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M. D. MOODY AND SONS, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 77-000304 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000304 Latest Update: Nov. 29, 1977

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a dealer in heavy construction equipment and has been since its incorporation on August 1, 1946. Among petitioner's competitors are Dewind Machinery Company, Florida Equipment Company of Jacksonville, Florida- Georgia Tractor Company, Inc., Great Southern Equipment Company, Inc., Pilot Equipment Company, Inc., Ring Power Corporation and Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Company. Like its competitors, petitioner frequently leases equipment to its customers, giving them an option to purchase, rather than selling them the equipment outright. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1 reflects one such transaction. On April 19, 1973, petitioner quoted Houdaille Duval Wright Company (Houdaille) a purchase price of twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) plus sale's tax, and monthly rent of fourteen hundred dollars ($1,400.00) plus sales tax on a diesel powered, self-propelled vibratory roller. After negotiations between petitioner and Houdaille, the purchase price dropped to seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), but the monthly rental remained unchanged. Houdaille agreed to lease the vibratory roller from petitioner on these terms. With respect to its option to purchase, Houdaille specified that: 100 percent of all rentals to apply towards purchase price of $17,000.00 less 10 percent discount on remaining outstanding balance at time of purchase. Interest to accrue at a rate 7 1/2 percent simple. Houdaille made lease payments for nine months, totaling twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600.00), before electing to exercise its option to purchase. In calculating the amount of money Houdaille was to pay to close out the transaction, petitioner began by treating the payments Houdaille had made under the lease as if they had been payments made in repayment of a loan, outstanding for the period of the lease, in the amount of seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), at 7 1/2 percent per annum. Petitioner allocated portions of each lease payment to principal and to interest, calculated on the declining principal balance, aggregating eleven thousand nine hundred ten dollars and fifty-four cents ($11,910.54) to principal, and six hundred eighty-nine dollars and fourty-six cents ($689.46) to interest. Petitioner then calculated the 10 percent discount by multiplying one tenth times the difference between the original price ($17,000.00) and the amount aggregated to principal ($11,910.54), which yielded five hundred eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($508.95). This figure was subtracted from the original contract price ($17,000.00) to ascertain the' discounted price ($16,491.05) against which the lease payments were credited in their entirety ($12,600.00), yielding the figure three thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and five cents ($3,891.05), on which petitioner calculated 4 percent sales tax. In addition, petitioner required Houdaille, in exercising its option to purchase, to pay six hundred eighty-nine dollars and forty-six cents ($689.46), the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. In every respect pertinent to the dispute between petitioner and respondent, this transaction between petitioner and Houdaille is typical of the transactions on which contested portions of the tax assessments were based. The same is true of petitioner's lease and sale of a truck crane to Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc. (Poston), the transaction reflected in exhibit No. 2 (although petitioner's agreement with Poston did not involve a discount.) The terms of the lease purchase agreement, as stated on respondent's exhibit No. 2, were: Option Price $124,855.00 with 100 percent of paid rentals to apply to purchase price less interest at 8.5 percent simple. After making lease payments totalling twenty-six thousand dollars ($26,000.00), Poston exercised its option to purchase. At this point the lease payments were recast as installment sales payments, portions being allocated to principal and interest accordingly. Respondent collected sales tax on the amount of money Poston paid in exchange for title, after electing to purchase, less the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. Petitioner has been entering into lease purchase agreements of this kind with various customers since 1946 or 1947, and, when customers exercised purchase options, petitioner ordinarily calculated sales tax in the manner it employed in connection with the sale of the vibratory roller to Houdaille, and the truck crane to Poston. In at least one instance, however, petitioner calculated sales tax as 4 percent of all the money a customer, Misener Marine Construction, Inc., paid when exercising its option to purchase a truck crane, including portions of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. On the lease payments themselves, petitioner regularly collected 4 percent sales tax which it regularly remitted to respondent. For federal income tax purposes, petitioner treated payments from customers under a lease purchase agreement as lease payments for every tax year in which the option to purchase was not exercised. For the tax year in which the option to purchase was exercised, the lease payments were treated as payments under an installment sale contract, for federal income tax purposes. When respondent audited petitioner's rentals for the period May 1, 1970, to April 30, 1973, and earlier when respondent performed a general audit of petitioner's books for the period July 1, 1959, to February 28, 1962, no mention was mace of petitioner's sales tax treatment of lease purchase agreements under which lessees had exercised purchase options. Before the audit which eventuated in the assessments now in controversy, however, the auditors were given a copy of a letter from L. N. Hansen to Thomas D. Aitken dated December 9, 1974. Mr. Hansen was formerly director of respondent's sales and use tax division. In the fall of 1974, he was one of a group or "board" of respondent's employees who considered questions arising under the tax laws and formulated policy for respondent. His letter to Mr. Aitken, which came in evidence as, petitioner's exhibit No. 5, was written on behalf of respondent after its substance was discussed at a meeting of respondent's policy group. It pertains to lease purchase agreements entered into by Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Co. (Rozier). Mr. Hansen's letter stated that Rozier was "not correct in reducing the taxable sales price by the rental payments and thereafter adding an interest charge which, if it was incurred at all, was incurred prior to the time of sale." Petitioner's exhibit No. 5, p. 1. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stucky's of Eastman, Georgia vs. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which appears as an appendix to the order.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent abandon the uncollected portions of its deficiency assessments. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 4-8, and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2 is irrelevant insofar as it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, and for that reason has not been adopted where it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3 has not been adopted because it is not relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 9 has not been adopted because what motivated respondent's employees is not relevant and because it was not proven what would have happened "[b]ut for the Hansen letter." Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 11 and 12 have not been adopted because they are irrelevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 13 has not been adopted as such because it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. The first paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, except that exercise of the purchase option may be said to relate back to the beginning of the contract. Significantly, respondent proposes as a finding of fact that the "amount termed 'Interest' . . . is payable for the use of the money during the rental/lease period." Paragraphs two through seven, nine and ten of respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. The eighth paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has not been adopted; it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire Post Office Box 1118 424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ms. Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (1) 212.05
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs IRVING HALSEY BRAIN, JR., 90-003228 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida May 24, 1990 Number: 90-003228 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1990

