The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for her answers to questions 55 p.m. and 56 p.m. on the Fundamentals of Engineering portion of the engineering licensure examination given on April 15, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The examination for licensure of an engineer in the State of Florida is administered by the Florida Engineers Management Corporation, a not-for-profit corporation, created under Section 471.038, Florida Statutes. A written examination is authorized by Rule 61G15-21.001, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent contracts with the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying to provide engineering licensure examinations. This practice is approved by Section 455.217, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61G1 5-21.005, Florida Administrative Code. The National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying develops standardized tests given for licensure throughout the United States and ensures that the questions are not ambiguous through a number of methodologies. A candidate for licensure as an engineer intern must attain a "scaled" score of 70 to pass the examination. On the examination taken by Petitioner, the minimum "raw" score required to attain a "scaled" score of 70 was 107; Petitioner's "raw" score was 105. Petitioner had initially challenged five questions; at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew her challenge to three questions; the two remaining challenged questions (55 p.m. and 56 p.m.) were "ethical" questions, i.e., they dealt with questions of engineering ethics. The challenged questions were multiple-choice questions. The test gives the following directions: "Each of the questions or incomplete sentences below is followed by four suggested answers or completions. Select the one that is the best in each case and then fill in the corresponding space on the answer sheet." (Emphasis added.) The challenged question 55 p.m. deals with an engineer hired to prepare a report on the design, manufacture, and assembly of a structure. The report contains references to "shoddy workmanship." Petitioner states that while she agreed that answer A [the graded "correct" answer] is correct, she believed that the inclusion of the word "also" in answer B included answer A in answer B by reference and therefore she chose B as her answer. Petitioner acknowledges that the word "also" in answer B could be referring to language in the question rather than in answer A. Answer A specifically refers to "engineering issues" which the engineer is "qualified to assess"; answer B indicates that the references to "shoddy workmanship" are "personal opinions" and "not professional opinions". An engineer is obligated by his license not to give an opinion for which he does not have expertise. An engineer should not render a personal opinion in a report in which the engineer gives a professional opinion. The challenged question 56 p.m. deals with an engineer who lacks expertise dealing with space frames but designed structures which included same. Regarding challenged question 56 p.m., the Petitioner acknowledged that answer A (the graded "correct" answer) could have been the correct answer as well as the answer she chose, answer D. Answer D indicates that the engineer was unethical because he did not refer that matter to the Registration Board. An engineer should not contact the Registration Board and report to the Board that someone has asked him to do something unethical; it is incumbent upon an engineer to practice engineering ethically without the input of the Board. In both instances in answering the challenged questions the Petitioner failed to provide the "best" answer and at hearing acknowledged that the graded "correct" answer by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveyors was a "correct" answer even though she chose a different answer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Engineers Management Corporation enter a final order denying Petitioner's challenge to questions 55 p.m. and 56 p.m. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Yvette Bowman 3401 North Lakeview Drive Apartment 216 Tampa, Florida 33618 Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dennis Barton, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Natalie A. Lowe, Esquire Vice President for Legal Affairs Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner Henry A. Wenz (Wenz) is a resident of Volusia County and submitted oral or written objections during the review and adoption proceedings. Petitioners Hart Land & Cattle Co., Inc., R. L. Hart, and Clyde E. Hart are residents of, own property in, or own or operate businesses in Volusia County and submitted oral or written objections during the review and adoption proceedings. Respondent Department of Community Affairs (DCA) is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing plans under Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Respondent Volusia County, which is a charter county, is a local government required to adopt a revised comprehensive plan under Sections 163.3164(12) and 163.3167, Florida Statutes. Volusia County is a charter county. Volusia County is located on the Atlantic Coast and is bounded by Flagler and Putnam Counties to the north, Brevard and Seminole Counties to the south, and Lake County to the west. The east boundary runs about 47 miles along the coastline, and the west boundary includes about 75 miles along the St. Johns River before running along lakes to the north and south. Volusia County contains 14 incorporated areas. Only four of these incorporated areas are in west Volusia County: DeLand, which is the County seat; Lake Helen; Orange City; and Pierson. The coastal area contains the remaining 10 incorporated areas, including the county's principal city, Daytona Beach. Public Participation By Resolution No. 86-105 adopted August 7, 1986, Volusia County established various requirements for notice and public hearings in the comprehensive planning process. Acknowledging that the Volusia County Planning and Land Development Regulation Commission serves as the local planning agency (LPA), pursuant to Volusia County Ordinance 80-8, as amended, Resolution No. 86- 105 directs the Volusia County Planning and Zoning Department to accept, consider, preserve, and respond to written public comments. Following the adoption of Resolution No. 86-105, the LPA commenced a process designed to ensure that citizens with a wide range of interests could make substantial contributions to the comprehensive planning process. The LPA formed five citizens' committees, known as Citizen Resource Committees, to consider planning questions corresponding to each of the elements required to be included in the comprehensive plan. Each committee comprised about 20 members, and the chair of each committee was a member of the LPA. 1/ Membership of each Citizen Resource Committee was diverse. For instance, members of the land use committee included homeowners, developers, and environmentalists. The diversity of membership was the result of the LPA's efforts to solicit nominations for membership from a broad range of civic, trade, or professional associations. In all, the LPA asked 150 organizations to make nominations and 62 organizations did so. In the case of the land use committee, for example, members were nominated by, among others, such groups as the League of Women Voters, Association of Condominiums, West Volusia Home Builders Association, and Volusia-Flagler Environmental Political Action Committee, Inc. Each Citizen Resource Committee met about nine times from July, 1988, to May, 1989. Prior to these series of meetings, the LPA conducted a meeting to explain the comprehensive planning process. Each meeting of the LPA or Citizen Resource Committee was open to the public and announced by news releases published in numerous local news media. During the nine months that the Citizen Resource Committees met, Volusia County amended Resolution No. 86-105 to require that all planning materials given to the Citizen Resource Committees, LPA, or County Council be available for review by the public. Adopted February 2, 1989, Resolution No. 89-27 made planning documents available for copying by the public at cost. Following the completion of the work of the Citizen Resource Committees, the LPA then conducted six public workshops between June 14 and June 27, 1989. Large display advertisements were published in local newspapers of general circulation preceding at least some of these meetings, including the June 14 and 19 meetings where it was announced that the LPA would consider certain named elements for recommendation to the County Council. The LPA ultimately recommended the draft elements to the County Council. On July 7, 1989, the County Council held its first public workshop on the proposed plan. Over the next two months, the County Council conducted nine such workshops, at least some of which were announced by large display advertisements in local newspapers of general circulation. Minutes and notes of these workshops indicate that Council members regularly solicited comments from members of the public in attendance. The County Council conducted nine public workshops or hearings from July 7, 1989, through August 29, 1989. The County Council workshops culminated in the transmittal hearing, which took place on September 7, 1989. The hearing was announced by large newspaper display advertisements that satisfied all requirements of law. After transmittal of the proposed plan and receipt of the Objections, Recommendations, and Comments of DCA, the County Council announced by large display newspaper advertisements that a hearing would be conducted on February 22, 1990, to receive public comments and adopt the comprehensive plan. The notice satisfied all requirements of law. The County Council received extensive public comments at the February 22 hearing and continued the hearing to March 8. Again receiving extensive public comment at the March 8 hearing, the County Council continued the hearing to March 15. The County Council adopted the comprehensive plan at the March 15 hearing, although Ordinance No. 90-10, which adopts the plan, indicates that the plan was adopted at a public hearing on March 10, 1990. 2/ Ordinance No. 90-10 adopts the goals, objectives, and policies, but not the supporting data and analysis. Traffic Circulation Element Data and Analysis In preparing the Traffic Circulation Element (TCE), the County first inventoried the existing road system to determine capacity, demand, and overall system performance. To assist in this effort, the County Council retained (Kimley-Horn and Associates, Inc., which issued a report in September, 1989, analyzing the availability of transportation facilities and services to serve existing and future demands (Kimley-Horn Report). The Kimley-Horn Report serves as part of the data and analysis on which the plan was based. Beginning with 1987 conditions, Kimley-Horn noted that the County required nearly $68.2 million of road improvements to attain level of service C on all roads. 3/ To evaluate future needs, Kimley-Horn used a standard traffic forecasting formula and socio-economic data provided by the County Planning Department. After identifying numerous traffic analysis zones and validating the model for the subject forecasting purposes, Kimley-Horn ran ten model runs. In designing various network alternatives, Kimley-Horn considered level of service standards in light of factors such as the requirement of concurrency, the goal of urban in-fill, and the "[d]irect correlation between urban size and acceptance of some highway congestion as a trade off for other urban amenities and cost considerations." Kimley-Horn Report, page 17. The West Volusia Beltline would be located in southwest Volusia County between U.S. 17/92 and 1-4. Comprising several segments, the beltway's southernmost segment is from Graves Avenue to Saxon Boulevard. Apparently while Kimley-Horn was preparing its report, Volusia County adopted a Five-Year Road Program, which includes certain projects from a 2010 financially feasible plan for the coastal area. The Five-Year Road Program, which will cost $94.7 million for right-of-way acquisition and construction, will require $52 million from the County, or $59.3 million after taking into consideration the effect of inflation. From north to south, the Five-Year Road Program includes the following segments of the West Volusia Beltway, which are all under County jurisdiction: Kepler Road to Taylor Road (1.0 mile)--construction of two lanes; Taylor Road to State Route 472 (2.3 miles)--construction of two lanes; and State Route 472 to Graves Avenue (1.0 mile)--addition of two lanes to the two existing lanes. The Kimley-Horn Report estimates that, during the five-year road program, the County will have revenues of only $49.2 million available for road construction without regard to inflation but assuming increases in population and tourism. The report discusses various options, such as raising impact fees, raising the share of gas taxes devoted to construction versus maintenance, and accelerating road projections to negate the effect of inflation. The County- estimated revenues are 6-17% short of estimated costs. In any event, the projected revenue shortfall during the Five-Year Road Program should have no effect on the three West Volusia Beltway projects. The Kimley-Horn Report ranks all of the five-year projects based on relative importance. All three beltway projects are in the top ten, and the cumulative construction costs expended through the first ten projects is $28.8 million, which is well within available revenues of $49.2 million. Assuming that the Five-Year Road Program is timely completed, Kimley- Horn calculated 1995 levels of service by applying County-supplied socioeconomic data to existing traffic models. The result, displayed on Figure 11 in the Kimley-Horn Report, discloses an insignificant segment of U.S. 17/92 in the downtown area at level of service F and, especially relative to east Volusia County, little system mileage at level of service E. Based on the analysis described in the preceding paragraphs, the Kimley-Horn Report concludes that county-wide roadway operating conditions in 1995 are excellent in that, out of 895.3 system miles, only 21.4 miles are predicted to operate at Level of Service F. This represents 2.39 percent of the county's system miles. In the same light, 52.86 miles fall at Level of Service E condition representing 5.9 percent of the total system miles. Overall, approximately 92 percent of the county-wide roadway system-miles is predicted to operate at Level of Service D or better in 1995. Kimley-Horn Report, pages 58-60. Table 28 of the report, which divides the County into 11 geographic areas, prioritizes road segments for construction after 1996 based on volume-to- capacity ratios projected for 1995 after completion of the base network. 4/ Table 28 projects no excessive use of segments in west Volusia County. The average volume-to-capacity ratios in west Volusia County are projected as follows: for the area north of DeLand--0.40; for the area south of DeLand--0.60; and for the area west of Deltona--0.75. Although the last area contains three segments with ratios over 0.90, the West Volusia Beltline would, in 1995, have a volume-to-capacity ratio of only 0.44. Designing a 2010 network, Kimley-Horn analyzed additional highway segments selected from a financially feasible plan and various alternatives previously considered in the report. These segments, which are listed in Table 19 of the report, exclude all of the roads contained in the Five-Year Road Program. The total cost, including right-of-way acquisition, construction, and inflation, is $1.38 billion, with the County's share at $510 million. From north to south, the 2010 network contains the following segments of the West Volusia Beltway, which are all projected to remain under County jurisdiction: State Route 44 to State Route 472 (5.6 miles)--addition of four lanes to two lanes in the existing or base network; State Route 472 to Graves Avenue (1.0 mile) --addition of two lanes to four lanes in the existing or base network; and Graves Avenue to Saxon Boulevard (3.0 miles)--construction of four lanes where none exists in the 1995 network. However, the 1995 level of service projections properly ignore those segments of the West Volusia Beltway included in the 2010 network, including the new four lanes south of Graves Avenue, because these segments are not part of the existing or base network. The Kimley-Horn Report estimates that gas taxes and impact fees available to the County to fund the County's system improvements from 1996 through 2010 will total only about $278 million. Assuming that future state contributions will equal past contributions, the Kimley-Horn Report estimates that state revenues for system improvements will total about $272 million from 1996 through 2010. The total County and state contributions are projected to be about $550 million for 1996 through 2010, which would leave a projected combined state/County deficiency of $338 million. The Kimley-Horn Report recommends that the County update the TCE once the projected revenue shortfall materializes following the construction of the base network in 1995. Specific items to be considered include the adjustment of level of service standards, identification of new revenue sources, and adjustment of permitted densities and intensities in the affected areas. The Kimley-Horn Report concludes that the plan updating process should be viewed as an on- going, iterative process whereby road needs, available revenues and finally financial analysis merge... This process is designed to provide a dynamic and on-going planning tool that can be used to provide an on-going monitoring and updating program for the transportation system in Volusia County. Kimley-Horn Report, page 83. Goals, Objectives, and Policies 1. Bicycles and Pedestrians TCE Objective 2.1.1 states that, prior to 1996, the County "shall implement programs to provide a safe, convenient, and efficient motorized transportation system." TCR Objective 2.1.2 states that, prior to 1995, the County "shall implement programs to provide a safe, convenient, and efficient non-motorized transportation system." TCE Policies 2.1.1.4 and 2.1.2.2 state that, prior to October 1, 1990, the County "shall develop regulations for the safe and efficient movement of pedestrians within all new development proposals" [sic]. TCE Policy 2.1.2.1 states that, prior to 1993, the County "shall coordinate with the MPO to develop a County-wide bicycle facilities plan." The Capital Improvement Program schedules all significant capital projects to be undertaken for the six years between 1990-1995. An adopted part of the plan, the Capital Improvement Program contains a summary of road projects beginning at page C-243. The table shows, by year and amount, expenditures for all capital road projects, including the above-described segments of the West Volusia Beltway without significant alterations. Also included are $1.17 million for constructing bike paths in fiscal year ending 1990 and $180,000 for constructing bike paths in the following year. Beginning in fiscal year ending 1991 and through the end of the covered period, the table shows that the County intends to spend about $370,000 annually constructing bike paths/sidewalks and, in the first two years, $860,000 in widening bike paths. 