Findings Of Fact The Respondent Herman Ginsberg is a licensed pharmacist having been issued license number 0008019. The last known address of the Respondent is 775 Northeast 164th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was the managing pharmacist at Jaffe Pharmacy, also known as Jaffe Discount Drugs, located at 737 Northeast 167th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. On or about November 26, 1980, the Respondent Ginsberg directed a clerk at the pharmacy, Lorraine Gronfine to remove nine (9) prescriptions from the class II prescription records and place them under a desk blotter. The scripts were pulled by Ms. Gronfine prior to a drug inspection by the authorities. According to the Respondent Ginsberg, he was ordered by the manager of the pharmacy, Ed Terry, to pull the prescriptions in order to inflate an insurance claim resulting from a burglary which occurred in September 1980. The Respondent complied with Mr. Terry's request and reported that drugs were stolen which were not in fact stolen in order to inflate an insurance claim to approximately $7,000. The prescriptions were discovered under the blotter by Irving Losee, another pharmacist employed by Jaffe, who turned them over to Graymark Security. Graymark personnel questioned both the Respondent and Ms. Gronfine about the prescriptions and both gave statements to Graymark concerning how the prescriptions came to be placed under the blotter. Many, although not all, of the prescriptions found by Losee were altered. No testimony expert or otherwise was introduced to prove that the Respondent altered the prescriptions in question. As noted by counsel for Respondent, no direct evidence was introduced to rebut the Respondent's sworn denial that he personally altered the prescriptions. In the normal course of business at Jaffee Pharmacy, a patient log was kept for all prescriptions filled on a daily basis. It is undisputed by the parties that the patient log, which was kept by the Respondent, was not altered and reflected the actual number of pills dispensed by the pharmacy. In order to divert classified drugs for personal profit, it is logical to assume that the Respondent would have altered the patient logs along with the prescriptions to consistently cover the amount of classified drugs ordered from pharmaceutical companies and placed on record with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Indeed, the failure to alter the daily patient logs to be consistent with the altered prescriptions was one of the ways that the problem with the altered prescriptions was uncovered. Although Mr. Terry examined the patient logs nightly to grade his employees on their sales of drugs, this would not have necessarily stopped the logs from being changed to conform to the altered prescriptions. The Respondent or anyone with access to the patient logs, could have altered the logs after the nightly review and conform the logs and prescriptions without arousing undue suspicion. No testimony was presented concerning this point other than that the logs did not go to accounting and were presented to Mr. Terry for his review. If Mr. Terry kept the logs and the Respondent had no further access to them, the Petitioner's theory concerning the alterations would be more plausible; however, the record failed to show that the Respondent lacked the ability to alter the logs subsequent to Mr. Terry's review. Each prescription placed into evidence and filled by the Respondent is marked as being "verified by the issuing physician." The Respondent has admitted that some of these prescriptions were not verified and that the certifications were erroneous. The Respondent admitted that a person named Fred Sessler, who was associated with a stress or obesity clinic, was permitted to pick up controlled drugs for the clinic without a prescription. Mr. Sessler was apparently permitted this privilege because the Respondent knew that one of the clinic physicians would eventually furnish a prescription. Additionally, the Respondent has admitted that in connection with the Sessler transactions, he failed to immediately record all the information required in order to dispense oral prescriptions and failed to notify the Drug Enforcement Administration that he was emergency dispensing via telephone. While acting as managing pharmacist at Jaffee, the Respondent ordered and distributed excessive quantities of a Schedule II drug. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 26 and Respondent's Exhibit 1.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the license of the Respondent Herman Ginsberg be suspended for two (2) years and that he be placed on probation for three (3) years thereafter, subject to attending appropriate continuing education classes and working under the direct supervision of a pharmacist approved by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1983.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $11,077.65 for claims filed between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida. His Medicaid provider number is No. 3801578-00. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Respondent was subject to all statutes, rules, and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. Specifically, Petitioner was required to follow the guidelines set forth in the Medicaid Coverage and Limitation Handbook and the Medicaid Reimbursement Handbook. Additionally, Petitioner was required to maintain all "Medicaid-related records" that supported his Medicaid invoices and claims and to furnish those records to Respondent upon request. In 1997 and until April 1998, Petitioner's advertisement in the yellow pages of the Panama City, Florida, telephone book invited the public to make an appointment for a "free spinal exam," which specifically included two X-rays, if medically necessary. The advertisement indicated that Petitioner's office accepted patients with major medical insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid coverage. The advertisement did not specifically exclude Medicare and Medicaid patients, but specifically stated that the free spinal exam did not include further examination, treatment, or workers' compensation and personal injury cases. However, Petitioner's subsequent advertisements in the telephone book specifically included Medicaid as a type of case that Petitioner excluded from the offer of free services. The original and subsequent advertisements further stated as follows: Our office policy: The patient and any other person responsible for payment has the right to cancel payment, or be reimbursed for payment for any other service, exam, or treatment which is performed as a result of and within 72 hours of responding to the ad for the free service, exam or treatment. ($99.00 value) Respondent's investigator, Julie Canfield-Buddin, saw the advertisement excluding Medicaid patients as recipients of the free services. After confirming that Petitioner was a Medicaid provider, Ms. Canfield-Buddin performed an audit of Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001. The audit revealed that Petitioner had not provided the advertised free services to Medicaid patients. In other words, Petitioner had received Medicaid reimbursements for initial office visits and X-rays of new patients who were Medicaid eligible. Petitioner received reimbursements for these services even though Medicaid policy prohibits payments to providers for services that are given to non-Medicaid patients free of charge. In April 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner a preliminary audit report. The preliminary report indicated that for the period beginning April 15, 1998, up to and including December 31, 2001, Petitioner had received $13,522.02 for certain claims that were not covered by Medicaid. The report included a request for Petitioner to send Respondent that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. After receiving the preliminary report, Petitioner's office contacted Ms. Canfield-Buddin, stating that Petitioner had some issues with the denied claims. Ms. Canfield-Buddin responded that Petitioner should state his concerns in writing and furnish Respondent with any additional medical documentation that would serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner sent Ms. Canfield-Buddin a letter dated April 25, 2002. Petitioner did not send Respondent any additional medical documentation with the letter to substantiate his position regarding the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner did not provide Respondent with any written office policy that delineated any difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In a final audit report dated May 9, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $13,522.02 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The final audit report included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. Ms. Canfield-Buddin