The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner overpaid Respondent Medicaid funds, for which Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Petitioner to seek repayment from Respondent.
Findings Of Fact During 1998, Respondent was an authorized Medicaid provider, pursuant to Medicaid provider number 105425200, and was a party to a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Respondent filed claims with Petitioner for payment, under the Medicaid program, for the goods and services that are the subject of the audit described below, and Petitioner paid Respondent for these claims. The audit period in this case is 1998. During 1998, Respondent submitted to Petitioner 36,257 claims for nearly 5.5 million units of over one thousand types of drugs. These claims totaled $3,075,449.88, which Petitioner paid Respondent. On June 2, 1999, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent informing it of a review of its pharmacy claims for 1998. The letter requests documentation of all purchases of 12 named drugs for 1998 and documentation of all credits for these drugs during the same period. The letter states that acceptable documentation includes itemized wholesaler sales history reports, itemized manufacturer sales history reports, itemized invoices, and credit return receipts. By letter dated June 5, 1999, Respondent provided the requested information. By letter dated June 23, 2000, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had examined the paid Medicaid claims for 1998 and the acquisition documentation that Respondent had provided in June 1999. The letter states: "You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid.” Thus, Petitioner made a "provisional" determination that it had overpaid Respondent $1,092,205.32. The letter invites Respondent to provide additional information to reduce the overpayment determination. The June 23 letter contains an Overpayment Attachment that lists ten of the twelve drugs for which Petitioner had sought documentation in its earlier letter. For each of these ten drugs, the Overpayment Attachment lists the generic code, number of units for which Medicaid paid, the total amount of Medicaid payments, the total units documented by Respondent to have been available during the relevant period, and the number of units for which Respondent provided no availability documentation. The Overpayment Attachment also calculates the amount of Medicaid payments attributable to the unavailable units and the total overpayment, which is $1,092,205.32. The overpayment calculations described in the preceding paragraph assume that all available units of the audited drugs were sold to Medicaid patients. The effect of this improbable scenario reduces the amount of the overpayment. The overpayment calculations attempt no extrapolation of overpayments on the over 10,000 other drugs for which Respondent received Medicaid payments during 1998. The effect of limiting the overpayment calculation to the ten listed drugs reduces the amount of the overpayment. However, the ten listed drugs are the drugs that generated the most Medicaid payments to Respondent and account for over one-third of the total Medicaid payments during the relevant period. Respondent provided additional information to Petitioner on August 30 and November 3, 2000. However, after examining the information, Petitioner advised Respondent, by letter dated April 8, 2002, that its final determination was that Respondent owed $1,096,489.77 due to its receipt of Medicaid overpayments. The overpayment increased by over $4000 due to the determination that Respondent's records documented 1000 fewer available units of two dosages of Risperdone than Petitioner had previously determined.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,096,489.77, plus interest, to repay overpayments that it received from the Medicaid program for the sale of drugs in 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grant P. Dearborn Assistant General Counsel Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5407 Jose M. Herrera Jose M. Herrera, P.A. 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Conclusions This cause came before the Agency for Health Care Administration for issuance of a Final Order. 1. On April 8, 2013, the Agency sent a letter to the Petitioner notifying the Petitioner that it owed an overpayment in the amount of $63,378.06 to the Agency based upon an adjustment in the Petitioner’s overpayment rates (Exhibit A). On April 23, 2013, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Hearing and the Agency Clerk referred the Petition for Formal Hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. On May 16, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge assigned to the case entered an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based upon a Joint Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction filed by the parties. On May 23, 2014, the Agency rescinded the overpayment letter (Exhibit B). The Agency’s rescission of the overpayment letter has rendered this matter moot. Filed August 14, 2014 9:31 AM Division of Administrative Hearings OA / CLERK P 33u Based on the foregoing, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: Respondent’s right to a hearing in this matter has been rendered moot and the Agency’s May 11, 2013 overpayment letter is rescinded. The parties shall govern themselves accordingly. DONE AND ORDERED this > day of Avow ot , 2014 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW, WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING THE ORIGINAL NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, AND A COPY ALONG WITH THE FILING FEE PRESCRIBED BY LAW WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been furnished by U.S. or interoffice mail to the persons named below on this Ut day of ZL Lisas OC, 2014. RICHARD J. SHOOP, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 9850) 412-3630 COPIES FURNISHED TO: Douglas Lomonico Assistant General Counsel George N. Meros, Jr. GrayRobinson, P.A. Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3189 Medicaid Program Integrity Office of the Inspector General Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Division of Medical Quality Assurance Department of Health
The Issue Whether Respondent's permit to operate a pharmacy should be suspended or revoked for alleged violations of Sections 465.18(1)(b), 465.18(2)(b), 465.22(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21S-1.14, Florida Administrative Code. At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for Respondent moved to continue the proceedings in order that Detective Robert Delgado could be deposed. There being no showing that a timely notice of taking deposition had been issued or a subpoena requested therefor, the Motion was denied.
Findings Of Fact While on a routine inspection of a pharmacy, Vernon K. Bell, investigator for the Petitioner, obtained a prescription issued by Dr. Rafael Cardella, Miami, Florida for 30 tablets of cardilate, 10 miligrams, that had not been picked up at the pharmacy by the person designated in the prescription. Bell secured this prescription for use in investigation of other pharmacies. Cardilate is a vasodilator that is used by cardiac patients with angina pectoris as a maintenance medication to prevent one from having angina pectoris attacks. It is a product made by Burroughs Wellcome Pharmaceutical House and consists of scored white tablets. The tablets act similarly to nitroglycerin medication and are dispensed only upon prescription (Testimony of Bell, Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Acting upon a prior complaint against Respondent's pharmacy, Bell conducted an investigation into its practices with regard to dispensing prescription medicine. At 8:50 P.M., January 14, 1976, he provided the cardilate prescription to officer Robert Delgado, intelligence investigator, Dade County Public Safety Department, who entered Respondent's pharmacy to see if the prescription would be filled during a period when it was assumed that the registered pharmacist was not on duty. He handed the prescription to Concepcion Prada and asked that it be filled. She went to the prescription area of the pharmacy through an unlocked door and in five or ten minutes came back with a bottle of pills labeled "cardilate 10". Delgado had been unable to observe who had filled the prescription. Mrs. Prada told him that she only had ten tablets, but that he could come the next day for the remainder of the prescription of thirty tablets. He paid her $1.50 for the medicine, left the pharmacy, and turned the bottle over to Bell who was outside (Testimony of Delgado, Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) Bell thereupon entered the Pharmacy, identified himself and asked Mrs. Prada if there was a pharmacist on duty. She responded in the negative. Bell then proceeded through an open door into the prescription department and picked up the prescription that he had given to Delgado. He then asked Mrs. Prada who had filled the prescription and she informed him that she had done so. He then told her that he would be issuing a violation complaint in the matter. Mrs. Prada had been a registered pharmacist in Cuba, but had informed Bell on a prior occasion that she was not a registered pharmacist in Florida. At the time of the incident described above, she told him that she was going to attend classes at Loyola School. This school prepares individuals who desire to obtain qualifications for taking examinations for registration before the Board of Pharmacy. Circumstances surrounding the statements made by Mrs. Prada to Bell establish that they were made voluntarily (Testimony of Bell.) It is possible that cardilate could save a life under certain circumstances. At the time of the dispensing of the medicine in question, three or four pharmacies within 10 blocks of Respondent's pharmacy were open (Testimony of Bell.)
