Findings Of Fact Respondent, Glen Thurlow (Thurlow), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission) on June 15, 1982, and was issued Certificate Number 02-3128. Thurlow has been employed by the West Palm Beach Police Department (WPBPD) for the last eight years. On the evening of November 24, 1990, Thurlow was assigned as a police officer to the WPBPD Criminal Apprehension Team (CAT), which is a street crimes unit. That evening Thurlow was partnered for the first time with Lee Rollins (Rollins), a fellow police officer on CAT. Thurlow and Rollins were assigned as plain clothes officers in an unmarked police vehicle, an old, gold Cadillac. Thurlow had on a black T-shirt, combat pants, black combat boots, duty leather and underneath his shirt a bullet-proof vest with a trauma plate. Rollins was dressed in a black T-shirt and jeans. He was not wearing duty leather, but was wearing a utility belt fastened with velcro. Both officers wore their police badges on a chain underneath their shirts. Around 10:30 p.m., near the end of their duty shift, they were returning to the police station. Thurlow was driving south on South Dixie Highway headed toward the Belvedere Road intersection. As they approached the intersection, the officers saw a man, later identified as Robert Jewett (Jewett), dressed in cut-off jeans, a T-shirt, and a cap standing near the middle of the south bound lanes on South Dixie Highway past the Belvedere Road intersection, near the Palm Beach Post Building. The officers continued through the Belvedere Road intersection toward Jewett. As they approached Jewett, he stuck out his left hand in a "hitchhiking gesture." Thurlow pulled over to the side of the road near the parking lot of the Palm Beach Post Building. When Thurlow pulled over, Jewett ran up to the car and got in the back seat. Rollins showed Jewett his police badge, told Jewett that he was a police officer, and requested Jewett to step outside the car. Jewett complied. Rollins exited the Cadillac and Thurlow remained inside. Rollins asked Jewett for his driver's license, which Jewett gave him. Rollins radioed the police dispatcher with the information on the driver's license in order to determine whether there were any outstanding warrants on Jewett. Rollins advised Jewett that he was going to charge him with hitchhiking, but that if there were no warrants against Jewett that he would be given a Notice to Appear and released at the scene, rather than being taken down to the police station. Rollins told Jewett to place his hands on top of the car and spread his legs so that Rollins could search him for weapons. Jewett complied. Thurlow, still sitting in the driver's seat, was monitoring the conversation between Rollins and Jewett. Rollins began the weapons search at Jewett's shoulder and continued down to his left pocket. Finding nothing, he started to search the right pocket. At that time Jewett brought his right arm down from the top of the car. Rollins caught his arm, put it back on top of the car, and told him to keep his hands on the top of the car. As Rollins proceeded to search Jewett's right pocket, Jewett brought his right arm down and stuck it in his pocket. At the same time he came around with his left elbow and hit Rollins on the left side of his chest, knocking him around. Rollins pulled Jewett's hand out of his pocket and they began to struggle. Rollins pulled his flashlight from his back pocket and tried to hit Jewett on his left forearm. Jewett tried to kick Rollins in the groin and Rollins grabbed Jewett's T-shirt. Their feet tangled, the men went down and Rollins fell back toward the car, hitting his head on the back door. Rollins was stunned from the blow to his head. Thurlow felt the Cadillac rock as if someone had bumped against the car. Rollins called to Thurlow to give him some assistance. Thurlow exited the car and came around to the passenger side, where he saw Rollins sitting on the ground with his back to the car, and Jewett straddling and leaning over Rollins with his arms raised as if he were preparing to hit Rollins. Thurlow ran up behind Jewett and put his arm below Jewett's Adam's apple in Jewett's upper chest area in order to pull Jewett back from Rollins. Jewett began to fight and had Thurlow on the balls of his feet. They went towards the front of the car. Jewett went down on his knees with Thurlow's arm still around him. Jewett stood up with Thurlow on his back and they both went backwards, and as a result Thurlow's arm slipped up towards Jewett's chin. Rollins, seeing Jewett put his right hand in his pocket, ran over to Jewett and tried to grab his right hand. The three men fell to the ground and rolled backwards landing in a grassy area. Thurlow still had his arm around Jewett's neck. Thurlow was on the bottom, Jewett in the middle and Rollins on top. Thurlow released his hold on Jewett and slipped out from under Jewett. Thurlow was on Jewett's left side and Rollins was sitting to Jewett's right, about, waist-high facing away from Jewett. Jewett was grabbing at his right pocket. Rollins saw a metal object in the area of Jewett's right pocket. Rollins took his flashlight and swiped at the metal object, sending both the flashlight and the metal object flying off in an easterly direction. Rollins told Jewett to quit struggling. Jewett grabbed the butt of Rollins' gun. Rollins hollered to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun. Rollins hit Jewett in the groin three to four times. Thurlow got up and threw a punch at Jewett connecting at Jewett's left eye. At that point Jewett quit fighting. Thurlow held Jewett's arm over the curb and told Rollins to handcuff Jewett. Having lost his handcuffs in the struggle, Rollins used Thurlow's handcuffs and cuffed Jewett's hands behind his back. All three men were breathing hard and sweating. Rollins told Thurlow that he had lost his flashlight and that something had been thrown out of Jewett's hand during the struggle. Thurlow left Rollins with Jewett and went to look for the lost items. At the time Thurlow left Rollins and Jewett, Jewett was breathing. During the struggle, Rollins' handcuffs, radio, and ammo pouch came off his belt. Rollins found his radio and called the dispatcher at 22:35:52 hours to report the incident. He then went to look for the rest of his missing equipment and was gone approximately one to one and a half minutes. Rollins returned to Jewett and started to pick him up; however Jewett was limp. Rollins put him back on the ground and tried to take his pulse. Because Rollins was still in an excited state from the fight, he could not tell whether he was getting a pulse from Jewett. He tried to take Jewett's pulse again but still could not determine whether he was getting a pulse. Thurlow, having found the flashlight in the grass and an open pocketknife on the sidewalk, walked back over to Rollins and Jewett. Thurlow asked Rollins if something was wrong with Jewett, and Rollins replied that Jewett did not look well. At 22:39:54 hours Thurlow radioed for the paramedics. At 22:43:35 hours, Thurlow again radioed for the paramedics to hurry and get to the scene. Rollins again checked for a pulse but could not determine whether there was a pulse. A few minutes later firefighters, responding to a medical call, arrived on the scene. One of the firefighters checked Jewett's pulse and breathing and determined that Jewett was not breathing and did not have a pulse. Jewett was pale with some discoloration and swelling about the face. Within several seconds, the rescue team arrived. The rescue team got Jewett uncuffed and began to administer advanced life support. Jewett was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Both Thurlow and Rollins were trained to administer CPR; however the unmarked police vehicle did not contain rubber gloves or a bag which are used in administering CPR to protect the person administering CPR from diseases such as AIDS which could be transmitted by bodily fluids. Additionally, Jewett appeared to be breathing, which would mean that he was not a candidate for CPR. At the time of the incident, Joseph Huffman and his girlfriend were traveling north on