The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of failure to account for and deliver funds to the person entitled thereto and/or guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, or dishonest dealing in a business transaction.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Irving Halsey Brain, Jr., was licensed as a real estate broker, and, with his wife, owned the stock of Jay Hearin, Inc. On October 10, 1983, Respondent negotiated a lease of property between Emily R. Hammer, lessor, and Suncoast Heat Treatment, Inc., lessee, (Exhibit 1) for a period of three years, beginning November 1, 1983, at an initial rental of $2,225 per month plus sales tax with annual adjustments for changes in the consumer price index, and the option to renew the lease for an additional three years at the expiration of the initial lease period upon the same terms and conditions. This lease was renewed November 1, 1986, to expire October 31, 1989. On May 22, 1986, Respondent negotiated the lease agreement between Emily R. Hammer, lessor, and Whitaker Roofing, Inc., lessee, for a building for a period of one year from June 1, 1986 to May 31, 1987, at a monthly rental of $1,250 per month plus sales tax, with options to renew the lease in 1987 and 1988 on similar terms and conditions with adjustment to the rent based upon the consumer price index. Both of these leases provided in clause 21 that the lease was procured through the efforts of Jay Hearin, Inc., who was to collect all rentals coming due from which, as compensation for procuring the lease, the lessor authorized Jay Hearin, Inc., to deduct 8 percent on the Suncoast Lease and 7 percent on the Whitaker lease and remit balance to lessor. Jay Hearin, Inc., was also authorized to pay any invoices applicable to the leased premises which had been approved by the lessor and to deduct the amount so paid. In February and March, 1987, Whitaker roofing did not remit rent payments to Hearin Realty, and the monthly computer printout Owner's Statements to Mrs. Hammer show only rental payments from Suncoast. However, the monthly statement for April 1987 shows Whitaker made the February, March and April payments, and these payments were remitted to Mrs. Hammer. The May and June statements do not show payments from Whitaker and, due to an office error, the June payment from Suncoast was not remitted to Mrs. Hammer. The July statement shows receipt of rent from Whitaker for May and June and for Suncoast for July. No rental payments were received from either tenant in August, and the September statement reflects payments from Suncoast for August and September. During this period of sporadic collections, Mrs. Hammer became upset at not getting her full rental payments, and attempted several times to contact Respondent Brain without success. Brain testified he also tried to contact Mrs. Hammer without success. Mrs. Hammer telephoned the tenants about their rental payments, and they told her they had paid Respondent. In August 1987, Mrs. Hammer engaged another real estate agency to manage the property for her and unilaterally terminated her contract with Respondent contained in Exhibit 1. The new agent advised the tenants to submit rentals to him. On the September 1987 Owner's Statement, Respondent listed the Suncoast rental payments for August and September, deducted his commission, added the June payment which had not been remitted, deducted the rental commission for the balance of the lease for both Suncoast and Whitaker and submitted to Mrs. Hammer a check for the balance of $463.63. This was not accepted by Mrs. Hammer, and she engaged the services of an attorney who filed suit against respondent and Jay Hearin, Inc. The suit alleged failure to remit rents for the months of June, August and September 1987, from Suncoast in the total amount of $6,955.14 and converting these payments to his own use; and for converting rental payments from Whitaker Roofing for the months of July and August 1987, in the total amount of $2,486.06 to his own use. This complaint alleged these conversions of funds constituted civil theft and demanded triple damages (Exhibit 3). Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Respondent submitted a letter (Exhibit 5) to Mrs. Hammer's attorney, Stephen Evans, on February 18, 1988, contending Mrs. Hammer had failed to comply with the terms of the lease agreement. The attorney for Mrs. Hammer obtained a default judgment against Respondent for triple the sums alleged to have been converted in the total amount of $28,353.60 plus costs of $105.00 and attorney's fee of $680.00 (Exhibit 2). Respondent then obtained the services of an attorney but was unable to get the judgment set aside (Exhibit 7). In 1989 Respondent submitted, through his attorney, $7,200.00 to Mrs. Hammer which apparently represents the figures shown on the September 1987 Owner's Statement without a deduction for future commissions plus interest and attorney's fees. Prior to the filing of this administrative complaint Jay Hearin, Inc., filed for bankruptcy and has been declared bankrupt. In his proposed recommended order, Respondent indicated he has also filed personal bankruptcy, but no evidence in this regard was presented at the hearing.