2. Level of Service Standards for Roads The objectives and policies under TCE Goal 2.2 set the level of service standards applicable to roads in the County. TCE Objective 2.2.1 states: Upon adoption of the Comprehensive Plan, Volusia County shall establish peak hour level of service standards and prior to 1996, Volusia County shall achieve and maintain standards for peak hour levels of service on the thoroughfare system. TCE Policies 2.2.1.3 through 2.2.1.6 establish the peak hour level of service standards for state-and County-maintained roads. The level of service standards for state-maintained freeways and principal arterials, in the urbanized and nonurbanized areas, are D and C, respectively. The level of service standards for state-maintained minor arterials and collectors, in the urbanized and nonurbanized areas, are E and D, respectively. TCE Policy 2.2.1.6 sets the level of service standards for County-maintained arterials and collectors, in the urbanized and nonurbanized areas, at E and C, respectively. With respect to the reduced level of service standard allowed on County roads in urbanized areas, TCE Policy 2.1.1.7 explains that the County "shall expend County transportation funds in a manner which encourages compact urban development." TCE Policies 2.2.1.3 through 2.2.1.6 permit certain exceptions to the general level of service standards. A major exception is that the level of service standards apply only to road segments that are neither backlogged nor constrained. By means of this exception, the County distinguishes between roads operating at or above 5/ their adopted level of service standards and capable of widening, which are subject to the general level of service standards, and roads that are, at the time of plan adoption, operating below their adopted level of service standards or are incapable of widening, which are backlogged or constrained, respectively. The plan defines a backlogged road as one operating at a level of service standard below the minimum adopted by the County Council. However, a road operating below its designated level of service standard is not a backlogged road if it is a constrained facility or if it is scheduled for capacity improvements in the five-year road program of the Florida Department of Transportation or the County Council. 6/ Plan Element 20, Paragraph 14. A constrained road is one to which two or more lanes cannot be added due to physical or policy barriers. Plan Element 20, Paragraph 41. TCE Policies 2.2.1.7 through 2.2.1.9 identify backlogged road segments. TCE Policy 2.2.1.10 requires that the actual level of service standard for each identified backlogged road segment be raised by one standard by 1996. TCE Policy 2.2.1.11 requires that the level of service standards for each identified backlogged road segment attain, by 2001, the general standards set forth in TCE Policies 2.2.1.3 through 2.2.1.6. For constrained roads presently at their adopted level of service standards, TCE Policy 2.2.1.22 provides that, barring acceptable mitigation, the County shall not allow further development after the constrained road reaches the applicable level of service standard. 3. Concurrency Requirements The introduction to the Capital Improvements Element (CIE) links the concepts of level of service and concurrency. The introduction, which is not an adopted part of the plan, notes: "The existing service level was used as a benchmark for most of the proposed service level standards found in this draft [sic] element." The introduction acknowledges: Adjusting service levels [and] facility costs to projected revenue allocated to capital facilities is part of the [planning] process. If revenue allocated to pay for capital costs is insufficient, then either service levels have to be reduced or additional revenue raised or created to support the desired level of service. CIE Policy 15.1.1.3 prohibits the issuance of a development order for development that would degrade the level of service standard below the adopted standard, unless the plan specifically permits such a degradation. CIE Policy 15.3.1.1 states that the level of service standards adopted in the plan apply to all development orders issued after October 1, 1990. The issue of vested rights, which is generally reserved for land development regulations, is addressed to some degree in the plan. CIE Policy 15.1.1.7 requires orders for developments of regional impact, if issued after October 1, 1990, to be subject to the plan's concurrency requirements. CIE Policy 15.3.4.3 contemplates the reduction of level of service standards due to the effect of vested development; however, a plan amendment is required in such cases. Recognizing the importance of vested development in terms of demand on public facilities, CIE Policies 15.5.4.6, 15.5.5.1, and 15.5.5.2 require a study of reserved capacities and inventory and analysis of capacity remaining after the demands of vested development have been met. CIE Objective 15.5.1 states that the concurrency provisions adopted as part of the plan will become effective October 1, 1990. Other concurrency provisions are to be included in land development regulations. CIE Policy 15.5.1.1 identifies those facilities, including roads, for which concurrency is required. CIE Policy 15.5.1.3 states: The required facilities shall be in place and operating or estimated to be operating at a minimum service level established in this Comprehensive Plan at the time a building permit is issued, or a building permit is issued subject to the condition that the required facilities shall be in place prior to issuing of that final development order. A final development order is a building permit. Plan Element 20, Paragraph 52. CIE Policy 15.5.1.4 states that the required facilities shall be deemed concurrent "if they are under construction or under contract for acquisition at the time a building permit is issued." CIE Policy 15.5.1.5 adds that the required facilities shall be deemed concurrent "if they are the subject of a binding contract executed for the construction or acquisition of the required facilities at the time a building permit is issued." CIE Policy 15.5.1.6 states: New developments may meet the test for capacity and concurrency if they can be supported by the construction of specific facilities and the expansion of facility capacity by specific projects contained in the first year of the Capital Improvements five year schedule of programmed improvements (Capital Budget), following the issuance of a final development order. This policy shall pertain to the following facility categories: roads ... Specific conditions for the timing of private development and completion of the above facility categories shall be part of an enforceable development agreement and shall be part of the County's development review process when land uses and their densities/intensities are first proposed. Specific timing and phasing of these facilities in relationship to the issuance of building permits and other final development orders shall be delineated in [various land development regulations]. However, CIE Policy 15.5.2.2 requires: The following facilities shall be available to coincide 7/ with approval of building permits for developments that are to be built during a single phase: roads ... It shall be the intent of this policy to ensure that the above-mentioned facilities and services needed to support such development are available concurrent with impacts created by such developments... Specific timing and phasing conditions related to the above concurrency facilities shall be identified in greater detail in [various land development regulations]. Dealing with development projects designed to take place over several years, CIE Policy 15.5.2.3 provides in part: In these cases, programmed improvements from the Five Year Schedule of Improvements shall be included as part of the concurrency determination as long as their availability coincides with the impact of such a multi- year, multi-phase development. CIE Policy 15.5.2.4 addresses the situation in which necessary public or private facilities are delayed. If the delayed facility "may imperil the public health, welfare and safety," the County "may impose delay requirements on any permits it has issued so that public facility availability may be approximately concurrent with the impact of new development." Just as the backlogged and constrained roads are subject to special level of service standards, so too are they subject to special concurrency provisions. These provisions are contained in the policy cluster under CIE Objective 15.5.3. CIE Policy 15.5.3.1 describes the process by which the County will monitor levels of service on backlogged roads. The process begins with documenting as a benchmark the traffic counts on these roads prior to the adoption of the plan. CIE Policy 15.5.3.1.b provides that each backlogged road "shall not be allowed to degrade its operational service standards ... by ... more than twenty (20) percent of the peak hour bench mark [traffic] counts ... " 8/ The monitoring provisions require the County to use generally accepted traffic modeling procedures to project the number of trips generated by proposed developments and the likely distribution of these trips. Regarding backlogged roads, CIE Policy 15.5.3.1.e states: The County shall not approve any additional final local development orders, (excluding vested properties) including building permits, once the percent threshold for projects within urban/urbanized area center(s) including municipalities is reached from final development orders only if such local development orders would generate trips in excess of ten/fifteen/twenty percent on a peak hour basis, unless a final development order is subject to the adoption and implementation of an Area-wide Traffic Action Mitigation Plan. An Area-wide Traffic Action Mitigation Plan shall include, but not be limited to, the following activities: turn lanes signalization incentives for employees to use mass transit where available van/car pooling programs staggered work hours CIE Policy 15.5.3.1.f states that the "goal" of the Area-wide Traffic Action Mitigation Plan is to achieve "100 percent mitigation of the impacts of a proposed development" and that, where applicable, the plan shall include participants besides the developer, such as "adjacent property owners, business establishments and homeowner associations." CIE Policy 15.3.4.8 states: The adopted Volusia County Five Year Road Program, reflected in the Capital Improvements Element's five year schedule of capital improvements[,] will provide the capacity necessary to relieve backlogged State roads. In the event that revenues collected from transportation (road) impact fees fall short of projections and the need arises to delay any of the identified capacity projects, Volusia County shall amend this element and the Traffic Circulation Element through coordination with the Florida Department of Transportation and performing [sic] speed delay studies to more accurately evaluate the level of service on the effected [sic] backlogged road. The County shall temporarily defer the issuance of development orders having direct impact on the facility which cannot be corrected through implementation of a Traffic Action Mitigation Plan as identified in 15.5.3.1(e) of this element, until such time that the level of service has been improved to the acceptable level. Any change in service level standards as a result of speed delay studies shall be done through a plan amendment. 9/ Awkward grammar in the first sentence of CIE Policy 15.5.3.2 precludes a finding as to what constrained facilities are addressed by this policy, but in general the policy provides that the County "may allow development to occur [on these constrained facilities] which will not increase peak hour traffic volumes by more than five or ten percent." Five-percent degradation is allowed for physically constrained state roads, and ten-percent degradation is allowed for policy constrained state roads. CIE Policy 15.5.3.2 requires the developer of the development impacting a constrained road to prepare a Traffic Analysis and implement an Area-wide Traffic Action Mitigation Plan, but only after an urbanized constrained state road has degraded to its minimum level of service, as set forth in the plan. At this point, "no further degradation will be permitted below the minimum approved local service levels set for constrained roads, that in 1989 were operating at or above the desired minimum service level." CIE Policy 15.5.3.2.d prohibits the County from denying a development order if the developer demonstrates a willingness to maintain service levels by entering into an enforceable development agreement including the implementation of either an Individual or Area-Wide Traffic Action Mitigation Plan, where the developer has demonstrated good faith to achieve 100 percent mitigation of the impact of such development. Payment of the road impact fee may not necessarily meet the 100% mitigation desired. For constrained County roads, the County "shall closely monitor" traffic volumes. Once the constrained road reaches its minimum acceptable level of service (C if nonurbanized, E if urbanized), TCE Policy 2.2.1.22 provides: "the County may not allow further development which cannot provide acceptable mitigative measures to the adverse traffic impacts of the proposed development." For development impacting either a backlogged or constrained road, TCE Policy 2.2.1.23 requires the developer to prepare an "Area-wide Traffic Action Mitigation Plan" covering those geographic areas specified as affected by relevant land development regulations. Other policies describe the traffic impact model in detail and procedural processes by which persons denied development orders may challenge the factual bases underlying the denial. CIE Policy 15.5.4.1 limits to two years the life of the concurrency determination for all public facilities for which concurrency is required, unless the County and applicant agree otherwise. In the latter case, however, the applicant must guarantee his financial obligations for public facilities by providing a cash escrow deposit, irrevocable letter of credit, prepayment of impact fees, prepayment of connection charges, or Community Development District, pursuant to Chapter 190, Florida Statutes. CIE Policy 15.5.4.4.1 provides that "if concurrency and facility capacity is not available or cannot be made available through Policy 15.5.4.1(2)(a) ..., these findings shall be reasons for denial of such development orders." CIE Policies 15.5.5.7-15.5.5.9 add detailed requirements to the land development regulations concerning the concurrency management system and specifically the evaluation and monitoring necessary for the successful operation of a concurrency management system. 