South Dixie Highway in a van. The van had windows on the rear doors and on the passenger and driver doors. As Mr. Huffman approached the Palm Beach Post parking lot, he saw two men scuffling on the hood of the gold Cadillac. He began to slow down to watch the fracas. He observed the fight for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, during which time he looked over to the El Cid Bar to see if anyone was watching. His girlfriend observed that Huffman tried to look at the fight through his side mirror but couldn't see so he stuck his head out the driver's window and glanced back once or twice, looking forward to check the approaching traffic. Huffman recalled seeing a third man strike Jewett at least 20 times in the groin with a flashlight; however the medical evidence does not support Mr. Huffman's assertion. Having judged the credibility of the witness, I find that Mr. Huffman's recollection is not credible. An autopsy was performed on Jewett by the Palm Beach County Medical Examiner, Dr. James Benz. The autopsy revealed that Jewett had a black eye, markings on the forehead and neck area, minor bruises and abrasions on the right forearm, abrasions on the knees, and abrasions on the right wrist. Jewett suffered fractured ribs and bruising of the left lung underlying the rib fractures. There was a "blow out" of the heart. There was hemorrhaging underneath the Adam's apple and an irregular fracture in the lamana below the Adam's apple. The hyoid bone, which sits above the voice box, was fractured. There were no injuries to the upper thighs, penis or lower abdomen. There was a mild bruise in the testicle area and hemorrhaging in the left testicle. The injuries to the testicles are not consistent with Jewett's being hit between 10 to 20 times with a flashlight in the groin. The "blow out" of Jewett's heart is called a cardiac tamponade. Most probably as a result of the impact to Jewett's chest when he, Rollins, and Thurlow fell to the ground, a thin area of Jewett's heart blew out forming a small hole in Jewett's heart. The heart pumped blood through the small hole into the pericardial sac. As a result of the blood flowing into the pericardial sac, the heart could not expand and death occurred. The cardiac tamponade did not occur after Jewett died nor did it occur in a peri-mortem, near-death state. The cardiac tamponade did occur while Jewett was alive and death occurred some time later. Based on the testimony of Dr. Charles Petty, an expert in forensic pathology, I find that the injuries to Jewett's neck occurred as a result of forceful application of force to the neck, which is consistent with a fall across a rounded object such as a forearm rather than police carotid holds and choke downs. The Use of Force Matrix from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is the state standard concerning the use of force by law enforcement officers. The matrix lists the resistance levels of a subject and indicates the appropriate level of force to be used by an officer in responding to the various levels of resistance. An aggressive physical resistance is defined as overt, hostile attacking movements which may cause injury, but are not likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. Aggravated physical resistance is when the subject makes overt, hostile, attacking movements with or without a weapon, with the intent and apparent ability to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. The resistance level of Jewett when he was straddled and leaning over Rollins as Rollins was up against the fender of the Cadillac and Jewett's actions at the front of the car with Thurlow constitutes aggressive physical resistance. The matrix guidelines indicate that an officer may use all levels of force with the exception of deadly force in dealing with aggressive physical resistance. When Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind to remove Jewett from his position of standing over Rollins, Thurlow was not using deadly force. His arm was not under Jewett's chin but was lower, nearer the upper chest area. The resistance level of Jewett when he was trying to get Rollins' gun constitutes aggravated physical resistance. The matrix guidelines for force to counter aggravated physical resistance include among other things, counter moves, incapacitation, and deadly force. Deadly force includes techniques that may result in imminent or serious injury, unconsciousness or permanent disfigurement, such as impact weapon strikes to the head or use of firearms. Thus, Thurlow's punch to Jewett's face was within the matrix guidelines.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Glen H. Thurlow. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2593 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly" which is rejected. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 10-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance; however it should be noted that it appeared to Thurlow that Jewett was about to strike Rollins. Paragraph 17: The first and second sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The evidence established that Thurlow jumped across Jewett's back, placing his arm across Jewett below Jewett's Adam's apple. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Accepted that Thurlow and Jewett continued to struggle. Rejected that Thurlow continued to maintain a choke hold on Jewett. The greater weight of the evidence established that Thurlow's arm did not slip up under Jewett's chin until Jewett and Thurlow began to fall backward. Paragraph 19: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance with the exception of "continued to hold Mr. Jewett in a choke hold." The evidence established that Thurlow's did not have a choke hold on Jewett until they fell backwards and that the choke hold was not an intentional action but rather resulted from the struggle between Jewett and Thurlow and Rollins running into them. Paragraph 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23: Accepted in substance except to the extent that such finding implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett at the time that Huffman saw them. Paragraphs 24-26: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Huffman's testimony concerning the repeated striking of Jewett in his groin not to be credible, particularly considering the medical evidence and the fact that Huffman was driving down the street while he was trying to look at the fight and keep track of traffic both in front of and behind him. Paragraph 27: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett the entire time that they were struggling. The evidence established that Thurlow did not start out with a choke hold but that during the struggle, Thurlow's arm slipped underneath Jewett's chin. Paragraphs 31-35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted in substance to the extent that at one point in time while Jewett was supine on the ground his head was turned toward Thurlow and he grabbed Thurlow's shirt but rejected to the extent that it implies that during the entire time Jewett was on the ground he was looking at Thurlow and grabbing Thurlow's shirt. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow did hear Rollins shout that Jewett had grabbed his gun and to the extent that Thurlow did not see Jewett actually grab the gun. Rejected to the extent that the word "claiming" implies that Rollins may not have shouted to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun and rejected to the extent that the last part of the sentence could be construed to mean that Thurlow did not see Jewett's right arm reach in the direction of Rollins' holster. Paragraphs 39-40: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly." Paragraphs 42-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The portion relating to rendering medical assistance is accepted in substance. The portion relating to never checking on the well being of Jewett is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Thurlow did inquire of Rollins concerning the condition of Thurlow before he called for the paramedics. Paragraph 47: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48: Accepted in substance to the extent that Rollins did not render any first aid but rejected to the extent that Thurlow always had an unobscured view of Jewett. The evidence established that Thurlow was looking for the knife and the flashlight during a portion of the time . Paragraph 49: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 50-51: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 52-53: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 54: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 55: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 57-59: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 60-73: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 74: Accepted in substance to the extent that Jewett was lying on the ground, was bloody, and was not moving. In light of the testimony of Mr. Cook that Jewett's skin was pale and there was discoloration about his face, I do not find Mr. Bouchillion's testimony that Jewett was turning blue to be credible. Paragraph 75: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 76-77: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 78-86: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 87: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 88: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 90-96: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97: Having considered the opinions of Dr. Benz and Dr. Petty, I reject the finding to the extent that it implies that the fractures resulted from a choke hold applied prior to Thurlow, Jewett, and Rollin falling down and rolling into the grassy area. Paragraph 98: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 99: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 100: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 101: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 102: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 103: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 104: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 105-109: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 110-111: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 112: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 113: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 114: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 115: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 116-117: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 118: Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 119: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett from the time there were at the rear of the Cadillac until they fell backwards. The evidence established that Thurlow did not have Jewett in a choke hold when Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind. Paragraph 120: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 121-125: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 2-3: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 4: The first and last sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The portion of the second sentence relating to Thurlow being able to hear is accepted but the portion that Thurlow could see everything is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The last sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow thought that he needed to monitor the traffic but the greater weight of the evidence established that the Cadillac was not in the lane of traffic while it was parked. Paragraphs 10-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28-30: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn P. Whitehurst, Esquire Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Scott N. Richardson, Esquire Atterbury, Goldberger & Richardson One Clear Lake Center, Suite 1400 250 Australian Avenue, South West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5012 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made. At all times material to this case the Respondent, Willie Whittington, was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, holding license number CG C006966. At all times material to this case the Respondent was the sole qualifying agent for Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. On May 15, 1987, Edwin W. Brown and Sandra J. Brown, husband and wife, contacted Respondent, in response to Respondent's advertising, to discuss the construction of a log house and an outbuilding on a lot owned by the Browns in Palm Beach County, Florida. The outbuilding was to be used as a combination garage and barn. During this initial meeting, the Browns described the project to Respondent. At the conclusion of the meeting on May 15, 1987, the Browns gave Respondent a $2,000.00 deposit to get started on the project. Respondent was to use that deposit to have plans drawn for the two buildings and to secure the necessary building permits. On June 23, 1987, Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. entered into two contracts with the Browns, one for the house and the other for the outbuilding. Respondent signed both contracts on behalf of Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. Both contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the work that was to be performed, as to the price that was to be paid for the work, and as to the schedules by which the construction draws would be made. The price for the house was set at $73,506.00. The price of the outbuilding was set at $11,665.00. Both contracts provided that construction would be completed within 130 days. On June 23, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $6,871.60 as required by the two contracts. Sandra Brown began keeping a log of her contacts with Respondent as of August 4, 1987, because she had experienced difficulty reaching Respondent by telephone and because no progress was being made on the project. Around August 4, 1987, Respondent told the Browns that he needed an additional $175.00 to pay to the architect to complete the plans. Because this was not provided for by their contracts, the Browns refused Respondent's request for this additional sum of money. On August 7, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $3,822.90 that Respondent was to use to order the logs. The building permits were not obtained until October 9, 1987. The permits were not obtained earlier than that date because Respondent did not diligently pursue his obligation to get the permits. As of early November 1987, the only work that had been done was the preparation of the lot for the foundation. On November 7, 1987, Respondent requested that the Browns advance him $5,000.00 so he could proceed with the construction. Respondent was financially unable to proceed because the Internal Revenue Service had garnished the account in which Respondent had placed the Browns' deposits. The Browns refused to advance Respondent this additional sum of money, but they remained willing to pay Respondent according to the draw schedules of the contracts. In December 1987 the Browns received a notice to owner form from Rinker Materials. In response to this notice, the Browns paid to Rinker Materials the sum of $2,664.77 and asked that no further materials be delivered on a credit basis to the job site. The Browns received a release of lien from Rinker Materials on December 28, 1987, for the materials Respondent had previously ordered on credit. In the middle of December 1987, the Browns learned that Respondent had neither ordered the logs for the construction nor determined the quantity of logs that would be required. On or about December 18, 1987, the foundation for the house was poured. Little work was done on the project between that date and January 4, 1988, the date Respondent told the Browns that his back was hurt and he could not work. The Browns filed a written complaint with the Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board on January 8, 1988. As of January 13, 1988, Respondent was unable to account for the funds the Browns had deposited with him. At a meeting on January 19, 1988, among Respondent, the Browns, and a representative of Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board, Respondent agreed to