Recommendation It is recommended that the charges contained in the administrative complaint filed April 26, 1990 against Irving Halsey Brain, Jr. be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1990. Appendix Accepted Rejected. Respondent was licensed as a broker Accepted Accepted, however, the provision quoted from the lease is Rejected as not being an accurate quote. Rejected. See Exhibit 4. Accepted only insofar as included in HO's #6,7, and 8 Accepted Accepted Treatment accorded Respondent's proposed findings: 1, 2, 3, and 4 Rejected as unsupported by evidence presented at this hearing. Accepted Accepted but for last sentence which is a legal conclusion, not as a fact. Accepted Accepted Accepted only insofar as included in HO's #6,7, and 8 (?) Accepted Accepted Accepted to the extent Respondent submitted $7,200 to Mrs. Hammer. Rejected. Evidence was presented that Jay Hearin, Inc. filed for bankruptcy, but the record does not indicate Respondent filed personal bankruptcy. Rejected as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Irving Halsey Brain, Jr. 334 State Street Commerce, GA 30529 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs DOROTHY K. LIVINGSTON, 90-004468 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jul. 20, 1990 Number: 90-004468 Latest Update: May 31, 1991

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. During times material, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman in Florida, having been issued license number 0319604. The last license issued Respondent was as a salesman, c/o Referral Realty Center, Inc. (herein Referral) at 8974 Seminole Boulevard, Seminole, Florida. On December 1, 1988, Respondent entered into a management agreement with Madeira Beach Yacht Club Condominium Association, Inc. (herein Madeira) to serve as property manager. Respondent assumed the property manager position with Madeira in June of 1987, which was formalized by a written agreement in December 1988. While acting as property manager for Madeira, Respondent handled the rental transactions of individual units for owners. In return for her services, Respondent was compensated based on a commission of 10% to 20% of the monthly rental. On at least one occasion, Respondent rented an individual unit for owners for a term greater than one year. Respondent was aware that she was renting the one unit for a term in excess of one year. Respondent signed leases for units belonging to individual owners as the rental agent or representative. Respondent used the commissions that she received to defray operating expenses for her rental business such as cleaning fees for the units and for personal compensation. Respondent maintained a bank account at the First Federal of Largo Savings and Loan Association entitled "Dorothy K. Livingston Rental Account" for her rental business. Deposits to that account were rental monies received from tenants from which disbursements were made to unit owners and the remaining commissions went to Respondent as compensation. The rental account maintained by Respondent was neither an account with her employing real estate broker, nor was it an escrow account. Respondent placed security deposits that she received from tenants in the referenced rental account that she maintained. Respondent did not inform her employing broker of the receipt of security deposits nor did she discuss with her employing broker any of her activities involving rental of units for owners at Madeira. However, there is credible testimony evidencing that her broker was knowledgeable of Respondent's activities relative to her rental of units for owners. During May 1989, Respondent placed her real estate license with Referral Realty Center (Referral) as her employing broker. She did so in order to receive payment for referring prospects to Referral. On or about May 22, 1989, Respondent entered into an independent contractor agreement with Referral. That agreement provided in pertinent part that: Independent contractor agrees that Independent contractor will not list any real estate for sale, exchange, lease or rental... . Independent contractor agrees to refer all prospective clients, customers, buyers and sellers of which Independent contractor becomes aware to the Center... . Independent contractor agrees that so long as this Agreement is in force and effect the Independent contractor will not refer any prospective seller or buyer to another real estate broker... . 