subsequently received a telephone call from Petitioner's office on May 30, 2002. She received Petitioner's written request for a formal administrative hearing on June 3, 2002. After receiving Petitioner's request for a hearing, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reviewed Petitioner's account statements that related to the Medicaid overpayments. Based on that review, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reduced the amount of overpayment to $11,077.65. The revised overpayment reversed denied charges for X-rays of Medicaid patients in excess of the two X-rays that should have been provided free of charge pursuant to the offer for free services. For example, Petitioner was reimbursed for services provided to B.A. on August 10, 2001. These charges included an initial office visit under the Current Procedures Terminology (CPT) code 99203, two X-rays under the CPT code 7240, two X-rays under the CPT code 72072, and two or three X-rays under the CPT code 72100. The final audit denied reimbursement for all charges except the two or three X-rays under CPT code 72100. The revised overpayment reversed the denied charges for two X-rays under the CPT code 72070. The end result was that Respondent denied Petitioner reimbursement only for the initial office visit and two X-rays that ordinarily would have been provided free to non-Medicaid patients. Medicaid allows reimbursement for services equal to the lesser of the Medicaid fee or the provider's usual and customary charge. Petitioner's advertisement offered free services to the public at large with certain exceptions. Petitioner cannot exclude Medicaid patients from that offer by also excluding patients with personal injury or workers' compensation claims. All patients who are not Medicaid eligible are non-Medicaid patients regardless of their payment source. Just because Petitioner excludes free services to non-Medicaid patients with personal injury and workers' compensation claims, does not mean that he can deny those free services to Medicaid patients when his usual and customary practice is to provide the services free to non-Medicaid patients. Some of the denied charges at issue here allegedly involve spinal manipulations that Petitioner claims he performed on Medicaid patients during their initial office visits. Medicaid reimbursement policy requires a spinal manipulation performed during an initial office visit under a 99203 CPT code for a new patient visit to be included as part of the examination conducted during that visit. Medicaid does not allow Petitioner to be separately reimbursed for a spinal manipulation performed on the same day of service as an initial office visit. Petitioner did not include more than two X-rays or any spinal manipulations in his offer of free services for any patient. When a patient has an initial office visit in response to Petitioner's offer of free services, Petitioner first takes the patient's history, performs an examination, and reviews the first two free X-rays. Depending on the results of the evaluation, Petitioner may or may not advise the patient that additional X-rays and/or a spinal manipulation are medically necessary. Petitioner then allows the patient to arrange for payment of those services with his office staff. If the patient is non-Medicaid eligible and is able to pay for services, Petitioner proceeds to take the additional X-rays and/or to perform the spinal manipulation immediately or during a subsequent visit with payment due as arranged. If a non-Medicaid patient requires subsequent examinations during the course of treatment, Petitioner bills the patient or his or her insurance carrier for those services. If the patient is Medicaid eligible, Petitioner may either proceed with taking the X-rays and/or performing the spinal examination immediately, knowing that he will not be separately reimbursed for the spinal manipulation, or make an appointment for the Medicaid patient to return on another day so that he can be reimbursed for the spinal manipulation. In any event, Medicaid regulations do not allow reimbursement for further examinations within a three-year period. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that some of the denied charges for initial office visits under the CPT code 99203 included spinal manipulations that he never intended to be free and that he did not provide spinal manipulations as a free service to non-Medicaid patients. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credited for two reasons. First, he did not produce any medical documentation to support his testimony as to any Medicaid patient receiving a spinal manipulation during an initial office visit. Second, he did not identify any such patient during his testimony. Respondent performs Medicaid audits after a provider renders services. Therefore, it is essential for providers like Petitioner, who contest denied claims, to be able to substantiate their billing with appropriate documentation. Such documentation must be created at the time of service, maintained pursuant to statutory and rule requirements, and furnished to Respondent upon request. Petitioner never responded to Ms. Canfield-Buddin's request for medical documentation to substantiate Petitioner's challenge to the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner testified that the services he performed for some Medicaid patients were not equivalent to the free services he performed for non-Medicaid patients because they often involved a higher level of service, including additional services, tests, or examinations. According to Petitioner, some of the Medicaid patients required more extensive screening and counseling that consumed more of Petitioner's time. Despite this testimony, Petitioner admitted that the histories he took of Medicaid patients and non-Medicaid patients were basically the same. Petitioner testified that the difference in the level of service provided to all patients varied based upon the individual patients and did not depend on whether they were or were not Medicaid patients. He had no written or unwritten guidelines or policies that limited the scope of screening or level of service in an initial office visit for either type of patient. Petitioner's testimony that the level of services provided to Medicaid patients differed from the level of services offered to non-Medicaid patients is not persuasive. Once again, Petitioner failed to provide the required medical documentation to support his testimony or to identify in his testimony Medicaid patients who required a higher level of service. Moreover, Petitioner knew, when he made his offer of free services, that he would not be able to claim reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid patients that were not separately reimbursable even if Petitioner was entitled to exclude Medicaid patients from the offer. This includes cases where a Medicaid patient may have required a high level of service in terms of the time expended during the screening or a spinal manipulation during the initial office visit. Petitioner provides free services to members of his family. The provision of free services to family does not establish that Petitioner had a usual and customary practice of providing free services. At times, Petitioner treats police officers and indigent persons free of charge. However, Petitioner does not publicly advertise that he treats these patients free of charge because he does not want to be overrun with people taking advantage of the offer. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely treats police officers covered by private health insurance and indigent patients covered by Medicaid free of charge. Therefore, it cannot be said that Petitioner's usual and customary practice is to furnish services to these patients free of charge. A Medicaid provider is allowed to use the CPT code 99203 for a new patient visit once per recipient every three years. Petitioner's offer of free services for non-Medicaid patients allows them one free office visit and two free X-rays regardless of the passage of time. According to Petitioner, this means that Respondent's interpretation of Medicare regulations would entitle a Medicaid patient to the free services every three years whereas a non-Medicaid patient would not be so entitled, showing yet another difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients under the offer of free services. However, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive because it is not based on medical documentation or testimony showing that Petitioner ever treated a Medicaid patient as a new patient more than once.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $11,077.65 for Medicaid reimbursement overpayments. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Grant P. Dearborn, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Hal Cowen ChiroNetwork Health Care Centers 127 West 23rd Panama City, Florida 32405 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since 1976, a Florida-licensed pharmacist. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent was employed by Eckerd Corporation as one of two full-time pharmacists assigned to the Eckerd Drug Store (Store Number 3372) located at 312 North Lake Boulevard in North Palm Beach, Florida, which housed a community pharmacy that was open 14 hours a day. Respondent and the store's other full-time pharmacist worked separate, alternating shifts. At the beginning of each shift, Respondent "signed on" the pharmacy's computer system. She "logged off" the system at the end of the shift. Respondent was responsible for the supervision of all activities in the pharmacy during her shift. Among the activities it was her responsibility to supervise were those engaged in by the pharmacy technician on duty. The pharmacy technician assisted Respondent by, among other things, preparing computer-generated prescription labels and customer receipts for prescriptions that needed to be filled. The technician prepared these items by entering the required information, including the name and strength of the prescribed medication, into the pharmacy's computer system. 1/ All prescription labels and customer receipts prepared by the pharmacy technician on duty during Respondent's shift contained Respondent's initials ("MCB"). After they were prepared, the prescription labels and customer receipts were placed in bags, and the bags were put in baskets on the counter near Respondent, where they remained until the prescriptions were filled. When filling a prescription, it was Respondent's practice to examine the actual prescription written by the prescribing physician or, in the case of an oral prescription, the pharmacy's written record of such prescription, to confirm the accuracy of the prescription information on the prescription label and customer receipt and to make sure that she was dispensing what the physician had prescribed. 2/ The pharmacy was a "very busy" one. As a result, at the end of her shift, there were sometimes prescriptions for which labels and receipts (bearing her initials) had been prepared, but which Respondent had not had the opportunity to fill, and it was not until the following shift, when she was off duty, that these prescriptions were actually filled. Respondent was on duty on June 18, 1998, when a computer-generated prescription label and customer receipt for a prescription (Prescription Number 6071853) for Patient H. V. were prepared. The computer-generated prescription label and customer receipt, which had Respondent's initials on them, indicated, among other things, that the prescription was for 15 180 milligram tablets of Thyroid and that the prescribing physician was Dr. H. Pomeranz. It is unclear when, and by whom, Prescription Number 6071853 was filled. On or about October 9, 1998, Patient H. V.'s son, R. V., filed a complaint with Petitioner alleging that "the prescription [his mother] was suppose[d] to [have] be[en] taking was 15 mil[li]grams," but she instead "was given 180 mil[lli]grams per day by [the] Eckerd Drug Store [on North Lake Boulevard]." David Dimon, a Medical Malpractice Investigator with the Agency for Health Care Administration, investigated the complaint. As part of his investigation, Mr. Dimon contacted Respondent, who advised him that she did not want to make a statement regarding the complaint. Mr. Dimon also spoke with the prescribing physician, Dr. Pomeranz, who told him that she "prescribed Thyroid, 15 milligrams, for the patient, and not the 180 milligram dose given by Eckerd Pharmacy." 3/ Dr. Pomeranz further indicated to Mr. Dimon that H. V. 4/ suffered "side effects" as a result of taking the 180 milligram tablets.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2001.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or Agency), is entitled to a Medicaid reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the authority and responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As part of this authority, the Petitioner is required to recover Medicaid overpayments when appropriate. See § 409.913, Fla. Stat. (2006). At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a licensed physician and a Medicaid provider subject to the provisions of Chapter 409. As a Medicaid provider, the Respondent was authorized to provide services to eligible patients but was obligated to comply with the Medicaid Provider Agreement in doing so. The Medicaid Program contemplates that authorized providers will provide services to eligible patients, bill the program and be paid according to the Medicaid standards. All Medicaid providers must practice within the guidelines of the Physicians Coverage and Limitations Handbook and applicable law. Providers may be audited so that it can be verified the process was appropriately followed. In this case, the Respondent was audited. According to the audit findings, the Respondent received payment for services that he did not perform. Dr. Eiber (a physician not part of the Respondent’s practice group) reviewed and signed off on x-ray studies and reports for which the Respondent billed and was paid by Medicaid. Dr. Eiber is a Medicaid provider but he is not affiliated with the Respondent or the Respondent’s group. In order for the Respondent to bill and receive payment for Dr. Eiber’s work, the latter physician would have to be listed and identified within the group in which the Respondent practiced. The Respondent was responsible for all billings for which he received payments. In connection with billing, the Respondent was required to maintain and retain all Medicaid- related invoices or claims for the audit period. In this regard, the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook specifies that when a radiological study is performed in an office setting, either the physician billing the maximum fee must have performed or indirectly supervised the performance and interpreted the study; or if a group practice, a member of the group must perform all components of the services. That procedure was not followed. When the Agency disallows a paid Medicaid claim, it must seek to recover the overpayment from the Medicaid provider who received payment on the claim. This is the basis of the “pay and chase” methodology used in the Medicaid program. The claims are paid, subject to audit, and recovery is sought when the claim is disallowed. Based on the audit findings in this cause, the Agency seeks $32,935.96 as an overpayment of Medicaid claims paid to the Respondent. The Petitioner also seeks an administrative fine in the amount of $1000.00. The Respondent was given the results of the audit and afforded an opportunity to respond and provide additional information to the Agency to show that the amounts billed were correct. The Respondent has presented no supplemental information to corroborate the correctness of the claims at issue.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order sustaining the Final Audit Report and finding an overpayment against the Respondent in the amount of $32,9935.96. The Final Order should also impose an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig A. Brand, Esquire Law Offices of Craig A. Brand, P.A. Grove Forest Plaza 2937 Southwest 27th Avenue, Suite 101 Miami, Florida 33133 Willis Melvin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount to be paid by Petitioner to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), out of her settlement proceeds, as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On August 11, 2014, Amanda Baker, then 15 years old, was transferred from a medical center to a specialty pediatric hospital where she presented with complaints and symptoms of back pain, weakness, and paresthesia in her lower extremities. Over the next few days, she underwent examinations and assessments, but no steps were taken to prevent her development of blood clots/embolisms due to her immobility nor were signs and symptoms of her development of blood clots/embolisms recognized. On August 13, 2014, Amanda suffered two cardiac arrests due to blood clots/embolisms traveling to her heart and lungs. She was resuscitated, but due to a lack of oxygen to her brain, Amanda suffered a catastrophic hypoxic brain injury. She is now in a persistent vegetative state. The Agency provided $162,146.65 in Medicaid benefits associated with Amanda's injuries, all of which represent expenditures paid for her past medical expenses. Amanda's parents brought a medical malpractice action against the medical providers responsible for her care to recover all of the damages associated with her injuries, as well as their individual damages associated with their daughter's injuries. Seven defendants maintained insurance policies with a policy limit of $250,000. The medical malpractice action