furnish receipts and an accounting of the construction funds by the next meeting on January 27, 1988. Respondent also agreed, during the meeting of January 19, 1988, to perform certain work on the project before the next meeting. At the next meeting, Respondent did not provide the Browns with receipts or with an accounting of the construction funds. Instead Respondent submitted a non-itemized bill in the amount of $18,131.20 for labor and materials supposedly expended by Respondent through January 27, 1988. The Browns refused to pay this bill. Respondent had worked only approximately 16 hours on the project between January 19 and January 27 and had not completed the additional work he had promised to have done January 27, 1988. The Browns fired Respondent and his company on January 27, 1988. At that time, Respondent had completed approximately 10% of the project `whereas it should have been approximately 60-70% completed. The delays by Respondent throughout his association with this project were not justified. After the Browns fired Respondent, they were forced to pay a materialman, MacMichael Lumber Company, to prevent the foreclosure of a lien against the property. This lien resulted because Respondent did not pay for certain materials he had ordered on credit before the Browns fired him. On February 4, 1988, Respondent agreed to repay the Browns the sum of $4,200.00. As of the date of the final hearing, Respondent owed the Browns $1,400.00. A subsequent contractor completed the project without undue delay in June 1988 for an additional $74,000. This price reflects changes the Browns made after the subsequent contractor began his work. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the regulation of contractors in the State of Florida. The Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondent alleges, in pertinent part, the following: Respondent failed to perform in a reasonably timely manner, and or abandoned said job(s), in violation of 489.129(1)(m),(k). There was financial mismanagement and/or misconduct in connection with this matter, attributable either to Respondent directly, or to Respondent's failure to properly supervise, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(h) & (m), as generally exhibited by, but not limited to, the following: Subject double billed Customer on several occasions; failure to pay subcontractors and suppliers; and failure to buy materials. There was no allegation in the Administrative Complaint or evidence presented at hearing that Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary action. Respondent has been licensed as a certified general contractor by the State of Florida since 1973. Following receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent denied the violations and timely requested a formal administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(h), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation and which further finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation so that the total fine to be imposed against Respondent is $3,000. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-0743 The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are addressed as follows. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 27. Addressed in paragraph 3. 4-5. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 8. Addressed in paragraph 9. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 10. 14-15. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 12. Addressed in paragraph 17. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 14. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 16. 22-26. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 17. Addressed in paragraph 19. Addressed in paragraph 23. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 24. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 22. 34-35. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Willie Whittington 342 Walker Street Greenacres City, Florida 34974 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On 17 July 1979, a few days after Harry W. Soward and his wife returned from a motor trip vacation and before the date he was to report for duty as Principal of Garden Elementary School in Venice, Florida, Soward left his residence to shop for shelving. Not finding the items desired at stores close to his residence, he proceeded further afield. After lunch he went to his son's place of business for a visit and upon arrival found his son absent. He then decided to go to a nearby beach for some sun enroute home. At this time Respondent was dressed in shorts, T-shirt and shoes. Upon parking the van he was driving, Respondent took off the T-shirt and donned a beach jacket which had been under the front seat of the van, locked his wallet in the van and walked north along the scarcely populated beach away from the area where most people congregate. Under the corduroy shorts Respondent was wearing black bikini briefs. After going some one-half mile or more from the parking area Respondent removed his corduroy shorts to sunbathe, leaving him wearing black bikini briefs and jacket. He then walked away from the water towards the wooded area clearly shown in Exhibit 1, and photographs constituting Exhibits 6 through 13. Officer Meredith of the Sarasota Police Department was assigned to the Lido Beach area on 17 July 1979 and had proceeded to North Lido Beach in response to a report that a nude made had been seen on the beach. Lido Beach is a publicly-owned swimming and sunning area; however, the north end of this beach is reputed to be an area where nude bathing occurs and homosexuals meet. Because of the topography and insects this area is not popular for picnicking. Officer Meredith had requested via radio a back-up when he departed for North Lido Beach and shortly after his arrival he was joined by Sergeant Schott, also of the Sarasota police. They saw no evidence of a nude male but decided to proceed southward inside the tree line from the beach where they would be able to observe activity on the beach without being seen. Meredith had 8 x 50 binoculars with which to detect something that might not be discernible to the naked eye. While walking inside the tree line the officers observed a large group of young boys supervised by older teenagers playing and proceeding southerly near the water's edge. After walking for several minutes inside the tree line the officers observed a white male ahead and a little seaward of them also moving southerly inside the tree line. When he reached a thicker clump of trees this man stopped for several seconds and Meredith focused the binoculars on him. This individual, later identified as Respondent, was facing south with his back to the officers when he stopped approximately 75 feet from the officers and some 500 feet from the water's edge where the young boys had been observed. For approximately one minute he was observed from the location occupied by the officers. Respondent, whose back was toward the officers, appeared to lower his bikini briefs and manipulate his penis in a manner both officers thought was masturbating. Meredith's testimony was that he could see Respondent's right arm moving but could not see his penis. While still under close scrutiny Respondent turned some 90 degrees to his left, placing his back to the water's edge and his profile to the officers. At this time they could see Respondent's briefs had been dropped enough to allow penis and testicles to be over the top of the briefs. At this time Respondent had his penis in his hand. Both officers testified Respondent did not have an erection but they did not believe the penis to be flaccid, nor did they believe he was urinating. Shortly thereafter Respondent turned towards the north, saw the two officers, pulled the briefs back over his privates and started to walk back to the beach. At this time, Officer Meredith yelled for Respondent to stop, which he did. Officer Meredith asked what he was doing in the tree area and Respondent replied "urinating". When asked his name, age and occupation, Respondent replied Soward, 54 years old, and a teacher at Venice. Respondent