Recommendation That a civil penalty in the sum of $500.00 be imposed against Respondent under the authority of Section 465.101(3), Florida Statutes, for violation of Section 465.18(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21S-1.14, Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Schwartz, Esquire 201 Ellis Building 1311 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stanley P. Kaplan, Esquire 404 Biscayne Building Miami, Florida Guillermo F. Mascaro, Esquire 301 Almeria, Suite 3 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Emilio De La Cal, Esquire 301 Almeria Avenue Coral Gables, Florida
The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Hospital Orlando (Respondent or FHO), was overpaid by Medicaid for care provided to patients in the amount of $34,644.10, as alleged by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or AHCA); or, as Respondent maintains, such care was medically necessary and supported by the record presented in this cause. Petitioner also maintains an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00 is warranted in this matter and that it is entitled to recover costs associated with the case in the sum of $7,635.27.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is the federal agency which administers Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program. CMS initiated an audit of Respondent’s Medicaid claims and contracted with Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), a Medicaid Integrity Contractor, to perform the audit. At all times material to the instant audit, Respondent was enrolled as a Medicaid provider, governed by a Medicaid Provider Agreement, and subject to all pertinent Medicaid rules and regulations related to the provision of Medicaid goods and services to Medicaid recipients/patients. Respondent was required to retain records documenting goods and services billed to the Medicaid program for a period of not less than five years. All of the disputed claims occurred within that five-year period. BAH requested medical records pertinent to the claims and FHO produced medical records in response to BAH’s audit. Respondent intended to produce all of its medical records as requested by BAH. Respondent's Medicaid Provider No. was 0010129001. All services provided to Medicaid patients are billed and identified by patient name, date of service, and provider. For purposes of confidentiality, the names of patients are redacted in audit proceedings. All goods and services billed to Medicaid must be medically necessary. If an audit determines that goods or services billed to Medicaid were, in fact, not medically necessary, Petitioner is entitled to recover monies paid as an overpayment claim against the Medicaid provider. The amount of the alleged overpayment is the subject of this proceeding. Before a Medicaid provider is authorized to bill Medicaid for medical goods and services rendered to a patient, several checks are considered. First, the patient must be Medicaid-eligible. There is no dispute that all recipients of care in this case were Medicaid-eligible patients. Second, before an inpatient stay is reimbursable, a Medicaid provider must seek prior authorization. To do so, at all times material to this case, AHCA enlisted the assistance of, and contracted with, KePro South (KePro) to perform utilization management for inpatient hospital services for Medicaid recipients. This meant the Medicaid provider contacted KePro by e-mail through a system known as "I-Exchange." In this case, FHO followed the protocol and requested prior approval for all of the claims at issue that required prior approval. All claims at issue were either approved by KePro or were exempt from the authorization requirement. Petitioner agrees that Respondent followed all of the protocols for approval of claims through the KePro system. Respondent agrees that all claims at issue as identified in the final audit report (FAR) were billed and paid. KePro approval does not mean goods and services billed to Medicaid are, in fact, medically necessary. All patient records for the claims at issue have been re-visited in the course of this case and have been thoroughly debated by doctors for both parties. In summary, AHCA's expert, Dr. Ferdinand Richards, opined that the records for the disputed claims do not support the "medical necessity" for the claims paid by Medicaid. In contrast, Dr. John Busowski and Dr. Ross Edmundson opined that the disputed claims were accurately billed and all care rendered was medically necessary. Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims submitted by providers. Audits performed after-the-fact reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines, pertinent rules, and law. The Medicaid provider agreement executed between the parties governs the contractual relationship between FHO and AHCA. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement of the claims that remain at issue. The provider agreement pertinent to this case was voluntarily entered into by the parties. Although Respondent claims it could not negotiate the terms of the agreement, it is undisputed that Respondent agreed to be bound by the agreement. Respondent was not obligated to become a Medicaid provider. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid overpayments. Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. Audits are to assure that providers bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. Respondent does not dispute Petitioner's authority to perform audits. If services rendered in this case were medically necessary, Petitioner does not dispute the amount billed as accurately reflecting the services. There is no question that Respondent provided the services identified in the disputed claims. For billing purposes, this case centers on three types of billing practices dictated by the medical circumstances of the patient. A Medicaid patient may be treated in an emergency room setting and once the presenting condition is addressed the stay may be considered outpatient, observation, or inpatient depending on the nature of the patient’s illness. Outpatient services may also be appropriate when a patient presents for a scheduled test or procedure. Observation services may be appropriate when additional time is needed to evaluate a patient’s condition. Inpatient care is dictated when the patient requires medical services or treatments because the severity of an illness or condition dictates an intensity of care that could not be provided at a less acute level. The levels of care at issue in this case are defined and specified in the Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitation Handbook and by Florida Administrative Code Rule. In this case, the disputed claims center on whether the claims were billed at the appropriate level of care. That is, if billed at the inpatient level should the claim have been billed as observation or outpatient? If billed as observation, should the claim have been billed as outpatient? Each disputed claim is listed and explained below. Each claim is described and evaluated based upon the medical documentation available to the treating physician at the time the services were rendered. The expert opinions of the parties’ witnesses have been fully considered and weighed in reaching the findings noted. The first five claims, identified as Adventist-FL-3006, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11, concerned a three-year-old patient with Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia. The child required five separate intravenous chemotherapy treatments. The five claims ($1,503.04 per day) were billed at an inpatient rate. For each of the claims, the patient’s hospital stay was for less than 24 hours, the patient had no significant complications from the treatments, and was able to return home at the conclusion of the treatment. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that these claims should have been billed as scheduled outpatient services. Petitioner is entitled to recoup the difference between the inpatient rate and an outpatient rate for these five claims. The amount of the overpayment is $7,515.20. Claim Adventist-FL-3006-21 concerned a 40-year-old morbidly obese female who went to the hospital emergency room (ER) on July 28, 2007. This patient complained of shortness of breath and chest pains. By history, it was known this patient had bipolar disorder, sarcoidosis, hypertension, and a record of being non-compliant with medications. A pulmonary function test was administered by ER staff and it was discovered the patient was at 50 percent of the expected function level. Although the initial admission to inpatient status was well documented, the record in this case is deficient, and the physicians who reviewed the record could not indicate why a four-day admission was required for this patient. Once the patient was provided a treatment for asthma (including IV steroids) and the evaluation for congestive heart failure proved negative, the patient should have been discharged. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that this claim should be discounted to only two days of inpatient stay and not the four days billed. The exact amount of the overpayment for this claim cannot be determined from the evidence but is less than the $5,723.60 claimed by Petitioner. Claim Adventist-FL-3006-22, involved the same patient as described in paragraph 14. Less than two months after the visit described above, the patient returned to the ER with mild wheezing, and the patient was admitted for three days as an inpatient. Given the history of this patient, and the lack of significant change to the presenting symptoms, it is determined that the weight of the persuasive evidence would require this claim to be reduced to two days of observation, not inpatient services. This patient did not have a medical condition to justify a three-day stay. It may have been that the patient needed a place to stay, and her shortness of breath was a convenient excuse for her to seek medical attention; in any event, she did not have a medical condition of the acuity requiring a multi-day inpatient stay. Respondent does not turn patients away. Nevertheless, Medicaid does not provide for housing of patients who need care other than to meet medical needs. It is undoubted Respondent provided a meaningful service to this patient, but the level of medical care is not supported by the record in this case. AHCA is entitled to recover $2,717.52 for this claim. The next disputed claim, Adventist-FL-3006-30, concerned a 31-year-old male who went to the ER after having thrown-up blood. The patient reported a history of blood in his stools and gastro-esophageal reflux disease. Although the patient’s vital signs were normal, and there was no evidence of bleeding in the ER, the patient was admitted to the intensive care inpatient unit (ICU) and monitored. After a period of time in the ICU, it was noted that the patient’s hemodynamic was stable and he was moved to a “step down” inpatient room. The weight of the persuasive evidence would require this claim to be reduced to two days of observation services not the two days of inpatient billed. The record does not support any acuity requiring intensive care services. Moreover, the endoscopy resulted in normal findings. Had the endoscopy been performed on admission, the normal findings could have ruled out the need for inpatient services. In this case, the treating physician did not think the patient’s condition required an emergency endoscopy. Based upon that determination and the patient’s normal hemoglobin and hematocrit, it was unlikely the patient required more than observation. Giving Respondent the benefit of the doubt with regard to this claim, and assuming this patient required more care than observation to rule out a more acute illness, that determination could have easily been concluded within a one-day inpatient stay. AHCA accepts a two-day observation stay for this patient thereby reducing the overpayment to $2,716.18 for this claim. Adventist-FL-48 claim was a 44-year-old male who, while working on a ladder, touched a live electrical wire. This patient was taken by rescue squad to the ER and presented with atrial fibrillation. The patient was admitted to inpatient status, and it was recommended he be given a full cardiac work- up. At some point during his ER stay, and prior to the cardiac testing, the patient returned to a normal cardiac rhythm. Against the recommendation of medical staff, the patient left the hospital. Approximately three days later this patient returned to the ER and requested the cardiac testing he had declined on his prior visit. When he returned, the patient had a normal heart rhythm, had no other symptoms to suggest a cardiac irregularity, and had normal vital signs. Instead of billing the cardiac testing as outpatient services, the patient was admitted for inpatient status and given the full complement of cardiac tests to rule out any adverse cardiac condition resulting from the electrical shock. The weight of persuasive evidence supports that the testing should have been given with this patient in an outpatient status. There was no medical instability supporting a more acute setting for the testing that was done. The overpayment for this claim is $1,503.04. The patient described in Adventist-FL-78 claim was a 63-year-old female who went to the ER with stomach discomfort, nausea, and headache. It was feared the patient was in a cardiac-related condition as the patient had multiple risk factors including atrial fibrillation. By history, the patient had suffered a heart attack in the recent past, and the ER physician rightly admitted the patient for inpatient care to perform a cardiac work-up and to rule out any cardiac event. The inpatient stay was for a 24-hour period so that the testing could be concluded. The weight of persuasive evidence supports this stay. Respondent has shown the medical necessity for the treatment provided for this patient. Adventist-FL-96 claim concerned a patient with a significant bone marrow disorder similar to leukemia. The patient had had a bone marrow transplant. Upon admission to the hospital he suffered nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. He was admitted for a one-day inpatient stay and treated for dehydration. He was given a white blood count test and once stabilized was discharged (within 24 hours) with the recommendation that the patient return to his regular provider in Tampa. The weight of persuasive evidence supports this stay. Respondent has shown the medical necessity for the treatment provided for this patient. The patient in Adventist-FL-98 claim was a 45-year-old male with a history of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), smoking, and alcohol abuse. The patient had a history of hospitalizations related to COPD and upon admission complained of shortness of breath. At the time of admission, the patient had normal vital signs, acceptable oxygen saturation levels, no wheezing, and a chest x-ray that showed no acute abnormalities. The weight of persuasive evidence supports the finding that a level of care of observation, and not inpatient, was the correct level Respondent should have billed for this patient. The patient had no medical acuity to support a one-day inpatient stay. AHCA is entitled to recover the overpayment in the amount of $1,358.09. AHCA no longer disputes Adventist-FL-154 claim. Consequently, the overpayment associated with the audit must be reduced by $3,856.68. It is determined Respondent accurately billed for this claim. Similarly, Respondent no longer disputes claims Adventist-FL-155-156. These claims should have been billed as observation, not inpatient stays. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to recover the overpayment associated with these claims in the amount of $2,672.98. The patient associated with Adventist-FL-180 claim was a 53-year-old female with a history of breast cancer and metastatic disease. On the date of her admission, she had had radiation therapy. She suffered nausea and vomiting and presented to the ER. She received an IV of fluids and IV Zofran, felt better, and left the hospital against medical advice. In total, the patient was in the hospital approximately three hours or less. The claim billed her admission as inpatient. This claim should have been billed as observation. Accordingly, the weight of persuasive evidence supports that an overpayment occurred with regard to this claim. Petitioner is entitled to recover the difference between inpatient and observation for this patient. The amount of the overpayment is unknown. With regard to Adventist-FL-230 claim, this patient was a 58-year-old male complaining of shortness of breath with a history of atrial fibrillation. The patient was admitted for a five-day inpatient admission. Respondent was paid for a four-day inpatient stay because that length of stay was approved by KePro. Petitioner disputes that an inpatient stay was required. The weight of persuasive evidence supports an inpatient stay of three days. The patient had stabilized, testing had been completed, and there was no significant medical basis for an inpatient stay beyond that point. The amount of the overpayment is unknown as the audit sought reimbursement at an observation rate. Although not entitled to the four days of inpatient as billed for this patient, Respondent has established it was entitled to a three- day inpatient compensation based upon the medical necessity established for this patient. Respondent, and other providers may adjust Medicaid billings after-the-fact to conform to medical necessity for any claim filed. In this case, Respondent did not review its claims once KePro approval had been secured. That is to say, if the KePro approval was documented, Respondent did not question the claim for medical necessity once treatment was given. Billings were adjusted to conform to KePro approval, but were not questioned or re-visited as to whether the appropriate level of acuity was documented. Petitioner asserts that Respondent failed to submit the complete medical records for Adventist-FL-98 claim until after the audit was issued. Respondent’s response that it provided all medical records timely to the auditor, BAH, is accepted. It is unlikely the records of one claim would have been omitted from the hundreds of pages of records given to the auditor. BAH conducted their audit over an extensive period of time. The Interim Audit Report was issued on October 4, 2010. The overpayment at that time was alleged to be $42,848.29. That amount was also noted in the FAR dated November 16, 2010. Concurrent with the FAR, Petitioner announced its intention to impose sanctions against FHO. The July 20, 2011, audit report reduced the overpayment to $38,790.68, but again claimed Petitioner was entitled to impose sanctions. The June 12, 2012, audit report further reduced the overpayment to $38,500.78. Subsequent to the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that the overpayment should be reduced another $3,856.68 to $34,644.10. Petitioner incurred investigative and legal costs in connection with this case in the amount of $7,635.27. Respondent has not challenged the reasonableness of that amount. Petitioner seeks sanctions against Respondent in the amount of $2,000.00. Respondent submitted records to BAH for 285 claims that had to be reviewed. Of that total, only those claims addressed above remain at issue. Ninety-four percent of the claims reviewed/audited by BAH were resolved without dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order adjusting the recoupment for the Medicaid overpayment as indicated in the foregoing findings of fact, imposing a sanction in the amount of $500.00, and recovering its costs in the amount of $7,635.27. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber, and Carter, P.A. Post Office Drawer 14079 2508 Barrington Circle (32308) Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4079 David W. Nam, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Stuart Williams, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Cesare Raoli, M.D., must reimburse the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, for an alleged overpayment of Medicaid funds for the audit period February 22, 1997 through February 22, 1999.