9. Independent contractor agrees to act, and to represent that he or she is acting solely as a referral associate of the Center... . While employed by Referral, Respondent also received commissions from individual unit owners at Madeira. During the time when Respondent had her license listed with Referral, she also received commissions from Referral for prospects she generated while renting units for owners and acting as property manager at Madeira. Respondent received a copy of a letter from attorney R. Michael Kennedy, addressed to J.L. Cleghorn of Building Managers International, Inc., dated September 5, 1989. In that letter, attorney Kennedy expressed his opinion that condominium or cooperative managers are exempted from the licensing provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and that receipt of a percentage of rental proceeds would not be precluded even if the manager was salaried. The Kennedy letter erroneously states support for attorney Kennedy's opinion by Alexander M. Knight, Chief of the Bureau of Condominiums, and Knight so advised attorney Kennedy of that erroneous support by a subsequent letter to him. It is unclear to what extent Respondent apprised attorney Kennedy as to the specifics of her activities and to what extent she relied on his opinion prior to engaging in her property manager's rental and referral activities. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7.) Respondent did not seek advice from Petitioner as to whether her activities fell within the guidelines of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent is familiar with the statutory definitions of a broker and salesman and what activities constitute brokerage and sales activities. During times material, Respondent's employing broker, David Hurd, was a licensed real estate broker in Florida, and the broker of record for Referral for procuring prospects and making referrals of real estate activities. Employment under an independent contractor agreement is considered employment under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500.00, issue a written reprimand to her, place her license on probation for a period of one (1) year with the further condition that she complete 60 hours of continuing education. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jerry Gottlieb, Esquire GOTTLIEB & GOTTLIEB, P.A. 2753 State Road 580, Suite 204 Clearwater, Florida 34621 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (5) 120.57475.01475.011475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GERALD SCHULTZ AND CHOICE RENTALS AND REALTY CORPORATION, 81-002330 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002330 Latest Update: Mar. 25, 1982

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Gerald Schultz was a real estate broker holding License #0215135 and active firm broker for Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation (formerly Choice Rentals, Inc., and hereinafter "Choice Rentals"), which was a corporate broker holding License #0195222. Rosemary Hufcut entered into a contract with Choice Rentals on July 30, 1980, for Choice Rentals to provide her with rental information based upon criteria she gave Choice Rentals. Hufcut paid a fee of $50 to Choice Rentals for its services. Hufcut was looking for an apartment for herself and her two daughters. She specified she wanted a good neighborhood with good schools. Hufcut was given rental data by Choice Rentals and, with her father, visited a number of the apartments listed. The apartments were not suitable. On the following day, Hufcut requested a refund and submitted a written request for a refund on August 6, 1980. On August 26, 1980, Hufcut's refund request was denied by a letter from Choice Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit #6). This letter provided in part: Refusal to accept available rental properties meeting the requirements as set forth in your contract with us, does not constitute cancellation of contractual agreement. (This is pursuant to the Florida Law regarding "obtaining a rental".) note - produced available rental property meeting the requirements stated on contract. Hufcut has never received a refund from Choice Rentals. The Board introduced Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through #6, which were received in evidence.