4. Financial Feasibility of Road Projects The final section of the CIE, although not formally adopted as part of the plan, is entitled, "An Introduction to the [CIE] Six Year Program: Fiscal Year 1989-90 to Fiscal Year 1994-95." This section begins: "The proposed [CIE]'s Five Year Program is feasible only to the extent that certain actions can be implemented prior to October 1, 1990." These actions include the following: approval of the one cent optional sales tax by May, 1990; increase of road impact fees to cover an estimated $6 million shortfall; and restriction of the funding of road safety and other road projects to sources other than existing gas tax revenues, such as the one cent optional sales tax, increased ad valorem taxes, or other sources. The introduction to the CIE concedes that the one cent optional sales tax is a key future revenue source to pay for improvements for facilities that either have no dedicated revenue source or that have revenue sources that have been used in the past but are no longer adequate to maintain or improve service levels into the future. Clearly without the One Cent Optional Sales Tax, the amount of Capital Improvements will have to be reduced in half. This will have severe impacts on service levels for ... roads ... The introduction reasons that ad valorem property taxes should not be used extensively for financing much of the required facilities because ad valorem taxes are needed to operate the newly constructed facilities and the seasonal population does not pay its fair share of the cost of facilities when they are financed by ad valorem taxes. Although not adopted as part of the plan, the data and analysis supporting the CIE contain useful background information concerning financial feasibility. Table 15-15 indicates that the County's share of the optional one cent sales tax would have been $81.3 million for the six-year period, 1990-95. Table 15-16 shows, for the same period, that capital road projects constitute about 24% of all capital expenditures. The Capital Improvement Program begins with a budget message from the County manager. Stressing the importance of the one cent optional sales tax, the message concludes that the only other viable Source of funding the County's infrastructure needs is the ad valorem tax. The total cost of road projects for 1990-96 is $122.6 million. Capital Improvement Program, page C-246. Of this sum, the local option sales tax was Projected to Provide $35.6 million. Id. During the same period, the County's capital expenditures are Projected to total $417.8 million. Capital Improvement Program, page B-2. Of this total, $249 million was Projected to be spent on facilities for which concurrency is required. Id. CIE Objective 15.3.1 places roads as the highest priority among all other facilities. The objectives and policies under CIE Goal 15.4 describe the funding Sources for capital projects. These Sources include user fees, impact fees, broad-based revenue sources, and debt Proceeds. Among user fees, CIE Policy 15.4.1.9 allocates the gas tax between maintenance and construction expenditures. CIE Policy 15.4.1.10 extends all gas taxes under the County's control to 2010. CIE Policy 15.4.1.11 directs the County to use "to the maximum extent possible" all other road user fees, such as toll roads, utility taxes, and special assessments. Addressing impact fees for roads, Objective 15.4.2 provides: Future development shall bear their fair share (a pro rata share) of not less than seventy (70%) percent of road facility costs including [right-of-way] as a result of their development in order to achieve and maintain the adopted level of service standards and other measurable objective standards. CIE Policy 15.4.2.6 requires the County to "verify that the impact fees are sufficient to cover the pro rata share of improvement costs necessitated by new development." CIE Objective 15.4.3 promises that the County will "rely primarily on the broadest revenue bases as possible for the funding of Capital facilities." CIE Policy 15.4.3.2 reserves the one cent optional sales tax for facilities for which no dedicated revenue sources exist. CIE Policy 15.4.3.3 restricts the County from using increases in the ad valorem tax millage rate for purposes other than operating costs associated with future additional capital facilities, unless other sources of funding are not available. CIE Policy 15.4.3.5 considers the alternatives if the one cent optional sales tax were not approved by the voters. In such a case, the County shall consider, among other measures, increasing the ad valorem tax millage rate to fund public facilities for which concurrency is required, creating special taxing districts, reducing service levels, increasing yet-to-be specified new revenue sources, and selectively using Community Development Districts. 10/ Relevant Provisions of the Regional Plan Policy 64.1 of the East Central Florida Comprehensive Regional Policy Plan (Regional Plan) provides: Local governments and the Florida Department of Transportation will set appropriate minimum levels of service for components of the regional roadway system under their respective jurisdictions. The ... Regional Planning Council will assist these bodies in developing their service standards, with the following level of service standards being used as guidelines in the determination of levels of service for individual components of the regional roadway system: In rural areas (Level of Service "C") * * * In urban fringe, urban residential areas, and outlying business districts (Level of Service "D") * * * In central business districts (Level of Service "E") * * * The minimum levels of service determinations will be based on the following criteria: Regional level of service guidelines: Existing conditions of each roadway: Planned programmed roadway improvements: Financial constraints: and Local Comprehensive Plans, and adopted DRI or other development orders. Level of service E on roads of the State Highway System are subject to the agreement of the local government, regional planning council, Florida Department of Transportation, and Metropolitan Planning Organization. Regional Plan Policy 64.5 provides: Access to minor arterials, major arterials and expressways shall be limited in order to maximize their traffic-carrying capacity and safety ... Regional Plan Policy 64.8 states: The principle of equitable cost participation shall be used as a guide in development approval decisions, including allocation of costs among private parties benefiting from or creating the need for transportation improvements, with consideration being given to: New development being required to pay its fair share as a condition for development approval, unless sufficient funds are available from other sources; Existing unmet needs being identified, to include the nature of the need and estimated cost of fulfillment; and Existing land uses and activities which benefit from better access being required to participate in the cost of the roadway improvement or new construction which results in the improved access in the form of user fees or special assessments. Provisions being made in local development orders to include the mitigation of adverse impacts on the state highway system. Regional Plan Policy 64.6 requires that traffic signalization, roadway signage, and operational capacities be designed "to optimize traffic flow and enhance the levels of service throughout the regional roadway network. Regional Plan Implementation Policy 64.5 provides in relevant part: Local governments are requested to undertake the following actions: Evaluate the feasibility and practicality of enacting ordinances capable of assessing existing landowners a proportionate share of costs associated with the elimination of unmet needs based on the provision of enhanced level of service benefits accruing from roadway improvements or new construction projects. Enact impact fee ordinances which are designed to cover the fair share cost of roadway improvements on local and state roadways except for that portion of deficient capacity already existing. Seek public review and comment on all new roadway construction proposals and widening projects. Regional Plan Implementation Policy 64.6 requests Metropolitan Planning Organizations to take certain actions and is thus irrelevant to the present case. Capital Improvements Element The financial feasibility of the entire plan, which is challenged by Petitioners Hart, has been considered to some extent in the findings concerning roads. These findings involve not only the financial feasibility of the Capital Improvement Program for roads, but the overall financial feasibility of the plan. As explained in the corresponding section of the Conclusions of Law, the optional one cent sales tax may be considered to a greater extent in determining the financial feasibility of the entire plan than it may be considered in the availability of scheduled capital projects in making concurrency determinations. The Capital Improvement Program, which schedules capital improvements for the six year period from 1990-1995, identifies, as noted above, $417.8 million in capital expenditures. Although the sources of funding are not collected in a single table like expenditures are, revenues are identified in numerous tables covering each of the numerous categories of public expenditures. In each case, revenues match expenditures. The Capital Improvement Program does not address alternative revenue sources to the optional one cent sales tax. However, CIE 15.4.3.5 describes revenue alternatives to the optional one cent sales tax. Future Land Use and Conservation Elements Data and Analysis The data and analysis accompanying the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) contain population tables prepared by the County, U.S Census, and Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Florida. The population projection for 2000, which is 506,000 persons, is the high-range projection prepared by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research. Support Document #1-1, page 14. Among the factors considered in the land use suitability analysis are the type of soil, presence of wetland vegetation, and nature of the floodplain if the land is located in the 100-year floodplain. Support Document #1-5, page Analysis of these factors is incorporated into a suitability rating system, which is then projected onto maps. Id. The land use suitability analysis contains an extensive inventory of native habitats, soils, and existing land uses by region. The suitability rating system factors in other items such as the availability of central water and sewer and the presence of historic resources. Support Document #1-6 describes the process by which future uses are allocated to the land. Taking the projected population of the unincorporated part of the County, the analysis first allocates the population among six geographic planning areas. Determining the number of dwelling units needed to accommodate the projected population, the analysis generates data indicating the additional acreage required, by the end of the planning timeframe, to accommodate expected residential and nonresidential uses. A growth factor of 30% is then added to the residential and commercial categories due to high growth rates expected from the County's proximity to Disneyworld and the proposed Spaceport. Support Document 1-7 describes the process by which the land uses necessary to accommodate the previously described growth are designated on the future land use maps. Data and analysis supporting the future land use designations for forestry, agriculture, and environmental uses are found in Support Document #12- 1, which accompanies the Conservation Element. Based upon considerable data concerning wildlife and native habitats, the analysis concludes that "there are broad expanses of ecologically interconnected lands." Id. at page 12R-50. The analysis recommends that the plan establish a land use category within which urban development would be discouraged... Because growth should be directed towards those lands best able to accommodate future development, marginally suited lands for development should be placed in a Natural Resource Management Area (NRMA), as should interconnecting environmentally sensitive and ecologically significant lands. This would include ... inland swamp systems, riverine and estuarine flood plains, critical wildlife habitats, and endangered, rare or threatened ecosystems." The recommendation for the establishment of Natural Resource Management Areas (NRMA) explains further: The area within the NRMA should be divided into districts of special use, promoting activities which are compatible with natural resource protection. Among these divisions should be one which affords a degree of protection to natural systems which would assure their continued, uninterrupted preservation. Although several thousand acres of these lands are in public ownership, there is not enough public funds to purchase all the environmentally sensitive lands in the County, and therefore requires land use controls to ensure an adequate degree of ecological integrity. Because a major component of the value of natural communities is the ecological interrelationships with other natural communities, a highly effective way to protect ecological functions would be to form a natural areas network, or corridors. Land which falls within this network, referred to as Environmental Systems Corridors (ESC's), would be restricted to land use activities which inflict extremely small long term impacts on ecological functions, primarily a type of large lot conservation residential and passive types of agriculture, particularly silviculture. The corridors should include protected systems of wetlands, conservation lands and, where possible, rare and threatened upland communities such as mesic hammocks and longleaf pine-oaks. Because silviculture is the predominant use on the relic marine terraces, and that this use appears to be the most suitable for the terraces given the natural constraints of the land, a forestry district should be established within the NRMA. The intent of the forestry district would be to promote silvicultural pursuits and to keep this a predominant use on the relic terraces. This should be part of the NRMA because silvicultural activities typically have the least impact on natural resources other than public ownership, and thus should be encouraged on private landholdings. Other types of agricultural uses should be allowed in the forestry district to provide a certain amount of flexibility, but silviculture should be the predominant use. * * * Established agricultural areas which occur within the NRMA, particularly around Samsula should be considered an agricultural enclave within the NRMA, and should have the appropriate agricultural land use classifications. The enclave should allow room for a limited amount of agricultural growth. Id. at pages 12B-51 and 12B-52. Although the analysis concedes that the data are unavailable by which to map the vegetative communities at a sufficiently high level of detail, the mapping was scheduled to be completed by March, 1990. In the meantime, maps contained in the Support Document indicate generally the location of important vegetative communities, partly because of extensive reliance upon NASA infrared maps of wetlands and vegetation. Goals, Objectives, and Policies Various goals, objectives, and policies are relevant to Petitioners Hart's challenge to the relationship between the forestry, agricultural, and environmental designations and the operative provisions of the plan. Conservation Element Objective 12.2.1 is to "provide for the protection of areas determined to be environmentally sensitive, and direct growth away from such areas." Toward that end, Conservation Element Policy 12.2.1.1 provides that "[e]xisting, relatively uninterrupted expanses of natural resources contained within the County shall be managed as an individual unit, providing natural resources the highest degree of protection in land development decisions and planning." These units are NRMA's. Conservation Element Policy 12.2.1.1 identifies specific areas to be included in NRMA. Conservation Element Policy 12.2.1.2 requires the County to: promote land use activities compatible with the intentions of the NRMA through the establishment of special use areas, the boundaries of which to be determined by resource data including: ecological community mapping as stated in Policy 12.2.2.1, USGS Topographic maps; National Wetland Inventory maps; Florida Natural Area Inventory records; available wildlife data; and site specific field information if available. Conservation Element Policy 12.2.1.2 establishes Environmental Systems Corridors (ESC) and Forestry areas within NRMA's. The policy identifies these two designations as follows: ESC's shall include significant interconnected natural systems of environmentally sensitive lands, connected to and including conservation areas where possible. Land use activities shall be limited to conservation, silviculture utilizing Best Management Practices, and large residential lots with limits on land clearance. Proposed roads which encroach within ESC's shall minimize adverse impacts by: aligning the routes at the least sensitive areas (e.g., narrowest width of wetlands); requiring sufficiently sized bridging and culverts over wetlands to allow non-interrupted water flow and wildlife access; and posting low speed limits and/or caution signs. A forestry category shall be established which shall promote the continued and expanded use of silviculture in Volusia County. Because the mixed use concept is an integral component of forest management, the standards of this category shall not interfere with this practice, so long as silviculture remains the dominant use and best management practices are followed. The Future Land Use Categories, which are adopted as part of the plan, describe in more detail the ESC, Forestry, and Agriculture designations. Most significantly, the Future Land Use Categories set residential densities at one unit per 25 acres for the ESC designation, an average of one unit per 20 acres for the Forestry designation (but one unit per five acres may be permitted), and one unit per ten acres for the Agriculture designation. FLUE, pages 1-2 to 1-6. The general designation of NRMA's is intended to carry out FLUE Objective 1.2.1, which requires FLUE designations to "reflect the inherent capabilities and