was settled for each of the insurance policy limits, resulting in a lump sum unallocated settlement of $1,750,000. This settlement was approved by the court. During the pendency of the malpractice action, the Agency was notified of the action. It asserted a $162,146.65 Medicaid lien against the Bakers' cause of action and settlement of that action. However, it did not institute, intervene in, or join in the action to enforce its rights, as provided in section 409.910(11), or participate in any aspect of the litigation. Application of the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) to Amanda's $1,750,000 settlement requires full payment of the Medicaid lien. Petitioner presented the testimony of Daniel Moody, Esquire, a Lakeland attorney with 30 years' experience in personal injury law, including medical malpractice. He represented Amanda and her family in the medical malpractice action. As a routine part of his practice, he makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured clients. He also stays abreast of jury verdicts in his area by reviewing jury verdict reporters and discussing cases with other trial attorneys. He has been accepted as an expert in valuation of damages. Based on his training and experience, Mr. Moody opined that the damages recoverable in Amanda's case had a conservative value of $30 million. Petitioner also presented the testimony of R. Vinson Barrett, Esquire, a Tallahassee trial attorney with more than 40 years' experience. His practice is dedicated to plaintiff's personal injury, as well as medical malpractice, medical products liability, and pharmaceutical products liability. He routinely makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured parties. He was accepted as an expert in the valuation of damages. Based on his training and experience, Mr. Barrett opined that Amanda's damages are "worth at a bare minimum – and we're talking very conservatively here -- $30,000,000." Both experts testified that using $30,000,000 as the value of all damages, Amanda only recovered 5.83 percent of the value of her damages. Accordingly, they opined that it would be reasonable, rational, and conservative to allocate 5.83 percent of the settlement, or $9,453.15, to past medical expenses paid by the Agency through the Medicaid program. The Agency did not call any witnesses, present any evidence as to the value of damages, propose a different valuation of the damages, or contest the methodology used to calculate the allocation to past medical expenses. In short, Petitioner's evidence was unrebutted. The testimony from Mr. Moody and Mr. Barrett is compelling and persuasive. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that $9,453.15 of the settlement represents reimbursement for past medical expenses.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Respondent, M. J. Warhola, was a doctor of osteopathic medicine and properly licensed as such by the State of Florida by license number OS 0001256, issued in 1957. He has been practicing osteopathic medicine at his present location in Tampa, Florida, for the past 17 or 18 years. Respondent first started treating Pearl O. Knowles in 1965. Generally, she was suffering from severe diabetes and was overweight. He also, over the years, treated her for arteriosclerosis. Among the drugs he was prescribing for her during the 1979-1989 time period were Placidyl (sleeping pill), Verstran (tranquilizer), Triavil (antidepressant), Dilantin (anticonvulsant) Teldrin (antiallergenic), Donnatal (sedative), Synalgos (painkiller), Talwin (painkiller), various antibiotics, and such other substances as insulin, stool hardeners, vitamins, diuretics, antihistamines, and antiemetics. During the period from January, 1979, through December, 1981, prescriptions written by Respondent for these varying medications for Mrs. Knowles or her husband were filled by area pharmacies in accordance with the following chart: MONTH/YR TOTAL MRS. K MONTH/YR TOTAL MRS. K Jan. 79 11 4 July 80 22 15 Feb. 79 15 7 Aug. 80 15 10 Mar. 79 10 5 Sept.80 26 19 Apr. 79 14 11 Oct. 80 20 10 May 79 13 10 Nov. 80 21 16 June 79 10 8 Dec. 80 22 17 July 79 11 6 Jan. 81 16 11 Aug. 79 15 10 Feb. 81 15 12 Sept.79 13 10 Mar. 81 25 17 Oct. 79 15 6 Apr. 81 26 17 Nov. 79 7 5 May 81 21 10 Dec. 79 17 12 June 81 11 4 Jan. 80 12 8 July 81 23 8 Feb. 80 17 12 Aug. 81 25 23 Mar. 80 21 17 Sept.81 5 5 Apr. 80 17 14 Oct. 81 20 14 May 80 24 22 Nov. 81 4 2 June 80 27 21 Dec. 81 2 2 TOTAL: 588 400 Many of the above instances are refills of the same prescription. According to Respondent, some prescriptions were authorized five refills without contact with him. Some, such as Prescription #27162 for 100 Triavil, initially filled on December 1, 1979, was subsequently refilled at least 11 times, and three other separate prescriptions for the same drug were filled multiple times. From January, 1979, through September, 1980, a period of 20 months, 30 tablets each prescriptions for Placidyl tablets, written by Respondent for Mrs. Knowles, were filled 46 times for a total of 1,380 tablets. During the same period, Triavil prescriptions for 100 capsules each written by Respondent for Mrs. Knowles were filled 22 times for 3,200 tablets, Talwin at 100 tablets 13 times for 1,300 tablets, at least 10 prescriptions for either Tylenol #3 or Fiorinol #3, both with codeine, at 50 tablets each for the Fiorinol at least totalling more than 509 tablets, as well as all the others stated in paragraph 2 above. Mrs. Knowles admits taking too much medication, but claims it is not the fault of Respondent. Whenever Respondent saw her and gave her a prescription for any medicine, he would tell her what dosage to take. She would see the Respondent every two or three weeks and get a new prescription each time and would also give her prescriptions at her request without her going to the office personally. Regardless of what instructions Respondent would give her concerning the dosage of the various painkillers and "nerve medicines" he would give her, she often exceeded the directed dose either by accident or in an effort to relieve the extreme pain she was experiencing in her hands and feet. Not only did she get drug prescriptions from Respondent, but by her own admission, she also saw other doctors during the period from whom she got "pain pills," as well as taking those given to her on her release from the hospitals to which she was admitted. She recognized that she was taking too many drugs at the time, but the pain was severe and she felt it was required. During this same period of time, from mid-1979 on through early 1982, while Mrs. Knowles was seeing Respondent for her diabetes and other chronic ailments, she was admitted to several hospitals in the area. On June 11, 1979, she was admitted to the Brandon Community Hospital (BCH) in Brandon, Florida (Brandon is a small community east of Tampa), in a confused and disoriented state. The admission diagnosis was diabetes with electrolyte imbalance. The attending physician noted at the time that the patient "is somewhat dependent on drugs." Approximately two months later, on August 15, 1979, Mrs. Knowles was again admitted to BCH, this time for uncontrolled diabetes and overdosing her drugs including Placidyl and Fiorinol. Again, the attending physician noted the failure of the patient to take care of her diabetes, her drinking, and her drug dependency. Mrs. Knowles thereafter stayed out of the hospital for about a year until, on September 1, 1981, she was again admitted to BCH, again for her diabetes. Secondary diagnoses on this occasion were hypertension and taxciencephalopathy, a disorder of brain function. At this time, she was seen in the hospital by Dr. Mark Stern. Based on the lab work performed and examination by Dr. Stern and other specialists to whom she was referred, it was concluded that her condition, aside from the diabetes and hypertension, was related to her overuse of drugs such as Talwin, Valium, Triavil, and the like. She was again seen by Dr. Stern at BCH on October 24, 1981, when she was admitted for an unintentional drug overdose. A drug screen done at the time of admission revealed a Placidyl level of 69.4 (normal level is 0.5 to 10, with toxic levels being greater than 20). A repeat test six and a half hours later showed the level of Placidyl at 62.4. Other lab tests showed opiates, benzodiazepan (tranquilizers such as Valium and Librium), and salecylates. When she was admitted on this occasion, she had with her a box containing several medicine bottles. Notwithstanding Petitioner's allegation that "Said labels were not labeled by Respondent," the testimony of Deborah Ann Brown, Director of Pharmacy at BCH, to whom the box of bottles was given for identification, shows that only one of all the bottles did not have the appropriate markings on it. It also appears that some of the medicines in the box had been prescribed for