Recommendation Having found the Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate suspend the licenses of Respondents for ten years. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. Gerald Schultz c/o John Hume, Esquire 5100 North Federal Highway, Suite 405 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Choice Rentals & Realty 3367 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.453
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. WILLIAM O`BRIEN, 80-000945 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000945 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 1981

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observations of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. By its one-count Administrative Complaint filed herein on April 3, 1980, the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Real Estate, alleged that the Respondent, William O'Brien, violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), due to his failure to deliver a security deposit to a property owner and that Respondent thereafter tendered a protion of the deposit in the form of a check which, when presented for payment, was not honored due to insufficient funds. During times material, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner and is the holder of Florida Real Estate License No. 168869. Gary ;Heide is the owner of the duplex apartment situated at 2407 Northeast 33rd avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The pertinent facts surrounding the allegations herein are, for the most part, simple and undisputed. The subject premises had been leased by owner Heide to Maurice L. LaReau. LaReau had leased the premises for approximately eleven (11) months when he found a residence that he intended to purchase and was therefore desirous of subletting the subject property with the owner's permission in an acceptable manner such that he would not incur any losses due to his vacating the premises prior to the expiration of the lease term. He, therefore, approached owner Heide and advised him of his intentions. According to LaReau, Heide gave him "carte blanche" authority to find a tenant to sublease the apartment but that he would appreciate it if he would "screen" the sub-lessee. Heide suggested that LaReau place an ad in the newspaper to secure a tenant and he also made known to LaReau his overall objective of not sustaining any loss of rents due to a vacancy in the apartment. During that conversation Heide also advised LaReau that he would be leaving for a vacation in Germany shortly. When LaReau leased the subject premises from Heide he entered a twelve (12) month lease and paid a $900.00 fee which included the first and last month's rent plus a security deposit. During times material, Respondent was the registered corporate broker for Exclusively Rentals and Management Company (Exclusively). Through the efforts of Respondent and Exclusively, Gregory A. Costa, III, was secured as a tenant to sublet the subject property from Maurice LaReau on or about October 8, 1977. Respondent had been approached by owner Heide to manage the subject property while Respondent was visiting an apartment complex adjacent to the Heide property on which Exclusively had the managing contract. According to the agreed terms for the subletting of the Heide property from LaReau to Costa, Costa agreed upon an occupancy date of October 15, 1977, for a total rental of $150.00 plus payment for the twelfth month rent for a fee of $300.00; a security deposit of $300.00 and a $150.00 commission to Exclusively for a total of $900.00. This amount was paid to tenant Maurice LaRaeau. Exclusively retained the agreed upon commission which represented on- half the monthly rental, or a fee of $150.00 See Respondent's Exhibit 1. Additionally, Messer. LaReau signed an agreement representing that the subletting was done with owner Heide's knowledge and was in accordance with his instructions. (Respondent's Exhibit 2). Upon returning from Germany, owner Heide became upset that LaReau had sublet the premises to Costa and contended that the subletting was only to have been done through the aid and assistance of another rental management firm know as Home Finders Real Estate Brokers. Heide contended that Audrey Lester was the only agent connected with that firm who had the authority to accept tenants or sub-lessees in his absence. Heide, therefore, contended that he was entitled to recoup from Respondent, through its corporate entity, Exclusively Rentals and Management Company, the entire $900.00 in addition to a continued retention of the $900.00 deposit which had been paid by the tenant, LaReau. Although Heide contended that he never used Exclusively to rent or otherwise secure tenants for any of his apartments, he acknowledged that he signed a new lease and accepted Costa as a tenant for the subject property. Heide's other complaint with Respondent is that a check dated November 10, 1977, in the amount of $150.00 and signed by Michael J. Cochran was not honored when presented for payment due to insufficient funds. An examination of that check does not reveal that it was returned by the bank upon which it was drawn or that it was even presented for payment as testified to by Messer. Heide (see Petitioner's Exhibit D). Respondent was approached by owner Heide to act as an agent to secure tenants for his property as vacancies occurred while Respondent was visiting an adjoining rental property through which Respondent's agency represented, the Ocean Gardens Apartment building. Heide also visited Respondent's office building prior to the subject incident (TR. 37 of the June 3, 1981, hearing). Respondent did not sustain any loss of rents due to the subletting of the subject property from LaReau to Costa through the efforts of Respondent and/or Exclusively Rentals and Management. Respondent credibly testified that there were ample monies in the account of Exclusively to pay the $150.00 check drawn by that firm to owner Heide in November of 1977, had it, in fact, been presented for payment. Respondent severed his relations with Exclusively and advised all of the associates of that severance during December of 1977. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: 1. That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of July, 1981. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1981.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57455.227475.25
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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. ALLISON ON THE OCEAN, INC., T/A ALLISON ON THE OCEAN CONDO, 86-001320 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001320 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 1986