limitations of the existing natural features of the land." FLUE Policy 1.2.1.1 requires that, during the development review process, the County shall consider the site's topography, vegetation, wildlife habitat, flood hazard, and soils, as well as the location of the 100-year floodplain. FLUE Policy 1.2.1.3 states that "lands most suited for silviculture activities shall be [designated] under the Forest Resource subcategory of NRMA." FLUE Policy 1.2.1.4 limits the extent of intensive agriculture in any NRMA. FLUE Policy 1.2.1.5 restricts residential development in any Forest Resource area to one unit per five acres. FLUE Coal 1.4 is to "ensure that agricultural and silvicultural lands are protected from encroachment by incompatible land uses and remain a vital element of the County's economy." FLUE Policy 1.4.1.1B provides that urban growth is to be directed away from Agriculture areas. Miscellaneous Findings Petitioners Hart own 11/ 1000-1500 acres at County Road 415 and State Road 44 in the vicinity of Samsula (Samsula Land). They also own 2000-2500 acres just west of Edgewater, south of State Route 44, and mostly east of I-95, which is known as the Charles Sibbald Grant (Sibbald Land). About 500-700 acres of the Sibbald Land lie west of I-95. About three miles south of the Sibbald Land, Petitioners Hart own 6000-8000 acres that is divided almost equally by I- 95 and is known as the John Lowe Grant (Lowe Land). It is not possible to cross I-95 where it divides the land. The Sibbald Land and Lowe Land have no improved roads or other public facilities. Petitioners Hart acquired all of the land for investment purposes. The Samsula Land is mostly undeveloped and used largely for cattle and possibly timbering. The Sibbald Land is a contiguous block of land that has not been subdivided. Hart Land & Cattle Co. acquired the land in the early 1970's. Timber has been harvested on the smaller section of this land west of I-95. The trees have been harvested for about 50 years. Back in the 1940's, a turpentine business was operated on the land. Petitioners Hart have also mined shell for road bases and red sand for asphalt from the Sibbald Land. Petitioners Hart acquired the Lowe Land in 1980 or 1981. Consisting of numerous noncontiguous lots, the Lowe Land is part of a 14,000-acre subdivision known as Cape Atlantic Estates, which was subdivided into 6000-7000 parcels in the late 1960's. Cattle are kept on the northeast corner of the Lowe Land. The Lowe Land has contained improved pastureland for almost 70 years. The record provides no basis for findings of the extent to which land owned by Petitioners Hart is subject to the ESC, Forestry, and Agricultural designations; the extent to which Petitioners Hart have been denied proposed uses of their land; the extent to which Petitioners Hart have exhausted County administrative remedies, such as requesting field surveys, to obtain available relief from the impact of the NRMA designations; or other matters relevant to the taking claims of Petitioners Hart. However, the evidence fails to establish that Petitioners Hart have been denied all economically reasonable uses of their entire property or any individual parcel. Ultimate Findings of Fact Traffic Circulation Element 1. Data and Analysis The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the analysis accompanying the TCE inadequately addresses existing levels of service and present and future system needs, as well as the need for new and expanded facilities. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the analysis inadequately addresses projected levels of service based on future land uses and the relevant plans of other jurisdictions. The evidence is clear that the West Volusia Beltway is feasible, given the funding priorities assigned to its various projects in the plan. There is substantial evidence to support the transportation data and modeling on which the road networks are based. There is no significant evidence that the projected levels of service for any road segments are inaccurate due to an unjustifiable reliance on the traffic to be borne by the West Volusia Beltway or for any other reason. Petitioner Wenz alleged that TCE Policy 2.2.1.6, which establishes a level of service standard of E for County-maintained roads in urbanized areas, was internally inconsistent with the introductory language of the CIE concerning the use of existing level of service standards as benchmarks for most of the proposed level of service standards set forth in the plan. This allegation has been treated as raising the issue of supporting data and analysis. 12/ For roads, the analysis begins with the existing levels of service and then, as indicating in the introduction, adjusts service levels to correspond to projected revenues. If the use of the word "benchmark" were to imply an unvarying standard, then the sentence would impose upon the planning effort an unrealistic and, in the case of the County's urban containment strategy, unworkable limitation. Operative plan provisions should not be rejected because of lack of support from incompetent analysis. 2. Goals, Objectives, and Policies The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan is not financially feasible in terms of scheduled road projects. Roads receive the highest priority for capital spending in the County. Although the optional one cents sales tax required a referendum, the plan adequately identifies other potential sources of revenue to fund needed road improvements. The unavailability of the optional one cent sales tax means the loss of $35.6 million for road projects over the six-year period covered by the Capital Improvement Program. Representing about 29% of the road budget for these six years, the optional one cent sales tax can be replaced by other funds. Total capital spending over this period is projected at $417.8 million, of which $249 million is projected for facilities for which concurrency is required. The evidence does not establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the shortfall of $35.6 million, under these facts, renders the plan financially unfeasible as to roads. As the plan acknowledges, another factor supporting the financial feasibility of the plan as to roads is the concurrency provisions. 13/ The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan fails to create a monitoring system to enable the County to determine whether it is adhering to the adopted level of service standards and whether public facilities are available. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan fails to require development agreements to ensure that required facilities will be in place when the impacts of development occur. During periods of revenue shortfalls, timely concurrency determinations supported by an effective monitoring system and understandable level of service standards may help preserve financial feasibility. A concurrency management system breaks the cycle by which the impacts of development outpace the ability of a local government to finance needed infrastructure. To prevent the accumulation of infrastructure deficits, such as backlogged roads, a concurrency management system limits development whose impacts exceed the available capacity of facilities for which concurrency is required. In the absence of funding from the developer or a third party, a financially strapped local government no longer permits the proposed development and thus does not increase the backlog of needed public facilities. The portion of Petitioner Wenz's challenge to provisions governing development agreements also raises the issue of concurrency determinations, at least in the situation where the developer, rather than the County, is providing the required facilities. As to development agreements, CIE Policies 15.5.1.6 and 15.5.3.2.d provide for the use of enforceable development agreements to provide required facilities. CIE Policies 15.5.1.1 et seq. establish generally applicable concurrency requirements that adequately correspond, for the purpose of resolving the present claims, to the concurrency criteria in Rule 9J-5.0055. The concurrency determinations for developments impacting backlogged and constrained roads reflect a strategy of adjusting level of service standards, subject to clear standards and specific time limits, to provide time to eliminate deficiencies that have accumulated over the years. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that this strategy, when used in development agreements, precludes effective concurrency determinations or, when considered in light of the financial feasibility of road projects, renders the plan financially unsound. 3. Consistency with Regional Plan The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan is inconsistent with the cited provisions of the Regional Plan. Most importantly, the plan's level of service standards are consistent with those contained in Regional Plan Policy 64.1, and the plan's sources of revenue are consistent with the principle of equitable cost participation in Regional Plan Policy 64.8. To the extent that the remaining Regional Plan provisions cited by Petitioner Wenz contain criteria against which the plan may be measured, no evidence suggests the existence of any inconsistencies. Capital Improvements Element The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan is not financially feasible. Future Land Use Element 1. Data and Analysis 120. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the data and analysis fail to include a land use suitability analysis or that they fail to support, such as through the absence of accurate population projections, the NRMA designations of ESC, Forestry, and Agriculture. To the contrary, the land use suitability analysis is thorough, and the omission of these NRMA designations or equivalent conservation designations would itself have been unsupported by the data and analysis. 2. Maps and Goals, Objectives, and Policies The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the NRMA designations of ESC, Forestry, and Agriculture, or any other designations contained on the future land use maps, are inconsistent with the operative provisions of the plan. Again, to the contrary, these NRMA designations graphically depict the text of relevant goals, objectives, and policies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order dismissing the petitions of all Petitioners. ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1991.
The Issue Whether respondent's license as a registered residential contractor and a registered plumbing contractor should be disciplined on charges that he unlawfully (1) diverted funds received for the purchase of a lot and construction of a home; (2) acted in the capacity of a contractor and used a name other than that appearing on his license; (3) aided and abetted an uncertified or unregistered person to violate the Construction industry Licensing Law; and (4) failed to properly qualify percent business organization.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Is a Licensed Contractor At all times material to the charges, respondent John W. Powell was licensed as a registered residential contractor (license no. RR 0002745) and a registered plumbing contractor (license no. RF 0038050). (Prehearing Stipulation; P-7) Respondent's Sale and Conveyance of Real Property In October, 1978, Joseph J. D'Antoni, a resident of Baltimore, Maryland, visited Indian Lake Estates Subdivision ("Subdivision") in Polk County, Florida, with the intention of purchasing a lot. Respondent, who owned numerous lots in the Subdivision, agreed to sell two lots to Mr. D'Antoni (and his brother-in-law) for the sum of $7,500. Mr. D'Antoni gave him a $1,000 payment, then mailed him the $6,500 balance after returning to Maryland. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-2) Respondent then executed and mailed a warranty deed conveying Lot 5, Block 340, Indian Lake Estates Subdivision, Unit II, to Mr. D'Antoni and his wife. He used a standard warranty deed form printed for Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, Orlando, Florida, and conforming to Section 689.02, Florida Statutes. As grantor, he "fully warrant[ed] the title to said land, and [promised to] defend the same against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever." (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-2) The deed was prepared by John P. White, an attorney in Lake Wales, Florida. Although respondent, as grantor, did not limit his warranty except for a standard limitation relating to taxes, easements, restrictions, and conditions of record), the preparer of the deed included a personal disclaimer indicating that he (the preparer) was expressing no opinion as to the condition of title: The preparer of this instrument was neither furnished with or requested to review an abstract on the described property and therefore expresses no opinion as to the condition of title. (P-2) Mr. D'Antoni was unaware that the property was encumbered by a mortgage held by the First Highlands Service Corporation. The mortgage had been executed by respondent in 1973. It covered numerous lots in the Subdivision and secured a loan of $330,000. Mr. D'Antoni, who trusted respondent, thought that he was receiving the property free and clear of encumbrances. Respondent did not tell him otherwise. Although the title disclaimer was not read by Mr. D'Antoni, it, by its terms, applied only to Mr. White, the identified preparer of the deed. It did not affect the warranty of title given by respondent, the grantor. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-2) A year later, in December, 1979, First Highlands Service Corporation sued the D'Antonis, Joseph Giardina, (his brother-in-law), and 19 other owners, seeking to foreclose its mortgage covering the Subdivision lots. In order to obtain release from the mortgage, the D'Antonis and Mr. Giardina paid First Highland Service Corporation $4,000 each. Respondent neither defended their title to the property, nor repaid them the $4,000. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-4, P-5) Respondent's Construction of a House for the D'Antonis On November 6, 1978, after the deed to lot 5 was executed and delivered, the D'Antonis executed a construction contract with J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc. Respondent, who signed as President of J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc., had not qualified that company with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. (Testimony of D'Antoni; Prehearing Stipulation, P-6) Under the contract, respondent agreed-to build a house on lot 5, in accordance with certain specifications, for $42,000. Item 10 of Article 8 specifies that the price includes "city water." The home was built; the D'Antonis paid the purchase price, then moved in. Some time later, they were sued by Consolidated Utility Company for $425, the waterline connection fee. They subsequently paid that amount, plus court costs, to the utility company. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-6) At the time respondent built the D'Antonis' house, Wilbur Sheffer was employed by Consolidated Utility Company to install waterlines along Fort Meyers Drive, the road where the D'Antonis' house was located. Mr. Sheffer installed the waterlines up to the individual property boundaries. It was standard practice for contractors to pay sewer charges and water meter deposit and connection (or tap-in) fees when they obtained their building permits, after which he would install the meter. The contractors would then lay waterline from the meter to the home, leaving the line uncovered for later inspection. Property owners were not allowed to connect to the adjacent waterlines unless fees were paid and the meters installed. Respondent paid the meter fee on the D'Antonis' home, but the meter was not installed because he did not pay the connection fee. Nevertheless, respondent, without authorization from the utility company, connected the D'Antonis' house to the utility's adjacent waterlines. (Testimony of Sheffer; P-8) On block 340 of the subdivision, where Ft. Meyers Drive was located, respondent was responsible for paying the water tap fees when the water was available. Records of the utility company show that respondent paid two of the four water tap fees he was billed for on block 340. At the time the D'Antonis' home was under construction, the utility company sometimes negotiated with contractors, who were building homes in the Subdivision, and waived tap fees in exchange for their constructing adjacent waterlines. However, such line extension agreements were usually handled through the office of the company's engineer, Richard Madaus. Mr. Madaus had no record of any agreement with respondent regarding waterline extensions to block 340, where the D'Antonis' home was being constructed. Instead, the records show that respondent was billed for connection fees on block 340 as early as October 26, 1978, and that, thereafter, he paid tap fees for two of the four homes on that block in March and July of 1979. (Testimony of Madaus; P-9a, P-9c, P-9d, P-9e) Respondent's testimony that he was never billed for water connection fees in block 340 and that it was not his responsibility to pay those fees because he had already paid for installing the adjacent waterline, is not credible given the fact that he paid two such connection fees and that the utility company requested these connection fees from him before he began building the D'Antonis' home. The only change in the utility company's policy occurring around the time the D'Antonis' home was constructed was to request the health department to notify the company when septic tank permits for homes in the Subdivision were paid for so that the company could request tap fees at the same time. (P-9a-F) Respondent's Failure to Qualify J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc. It is undisputed that respondent failed to qualify J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc. with the Construction Industry Licensing Board. He did not know that such action was required. The attorney who formed the corporation did not tell him of this requirement. Neither did the county tax collector who Issued him occupation licenses under both his and the corporation's name. (Testimony of respondent)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be fined $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1983.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."