Mrs. Knowles' husband, Ira. Dr. Stern again saw Mrs. Knowles when she was brought to BCH on January 6, 1982, complaining of weakness and difficulty in walking. Again, her history showed she was taking antidepressants and Placidyl for chronic insomnia. Dr. Stern recalls that Mrs. Knowles telephoned him on October 9, 1981, and requested prescriptions for Placidyl, Triavil, and Talwin, but he refused to prescribe them for her. He terminated his relationship with her in August, 1982. During the period she was his patient, however, he did prescribe for her such substances as painkillers, sleeping pills, and antianxiety drugs, the same generic types of drugs as prescribed by Respondent, by written prescriptions, some of which called for multiple refills. Though Mrs. Knowles advised Dr. Stern that she was being treated by Dr. Warhola, Dr. Stern did not discuss her with Dr. Warhola or even contact him. Even when Mrs. Knowles threatened to get drugs from Respondent when Dr. Stern refused to give her prescription over the phone in October, 1981, Dr. Stern still did not contact Dr. Warhola. Between the fourth and fifth BCH hospitalizations, on December 21, 1981, Mrs. Knowles was admitted to Tampa General Hospital (TGH) and was examined by Dr. Jeffrey L. Miller, a rheumatologist internist, at the request of her regular physician, Dr. Sugarman. When Dr. Miller first saw her, Mrs. Knowles was overmedicated. She was confused, and her speech was slurred. She indicated to Dr. Miller that she was taking Triavil and other drugs as well, such as Zomax and Placidyl, but refused to tell him all the drugs she was taking. Those she mentioned are addictive, and it appeared that she was addicted because she had been hospitalized for nonaccidental overmedication and because her condition was consistent with addiction. Mrs. Knowles denied having a drug problem. In Dr. Miller's opinion, however, Mrs. Knowles was not receiving the proper therapy. Her diabetes did not require the drugs she was getting. Her other symptoms, in his opinion, did not justify the apparent liberal prescriptions she was getting and should have been treated with psychotherapy rather than drugs. In his opinion, therapy should be tailored for an individual like Mrs. Knowles so that the medication is limited and regulated to prevent addiction and the buildup of tolerance to a drug, which results in larger and larger doses. The evidence also shows, however, that Mrs. Knowles was a difficult patient. Dr. Sugarman was having difficulty with her and requested the consult by Miller. What must also be considered is that Mrs. Knowles' leg, about which she constantly complained of the pain, was subsequently surgically removed in 1982 as a result of her diabetes. The pain associated with this condition leading up to the amputation was real and required relief to some degree. In any case, Dr. Miller did not ever discuss Mrs. Knowles with Respondent or advise him of her addiction. Mrs. Knowles still receives painkillers and "nerve medicine" from her current physician, Dr. Sugarman, whom she sees every two weeks. She stopped seeing Dr. Warhola when she started seeing Dr. Sugarman, who, she felt, was more current in some of her problem areas than Respondent. She did not leave Respondent because she was dissatisfied with him. In fact, he was the only one who helped her blood clots. According to Respondent, he gave Mrs. Knowles the Placidyl for sleep because she had a lot of pain as a result of her diabetes and needed it to help her sleep. At this same time, Mrs. Knowles' husband was a severe alcoholic and, since she was under a lot of strain because of that, he gave her the drug to help her sleep. The call he got from Dr. Stern on October 26, 1981, when she was in BCH, indicating she was mixing drugs, was the first indication he had that she was abusing drugs. He told Stern she was not to get any more, and he, Respondent, has not prescribed any for her or seen her since. In fact, he was not informed of her hospitalizations in June or August, 1979, or in September, 1981. It is, even by the testimony of Petitioner's expert, Dr. Gladding, not uncommon in Florida for M.D.s to admit a D.O.'s patient to a hospital and not ever notify the D.O. of that fact. Mrs. Clifton M. Wood of Winter Haven, Florida, was first taken to see Respondent for a diet regimen in 1980. On the first visit on February 7, 1980, he gave her a physical examination which included a complete laboratory workup, cardiogram, and weight and pressure check. He gave her some pills which had instructions for use on the bottle, but did not tell her what they were. Each time she came to his office for a visit thereafter, on a monthly basis, either Respondent or his nurse would weigh her and take her blood pressure and adjust her medication as required. During the course of treating Mrs. Wood, Respondent gave her phedymetrazine, an appetite suppressant, methahydrine for high blood pressure, Donnatal, and vitamins and minerals. He gave Mrs. Wood only the drugs he felt she needed in the amount she needed. Mrs. Wood was admitted to Winter Haven Hospital on October 26, 1980, because a neighbor who was concerned about her brought her in. At the time, Mrs. Wood had trouble with dizziness, her balance, and falling. Before this incident, however, Respondent on one or more of his visits, had given her pills for her blood pressure and potassium pills for her to take in water. According to Dr. Gordon Rafool, who had also treated Mrs. Wood since 1979 and who admitted her to the hospital in October, 1989, at the time of admission, she was, among other things, dehydrated and had an electrolyte imbalance (lack of body salt, specifically potassium), the latter possibly being caused by the intemperate use of a diuretic. A diuretic is often used in cases of heart failure, high blood pressure, and, though not recommended, weight reduction, to get rid of body water. Since it was important to know what medicines Mrs. Wood was taking to help determine the reason for her condition, Dr. Rafool and other hospital personnel tried to get an identification of the drugs in Mrs. Wood's possession when she was brought in. The hospital pharmacy could not identify them, and no drug screen was done, but Dr. Rafool obtained a written authorization of Respondent to permit Respondent to release any information regarding drugs dispensed or prescribed to the patient by him. This authorization was forwarded to Respondent's office with a request for Mrs. Wood's medical records, but they were never released. Dr. Warhola's office manager, Mrs. Zacchini, states the request and authorization on Mrs. Wood were received, but were apparently inadvertently filed in the office record without the requested records being sent out. Though Dr. Rafool says that numerous follow-up calls were made to Respondent's office, Mrs. Zacchini denies any were received from either the hospital or Dr. Rafool. In any case, there is no evidence to indicate any calls were made to or received by Respondent directly, and he denies every having received any. Mrs. Wood still considers Respondent to be a good doctor, but she has not gone back to see him since her release from the hospital because Dr. Rafool told her to stay away from him. She has been seeing Dr. Rafool, who has been treating her with pills for her arthritis and high blood pressure. Petitioner presented the deposition of Dr. Lloyd D. Gladding, D.O., over the partial objection of Respondent, whose objection was not to the use of the deposition, but to specific parts thereof based on particular grounds. For example, Respondent objected to Dr. Gladding's testifying as an expert because, he contended, there had been no showing by Petitioner that the witness's experience compares to that of Dr. Warhola. He contends the witness does not practice in the same geographical area nor is there a showing he is a similar health care provider with a similar specialty or a similar type practice. However, Dr. Gladding's curriculum vitae, admitted without objection, shows he is currently co-chairman of a family practice seminar in his area and a clinical preceptor (teacher) at an osteopathic medical school and has been engaged in a family practice in the Fort Myers area since 1978. This area is geographically not far removed from the Tampa Bay area (the distance is not significant) and there is no showing that the patient conditions involved in the two cases at issue would or could be affected significantly by the geographical location of the patient or that treatment of these conditions varies greatly from location to location. In fact, according to this witness, he finds patients from widely differing areas (Pennsylvania, where he was trained, as opposed to Florida, where he practices) to be the same. Accepting the witness as an expert, then, with reference to Mrs. Knowles and her condition, he has had patients with a similar series of health