The Issue The issue framed by the Notice to Show Cause is whether Allison on the Ocean, Inc., violated Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.) by accepting a deposit of $85,000 and executing a "Memorandum of Agreement" with Hildagard Waltraud Bitton when that Memorandum of Agreement had not been approved for use as a reservation agreement form by the Division of Land Sales Condominium and Mobile Homes?

Findings Of Fact Allison on the Ocean, Inc., is an active, for profit Florida Corporation (PX 4). 1/ Ms. Chantal Fianson is the owner of all five hundred shares of authorized stock in Respondent (PX 4; testimony of Ms. Fianson). The Allison Hotel in Miami Beach, consisting of studio apartments, was leased by Ms. Fianson. She intended to convert it to condominium ownership. Apparently the lease was held in the name of Allison on the ocean, Inc. An attorney was retained by Ms. Fianson to prepare the necessary papers for the condominium conversion. In connection with that conversion application, a reservation deposit agreement had been submitted to the Department of Business Regulation, copy of which was entered into evidence as PX 2. After those conversion papers were submitted to the Division in Tallahassee, Ms. Fianson was informed in April 1954 that the condominium conversion would not be approved because although she had a long-term lease, a condominium project required ownership of the land on which the building stood (testimony of Ms. Fianson). Before the Department of Business Regulation declined to approve the condominium project as originally proposed by Ms. Fianson, on March 2, 1984, an agreement entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" was executed between Allison on the ocean, Inc., and Hildagard Waltraud Bitton by their respective representatives stating Ms. Bitton's intent to purchase or sublease three units in the property (PX 1). That memorandum shows by its terms that it was not intended to be the contract for the purchase and sale of the units. It provided for the cancellation of the agreement within ninety days, at the buyer's option, and stated that the validity and the interpretation of the agreement would be governed by Florida law (PX 1 paragraph 7). Ms. Bitton paid $85,000 to Allison on the Ocean, Inc., in connection with this Memorandum of Agreement, which money was then used for expenses related to the conversion of the building to a condominium (testimony of Ms. Fianson). Significantly, the prefatory "whereas" clauses in the agreement stated that "Developer is in the process of converting the Allison Hotel, located at 6261 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida to a Condominium . . ." after which by hand interlineation was written "or SUB LEASE" and the initials of the representatives of both parties appear. The memorandum expressed the intention of the parties that if the proposed condominium conversion were not approved, Ms. Bitten would receive not a fee ownership in condominium units, but a sublease of an unspecified term from the lessee-developer, under the long-term lease which the Respondent did have on the Allison Hotel. The attorney for the purchaser/lessee Ms. Bitten drew up the Memorandum of Agreement (PX 1), and it was not submitted to the Division for review before it was executed. After learning in April 1984 that the condominium project would not be approved, Ms. Fianson did arrange to purchase the land from its owner, and another lawyer was obtained to file condominium documents reflecting the fee ownership by the developer. In the interim, the condominium market became very bad, and ultimately the bank which had provided the Respondent the purchase money mortgage for the property foreclosed on the Allison Hotel. The evidence does not show whether the $85,000 which was used in the conversion process was ever returned to Ms. Bitton.

Recommendation It is recommended that the notice to show case issued in this case be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of September 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September 1986.

