plan E, on December 31, 1978, and then into FRS on January 1, 1979. In transferring from TRS to FRS, a member is entitled to a refund of excess TRS contributions. In early 1979, Mr. Price received refund warrants totalling $16,060.61 which represented TRS contributions of $10,138.73 and accrued interest of $5,921.88. In early 1979, Mrs. Price received refund warrants totalling $17,515.03 which represented TRS contributions of $11,383.91 and accrued interest of $6,131.12. The petitioners failed to cash these refund warrants and to date have not negotiated them. In November, 1979, the petitioners visited the Division of Retirement and discussed the cashing of these warrants based on questions of taxation. This discussion was followed by a letter dated December 30, 1979, to A. J. McMullian III, State Retirement Director, in which the petitioners again discussed the taxation questions and advised the respondent that they had not cashed the warrants. They asked that new warrants be issued and that they be paid interest on the amount of the warrants for the period of time from the issuance to the cashing of the warrants. By letter dated January 25, 1980, Mr. McMullian advised the petitioners to cash the warrants and further told petitioners that interest could not be paid. In their petition for an administrative hearing, the petitioners alleged that they were under-refunded; however, at the hearing the parties stipulated that only two issues are presented for resolution: Whether the petitioners are entitled to interest on their contributions from July 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, and Whether the petitioners are entitled to interest on the total amount of the uncashed warrants from the date of issuance to the present. Ruth Sansom, Assistant Bureau Chief, Bureau of Benefits, Division of Retirement, testified that she has worked with TRS and FRS in a supervisory capacity since 1963. In these seventeen years, Section 238.10, Florida Statutes, has consistently been construed as providing for the payment of interest on contributions based on a fiscal year. The fiscal year is from July 1 to June 30. On June 30 of each year, interest is calculated on the total accumulated contributions then on deposit. If no contributions are on deposit on June 30, no interest is credited for this fiscal year. Since the petitioners received refunds of excess accumulated contributions on December 31, 1978, no interest was paid for the 1978-79 fiscal year because no contributions were on deposit on June 30, 1979. At the time that refund warrants are issued, the funds backing the warrants are transferred from the retirement system trust fund to the Treasurer's Office and the Division earns no more interest on these funds. The petitioners contend that they were advised by Leon Burnett of the Division of Retirement not to cash the warrants in their possession pending the outcome of this case. Ruth Sansom testified that it is standard practice to advise members not to cash benefit warrants if the amount of the benefit is in question, but that refund warrants may be cashed and adjustments made in the future. In a separate case (Case No. 80-1029), Mr. Price is challenging the amount of his benefit warrants. However, at the hearing in this case the petitioners did not understand the difference between a refund warrant and a benefit warrant, although this subject was discussed at their November, 1979, meeting with Mr. Burnett, and Mr. Price had in his possession both refund warrants and benefit warrants which had not been cashed.
Recommendation BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, seeking interest on their contributions for the period of time from July 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED that the claim of the petitioners, Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, for interest on the total amount of their uncashed warrants from the date of issuance, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 19 day of September, 1980. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-1779 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price 1000 N.E. 96th Street Miami, Shores, Florida 33138 Diane R. Keisling, Esquire Cedars Executive Center Suite 207C, Box 81 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for retirement credit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner previously worked for the Sheriff's Office for DeSoto County, Florida. It is undisputed that the Sheriff's Office is a qualified Florida Retirement System ("FRS") employer and that Petitioner was, during all times relevant hereto, an FRS eligible employee. In the instant case, it is undisputed that in October 2006, Petitioner sustained a work-related injury while in the course and scope of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner, from the time of her injury through approximately September 11, 2007, received temporary total disability workers' compensation benefits for her employment- related injuries. The precise dates when these benefits were received by Petitioner are not at issue in the instant dispute. On September 12, 2007, Petitioner returned to work at the Sheriff's Office with light-duty work limitations. Also on this date, Petitioner resumed receiving payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner continued to receive temporary partial disability wage payments through December 2008 and received workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010. When Petitioner returned to work on September 12, 2007, she was still receiving medical treatment from the workers' compensation physician and attended regular sessions with the physician throughout the duration of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. The visits to the workers' compensation physician often occurred during times when the Sheriff's Office scheduled Petitioner to work, thus, resulting in her absence from work on these days. The Sheriff's Office terminated Petitioner's employment on December 12, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner was on the Sheriff's Office payroll and received wages as follows: For the period September 23, 2007, through October 6, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days; For the period October 7, 2007, through October 20, 2007, she received payroll wages for five days; and For the period October 21, 2007, through December 12, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days. No evidence was presented at the hearing explaining Petitioner's work schedule for the period September 13, 2007, through October 5, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner worked and received payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office for a total of 34 days. Although the 34 days that Petitioner worked were dispersed throughout the months of September, October, November, and December, Petitioner, nevertheless, received a paycheck from the Sheriff's Office for wages for each pay period following her return to work. There was no testimony offered at the hearing as to the total number of days that Petitioner was scheduled to work between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007. However, Petitioner testified that any scheduled work days that she missed during this period occurred as a result of