problems where the patient was placed on multiple drug regimens. Sometimes, these patients developed drug dependencies for the different medications he prescribed. In the case of Mrs. Knowles, based on the number of Placidyl prescribed by the Respondent over about a year, she received enough to take two per day, which would constitute 1,500 mg. of the drug per day (two tablets of 759 mg. each). The drug company's recommended daily dose is between 590 and 750 mg. given at bedtime, with an additional 109 to 200 mg. later on, if needed. The fact that Mrs. Knowles was also getting other drugs, including a different type of sleeping pill, makes Dr. Gladding feel the prescriptions by Respondent were excessive. He admits, however, he does not know how much pain the patient was in and this makes it difficult to render an opinion. Because of this, he cannot unequivocally say that the dosage prescribed was excessive. Good practice is to prescribe as few Schedule II drugs as is possible. However, without knowing the patient, her attitude, and her actual condition, an opinion as to the appropriateness of the drugs prescribed, unless clearly inappropriate, would be merely guesswork. As to the patient Mrs. Wood, Dr. Gladding could not read Dr. Warhola's notes of what drugs he gave her. Therefore, in analyzing Respondent's prescriptions, he relied on and referred to a federal drug analysis of the unmarked drugs she got from Respondent as including barbiturates or their derivatives. This analysis was not introduced into evidence, and Dr. Gladding's reference to it is hearsay which cannot, by itself and without other independent evidence of the identity of the drugs, support a finding of fact even though it would appear some were drugs that would not be used in weight control. However, there were drugs identified independently, such as the potassium replacement and the weight reduction drug, which were appropriate and, in addition, the tranquilizer could also be appropriate. In any case, Dr. Gladding does not know what Mrs. Wood told Respondent about the problems she was having sleeping. If she did tell him this, even the barbiturates could be appropriate. Dr. Gladding has also been confronted with a situation where a patient of his has been hospitalized and the hospital calls him for information on the patient on an emergency basis. He knows, he says, everyone in the local hospitals and generally provides the requested information on the spot without a formal release. He is more concerned with the patient's welfare than with technicalities. However, in the case of Mrs. Wood, there was not an emergency situation and there was no showing Respondent was ever personally contacted. In addition, there was evidence of only one written release, not three, as reflected by the witness.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein against Dr. Warhola be dismissed, but that he be officially reminded of the necessity to conservatively prescribe controlled substances in the course of his practice. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32391 Gerald Nelson, Esquire 4950 West Kennedy Boulevard Suite 693 Tampa, Florida 33609 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee. Florida 32301 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The amount to be paid by Petitioners, Pedro Garcia, a minor by and through his parents and natural guardians, Jesus Garcia and Norma Cisneros ("Petitioners") to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"), out of the settlement proceeds, as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pedro Garcia ("Pedro") was born on October 30, 2014. When he was two months old, he presented to the emergency room ("ER") with vomiting and excessive crying. The doctors failed to diagnose an intestinal blockage and discharged Pedro home. Pedro was taken again to the ER in dire distress. He was airlifted to a pediatric hospital where emergency surgery was performed to remove 90 percent of his intestine. Pedro now suffers from the effects of having 90 percent of his intestine removed, including: nutritional deficiencies, diarrhea, dehydration, and abdominal distress. He cannot play with exertion and his activities are limited. Pedro will suffer the effects of his injury for the remainder of his life. A portion of Pedro's medical care related to the injury was paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program and Medicaid, through AHCA, provided $71,230.43 in benefits. Pedro's parents and natural guardians, Jesus Garcia and Norma Cisneros, brought a medical malpractice action against the medical providers and staff responsible for Pedro's care ("Defendants") to recover all of Pedro's damages, as well as their individual damages associated with their son's injury. Because of uncertainty on issues of liability and only a $250,000 insurance policy on the most culpable defendant, Pedro's medical malpractice action against the Defendants was settled for a confidential unallocated lump sum of $2,000,000. During the pendency of Pedro's medical malpractice action, AHCA was notified of the action and AHCA asserted a $71,230.43 Medicaid lien against Pedro's cause of action and settlement of that action. The Medicaid program through AHCA, spent $71,230.43 on behalf of Pedro, all of which represents expenditures paid for Pedro's past medical expenses. Another non-AHCA Medicaid provider, Integral Quality Care, provided $223,089.26 in past medical expenses on behalf of Pedro. Another non-AHCA Medicaid provider, Department of Health, Child's Medical Services, provided $168,161.12 in past medical expenses on behalf of Pedro. Accordingly, a total of $462,480.81 was paid for Pedro's past medical expenses. AHCA did not commence a civil action to enforce its rights under section 409.910 or intervene or join in Pedro's action against the Defendants. By letter, AHCA was notified of Pedro's settlement. AHCA has not filed a motion to set-aside, void, or otherwise dispute Pedro's settlement. Application of the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) to Pedro's $2,000,000 settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $71,230.43 Medicaid lien. At the hearing, Petitioners presented the expert testimony of attorney Edward H. Zebersky, who represented Pedro throughout the underlying medical malpractice action against the Defendants. Without objection, Mr. Zebersky was accepted as an expert in the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties. Mr. Zebersky has been an attorney since 1991. Since 1992, Mr. Zebersky has been a plaintiff's trial lawyer, with a substantial portion of his practice devoted to personal injury cases, including medical malpractice matters. He is a partner with the law firm of Zebersky Payne Shaw Lewenz, LLP and AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell. Mr. Zebersky is a member of numerous trial attorney associations and has held leadership positions in several associations, including president of the Florida Justice Association in 2006 and serving on the Board of Governors of the American Association for Justice for the past ten years. Mr. Zebersky handles jury trials. He has secured multiple eight-figure verdicts and several seven-figure verdicts, and he stays abreast of jury verdicts on other cases in his area. As a routine part of his practice, Mr. Zebersky makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by his clients. Mr. Zebersky was accepted as an expert in a Medicaid lien dispute at DOAH in the case of Herrera v. Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 16-1270MTR, 2016 Fla. Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS 493 (Fla. DOAH Oct. 11, 2016). Mr. Zebersky was familiar with the circumstances surrounding Pedro's injury and medical malpractice claims and gave a detailed explanation of them. Mr. Zebersky reviewed Pedro's life care plan, which details Pedro's future medical needs, and an economist report, which calculated the present value of Pedro's future medical care and present value of Pedro's lost future earnings. The economist placed the present value of Pedro's future medical expenses and lost future earnings at approximately $9,500,000. According to Mr. Zebersky, past medical expenses would also be added to arrive at the full value of Pedro's economic damages. Mr. Zebersky testified that in addition to economic damages, a jury would also be asked to assign a value to past and future noneconomic damages (i.e., pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life). Mr. Zebersky testified that Pedro's claim for noneconomic damages would have an exceedingly high number, which as a "rule of thumb" is three times the value of his economic damages. Mr. Zebersky persuasively and credibly testified that the total value of all of Pedro's damages would be in excess of $20,000,000, and that valuing Pedro's damages at $15,000,000 is a very conservative and low valuation of his damages. Mr. Zebersky persuasively and credibly testified that the $2,000,000 settlement did not fully compensate Pedro for the full value of his damages. Mr. Zebersky testified that based on a conservative value of all of Pedro's damages of $15,000,000, the $2,000,000 settlement represents a recovery of 13.33 percent of the full value of his damages. AHCA did not call any witnesses, present any evidence as to the value of damages, or propose a different valuation of damages. Mr. Zebersky's testimony regarding the total value of Pedro's damages was credible, unimpeached, and unrebutted. Petitioner proved that the settlement of $2,000,000 does not fully compensate Pedro for the full value of his damages. Mr. Zebersky further testified that because Pedro only recovered in the settlement 13.33 percent of the full value of his damages, he only recovered 13.33 percent of AHCA's $71,230.43 Medicaid lien, or $9,495.01. Mr. Zebersky testified that it would be reasonable to allocate $9,495.01 of the settlement to past medical expenses paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program. Following the settlement, Mr. Zebersky negotiated the non-AHCA Integral Quality Care Medicaid lien from $233,089.26 to $18,737.00, and the non-AHCA Department of Health, Child's Medical Services lien from $168,161.12 to $22,415. On cross-examination, Mr. Zebersky acknowledged that the $233,089.26 and $168,161.12 from Integral Quality Care and Department of Health, Child's Medical Services are part of Pedro's claim for past medical expenses. However, Mr. Zebersky failed to include these past medical expenses in applying the ratio to reduce the Medicaid lien amount owed to AHCA. AHCA successfully contested the methodology used to calculate the allocation to past medical expenses based on Mr. Zebersky's failure to include these past medical expenses in applying the ratio. Accordingly, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 13.33 percent is the appropriate pro rata share of Pedro's past medical expenses to be applied to determine the amount recoverable by AHCA in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. Total past medical expenses is the sum of AHCA's lien in the amount of $71,230.43, and the past medical expenses in the amounts of $233,089.26 and $168,161.12, which equals $462,480.81. Accordingly, following Mr. Zebersky's methodology and applying the $15,000,000 valuation to the proper amount of total past medical expenses of $462,480.81, the settlement portion properly allocable to Pedro's past medical expenses to satisfy AHCA's lien is $61,648.69 ($462,480.81 x 13.33 percent = $61,648.69).
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent for payments totaling $1,140,763.88 that Petitioner received from the Medicaid Program in compensation for the provision of prescription drugs between late-August and November of 1998. Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to retain the payments in question because Petitioner allegedly has failed to demonstrate that it had available during the pertinent period a sufficient quantity of the prescription drugs in question.
Findings Of Fact The parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts and the evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties The Agency for Health Care Administration (the “Agency”) is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As one of its duties, the Agency must recover "overpayments . . . as appropriate," the term "overpayment" being statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake." See Section 409.913(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Palm Beach Pharmacy, Inc. (“PBPI”), d/b/a Eddie’s Drug (“Eddie’s”) was, at all times material hereto, a duly contracted Medicaid provider, having entered into a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency and been assigned a Medicaid Provider Number: 106343000. Eddie’s is a Florida licensed pharmacy.1 As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Eddie’s is authorized to dispense drugs and supplies to Medicaid recipients. In return, Eddie’s has agreed to comply with all governing statutes, rules, and policies, including those policies set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (the “Handbook”). The Agency, which prepared the Handbook and furnishes it to Medicaid providers, has incorporated the Handbook by reference into Rule 59G-4.250(2), Florida Administrative Code. PBPI, which owned and operated a number of pharmacies (including Eddie’s), maintained its corporate headquarters in West Palm Beach, Florida. Eddie’s was located in Miami, Florida. On July 1, 1998, PBPI acquired a drug store known as Jay’s Drugs (“Jay’s”). Jay’s was located in Miami, Florida, across the street from Eddie’s. Thus, before both stores came under common ownership, they had been competitors. This case arises out of the Agency's attempt to recover alleged overpayments on Medicaid claims for which Eddie’s was paid several years ago. The "audit period" that is the subject of the Agency's recoupment effort is April 1, 1998 to July 31, 1999, although the actual period in controversy is much shorter. From July 1, 1998, until the end of the audit period, PBPI owned and operated both Eddie’s and Jay’s. The Underlying Facts The transactions at the heart of this case occurred between late-August and November of 1998, during which period (the “Focal Period”) Medicaid reimbursed Eddie’s more than $1 million for prescription drugs including Neupogen and Epogen/Procrit (collectively, the “Drugs”). The Drugs are used to treat AIDS patients and persons infected with HIV. Prior to the Focal Period, Eddie’s had not dispensed $1 million worth of the Drugs——or any figure approaching that amount——in three or four months’ time. The reason for the dramatic spike in Eddie’s business is that Eddie’s was dispensing the Drugs to customers of Jay’s pursuant to an arrangement designed to manipulate PBPI’s contractual obligations to the former owner of Jay’s under the purchase and sale agreement by which PBPI had acquired Jay’s. Essentially, the arrangement was this. Jay’s was dispensing the Drugs to a large number (approximately 150) of Medicaid beneficiaries who were receiving treatment at a nearby clinic. Because the Drugs were administered to the patients via intravenous infusion, the clinic typically obtained the Drugs from Jay’s in bulk. To fill these prescriptions, Jay’s ordered the Drugs from a wholesale supplier, which usually delivered the Drugs to Jay’s the next day. At some point before the Focal Period, arrangements were made to have the clinic present its prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s rather than Jay’s.2 The evidence does not show, exactly, how this was accomplished, but whatever the means, the clinic abruptly began bringing prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s.3 This diversion of Jay’s’ business to Eddie’s was intended to deprive Jay’s of Medicaid reimbursements to which Jay’s’ former owner had access as a source of funds for paying down a note that PBPI had given for the purchase of Jay’s. By having Eddie’s dispense the Drugs and submit the Medicaid claims, Medicaid money flowed into Eddie’s’ bank account (rather than Jay’s’ bank account) and hence was not immediately available to the former owner of Jay’s to reduce PBPI’s debt. During the Focal Period, Eddie’s did not purchase the Drugs from a wholesaler but instead acquired them from Jay’s. The process by which this was accomplished involved a pharmacy technician named Wright, who was employed at Eddie’s, and a pharmacist named Shafor, who worked at Jay’s. Wright (at Eddie’s) accepted the prescriptions for the Drugs as the clinic brought them in Then, she called Shafor (at Jay’s) and told him the quantities needed to fill the prescriptions. Shafor ordered the Drugs from a wholesaler, which delivered them in bulk to Jay’s, usually the next day. Upon receiving the Drugs, Shafor personally delivered them to Wright, who, recall, was across the street at Eddie’s. Wright labeled and dispensed the Drugs. Eddie’s submitted a claim for the Drugs to Medicaid, and Medicaid paid Eddie’s. PBPI maintained separate accounting ledgers for Eddie’s and Jay’s, respectively. The company’s accountants recorded the subject transactions in these ledgers so that Jay’s——not Eddie’s——would “recognize” the sales of the Drugs. In a nutshell, this was done through “inter-company” transfers whereby all of the money that Eddie’s received from Medicaid for the Drugs was moved, on the books, into an account of Jay’s. In this way, any profit from the sales of the Drugs (the difference between the wholesale cost of the Drugs and the Medicaid reimbursement therefor, less overhead) was realized on Jay’s’ books.4 The Medicaid payments to Eddie’s that the Agency seeks to recoup were included in four remittance vouchers dated September 2, 1998; September 30, 1998; October 28, 1998; and November 25, 1998, respectively. The September 2 payment to Eddie’s totaled $287,205.52. Of this amount, $276,033.23 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of September 30, 1998, the sum of $276,033.23 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The September 30 payment to Eddie’s totaled $439,175.77, of which $432,700.36 was paid in consideration of the Drugs. The October 28 Medicaid payment was $431,753.82, of which total the Drugs accounted for $424,202.76. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of October 31, 1998, the sum of $870,929.59 (439,175.77 + 431,753.82) had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The November 25 payment to Eddie’s totaled $407,088.00. Of this amount, $393,063.00 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of November 30, 1998, the sum of $407,088.00 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The Agency’s Allegations On October 31, 2000, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (“Audit”) in which Eddie’s was alleged to have received $1,143,612.68 in overpayments relating to the Drugs. In the Audit, the Agency spelled out its theory of the case; indeed, the Audit is the only document in the record that does so. The Agency cited several statutory provisions. First, Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes, was referenced. This section states: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: * * * (e) Are provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes. The Agency did not allege (or prove), however, that Eddie’s had violated Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes.5 Put another way, the Agency did not plead or prove lack of supervision, submission of a false claim, or that the Drugs were not provided in accordance with applicable law. Next, the Agency cited Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: A Medicaid provider shall retain medical, professional, financial, and business records pertaining to services and goods furnished to a Medicaid recipient and billed to Medicaid for a period of 5 years after the date of furnishing such services or goods. The agency may investigate, review, or analyze such records, which must be made available during normal business hours. However, 24-hour notice must be provided if patient treatment would be disrupted. The provider is responsible for furnishing to the agency, and keeping the agency informed of the location of, the provider's Medicaid- related records. The authority of the agency to obtain Medicaid-related records from a provider is neither curtailed nor limited during a period of litigation between the agency and the provider. The Agency further alleged, as fact, that Eddie’s had failed, upon request, “to submit invoices from [its] suppliers to substantiate the availability of drugs that [were] billed to Medicaid” and thus had not “fully substantiated such availability.” The Agency, however, did not invoke any of the available remedial provisions as authority to impose a sanction for this alleged failure to turn over Medicaid-related records. See, e.g., Sections 409.913(14)(b), (c), and (d), Florida Statutes. The Agency cited Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Agency to “require repayment for inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive goods or services from the person furnishing them, the person under whose supervision they were furnished, or the person causing them to be furnished.” There was no allegation (or proof), however, that the Drugs which Eddie’s had purported to dispense (i.e. the Drugs for which it had submitted Medicaid claims) were “inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive.” Thus, Eddie’s was not alleged (or shown) to have violated Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes. Finally, the Agency relied upon Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes, which is the basis of the Agency’s legal theory. This section provides: The agency may seek any remedy provided by law, including, but not limited to, the remedies provided in subsections (12) and (15) and s. 812.035, if: * * * (n) The provider fails to demonstrate that it had available during a specific audit or review period sufficient quantities of goods, or sufficient time in the case of services, to support the provider's billings to the Medicaid program[.] The Agency contended, additionally, that “[b]illing Medicaid for drugs that have not been demonstrated as available for dispensing is a violation of the Medicaid laws and regulations and has resulted in the finding that [Eddie’s] ha[s] been overpaid by the Medicaid program.” (Emphasis added). The Agency explained, “Medicaid payments that have been substantiated by documented inventory are assumed to be valid; and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid.” Thus, the Agency’s theory of recovery is that Eddie’s must forfeit “overpayments” arising from its failure to demonstrate the availability, in inventory, of a sufficient quantity of the Drugs for which claims were submitted, as required by Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes. After the Audit was issued, the Agency accepted a handwritten note regarding the transfer of a small quantity of Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s as sufficient to demonstrate the availability of such amount. This resulted in a slight reduction of the amount of the alleged overpayment, to $1,140,763.88. The Separate Audit of Jay’s The Agency conducted a separate audit of Jay’s, concerning which some evidence was introduced at hearing. Without getting into unnecessary detail, the audit of Jay’s revealed that Jay’s had purchased, during and around the Focal Period, a quantity of the Drugs that exceeded the number of units that Jay’s had billed to Medicaid. It was Eddie’s theory that this “excess inventory” of Jay’s matched, more or less, the alleged inventory shortfall at Eddie’s, thereby corroborating the testimony concerning the transfer of these Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s for dispensation. At hearing, the parties sharply disputed whether, in fact, Jay’s had transferred the Drugs to Eddie’s. The Agency, of course, maintained that such transfers were not properly documented; Eddie’s argued that the documents and other evidence, including testimony about the transactions in question, adequately demonstrated that the transfers had, in fact, occurred. There was no dispute, however, that if it were found that such transfers had occurred, and if, further, the documents (and other evidence) pertaining to the inventory of Jay’s were accepted as proof of the quantities of Drugs so transferred, then all but $176,078.30 worth of the Drugs could be accounted for. Thus, as counsel for Eddie’s conceded at hearing, the Agency is entitled to recoup some sum of money. The question is whether that sum is $1,140,763.88 or $176,078.30. Ultimate Factual Determination Based on all of the evidence in the record, including the deposition testimony received through the parties’ joint stipulation, it is determined that, more likely than not, Eddie’s had available during the Focal Period a sufficient quantity of the Drugs to support all but $176,078.30 worth of the claims in dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Eddie’s to repay the Agency the principal amount of $176,078.30. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2002.
Conclusions This cause came before the Agency for Health Care Administration for issuance of a Final Order. 1. On March 26, 2013, the Agency sent a letter to the Petitioner notifying the Petitioner that it owed an overpayment in the amount of $565,279.55 to the Agency based upon an adjustment in the Petitioner’s overpayment rates (Exhibit A). 2. On April 16, 2013, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Hearing and the Agency Clerk referred the Petition for Formal Hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. 4. On May 13, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge assigned to the case entered an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based upon a Joint Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction filed by the parties. 5. On May 23, 2014, the Agency rescinded the overpayment letter (Exhibit B). 6. The Agency’s rescission of the overpayment letter has rendered this matter moot. Filed August 14, 2014 9:26 AM Division of Administrative Hearings Based on the foregoing, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: Respondent’s right to a hearing in this matter has been rendered moot and the Agency’s May 11, 2013 overpayment letter is rescinded. The parties shall govern themselves accordingly. DONE AND ORDERED this S day of Novurt , 2014 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K ELIZABETH DUDEK, SECRETARY AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