Findings Of Fact The following facts have been stipulated by the parties: Petitioner, Brian L. Blair, is a Respondent in a case before DOAH styled, Florida Elections Commission v. Brian L. Blair, Case No. 09-2069, wherein the Florida Elections Commission ("Commission") has charged Mr. Blair with two counts of willfully accepting campaign contributions in excess of $500.00 in violation of Subsection 106.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner filed a Petition to Determine Invalidity of Existing Rule on August 28, 2009, wherein he alleges that the Commission Rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. As a person subject to Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, and accused of willfully violating one of its prohibitions, Mr. Blair is substantially affected by the Commission's application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 to his case and, therefore, has the requisite standing to bring this action. In 2007, the Florida Legislature repealed Section 106.37, Florida Statutes (2006), which contained a definition of "willfulness" for purposes of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. That section was repealed by CS/HB 537 (Section 51, Chapter 2007-30, Laws of Florida), effective January 1, 2008. Contemporaneous with the repeal of Section 106.37, Florida Statutes, the same legislation amended Subsection 106.25(3), Florida Statutes, to provide that willfulness is "a determination of fact." (§ 48, Chap. 2007-30, Laws of Florida, effective January 1, 2008). Subsection 106.25(3), Florida Statutes, currently provides: (3) For the purposes of commission jurisdiction, a violation shall mean the willful performance of an act prohibited by this chapter or chapter 104 or the willful failure to perform an act required by this chapter or chapter 104. Willfulness is a determination of fact; however, at the request of the respondent, willfulness may be considered and determined in an informal hearing before the commission. (Emphasis added.) The 2007 Legislative Session ended on May 4, 2007; CS/HB 537 was signed and approved by the Governor on May 22, 2007. On May 24 and 25, 2007, Barbara Linthicum, executive director of the Commission at the time, engaged in the following exchange via email with the Commission's attorney, Edward A. Tellechea, counsel of record in this case, regarding Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002: Ms. Linthicum: "Do you think we have authority to add chapter 106 to the willfulness rule?" Mr. Tellechea: ". . . Someone will challenge it[,] but what the heck[,] I'm game." Ms. Linthicum: "But, if you are game, I think we should definitely go ahead before January 1 comes along. You certainly do have a good track record defending our rules" The amendment of Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 was effective December 25, 2007. The repeal of the definition of "willfulness" in Section 106.37, Florida Statutes, became effective January 1, 2008. The proposed rule amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 that is the subject of this proceeding was reviewed in 2007 by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee of the Florida Legislature, pursuant to Section 120.545, Florida Statutes, prior to its adoption, and the Committee made no written comments or filed any written objections. In order to determine whether willful violations of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, have occurred, the Commission employs the definition of "willful" contained in Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002, when making the factual determination of willfulness.
The Issue Whether Policy 20.11.1 of Goal 20: Transportation, of Rule 29H-9.002, Florida Administrative Code, (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rule"), constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners. Pasco is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Its offices are located at 705 East Live Oak, Dade City, Florida. BAGT is an association. BAGT's approximately 697 members are involved in some manner in the development or building industry in the Tampa Bay region. For the most part, BAGT's members reside and own property within the four-county jurisdiction of the TBRPC. BAGT's membership includes approximately 176 builder and developer members and 520 associate members who are subcontractors, material suppliers, financial institutions, engineering firms, architectural firms and other types of firms that provide goods and services related to the building industry. BAGT's membership includes builders who build in "development of regional impact" (hereinafter referred to as "DRI"), projects and associate members who provide construction support services to DRI projects. During an eighteen month period, over 50 percent of the building permits issued in Hillsborough County were issued to twenty-three BAGT builder- members for DRI projects. This amounts to approximately 3.3 percent of the membership of BAGT. BAGT works on behalf of its membership to promote a strong and viable building industry. BAGT has the responsibility to "work for the elimination of governmental orders improperly restricting the home building industry and to support beneficial directives." Certificate of Reincorporation and By-Laws, BAGT exhibits 5 and 6. BAGT members have to consider the levels of service for transportation of local governments and TBRPC in obtaining permits for DRI projects. If more stringent levels of service are required for a project, the development may be prolonged and be more costly to complete. The City is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The City's offices are located at 315 East Kennedy Boulevard, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. The City and Pasco are located within the jurisdiction of TBRPC. The Petitioners are all substantially affected by the Challenged Rule. The Respondent. TBRPC is an agency of the State of Florida within the definition of the term "agency" contained in Section 120.52(1)(b), Florida Statutes. TBRPC was created pursuant to Section 186.504, Florida Statutes. TBRPC's offices are located at 9455 Koger Boulevard, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. TBRPC's geographic boundaries, which generally include the four- county, Tampa Bay region, include the geographic areas within Department of Transportation Districts one and seven. TBRPC does not build or maintain roads. Nor does TBRPC provide funds to those that are responsible for building or maintaining roads. Comprehensive Regional Policy Plans. Pursuant to Section 186.507, Florida Statutes, all regional planning councils, including the TBRPC, are required to adopt a "comprehensive regional policy plan". Among other things, the comprehensive regional policy plan must include the following: (8) Upon adoption, a comprehensive regional policy plan shall provide, in addition to other criteria established by law, the basis for regional review of developments of regional impact, regional review of federally assisted projects, and other regional overview and comment functions. As required by Section 186.507(1), TBRPC has adopted a comprehensive regional policy plan, Rule 29H-9.002, Florida Administrative Code, Future Of The Region, A Comprehensive Regional Policy Plan for the Tampa Bay Region. The comprehensive regional policy plan was adopted in 1987, and has been amended in 1988, 1990 and 1991. Although in adopting a comprehensive regional policy plan a regional planning council is required to consider state and local plans and local governments are given an opportunity to comment, the regional planning council is not bound by those plans or comments. Section 186.507(4)-(6), Florida Statutes. TBRPC's comprehensive regional policy plan was adopted before some of the local government comprehensive plans in its region were promulgated. TBRPC interprets Sections 186.507(1) and (8), Florida Statutes, to require that it include the criteria it intends to use in its review of a DRI. The Department of Community Affairs has been designated by the Executive Office of the Governor to review comprehensive regional policy plans and amendments. See Section 186.507(2), Florida Statutes. The Department of Community Affairs reviewed TBRPC's comprehensive regional policy plan. Developments of Regional Impact. Part of the responsibility assigned to regional planning councils, including TBRPC, is the responsibility to review DRIs. Section 380.06, Florida Statutes. DRIs are created and regulated in the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act, Sections 380.012-380.10, Florida Statutes. DRI is defined in Section 380.06(1), Florida Statutes. The procedure for reviewing DRI applications is set out in Section 380.06, Florida Statutes. Several government agencies are involved in the review process, including TBRPC. The Department of Community Affairs is required to, among other things, adopt rules governing the review of DRI applications. Section 380.06(23)(a), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to this authority, the Department of Community Affairs has adopted Chapter 9J-2, Florida Administrative Code. These Rules wee promulgated to "ensure uniform procedural review of developments of regional impact by [the Department of Community Affairs] and regional planning agencies under this section." Section 380.06(23)(a), Florida Statutes. The Bureau of State Planning is the bureau of the Department of Community Affairs with primary responsibility for administering Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, to the extent of the Department of Community Affairs' involvement. Regional planning councils, including the TBRPC, are required to review all DRI applications involving developments in their regions. Section 380.06(12), Florida Statutes, requires that regional planning councils issue a report and make recommendations concerning the impact of proposed DRIs. Regional planning councils, while subject to any rules governing DRI review adopted by the Department of Community Affairs, are authorized to adopt additional rules concerning their review of DRI applications. Section 380.06(23)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Those rules, however, must not be "inconsistent" with the rules governing DRI review adopted by the Department of Community Affairs. TBRPC interprets Section 380.06(23)(c), Florida Statutes, as authorizing the Challenged Rule. What is "inconsistent" for purposes of Section 380.06(23)(c), Florida Statutes, is not specifically defined. Ultimately, the decision on a DRI application is made by the local government in which the DRI is located. Section 380.06(15), Florida Statutes. In making that decision the local government is required to consider the local government's comprehensive plan and land development regulations, the State Comprehensive Plan and the report and recommendations of the regional planning council. Section 380.06(14), Florida Statutes. Local governments are governed by the provisions of Section 380.06(15), Florida Statutes, in determining whether to issue a DRI. A local government's decision on a DRI application may be appealed to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as "FLWAC"). Section 380.07, Florida Statutes. The final decision on the DRI application, if an appeal is taken, is made by FLWAC after a formal administrative hearing is conducted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Regional planning councils have the right to appeal a local government's decision. In determining whether a DRI should be granted, local governments are not bound by any of the comments made by the regional planning council that reviewed the DRI application. They are only required to consider the comments of the regional planning council made pursuant to Section 380.06(12), Florida Statutes. Should the local government fail to adequately take into account the comments of the regional planning council, however, it faces the possibility that the regional planning council will appeal the local government's decision on a DRI application to FLWAC. The Role of Comprehensive Plans in DRI Reviews; Establishing Levels of Service. The local government comprehensive plan and the land development regulations which a local government is required to consider when reviewing a DRI application are required by Part II of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. Every local government in Florida is required by Section 163.3167, Florida Statutes, to adopt a comprehensive plan. Land development regulations governing the issuance of development orders are required by Section 163.3202, Florida Statutes. In the TBRPC region the comprehensive plans of all local governments, except St. Petersburg Beach and Port Richey, have been found by the Department of Community Affairs to be in compliance with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. Among other things, each comprehensive plan must provide for transportation facilities within the local government's geographic area. Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes. The Legislature has required that local governments specifically establish levels of service for public facilities in their comprehensive plans. Section 163.3177(10)(f), Florida Statutes. See also Rule 9J-5.005(3), Florida Administrative Code. A "level of service" for a road is the quantification of the quality of travel on the road expressed by letter grades rating from an optimal operating condition of "A" to a rating of unstable operational conditions of "F". Local governments are required by Section 380.06(14), Florida Statutes, to insure that a development is consistent with its comprehensive plan. Therefore, it must insure that a DRI is consistent with the levels of service contained therein. See also Section 163.3194, Florida Statutes. The Florida Department of Transportation has also been specifically authorized to establish levels of service for state roads. Sections 334.044(10) and 336.45, Florida Statutes. The Department of Transportation has adopted Chapter 14-94, Florida Administrative Code, establishing levels of service for its use. The Department of Community Affairs has required that levels of service contained in local comprehensive plans be compatible with Department of Transportation levels of service "to the maximum extent feasible". Rule 9J- 5.0055(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code. The Legislature has not specifically required or authorized regional planning councils to adopt levels of service. Nor has the Legislature specifically prohibited regional planning councils from adopting levels of service. The City's and Pasco's Comprehensive Plans. Pasco's comprehensive plan has been adopted and in compliance since June, 1989. In its comprehensive plan, Pasco has included levels of service for State roads which are compatible with those established by the Department of Transportation. Pasco uses the levels of service contained in its comprehensive plan to review DRI applications. The City adopted its comprehensive plan by Ordinance No. 89-167, in July, 1989. The City's comprehensive plan has been found to be in compliance with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The City's comprehensive plan contains transportation levels of service in its Traffic Circulation Element. The City uses the levels of service contained in its comprehensive plan to review DRI applications. The Challenged Rule. Pursuant to Section 186.507(1), Florida Statutes, TBRPC is required to include in its comprehensive regional policy plan regional issues that may be used in its review of DRI applications and the criteria TBRPC intends to rely on in its review. As part of its comprehensive regional policy plan, TBRPC has enacted Policy 20.11.1 of Goal 20 of the Future Of The Region, A Comprehensive Regional Policy Plan for the Tampa Bay Region, as Rule 29H-9.002, Florida Administrative Code. Notice of the Challenged Rule was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on July 24, 1992. The Challenged Rule was approved by TBRPC on September 14, 1992, and it was filed for adoption on October 12, 1992. The Challenged Rule provides: Development of Regional Impact (DRIs) shall be required to analyze project impacts and mitigate to an appropriate peak hour, peak season operating Level of Service (LOS) on regional roads. The level of service standards for DRI's within the Tampa Bay regional shall be: Rural Roads (those not included - C in an urbanized or urbanizing area or a TCMA Within designated CBDs - E Within designated Regional - E Activity Centers Within Transportation Concurrency - as Management Areas (TCMA) established pursuant to Sec. 9J-5.0057 Constrained or Backlogged - maintain