Florida Laws (4) 120.68718.104718.401718.502
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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. POLYNESIAN ISLES DEVELOPERS, LTD., 86-001003 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001003 Latest Update: May 17, 1988

Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are based upon the stipulation of the parties, as well as the evidence presented at hearing, including the demeanor of the witnesses: Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., was a developer of a time-share property, within the meaning of Section 721.05(9), Florida Statutes, in Osceola County in 1984. Bailey M. Weldon was a general partner of Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., and a developer of time-share property known as Polynesian Isles Resort Condominium I from November 23, 1982 to January 16, 1985. Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., submitted certain advertising to Petitioner for approval on January 9, 1984, and was noticed of deficiencies in its Polynesian Isles- Super Bowl advertising materials by notice issued by the Petitioner on January 17, 1984. These advertising materials were distributed in the January 18, 1984 Super Bowl Supplement to the St. Petersburg Times without correction of the noticed deficiencies. No time-share unit weeks were sold as a result of this ad. It was represented in the Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., public offering statement, and its sales contract with purchasers of time-share unit weeks, that purchasers would obtain fee title to purchased unit weeks free and clear of encumbrances. It was also represented in such sales contracts with purchasers of time-share unit weeks that Polynesian Isles Developments, Ltd., as Seller, would provide purchasers with an owner's title insurance policy upon closing Respondent agrees and stipulates that no owner's title insurance policy was issued for some of the unit weeks sold and closed in 1984. The evidence establishes that no title insurance policies were issued for 329 unit weeks. Respondent established an escrow account for the deposit and withdrawal of all funds received from, or on behalf of, time-share purchasers. Daniel Giannini served as escrow agent for Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., for the purpose of receiving and disbursing funds pursuant to Section 721.08 Florida Statutes. Respondent agrees and stipulates that some affidavits for release of escrow funds were delivered to Daniel Giannini as escrow agent when all conditions required by Section 721.08, Florida Statutes, had not occurred. The evidence establishes that these affidavits falsely stated that all conditions for closing had occurred when, in fact, closing had not properly occurred on 331 unit weeks in 1984 because title was not conveyed free and clear of all encumbrances. As a result, purchasers' funds in escrow were released to Respondent without the conveyance of free and clear title or the issuance of title insurance policies. Goldome Savings Association held the primary mortgage on the first phase of the Polynesian Isles Development. This mortgage encumbered unit weeks sold by the Development. Respondent failed to obtain partial releases from Goldome of the mortgages on 331 unit weeks which closed in 1984, and therefore the sale of these weeks closed without free and clear title. Deeds to the 331 unit weeks were recorded without disclosure of the underlying mortgage. Title insurance policies were not issued on 329 of these unit weeks as a result of the failure to obtain releases. Respondent Weldon was the general partner who was in charge of legal matters, closings and title insurance. He also supervised the general manager of Polynesian Isles with his other general partner, Richard Barcley. It was Weldon's general practice to sign escrow affidavits in blank and to rely on his employees to insure that they were used properly at closings. The general manager of the development during 1984 was Frank Cuyler. Respondent terminated Cuyler when he learned that Cuyler had agreed to an unfavorable change in the terms of Goldome's mortgage as an inducement to obtaining financing for phase II of the development, and had failed to report such change to Respondent, or obtain his approval. The effect of the change which was agreed to by Cuyler was to increase the amount the development had to pay to Goldome for a partial release on each unit-week from $1800 to approximately $3800. When it became apparent that it was not financially feasible for the development to pay this increased amount for releases, Cuyler simply proceeded to close on 331 unit-weeks without releases. Respondent was unaware of this practice, and when it came to his attention he immediately gave instructions that it be discontinued, and terminated Cuyler. In addition, he raised approximately $1.4 million, including $300,000 of his own money, to obtain the releases on these 331 unit-weeks, and to cure any mortgage default. However, the evidence does not establish that releases were ever obtained.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order assessing an administrative penalty against Respondent Bailey M. Weldon in the amount of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 86-1003) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1.(a)-(c) Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 1(d) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 1(e) Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 1(f)-(g) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 1(h)-(i) Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 2(a)-(b) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 2(c)-(e) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 2(f) Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 2(g)-(h) Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 2(i)-(j) Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 2(k) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Rejected since this is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3A Rejected as irrelevant to the charges in this case. 3B Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3C Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 5. 3D Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, assuming typographical error of 229 which should be 329. 3E Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 3F(a) Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. 3F(b) Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence in the record. 3F(c) Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. 3F(d) Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 4, 6. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela S. Leslie, Esquire Eric H. Miller, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Charles Edwin Ray, Esquire 6534 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33707 E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

Florida Laws (5) 120.57721.05721.08721.11721.26
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs RUSSELL G. WOLVEN, 05-000142PL (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 18, 2005 Number: 05-000142PL Latest Update: May 18, 2012

