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KEVIN SCULLY vs SAM PATTERSON AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 05-000058 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 07, 2005 Number: 05-000058 Latest Update: May 23, 2005

The Issue Whether Sam Patterson’s proposed dock project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d).

Findings Of Fact The Parties Mr. Scully resides at 941 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 16, adjacent to and south-southeast of Mr. Patterson's residential property. The northern or rear portion of Mr. Scully's lot borders on an artificial canal that is designated a Class III water by Department rule. He does not have a dock per se; he moors his boat against and parallel to a narrow concrete area (and his lot line), separated by buffering material. Mr. Patterson, the applicant, owns the property at 930 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 15. Lot 15 is north-northwest and adjacent to Mr. Scully’s property. This residential property is currently leased to others. The residential property (Lot 14) adjacent to and north-northeast of Mr. Patterson's lot is apparently owned by an individual named Meloche. The Department has the jurisdiction to determine whether the proposed project is exempt from ERP requirements. The Proposed Project On or about September 13, 2004, Mr. Patterson filed an application requesting an exemption to replace an existing five- foot by 21-foot (105-square feet) marginal dock in the same location, configuration, and dimensions as the existing dock. He also requested an exemption to install a five-foot by 16-foot (80-square feet) wooden finger pier extending perpendicular to and from the middle of the existing marginal dock. As of the final hearing, the project has been revised such that the wooden finger pier will extend 11.8 feet (rather than 16 feet) and perpendicular from the middle of the marginal dock. Mr. Patterson changed the length of the finger pier to comply with City regulations, which are not at issue in this case. The “Site Plan” is attached to the Department’s Notice of Determination of Exemption. (JE 1). The “Site Plan” shows a one-story residence on Mr. Patterson's Lot 15. The front of the lot measures 100 feet, whereas the rear of the lot (that abuts the canal on the easternmost portion of the lot) is 50 feet in length from south to north. The seawall is one-and-one-half feet in width. The existing marginal dock abuts the seawall running south to north and is 21 feet long and five feet wide. Small concrete platforms abut the marginal dock on the south and north. The Department reviewed the original application and on October 13, 2004, advised Mr. Patterson, in part, that his project was exempt from the need to obtain an ERP under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d). The Department had not reviewed the change to the project prior to the final hearing. See Finding of Fact 5. Lots 16, 15, and 14 are situated as a cul-de-sac (semi- circle) with the canal north of Lot 16, east of Lot 15, and south of Lot 14. Lot 14 is across the canal from Mr. Scully's Lot 16. There are five properties on each side of the canal, running west to east. The artificial canal runs directly east from Mr. Patterson’s property for an uncertain distance to the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW). Mr. Patterson’s property (Lot 15) is the western end-point for this canal. Mr. Patterson’s eastern property line (fronting the canal) is 50 feet in width. However, the precise width of the canal between Lots 14 and 16 is unclear. Ms. Smith reports (in her site inspection report of March 3, 2005 (JE 3)) that the canal is approximately 50 feet wide. Mr. Patterson testified that Karen Main with the City of Boynton Beach advised him that the consensus opinion of City employees reviewing the issue was that the canal measured 66 feet in width. There appears to be some widening of the canal east of Mr. Patterson’s property line and then the canal appears to straighten-out as it proceeds to the east to the ICW and past the easterly property lines for Lots 14 and 16. See (JEs 1-site plan; 5-aerial). The weight of the evidence indicates that the canal, between Lots 14 and 16, is approximately 60 to 66 feet wide. See, e.g., id. In the past, the prior owner of Lot 15 (Mr. Patterson's property) moored a boat at and parallel to the marginal dock, which means that the bow, for example, faced Lot 14 and the stern faced Lot 16. Mr. Patterson currently owns a 16-foot boat that he wants to moor at the marginal dock. However, he feels that it is unsafe to do so, particularly if Mr. Scully’s boat drifts. Meloche (Lot 14 to the north) has a fixed boatlift, which allows for the elevation of a boat out of the water, with the bow facing west toward and in front of the northern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. (JE 4). Mr. Scully moors his boat parallel to the shoreline of Lot 16 and perpendicular to Mr. Patterson’s 50-foot eastern seawall and property line. (JEs 4 and 6). Mr. Scully’s seawall intersects Mr. Patterson’s seawall such that when Mr. Scully’s 22-foot boat is moored at his seawall, it is also in front of the southern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. Id. When Mr. Scully’s boat is tightly moored at his seawall, it does not interfere with or block Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 6). However, when Mr. Scully’s boat is loosely moored, it drifts toward the center of the canal in front of Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 4). With no boat moored at the marginal dock, Mr. Scully is able to freely maneuver his boat to his seawall with limited “backing” of his boat required (stern first). With a boat consistently moored at Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock, Mr. Scully would have to back into his area beside his seawall in order to avoid colliding with that boat. Mr. Patterson’s finger pier would enable him to safely moor a boat perpendicular to the marginal dock. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock is likely to make it easier for Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully to navigate to their respective mooring areas, depending on the size of the boats moored by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully. (The Department, in reviewing similar exemption requests, does not consider the type and size of the boat(s) to be moored at the proposed dock or adjacent mooring site.) It is preferable for the boats to be moored, in this location, stern first, with the bow facing down the canal from the wake of the boats traveling in the ICW. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock and mooring Mr. Patterson’s boat on the north side of the finger pier is likely to enable Meloche, Mr. Patterson, and Mr. Scully to moor their boats parallel to each other and avoid collisions.1 Placement of the finger pier at the northern end of the finger pier, while favored over the proposed location by Mr. Scully, is likely to interfere with Meloche’s use of his property and boatlift. With the finger pier centered on the marginal dock and a boat moored to the north, Mr. Scully can maneuver his boat to his seawall by “backing in” stern first. An experienced boater can accomplish this task in two to three maneuvers. Mr. Scully is an experienced boater and has lived on the canal for approximately eight years. Shortening the finger pier from 16 feet to 11.8 feet will not affect Mr. Patterson’s ability to safely moor a boat on the northern side of the finger pier. The Challenge Mr. Scully contends that the placement of the wooden finger pier and the mooring of a sizable boat on the proposed finger pier will interfere with his ability to navigate in and out of the canal in or around his property, and necessarily interfere with his ability to moor his boat adjacent to his property. He also contends that the marginal dock and the finger pier are two docks, not one. Resolution of the Controversy Replacement of the existing marginal dock will consist of replacing the decking and using the existing pilings. The existing marginal dock is currently functional. Reconstruction of the marginal dock and construction of the finger pier will be done by a licensed marine contractor. The licensed marine contractor will use best management practices to avoid water quality problems in the canal during construction. Construction of the proposed project is not expected to adversely affect flood control or violate water quality standards. The proposed project will not impede navigation. But see Endnote 1.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that Mr. Patterson’s proposed dock project, as revised, is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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DONALD FLYNN AND BEVERLY FLYNN vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 96-004737 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 07, 1996 Number: 96-004737 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1998

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.

USC (1) 18 U.S.C 1001 Florida Laws (16) 120.569120.57120.595253.002253.03267.061373.114373.403373.4136373.414373.421373.427373.4275373.430380.06403.031 Florida Administrative Code (5) 18-21.00218-21.00318-21.00418-21.005162-343.075
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G AND G MARINE, INC., AND C-TERM PARTNERS vs PALM BEACH POLO HOLDINGS, INC., AND BROWARD COUNTY, 08-001393 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 19, 2008 Number: 08-001393 Latest Update: Aug. 22, 2011

The Issue Whether Broward County should issue an Environmental Resource Permit (the "ERP" or "Permit") to Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc., for the construction of five finger piers as sized, configured, located and approved by Broward County's Proposed Permit issued in 2007?