Facilities existing V/C (Volume to Capacity) All other regional roadways - D If the affected local government(s) has more stringent standards, those standards will apply. TBRPC adopted the Challenged Rule to fulfill its responsibility to include the criteria for transportation impacts to be used in its DRI review in its comprehensive regional policy plan. TBRPC has been using levels of service for review of transportation impacts of DRIs since 1975. There are levels of service contained in the comprehensive plans of the City and Pasco which are different than some of the levels of service contained in the Challenged Rule. The Challenged Rule provides that the levels of service contained therein are to be used by TBRPC in its review of DRI applications except to the extent that a level of service contained in the local government's comprehensive plan may be more stringent. To the extent that a level of service in the Challenged Rule is more stringent, however, TBRPC intends to recommend to the local government the use of its more stringent level of service. Ultimately, if the local government decides to use a less stringent level of service contained in its comprehensive plan and its decision is appealed, FLWAC will be required to exercise its authority to determine which level of service is consistent with Florida law. The Challenged Rule does not require that local governments accept the levels of service created therein. The Challenged Rule establishes the levels of service that the TBRPC will use in its review and comment on DRI applications. The Challenged Rule also puts developers on notice of the levels of service that TBRPC will base its review of DRI applications on. While a local government must consider the comments of TBRPC, the Challenged Rule does nothing to change the fact that it is up to the local government, after consideration of its comprehensive plan, the State comprehensive plan and the comments of the TBRPC to make the ultimate decision as to whether a DRI application is consistent with State law. Local governments are not required to accept the levels of service contained in the Challenged Rule. Nor is TBRPC, in fulfilling its responsibility to review DRI applications, required by law to only apply levels of service established by local governments in their comprehensive plan. If a local government decides to apply a more strict level of service contained in the Challenged Rule as a result of a comment from TBRPC or as a result of an appeal to FLWAC, the costs associated with the DRI to the local government, including Pasco and the City, could be increased in order to achieve and maintain the higher level of service. Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code. Pursuant to the authority of Section 380.06(23)(a), Florida Statutes, the Department of Community Affairs adopted Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, sets out the Department of Community Affairs' policy concerning its role in the review of DRI applications. Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, establishes the "minimum standards by which the Department will evaluate transportation conditions in development orders for developments of regional impact " As currently in effect, Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, specifically provides that the Department of Community Affairs, in evaluating a DRI application, will look to the "policies of the local comprehensive plan and Chapter 80 . . ." if a local comprehensive plan is in effect and to the "transportation conditions pursuant to 9J-5, F.A.C., and Chapter 380 . . . " if no local comprehensive plan is in effect. Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, is limited to Department of Community Affairs' evaluations of DRI applications. The Rule does not specify that regional planning councils must utilize the Rule or local government comprehensive plans in their review of DRI applications. The fact that Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, provides that, after a local comprehensive plan has been adopted and found to be in compliance, the levels of service contained therein will be used by the Department of Community Affairs for its purposes does not cause levels of service established by TBRPC for its purposes to be inconsistent with Rule 9J- 2.0255, Florida Administrative Code. The standards established in Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, are only designated as "minimum" standards. Nothing in the Challenged Rule requires the use of any standard less that those "minimum" standards even for purposes of TBRPC's review of DRI applications. The Challenged Rule even specifically provides that, to the extent that a level of service contained in a local government's comprehensive plan is more stringent than that contained in the Challenged Rule, that level of service will be applied by TBRPC. When originally adopted in January, 1987, Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, provided specific transportation levels of service which the Department of Community Affairs intended to use until comprehensive plans containing levels of service were adopted by local governments. The Rule provided, however, that it was not intended to "limit the ability of the regional planning councils and local governments to impose more stringent mitigation measures than those delineated in this rule." Rule 9J-2.0255(8), Florida Administrative Code. This provision is no longer effective. The original rule also did not specifically indicate that levels of service contained in local government comprehensive plans were to be used by the Department of Community Affairs as it now provides. While there was testimony during the final hearing of this matter that the use of different levels of service by TBRPC and the City or Pasco will result in "inconsistent" reviews of DRI applications, there is nothing in Florida Statutes or the Department of Community Affairs' rules that requires consistency in reviews. There was also testimony that such differences will "not promote efficient DRI review." If the Legislature believes the consideration by the TBRPC and local governments of different levels of service in reaching a decision on a DRI application is "inefficient", it has not made its belief clear in Florida Statutes. If the Legislature wants all of the various agencies involved in DRI review to "not disagree" in order to have "efficient" DRI reviews, it must specifically so provide. The Department of Community Affairs reviewed the Challenged Rule. During its review concern was expressed by the then Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs about the inclusion in the Challenged Rule of levels of service. TBRPC was urged "to adopt standards and methodologies for reviewing DRIs that are consistent with those used by the Department of Community Affairs." TBRPC was not, however, told that the use of levels of service consistent with local government comprehensive plans was required by Department of Community Affairs' rules or that the failure of TBRPC to comply with the Department's suggestion would cause the Challenged Rule to be considered inconsistent with Department of Community Affairs' rules. Concern was also expressed during the review of the Challenged Rule to the Department of Community Affairs by the Department of Transportation about possible inconsistencies of the Challenged Rule's levels of service with the Department of Transportation's Rules. Concerns were also raised within the Department of Community Affairs by the Bureau of State Planning. Ultimately, after considering comments from those interested in the Challenged Rule and in spite of the fact that the Department of Community Affairs would prefer that the levels of service used by the Department of Community Affairs, local governments and regional planning councils be the same, the Department of Community Affairs did not conclude that the Challenged Rule was inconsistent with Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, or any other statute or rule. I. Section 32, CS/CS/HB 2315. On April 4, 1993, Section 32, of CS/CS/HB 2315 (hereinafter referred to as "Section 32"), was enrolled. Section 32, if signed by the Governor, creates Section 186.507(14), and provides: (14) A regional planning council may not, in its strategic regional policy plan or by any other means, establish binding level-of- service standards for public facilities and services provided or regulated by local governments. This limitation shall not be construed to limit the authority of regional planning councils to propose objections, recommendations, or comments on local plans or plan amendments. Section 32 has not yet become law. Additionally, it Section 32 becomes law, it will not be effective until July 1, 1993. Section 32 was filed in this proceeding by BAGT on April 7, 1993, after the final hearing of these cases had closed. Section 32 was not available to the parties until immediately before it was filed by BAGT. Therefore, it could not have been raised at the time of the final hearing of these cases.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-15.008, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and because it exceeds Respondent’s rulemaking authority; and Whether an interpretation of Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, constitutes an unpromulgated “rule.”
Findings Of Fact The first 12 findings of fact are facts contained in the Stipulation: Prior to June 2005, Petitioner, Juan Cuellar, Luis Garcia, and Gerardo Quintero, received what appeared to be a valid Miami-Dade Building Business Certificate of Competency. Upon receipt, Petitioners applied to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”), to obtain a registered contractor’s license using the Certificates of Competency. Based on the Certificates of Competency, the Department issued each Petitioner a registered contractor’s license bearing license numbers RG291103667 (Mr. Cuellar), RF11067267 (Mr. Garcia), and RF11067268 (Mr. Quintero). Petitioners each applied for a certificate of authority for their respective businesses, Cuellar Construction and Drywall (Mr. Cuellar), A.P.A. Plumbing Corp. (Mr. Garcia), and Q Plumbing Services Corp. (Mr. Quintero). Based on the fact the Certificates of Competency and the registered contractor’s licenses had been granted, the Department issued a certificate of authority to Cuellar Construction and Drywall, QB 41342; APA Plumbing Corp., QB 42763; and Q Plumbing Services Corp., QB 42825. At the time the Department issued Petitioners their registered contractor’s licenses and subsequent certificates of authority, it did so based solely on the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificates of Competency presented by Petitioners and the only information submitted to it. The parties stipulate that Petitioners were not entitled to their registered contractor’s licenses and certificates of authority because the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificates of Competency were not valid certificates. At the time of their applications to the Department, Petitioners were not qualified by any local jurisdiction or any other method necessary to receive a registered contractor’s license from the Department. The Department filed Administrative Complaints against Petitioners for the suspension or revocation of their licenses based on violations of Sections 489.129(1)(a), 489.129(1)(d), 489.129(1)(m), and 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Administrative Complaints”). (All references to Sections of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, as they relate to the Administrative Complaint are to the 2005 version. All other references to Florida Statutes are to the 2007 version). Each Petitioner challenged the Administrative Complaint filed against him in DOAH Case No. 07-2823PL (Mr. Cuellar), DOAH Case No. 07-2824PL (Mr. Garcia), and DOAH Case No. 07-2825PL (Mr. Quintero). On December 13, 2007, the undersigned, as the Administrative Law Judge to whom the cases had been assigned, issued a Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 07-2823PL (Mr. Cuellar), DOAH Case No. 07-2824PL (Mr. Garcia), and DOAH Case No. 07-2825PL (Mr. Quintero), determining that Petitioners violated Sections 489.129(1)(a), 489.129(1)(m), and 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred collectively as the “Recommended Orders”). The “Recommendation” in each of the Recommended Orders was, except for the name of the Respondent, the same as the following: Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department finding that Luis Garcia violated the provisions of Sections 489.129(1)(a) and (m), and 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I, III, and IV of the Administrative Complaint; dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint; requiring that Respondent pay the costs incurred by the Department in investigating and prosecuting this matter; giving Respondent 30 days to voluntarily relinquish his license; and revoking Respondent’s license if he fails to voluntarily relinquish it within 30 days of the final order. Based upon the foregoing, and the fact that no final decision has been entered by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”), Petitioners are facing the possible revocation or voluntary relinquishment of their licenses (an adverse impact whether they are “entitled” to the licenses or not), continued defense against the Administrative Complaints, and the payment of the cost incurred by the Department in prosecuting the Administrative Complaints. Should the Board revoke Petitioners’ licenses, they will also be precluded from re-applying for licensure for a period of five years pursuant to Section 489.129(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioners face the same consequence even if they voluntarily relinquish their license pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.017(3)(a). The adverse consequences of the possible final action on the Administrative Complaints which they face stem in part from a finding that they have violated Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides the following: The board may take any of the following actions against any certificateholder or registrant: place on probation or reprimand the licensee, revoke, suspend, or deny the issuance or renewal of the certificate, registration, or certificate of authority, require financial restitution to a consumer for financial harm directly related to a violation of a provision of this part, impose an administrative fine not to exceed $10,000 per violation, require continuing education, or assess costs associated with investigation and prosecution, if the contractor, financially responsible officer, or business organization for which the contractor is a primary qualifying agent, a financially responsible officer, or a secondary qualifying agent responsible under 489.1195 is found guilty of any of the following acts: Obtaining a certificate, registration, or certificate of authority by fraud or misrepresentation. . . . . Petitioners were found in the Recommended Orders to have violated Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, based upon an interpretation of that statutory provision adopted by the Board in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-15.008, an existing rule which Petitioners have challenged in this proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the “Challenged Existing Rule”), which provides: Material false statements or information submitted by an applicant for certification or registration, or submitted for renewal of certification or registration, or submitted for any reissuance of certification or registration, shall constitute a violation of Section 489.129(1)(a), F.S., and shall result in suspension or revocation of the certificate or registration. Essentially the same conclusions of law were reached in the Recommended Orders concerning the application of the Challenged Existing Rule (in paragraphs numbered “23” through “25” or “25” through 27” of the Recommended Orders): While Respondent has not been specifically charged with a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4- 15.008, the Department cited the Rule, which contains the following interpretation of what constitutes "[o]btaining a certificate, registration, or certificate of authority by . . . misrepresentation" in violation of Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in support of Count I of the Administrative Complaint: . . . . It is the Department’s position, that despite the fact that Respondent did not commit “fraud” in obtaining his license and a certificate of authority for [the business] and, in fact, did not knowingly submit false information to the Department in obtaining his license and the certificate of competency, “[m]aterial false statements or information” were nonetheless submitted by Respondent in support thereof. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4- 15.008, in defining what constitutes the act of "[o]btaining a certificate, registration, or certificate of authority by . . . misrepresentation” eliminates the need for the Department to prove any knowledge on the part of Respondent that he has made a material misrepresentation or any intent on the part of Respondent to rely upon a material misrepresentation. All that is required is proof that a material representation was made and that the representation was false. Petitioners have challenged the validity of the Challenged Existing Rule as being an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes. Petitioners were also found in the Recommended Orders to have violated Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, based upon an interpretation of that statutory provision advanced by the Department during the prosecution of the Administrative Complaints. Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, provides that the following act constitutes grounds for which disciplinary action may be taken: (h) Attempting to obtain, obtaining, or renewing a license to practice a profession by bribery, by fraudulent misrepresentation, or through an error of the department or the board. (Emphasis added). The Department’s argument concerning the appropriate interpretation and application of Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, advanced in the prosecution of the Administrative Complaints, was advanced in paragraphs 24 through 26 of the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order: Obtaining a certificate or registration in error as a result of a misrepresentation made during the application process is conduct proscribed by Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued a registration by error of the Department. To be issued a registration by the Department, an applicant must submit along with an application for registration, a copy of the applicant’s validly issued competency card from a local government licensing board . . . . Respondent submitted a fake competency card that appeared to be validly issued by the Miami Compliance Office. . . . If the Department had known Respondent’s Competency Card was fake and Respondents’ answer to the attest statement was false, the Department would not have issued Respondent a registration. Thus, since the Department did not have truthful and accurate information, the registration issued to Respondent was in error. The Department’s interpretation was described and accepted in the Recommended Orders (in paragraphs numbered “29” through “31” or “31” through 33”, in the Recommended Orders), as follows: In support of this alleged violation, the Department has argued that Respondent obtained his license “through an error of the department . . . .” That “error” was the Department’s reliance upon an improperly issued Miami-Dade building business Certificate of Competency. The evidence proved clearly and convincingly that the Department issued the Respondent’s license in “error.” While it is true that Respondent did not intentionally cause or even know of the error, the Department reasonably takes the position that Respondent obtained his license nonetheless as a result of this error and that is all that Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes. The Department has proved clearly and convincingly that Respondent violated Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes [requires]. Although not specifically quoted in their Petition in this case, Petitioners have quoted what they believe is the unpromulgated rule of the Board which they are challenging in this case in paragraph 60 of Petitioner’s Proposed Final Order (hereinafter referred to as the “Challenged Language”): . . . . Essentially, the Board applies the following unadopted rule when applying Section 455.227(1)(h): Disciplinary action may be taken pursuant to Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, where an individual attempts to obtain a license through an error of the department even if the individual did not have knowledge of the error. As of the date of the final hearing of this matter, the Board had taken no action on the Recommended Orders.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: During the development stage of a condominium project, known as Lake Villas Condominium, in Altamonte Springs, Florida, First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando foreclosed on some forty (40) units of the project. At that time, approximately in November of 1975, thirty-one (31) units already had fee- simple owners or were under a lease/purchase option and they were not involved in the foreclosure proceedings. Mr. David McComb, a vice-president and mortgage loan officer with First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, was given the responsibility of assuring the completion of the remaining units, selling the units and setting up a homeowners' association for the Lake Villas Condominium. The petitioner Lake Villas Condominium Association's five-position board of directors was originally comprised of three members who were personnel of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, so that First Federal would have majority control at a time when it held the ownership to the majority of the units. In June of 1976, thirty-seven of the seventy-one units had been sold to individuals. Thereafter, the composition of the petitioner's board of directors changed and the individual-unit owners held the majority of the five positions. Mr. McComb, as a representative of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, remained on the board of directors and continued First Federal's attempts to sell the remaining unsold units. First Federal retained a sales representative who lived in one of the condominium units, operated her sales office from one of the vacant units owned by First Federal and was paid a real estate commission when she sold a unit. The sales contract on the last of the units owned by First Federal was closed on December 12, 1977. Prior to mid-1976, the Florida Power Corporation account for seven or eight common element meters was in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, doing business as Lake Villas Condominium Association, and the billing statements were mailed to the Orlando office of First Federal Savings and Loan. In June or July of 1976, after the majority of units had been purchased by individual owners and majority control of the board of directors was obtained by the individual owners, Mr. McComb of First Federal placed a telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office. The purpose of this call was to inform respondent that First Federal wanted the account name and address for the seven or eight meters changed and to inform respondent that the Lake Villas Condominium Association had taken over responsibility for the accounts. Mr. McComb spoke on the telephone to a female who handled commercial accounts for the respondent's Winter Park office and informed her that he wanted the name of First Federal Savings and Loan taken off the account and the bills to be mailed to the Lake Villas Condominium Association at a post office box in Altamonte Springs. The female to whom Mr. McComb spoke took down the information regarding the account numbers and change of billing names and addresses, and told him she would take care of it. Mr. McComb did not inquire about a rate adjustment, and no discussion was had concerning rates for the seven or eight meters. Following the June or July, 1976, discussion between Mr. McComb and a female at the respondent's Winter Park office concerning a change in billing name and address, the billing statements were sent and received at the post office address of the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. in Altamonte Springs. Approximately one year later, in mid-1977, Mr. McComb was forwarded some delinquent notices on the seven or eight meters. They had originally been sent to the petitioner's post office box in Altamonte Springs, but were thereafter forwarded to Mr. McComb's attention at First Federal. Mr. McComb noticed that, although the post office address had been changed, the accounts were still in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando. He then placed another telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office, spoke with a female in the commercial department and requested that the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando be removed from the account and that the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be inserted as the new-named customer. The female informed Mr. McComb that this request would be taken care of and that nothing further need be done. No inquiry by Mr. McComb or discussion was had concerning a rate adjustment for these seven or eight meters. Electricity for the individual living units of the Lake Villas Condominiums are separately metered. In addition, there are seven or eight separately billed meters which service the common areas of the condominium, such as the two swimming pools, the internal street and sidewalk lighting, the clubhouse and small post lamps for an open green area. From at least April of 1979 through October of 1980, no commercial activity occurred in any of the condominium units. In April of 1979, Mr. O. K. Armstrong became the manager of the Lake Villas Condominiums and was responsible for the association's financial transactions. He noticed in May of 1979 that the bills for the seven or eight subject meters contained the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, though they did list the condominium's post office box number for the address. After speaking with Mr. McComb about the matter, Mr. Armstrong telephoned a Mr. Harbour at the respondent's Winter Park office. It was during this discussion that petitioner, through Mr. Armstrong, learned that the seven or eight common element meters might qualify for a residential, as opposed to the higher commercial, rate. Thereafter, the rates for the seven or eight meters were changed by Florida Power Corporation from commercial to residential. The request of Mr. Armstrong for a retroactive application of those residential rates to January 1, 1976, which would amount to a refund of all amounts paid in excess of the residential rates from that date, was denied by Mr. Harbour, respondent's office manager in Winter Park. During the hearing, the petitioner verbally amended the request for retroactive application of the residential rate from January 1, 1976, to July of 1976.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition filed by the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Mapp Hunter, Pattillo, Marchman, Mapp and Davis Post Office Box 340 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Blair W. Clack Assistant Counsel Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Arthur Shell Public Service Commission Legal Department 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, Robert Dugger, committed the violations alleged in an Amended Administrative Complaint, DPBR Case Number 2002-007094, filed by the Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation on April 11, 2006, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of community association management pursuant to Chapters 455 and 468, Florida Statutes. (Stipulated Fact). Robert Dugger, is and was at the times material to this proceeding a licensed Florida Community Association Manager (hereinafter referred to as a “CAM”), having been issued license number CAM 1148. (Stipulated Fact). At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger’s address of record was 7401 Beach View Drive, North Bay Village, Florida 33141. Miramar Gardens. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger was employed by Timberlake Group, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Timberlake”). In his capacity with Timberlake, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for 30 homeowners’ associations. In particular, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Association”). (Stipulated Fact). The Association is made up of approximately 350 homeowner members. The Association was initially created by the Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc., Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions adopted on or about December 16, 1975. By-Laws for the Association were also adopted on December 16, 1975. Article X of the By-Laws provides the following homeowners’ rights concerning the books and records of the Association: The books, records and papers of the Association shall at all times, during reasonable business hours, be subject to inspection by any Member. The Declaration, the Articles and these By-Laws shall be available for inspection by any Member at the principal office of the Association, where copies may be purchased at reasonable cost. Prior to 2001, the Association, along with Vista Verde Townhome Homeowners Association (hereinafter referred to as “Vista Verde”), an adjacent community association, had been placed in receivership and was managed by a civilian board. These events came about due to the dismal state the two communities were in. Crime was rampant, there were no street signs or lights, common areas and alleys were unkempt, there were abandoned vehicles, and the associations for both areas were essentially non-existent. Miami-Dade County had taken over ownership of many homes in the community by foreclosure. Mr. Dugger became involved early with the reorganization and revitalization of the Association and Vista Verde. In 1997, Mr. Dugger was appointed by the receiver as the CAM for the Association and Vista Verde. At the end of 2000, the Association was ready to govern itself. Toward that end, on or about December 21, 2000, the Association and Timberlake, entered into a Management Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Management Agreement”). Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Timberlake was designated as the “Exclusive Managing Agent” for the Association commencing January 1, 2001. Among the duties assumed by Timberlake, are the following: 2) MAINTENANCE OF ASSOCIATION FILES: The Manager will collect, organize and maintain in the office of the Manager, all Association information, including but not limited to the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, Declaration of, [sic] Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, site plans, owner lists, correspondence, rules and regulations, blue prints, specifications, corporate minutes, all maintenance and service contracts in effect and the necessary administrative financial information related to the Association. 8) ASSISTANCE TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: The Manager will provide administrative support services to the Board of Directors, to include notifying Directors of Board meetings, circulating minutes of the preceding meeting, as prepared by the Secretary . . . . Timberlake has continued to provide the services of Mr. Dugger as CAM since 2001. During his tenure, street signs and lights have been installed, the common areas have been cleared, and the community has greatly improved. Proposed findings of fact 14 through 19 of Mr. Dugger’s Proposed Recommended Order generally describe Mr. Dugger’s efforts as CAM, the improvement of the community, and Mr. Dugger’s reputation as CAM. Count I: Criminal Violations. During 2003, Mr. Dugger served as a city commissioner for the City of North Bay Village, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “Village”). On or about December 12, 2003, Mr. Dugger was charged with eight criminal violations in an Information issued in case number F03-33076, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. The alleged violations arose out of Mr. Dugger’s activities as a city commissioner for the Village. Two of the criminal charges, Counts 2 and 8, are of pertinence to this matter: (a) Count 2 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(d), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes; and (b) Count 8 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(i), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. As to Count 2 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about April 08, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a member of THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did vote on a matter presented to said COMMISSION, to wit: ITEM 7A, AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 152.029 OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE CODE OF ORDINANCES (FIRST READING), when said defendant would or might, directly or indirectly, profit or be enhanced by this action of said COMMISSION on said matter, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s.2.11.1(d) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . As to Count 8 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about July 01, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a MUNICIAL OFFICAL to wit: MEMBER OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did fail to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Chapter 112 (Part III) of the Florida Statutes by failing to DISCLOSE ALL LIABILITIES IN PART E. OF FORM 1 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS FOR 2002, filed with the City Clerk of THE CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s. 2-11.1(i) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . Counts 2 and 8 were based upon the following allegations of the Complaint/Arrest Affidavit: Robert A. Dugger was elected Village Commissioner for the City of North Bay Village on November 19, 2002. On September 21, 2002, Mr. Robert Dugger filed his Statement of Financial Interest for the calendar year 2001, as required by Miami- Dade County ordinance. In Part E of the Statement of Financial Interest (this section is designated for Liabilities – major debts-and asks for the name and address of creditor), Mr. Dugger marked N/A in this section. Commissioner Robert Dugger has substantial indebtedness to Al Coletta that was incurred when Al Coletta assumed the mortgage on one of Dugger’s properties and paid off the mortgage on another. Rachael Dugger admitted these debts under oath during her sworn statement. Commissioner Dugger failed