The Issue In relation to DOAH Case No. 05-0515, does the case involve the sale of securities as described in Chapter 517, Florida Statutes (2002), that would confer jurisdiction upon OFR to proceed to a hearing on the merits of the Administrative Complaint that forms the basis for DOAH Case No. 05-0515, and to what extent, if any, the named Respondents have been involved with the sale of securities sufficient to declare jurisdiction over their activities? Preliminary to that determination is the related issue concerning the possible pre-emption of OFR's regulatory authority by virtue of the regulatory action previously taken by the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (DBPR) under authority set forth in Chapter 721, Florida Statutes (2002)? Argument has also been set forth concerning the significance of court cases as they might influence OFR's ability to declare their regulatory authority in this instance.

Findings Of Fact * * * 2. RESPONDENT is the 'creating developer' of the Universal Luxury Lease Plan, a personal property 'timeshare plan' as those terms are defined in sections 721.05(9)(a) and 721.05(37), Florida Statutes, located in the city of Sanford, Florida. * * * On or about July 10, 2003, DIVISION was made aware of a newspaper advertisement for Universal Luxury Lease Plan. This advertisement, promoted the purchase of a timeshare interest in the Universal Luxury Lease Plan as an investment that offered purchasers a 10 percent per year return on their investment. On July 25, 2003, DIVISION'S investigators were given an application package containing the Universal Luxury Lease Plan Enrollment Forms, CD-ROM, Public Offering Statement, Contracts and Motor Coach Brochures. The application package stated that it was advertising material being used for the purposes of soliciting timeshare interests. It described a component of the timeshare plan called the 'Affinity Rental Program' and stated that the program will typically produce a monthly income of 10 percent of the lease-hold ownership interest.

Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That an order be entered by OFR finding jurisdiction to proceed with the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 05- 0515 on its merits. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2006.

Florida Laws (17) 120.565120.569120.57517.021517.12517.221517.3017.221721.02721.05721.056721.06721.07721.11721.111721.23721.26
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. DEBORAH LYNN TENGZELIUS AND THE RENTAL CENTER, INC., 86-003776 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003776 Latest Update: Feb. 10, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deborah Lynn Tengzelius (Tengzelius), was at all time material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0229363. Tengzelius was the qualifying broker for Respondent, The Rental Center, Inc. (Rental Center), a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida under license number 0229362. Respondents are, inter alia, engaged in the business of providing rental information for a fee. Consequently, in October 1983, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, Respondents forwarded to the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), a copy of their proposed rental information agreement. By letter of October 31, 1983, the Department returned Respondent's proposed agreement with instructions to correct certain provisions to bring it into compliance with Section 475.453, Florida Statutes. Respondents made the necessary changes, and by letter of November 15, 1983, the Department advised them that their agreement now appeared to comply with the rules and regulations of the Florida Real Estate Commission. On August 22, 1985, Tengzelius, on behalf of the Rental Center, executed its standard rental information agreement with Elizabeth Wilson (Wilson) in exchange for a fee of $60.00. That agreement, previously approved by the Department, provided in part: NOTICE: Pursuant to Florida law, if the rental information provided under this contract is not current or accurate in any material aspect you nay demand within thirty (30) days of this contract date a return of your full fee paid. If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of seventy-five (75 percent) percent of the fee paid if you make a demand within thirty (30) days of this contract date. CLIENT COMMITMENT As a prospective Tenant, I hereby agree: 1. To make any refund request within 30 days following above date, in writing, and delivered to The Rental Center, Inc. .... (Emphasis added). In mid-September, less than 30 days after the rental information agreement was signed, Wilson telephoned the Rental Center and requested a return of the fee she had paid. Wilson averred that she was not able to obtain a rental. Respondents refused to return 75 percent of the fee because Wilson's request was not in writing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3776 Respondents submitted an unnumbered 13 paragraph memorandum of law and facts". These paragraphs have been number 1-13 and addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 3-4. Addressed in conclusions of law. 5-7. Addressed in paragraph 2. 8-13. Addressed in conclusions of law if pertinent. Respondent's suggestion that the doctrine of entrapment is applicable to the facts of this case is ill-founded. See: Thomas v. State, 243 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 C. Michael Shalloway, Esquire 909 North Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Benton, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 475.25475.453775.082775.083775.084
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