Findings Of Fact The Port Laudania Property Port Laudania is a privately-owned marina basin (the "Marina Basin" or the "Basin") in Broward County. Located just off the Dania Cut-off Canal south of Port Everglades, the Marina Basin is not far from the Atlantic Ocean and the Intra-coastal Waterway that lies along all of Florida's east coast. There are no fixed bridges or other impediments to the passage of large sea-going boats and ships between the Basin and the Atlantic. The Marina Basin is an ideal spot to berth large vessels such as yachts and those used in the ocean-freight shipping business. PBPH owns the submerged lands in the western approximate two-thirds of the Basin as well as adjacent uplands. Together, these submerged lands and uplands constitute the parcel located at 750 N.E. 7th Avenue in the City of Dania (the "PBPH Parcel"). Immediately adjacent is a parcel owned by C-Term, a Florida general partnership. Located at 760 N.E. 7th Avenue in Dania, the uplands at the address and the approximate eastern one-third of the Marine Basin (the part not owned by PBPH) comprise the "C-Term Parcel." The PBPH Parcel and the C-Term Parcel make up the Port Laudania Property. Prior to a conveyance in 1987 that divided the Port Laudania Property into two parcels, the property had been under common ownership. The entire property was owned in fee simple by Dennison Marine, Inc. ("DMI"). Just prior to the division of the property into two parcels, DMI conveyed an easement that would ensure that owners and lessees of both parcels would have unhindered access from the Dania Cut-off Canal to their respective parcels: a Cross-use Easement of Ingress and Egress (the "Cross-use Easement"). The Cross-Use Easement for Ingress and Egress On June 29, 1987, DMI executed the Cross-Use Easement.2/ Earlier, DMI had divided the Port Laudania Property into two parcels (Parcel I and Parcel II in the Cross-use Easement, referred-to in this order mainly as the C-Term Parcel and the PBPH Parcel, respectively) and had entered into an Agreement for Deed and Lease with Port Denison, Inc., for the purchase and sale of one of the two parcels. The transaction subject to the agreement had not yet occurred so that DMI remained the sole owner of the Port Laudania Property on the date the Cross-Use Easement was established. The Cross-Use Easement contains the following: WHEREAS, both Parcel I and Parcel II share an inlet off of Dania cut-off Canal, . . . WHEREAS, it is to the mutual advantage of the present and future owners, tenants, invitees, etc. of both Parcel I and Parcel II that the entire inlet be available to the owners of the other parcel for the purposes of ingress and egress; NOW THEREFORE, . . . Denison Marine, Inc., with the consent of Port Denison, Inc., does hereby for itself and its successors and assigns, give and grant to the future owners, tenants and future tenants of all or any portion of the Property, their respective customers, employees, agents, invitees, successors and assigns, a non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress over and across the inlet as described in Composite Exhibit "C" hereto. This non-exclusive easement shall run as a covenant with the land and constitute [sic] an appurtenance thereto. Petitioners' Ex. 1 at 0164-0165. Composite Exhibit "C" of the Cross-Use Easement contains sketches and descriptions of both the "Easterly Portion of the Marina," see id. at 170-171, (the C-Term Parcel) and the "Westerly Portion of the Marina," see id. at 172-173 (the PBPH Parcel.) The descriptions include the entire Basin except for that occupied by the boat lift in the northern end of the Basin.3/ Neither the legal descriptions nor the surveys attached to the Cross-Use Easement depict any finger piers, docks or pilings in the Basin. Under the Cross-Use Easement, the ability of the parties to amend the rights granted therein is governed by the following: This Agreement may be altered, amended or terminated by written document executed by all the then fee simple title holders of all portions of the Property and then record holders of any first mortgages then encumbering any of said lands and recorded in the public records of Broward County, Florida. Petitioners' Ex. 1, second page, BK 1490 PG0165. C-Term has not agreed to amend the Cross-Use Easement to permit construction of the docks contemplated by the 2007 Notice of Intent and Proposed Permit. The rights conferred by the Cross-Use Easement are property rights that govern the use of the Basin. The Basin and the Cut-off Canal The Basin is man-made and frequently referred-to in documents that relate to it as an "inlet" off the Dania Cut-off Canal. Small and medium-sized pleasure crafts, large yachts, mega-yachts,4/ and commercial cargo vessels, some of which are as lengthy as 250 feet regularly pass through The Dania Cut-off Canal in the area of the Basin immediately south of its mouth. Aerial photographs show that the Basin was excavated in the early 1960's. Shortly after excavation, the Port Laudania Property was used as a commercial cargo terminal. Since at least 1967, the Basin has accommodated cargo vessels with lengths up to 250 feet give or take 15 feet. Petitioners' Exhibit 145 is an aerial photograph that shows vessels of approximately 250 feet on both sides of the Basin. For the approximately 250-foot vessel on the east side of the Basin (the C-Term side), the margin of error in measuring the vessels from the aerial is "[p]robably 10 feet, plus or minus." Tr. 1049. G&G has operated numerous vessels in the Basin at lengths of over 200 feet. Of the seven vessels that G&G owned or operated at the time of hearing the maximum length is 234 feet. From April 1999 to March 2006, vessels owned or operated by G&G have struck finger piers or docks on the PBPH side of the Basin "a handful of times." Tr. 893. None of the details of these collisions was produced at hearing. Standard procedure for such incidents would have been to file an internal report or a captain's report, but Mr. Ganoe could not remember whether a report was filed.5/ For his part on the PBPH side of the Basin, Mr. Straub is not aware of any G&G vessels hitting boats moored at the finger piers on the PBPH side of the Basin, indicating that the collisions were not serious. In contrast to evidence that collisions have occurred is evidence from one frequent navigator of the Basin, Jim Steel of Steel Marine Towing. With the exception of the years in college, Mr. Steel has towed vessels in the area of Broward County consistently since 1988 when he began towing with his father at the age of 12. The range in length of the vessels, both commercial and private, that Mr. Steel has towed is from 120 to 250 feet. Mr. Steel has towed hundreds of vessels in and out of the Basin. During those times, he has observed various dock and finger pier configurations. He never collided with the docks on the PBPH side of the Basin with his tugboat or the vessels he towed even when the fifth finger pier was 150 feet long during the time period from 1995-96. Mr. Steel described the Dania Cut-off Canal in the vicinity of the Basin as a congested area with a number of facilities that cater to marine traffic. Large motor yachts (100 feet to 150 feet in length), mega-yachts (longer than 150 feet), commercial vessels (up to 250 feet), smaller pleasure craft as well as other smaller boats comprise the traffic seeking access to facilities along the canal. The facilities include Harbortown Marina across the canal from the Basin, which has some spots for large motor yachts and berths for hundreds of smaller boats up to 90 feet. Facilities in the area that serve mega- yachts are Director's Shipyard, Powell Brothers, and Playboy Marine. In the last five years, new facilities have been opened along the canal for smaller pleasure craft: American Offshore, Dania Beach Club and Dusty's. Mr. Steel described their function, "[t]hey are . . . what you would call rack and stack," (tr. 1562) storing boats sized from 20 to 40 feet pulled in an out of the water and stacked with a forklift. There are eight or nine such facilities west of the Basin. Mr. Steel estimated each of these facilities house at least several hundred boats. Mr. Steel summed up the traffic in the canal: "Some bright sunny days, it is extremely congested, some days it is not as congested, but there's always traffic there." Tr. 1550. 2001: The Delegation Agreement On May 22, 2001, an agreement was entered by three parties. Entitled "Delegation Agreement Among the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, The South Florida Water Management District and Broward County" (the "Delegation Agreement"), it delegated to Broward County's EPD "the authority for permitting, compliance, and enforcement on behalf of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection and the South Florida Water Management District programs." Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 1, at 11, 12. "Section 11E. of the Delegation Agreement provides that permits issued by the County under the Delegation Agreement 'shall consolidate in a single document the permit under part IV of Chapter 373 of the Florida Statutes, and any required Environmental Resource License' ("ERL") required under Chapter 27 of the Broward County Code of Ordinances ("BCC" or "Code").[']" Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 2, at 12. In April of 2002 or thereabouts, Broward Yachts submitted an after-the-fact application to EPD for an ERP and an Environmental Resource License (the "Dock Application"). "The Dock Application sought approval to install six total docks [finger piers] comprised of five [finger piers composed of] floating docks in the Basin, with lengths ranging from 150 feet to 190 feet, and one dock, in the canal parallel to the seawall, with a length of 240 feet." Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 4, at 12. Although the docks were on the PBPH Parcel of the Port Laudania Property, the application was not PBPH's, the owner; instead it was submitted by Broward Yachts, a PBPH tenant. PBPH and C-Term Tenants From November of 1998 to March of 2005, Broward Yachts, Inc. ("Broward Yachts")6/ leased the PBPH Parcel from PBPH for the purpose of manufacture and sale of private yachts and boat dockage. Broward Yachts sold certain of its assets to Lewis Property Investors, Inc., under an Asset Purchase Agreement dated March 2, 2005. On March 8, 2005, Lewis Property Investors' assigned its interest in the Asset Purchase Agreement to Broward Marine. Broward Marine is a Florida limited liability company, formerly engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and servicing private yachts and activities that constituted operation of a marina on the PBPH Property. Broward Marine leased the PBPH Property starting in March of 2005. It continued to occupy the property under a lease-purchase option agreement with PBPH until June of 2009. C-Term's Property is the subject of a tenancy with G&G, an ocean-freight shipping company. G&G, therefore, has shared the Marina Basin with Broward Marine in recent years. Broward Marine's Departure In March 2009, Broward Marine signed an early termination of its lease with PBPH caused by Broward Marine's failure to pay rent. Broward Marine has not been a tenant or otherwise in possession of the PBPH Property since approximately November, 2009.7/ The termination of Broward Marine's lease was effective on June 15, 2009. After termination of the Broward Marine lease, the PBPH Property was re-let to Broward Shipyards, Inc., an entity that is not a party to this proceeding. At the time of the termination, Broward Marine's interests in the 2002 Dock Application and a revision of the application in 2003 (the "2003 Revised Application") were assigned to PBPH.8/ In the meantime, PBPH has pursued the application which had its origin in a complaint about the unpermitted structures and a warning notice issued by the County in 2002. See paragraph 35., et seq., below. The application for the license and permit was for floating docks. Floating Docks The floating docks used by Broward Yachts and others on the PBPH side of the Basin generally come in sections of 8-10 feet. They are secured to existing pilings in the Basin by a collar which slides up and down the piling or, as Mr. Lewis put it at hearing, "[t]hey float up and down . . . as the tide comes in and goes out." Tr. 204. The top of the piling emerges from the water and the rest of the piling extends downward generally into the bedrock at the bottom of the Basin. A series of floating docks make up a finger pier. Finger piers, the structures authorized by the Proposed Permit, can be lengthened or shortened by adding or removing floating docks based on business needs.9/ The ability to easily lengthen or shorten a finger pier in response to the business needs of PBPH or its tenants accounts for one of the main evidentiary features in this proceeding: the many finger pier configurations that appear in aerial photographs over the years and, in particular, since 1998 when PBPH came into ownership of the PBPH Parcel. The floating docks have been constructed of wood and Styrofoam. Those that PBPH seeks to install under the Proposed Permit will be "concrete bathtubs," tr. 580, which "work just as well and are a lot more permanent." Id. Structures made of concrete are of much likely to cause damage in the event of a collision with a vessel than are floating docks made of wood and Styrofoam. Warning Notice and 2002 Dock Application On January 22, 2002, the EPD visited the PHPB Property in response to a complaint about unlicensed docks. Julie Mitchell (then known as "Julie Karczyk"), a Natural Resources Specialist with the County was present on the property during the visit to conduct an inspection. In a Case Summary admitted into evidence, Ms. Mitchell documented the visit with an employee of the State Department of Environmental Protection. The two visitors asked the manager of the property to provide a copy of permits and licenses for the docks on site. If he could not provide them he was advised of the necessity to apply for them. At the time of visit, there were four finger piers composed of floating docks on the PBPH side of the Basin. The four piers protruded into the Basin at an angle similar to the angle of the finger piers shown in the drawings approved by the Proposed Permit. These four docks (from north to south) had lengths of 117, 130, 150 and 150 feet respectively and were each 7.5 feet wide. The northernmost dock was separated from the second dock (the dock immediately to its south) by 52 feet; the second dock was separated from the third by 60 feet; and the third from the fourth by 55 feet. There was also a fifth structure. It may have been a fifth finger pier, but, because of its width which is substantially more than the 7.5 feet, see Petitioners' Ex. 114F (an aerial photograph with a "fly date" of January 2002), it is more likely to have been "work platforms to construct the docks." Tr. 114. Whatever its function, the fifth structure did not protrude into the Basin as far the four others. It was "[r]ight up against the seawall." See id., Petitioners' 125 at 5, and tr. 114. Ms. Mitchell checked the County records and could not locate a license or permit for finger piers or other structures in the Basin. No evidence of a license or permit was provided by either PBPH or any of its tenants. The status of the finger piers and floating docks today remains the same: unlicensed and unpermitted. The County required Broward Yachts as the tenant of the PBPH Property to submit an after-the-fact permit and license application if it wished to keep the structures. Broward Yachts submitted its application for an ERP and Environmental Resource License ("ERL") to the County (the "2002 Dock Application") on April 16, 2002. In the meantime, Broward Yachts installed an additional finger pier in the Basin angled from the seawall just as the four piers observed by Ms. Mitchell. The installation occurred without County authorization. On May 2, 2002, the County issued Warning Notice No. WRN02-0125 (the "Warning Notice"). Directed to both Broward Yachts and PBPH, the Warning Notice contains one count. See Petitioners' Ex. 7. The count reads as follows (bold type in original): Respondent: Broward Yachts, Inc. Respondent: Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. Violated section 27-333(a)(1), BCC, which states: "No person shall conduct or cause to be conducted mangrove alteration, construction, demolition, dredging or filling in regulated aquatic or wetland resources, except in accordance with a currently valid environmental resource license issued by DPEP and all general and specific license conditions therein." By: constructing docks and installing pilings without a valid DPEP Environmental Resource License. Corrective Action: The respondent must apply for an after- the-fact license from the Department for the dock construction and piling installation. The license will not be issued until the respondent obtains a South Florida Water Management District Right-of-Way permit for the pilings located within the Dania Cut-off Canal. Correct within 14 days of this notice. Id. The 2002 Dock Application was filed on April 16, 2002 (prior to the Notice of Warning.) In the meantime and subsequent to the Notice of Warning, the County conducted a review of the 2002 Dock Application. The 2002 Dock Application The 2002 Dock Application was signed by Paul Bichler of Tri County Marine. Mr. Bichler and his company are listed on the application as the "Entity to Receive Permit," see Respondents' Ex. 3 at 3-4, and Bill Thomas of Approved Permit Services, Inc., is listed as the "Agent Authorized to Secure Permit." Id. The owner of the land is shown as Richard Arnold, General Manager of Broward Yachts. Mr. Arnold signed the application in order to give Mr. Thomas the authority to act as the agent of Broward Yachts in securing the permit. There is no mention of PBPH in the application. Part 8 of the 2002 Dock Application requires the applicant to describe in general terms the proposed project, system or activity. Filled in is: "Install Floating Docks!" Id. at 3-5. No other description is offered. The application contains as attachments a map of the site showing the Port Laudania Property and a drawing of Parcel A at the site (the PBPH Parcel.) The drawing shows six finger piers to be installed. Five are attached to the western seawall of the Port Laudania Property at such an angle so that they lie in the Basin in a southwesterly direction (much the same as the four finger piers observed in January of 2002 by Ms. Mitchell). The lengths of the five range from 150 to 190 feet. The fourth and fifth finger piers are proposed to be 180 feet and 155 feet in length, respectively. The sixth pier lies roughly parallel to the southern terminus of the bulkhead on the PBPH Parcel and extends into the mouth of the Basin. Unlike the other five, the sixth structure is not attached to the western seawall. To the south of the bulkhead and with no attachment to the bulkhead, it runs 240 feet in length. At its eastern end, it overlaps the boundary between the Basin and the Dania Cut-off Canal and protrudes into the canal. Id. at 3-9. The drawing also depicts pilings associated with each of the six structures. The floating docks applied for in the 2002 Dock Application were to be made out of Styrofoam and wood. Permitting Criteria/County Review The County's evaluation and processing of the 2002 Dock Application was conducted appropriately pursuant to the Delegation Agreement. Section (1) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.30210/ (the "ERP Additional Conditions Rule") requires an applicant to "provide reasonable assurances that the construction, alteration, operation, maintenance, removal, and abandonment of a system" will meet conditions contained in subsections (a) through (d).11/ For systems located in, on, or over surface waters that are not Outstanding Florida Waters, such as the finger piers and floating dock systems proposed by PBPH, reasonable assurances must be provided that the activity "will not be contrary to the public interest [the "Public Interest Test"] . . . as determined by balancing"12/ seven criteria listed in the ERP Additional Conditions Rule: Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangerment or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the activity will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the activity will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity; Whether the activity will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the activity will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of s. 267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. Of the seven criteria, above, the two deemed most relevant and determinative for the EPD in processing the 2002 Dock Application were 1., and 3., that is, whether the activity will adversely affect public safety, the property of others, and navigation. The County considered the proposed sizes, locations and configuration of the docks as shown in the drawing attached to the application. It had no navigational experts on staff and did not consult with outside navigational experts. Nonetheless, the County considered the nature of the use and whether it would adversely affect safety and navigation. The County also considered an objection to the location of certain pilings and a "future floating pier along the south edge of the basin at Port Laudania." Petitioners' Ex. 8 at 4. The objection had been lodged by the Port Everglades Pilot's Association in a letter dated May 1, 2002: Port Everglades Pilots are responsible for insuring the maximum level of safety of commercial vessels transiting the water of Port Everglades and Port Laudania. * * * I am writing to you in reference to some pilings that have been driven by Broward Marine for what appears to be a future floating pier along the south edge of the basin at Port Laudania in Broward County, Florida. This is the basin that is shared by Broward Marine and G&G Shipping and located within the City of Dania Beach. These pilings are affecting the safe navigation of commercial vessels that have already been using the basin at Port Laudania for many years. Vessels docked at this new pier will pose additional risk to navigation. * * * I would like to go on record stating that the location of these pilings and potential pier is not satisfactory as it hinders the navigation of commercial vessels using the basins at Port Laudania. Id. The letter is signed by Captain James J. Ryan, Managing Pilot for the Port Everglades Pilots' Association. The County acknowledged receipt of the application in a letter dated August 16, 2002, and informed Broward Yachts' agent that the "application for license is incomplete." Petitioners' Ex. 8. The letter requested prompt submission of the information listed on an attached sheet and warned that failure to submit it within 60 days of the request could result in denial. Two items were found omitted or incomplete in the application. The first was a "South Florida Water Management District right-of-way permit for the pilings located within the Dania Cut-off Canal." Petitioners' Ex. 8 at 2 of 3. The second was a response to the navigation issue posed by the Port Everglades Pilot Association. Id. The County's letter advised that upon a showing of resolution of issues posed by the omissions, the Department would process the application as an ERP since the applicant was allowed by a state administrative rule to apply for an ERP concurrently with an ERL. To that end, the letter requested payment of an additional $700 fee. Id. Four other items were also requested for submission. Five months later, Broward Yachts' agent wrote Ms. Mitchell listing seven responses as "the additional information you requested." Petitioners' Ex. 9. With regard to Item 2, the letter states: 2. I am working with Dan Boyer who is handling the Right of Way permit @ SFWMD, I am also addressing same issue with him, if I can demonstrate that a boat when moored at the proposed dock will not extend more than 25% into the canal, he will recommend to the Board of Governors that the project be approved. I am waiting for a signed and sealed survey to show the exact width of the waterway at this location. Petitioners' Ex. 9. With regard to Item 3, the agent responded, "[c]heck enclosed." The letter did not respond to all the requested information. For example, with regard to requested information concerning the anticipated use of the dock proposed within the Dania Cut-off Canal, whether boats would be moored on both its sides, and the anticipated length and draft of the boats, the agent responded, "I will need to get back to you about this one!" Id. Together with a memorandum dated July 21, 2003, the agent submitted revised drawings for the permit (the "2003 Revised Dock Application" or the "Revision"). The Revision removed any portion of the structures or pilings from the Dania Cut-off Canal in order to avoid the requirement for a SFWMD Right-of-Way Permit. Instead of the six finger piers shown in the 2002 Dock Application, the Revision showed seven. Six were similar to the five that angled into the Basin in a southwesterly direction from where they touched the western seawall. The six piers ranged from 120 feet in length to 150 feet in length. The seventh was similar to the sixth finger pier in the 2002 Dock Application but was depicted as being only 60 feet in length. It no longer protruded into the Dania Cut-off Canal. See Petitioners' Ex. 10 at 2. A memorandum to the file dated August 11, 2003, shows that Ms. Mitchell faxed the drawings in the 2003 Revised Dock Application to the Port Everglade Port Association. The memorandum reported that Captain Ryan responded by saying "he no longer had any objections to the project because the structures had been removed from the ROW [of the Dania Cut-off Canal]." Petitioners' Ex. 11. The memorandum also reported that Captain Ryan stated that there still may be navigational and safety concerns with the proposed pier lengths and locations, and that there may be special circumstances for ships wanting to use the basin such as, navigation during slack tide only, daylight only, and other factors that would exacerbate the concerns. Six weeks or so later, Ms. Mitchell signed a letter from the County. The letter, dated September 29, 2003, advised Broward Yachts that the additional information submitted in response to the January 2002 request had been received. It also advised that the project required an Environmental Resource License (in addition to the ERP) and that the application for such a license had been received. To fully evaluate the project, additional information was needed. This second request for additional information consisted of one item: [1] A Cross Access Agreement (attached), recorded on October 27, 1987, states that "the entire inlet be available to the owners of the other parcel for the purposed (sic) of ingress and egress." The Department has received objections from the adjacent property owner that the proposed docks, specifically the most southern 150-foot-long dock, may hinder the navigation of commercial vessels using the basin. Please provide evidence that the proposed docks will not negatively affect the safety and navigation of vessels using the basin. Petitioner's Ex. 12, Completeness Summary, Environmental Resource License Application at 2 of 2, (emphasis added.) The additional information requested was not provided by Broward Yachts or any other party. On October 6, 2003, Ms. Mitchell forwarded a copy of the Cross-use Easement to the County Attorney's Office and asked for it to be reviewed "to confirm that the [easement] pertains to both facilities [the applicant's and G&G's] and that G&G has a basis for their objection." Petitioners' Ex. 13. The objection by G&G was expressed as: "the most southern proposed finger pier will hinder [G&G's] ability to safely navigate their vessels." Id. Attached is a drawing that depicts seven docks. Opinion of the Broward County Attorney's Office In response to Ms. Mitchell's request, an opinion of the Broward County attorney's office was issued on October 31, 2003. The opinion addresses two questions: first, does the Cross-use Easement pertain to both facilities operated by Broward Yachts and G&G; and, second, does G&G have a basis for its objection. Both questions were answered in the affirmative with the following elaboration on the second question: The Easement includes granting a non- exclusive right to the successors of Port Denison, Inc. to use "all or any portion of the Property . . . for ingress and egress over and across the inlet as described in Composite Exhibit C. . ." The Property referred to in Exhibit A includes all of Parcels I and II. Composite Exhibit C is made up of a sketch and legal description of the easement area, with each Parcel having its own description and sketch. The physical structures referred to that limit the easement are the wetface of the bulkhead and the boat hoist structure. The easement rights granted are not similarly limited by reference to docks or piers that may have existed around the time that the easement was granted. This reading of the easement is consistent with the intent of the parties, as clearly reflected in the last "Whereas" clause which reads: " . . . it is to the mutual advantage of the present and future owners, tenants, invitees, etc. that the entire inlet be available to the owners of the other parcel for the purposes of ingress and egress." Since G&G Shipping's objection is related to the use of the inlet for ingress and egress with reasonable reference to navigation safety, and G&G Shipping accommodates uses that it does not anticipate will interfere with such activities, its objection to the license application has a basis in its easement rights. While the additional correspondence from Broward Yachts dated October 11, 2003, refers to an undated photo showing floating docks that are asserted to exist "around the time that the agreements were drawn-up for cross access," this photo doesn't control or limit the terms of the Easement, which grants the use of the entire inlet to both parties. Petitioners' Ex. 16 at 1-2. Another RAI On December 16, 2003, the County sent another request for information (RAI) to Broward Yachts (the "December 16, 2003 RAI." The request stated, "[y]our response dated October 14, 2003, does not adequately address the navigational and safety concerns stated in our letter [of September 29, 2003]." Petitioners' Ex. 17. The December 16, 2003, RAI referenced the County attorney's October 31, 2003, Opinion which "concluded that G & G Marine, Inc., does have a legal basis for their objection to the docks." Id. The December 16, 2003, RAI concluded: [T]he Department has not received reasonable assurances that the proposed docks will not negatively affect navigation and safety, nor have we received a response regarding the objections. It is the intent of this letter to inform Broward Yachts, Inc. (applicant) and Mr. Bill Thomas (agent) that the license application will be closed, pursuant to Section 27- 55(d)(4), if all requested information is not provided within ten (10) days of the receipt of this letter. Id. Broward Yachts requested an additional 90 days to provide the information. The request was granted. A second request to extend the time for providing the information another 90 days was denied by the County. The County Holds its Position Correspondence dated July 8, 2004, from Larry Zink, Esquire, requested reconsideration of the County's October 31, 2003, Opinion. The County responded in a letter dated July 21, 2004. See Petitioners' Ex. 22. The July 21, 2004, letter refers to "additional information, such as Mr. Denison's Affidavit and references to Florida case law," id. and then concludes: After consideration and based upon the Easement, Broward Yachts' letter of October 11, 2003, [Mr. Zink's] letters of May 5, 2004, May 21, 2004, and July 8, 2004, Mr. Denison's affidavit, Florida law, and G&G Shipping's objections dated November 5, 2003 and April 13, 2004, the conclusion that G&G has a basis for its objection to the Project is still correct . . . . Id. The July 21, 2004, letter addresses Florida Law with regard to the Cross-Use Easement: Florida Law: You have asserted that "[t]he Florida Court's have held that to determine the scope of an easement the Court's attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time the easement was created," referencing the cases of Hillsborough County vs. Kortum and Florida Power Company vs. Silver Lake Homeowners Assn. However, the following more completely summarizes the relevant case law standards: The construction or interpretation of an easement is not evidentiary; it is a matter of law. Hillsborough Co. v. Kortum, 585 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991), rev. denied, 598 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1992). The determination of the extent and nature of an easement granted or reserved in express terms by deed depends upon a proper construction of the language of the instrument, for an examination of all of the material parts thereof, and without consideration of extraneous circumstances. Kotick v. Durrant, 143 Fla. 386, 196 So. 802 (1940). An easement holder has the right to do what is reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement, but the right must not be increased to any greater extent than reasonably necessary and contemplated at the time the easement was created. Crutchfield v. F.A. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1954). However, rights of the owners of an easement are not absolute and unlimited. The owner of the servient estate may use [the] land, including the easement, in such a way that will not interfere with the easement owner's right of passage. Tortoise Island Communities, Inc. v. Roberts, 394 So.2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). (String citations have been omitted for brevity.) As you may know, the Circuit Courts of Florida have exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions involving title and boundaries of property. See Section 26.012(2)(g), Florida Statutes. Therefore, it is the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court that has jurisdiction and authority to determine the relative title interest rights of Broward Yachts and G&G in relation to the Project. The Office of the County Attorney respectfully declines to act in a role which is the proper jurisdiction of that Court. Within the limited scope of the previous and instant reviews, it is merely apparent that G&G objects to the Project and holds a title interest which, on its face, could be negatively affected by the Project. Therefore, it has a basis for its objection. Id., paragraph 2, at page 2 of 3 (emphasis added.) The County determined that Broward Yachts had not provided reasonable assurances that the Project would not adversely affect safety and navigation and would not violate the Cross-Use Easement. In light of the determination, the County sent a memorandum on July 21, 2004, see Petitioners' Ex. 23, requesting such assurances (the "July 21, 2004, RAI"). The July 21, 2004, RAI recognized that the issue with regard to the Cross-Use Easement was the subject of litigation between Broward Yachts and G&G Marine, but in the meantime requested reasonable assurances with regard to the navigation and safety issues or "have your client amend its application to resolve this concern." Id. As with the December 16, 2003, 10 RAI, the July 21, 2004, RAI was required to be answered in 10 days. The County hoped that a response would provide guidance from a navigational expert that the new docks would not affect the ability of other vessels to come in and out of the Basin. Denial and Petition for Review By the end of January 2005, the ten-day period for submitting additional information relative to the 2003 Revised Dock Application had expired. No information relative to safety and navigation concerns or compliance with the Cross-Use Easement had been submitted. By letter dated January 31, 2005 (the "Application Denial"), the Broward County EPD announced its decision to deny the application based on a lack of "reasonable assurance that the proposed docks will not negatively affect navigation and safety, nor violate the Cross-Use Easement . . . ." See Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 7 at 13. The County's intent in issuing the Application Denial was to deny both the ERL and ERP. The parties stipulated to what happened next: Broward Yachts filed a Petition for Review of Final Administrative Determination, Environmental Resource License Application No. DF03-1121, Environmental Resource Permit Application No. 06-0194386-001 (the "Administrative Review Petition") with EPD on February 7, 2005, challenging the denial of its "license and permit applications." The Administrative Review Petition invoked the procedures of Chapter 27, BCC. Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 8 at 13. The Administrative Review Petition did not invoke the procedures of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to an internal procedure, the Administrative Review Petition was reviewed by the Department Director. After an independent review, the Department Director upheld the denial. That decision was communicated to Broward Yachts in a letter dated March 11, 2005, signed by Eric Myers, Director of the Broward County EPD. See Petitioners' Ex. 41. The March 11, 2005, letter proposed a compromise that related to an aerial photograph taken at roughly the time of the submission of the 2002 Dock Application. The photograph showed four finger piers ranging in length from 130 to 150 feet. The County offered to permit such a configuration if Broward Yachts modified its application. Broward Yachts was apparently unwilling to do so. Broward Marine Involvement The denial of the 2002 Dock Application was directed only to the application filed by Broward Yachts. Likewise, the Administrative Review Petition was filed solely by Broward Yachts. In March of 2005, however, Broward Marine took over the possession and operation of the PBPH Property from Broward Yachts. It also purchased the assets of Broward Yachts, including the 2002 Dock Application and the 2003 Revised Application. Response to the County's Proposal In June of 2005, the County met with representatives of Petitioners to discuss acceptable dock configurations. Petitioners advised that they would accept a configuration consisting of four docks extending into the Basin at a southeasterly angle and that they would be amenable to a fifth dock parallel and immediately adjacent to the southern portion of the PBPH bulkhead. The County presented the proposal to Mr. Zink, counsel for Broward Yachts, Broward Marine and PBPH in a letter dated July 11, 2005. Mr. Zink responded by letter dated July 14, 2005. The letter references: "Broward Yachts, Inc. - Floating Docks" even though at the time the 2002 Dock Application and the 2003 Revised Dock Application had been assigned to Broward Marine. The one paragraph letter reads: I am in receipt of Michael Owens July 11, 2005 letter regarding the above matter. Though my client does not agree the 2002 aerial photos are historically representative of the number of floating docks, Broward Yachts is submitting herewith a revised drawing dated July 13, 2005 which accepts what is proposed in paragraph two (2) of Mr. Ownens July 11, 2005 letter. Petitioners' Ex. 54, (emphasis added.) The revised drawing, that was neither signed nor sealed, was attached to Mr. Zink's letter. It shows five floating docks "ALL 7'6" WIDE," id. at second page, four of which are angled into the Basin in a southeasterly direction, none of which are more than 150 feet in length. It also shows a fifth dock that lies immediately adjacent to the eastern seawall of the bulkhead on the PBPH property so that it does not angle into the Basin at all. It is 200 feet long and stops short of the south end of the bulkhead so as to be well clear of the Dania Cut-off Canal. Mr. Zink's acceptance of the proposal on behalf of Broward Yachts did not, however, lead to a resolution. The County asked for two additional matters: signed and sealed drawings from an engineer and that PBPH, as the owner of the property, become the applicant. PBPH Steps In Through a letter dated October 20, 2005, Mr. Zink agreed to the two additional demands of the County. The letter enclosed "sealed drawings for the above applications." Respondents' Ex. 6. The applications were referenced in the letter as ERL and the ERP for "Broward Yachts - Floating Docks," but the letter stated, "[a]s per your E-mail of August 25, 2005, a Revised Application identifying Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. as the property owner will be submitted to you directly by my client." Id. The signed and sealed drawings that were submitted did not reflect the proposal made by the County and agreed to by Mr. Zink on behalf of his client in July of 2005. The drawings showed one finger pier immediately alongside the western seawall of the bulkhead and five finger piers composed of floating docks that angled into the Basin. The signed and sealed drawings showed six finger piers instead of five and five finger piers that angled into the Basin instead of the four envisioned by the agreement finalized by Mr. Zink's letter on July 14, 2005. In a letter dated November 11, 2005, and received on November 16, 2005, that was characterized by Mr. Zink as "a follow up on my October 20, 2005, letter to [the County]," Petitioner's Ex. 7, Mr. Zink enclosed two documents: "1) Original executed Application on behalf of Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. 2) Drawing prepared by Frank L. Bennardo, P.E., depicting the docks." Id. The letter dated November 11, 2005, was not accepted for reasons outlined in an e-mail message from Julie Mitchell to Eric Myers. See Petitioners' Ex. 69. In the wake of the message, the County continued to process the 2003 Revised Dock Application. In a letter dated December 16, 2005, with the same reference line used in his earlier correspondence ("Re: Broward Yachts, Inc. - Floating Docks"), Mr. Zink submitted "(2) Revised Drawings prepared by Frank L. Bennardo, P.E., Inc. dated 11/30/05 depicting the five (5) finger piers as per the July 13, 2005, conceptual drawing approved by DPEP." Petitioners' Ex. 75. As represented by Mr. Zink, the drawings matched the configuration proposed by the County in its letter of July 11, 2005. At this point in the series of events initiated by the Notice of Violation in 2002, the parties would have been justified in thinking that an agreement had been reached, that the ERL and ERP could be issued and that all files on the matter of the Broward County EDP could be successfully closed. Mr. Lewis on behalf of Broward Yachts expressed the sentiment at hearing: [I]n the course of that same period, [Mr. Ganoe] was concerned about turning vessels where the fifth dock was. And we put a buoy in the basin where the length of a boat extending beyond that pier would be, he had given us a radius of what he wanted. We had McLaughlin Engineering take that, and I can't remember how many feet that he wanted clear in that area, plotted it on a drawing, went over it with him, thought we had an agreement. Tr. 181 (emphasis added.) Between the County's July 2005 proposal and Mr. Zink's December 16, 2005, letter that appears to have finalized the proposal's acceptance, however, a disruptive event occurred. The event caused destruction in the Basin, halted businesses on both of its sides and stressed the resources of the County: Hurricane Wilma. Hurricane Wilma Hurricane Wilma destroyed most of the docks and pilings in the Basin. In the wake of the destruction, Broward Marine submitted an application to the County for the issuance of a general license (the "General License") to repair and re- install pilings and ramps. The difference between projects that require an ERL, such as the project at issue in this proceeding (which required both an ERL and an ERP), and those that require only a general license was explained by Ms. Mitchell at hearing: "A general license is for smaller projects, specifically for docks where the total overwater area is less than 500 feet . . . ." Tr. 386. A Broward County general license was also distinguished from the ERP at issue in this case. Projects for which the overwater area is less than 1,000 feet are not subject to ERPs. The general license was approved in a letter issued by EPD's Wetlands/Uplands Resources Section: This letter is to inform you that your request for a General License has been granted. General License No. GL- DAN0512-029 authorizes the installation of ten (10) pilings and five (5) floating ramps, adjacent to 750 NE 7th Avenue, in the City of Dania Beach. Respondents' Ex. 9 at 9-2. The General License authorized pilings and ramps only; it did not authorize floating dock structures such as finger piers. The approved project description was attached to the January 6, 2006, letter. It shows the approved project to be pilings installed within the Basin at certain distances from the seawall. For the northernmost four set of pilings the distances range from 115 feet to 150 feet. The distance from the seawall of the fifth set of pilings (the southernmost set that corresponds to the fifth finger pier applied for in the ERP application) is 75 feet, a distance significant to safety and navigability. Notwithstanding that the General License did not authorize finger piers, Broward County installed finger piers in the Basin. The installation of finger piers was done without an ERL or an ERP. When asked why a Notice of Intent was not issued that reflected the parties' putative agreement at the end of 2005, Ms. Mitchell replied, "To be honest, I don't recall because there was so much settlement going on outside of our department with the attorneys, I don't remember exactly why it ended up going [to hearing.]" Tr. 397. The record is unclear as to why a Notice of Intent was not issued. It may have been because of the interruption and destruction of Hurricane Wilma and the confusion it caused when country resources were diverted to other pressing matters. It may have been because of lack of communication between all of the parties and their attorneys. Or, it may have been because of objections from Broward Marine that are referenced in Petitioners' Ex. 69 as to the November 16, 2005, submission of information. The objections are counter to Mr. Zink's letter of December 16, 2005, and inconsistent with Mr. Lewis' recall of having reached an agreement in mid-2005. Whatever the reason, a Notice of Intent for an ERL and an ERP authorizing finger piers and floating docks as referenced in Mr. Zink's December 16, 2005, letter was not issued. In March of 2006, the 2002 Dock Application and the amendment to it in the 2003 Revised Application proceeded to hearing before a Broward County Hearing Examiner because of their denial by the County. The March 2006 Hearing, the Final Order and the Omnibus Order The hearing was held on March 30, 2006. There were two parties to the proceeding: Broward Yachts, Inc., as the Petitioner, and Broward County Environmental Protection Department. Aside from the County, none of the parties to this proceeding13/ (DOAH Case No. 08-1393) were parties to the proceeding before the Hearing Examiner. In his Final Order, the Hearing Examiner described those who participated or were present: At the hearing, the Environmental Protection Department was represented by Michael Owens, Esquire, who presented the testimony of Julie Krawczyk, Natural Resource Specialist II. The Petitioner was represented by Larry Zink, Esquire, who presented the testimony of Glenn Straubb [sic], the President of Palm Beach Holdings, Inc. Also in attendance at the hearing was Steve Ganoe, President of G&G Marine, Inc. ("G&G") Respondents' Ex. 10. The Hearing Examiner entered the Final Order on June 5, 2006. The Final Order found that "these docks, is some shape or form, have existed in this area for over twenty one years and have been used for substantially the same purpose for those years." Id. at 10-2. The order further found "that no competent substantial evidence was presented that would support or warrant the denial of the license and permit sought by the Petitioner [Broward Yachts] to maintain its existing docks." Id. at 10-3. The order concluded, "The administrative decision denying the license/permit to maintain the docks is quashed and the matter is remanded to EPD to take appropriate action in accordance with the terms of this Final Order." Id. The order is based on the following finding: The only relevant standard to this proceeding . . . is . . . whether the docks will adversely affect public safety or welfare or the property of others. No evidence was presented that the docks, which have been in existence since 1985, have ever caused an accident or that they impede G&G's reasonable use of the easement. Moreover, while the EPD does have the right to regulate these docks and the navigable water upon which the docks rest, the easement area is not generally travelled by the public and more or less serves as an entrance to only two businesses, G&G and that of the Petitioner. Id. Broward County filed a motion for reconsideration of the Final Order. G&G filed a motion for rehearing and/or reconsideration as a "nonparty." See Respondents' Ex. 11. Both motions were considered in an order entitled "Omnibus Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Post Hearing Motions." Respondents' Ex. 12. The County's motion was denied. The motion of G&G's was granted in part. The motion was found to request relief not inconsistent with the Final Order. "Specifically, G&G requests that the Final Order prohibit the installation of additional docks and prohibit increasing the size of the existing docks." Id. at 12-2. The Omnibus Order grants the following relief: Petitioner may maintain the five existing docks and repair and replace them, but may not do so in a manner that causes any of the docks to protrude at a greater length or distance into the waterway. Additionally, Petitioner may not construct or maintain any docks other that the five existing docks. Id. at 12-2, 12-3. Neither the Final Order nor the Omnibus Order contains a finding of fact as to the configuration of docks at the time of the hearing conducted by the Hearing Examiner. There is evidence in the record of this case (DOAH Case No. 08-1393) that the five docks existing on March 30, 2006, were configured consistently with the pilings authorized by the General License, that is, they had lengths beginning with the northernmost dock of 135, 135, 150, 150 and 75 feet, respectively. At the time of the final hearing in this proceeding, moreover, the docks were present in the Basin in approximately the same configuration as existed in March of 2006. The 2006 and the 2007 NOIs On October 23, 2006, the County issued a Notice of Intent (the "2006 Notice of Intent") to issue a combined permit/license for the construction of the five docks ranging from 132 feet to 192 feet in length. The 2006 Notice of Intent was issued solely because the County believed it was required by the Hearing Examiner's Final and Omnibus Orders. See Tr. 405. The configuration of docks authorized by the 2006 Notice of Intent resembled the July 2005 Proposal accepted by Mr. Zink on behalf of Broward Yachts: four docks angled into the Basin in a southwesterly direction with one additional dock parallel and adjacent to the seawall. The County did not conduct any evaluation of its own between the dates of the Hearing Examiner's Final and Omnibus Orders as to whether the configuration authorized by the 2006 Notice of Intent had unacceptable impacts to navigation and safety. The draft permit attached to the 2006 Notice of Intent contains several sets of conditions. DEP General Conditions, Broward County EPD General Conditions and ERP and ERL Specific Conditions ("Specific Conditions"). The Specific Conditions were included under the County's authority to impose conditions necessary to carry out the intent of the ERP and ERL permitting regulations. Specific Condition 18 is "Mooring of vessels with lengths exceeding the length of the permitted structures is prohibited." Respondents' Ex. 13 at 13-17. The purpose of including Specific Condition 18, as testified by Eric Myers, Director of the Broward County EPD at the time the 2006 Notice of Intent was issued, "was to make sure that . . . adequate navigation was maintained within the Basin." Tr. 560. G&G challenged the 2006 Notice of Intent by filing a petition for formal proceedings with EPD seeking a clarification in interpretation with regard to the lengths of vessels to be moored in the PBPH side of the Basin vis- à-vis the length of the permitted structures. Broward Marine also filed a Petition for Formal Proceedings challenging the 2006 NOI. In furtherance of discussions with the County, Broward Marine, by letter dated June 26, 2007, submitted four surveys for consideration by the County. The first purported to show the dock configuration existing after Ms. Mitchell's January 2002 visit but before the submission of the Permit Application; the second purported to show the dock configuration on December 11, 2003; the third showed the dock configurations sought by Broward Marine; and the fourth showed all configurations overlapping. None of the surveys depicted the dock configuration existing on January 22, 2002, the date of the Ms. Mitchell's visit, which was the configuration the County had requested Broward Yachts to submit for approval. The County did not transmit the G&G petition or the Broward Marine petition to DOAH. Instead, on or about August 23, 2007, EPD issued another Notice of Intent to Issue Permit/License (the "2007 NOI") to PBPH. The 2007 NOI identifies the proposed project as the Broward Yachts Marine Facility, with permit No. 06-0194386-001 and License No. DF03-1121 and lists the Permittee/Licensee as "Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc." Respondents' Ex. 14 at 14-9. With respect to the factors considered by the County in issuing the 2007 NOI, it provides: The Department reviewed the information presented in the petitions, the Hearing Examiner's Final Orders, and surveys provided by Broward Marine with a letter dated June 25, 2007, and as a result has reformulated the draft permit and agency action. Respondents' Ex. 14 at 14-3. The 2007 NOI also referred to an earlier NOI and draft permit issued on August 2, 2007. On August 8, 2007, EPD was notified of typographical errors in the August 2, 2007, NOI. As a result of the typographical errors and other previous errors, the 2007 NOI stated, "this Notice hereby supersedes the October 23, 2006, and August 2, 2007, Notices of Intent to Issue and draft permits/licenses." Id. The Proposed Permit and the draft Environmental Resource License attached to the 2007 NOI allows PBPH to construct five floating finger piers as detailed in a section of the Proposed Permit entitled "PROPOSED PROJECT DESIGN," as follows: The proposed project is to construct five (5) floating finger piers in an existing privately-owned marina basin. From north to south, the finger piers shall have the following sizes: (1) 7.5-foot-wide by 122-foot-long pier; (2)7.5-foot-wide by 135.8-foot-long pier; (3) 7.5-foot-wide by 150.5-foot- long pier; (4) 7.5-foot-wide by 150.5- foot-long pier; and (5) 7.5-foot-wide by 152.6-foot-long pier. All five (5) finger piers shall be placed sixty-five (65) feet apart and angled in a southeasterly direction from the existing seawall, as depicted on the attached drawing. The total over-water area of the structures shall be 5,378.25 square feet Respondents' Ex. 14 at 14-10. The dock configuration authorized in the Proposed Permit is the same dock plan depicted in Exhibit C to the June 25, 2007, letter from Broward Marine to the County. The County issued the 2007 NOI, revising the dock configuration from what it had authorized in the 2006 NOI, due to objections from Broward Marine that the configuration in the 2006 NOI was not consistent with the Final Order and the Omnibus Order. The Proposed Permit also eliminated Specific Condition 18 that was in the 2006 NOI. It did not impose any restriction or limitation on the length of vessels that may be moored at the proposed finger piers, and PBPH indicated at hearing that it would moor vessels alongside the finger piers whose lengths exceeded the piers.14/ In addition to elimination of Specific Condition 18, there were other significant differences between the 2006 NOI and the 2007 NOI. For example, the 2007 NOI allows all five finger piers to be placed 65 feet apart and angled in a southeasterly direction from the seawall. In contrast, the 2006 NOI provided that the southernmost pier of the five would be placed immediately parallel to the seawall so that it did not jut out at all into the Basin. The 2007 NOI contemplates that the structure of the finger piers would be more permanent. The 2003 Revised Application had sought floating docks, of the type existing at the time made of Styrofoam and wood, as opposed to fixed piers. The concrete pilings and the concrete tub floating docks contemplated by the 2007 NOI are more permanent than the existing wood pilings and the wood and Styrofoam docks. Eric Myers, Director of EPD at the time, signed the 2007 NOI. When he did so on August 26, 2007, he believed that the issues regarding safety and navigation that had been raised by G&G and C-Term had been resolved "based on the advice of staff." Tr. 529. Historical Configuration of Docks in the Basin PBPH contends that the finger pier and dock configuration authorized by the 2007 NOI is consistent with historical lengths and configurations of piers and docks in the Basin. The evidence establishes that the length, number, configuration and locations of docks within the Basin varied greatly over time. As Mr. Straub testified in response to a question about the dock configuration when the property was acquired by PBPH, "Whatever we wanted them to be. It could change from day-to-day and month-to- month." Tr. 582. Aerials taken by Broward County dating back to 1998 demonstrate that the docks in the Basin ranged in number, length and location until 2006 when docks were installed following issuance of the General License. Until 1998, there were many different configurations. Since 2006, the number, lengths, and sizes of the docks have remained fairly consistent to the time of hearing. In the January 2007 Broward County aerial photograph, the five docks (from north to south) have lengths of 151.5, 136, 156, 156 and 88 feet, respectively. These lengths are roughly similar to the piling configuration authorized by the General License.15/ Safety and Navigation16/ The multiplicity of factors that affect navigation in the Dania Cut-off Canal "makes maneuvering extremely tricky" in the canal. Tr. 1574. These same factors affect Basin ingress and egress of G&G vessels and other vessels that have access to the Basin. Wind near the Basin comes from any direction. The predominant wind in the area of the Basin is out of the east/southeast at average speeds of 10-12 knots. From time-to-time, of course, the wind shifts. When cold fronts come through the area, for example, they generally come from the west/northwest and the wind blows mainly from the north. Strongest winds associated with a cold front are usually "anywhere from 20 to 30 knots. Constant winds with a good cold front, usually 15 to 20 knots." Tr. 1260. Direction and strength of wind affects stability and handling capacity of vessels entering and exiting the Basin. The bow of the vessel is affected the most. In the front, it is the narrowest part of the vessel, the least heavy, and has the least draft (depth in the water). Vessels entering and exiting the Basin are affected by leeway defined by Mr. Danti at hearing: "[L]eeway is the physical amount of sideways motion that is going to be activated on a vessel by the wind. It is the amount of side motion created by the wind on a vessel." Tr. 1268-9. Leeway varies depending on a number of factors, among them, the strength and direction of the wind, the angle of the vessel, and its draft. Ocean-freight shipping vessels have different handling characteristics from yachts. The effect of leeway on vessels in the Basin varies from vessel to vessel. Typically, the effect of leeway is greater on G&G vessels than on the PBPH vessels. The current in the Dania Cut-off Canal is 2.0 to 2.5 knots. The current in the canal in the immediate vicinity of the Basin has significant effects on the maneuverability of vessels. Because of the current in the canal, it is advisable for vessels entering and exiting the Basin to perform the majority of turns and other maneuvers in the Basin rather than in the canal. Another factor that makes turning maneuvers by G&G vessels safer in the Basin is boat traffic in the Dania Cut-off Canal. That traffic has increased greatly in recent years, as Mr. Steele testified. Vessels exiting the Basin, furthermore, must yield to vessels in the canal. Boat traffic is not visible to the typical G&G vessel until the vessel has committed to exiting the canal. Once committed, the G&G vessel cannot stop and wait for traffic to pass. It must complete the exit maneuver. It is much better, therefore, for the G&G vessel to turn in the Basin before committing to an exit so that it can emerge bow-first with a better view of canal traffic rather than emerge by backing out. Another factor that makes turning in the Basin safer is the Harbortown Marina, located directly across the canal from the Basin. There is a greater chance for collision the farther the G&G vessels must go into the Dania Cut-off Canal before beginning maneuvers necessary to head out to sea. Vessels will have to go closer to the southern side of the canal, that is, farther into the canal, when emerging from the Basin if they back out and turn in the canal rather than turn in the Basin before heading out toward the Atlantic Ocean. The Basin has a width of 320 feet at the north end and a width of 323 feet at the south end. Mr. Danti fashioned an "Unobstructed Line," depicted on Petitioners Ex. 114A and superimposed on Exhibits 114B through 114"O", fourteen aerial photographs of the Basin taken between 1998 and 2008.17/ The line commences at the north end of the Basin 162' from the Basin's western seawall and runs to the south with two "jogs" to the west before it ends at a projected bulkhead line in the mouth of the Basin just north of the Dania Cut- off Canal. The two jogs run perpendicular to the western seawall; the first, to the tip of the fourth finger pier allowed by the 2007 NOI and the second to a point 59.90 feet east of the western seawall in the approximate middle of the fifth and southernmost finger pier allowed by the 2007 NOI. The part of the Basin to the east of the Unobstructed Line is a navigational safe area (the "Safety Zone") created by Mr. Danti in which it is safe, in his opinion, for G&G vessels to turn and take maneuvers necessary to safely enter and exit the Basin. The Unobstructed Line and the Safety Zone were determined by Mr. Danti in a calculation that took into consideration factors including wind, current and tide, as well as the length, width, draft, maneuverability and handling characteristics of the bulk of G&G vessels and the fact that G&G vessels entering and exiting the Basin need the use of a minimum amount of space in the southern part of the Basin to initiate and complete safe entry and exit navigation maneuvers. Ultimately, the Safety Zone provides a minimum distance for a vessel 190 feet in length determined as half the beam of a vessel18/ from the bow, stern or either side of a vessel to any other vessel, dock, piling or seawall. It does not take into account factors that may require a greater distance such as wind, current and traffic under conditions that are less desirable than the best conditions experienced in the area of the Basin ("Best Conditions"). In order for vessels of the size and character that enter and exit the Basin to do so safely under Best Conditions, no finger piers, docks or moored vessels should protrude from the PBPH side of the Unobstructed Line into the Safety Zone. Under ideal wind, current, and weather conditions, the lengths of the first four finger piers from north to south as authorized by the Proposed Permit will not result in adverse effects to safety and navigation of vessels in and around the Basin. The fifth finger pier, however, is another matter. Authorized to be 152.60 feet in length as depicted in the Proposed Permit, it will protrude by more than 77 feet into the Safety Zone developed by Mr. Danti. Put another way, the fifth finger pier will adversely affect safety and navigation unless it is 75 feet or less in length given its southeasterly angle depicted in the Proposed Permit.19/ The authorized length of the fifth finger pier is not the only navigation and safety issue about which Mr. Danti testified. The length of vessels moored at the finger piers in the Proposed Permit, if too long, can present safety and navigation issues, as well, for G&G's vessels coming in and out of the Basin. With respect to the three northernmost finger piers, moored vessels should not extend past the Unobstructed Line, that is, they should not extend more than 162 feet measured perpendicularly from the Basin's western seawall. With respect to the fourth finger pier, vessels moored there should not extend past the 150.50 feet allowed for the length of the pier as depicted in the Proposed Permit. Similarly, no vessels moored at the fifth finger pier should extend past the end of a longest possible safe fifth finger pier, that is, one that is no more than 75 feet in length at the angle depicted in the 2007 NOI. The adverse affects on safety and navigation caused by the fifth finger pier at the length and as configured in the Proposed Permit would not be alleviated by G&G's use of tugboats to assist vessels entering and exiting the Basin. Tugboats are connected to the vessels they tug by tow lines at the bow and stern of the vessels. Such an arrangement adds approximately 85 feet to a typical G&G vessel of 190 feet, thereby requiring more room in the Basin for maneuvering than the vessel would need under its own power. The use of tugboats would require an even more expansive Safety Zone than was developed by Mr. Danti.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Broward County: modify the Proposed Permit attached to the 2007 Notice of Intent to shorten the length of the fifth finger pier to 75 feet and then issue the permit with the modification; or absent such a modification, deny the issuance of the Proposed Permit as applied for by PBPH. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2010.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.569120.57120.60120.6826.012267.061373.414373.415 Florida Administrative Code (1) 40E-4.302
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SECRET OAKS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 93-000863 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Feb. 16, 1993 Number: 93-000863 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 1993