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. At all times material to the allegations of this matter the Petitioner was a Medicaid provider. It is undisputed the Petitioner received payments for services rendered to Medicaid recipients during the period of time covered by the audit at issue in this proceeding. The audit period for purposes of this case was February 22, 1997 through February 22, 1999. As a Medicaid provider the Petitioner is required to comply with a Medicaid Provider Agreement. Additionally, all services provided by the Petitioner must be fully and completely documented by records maintained by the provider. Such records must comply with the Physicians Coverage and Limitations Handbook, and the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook. In performing an audit such as the one at issue, the Respondent reviews the provider's records to verify that the appropriate documentation supports the amount paid to the provider for the service rendered. In this case the parties have not challenged the authenticity of the patient records. The parties stipulated to the use of all patient records addressed in this order. In this case, the Respondent claims the psychiatric codes billed by the Petitioner (and paid by the Agency) are not supported by the documentation submitted by the Petitioner. In many instances the billing code was "down graded" to a lesser amount. As a result the difference between that paid and the amount documented is the amount of the overpayment sought. In other instances the documentation did not support any charge and the entire amount is claimed for reimbursement. When a provider signs on to the Medicaid program the Respondent provides copies of the handbooks identified in paragraph 3. Additionally, although supplied at the time of enrollment in the program, the handbooks are also available thereafter. When an audit is performed of a provider's records, the handbooks, billing codes, and types of services applicable for the type of provider are reviewed. In this case the Petitioner is a psychiatrist. The Agency reviewed Petitioner's records to determine if the service provided was medically necessary and properly documented. For billing purposes when psychiatric codes 90805, 90806, 90807, 90808, 90809, 90812, 90813, 90815, or G0078 were used, the Petitioner was required to document the specific time spent providing the service to the recipient. In many instances the Petitioner's records did not include a specific time. The Petitioner conceded that he did not note the length of the time spent with the patient and that the specific time is required by the billing guidelines. Similarly, when the records were reviewed at hearing, the Respondent conceded (and therefore eliminated) some of the disputed charges paid to the Petitioner. Consequently, the reimbursement amount now claimed by the Respondent is less than the amount previously sought. In performing an audit such as the one at issue, the Respondent took a random sample of all claims filed by the Petitioner for the audit period. After the computer program generated and identified 41 claims randomly selected, the individual records were fully reviewed. The use of a random sample of 41 (from 376) is statistically valid for purposes of extrapolating the results of the sample and applying it to the whole claims for the period of the audit. In fact, within a statistical certainty, the amount claimed in this cause based on the 41 records used is lower than the reimbursement amount actually owed by the Petitioner if all records were reviewed. The Respondent established that its methodology in computing the overpayment was statistically valid. The Petitioner did not document or refute with any statistical or actual analysis that the methodology could not be accepted. Moreover, the Petitioner did not produce records to support an argument that the extrapolation is factually unreliable. To fully review the 41 claims, the patient records associated with the claims were introduced at hearing. On a claim-by-claim basis each individual document was reviewed to determine if it was accurately billed to Medicaid. Listed by recipient number the claims totaled 218 entries. The Respondent has acknowledged that there is no overpayment claimed for recipient numbers 5, 17, 20, 22, 30, and 34. As to recipient number 1, the Petitioner withdrew his challenge to the overpayment as to all claims submitted for April 7, 1998. As to recipient number 2, the Petitioner withdrew his challenge to the overpayment as to the claim dated August 12, 1997. As to recipient number 3, the Petitioner did not either submit documentation to support the claims or specify the time spent with the patient. Accordingly, the Respondent has established the overpayment for this recipient. As to recipient number 4, the Petitioner did not specify the time spent with the patient. Accordingly, the Respondent has established the overpayment for this recipient. As to recipient number 6, the Petitioner did not either submit documentation to support the claims or specify the time spent with the patient. Accordingly, the Respondent has established the overpayment for this recipient. As to recipient number 7, the Petitioner withdrew his challenge to the claim overpayment for December 6, 1997. The Respondent withdrew its overpayment claim for two of the codes for May 4, 1998, however the third claim for that date had no documentation and should be reimbursed. As to recipient number 8, the Petitioner conceded the overpayment amount. As to recipient number 9, there was no documentation to support the claim billed therefore the overpayment is established. As to recipient number 10, the Petitioner either withdrew his challenge to the overpayment or presented no documentation to support the claim as billed. Therefore, the overpayment is established as to this recipient. As to recipient number 11, the Respondent conceded the claim for June 30, 1998, therefore this overpayment must be eliminated. As to the other two dates of services, the Petitioner did not provide a specific time in the record. Accordingly the overpayment has been established for December 18, 1998 and January 25, 1999. As to recipient number 12, either the Petitioner failed to document a specific time in the record, did not document the examination claimed, or withdrew his challenge to the overpayment. Therefore, the overpayment as to this recipient has been established. As to recipient number 13, the Petitioner failed to document the service. Therefore, the overpayment as to this recipient has been established. As to recipient number 14, the Petitioner failed to document the specific time spent with the recipient. Therefore, the overpayment as to this recipient has been established. As to recipients numbered 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 41, either the Petitioner withdrew his challenge to the amount of overpayment claimed, supplied no documentation to support the claim, or the Respondent conceded the original claim amount. Accordingly, while not in the amount originally claimed by the Agency, an overpayment for these recipients has been established. As to recipient number 25, the Respondent has conceded the claims dated July 8 and July 10, 1998. As to the other claims for this recipient, the Petitioner either provided no documentation to support the amount of the claim or failed to document the specific time spent with the recipient. Therefore, the Respondent has established an overpayment as to this recipient. As to recipient number 27, the Petitioner has conceded the correct billing code for the date of service April 19, 1998, should have been 99215, thereby supporting the overpayment claim. The Respondent conceded the code billing for the second service of that date. As to recipient number 31, either the Respondent conceded the billed amount, or the Petitioner agreed to a reduced code billing, or no time was specified, or the Petitioner withdrew his challenge to the overpayment. Therefore, although not in the amount of its original overpayment claim, the Agency has established an overpayment as to this recipient. As to recipient numbers 35 and 40, either the Petitioner withdrew his challenge to the overpayment claim, did not perform the service billed, or provided no documentation to support the service billed. Therefore, the overpayment as to this recipient has been established. As to every instance where the specific time spent with the recipient was not documented, the medical records provided by the Petitioner were the sole source of information available to the Respondent. No medical expertise is necessary to determine whether or not the specific time was posted on the records. Similarly, where no document was provided to support a claim, medical expertise is not required to disallow such claim. It is undisputed that the Petitioner served Medicaid- eligible recipients. Additionally, there is no claim that the recipients served (and whose records were reviewed) were not eligible for the service provided. The Petitioner did not willfully or fraudulently overstate the claims. In order to perform a "peer review of records," the Respondent's agent does not have to directly interview the recipient regarding the services rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order requiring the Petitioner to reimburse the state for an overpayment of Medicaid funds. Such overpayment must be calculated using the revised amounts for each of the recipients identified in this record and extrapolating the total to claims for the entire audit period. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jeffries H. Duvall, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Anthony C. Vitale, Esquire Anthony C. Vitale, P.A. 799 Brickell Plaza, Suite 700 Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue Whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent has been the state agency charged with responsibility for overseeing the Florida Medicaid Program, including the recovery of overpayments to Medicaid providers pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was an authorized Medicaid provider, having been issued provider number 377290000. Petitioner had valid Medicaid Provider Agreements with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) during the Audit Period, which began on January 1, 1996, and ended on May 10, 1999. Petitioner graduated from the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine in 1987, did an internship at Tulane University, did a residency in internal medicine at Eastern Virginia Graduate Medical School, and did a fellowship in hematology at Washington Hospital Center. He served as Chief of Hematology for Kessler Medical Center in Biloxi, Mississippi, while serving in the United States Air Force (with the rank of major). At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in Florida, Virginia, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was employed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as a Medical Officer, Health Scientist Administrator. Petitioner served as an advisor to the director of the NIH on issues related to HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome). Petitioner’s specialty is internal medicine with a sub- specialty in hematology. Petitioner has extensive experience treating persons suffering with HIV and AIDS dating back to 1987. Pursuant to his Medicaid Provider Agreements, Petitioner agreed to: (1) retain for five years complete and accurate medical