pronounces his name in one syllable. When Meredith asked if the name was spelled S-o-r-d, Respondent did not reply. When Meredith saw what he thought to be Respondent reaching into a pocket of the jacket he grabbed his hand, reached into the pocket and extracted a tube of K-Y jelly. Respondent extracted a pair of yellow women's briefs from the other pocket. When asked why he had the lubricant Respondent replied he used it occasionally for his hemorrhoids. The yellow bikini Respondent identified as belonging to his wife who also occasionally used the same jacket. After berating Respondent and accusing him of being a deviate Meredith ordered Respondent to get off the beach and warned him not to return "to our city beaches in the future." (Tr. p. 33). The testimony of all witnesses, consisting of the two police officers and Respondent, was essentially the same with respect to the facts noted above. Respondent testified that he went into the wooded area where he could not be seen by anyone on the beach to urinate, that he had a prostate condition which made it difficult at times for him to commence urination, and that massage of the prostate behind he testicles sometimes helped induce urination. He further testified that he was taking diuretics, which caused more frequent urination. The taking of diuretics was confirmed by his physician. Respondent produced at the hearing the jacket and briefs he was wearing, plus the yellow bikini bottom that was in the jacket pocket when he was accosted. This bikini bottom was identified by Mrs. Soward as belonging to her and having been left in the jacket pocket. Respondent identified it as the one removed from the jacket when he was apprehended, while Officer Meredith testified the yellow briefs removed from the jacket pocket had lace around the legs, were women's underpants and not the bottom of a bikini swimsuit presented at the hearing. After being ordered to leave the beach, Respondent donned his corduroy shorts and proceeded back to the parking lot. Meredith also went to the parking lot and after Respondent got in his van, Meredith came up to demand identification partially because he didn't think Respondent to be as old as he had stated. When he saw the name on the driver's license was not spelled Sord, Meredith accused Respondent of giving the wrong name. The driver's license did confirm Respondent's age to be what he had told Meredith. Meredith did not arrest or prefer charges against Respondent. His reason given for not doing so was that Respondent could not be seen from the beach and unless lewd and lascivious behavior was perpetrated in a place from which the perpetrator could be seen by "civilians" (as opposed to police) the judges in the Sarasota courts would not convict those arrested on charges of lewd behavior. Nevertheless, when he returned to the station Meredith prepared a report of his encounter with Respondent which, since a member of the school system was involved, was passed to the Superintendent of Schools of Sarasota County. The Superintendent talked to Meredith and Schott and received a copy of the report prepared by Meredith. The Superintendent advised the Director of Elementary Education, who was the supervisor of principals, of the police report and requested she bring Respondent to his office. When presented with the police report in the presence of the Superintendent, Respondent again denied any wrongdoing, insisted he had entered the wooded area to relieve himself and explained the purpose for which he had the K-Y jelly in the jacket, as a lubricant for hemorrhoids. The Superintendent chose not to believe the explanation offered by Respondent and gave him the option of resigning rather than suffer the unpleasantness of further investigation by Petitioner, to whom the Superintendent would refer the matter, and a possible hearing. Respondent declined to resign. Respondent was relieved of his duties as principal of Garden Elementary School, a position which he had held since the school opened in 1974, and was reassigned temporarily to the administrative staff of the school system. These charges here under consideration were subsequently preferred. A substitute principal was assigned to Garden Elementary School and when the school year began the Superintendent addressed the faculty at Garden Elementary to explain Respondent's absence was due to a report submitted by the police which had been turned over to the Petitioner and if the faculty wanted to know more they could read the police report at the police state. Many of them did so. The newspapers were aware of this police report but did not publish any news items relating thereto. After the School Board took action to relieve Respondent from duty and refer the matter to Petitioner, an article appeared in the Sarasota Herald-Tribune on August 2, 1979 and a similar article appeared in the Venice Gondolier, a newspaper whose circulation is limited to the southern part of Sarasota County. These articles reported the reassignment of Respondent pending an investigation of an incident reported by police and stated that no charges had been preferred by the police. Of the 17 witnesses called by Petitioner only two, the police officers, saw Respondent at any time material to these charges. Both of these officers were looking for nudes or perverts when they saw Respondent. Meredith was looking so hard he used 8 x 50 binoculars to observe Respondent from a distance of 75 feet. At that range this magnification should allow resolution of the order of one-fourth to one-eighth inch. A stationary housefly on an appropriate background could be seen at 75 feet with 8-power binoculars. Meredith testified regarding the reputation of North Lido Beach and anytime he saw someone in this section of the beach there was a question in his mind why they were there. (Tr. p. 62). One looking for deviate behavior would be more likely to associate movement that could be manipulation of the penis with masturbation than would an observer not looking for such behavior. Follow this impression with discovery of K-Y jelly in one pocket, ladies' bikini bottoms in the other pocket of the jacket, and a group of young boys in the vicinity (albeit 500 feet distant) and Officer Meredith was quite sure he had encountered a pervert. When Respondent told Meredith that he was a teacher, Meredith undoubtedly commented, as Respondent testified, about perverts working with kids (Tr. p. 352) and told Respondent he would get him out of the school system. Without sufficient evidence to arrest Respondent, Meredith was left to the writing of the report. Most of the witnesses called by Petitioner had read the police report and gathered from this report that Respondent was observed masturbating on North Lido Beach in the vicinity of an in view of children of tender ages and that he had questionable items in his jacket pocket. These witnesses were aware of the reputation of North Lido Beach as a nude and gay beach and many didn't think that was an appropriate place for a principal to go. These factors led them to conclude that Respondent could no longer function effectively in the Sarasota County School System. This conclusion was reached without the benefit of Respondent's explanation of his actions, without full knowledge of the density of the foliage, without realizing that no one but the police could or did see him with penis exposed, and without knowledge that neither K-Y jelly nor bikini bottoms were in use or evidenced until after Respondent started back to the beach. Those witnesses called by Petitioner who had been associated with Respondent at Garden Elementary School acknowledged that prior to this incident they considered Respondent to be an able and effective administrator. Many of these witnesses opined that even if found innocent of any wrongdoing, Respondent's effectiveness in the school system has been seriously reduced. Many of the 33 witnesses called by Respondent knew Respondent socially and professionally as a "fine man". Respondent's church workers think highly of him both in integrity and morality and they did not believe the truth of the police report that Respondent had masturbated on Lido Beach. The pastor of the First Church of Nazarene in Bradenton, an ordained minister, has known Respondent for the past 6-1/2 years as the church's unpaid associate pastor. Respondent has taught Sunday School at this church for many years and the pastor considers Respondent one of the finest men he ever knew. Neighbors know Respondent as a quiet family man and good neighbor who had never shown any indication of questionable morals or conduct. Professional associates found Respondent a competent administrator and teacher. Some found him strict but none ever had cause to question his moral character prior to July 17, 1979.