The Issue Whether or not Petitioner should be granted a dredge and fill permit for construction of a multi-family dock in either of the two configurations proposed in its application filed pursuant to Section 403.918 Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Secret Oaks Owners' Association, Inc. is a not-for-profit Florida corporation with its principal place of business in First Cove, St. Johns County, Florida. DER is the State agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing permits under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes and its applicable rules. Martin Parlato and his wife Linda Parlato are the owners of, and reside on, Lot 10, Secret Oaks Subdivision, First Cove, St. Johns County, Florida. They have standing as Intervenors herein under the following facts as found. Petitioner claims rights to dredge and fill pursuant to an easement lying along the southerly boundary of Lot 10 in Secret Oaks Subdivision, which is a platted subdivision in St. Johns County, Florida. The easement runs up to and borders the St. Johns River, a tidal and navigable river in St. Johns County, Florida. Petitioner filed an application for dredge and fill permit with DER on September 18, 1992. The dock was proposed to be five feet wide and 620 feet long including a 20 foot by 10 foot terminal platform and six associated mooring pilings. On November 3, 1992, the Petitioner filed an alternative proposal with DER. That submission proposed construction of an "L" shaped walkway into the St. Johns River to connect the easement with an existing private dock to the north, which dock is owned by the Intervenors. The walkway is proposed to be five feet wide and may extend approximately 80 feet into the river, and then turn north and run parallel to the shoreline a distance of 41 feet to connect with the existing dock. Additionally, the existing dock would be reclassified as multi-family and four mooring pilings would be placed on the south side of the terminal platform. It is undisputed that a DER permit is necessary to construct either dock requested by Petitioner. While Petitioner sought to create an issue regarding a dock that once was located emanating from the easement and connecting with the present dock emanating from Lot 10 in a configuration similar to the Petitioner's proposed auxiliary dock configuration, the previous dock was never permitted and would be subject to DER rules and potential removal orders if it still existed, unless some "grandfathering" legislation or rule protected the structure. No such "grandfather" protections have been affirmatively demonstrated. Instead, it was orally asserted, without any corroborating circuit court orders, that after Petitioner prevailed over Intervenors in circuit court on various real property, riparian rights, and property damage issues due to Intervenors' removal of the old dock, the circuit court had conditioned further relief upon Petitioner obtaining the necessary DER permit. In its Notice of Permit Denial dated January 22, 1993, DER stated several reasons why reasonable assurances had not been given by Petitioners that water quality would not be violated and that the project was not contrary to the public interest, and further stated, by way of explaining how the permit might still be granted, that, "Compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 17- 312.080(1) and (2) can be achieved for either proposal by complying with the following requirements: Determine the legal status of the easement to establish ownership and control; Design a structure to provide a sufficient number of slips to accommodate all members in sufficient depth of water so that the grassbeds will not be disturbed by boating activity, or specifically limit only the area of the dock in water greater than three feet to be utilized for mooring boats or boating activity and record this action in a long-term and enforceable agreement with the Department; Obtain documentation from adjacent landowners that demonstrates they fully recognize and consent to the extent of activity which may occur in the water by either proposal (i.e., single dock or access walkway). Subsequent to the denial of Petitioner's application, Petitioner and DER representatives met and discussed DER's recommendations for reasonable assurances outlined in the Notice of Permit Denial. DER representatives have also orally recommended alternatives for hiring a dock-master or creating assigned boat slips, but DER has received no formal submissions of information from the Petitioner. All of Petitioner's and DER's proposals have not been reduced to writing. No long-term enforceable agreement as proposed by DER in the Notice of Permit Denial has been drafted. The project site is located on the eastern shore of the St. Johns River, three-quarters of a mile north of Cunningham Creek and one mile south of Julington Creek, at First Cove, a small residential community in the extreme northwest of St. Johns County, where the St. Johns River is approximately 2.5 miles wide. Located at the proposed project site are submerged grass beds (eel grass) that extend from approximately 100 feet to 450 feet into the St. Johns River in depths of two to three feet of water. The water at the proposed project site is classified as Class III Waters suitable for recreational use and fishing, but the area is not listed as an Outstanding Florida Water. The grass beds at the proposed project site are important for the conservation of fish and wildlife and the productivity of the St. Johns River. They provide detritus for support of the aquatic based food chain and they provide a unique, varied, and essential feeding and nursery habitat for aquatic organisms. They are valuable for the propagation of fish. Endangered West Indian manatees seasonally graze on the eel grass in this locale during their annual migrations. Absent the replacement of the auxiliary dock, lot owners' primary access to the larger dock is by swimming or boating from the upland of the pedestrian easement to the larger dock. This can mean sporadic interaction with the eel grass. However, DER's experts are not so much concerned with the individual and occasional usages of Petitioner's lot owners but with the type of activity common to human beings in congregate situations encouraged by multi- family docks. The proposed construction of the auxiliary dock does not intrude on the eel grass as the dock does not extend 100 feet from the upland. The grassbeds end some 200 feet east of the west end of the dock. DER experts testified that the time-limited turbidity and scouring associated with construction of either proposed configuration would have very minimal impact, but the continual increased turbidity of the water over the eel grass to be anticipated from multi-family use of either dock may detrimentally affect juvenile aquatic life and the Manatees' feeding ground. The auxiliary dock as proposed provides no facilities for docking watercraft. The permit application provides for a maximum of four facilities for docking watercraft, presumably by tying up to four end buoys. Petitioner intends or anticipates that only four boats would ever dock at one time under either configuration because of planned arrangements for them to tie up and due to an Easement and Homeowners Agreement and Declaration recorded in the public records of the county. Among other restrictions, the Agreement and Declaration limits dock use and forbids jet ski use.1 The permit application seeks a multi alternative dock construction. Petitioner intends to control the use of the dock(s) only by a "good neighbor policy" or "bringing the neighborhood conscience to bear." Such proposals are more aspirational than practical. Petitioner also cites its Secret Oaks Owners' Agreement, which only Petitioner (not DER) could enforce and which Petitioner would have to return to circuit court to enforce. Petitioner has proposed to DER that it will limit all boating and water activity to the westward fifty feet of the larger dock, prohibit all boating and water activity on the auxiliary dock, and place warning signs on the docks indicating the limits of permissible activity, but Petitioner has not demonstrated that it will provide any mechanism that would insure strict compliance with the limited use restrictions placed on the homeowners in Secret Oaks by their homeowners' restrictive covenant. Testimony was elicited on behalf of Petitioner that Petitioner has posted and will post warning signs and will agree to monitoring by DER but that employing a dock master is not contemplated by Petitioner, that creating individual assigned docking areas is not contemplated by Petitioner, and that there has been no attempt by Petitioner to draft a long term agreement with DER, enforceable by DER beyond the permit term. The purpose of the dock is to provide access to the St. Johns River for the members of the Secret Oaks Owners' Association which includes owners of all sixteen lots, their families, and social invitees. Although there are currently only three or four houses on the sixteen lots, there is the potential for sixteen families and their guests to simultaneously use any multi-family dock. Although all sixteen lot owners do not currently own or operate boats, that situation is subject to change at any time, whenever a boat owner buys a home or lot or whenever a lot owner buys a boat. All lots are subject to alienation by conveyance at any time. It is noted that this community is still developing and therefore anecdotal observations of boating inactivity among homeowners before the old dock was torn down are of little weight. No practical mechanism has been devised to limit homeowners' use of the dock(s) if a multi-family permit is issued. Also, no practical mechanism has been devised to exclude any part of the boating community at large from docking there. Thomas Wiley, a DER biologist, accepted without objection as an expert in the environmental impacts of dredge and fill activities, and Jeremy Tyler, Environmental Administrator for DER's Northeast District, also accepted without objection as an expert in environmental impacts of dredge and fill activities, each visited the site prior to formal hearing. They concurred that the application to construct the 620 foot long dock presented the potential for a number of boats to be moored or rafted at the pier at any one time, particularly weekends and holidays, and that multiple moorings might greatly exceed the capacity intended by Petitioner. Wiley and Tyler further testified, without refutation, that over-docking of boats could hinder or block the use of the waters landward of the terminal structures by adjoining property owners. Congregations of power boats at marinas and facilities designated for multi- family use also pose a threat to the endangered West Indian manatees. With regard to alternative two of the application to reconstruct the unpermitted "L" shaped walkway, such a configuration would extend 80 feet of the "mean high water line", then run 41 feet parallel to the shoreline of Lot 10 before attaching to the existing pier and that the parallel portion of the walkway lies immediately adjacent to, and inshore of, the extensive submerged grass beds. According to Wiley and Tyler, it can reasonably be expected that boaters would utilize this walkway as a convenient boat loading/off facility rather than walking to and from the terminal end of the existing 620 foot long dock. Water depths vary from two to three feet offshore of the proposed structure, and the operation of boats, jet-skis, and other watercraft would result in prop scouring of the silt/sand bottom and damage to grass bed areas, degrading water quality and adversely impacting important habitat areas. The DER experts concluded that the applicant had not provided reasonable assurances that the proposed structures would not cause hindrances to ingress and egress or the recreational use of State waters by adjacent property owners, including Intervenors at Lot 10, that grass habitat areas will not be adversely impacted or inshore water quality will not be degraded by boating and related activity. The potential for intensive use of either of the proposed docks could result in a large number of boats and/or water activity at and around the docks. Submerged grass beds occur in waters generally less than three feet deep in areas near the docks. Any boating activity landward of 450 feet from the shore could seriously damage the extensive grass beds that occur there. Boating activity is likely to occur in the areas of the grassbeds if a number of boats are using the dock(s) at the same time or if a boater desires to minimize the length of dock to be walked, in order to reach the uplands. That damage is expected to be from prop dredging and resuspension of bottom sediments onto adjacent grasses. Upon the evidence as a whole, the project is neutral as to the public health, safety, welfare, and property of others, except to the extent it impacts the Intervenors as set out above. The anticipated increase in water-based activities around the proposed dock(s) will cause shifting, erosion and souring that can be harmful to the adjacent grass beds. The anticipated increase in water based activities around the proposed dock will adversely affect marine productivity because the clarity of the water in the area of the grass beds will be decreased. The project may be either temporary or permanent but should be presumed permanent. The project does not affect any significant historical or archeological resources. The current condition of the eel grass beds in the area is lush and valuable as a fish and wildlife habitat. In the course of formal hearing, DER witnesses testified that absent any disturbance of the grassbeds, DER would have no complaints about either proposed project configuration. After considering and balancing the above criteria, it is found that Petitioner has not provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project in either form would not violate state water quality standards and that it would not be contrary to the public interest.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the permit application be denied without prejudice to future applications. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of July, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1993.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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MICHAEL M. SINGER vs TIMOTHY AND HOPE DELONG AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 01-003327 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 21, 2001 Number: 01-003327 Latest Update: Oct. 28, 2003