records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program; (2) bill Medicaid only for services or goods that are medically necessary; and (3) abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. Respondent audited Petitioner’s Medicaid claims during the Audit Period and conducted a peer review of Petitioner’s billings and medical records of 25 of Petitioner’s patients as part of that audit.2 Joseph W. Shands, M.D., conducted the peer review of the documentation provided by Petitioner for purposes of the audit conducted by AHCA. Dr. Shands first reviewed documentation provided by Petitioner in 1999. He had no further participation in the audit until he reviewed information in preparation for his deposition in this proceeding. Dr. Shands graduated from medical school in 1956, trained in internal medicine, and worked as a microbiologist for approximately 15 years. He served as Chief of Infectious Diseases at the University of Florida for 23 years and also treated patients through the Alachua County Public Health Department and Shands Hospital at the University of Florida. Dr. Shands' practice was devoted almost entirely to the treatment of patients diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. Dr. Shands retired from the practice of medicine in May 2002. For three years prior to his retirement, Dr. Shands practiced medicine part-time. Petitioner was sent a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) dated May 25, 1999, that found an overpayment in the amount of $862,576.72. In response to that PAAR, Petitioner had the attorney representing him at that time respond to AHCA in writing. The letter from the attorney, dated June 2, 1999, requested a copy of AHCA’s supporting materials and clarification of certain matters. AHCA did not respond. AHCA issued its FAAR on January 22, 2004, asserting that Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program in the total amount of $261,336.14 for services that in whole or in part were not covered by Medicaid. There was no plausible explanation why the FAAR was not issued until 2004, whereas the audit period ended in 1999. The difference between the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the PAAR and the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the FAAR is attributable to the use of different methodologies in calculating the amounts overpaid. The FAAR used the correct methodology that was not challenged by Petitioner. The FAAR sets forth five categories of alleged overpayments. Each category accurately describes an overpayment based on applicable Medicaid billing criteria. The five categories are as follows: Medicaid policy specifies how medical records must be maintained. A review of your medical records revealed that some service for which you billed and received payment were not documented. Medicaid requires documentation of the services and considers payments made for services not appropriately documented an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category I.) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category II.) Medicaid policy addresses the type of pathology services covered by Medicaid. You billed and received payment for laboratory tests that were performed outside your facility by an independent laboratory. Payments made to you in these instances are considered overpayments. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category III.) Medicaid policy requires the Medicaid services be provided by or under the personal supervision of a physician. Personal supervision is defined as the physician being in the building when the services are rendered and signing and dating the medical records within twenty-four hours of service delivery. You billed and received payment for services which your medical records reflect you neither personally provided nor supervised. Payment made to you for all or a part of those services is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category IV.) Medicaid policy requires services performed be medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness. You billed and received payments for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, indicated that the services provided did not meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. The claims which were considered medically unnecessary were disallowed and the money you were paid for these procedures is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category V.) CATEGORY I CLAIMS The disputed Category I claims can be separated into two subcategories: services performed while an employee of a corporate employer and services performed while a recipient was hospitalized. As to both subcategories Petitioner argues that he has been prejudiced by Respondent’s delay in issuing the FAAR because Medicaid requires providers to retain medical records only for five years from the date of service.3 Although Respondent was dilatory in prosecuting this matter, Petitioner’s argument that Respondent should be barred (presumably on equitable grounds such as the doctrine of laches) should be rejected. Petitioner has cited no case law in support of his contention, and it is clear that any equitable relief to which Petitioner may be entitled should come from a court of competent jurisdiction, not from this forum or from an administrative agency. All billings for which there are no medical records justifying the services rendered should be denied. CATEGORY II CLAIMS The following findings as to the Category II claims are based on the testimony of the witnesses and on the information contained in the exhibits.4 Although nothing in the record prior to the final hearing reflects that position, Petitioner did not dispute most of the down-codings at the final hearing. Office visits, whether supported by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note, for the sole purpose of administering IVIG treatment, will be discussed in the section of this Recommended Order dealing with Category V claims. The office visits, which were for the purpose of intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) treatment and for other reimbursable medical services, are set forth as part of the Category II disputes. The following findings resolve the Category II disputes. The date listed is the date the service was rendered. The billing code following the date is the billing code that is supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Recipient 1:5 01-20-98 99213 Recipient 2 09-27-96 99214 10-10-96 99213 11-13-96 99214 12-23-96 99212 02-24-97 99214 04-21-97 99213 04-28-97 99214 05-21-97 99213 06-02-97 99213 07-09-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 08-06-97 99213 08-11-97 99212 10-01-97 99213 10-10-97 99213 10-15-97 99214 10-21-97 99214 11-10-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 12-17-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-21-98 99213 Recipient 3 10-21-97 99213 11-04-97 99213 11-25-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-27-98 99214 02-26-98 99214 Recipient 4 01-03-98 99254 01-04-98 99261 01-05-98 99261 Recipient 5 09-29-97 99204 Recipient 6 11-11-97 99204 11-18-97 99213 Recipient 7 01-26-98 99204 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 8 09-26-96 99214 09-30-96 99213 10-03-96 99213 10-10-96 99212 10-25-96 99214 11-29-96 99213 12-04-96 99213 12-30-96 99213 01-22-97 99214 01-31-97 99211 02-14-97 99212 03-17-97 99214 04-04-97 99213 04-25-97 99212 05-30-97 99211 07-11-97 99213 08-08-97 99213 08-22-97 99213 09-05-97 99212 09-19-97 99214 10-31-97 99214 11-24-97 99214 12-03-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-09-98 99214 01-16-98 99213 01-30-98 99214 02-13-98 99214 Recipient 9 11-24-97 99203 Recipient 10 10-14-96 99205 11-04-96 99213 11-11-96 99213 11-25-96 99214 12-30-96 99213 01-27-97 99214 02-24-97 99214 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 04-07-97 99213 04-21-97 99214 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 05-21-97 Deny 06-09-97 99213 07-07-97 99212 08-04-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 09-24-97 992136 10-06-97 99213 10-10-97 99214 10-27-97 99213 11-10-97 99213 11-19-97 99214 11-24-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 02-02-98 99213 Recipient 11 06-30-97 99204 11-06-97 Recipient 12 Deny due to lack of documentation. 10-14-97 99213 11-06-97 99204 11-20-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-06-98 99213 Recipient 13 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 14 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 15 09-16-97 992157 Recipient 16 02-19-98 99212 Recipient 17 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 18 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 19 09-27-96 99212 10-01-96 99213 10-10-96 99213 10-23-96 99213 11-06-96 99213 11-20-96 99213 12-18-96 99211 12-30-96 Deny due to lack of 01-09-97 documentation. Deny due to lack of 01-22-97 documentation. 99211 02-05-97 99214 03-05-97 99214 03-19-97 99211 03-24-97 99214 03-26-97 04-02-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 04-21-97 99213 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 06-02-97 99212 06-30-97 99213 07-07-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 07-28-97 99212 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-08-97 99213 09-15-97 99214 09-22-97 99213 10-28-97 99214 11-04-97 11-07-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 11-24-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-12-98 99213 01-26-98 99213 02-19-98 99214 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 20 12-04-96 99204 12-13-96 99213 01-03-97 99213 01-17-97 99213 01-27-97 99213 02-07-97 99214 02-21-97 99213 03-07-97 99214 03-21-97 99212 04-04-97 99214 04-21-97 99212 05-06-97 99213 06-04-97 99213 06-13-97 99213 06-30-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 08-04-97 99213 01-19-98 99213 Recipient 21 04-29-97 99204 05-13-97 99214 05-16-97 99213 05-23-97 99212 06-09-97 99212 06-23-97 99212 07-11-97 99211 07-25-97 99213 08-11-97 99213 09-10-97 99213 11-05-97 99214 11-19-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 01-07-98 99214 01-21-98 99213 02-04-98 99213 Recipient 22 02-16-98 99205 02-20-98 99213 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 23 06-23-97 99215 10-02-97 992138 Recipient 24 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 25 01-24-97 99213 02-07-97 99213 02-24-97 99212 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99212 06-02-97 99212 06-16-97 99212 07-14-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 07-28-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-15-97 99213 10-01-97 99213 10-13-97 99213 10-27-97 99214 12-08-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-13-98 