The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether Petitioner's claim is time-barred for failure to timely file an initial charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. If Petitioner's claim were timely, then the question would be whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact From April 4, 1998 until May 22, 2003, Petitioner Carol Manzaro ("Manzaro") worked for Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF") as an Inspector Specialist I (essentially, an investigator) in the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"). Manzaro's duty station was at a satellite office located in Riviera Beach, Florida. Her supervisor was Richard Scholtz, who was based in the OIG's Fort Lauderdale field office. In October 2002, Sheryl Steckler became DCF's Inspector General. Shortly after assuming this position, Ms. Steckler hired Tom Busch as Chief of Investigations. Mr. Busch was responsible for, among other things, overseeing the OIG's field office in Fort Lauderdale and the satellite office in Riviera Beach. Ms. Steckler and Mr. Busch worked at offices in Tallahassee. In late December 2002, Mr. Busch called Manzaro and reprimanded her for sending an e-mail that Ms. Steckler felt was inappropriate. Manzaro believes that the reprimand was unwarranted and demonstrates that she was being singled out (or set up), but the evidence regarding this particular incident is much too sketchy for the undersigned to make such a finding. In January 2003, Manzaro and Louis Consagra, another inspector who worked in the Riviera Beach satellite office, were directed to attend a meeting in Fort Lauderdale, which they did. After they arrived, their immediate supervisor Mr. Scholz, recently back from a trip to Tallahassee, told the two that Mr. Busch had said to him, "Sometimes when you get older, you miss a step." Mr. Scholz further related that Mr. Busch had announced that "changes w[ould] be made." Mr. Scholz warned them that "they are looking to fire people," and that he (Scholz) would fire people to protect himself if need be. The three (Manzaro, Consagra, and Scholz) then met with Mr. Busch, who had traveled to Fort Lauderdale to see them. Mr. Busch informed them that he had just fired an inspector who worked in Fort Lauderdale, and that Ms. Steckler planned to close the Riviera Beach satellite office by June or July of 2003, at which time Manzaro and Mr. Consagra would be reassigned to the Fort Lauderdale field office. Manzaro, who was then 55 years old, decided at that moment it was time to start looking for a new job. Immediately upon returning to Riviera Beach, she began making phone calls to that end. Manzaro claims that for some weeks thereafter she received "haranguing" phone calls from Mr. Busch, who deprecated her abilities and was rude and patronizing. The undersigned credits Manzaro's testimony in this regard (which was not rebutted), but deems it insufficient to support an inference that Mr. Busch was critical of Manzaro because she was over the age of 40.1 Mr. Busch's telephone calls caused Manzaro to see (in her words) the "handwriting on the wall"; by this time, she "knew" her employment would be terminated. In March 2003, Manzaro's co-worker, Mr. Consagra, was fired. Around this time——it is not clear when——Manzaro was given a below-average performance evaluation.2 Not long after that, by letter dated April 18, 2003, Manzaro was notified of her appointment to the job of Economic Self Sufficiency Specialist I with DCF's District Nine, a position which Manzaro had sought.3 By accepting this appointment, she could continue working for DCF in Palm Beach County, albeit at a lower salary than she was earning as an inspector for the OIG. She decided to take the job. Manzaro resigned her position with the OIG via a Memorandum to Ms. Steckler dated April 18, 2003. In pertinent part, Manzaro wrote: I would first like to thank you for the opportunity to serve the Department and Office of Inspector General and for the opportunity to find other employment within the Department. At this time, familial and financial responsibilities preclude my traveling to the proposed new duty location in Ft. Lauderdale. As you will see from the attached letter, I have accepted a position with Economic Self Sufficiency effective May 23, 2003. With your permission, I would like to complete writing the three cases I presently have open and commence annual leave on May 5 through May 22, 2003. On or about May 27, 2003, Manzaro started working at her new job for DCF. On July 12, 2003, Manzaro received some paperwork that had been sent to her accidentally, which revealed that her replacement in the OIG was younger than she, and also was being paid more than she had earned as an investigator. Manzaro claims that it was then she discovered that she had been the victim of age discrimination, absent which she would not have been "involuntarily demoted" to the position of Economic Self Sufficiency Specialist I. Ultimate Factual Determinations Manzaro's theory is that she was forced to resign her position in the OIG by the threat of termination, which caused her to seek and ultimately accept other, less remunerative employment with DCF. Manzaro describes the net effect of her job-switch as an "involuntary demotion" and charges that DCF "demoted" her because she was over the age of 40. Manzaro testified unequivocally, and the undersigned has found, that during a meeting in Fort Lauderdale in January 2003 (the one where Mr. Busch had informed Manzaro and her colleagues that the Riviera Beach satellite office would be closed), Manzaro had made up her mind to look for another job. This means that the untoward pressure allegedly used by DCF to force Manzaro's resignation had achieved its purpose by January 31, 2003, at the latest.4 Therefore, if the alleged discrimination against Manzaro were a discrete act——which is, at least implicitly, how Manzaro views the matter——then the discrete act apparently occurred on or before January 31, 2003.5 Assuming, for argument's sake, that DCF did in fact force Manzaro to decide, in January 2003, to resign her position as an inspector, then the pressure that DCF exerted on Manzaro consisted of: (a) a verbal reprimand regarding an e-mail; (b) Mr. Busch's comment (reported via Mr. Scholz) that age sometimes causes one to "miss a step"; (c) Mr. Scholz's warning that people would be fired; (d) the firing of a Fort Lauderdale-based inspector; and (e) the announcement that the Riviera Beach satellite office would be closed. Assuming for argument's sake that the foregoing circumstances amounted to discriminatory coercion, the undersigned determines that Manzaro should have known, when she succumbed to the threat of termination and involuntarily decided to resign, that she might possibly be a victim of age discrimination.6 The undersigned comes to this conclusion primarily because Mr. Busch's comment about older people sometimes missing a step is the strongest (if not the only) hint of age discrimination in this record.7 The significance of the previous finding is that, if the discrimination consisted of the discrete act of demotion (as Manzaro urges), then the 365-day period within which a charge of discrimination must be filed with the FCHR began to run on Manzaro's claim no later than January 31, 2003, by which time she was on notice of the allegedly discriminatory act.8 Because Manzaro's charge of discrimination was not filed with the FCHR until June 10, 2004, it is clear that, as a claim involving a discrete act of discrimination, Manzaro's charge was untimely. Putting aside the question whether Manzaro's case is time-barred, it is further determined that, in any event, Manzaro did not suffer an "adverse employment action." The undersigned is not persuaded that Manzaro was forced to take another job, as she now contends. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that Manzaro elected voluntarily to seek other employment after learning that her duty station was being moved to Fort Lauderdale and developing concerns about her job security in light of new management's efforts to weed out employees it viewed as under-performers. Ultimately, it is determined that DCF did not discriminate unlawfully against Manzaro on the basis of her age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Manzaro's Petition for Relief as time-barred, or alternatively finding DCF not liable for age discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2005.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, John L. Eifert (Respondent) was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Petitioner). Respondent was certified on July 17, 1981, being issued Certificate Number 74043. On or about June 14, 1984, Officer Goodwin of the Miami Beach Police Department (Miami Beach P.D.) was involved in an automobile accident. Officer Goodwin was off-duty at the time. The officers dispatched to the accident scene found, among other things, on the driver's side of Officer Goodwin's vehicle, evidence bags from the Miami Beach P.D. and a clear plastic bag. The evidence bags were clearly marked as Miami Beach P.D. evidence bags. The clear bag and one of the evidence bags contained a white substance that the officers suspected was cocaine. Officer Goodwin was arrested for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages and/or narcotics. All the bags found in Officer Goodwin's vehicle at the accident scene were seized and placed into evidence. The white substance in the bags was subsequently tested. The tests revealed that the white substance was cocaine. The cocaine found in Officer Goodwin's vehicle was the same cocaine that he had seized in a narcotic's case. He had obtained the cocaine from the evidence room under false pretenses, indicating that he was going to testify in court and needed the cocaine for his testimony. There was no court hearing. Officer Goodwin obtained the cocaine for his own personal use; he intended to consume the cocaine himself. Officer Goodwin was Respondent's fellow officer with the Miami Beach P.D. and friend. They had gone through the police academy together in 1981, and they were motorcycle officers together. Prior to the accident, at approximately 9:30 a.m. on June 14, 1984, Officer Goodwin had visited Respondent at Respondent's off-duty job. Respondent was moonlighting as a security guard at a bank. Officer Goodwin had been ingesting cocaine prior to the visit, had not slept in approximately 24 hours, and was paranoid. Officer Goodwin wanted to use Respondent's residence to consume more cocaine. Because of his paranoid behavior and because he was a friend, Respondent agreed for Officer Goodwin to go to his residence and convinced Officer Goodwin to wait for him there. When Officer Goodwin arrived at Respondent's residence, he continued to ingest cocaine. Also, he placed some of the cocaine in individual plastic bags. Officer Goodwin hid the cocaine filled plastic bags in Respondent's residence. When Respondent came to his residence at approximately 4:45 p.m. that same day, he found Officer Goodwin more paranoid than before. Officer Goodwin refused to remain at Respondent's residence and left shortly before 5:00 p.m. Before leaving, Respondent agreed for Officer Goodwin to leave the cocaine filled plastic bags in his residence. Officer Goodwin informed Respondent where he had hid the bags. Respondent located the cocaine filled bags. Without getting any sleep, Respondent continued with his social activities planned for the remainder of the evening. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Respondent went to his second moonlighting job. On June 15, 1984, around 3:30 a.m., Officer Goodwin called Respondent at his second moonlighting job. Officer Goodwin informed Respondent that he had been arrested and requested that Respondent dispose of the cocaine and told him where to leave it. Unbeknownst to Respondent, Officer Goodwin was calling from police headquarters and was attempting to return the remaining cocaine to the Miami Beach P.D. Instead of following Officer Goodwin's instructions, Respondent went home around 3:50 a.m. and disposed of the cocaine by dumping it into the bay behind his residence. Respondent believed that he was helping Officer Goodwin, a friend. Subsequently, around 6:00 a.m., Respondent received another telephone call from Officer Goodwin. Respondent informed him what he had done with the cocaine. Officer Goodwin was upset about what Respondent had done. Goodwin admitted at hearing that, due to the quantity of cocaine that he had ingested, beginning June 13, 1984, and continuing into June 14, 1984, he had very little independent recollection of what happened that day. His information, as to what happened that day, is mostly from reading his statements that he had made regarding the incident, police reports, and transcripts of depositions. Further, Goodwin also admits that his recall prior to going to Respondent's residence is fair. Officer Goodwin entered into a plea agreement regarding the accident and the cocaine. The plea agreement provided, among other things, that he give testimony, regarding the incident, forever in whatever the forum may be and that he relinquish his certification from Petitioner. Presently, Goodwin is in charge of a drug treatment center for Metro- Dade County. He has been in this position for five years. In June 1984, Respondent resigned from the Miami Beach P.D. Consistent with the policy of the Miami Beach P.D. at that time, no investigation was instituted against Respondent by Internal Affairs of the Metro-Dade Police Department due to his resignation. Respondent does not deny that he permitted Goodwin to take the cocaine to his residence, that he permitted Goodwin to leave some of the cocaine at his residence, and that Goodwin left some of the cocaine at his residence. Furthermore, Respondent does not deny that the cocaine remained at his residence after Goodwin left and that he disposed of the cocaine by dumping it into the bay. At the time of his resignation, Respondent and the Miami Beach P.D. agreed that, whenever inquiries were made regarding Respondent, the Miami Beach P.D. would make neither negative nor positive comments about Respondent. The intent of this agreement was to allow Respondent to keep his record clean. However, the reverse occurred. He was effectively prevented from getting jobs in law enforcement. Subsequently, Respondent and the Miami Beach P.D. agreed to full disclosure regarding Respondent and the cocaine incident. In 1987, Respondent began to obtain employment in law enforcement. From September 1987 to January 1989, Respondent was employed as a police officer with the Indian Creek Village Police Department. From February 1989 to May 1989, he was employed as a police officer with the Florida City Police Department. Respondent resigned from both positions. In January 1990, Respondent was rehired by the Florida City Police Department (Florida City P.D.). At the time of hearing, he was still employed with the Florida City P.D. Respondent's personnel file reflects that, during his tenure as a police officer, Respondent has had one reprimand. The reprimand occurred after his resignation from the Miami Beach P.D. However, Respondent's personnel file also reflects that, during his tenure as a police officer, Respondent has had numerous commendations and letters commending his performance. He has been subjected to pressure and dangerous encounters and has performed in an exemplary manner. At hearing, several individuals, law enforcement and non-law enforcement, supported Respondent either through testimony or letters. Respondent's former pastor and the Mayor of the City of Florida City testified in support of him. Both regarded Respondent as having high moral character. Moreover, the Mayor's position was that the incident in June 1984 would have no effect on his opinion of Respondent. Additionally, the former Police Chief of the City of Miami Beach at the time of the incident in June 1984 did not find it odd or unusual for Respondent to still be in law enforcement. To him, Respondent had made a mistake, paid for the mistake, and had turned his life around. By letter, Respondent's immediate supervisor of five years with the Florida City P.D. supported him. Also, a special agent with the Florida East Coast Railway Police, who has known Respondent both personally and professionally for approximately nine years, supported Respondent. Petitioner filed the administrative complaint against Respondent on August 9, 1993. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action against him by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order Reprimanding Respondent; and Placing Respondent on probation for one (1) year under terms and conditions that the Commission deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED in this 2nd day of January, 1997 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Braverman, Esquire Braverman and Grossman, P.A. 2780 Douglas Road, Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33133-2749 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact An ethics complaint was filed against Petitoner, Eli Tourgeman (Tourgeman) alleging that Tourgeman, as Mayor of the Town of Surfside, violated Chapter 112, Florida Statutes. Respondent, the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission), found probable cause to believe that Tourgeman did violate Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. A formal hearing was held by the Division of Administrative Hearings. Tourgeman hired Richard Waserstein to represent him in the administrative proceedings. The Commission issued a Final Order and Public Report on July 20, 1994, Complaint No. 91-73 and Final Order No. COE 94-28, finding that Tourgeman did not violate Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the complaint. Tourgeman filed a Petition for Award of Costs and Attorneys Fees. In the petition, he alleged that he was on the Town of Surfside City Commission for six years and during the last four years he served as Vice Mayor and Mayor of the Town of Surfside. He also alleged that he is a banker employed by Glendale Federal as a Branch Manager and Vice President. Mr. Waserstein spent 52.75 hours in representing Tourgeman in the case at a rate of $150 per hour. The total cost for legal services was $7,912.50. The costs incurred by Tourgeman was $1,934, which included costs for depositions, transcripts, and travel to attend the Commission meeting in Tallahassee.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Stills filed a sworn application for eligibility to sit for the licensure examination for limited surety agents with the Department of Insurance on February 24, 1992. The application contains these questions: Q: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty of no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude, or a felony, or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or conviction has been entered? What was the crime? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Where you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged: If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the Information or Indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. Mr. Stills answered "no" to the main question and filed no response to subquestions a through f. Discharging a firearm - 1973 Mr. Stills had been charged with the misdemeanor of discharging a firearm within city limits on September 10, 1973, a violation of Section 790.15, Florida Statutes (1973). The incident occurred in Pensacola, Florida. Mr. Stills accidently discharged a shotgun in an incident involving his father. Mr. Stills had been called to his father's home because of a dispute his father was having with a neighbor. His father met him on the back porch, with a shotgun in his hand. Mr. Stills calmed his father, and was able to get him to give him the shotgun. The shotgun was an old one, and as Mr. Stills attempted to unload it, the hammer slipped and the gun accidently discharged. The neighbor called the police, and the charge was filed, and Mr. Stills paid a small fine. Second degree murder - 1984 On May 31, 1984, Mr. Stills was arrested and charged with second degree murder, in violation of Sections 775.087(2) and 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (1983). The arrest arose from an argument which Mr. Stills had with the decedent. On May 24, 1980, Mr. Stills and the decedent had an argument in which the decedent threatened to kill Mr. Stills. Mr. Stills then left. Later that afternoon, the decedent approached Mr. Stills at another location, and appeared to reach for something. Out of fear generated by the decedent's earlier threat Mr. Stills had already armed himself, and when the victim made a threatening movement, Mr. Stills shot him out of fear for his own safety. He was arrested, charged with second degree murder, but acquitted in a jury trial on March 21, 1985 based on his plea of self defense. Firearms chares - 1987 Mr. Stills was charged on April 15, 1987, in an Information with the felony of carrying a concealed firearm, in violation of Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987), and the misdemeanor of improper exhibition of a firearm, in violation of Section 790.10, Florida Statutes (1987). On that date, Officer John Gonzalez responded to a request for police assistance; the call said a man was displaying a firearm in a threatening manner. Officer Gonzalez arrived at the location given to him, and saw Petitioner, who generally fit the description of the man allegedly waiving a firearm about. Mr. Stills was then seated in an automobile. He was not waiving a gun about or threatening anyone. Officer Gonzalez approached him from the passenger side of the car, where he observed a revolver sitting on the passenger seat; the gun was loaded. He then arrested Mr. Stills. The charge of carrying a concealed firearm was dismissed by the court. Mr. Stills entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor of exhibiting a firearm on July 20, 1987. After exchanging correspondence with the Department, Mr. Stills amended his application, disclosing the charges and sending the necessary backup information required by the application form. He stated he had misread the question as requiring only information on felony convictions, and he had none. When the Department denied Mr. Still's application it gave these specific reasons: He had been charged with discharging a firearm within the City of Pensacola on September 17, 1973. He had been charged with second degree murder on May 21, 1984, but had been found not guilty on March 21, 1985. On April 15, 1987, he had been charged with carrying a concealed firearm and improper exhibition of a firearm, that he had pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge and been placed on three months probation yet Mr. Stills had failed to acknowledge any of these charges on his application. The Department relied on Section 648.32(2)(f), Florida Statutes, and 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, to deny his application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order finding Mr. Stills eligible for licensure as a limited surety agent, and permitting him to sit for the licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31st day of March 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March 1993. APPENDIX The following constitute my rulings on findings proposed by the Department as required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted, as modified in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Cassidy, Esquire 6121 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Suite 403 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409-0223 Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