The Issue This issue in this case is whether the private Respondents are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Because the undersigned is not required or authorized to recommend a disposition on the merits of Singer’s Petition, the fact-findings that follow are limited to those necessary to determine the narrow issue whether an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is proper under Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes. In addition, as written, the findings below assume the reader’s familiarity with the preceding Preliminary Statement. On July 22, 1999, the Owners submitted an application to the Department seeking approval to build a dock. In a letter dated January 21, 2000, which is included in File 2, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the proposed dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This January 21, 2000, letter constituted the first agency action (“First Action” or “FA”) concerning the Owners’ dock. The First Action comprised three distinct determinations (for short, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3”), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: FA-D1: The dock is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”). FA-D2: The dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. FA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the dock is deemed consistent with the State Programmatic General Permit (“SPGP”) program. As originally designed, and as approved by the Department on January 21, 2000, the Owners’ dock will be referred to herein as the “Approved Dock.” After receiving notice of the First Action, the Owners caused a “Notice of Determination of Exemption” to be published in the February 1, 2000, issue of the Palm Beach Daily Business Review. In pertinent part, this public notice stated: The Department of Environmental Protection gives notice that the [Owners’] project to construct a 125-foot by 4-foot access dock and a 40-foot by 8-foot terminal platform has been determined to be exempt from the requirements to obtain an environmental resource permit. . . . . A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department’s action may petition for an administrative proceeding (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57 of the Florida Statutes. . . . . * * * Complete copies of all documents relating to this determination of exemption are available for public inspection during normal business hours . . . at the [Department’s regional office]. (Owners’ Exhibit No. 4). Following the publication of this notice, an individual named Karrie Webb timely filed a petition with the agency challenging the Department’s approval of the Approved Dock. Her Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing was filed with DOAH on February 17, 2000, initiating Webb. v. Timothy and Hope Delong and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 00-0761 (the “Webb case”). The Webb case proceeded through final hearing, but before a Recommended Order was issued, the petitioner, on January 9, 2001, filed a Stipulation for Dismissal. Consequently, on January 12, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order closing the file.1 Not long after the conclusion of the Webb case, the Owners submitted a second application to the Department for authorization to build a dock. As described in this second application (which gave rise to File 3), the newly proposed dock (hereafter, the “Redesigned Dock”) differed somewhat from the Approved Dock. Most noticeably, the terminal platform of the Redesigned Dock faced north, towards Singer’s property, whereas the terminal platform of the Approved Dock had faced south. Singer and the Owners disagreed sharply as to whether the differences between the Approved Dock and the Redesigned Dock should be considered “substantial” (as Singer claims) or merely “minor” (as the Owners claim). For present purposes, however, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, to resolve that particular dispute. What is significant and should be emphasized, however, is that whether or not the Redesigned Dock differed substantially from the Approved Dock, the Owners submitted a new application respecting the Redesigned Dock as if it were a new project, and the Department acted upon the Owners’ second application as if the first one had neither been made nor approved. Thus, in a letter dated February 28, 2001, which is included in File 3, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the Redesigned Dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This February 28, 2001, letter constituted the second agency action (“Second Action” or “SA”) concerning the Owners’ dock (though it was, of course, the first agency action on the Redesigned Dock). Like the First Action of the previous year, the Second Action was composed of three distinct determinations (again, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3” for short), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: SA-D1: The re-designed dock is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. SA-D2: The re-designed dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. SA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the re-designed dock is deemed not consistent with the SPGP program.2 The Owners did not cause notice of the Department’s Second Action to be published in a newspaper of general circulation. Armed with the Second Action, the Owners proceeded to have the Redesigned Dock constructed, and it now exists in fact. The existing structure will be referred to herein as the “As- Built Dock,” which, to be clear, was constructed according to the blueprint of the Redesigned Dock. After the construction began, Singer initiated this administrative litigation, the procedural history of which is summarized in the Preliminary Statement. In the course of the litigation, on May 17, 2002, the Department filed both a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction. As the basis for its request that the undersigned relinquish jurisdiction over File 3——that is, the Department’s file supporting the Second Action, which had approved the Redesigned Dock——the Department relied upon a letter dated May 16, 2002, from the Owners’ counsel to the Department’s counsel, which contained the following pertinent text: Please accept this notice as the withdrawal of the application filed by Timothy and Hope Delong in the above matter [namely, File 3]. The Department (with the Owners’ concurrence) contended that because the Owners had voluntarily withdrawn their application, the agency had lost jurisdiction to enter a final order implementing, modifying, or rescinding the Second Action, which had preliminarily approved that application. See, e.g., City of North Port, Florida v. Consolidated Minerals, Inc., 645 So. 2d 485, 486-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The undersigned agreed that, by withdrawing their application for approval of the Redesigned Dock, the Owners had divested the Department of jurisdiction in the matter. Accordingly, the undersigned relinquished jurisdiction over File 3. In withdrawing their second application, the Owners materially changed their position and substantially modified the outcome of the most relevant preliminary agency action at issue, namely, the Second Action approving the Redesigned Dock. Indeed, by nullifying the Second Action, the Owners forfeited the only express authorization, albeit a preliminary one, that they had ever obtained from the Department for the Redesigned Dock. Thus, in other words, rather than defend the Department’s preliminary approval of the Redesigned Dock in this proceeding, the Owners elected to rely upon the First Action as a defense against any future claim that the As-Built Dock is an illegal, unpermitted project.3 The Owners’ withdrawal of their second application was intended to resolve, and in fact did resolve, matters raised in Singer’s Petition. The undersigned specifically finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Owners’ change of position was substantial for purposes of Section 120.595(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.59557.111
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ROBERT E. AND SUZANNE E. STOYER vs ROBERT ECKERT, JR., AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 91-001181 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Feb. 25, 1991 Number: 91-001181 Latest Update: Oct. 24, 1991

Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1990, Respondent Eckert applied to Respondent DER for a permit seeking authorization to construct a 280-foot single-family recreational dock at 5766 Red Cedar Street in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The dock would extend waterward from that address and lot into Russell Bayou in Escambia County, Florida, a class III water of the State. When objections were filed to the original application for the 280-foot dock, Respondent Eckert amended his permit application and now requests a permit to build a 265-foot dock, meaning that the dock would extend 265 feet waterward from the mean high water line and, therefore, the boundary of the Respondent/applicant's property. The Petitioners are all adjacent or nearby land owners who object to the project, pursuant to Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), asserting that the project is contrary to the public interest in terms of recreational values or navigation. Russell Cove is a relatively-shallow body of water enclosed on three sides, with access to open water on its western end. Its depth fluctuates somewhat. It is tidally influenced, including lunar tides, which cause shallower-than-normal low water. The bottom of the cove is sandy with areas of rolling contours and shifting sandbars. The deepest points in the vicinity of the proposed dock vary between four and five and one-half feet. A 300-foot dock exists on the outward or westward end of Russell Cove. The channel widens to such an extent by the time it reaches the vicinity of that dock, however, that a 300-foot dock poses no navigational problem to boats using the interior of the cove. The applicant contends that the Petitioners who live eastward and "up the cove" from him have plenty of room to navigate past his proposed dock because, as his chart indicates, an apparently wide channel of slightly deeper water traverses the cove, waterward of all the docks in the cove, including that which he proposes to construct, with sufficient width beyond the end of his proposed dock to allow any boats which typically use the cove to navigate by it safely. The Petitioners who live on the interior of the cove, eastward of his proposed dock, and who would have to navigate by it, contend, however, that the safest route for them to navigate is immediately in front of or intersecting the tip of the location of the proposed dock. Ms. Bass testified for Petitioner Wittig. Her boat is equipped with a depth finder, and over the years of navigating in and out of the cove, she has learned that the supposedly wide channel referenced by the applicant is not actually a uniform wide, deep channel. Rather, there are sandbars occurring at various intervals, which sometimes shift in location, which point into the channel from the more southerly part of it, thus constricting it so that the safest passage is really a much narrower route closer to the ends of the docks and the proposed dock jutting into the channel. The safest passage is a slender route directly intersecting the tip of the location of the proposed dock. Ms. Bass established that there is already a narrow margin of maneuverability in the cove due to the intermittently shallow water, and, in stormy or foggy weather, the extra length of the dock might be unsafe. Petitioner Ericson has a non- motorized sailboat which must tack back and forth to enter or leave the cove when sailing into the wind. Thus, he needs a wide area to navigate in or out of the cove under certain prevailing wind conditions. Although DER's expert witness, Mr. Harp, supported the relative depth measurements established by the applicant (adjusted for seasonal tidal variations), he conceded that he had not measured an east/west line in the sandbar area described by Ms. Bass on the southerly side of the channel and jutting into the channel. Rather, he measured a north/south line and an east/west line in the route which Ms. Bass indicated she uses close to the docks and the proposed dock but not an east/west line in the sandbar area. He further conceded that the bottom was uneven or rolling in some areas. The applicant desires the extra dock length, compared to the 210-foot length of the Jones and Johnson piers on either side of him, so that he will be able to cast into slightly deeper water for fishing purposes. However, the depth prevailing at the 210-foot mark waterward from the shoreline is four feet, and the depth at the end of the proposed dock would only be approximately two inches deeper, 55 feet waterward of the other docks. Even out at the 300-foot waterward mark from shoreline, the water would be less than six inches deeper than it is at the 210-foot mark. Consequently, it was not shown how the applicant would gain any particular fishing advantage, in terms of deeper water, by locating the end of his dock some 55 feet waterward of the adjacent docks. Mr. Harp of DER visited the site to determine the water depths referenced above and to determine whether the dock would comply with Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the various pertinent rules concerning water quality contained in Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Harp made a biological appraisal of the site to determine the location and density of seagrass beds and to determine whether the project would adversely affect water quality in Russell Bayou. Seagrasses exist at the site only between approximately 130 and 150 feet waterward of the mean high water mark. The remaining bottom substrate waterward of that point to, including, and beyond the end of the proposed dock is simply bare sand. The dock is narrow enough not to damage seagrasses by shading. Based upon Mr. Harp's uncontroverted expert testimony, it is found that the project will not result in a violation of class III water quality standards and, indeed, no Petitioner disputes that fact. Except indirectly, through navigational impact, the proposed dock does not pose a significant adverse affect on public health, safety, welfare or the property of others. It was not shown that the dock would adversely affect the conservation of fish or wildlife and, indeed, those elements of the "public interest criteria" are undisputed. The proposed dock is considered permanent in nature and will have no significant historical or archeological resource impact. It will not cause a significant adverse effect on fishing values aside from the incidental effect its navigational impact might have on those values. The proposed dock will have some impact on navigation. As shown by Respondent's Exhibit 3, the dock will extend approximately 55 feet more waterward than the existing 210-foot Johnson pier. Although a channel width of four times a boat's length is an adequate margin of safety for an average boat sailed in a competent manner, the fact that the proposed dock would extend 55 feet beyond the extent of the adjacent Johnson dock and the fact, established by Ms. Bass, that there are intermittent shallow sandbar areas which further narrow the channel from the southerly margin of it, reveal that the safe navigational channel is much narrower at the location of the end of the proposed dock, than in other nearby areas. The proposed dock would intersect this narrow "safe channel" at its most constricted point or "pinched area". For this reason, the proposed dock with its length constitutes an impediment to navigation to both the power boat and sailboat navigation described by the Petitioners' witnesses. The pier existing at the westward opening of the cove, although it is 300 feet in length, does not impose an impediment to navigation because the channel is much wider at that point than at the constricted point where the applicant's proposed 265-foot dock would intersect it. The dock would also pose some detrimental effect on the recreational values of the project site to the Petitioners in terms of their passive recreational interest in an unobstructed view. Further, the fact that the dock would infringe on a long-accepted course of travel for boats, which is located some 50 feet or so beyond the end of the existing docks would cause both a navigational and recreational adverse impact in terms of the "public interest criteria" of Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. No other adverse impacts would be occasioned by installation of the dock, however, and these adverse impacts can be alleviated if the dock permit were conditioned upon an alteration so that the proposed dock does not extend more than 210 feet waterward of the mean high water mark. The proposed dock will not cause any significant, cumulative or secondary adverse impacts.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by DER granting the permit sought by Respondent Eckert on the condition that the dock proposed to be constructed, and for which the permit is sought, is restricted to a length of no more than 210 feet waterward of the mean high water mark at the Respondent/applicant's property, including that portion of the dock represented by the terminal platform. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-1181 Petitioner Richard J. and Judith A. Wittig's Proposed Findings of Facts 1-17. Accepted. Petitioner Robert E. and Suzanne E. Stoyer's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-7. Accepted. Rejected as speculative and not supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. Respondent DER's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-12. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by preponderant evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not supported by preponderant evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Accepted but not itself materially dispositive. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esq. General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Richard Coates, Esq. Pat Comer, Esq. Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Steven E. Quinnell, Esq. JAMES L. CHASE, P.A. 101 East Government Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Robert E. and Suzanne E. Stoyer 5768 Red Cedar Street Pensacola, FL 32507 S.P. and P.A. Gallup 5660 Innerarity Circle Pensacola, FL 32507 E. P. Ericson 5652 Innerarity Circle Pensacola, FL 32507-8300 Philip E. Johnson 5794 Red Cedar Street Pensacola, FL 32507 Richard J. and Judith A. Wittig 11903 Autumnwood Lane Ft. Washington, MD 20744 Robert Eckert, Jr. 4817 Ravine Court Mobile, AL 36608