99212 01-19-98 99214 02-02-98 99212 CATEGORY III As set forth in the Physician Coverage and Limitation Handbook (Respondent’s Exhibit 6), Petitioner is not entitled to billings for laboratory tests that were performed outside his facility by an independent laboratory. The only billing arguably in Category III is the billing for Recipient 1 on February 19, 1998. That billing should have been approved because it was for a urinalysis by dip stick or tablet that was administered and analyzed by Petitioner. It was not analyzed by an independent laboratory. CATEGORY IV All Category IV billings pertained to Petitioner’s supervision of his staff while patients were receiving treatments of IVIG. Those billings will be subsumed in the Category V billings discussion. CATEGORY V The alleged Category V overpayments relate to Petitioner’s IVIG treatment of Patients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25, each of whom was an adult diagnosed with AIDS. In many of these cases a nurse administered the IVIG treatment. A dispute as to whether Petitioner properly supervised the nurse while he or she administered the IVIG treatment is moot because of the findings pertaining to the IVIG treatments set forth in Paragraphs 20 and 21. The Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook requires that rendered services be medically necessary, as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary and do not duplicate another provider’s service. In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient’s needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient’s caretaker, or the provider. The use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). The use of a drug for a purpose other than the uses approved by the FDA is referred to as an “off-label” use. The off-label use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not effective either from a medical standpoint or from an economic standpoint. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions other than AIDS that would justify the IVIG treatment administered by Petitioner. The following finding resolves that conflict. Utilizing applicable Medicaid billing criteria, the medical records produced by Petitioner fail to document that any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions that warranted treatment with IVIG.9 All of Petitioner’s billings for IVIG treatments for Recipients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25 were properly denied under the rationale of the FAAR’s Category V. Included in the billings that were properly denied were billings for office visits (whether documented by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note) when the sole purpose of the office visit was the administration of an IVIG treatment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order require that Petitioner repay the sum of the overpayment as determined by Respondent’s staff based on the Findings of Fact set forth in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Herman Ginsberg is a licensed pharmacist having been issued license number 0008019. The last known address of the Respondent is 775 Northeast 164th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was the managing pharmacist at Jaffe Pharmacy, also known as Jaffe Discount Drugs, located at 737 Northeast 167th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. On or about November 26, 1980, the Respondent Ginsberg directed a clerk at the pharmacy, Lorraine Gronfine to remove nine (9) prescriptions from the class II prescription records and place them under a desk blotter. The scripts were pulled by Ms. Gronfine prior to a drug inspection by the authorities. According to the Respondent Ginsberg, he was ordered by the manager of the pharmacy, Ed Terry, to pull the prescriptions in order to inflate an insurance claim resulting from a burglary which occurred in September 1980. The Respondent complied with Mr. Terry's request and reported that drugs were stolen which were not in fact stolen in order to inflate an insurance claim to approximately $7,000. The prescriptions were discovered under the blotter by Irving Losee, another pharmacist employed by Jaffe, who turned them over to Graymark Security. Graymark personnel questioned both the Respondent and Ms. Gronfine about the prescriptions and both gave statements to Graymark concerning how the prescriptions came to be placed under the blotter. Many, although not all, of the prescriptions found by Losee were altered. No testimony expert or otherwise was introduced to prove that the Respondent altered the prescriptions in question. As noted by counsel for Respondent, no direct evidence was introduced to rebut the Respondent's sworn denial that he personally altered the prescriptions. In the normal course of business at Jaffee Pharmacy, a patient log was kept for all prescriptions filled on a daily basis. It is undisputed by the parties that the patient log, which was kept by the Respondent, was not altered and reflected the actual number of pills dispensed by the pharmacy. In order to divert classified drugs for personal profit, it is logical to assume that the Respondent would have altered the patient logs along with the prescriptions to consistently cover the amount of classified drugs ordered from pharmaceutical companies and placed on record with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Indeed, the failure to alter the daily patient logs to be consistent with the altered prescriptions was one of the ways that the problem with the altered prescriptions was uncovered. Although Mr. Terry examined the patient logs nightly to grade his employees on their sales of drugs, this would not have necessarily stopped the logs from being changed to conform to the altered prescriptions. The Respondent or anyone with access to the patient logs, could have altered the logs after the nightly review and conform the logs and prescriptions without arousing undue suspicion. No testimony was presented concerning this point other than that the logs did not go to accounting and were presented to Mr. Terry for his review. If Mr. Terry kept the logs and the Respondent had no further access to them, the Petitioner's theory concerning the alterations would be more plausible; however, the record failed to show that the Respondent lacked the ability to alter the logs subsequent to Mr. Terry's review. Each prescription placed into evidence and filled by the Respondent is marked as being "verified by the issuing physician." The Respondent has admitted that some of these prescriptions were not verified and that the certifications were erroneous. The Respondent admitted that a person named Fred Sessler, who was associated with a stress or obesity clinic, was permitted to pick up controlled drugs for the clinic without a prescription. Mr. Sessler was apparently permitted this privilege because the Respondent knew that one of the clinic physicians would eventually furnish a prescription. Additionally, the Respondent has admitted that in connection with the Sessler transactions, he failed to immediately record all the information required in order to dispense oral prescriptions and failed to notify the Drug Enforcement Administration that he was emergency dispensing via telephone. While acting as managing pharmacist at Jaffee, the Respondent ordered and distributed excessive quantities of a Schedule II drug. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 26 and Respondent's Exhibit 1.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the license of the Respondent Herman Ginsberg be suspended for two (2) years and that he be placed on probation for three (3) years thereafter, subject to attending appropriate continuing education classes and working under the direct supervision of a pharmacist approved by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1983.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $11,077.65 for claims filed between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida. His Medicaid provider number is No. 3801578-00. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Respondent was subject to all statutes, rules, and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. Specifically, Petitioner was required to follow the guidelines set forth in the Medicaid Coverage and Limitation Handbook and the Medicaid Reimbursement Handbook. Additionally, Petitioner was required to maintain all "Medicaid-related records" that supported his Medicaid invoices and claims and to furnish those records to Respondent upon request. In 1997 and until April 1998, Petitioner's advertisement in the yellow pages of the Panama City, Florida, telephone book invited the public to make an appointment for a "free spinal exam," which specifically included two X-rays, if medically necessary. The advertisement indicated that Petitioner's office accepted patients with major medical insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid coverage. The advertisement did not specifically exclude Medicare and Medicaid patients, but specifically stated that the free spinal exam did not include further examination, treatment, or workers' compensation and personal injury cases. However, Petitioner's subsequent advertisements in the telephone book specifically included Medicaid as a type of case that Petitioner excluded from the offer of free services. The original and subsequent advertisements further stated as follows: Our office policy: The patient and any other person responsible for payment has the right to cancel payment, or be reimbursed for payment for any other service, exam, or treatment which is performed as a result of and within 72 hours of responding to the ad for the free service, exam or treatment. ($99.00 value) Respondent's investigator, Julie Canfield-Buddin, saw the advertisement excluding Medicaid patients as recipients of the free services. After confirming that Petitioner was a Medicaid provider, Ms. Canfield-Buddin performed an audit of Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001. The audit revealed that Petitioner had not provided the advertised free services to Medicaid patients. In other words, Petitioner had received Medicaid reimbursements for initial office visits and X-rays of new patients who were Medicaid eligible. Petitioner received reimbursements for these services even though Medicaid policy prohibits payments to providers for services that are given to non-Medicaid patients free of charge. In April 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner a preliminary audit report. The preliminary report indicated that for the period beginning