to report these debts on his Statement of Financial Interest. Additionally, on March 15, 2001, a Summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure was ordered and adjudged on behalf International Financial Bank, against Tomin Incorporated, and Robert Dugger and Rachael Dugger personally, in the amount of $1,154,427.50. Following the Judgement on March 15, 2001, title of the property in question was acquire by International Finance Bank on Mary [sic] 2, 2001 and sold to a third party on June 1, 2001. The sale amount of the property was $750,000. A short fall of $404,427.50 remained after the sale and is still unpaid. Commissioner Dugger also failed to report this debt on his Statement of Financial Interest for the year 2001. . . . . Based on Commissioner Robert Dugger’s indebtedness to Al Coletta, he had a Conflict of Interest by voting on matters involving Al Coletta, that came before the North Bay Village Commission, each vote is a separate violation of the Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second [degree] misdemeanor. Commissioner Dugger violated the aforementioned Section 2-11.1(d), of the Miami-Dade Code on the following occasions: April 8, 2002, Item 7A, Page 7 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes: A zoning amendment concerning property owned by Al Coletta. Page 14 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes, Commissioner Dugger voted – yes, for approval of the ordinance. . . . . . . . . This action is in violation of Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second-degree misdemeanor . . . . Additionally, Commissioner Dugger is in violation of Section 2-11.1(i)(3), Miami- Dade County Conflict of Interest and Code of Ethics Ordinance. This Section required that candidates for County and municipal office must comply with the filing requirements, under Chapter 112, Florida State Statutes. This is a second-degree misdemeanor. . . . Section 2-11.1(d) of the Miami-Dade County Code, prohibits, in pertinent part, the following: Additionally, no person included in the term defined in subsection (b)(1) shall vote on or participate in any way in any matter presented to the Board of County Commissioners if said person has any of the following relationships with any of the persons or entities which would be or might be directly or indirectly affected by any action of the Board of County Commissioners: (i) officer, director, partner, of counsel, consultant, employee, fiduciary or beneficiary; or (ii) stockholder, bondholder, debtor, or creditor, if in any instance the transaction or matter would affect the person defined in subsection (b)(a) in a manner distinct from the manner in which it would affect the public generally. . . . Section 2-11.1(i)(3), of the Miami-Dade County Code, requires that candidates for County and municipal elective office meet the filing requirements of Chapter 112, Part III, Florida Statutes, “at the same time that candidate files qualifying papers.” Section 125.69, Florida Statutes, which provides procedures for the prosecution of county ordinances, states that they are to be prosecuted “in the same manner as misdemeanors are prosecuted.” On July 29, 2005, Mr. Dugger entered a plea of nolo contendere to Counts 2 and 8 of the Information, in case number F03-33076, both second-degree misdemeanor violations of Section 2-11.1 of the Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. (Stipulation of Fact). Mr. Dugger was adjudicated guilty of the violations alleged in Counts 2 and 8, and was ordered to pay $468.00 in fines and costs. Mr. Dugger was, therefore, adjudicated guilty of having voted on a matter in which he had a conflict of interest because the matter involved an individual to whom he was indebted; and of having failed to fully disclose liabilities on financial disclosure forms he was required to file pursuant to Florida law at the time he qualified to run for public office. Neither of the convictions directly involved Mr. Dugger’s practice as a CAM. Nor has the Department made such an argument. Instead, the Department presented expert testimony in support of its position that at least one of the convictions relates to Mr. Dugger’s ability to practice as a CAM. That testimony was convincing. All CAMs are involved in a fiduciary relationship with the associations they manage. It takes little expert testimony to support a finding that such a fiduciary relationship requires trust and integrity. CAMs must be trusted to handle association money, maintain the records of the association, and to deal on behalf of the association with potential and existing vendors. The association must be able to assume that a CAM will fully disclose any possible conflict the CAM may have with the association’s vendors. Mr. Dugger is responsible for billing, writing checks, paying insurance premiums, and maintaining a payment book for the Association. Paragraph 10 of the Management Agreement specifically provides that Timberlake “shall provide financial management services to the Association . . . .” Paragraph D(11)(a) authorizes Timberlake to “solicit and analyze bids for necessary insurance coverage.” Mr. Dugger has similar responsibilities with Vista Verde. Clearly, the Association must be able to trust that Mr. Dugger will carry out all these duties without having any conflict of interest. The Association must be able to assume that Mr. Dugger is acting in its best interest and not his own. In his defense as to the voting of interest conflict charge, Mr. Dugger, prior to the pertinent vote, made disclosure of his relationship with Mr. Coletta, the owner of the property which was the subject of the vote, to the attorney for the City of the Village. The Department failed to prove that Mr. Dugger did not make full disclosure. Mr. Dugger was advised that no conflict existed. Mr. Dugger cast his vote after receiving this advice. Subsequent to the vote, Mr. Dugger sought an opinion from the Miami-Dade County Commission on Ethics & Public Trust (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”). The Commission, like the city attorney, opined in writing that no conflict of interest existed. Mr. Dugger entered his plea on the two charges in order to avoid the cost of litigation. The evidence, however, failed to prove why prosecutors agreed to accept a plea on only two of the eight counts. Count IV: Alleged Denial of Access to the Records of the Association. During 2003, Miryam Ruiz lived in Miramar Gardens Township and was a member of the Association. While she had been in arrears for 2001 and 2002, presumably in her association dues, she became current when she paid all outstanding dues in March 2003. On March 14, 2003, during normal business hours, Ms. Ruiz went to the office of Timberlake and requested that she be allowed to inspect certain records of the Association. She made her request verbally and in writing, leaving Petitioner’s Exhibit 13 with a Timberlake employee, apparently the receptionist, which listed the documents she wanted to inspect. She was told by the receptionist that she could not see the documents until she had made an appointment to do so. By letter dated Thursday, March 27, 2003, Ms. Ruiz was informed by Mr. Dugger’s wife, Rachel, that Ms. Ruiz could review the documents. She was also told that, “[i]f you would like, call us to make an appointment at your convenience.” On the morning of Monday, March 31, 2003, not having received Ms. Dugger’s March 27th letter, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by facsimile to Timberlake stating that she would be at the office at 11:00 a.m. that morning to “pick up” the documents. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office at 11:00 a.m. she was again told that she could not review the documents because she had no appointment. Ms. Ruiz left the office. Later that day, Ms. Ruiz sent a second facsimile letter addressed to Ms. Dugger. Ms. Ruiz ended the letter by informing Ms. Dugger that she would be at the office the next day, April 1, 2003, “for the inspection and copying of records at 9:30 a.m.” On April 1, 2003, Ms. Ruiz returned to the Timberlake office and was again told that the records were not available because no appointment had been made. Ms. Ruiz told the receptionist that she would return on Friday, April 4, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. to inspect the documents. In a letter to Ms. Dugger dated April 1, 2003, she stated that she was confirming the date and time. The evidence failed to prove whether the letter was received prior to April 4, 2003. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office on April 4, 2003, she was again denied access to the documents and was told by Ms. Dugger that she had no appointment because the date and time suggested by Ms. Ruiz had not been confirmed by Timberlake. Ms. Ruiz left the office. The following day, April 5, 2003, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by certified mail addressed to Mr. Dugger describing the events leading up to that moment and asking what it would take for her to be allowed to inspect the records. Mr. Dugger did not respond to this letter. In response to Ms. Ruiz’ April 5th letter, a letter dated April 22, 2003, was sent by Ms. Dugger. That letter indicated that the records would be available for inspection at 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday, May 6, 2003. The letter, which was postmarked May 2, 2003, ten days after the date of the letter, was not received by Ms. Ruiz prior to May 6th. Sometime during the month of May 2003, approximately two months after first attempting to review the records of the Association, Ms. Ruiz was finally allowed to inspect the records. Ms. Ruiz, without doubt, had the right to review the records of the Association she had requested. Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Mr. Dugger was required to collect, organize and maintain the records of the Association. The Management Agreement also required that Mr. Dugger was to assist the Board of Directors in their enforcement of the provisions of the “Association documents and rules and regulations ” Pursuant to Article X of the By-Laws of the Association, also quoted, supra, gives Association members the right to inspect and copy all Association documents The right to inspect association documents is not an unfettered one. In light of the duty and responsibility of a CAM to “maintain” records, it is not unreasonable for a CAM to set reasonable safeguards for a member’s review of those records. The Department did not produce evidence to refute the evidence presented by Mr. Dugger concerning the reasonableness of a CAM insisting on being present during the inspection of documents. The evidence also failed to prove that, given the fact that Mr. Dugger is the CAM for as many as 30 associations, he is not always available at his office to supervise a review of documents. The procedure followed with regard to reviews of the Association’s had been announced at an Association meeting. Members were told that anyone who wished to review records could contact the Timberlake office and make an appointment so Mr. Dugger could be present during an inspection, or that a copy of a document could be obtained upon payment for the document. It is clear that not all of the requests to Timberlake made by Ms. Ruiz were totally reasonable: (a) her first request on April 14, 2003, was without any notice; (b) her notice of March 31, 2003, gave only three hours notice; (c) her request for review on April 1, 2003, gave only one day notice; and (d) her request for review on April 4, 2003, gave only 3 days notice. While Ms. Ruiz eventually was allowed to review the documents, it took approximately two months after her initial request had been made. It is also clear that, although she did not always give reasonable notice for appointments she announced, Mr. Dugger (and his employees) could and should have done more to remedy the situation. Mr. Dugger first became aware of the request on March 14, 2003. It took 13 days to respond to that request. When Ms. Ruiz mailed a certified letter to Mr. Dugger dated April 5, 2003, it was not until May 2, almost a month later that a letter in response to that letter was post-marked. Based upon the foregoing, while neither Ms. Ruiz nor Mr. Dugger did much to ameliorate the situation, for at least part of the two months it took Ms. Ruiz to obtain access to the records of the Association, Mr. Dugger “denied” Ms. Ruiz access to the records of the Association. Count VI: Alleged Failure to Maintain Association Records. Pursuant to the Management Agreement entered into by Mr. Dugger with Miramar Gardens, at paragraph D(2), quoted, supra, Mr. Dugger agreed to collect, organize, and maintain all Association documents in the offices of Timberlake. Beginning in 2001, the minutes of meetings of the Association (held jointly with the meeting of Vista Verde) were usually taken by Claudette Brinson, president of the Association. On occasions, they were taken by others. Minutes taken by Ms. Brinson were written by hand and, after the meeting, were taken home with her. On some occasions, Ms. Brinson would ensure that her hand-written minutes were typed at various locations, including Mr. Dugger’s office. When typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, a copy was retained by Mr. Dugger and maintained with the records of the Association. Ms. Brinson’s testimony at hearing as to whether Mr. Dugger was given a copy of all minutes was in conflict. She initially testified that she had provided him with a copy of all minutes. When recalled by Mr. Dugger, she testified that on some occasions, when she did not have the minutes typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, while maintaining a copy at her home, she did not always provide him with a copy. While the latter testimony was more convincing and has been credited, the bottom line is that Mr. Dugger did not maintain a copy of the minutes from all meetings of the Association. At hearing, Mr. Dugger admitted that when he was served an Investigative Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Department on or about August 30, 2004, he realized that he did not have all the records the subpoena sought. In particular, Mr. Dugger did not have all of the documents requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “[t]he minutes of all meetings of the board of directors and of the members of Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc.” Mr. Dugger, therefore, contacted Ms. Brinson and asked her if she could provide a copy of the minutes of Association meetings that he did not have. She was not able to do so within the time Mr. Dugger had to respond to the subpoena. In a letter to the Department dated September 17, 2004, Mr. Dugger indicted the following with regard to the minutes requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “The Minutes in our possession. Original minute meetings are in the hands of the Receiver, which were retained for his records. Some additional minutes are in the hands of Board members, which we will attempt to locate.” During calendar year 2002, minutes had been kept for meetings held during February, March, April, May, June, July, October, and December. During calendar year 2003, minutes had been kept for meetings held during January, February, March, May, June, July, August, September, October, and November. Finally, during calendar year 2004, minutes were kept for meetings held in January, February, March, April, July, August and September. Mr. Dugger at the time of responding to the Department’s subpoena did not have minutes for all of these meetings. For example, for 2002 he only had minutes for the meetings held in February, March, and June, and for 2003, he only had minutes for the meetings held in January and December. While Ms. Brinson adequately explained why she was not always able to provide a copy of meeting minutes to Mr. Dugger, Mr. Dugger did not provide an adequate explanation as to why he had not made sure that he obtained a copy of all minutes so that he could fulfill his obligation under the Management Agreement. No evidence was presented to suggest that Mr. Dugger’s failure to maintain all minutes was the result of bad faith or any intent on the part of Mr. Dugger to circumvent the rules of the Department or the requirements of the Management Agreement. Prior Discipline Against Mr. Dugger’s CAM License. Mr. Dugger’s CAM license was disciplined in DBPR Case Number 00-02226, pursuant to a Stipulation entered into by the Department and Mr. Dugger which was accepted by Final Order entered on April 9, 2001. The Stipulation provides that Mr. Dugger “neither admits or denies the . . . facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint ”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding that Mr. Dugger committed the violations described in this Recommended Order and imposing the following penalties: A stayed suspension of his license for six months, with the stay being lifted should Mr. Dugger be found to have committed any additional violation with regard to his CAM license within two years of the issuance of the final order in this case; An administrative fine in the amount of $1,500.00; Attendance at continuing education classes in records maintenance in an amount to be determined by the Department; and Payment of the costs of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Philip F. Monte, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 E. Gary Early, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Anthony B. Spivey, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