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HARRIS J. SAMUELS vs JUANETTE IMHOOF AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 03-002586 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Smyrna Beach, Florida Jul. 17, 2003 Number: 03-002586 Latest Update: May 28, 2004

The Issue The issues in this case involve the status of a private, single-family dock built by the late Edward Neal Imhoof and his widow, Juanette Imhoof, on the Indian River in New Smyrna Beach, Florida.

Findings Of Fact Juanette Imhoof owns and resides on a piece of residential property (Imhoof property) located at 1402 Riverside Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Mrs. Imhoof's ownership is evidenced by a warranty deed and a quitclaim deed. The warranty deed describes property bordered on the east side by a road named Riverside Drive. East of Riverside Drive is a strip of undeveloped land between Riverside Drive and the water line. Mrs. Imhoof claims this strip of undeveloped land as her riprarian uplands. Her quitclaim deed includes the property described in the warranty deed "together with any and all riparian rights appertaining to or belonging to the above described property." Petitioner, Harris J. Samuels, and his wife, own a piece of property adjacent to the south side of Mrs. Imhoof's claimed riparian uplands. Their lot narrows to approximately 35 feet wide at the river. They have a small dock which extends into the water from their riparian uplands. In the year 2000, Mrs. Imhoof's late husband, Edward Neal Imhoof, contacted DEP Central District Office about obtaining authorization to build a dock on the Imhoofs' riparian uplands. In April of 2000, Mrs. Lisa Prather (f/k/a Lisa Moll), at that time an Environmental Specialist with DEP, visited the Imhoof property in order to do a pre-application site inspection. Following the onsite inspection, Mrs. Prather received an exemption application from Mr. Imhoof on July 12, 2000, which included copies of the Imhoofs' warranty deed and quitclaim deed. The application also included a drawing of the proposed dock. According to the drawing, Mr. Imhoof intended to build his dock on the southern side of the claimed riparian upland. The access pier was depicted mostly parallel to and approximately ten feet from Petitioner's northern property line. Near the terminal platform, the access pier angled to the northeast, and the platform was centered on and perpendicular to the access pier. According to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18- 21.004, a dock must be set back "a minimum of 25 feet inside the applicant's riparian rights lines" unless it qualifies for a waiver. In order to qualify for a waiver, DEP must determine that locating the dock within 25 feet of the riparian rights lines will minimize or avoid impacts to natural resources. See Conclusion of Law 26, infra. However, Mrs. Prather testified that, at the time she received this application, it was not DEP's practice to consider the 25-foot setback requirement when granting exemptions. Subsequently, DEP's legal counsel advised her to consider such waivers when granting exemptions. Mrs. Prather relied on the quitclaim deed and the survey included in the application to determine that the Imhoof property had sufficient riparian upland interest to qualify for an exemption and BOT consent of use. In addition to these materials, Mrs. Prather relied on the Property Appraiser's records, which indicated that there are riparian rights attached to Lot 2, which was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Imhoof. In addition, almost every other similarly-situated property on Riverside Drive to the north of the Imhoofs' property has a dock built on the strip of land between Riverside Drive and the water line. Based on Mrs. Prather's review, DEP granted Mr. Imhoof's exemption application. On August 8, 2000, DEP issued Edward Neal Imhoof a Notice of Exemption for construction of a 628 square foot private, single-family dock on the Indian River in New Smyrna Beach. The Notice of Exemption informed Mr. Imhoof, among other things, that his proposed dock was "exempt from the need for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) under Rule 40C-4.051(11)(g), Florida Administrative Code." However, it also informed Mr. Imhoof that its regulatory exemption "determination shall expire after one year." In a separate authorization, it also informed him, that his proposed dock "qualifies for a consent to use sovereign, submerged lands" from the BOT. In relation to both authorizations, it also informed Mr. Imhoof,: "If you change the project from what you submitted, the authorization(s) granted may no longer be valid at the time of commencement of the project. Please contact us prior to beginning your project if you wish to make any changes." (Emphasis in original.) Construction on the dock in question did not commence within a year of the exemption determination. The evidence was confusing, but it appears that the Imhoofs may have sought a dock permit from the City of New Smyrna Beach during the summer of 2002, and that a question arose as to whether DEP would allow the Imhoofs to build their dock within ten feet from Petitioner's northern property line.5 On July 22, 2002, Mrs. Prather stated in an email to an individual named Seann Smith, who was not further identified by the evidence: "The Department is authorized to waive any setback waiver [sic] if it [sic] the proposed location will have less environmental impact. Therefore, Mr. Imhoof is authorized to construct his dock 10 feet from his property line." There was no other action from DEP waiving the setback requirement; nor was there any action to extend the duration of the regulatory exemption. Construction of the Imhoofs' dock did not begin until approximately April of 2003. On May 5, 2003, Mr. Samuels filed a complaint with DEP regarding the proximity of the Imhoof dock to his own. DEP also received a complaint from the City concerning the dock and trimming of mangroves. Also in May of 2003, Mrs. Prather received a telephone call from Chip Steele, an environmental consultant for the Imhoofs, who inquired as to setback requirements and requested a waiver. It appears that on May 23, 2003, Mr. Imhoof emailed a letter to Mrs. Prather at DEP requesting a waiver from the 25- foot setback requirement for the Imhoofs, who inquired as to a waiver from the setback requirement. It appears that he attached a copy of the email from Mrs. Prather to Seann Smith dated July 22, 2002.6 As further support for the granting of the waiver, Mr. Steele sent Mrs. Prather a photo of the property and a letter outlining his analysis for granting of a waiver of the 25-foot setback requirement, as well as a proposed location for the dock. Based on this information, as well as her previous site inspection in April of 2000, Mrs. Prather apparently confirmed that the dock was eligible for a waiver to the 25-foot setback requirement, and construction commenced. There was no evidence of any additional writing from Mrs. Prather or DEP determining that the 25-foot setback was waived. The dock, as built, is not in the same place as proposed in the materials previously provided by Mr. Imhoof and Mr. Steele. Instead, the access pier proceeded for most of its length, but not all the way through the mangrove fringe, approximately 11 feet from Petitioner's northern property line (as previously proposed). Then, earlier than previously proposed, and still within the mangrove fringe, the access pier angled to the northeast for a short distance, taking it farther away from Petitioner's northern property line (but apparently still within 25 feet of the property line), before angling back to the east and then to the southeast for short distances before terminating in the platform, which extended south towards the riparian rights line. As built, the platform of the Imhoofs' dock is approximately 17 feet north of the platform of Petitioner's dock. Mrs. Prather testified that the dock, as built, still falls within the parameters to be granted a waiver from the 25-foot setback requirement. Mrs. Prather testified that the first 80 feet of the access pier (where it parallels Petitioner's northern property line) is devoid of mangroves, whereas the remainder of the property was at least 85 percent covered with mangroves. Therefore, placing the dock on the south side would result in less destruction of natural vegetation and less loss of habitat. Aligning the dock wholly or partially through the middle of the lot, which was one of Petitioner's alternative proposals, would be more detrimental to the environment because it would bisect the healthy mangrove fringe. In addition, the dock, as built, has been elevated to minimize impact to the vegetation from shading, at a greater expense to the Imhoofs, even though it is not required to be. Mrs. Prather testified that the as-built location avoids or minimizes environmental impacts due to shading, edge effect, and diversity. Carolyn Schultz, a biologist, confirmed the testimony of Mrs. Prather. Mrs. Schultz testified that, on the southern boundary of the claimed riparian uplands, where the access pier was placed, fill material from Petitioner's property extends onto the Imhoofs' claimed riparian upland and has created an edge effect. As a result, this area already has been disturbed, and placement of the dock in that location, as opposed to the less impacted area elsewhere on the Imhoofs' claimed riparian uplands, would be less of an environmental impact. Petitioner presented an expert biologist, Joe H. Young, to testify regarding the placement of the Imhoof dock. It was Mr. Young's opinion that placing the dock farther to the north side of the property would result in less environmental impact. Mr. Young proposed angling the access pier to the northeast sooner (i.e., closer to Riverside Drive, namely approximately 112 feet from the road), and continuing it in that direction until termination in the platform, which would be much farther north (and farther away from the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock) than as-built. Mr. Young calculated that approximately 30 square feet less mangrove fringe would be impacted under his proposal. (It appears that his proposed alternative dock also would still not meet the 25-foot setback requirement.) However, Mr. Young did not perform any type of percentage-of-cover or qualitative analysis. The Imhoofs' expert, Mrs. Schultz, performed such an analysis and found that the mangrove fringe was thicker and healthier (primarily, more diverse) where Mr. Young proposed that the dock be built. Even disregarding relative health of the mangrove fringe in the two locations, when she factored in percentage-of-cover, Mrs. Schultz found that 5 square feet less mangrove vegetation was impacted by the Imhoofs than would be under Mr. Young's proposal. Petitioner did not rebut the testimony of the opposing experts that the as-built location was preferred because of factors such as diversity, edge effect, and shading. The evidence is clear that, waterward of the mangrove fringe, there is no significant difference in natural resources to be impacted by placement of the Imhoofs' dock. In other words, placement of the terminal platform in the as- built configuration is not necessary to avoid or minimize adverse impacts to natural resources. Extending the platform to the north, away from the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock, would be just as environmentally-friendly. Petitioner testified that the location of Mrs. Imhoof's dock, approximately 17 feet to the north of his dock, interferes with his riparian rights and the use of his dock for kayaks and sailboats. As for riparian rights, Petitioner accepted the riparian rights lines drawn by Respondents for purposes of this case. Those riparian rights lines indicate not only that Mrs. Imhoof's dock does not interfere with Petitioner's riparian rights but that Petitioner's dock actually interferes with Mrs. Imhoof's claimed riparian rights. As for launching and docking kayaks and sailboats, the location of Mrs. Imhoof's dock interferes with Petitioner to some degree, especially in certain current and wind conditions. Some degree of such interference may not be unreasonable, especially given the location of Petitioner's dock within Mrs. Imhoof's claimed riparian rights lines. But there was no valid, natural resource-based reason for the Imhoofs to construct the platform of their dock so as to extend south towards the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock. The DEP representative who took Petitioner's complaint on May 5, 2003, wrote on the complaint form: "Mr. Imhoof constructed dock longer and closer to his dock than we authorized in our exemption of August 2000." The "we" appears to refer to DEP, not Petitioner. It appears from the evidence that Petitioner first learned of the existence of the Imhoofs' exemption in early May 2003, when he went to the City of New Smyrna Beach to complain about the location of the dock being constructed by the Imhoofs. However, on its face, the exemption appeared to have expired well before construction began. On May 20, 2003, DEP conducted a site investigation of the complaints against the Imhoofs. After the site visit, DEP representatives spoke to Petitioner and told him that the Imhoofs' dock was exempt and had a waiver from the setback requirement. On or about May 22, 2003, Mr. Samuels went to DEP's Central Office and obtained another copy of the expired exemption. On July 1, 2003, Mr. Samuels mailed DEP his Amended Petition. It was not clear from the evidence whether there was an earlier petition or, if so, when it was filed. Respondents did not file a motion to dismiss the Amended Petition as being untimely; however, their PRO raised this issue. It was not clear from the Amended Petition whether Petitioner was requesting an administrative hearing on proposed agency action (to determine de novo whether Mr. Imhoof's proposed dock should be exempt), or whether he was requesting revocation of the exemption for construction not consistent with the exemption. The Amended Petition did not articulate that the exemption expired before construction, or take the position that Mr. Imhoof's dock was constructed without the benefit of a valid regulatory exemption (or permit) and BOT consent of use.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order determining that Mrs. Imhoof: is entitled to a regulatory exemption for her dock; and should be given consent of use by the BOT for her dock, so long as the terminal platform extends to the north, away from the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S --- J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2004.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.60253.141403.813
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FRED ROTH vs. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 88-002058 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002058 Latest Update: Oct. 31, 1988