April 15, 1998, up to and including December 31, 2001, Petitioner had received $13,522.02 for certain claims that were not covered by Medicaid. The report included a request for Petitioner to send Respondent that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. After receiving the preliminary report, Petitioner's office contacted Ms. Canfield-Buddin, stating that Petitioner had some issues with the denied claims. Ms. Canfield-Buddin responded that Petitioner should state his concerns in writing and furnish Respondent with any additional medical documentation that would serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner sent Ms. Canfield-Buddin a letter dated April 25, 2002. Petitioner did not send Respondent any additional medical documentation with the letter to substantiate his position regarding the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner did not provide Respondent with any written office policy that delineated any difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In a final audit report dated May 9, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $13,522.02 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The final audit report included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. Ms. Canfield-Buddin subsequently received a telephone call from Petitioner's office on May 30, 2002. She received Petitioner's written request for a formal administrative hearing on June 3, 2002. After receiving Petitioner's request for a hearing, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reviewed Petitioner's account statements that related to the Medicaid overpayments. Based on that review, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reduced the amount of overpayment to $11,077.65. The revised overpayment reversed denied charges for X-rays of Medicaid patients in excess of the two X-rays that should have been provided free of charge pursuant to the offer for free services. For example, Petitioner was reimbursed for services provided to B.A. on August 10, 2001. These charges included an initial office visit under the Current Procedures Terminology (CPT) code 99203, two X-rays under the CPT code 7240, two X-rays under the CPT code 72072, and two or three X-rays under the CPT code 72100. The final audit denied reimbursement for all charges except the two or three X-rays under CPT code 72100. The revised overpayment reversed the denied charges for two X-rays under the CPT code 72070. The end result was that Respondent denied Petitioner reimbursement only for the initial office visit and two X-rays that ordinarily would have been provided free to non-Medicaid patients. Medicaid allows reimbursement for services equal to the lesser of the Medicaid fee or the provider's usual and customary charge. Petitioner's advertisement offered free services to the public at large with certain exceptions. Petitioner cannot exclude Medicaid patients from that offer by also excluding patients with personal injury or workers' compensation claims. All patients who are not Medicaid eligible are non-Medicaid patients regardless of their payment source. Just because Petitioner excludes free services to non-Medicaid patients with personal injury and workers' compensation claims, does not mean that he can deny those free services to Medicaid patients when his usual and customary practice is to provide the services free to non-Medicaid patients. Some of the denied charges at issue here allegedly involve spinal manipulations that Petitioner claims he performed on Medicaid patients during their initial office visits. Medicaid reimbursement policy requires a spinal manipulation performed during an initial office visit under a 99203 CPT code for a new patient visit to be included as part of the examination conducted during that visit. Medicaid does not allow Petitioner to be separately reimbursed for a spinal manipulation performed on the same day of service as an initial office visit. Petitioner did not include more than two X-rays or any spinal manipulations in his offer of free services for any patient. When a patient has an initial office visit in response to Petitioner's offer of free services, Petitioner first takes the patient's history, performs an examination, and reviews the first two free X-rays. Depending on the results of the evaluation, Petitioner may or may not advise the patient that additional X-rays and/or a spinal manipulation are medically necessary. Petitioner then allows the patient to arrange for payment of those services with his office staff. If the patient is non-Medicaid eligible and is able to pay for services, Petitioner proceeds to take the additional X-rays and/or to perform the spinal manipulation immediately or during a subsequent visit with payment due as arranged. If a non-Medicaid patient requires subsequent examinations during the course of treatment, Petitioner bills the patient or his or her insurance carrier for those services. If the patient is Medicaid eligible, Petitioner may either proceed with taking the X-rays and/or performing the spinal examination immediately, knowing that he will not be separately reimbursed for the spinal manipulation, or make an appointment for the Medicaid patient to return on another day so that he can be reimbursed for the spinal manipulation. In any event, Medicaid regulations do not allow reimbursement for further examinations within a three-year period. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that some of the denied charges for initial office visits under the CPT code 99203 included spinal manipulations that he never intended to be free and that he did not provide spinal manipulations as a free service to non-Medicaid patients. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credited for two reasons. First, he did not produce any medical documentation to support his testimony as to any Medicaid patient receiving a spinal manipulation during an initial office visit. Second, he did not identify any such patient during his testimony. Respondent performs Medicaid audits after a provider renders services. Therefore, it is essential for providers like Petitioner, who contest denied claims, to be able to substantiate their billing with appropriate documentation. Such documentation must be created at the time of service, maintained pursuant to statutory and rule requirements, and furnished to Respondent upon request. Petitioner never responded to Ms. Canfield-Buddin's request for medical documentation to substantiate Petitioner's challenge to the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner testified that the services he performed for some Medicaid patients were not equivalent to the free services he performed for non-Medicaid patients because they often involved a higher level of service, including additional services, tests, or examinations. According to Petitioner, some of the Medicaid patients required more extensive screening and counseling that consumed more of Petitioner's time. Despite this testimony, Petitioner admitted that the histories he took of Medicaid patients and non-Medicaid patients were basically the same. Petitioner testified that the difference in the level of service provided to all patients varied based upon the individual patients and did not depend on whether they were or were not Medicaid patients. He had no written or unwritten guidelines or policies that limited the scope of screening or level of service in an initial office visit for either type of patient. Petitioner's testimony that the level of services provided to Medicaid patients differed from the level of services offered to non-Medicaid patients is not persuasive. Once again, Petitioner failed to provide the required medical documentation to support his testimony or to identify in his testimony Medicaid patients who required a higher level of service. Moreover, Petitioner knew, when he made his offer of free services, that he would not be able to claim reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid patients that were not separately reimbursable even if Petitioner was entitled to exclude Medicaid patients from the offer. This includes cases where a Medicaid patient may have required a high level of service in terms of the time expended during the screening or a spinal manipulation during the initial office visit. Petitioner provides free services to members of his family. The provision of free services to family does not establish that Petitioner had a usual and customary practice of providing free services. At times, Petitioner treats police officers and indigent persons free of charge. However, Petitioner does not publicly advertise that he treats these patients free of charge because he does not want to be overrun with people taking advantage of the offer. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely treats police officers covered by private health insurance and indigent patients covered by Medicaid free of charge. Therefore, it cannot be said that Petitioner's usual and customary practice is to furnish services to these patients free of charge. A Medicaid provider is allowed to use the CPT code 99203 for a new patient visit once per recipient every three years. Petitioner's offer of free services for non-Medicaid patients allows them one free office visit and two free X-rays regardless of the passage of time. According to Petitioner, this means that Respondent's interpretation of Medicare regulations would entitle a Medicaid patient to the free services every three years whereas a non-Medicaid patient would not be so entitled, showing yet another difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients under the offer of free services. However, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive because it is not based on medical documentation or testimony showing that Petitioner ever treated a Medicaid patient as a new patient more than once.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $11,077.65 for Medicaid reimbursement overpayments. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Grant P. Dearborn, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Hal Cowen ChiroNetwork Health Care Centers 127 West 23rd Panama City, Florida 32405 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent's permit to operate a pharmacy should be suspended or revoked for alleged violations of Sections 465.22(1)(c), 465.18(1)(b), 465.18(2)(b) F.S., and Rule 21S-1.14 F.A.C. At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew Count-I of the Complaint. Respondent's Motion To Dismiss Counts II and III of the Complaint at the conclusion of Petitioner's case in chief was denied.