her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. Respondent offered no evidence to the contrary as to this point. Given the severity of Petitioner's work-related injury, which apparently resulted in her being away from work for nearly a year, coupled with the fact that she continued to receive workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010 (some four years after the date of her injury), the undersigned accepts as credible Petitioner's testimony that any scheduled work days that she missed between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, resulted from her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. On April 4, 2008, Petitioner submitted correspondence to the Division and stated therein the following: Sir, I am writing this email in regards to my retirement. Under the florida [sic] retirement system, a member is entitled to retirement credit for periods of eligible workman [sic] comp[ensation]. The member must return to FRS covered employment for one month. Creditable workman [sic] comp[ensation] includes all periods that workman [sic] comp[ensation] are made. FRS employers are required by Section 121.125, Florida Statutes, and Section 60S-2012, Florida Administrative Code, to report the period covered by workman [sic] comp[ensation] on the monthly retirement report. D.C.S.O. stated I worked intermittently but where is it written in the Florida State Statutes or Administrative Code, how many days during the month you are allowed to miss and it would not be credible service or considered a break in service. [sic] Sir, I was still active [sic] employed with D.C.S.O. upon returning to work on Sept[ember] 12, 2007. The days I missed was [sic] due to medical appointmentts [sic] for my workman's [sic] comp[ensation] injury I sustained at D.C.S.O. I always provided documentation from the physician. I was not terminated until December 13, 2007 when Capt. McClure of D.C.S.O. called me at 8:21 A.M. [sic] on my scheduled day off. The three months I was allowed to work and the period on workman [sic] comp[ensation] should be credible service towards retirement. Sir, my question is when the other employees at D.C.S.O. take off more than a couple of days, during the month, for various reasons, without medical documentation[,] do[es] it count for credible service towards retirement or is it a break in service. [sic] On April 7, 2008, Doug Cherry, on behalf of the Division, responded to Petitioner's inquiry of April 4, 2008, and stated the following: Ms. Leonard, as I explained in our phone conversation, for periods of workers' compensation (temporary partial or temporary total) to be eligible for retirement credit there must be a return to active employment for one complete calendar month. The attached letter from the Sheriff of DeSoto County shows that from your scheduled date of return in September 2007, your employment was not active for the required month. This letter states you worked intermittently until your termination of employment in December 2007. To satisfy the one calendar month of active work, you needed to be consistently working through October 31, 2007. You indicated in our conversation that the information from the Sheriff was incorrect. If so, you would need to contact that office to resolve any discrepancy. I [have] also attached the appropriate Florida Statute (121.125) and the Florida Administrative Code (60S-2.012) which states [sic] this requirement. The law does not provide for exceptions or a combination of active and non-active employment during the one calendar month. Regarding your question about active members taking off days during the month, the requirements for earning service credit are different than the eligibility requirement for periods of workers' [sic] compensation. In your own account, you did earn credit for the months of September, October, November and December 2007 for the time you did work and earn salary. However, as stated above, for the period of workers' compensation to be creditable for retirement, the requirement is active employment for the full calendar month, not to earn service credit after such period. You also indicated that you were going to provide your attorney with this information. If your attorney would like to give me a call (850-488-9623), I will be glad to discuss this issue with him or her. I hope this information will help clarify this issue for you. On January 7, 2011, Respondent wrote Petitioner and informed her of the following: Dear Ms. Leonard: This will respond to your request for retirement credit for the period of time you received Workers' Compensation (WC), that was submitted to the State Board of Administration (SBA). Because this is an issue of creditable service, the SBA forwarded the request to the Division of Retirement since the Division is the proper agency to address such an issue. Information you and your agency provided indicates that you were out on WC October 2006 through September 2007 at which time your employer, the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office, sent you a letter dated September 6, 2007 requiring you to return to work within two weeks or be terminated from employment. The Division has not received any documentation from the Workers' Compensation carrier to substantiate the actual periods of WC or the date maximum medical improvement was reached. Therefore, this letter cannot address periods of possible eligibility for retirement credit but will address whether your employment from September 2007 met the return to work requirement for such eligibility. The Sherriff's [sic] office provided us with documentation of your time worked in September, October, November, and December 2007. During these months, you worked intermittently and did not have a full calendar month of active employment before your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. * * * You did not consistently work during any of those calendar months until your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. Therefore, starting in September 2007, you did not meet the return to actively performing service requirement of the above provision to establish eligibility for possible retirement credit. Petitioner's failure to return to active employment status was the only reason given by the agency when denying Petitioner's claim. Andy Snuggs has worked as a benefits administrator for the Division for approximately the last 20 years. The Division offered, and the undersigned accepted, Mr. Snuggs as an expert in matters related to the Act. Mr. Snuggs testified that in the exercise of the agency's discretion, the agency defines the phrase "active employment," as it relates to section 121.125, to mean that an employee must work each scheduled work day in a regularly established position for at least one calendar month following the employee's return to work and that no allowances are made for any absences, excused or otherwise. Mr. Snuggs did not offer any testimony explaining why the Division selected the particular definition that it did for the term "active."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Irene Leonard, met the return-to-work requirements necessary to receive retirement credit for workers' compensation payment periods. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2011.