Findings Of Fact Sunset Company of Wilton, Incorporated, is the record title owner of a parcel of real property in Government Lot 1, Section 5, Township 66 South, Range 33 East, on Crawl Key No. 3 also known as Fat Deer Key, Monroe County, Florida. A portion of that parcel has been conveyed by Sunset Company to Whaler's Plaza, Incorporated, although that deed may not have been recorded. Petitioner Fred Roth owns and controls both corporations and exerts ownership and control over the entire parcel. The submerged lands in Tarpon Creek which are waterward of the line of mean high water contiguous to the parcel are sovereignty submerged lands. Roth received "major development" approval from Monroe County to develop the parcel by constructing a commercial/retail development known as "Whaler's Plaza.' The major development plan submitted to and approved by Monroe County includes a docking facility. In 1979 Roth filed an application with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for a private dock facility at Whaler's Plaza. The Department of Environmental Regulation approved that application and issued to Roth Permit/Certification No. 44-18542-5E. Roth never constructed that docking facility, and the permit expired on August 1, 1980. One of the agencies involved in reviewing that permit application was the Respondent. On June 26, 1979, Respondent notified Roth that upon review of the application in DER File No. 44-18542-5E, it had determined that the submerged lands were state-owned but that no lease agreement with Respondent would be required. After Permit No. 44-18542-5E expired on August 1, 1980, the Department of Environmental Regulation directed a letter to Petitioner advising him that the permit had expired and further advising him that if he wished to pursue the project he would have to obtain a new permit. in October 1983 Roth sought new authorization from the Department of Environmental Regulation and Respondent to construct a docking facility at Whaler's Plaza. His application was assigned DER File No. 440774875. On December 29, 1983, Respondent notified Roth that a lease would be required for the use of state-owned lands contiguous to Whaler's Plaza, relative to DER File No. 440774875. Respondent's rules changed in 1982 so that Roth's docking facility would be required to meet new criteria. The docking facility proposed by Roth in 1983 was similar to the docking facility proposed in 1979. The 1983 proposed modified docking facility was still represented to the Department of Environmental Regulation to be a private boat dock. The Department of Environmental Regulation issued an intent to deny the 1983 application under its then-existing rules, and Roth requested a formal hearing on that preliminary denial. Before a final hearing could be conducted, Roth again modified the proposed docking facility so that he qualified for a dredge and fill permit exemption from DER, so that no DER permit was needed for his project. A final order was entered by the Department of Environmental Regulation on August 27, 1985. While Roth's 1983 application was pending before the Department of Environmental Regulation, Roth was processing his application with Respondent for a submerged land lease for the docking facility. The documents he filed with Respondent, however, indicated that the docking facility was not intended to be a private dock but rather was a dock related to the commercial development at Whaler's Plaza. Roth represented to Respondent that the proposed docking facility would be for the convenience of patrons of the stores and restaurant at Whaler's Plaza and for his own personal use. Specifically, on June 3, 1985, Roth directed a letter to Respondent pursuant to Respondent's request for additional information. He described the Whaler's Plaza docking facility as follows: The wood dock will be used for arriving and departing customers of the restaurant and stores and my own personal use. The upland land use and activities of the property--will be developed into a shopping center. At the present time, the first phase is completed which is a one-story building containing four units, housing six retail stores, plus offices. The next phase will consist of three more buildings having five units each, 1,0000 [sic] sq. ft. each unit which will be for retail stores and offices, and the final phase will be a 200 seat restaurant, a miniature [sic] petting zoo and possibly a miniature golf course. ... 70 percent of the slips will be open to the general public for their convenience In patronizing the restaurant and stores; the remaining 30 percent of the slips will be for my own personal use. Roth never completed the lease application he filed with Respondent, and he failed to obtain approval for the use of the sovereignty submerged lands preempted by the docking facility proposed in DER File No. 440774875. Eventually, his pending application with Respondent was deactivated, and the file was closed. In late 1986, Roth initiated construction of his docking facility on sovereignty submerged lands, and he caused 30 pilings with cross-bracing to be placed into the submerged lands. On September 1, 1986, Grant Gelhardt, one of Respondent's enforcement officers, discovered the dock being constructed and verbally instructed Roth, through Mrs. Roth, to immediately cease construction activity. No further construction has taken place. Despite the verbal notification, a subsequent warning notice sent by certified mail, and Respondent's Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action, Roth has failed to remove the pilings and/or to take corrective measures regarding the partially completed docking facility. Roth has allowed vessels to be moored at the partially completed docking facility, has moored his own vessels at the partially completed docking facility, and has failed to prevent other persons from mooring at the partially completed docking facility. Roth's actions have resulted in damage to a benthic seagrass community on the adjacent sovereignty submerged lands over which Roth's partially completed docking facility is located, and over which vessels using the facility have been and would be moored. Those submerged lands constitute a benthic community of seagrass which supports various fauna and which would be adversely affected by completion and operation of the docking facility. The water depths in the area are shallow, with areas of less than -4 feet mean low water. The width of Tarpon Creek in the project area is approximately 100 feet. The length of the partially completed docking facility is approximately 150 feet. Although the dock extends parallel to the shore, the distance the dock extends into Tarpon Creek, as measured from the shoreline, is approximately 35 feet. Roth knowingly trespassed on sovereignty submerged lands by initiating construction of the docking facility, and he has willfully damaged those lands by drilling holes and placing pilings, and by allowing moored vessels to shade the seagrass. Although Roth ceased construction of the docking facility when told to stop, he has failed to attempt to resolve the violation, to remove the pilings, to seek an after-the-fact approval, or to cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands, even subsequent to receiving the Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action. Respondent's June 26, 1979 letter to Roth authorized the activities described in DER Permit No. 44-18542-5E, for the period authorized by that permit. Roth knew that the DEP permit, and therefore Respondent's approval to engage in the activity authorized by that permit, had expired. Roth further knew that his new application filed in 1983, DER File No. 440774875, which was approved by DER after Roth further modified it in order to qualify for an exemption, did not exempt him from obtaining authorization from Respondent to use sovereignty submerged lands for the project and further knew that when he commenced construction of the docking facility in 1986 that he had not obtained approval from Respondent to use state-owned submerged lands. Roth offered no evidence to demonstrate any detrimental reliance upon the June 26, 1979, DNR letter, and the letter did not create a vested right for Roth to construct a different docking facility at a later time without authorization from Respondent. The uplands at the Whaler's Plaza commercial/retail development are owned by for-profit corporations which Roth controls and which derive income from the business and commercial activities at Whaler's Plaza. The docking facility intended primarily for the use of customers of Whaler's Plaza would therefore constitute a revenue generating/income related activity.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring petitioner to: Remove the unauthorized structure within 20 days from the date on which the Final Order is entered and in accordance with Respondent's supervision of that removal; Immediately cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands of the parcel known as Whaler's Plaza until authorized to use state-owned lands; and Pay a fine of $2500 within 15 days of receipt of a certified letter from the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources demanding payment to the internal improvement Trust Fund. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of October, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Manz, Esquire Post Office Box 177 Marathon Florida 33050 Ross S. Burnaman, Esquire Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Florida Laws (3) 120.57253.002253.77 Florida Administrative Code (3) 18-14.00218-14.00318-14.005
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RIVERWALK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. YACHTING ARCADE AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 85-000721 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000721 Latest Update: Aug. 07, 1985

Findings Of Fact Respondent/applicant, The Yachting Arcade (applicant), initiated this matter when it filed an amended application with respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER), on April 27, 1984, seeking a permit authorizing the construction of a docking facility on the eastern shore of Bethel Creek in the City of Vero Beach, Florida.1 Specifically, applicant wished to construct a commercial shoreline dock 530 feet long and six feet wide with four access docks at various locations along the shoreline. The access docks would vary in size from thirteen to sixteen feet in length and from four to ten feet in width. The dock will be situated in front of a two-story commercial structure and parking lot on 1.14 acres owned by applicant which lies between Highway A-1-A and Bethel Creek. That structure will house a restaurant and other retail establishments. A city permit for the dock was previously issued on November 17, 1983, and remains in effect at this time. According to the parties, permit approval is also required from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). However, DNR is awaiting action by DER before issuing or denying a permit. Bethel Creek is a relatively small navigable U-shaped dead-end canal connected to the Intracoastal Waterway in the Indian River in Indian River County, Florida. It is classified as a Class III water of the State. Because of continued development along the Creek, and poor flushing characteristics, the water has gradually deteriorated over the years. Most of its shoreline is bulkheaded in the vicinity of the proposed project, and it has a depth of around fifteen to twenty feet. The width of the Creek at the site of the project ranges from 120 to 195 feet and represents the most narrow part of the canal. The project is approximately one to two-tenths of a mile from the dead-end of the canal, and less than a half a mile from the opening at Indian River. In addition to applicant's commercial development, there are a number of single family residences on the Creek, a large condominium known as the Riverwalk Condominium, and eight townhouses at the deadend of the Creek. Other development may also exist but was not disclosed at hearing. There are a number of existing private docks with boats on the Creek including a four-dock marina at the end of the canal. Petitioner, Riverwalk Condominium Association, Inc., is an association of condominium owners who reside within 500 feet of the proposed activity. Under the proposal, applicant intends to limit the docking facilities to the private use of The Yachting Arcade." There will be no fuel or maintenance service for boats, and sewage disposal facilities and live-aboards will be prohibited. Shoreline improvement is to be accomplished by excavating an area landward of the dock, backfilling the area with sand and rubble, placing filter fabric over the backfill, laying sand and gravel over the fabric and revegetating the excavated/backfilled area with cordgrass and red mangroves. The theoretical capacity of the docking facility will depend on the size of the boats, but it will allow docking by up to twelve to fifteen boats of the fifty foot category at one time, or up to thirty-six smaller boats simultaneously. At the insistence of DER, the boats will be moored parallel to the Creek in an effort to not impede navigation. After receiving the original and amended applications, DER personnel made three on-site inspections of the property. These were conducted in January and May, 1984 and May,|1985. Although no water quality testing was performed, the Department found the Creek to be a viable habitat for various game and nongame species, including mullet, sheepshead, tarpon, snapper, manatees, great blue herons and egrets. The property along the shoreline was comprised of Australian pines, pepper trees and railroad vines until they were removed in June, 1985 by applicant. There has been severe erosion along the water front but this will diminish through revegetation and excavation of the bank. The construction of the dock will create only minor, short-term turbidity. The quality of the water within the Creek is now poor, but a vegetated shoreline, including mangroves, will assist in cleansing the water and improving its quality. Therefore, applicant has given reasonable assurances that the proposed project will not violate established water quality standards, or constitute a threat to marine life, wildlife or natural resources. According to agency rule an applicant must demonstrate that "the proposed project will not create a navigational hazard, or a serious impediment to navigation. . ." in the affected waters. Even though the dock will be built at the most narrow part of the creek, and may have as many as thirty-six boats moored at any one time, the agency expert concluded that no impediment to navigation would occur.2 However, testimony by residents on the Creek indicate that the actual navigable part of the stream is much smaller, and that boats are frequently "beached" because of the shallow nature of the waters. Since applicant will simultaneously allow as many as fifteen boats in the fifty-foot category, or thirty-six of a smaller variety, to traverse the Creek, there will be a serious impediment to navigation on the narrow navigable part of the Creek. Moreover, it will create a navigational hazard. A restriction on the number of boats to use applicant's dock at one time is not practical, and even DER omitted such a condition because of its inability to enforce this provision. Therefore, the criteria for issuance of a permit have not been met.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of The Yachting Arcade for a permit to construct a shoreline dock on Bethel Creek in Indian River County, Florida be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1985.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57403.0876.08
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ARCHIPELAGO COMMUNITY ASSOC., INC. vs DUANE RAAB AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 98-002430 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Stuart, Florida May 28, 1998 Number: 98-002430 Latest Update: Apr. 17, 2000

The Issue Whether the finger pier portion of Respondent Raab's dock creates a navigational hazard. The resolution of that issue will determine whether the dock qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact DEP has the authority to regulate the construction of docks in jurisdictional wetlands and other waters of the State of Florida and on state submerged lands under Chapters 253, 373, and 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 62-330 (which adopts Chapter 40E-4) and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. The Association is a residential community located in Sewall's Point, Martin County, Florida. All lots within the community abut navigable channels which provide ingress and egress to the ICW. These channels converge so that there is only one channel that connects to the ICW. Most of the residents of the community have large vessels that routinely navigate the channels within the community. At the time of the formal hearing, many of the vessels owned by residents of the community had drafts of four feet and at least two had drafts of five feet. In 1997, Mr. Raab purchased a residence in the Association that is located very close to where the channel meets the ICW. Because of that location, practically all residents of the Association have to pass in front of Mr. Raab's property when going into or returning from the ICW. The property at issue is located at 22 Simara Street, Sewalls Point, Martin County, Florida. The dock at issue in this proceeding is subject to DEP's regulatory authority. When Mr. Raab purchased this property in 1997, there was an existing marginal dock parallel to the bulk-head. Mr. Raab subsequently sought and received approval from DEP to demolish the existing marginal dock and replace it with a virtually identical structure. The existence and configuration of the marginal dock is not at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Raab thereafter sought to modify his approved marginal dock by adding a finger pier which extended into the channel 36 feet so he could dock his vessel perpendicular to the bulkhead. Mr. Raab's plan also called for the construction of two pilings 12 feet from the end of the finger pier. Mr. Raab had, as of the time of the formal hearing, re-constructed the marginal dock and had constructed the finger pier. 3/ The two additional pilings had not been constructed at the time of the formal hearing. After reviewing the modified project, DEP determined that the project was exempt from the need for an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes. DEP also authorized Mr. Raab to use state-owned submerged lands if necessary. The Association thereafter timely challenged DEP's determination that the finger pier portion of the project (and the two additional pilings) did not require an environmental resource permit. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the functional width of the channel in front of Mr. Raab's property. 4/ Mr. Holly testified on behalf of the Association that the functional width of the channel was 83 feet. Mr. Lidberg, testifying on behalf of Mr. Raab, testified that the functional width was 101 feet. This conflict is resolved by finding that the functional width of the channel in front of the Raab property is 101 feet. 5/ The prevailing winds in the area in front of Mr. Raabb's dock blow into the dock. The depth of the water in the channels is influenced by tides. The principal reason Mr. Raab wants the finger pier is so that he can moor his boat with the bow to the prevailing winds in times of high winds. At the time of the formal hearing, Mr. Raab owned a vessel with an overall length of 44 feet. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Raab's finger pier and the two pilings that have been authorized, but not constructed, constitute a hazard to navigation. 6/ Based on the totality of the evidence, it is found that these structures do not create a navigational hazard. 7/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order dismissing the Association's challenge to the determination that Mr. Raab's project qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2000.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57373.414403.813 Florida Administrative Code (1) 40E-4.051
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