Findings Of Fact Respondent presently holds and did so hold at the time of the events alleged in the Complaint a permit to operate a pharmacy issued by Petitioner (Stipulation.) Prior to the events alleged in the Complaint, Petitioner's agent, Vernon K. Bell, an inspector, obtained an authentic prescription from another pharmacy that had not been picked up by a customer, for use in investigations of other pharmacies. The prescription was issued by Dr. George A. Fernandez, Miami, Florida, Number 012194, dated December 11, 1975, to Fela Rivias and was for twenty-one tablets of Erythrocin, 250 miligrams. Erythrocin is an antibiotic prescription drug used for various infections (Testimony of Bell, Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) On December 19, 1975, Bell visited Respondent's pharmacy and observed that the door to the prescription area was unlocked. On December 22, 1975, at approximately 3:30 P.M., Reynaldo Santiago, another agent of the Board of Pharmacy, entered Respondent's pharmacy with the prescription referred to in paragraph 2 above that had been given to him by Bell. Santiago gave it to the cashier to be filled. He observed her go to the prescription department, open a door, and place the prescription on a counter. He then observed Hildelisa Hernandez go to the prescription department and start filling the prescription. Thereafter, Ms. Hernandez, accompanied by Mr. Jose E. Valdez, came out of the prescription area and Hernandez gave a pill bottle to the cashier. The cashier in turn gave it to Santiago for the price of $3.95 or $4.00. The bottle contained 21 tablets and a label affixed thereon contained pertinent information as set forth in the prescription that Santiago had given to that cashier, including the name of the drug, doctor, prescription number and name of patient (Testimony of Santiago, Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) Santiago took the bottle of pills outside and then he and Bell re- entered the Pharmacy. Bell identified himself to Mr. Valdez and asked him who was his registered pharmacist and if he had a pharmacist on duty. Mr. Valdez stated that Hal Glass was his pharmacist, but that he had left the store at 2:00 P.M. Bell then asked Valdez if he had filled the prescription which Santiago had taken into the store and, after some hesitation, Bell asked Hernandez if she had filled it. She replied in the affirmative. She stated that she was not a licensed pharmacist in Florida, but had been a pharmacist in Cuba. Bell then wrote a violation and left the store. Neither he nor Santiago recalled seeing a sign indicating that the prescription department was closed on December 22 (Testimony of Bell, Santiago.) Jose E. Valdez testified that although he formerly had two pharmacists at his previous pharmacy, in August or September of 1975 he was forced to cut back to one part-time pharmacist because of the bad economic situation. He conceded that Ms. Hernandez was not a registered Florida pharmacist. He also stated that he was not aware of the rules requiring that the prescription department be locked when no pharmacist was present until this incident occurred and that, in fact, the door to the prescription area had not been locked although a sign indicating that the prescription department was closed had always been used. He further testified that on February 1, 1976, he hired a full-time pharmacist who is present at all times when the pharmacy is open and that the prescription department is now always locked when she is not present.
Recommendation That a civil penalty in the sum of $250.00 be imposed against Respondent in lieu of suspension or revocation of its permit, for violation of Section 465.18(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21S-1.14, Florida Administrative Code DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Stanley Kaplan, Esquire 404 Biscayne Building Miami, Florida Seymour M. Litman, Esquire 10 Northwest 14 Avenue Miami, Florida 33125
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ronald L. Askowitz, held dentist license number DN 0003884 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry (DPR or the Board). Dr. Askowitz is a 1960 graduate of the Medical College of Virginia. Since 1965, he has practiced dentistry in the South Dade County area. Presently, he is engaged in the practice of general dentistry in Perrine, Florida. When the events herein occurred in 1984 and 1985, respondent's practice consisted of approximately forty percent Medicaid patients and sixty percent private pay patients. In order to be reimbursed for providing services to Medicaid patients, Dr. Askowitz was required to obtain a Medicaid provider number from the State of Florida and to adhere to then existing regulations. Among other things, respondent had to submit a dental remittance voucher to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) as a prerequisite to reimbursement. Respondent has conceded that he completed and signed all vouchers himself. After HRS reviewed the voucher, a check would be issued to respondent reimbursing him at the fixed Medicaid rate. 2/ On average, Dr. Askowitz received around $1,000 per month for treating Medicaid patients. He did not differentiate between Medicaid and private pay patients in terms of quality of care. Because of unusually high billings for three surface amalgam restorations which exceeded the normal statewide range, the HRS computer "kicked out" respondent's name for further review by the Auditor General's Medicaid fraud unit. Thereafter, the billing records of thirty-one patients were picked at random and manually reviewed by the unit to ensure their accuracy. Eventually, this sample was reduced to seventeen files. Because of apparent irregularities in the files, an HRS dental consultant and two Medicaid special investigators visited each of the seventeen patients in the Miami area in August, 1985. The consultant performed an examination of the patients' teeth and compared the work he saw with the billings submitted by Dr. Askowitz to verify whether all billed work had actually been performed. Finding that many of the services for which respondent had been paid had not been performed, the consultant concluded that Dr. Askowitz had filed reports he knew to be false, that deceptive or untrue representations in the practice of dentistry had been made, that the patients had been financially exploited, and that respondent had engaged in fraud, deceit or misconduct in the practice of dentistry. Armed with the results of the unit's investigation, the State Attorney thereafter filed an information charging Dr. Askowitz with numerous counts of public assistance fraud. He was arrested on May 16, 1986. On October 17, 1986 respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to seventeen counts of public assistance fraud. Adjudication was withheld and respondent was placed on five years' probation and required to provide 300 hours of community service. The probation term can be reduced to two years if all special conditions are met. In addition, Dr. Askowitz was required to make a voluntary $15,000 payment to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit and a $20,000 payment to the Florida Medicaid Program. After the plea was entered, petitioner initiated this proceeding charging respondent with various violations of Chapter 466, Florida Statutes (1985), all of which relate to his billings on sixteen Medicaid patients. In general terms, respondent submitted Medicaid bills for various services rendered on these patients (mainly surface fillings), but in actuality all such services had not been performed. A more complete analysis of these billings is found in petitioner's exhibits 3, 4 and 5 received in evidence. As a result of these claims, Dr. Askowitz received some $3,412 in overpayments during a ten month period. He has not denied his wrongdoing. It is noted, however, that Dr. Askowitz actually saw every patient in question, and that all work actually performed was necessary. In addition, there is no allegation or evidence that Dr. Askowitz performed any work in a negligent or shoddy manner. Finally, the parties have stipulated that there is no issue regarding respondent's competency. At final hearing, respondent stated he was "frustrated" with HRS because he had not been paid for all of the services that he had rendered. Consequently, he filed these claims. He is now sorry he did so, and has paid a dear price for his misdeeds. He described the notoriety surrounding his arrest as having a devastating effect on his practice. Nonetheless, he still desires to continue his practice of dentistry. Indeed, Dr. Askowitz still operates an office, serving primarily patients from the middle and lower income classes. His Medicaid provider number has continued to remain valid, and he is the only dentist in the Perrine area who treats Medicaid patients. He has completed his community service hours by providing free dental care to residents of a drug and alcoholic treatment center. He has no prior disciplinary action against him over a career spanning some twenty-two years. Testimony by other dentists also established that respondent is highly regarded from a professional standpoint, and that he has done a creditable community service by treating numerous patients from the lower income stratum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of all charges, and that his license be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ORDERED this 21st day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1987.
