Conclusions This matter is before Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Board of Trustees (“"FAMU,” “Petitioner,” or the “University”) for final agency action.’ By letter dated December 1, 2008, Albert Clayton Smith, Respondent, was notified by FAMU that, pursuant to FAMU BOT Regulation 10.111, his employment with the University was terminated “effective immediately.” Pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, Respondent requested a disputed-fact hearing to protest the termination of his employment and the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on or about January 26, 2009. Respondent's request for hearing was assigned DOAH case number 09-0430. On or about April 21, 2009, Respondent filed a motion seeking to hold the DOAH case in abeyance pending resolution of a pending felony charge related to the instant matter. Multiple orders were issued by DOAH directing that the case be held in abeyance, the last of which was entered on January 8, 2010. On or about March 15, 2010, Respondent dismissed with DOAH his request for a " FAMU is identified as Petitioner in that the University generally carries the burden of proof in employment termination proceedings. disputed fact hearing and by Order entered March 17, 2010, DOAH closed its file and relinquished jurisdiction to FAMU. Accordingly, Respondent's effective date of dismissal from employment with the University is December 1, 2008. Respondent may seek judicial review of this Final Order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.190, applicable to review of quasi-judicial decisions of an administrative body not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, by filing a petition for certiorari review within thirty (30) days of the date this Final Order is filed with the Agency Clerk. DONE and ORDERED this aay of July, 2010. pace Ammons President Filed, with the Agency this [2 day of July, 2010. Abul Vaan V. Raddar Agency Clerk Copy: Teresa Hardee, CFO and Vice President, Administrative and Financial Services Avery D. McKnight, FAMU General Counsel Linzie F. Bogan, Associate General Counsel, Director of Labor Relations Nellie C. Woodruff, Associate Vice President, Human Resources Claudio Llado, DOAH Clerk
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent has violated Section 466.028(1)(bb), Florida Statutes, by practicing dentistry without an appropriate, active license to practice dentistry and, if so, what penalty should be imposed for such a violation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the exhibits received in evidence and on the testimony of the witness called at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent, James Wilson, D.D.S., held a dental license, number DN0002819, issued by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry. Respondent was awarded a licensed certificate to practice dentistry in the state of Florida on August 10, 1959, by the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners. Respondent was licensed to practice dentistry in the state of Florida for the 1982/83 biennial period which ended on December 31, 1953. The license of Respondent expired on January 1, 1984. Respondent was advised by Department personnel, on April 23, 1984, that his license was delinquent. Respondent was also advised of the procedures required to renew said delinquent license. Respondent made payment to the Board of Dentistry in the amount of $200 on July 23, 1984, for renewal of his expired license, which payment applied toward the 1984/85 biennial period. The amount of $200 reflects the sum of the renewal charge of $150, plus $50 for his late renewal. Respondent, from the period January 1, 1984, to August 8, 1984, was actively practicing dentistry, during which time his license was expired.
Recommendation Based upon all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Dentistry enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Finding Respondent guilty of a violation of Section 466.028(1)(bb), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; Reprimanding Respondent for being guilty of such violation; Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $250 on Respondent; and Allowing the Respondent 30 days from the date of entry of the final order in this case within which to pay the administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Nancy M. Snurkowski, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Wilson, D.D.S. 3116 Moncrief Road Jacksonville, Florida 32209 James Wilson, D.D.S. 7145 Dostie Drive East Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Wings Slocum Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Pat Guilford, Executive Director Board of Dentistry Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Discovery Experimental and Development, Inc. ("Discovery") is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the authority of Section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact In Discovery Experimental and Development, Inc., v. Department of Health, DOAH Case No. 99-0005RX (the "rule challenge"), three existing rules of the Department were challenged by Discovery pursuant to Section 120.56(3), Florida Statutes. At final hearing, challenge to one of the three was dropped because it was no longer in effect. On February 22, 1999, the Final Order was rendered in the case. Discovery prevailed as to one of the two rules still subject to the proceeding. Rule 69F-12.019, Florida Administrative Code (the "invalidated rule"), was determined to constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The determination of invalidity was made because the rule, in an unrestrained manner, purported to allow Department agents to inspect any property, building, or records in determining compliance with certain state drug laws. The statute which the rule attempts to implement circumscribes which property, building, or records may be inspected. The Administrative Procedure Act mandates the following: If the . . . administrative law judge declares a rule or portion of a rule invalid pursuant to Section 120.56(3), Florida Statutes, a[n] . . . order shall be rendered against the agency for reasonable costs and attorney's fees, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. Section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Substantial Justification or Special Circumstances The Department's witness testified that the rule had been amended into its invalidated form, to make the "rule more understandable and easier to read." (Tr. 58). The amended rule is more expansive than its predecessor with regard to what buildings, property, and records are subject to inspection. Still, the procedures governing the Department's inspectors (outside of those provided by the challenged rule) remained consistent before and after the amendment: to inspect only establishments, commercial or otherwise, that "are involved in the drug, device and cosmetic industry" (Tr. 60), all in relation to compliance with Chapter 499, Florida Statutes. The Department's bureau chief responsible for supervising inspectors and for development of the invalidated rule thought that department inspections would be confined by the challenged rule itself to only those buildings, property, and records as allowed by statute since the rule in subsection (1) announces that "[i]nspections and investigations are conducted to determine compliance with the provisions of Chapter 499, [and] Chapter 893, F.S. . . ." This expectation defies the plain wording of the rule that allows inspectors access to any buildings, property, or records. Reasonable Costs and Attorney's Fees Discovery was represented by its in-house counsel, R. Elliott Dunn, Esquire. As in-house counsel, Mr. Dunn is paid a salary. He does not normally keep records of time spent in matters representing Discovery, nor is he required to do so by his employer/client. He did not keep any contemporaneous records of time actually spent on the rule challenge. DOAH Case No. 99-0005RX was the first proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, in which Mr. Dunn had ever been involved. The challenge involved extensive research into the Fourth Amendment's impact on search and seizure cases in industries historically regulated in a pervasive manner by government. In addition to legal services expended in litigation, Mr. Dunn was required to review the law in relation to both Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, and the Fourth Amendment's relationship to regulatory inspections conducted within the drug and pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. Mr. Dunn spent approximately 104 hours on the case, of which roughly 83 hours (80%) related directly to the invalidated rule. A rate of $175. per hour is a reasonable rate for attorney's fees in a case of this kind. The petition in this case requests that fees be awarded for 52 hours of work at $175 per hour for a total fees award of $9,100. Discovery also claims costs in the amount of $648 for air fare for both Mr. Dunn and Discovery's President, James T. Kimball, to travel to Tallahassee from Wesley Chapel via the Tampa International Airport for the final hearing. (Mr. Kimball appeared pro se in DOAH Case No. 99-0006RX, a case that was consolidated with Case No. 99-0005RX but dismissed for lack of standing.) Additional costs claimed by Discovery are $78 for automobile rental and parking. No receipts for any of the costs claimed were presented by Discovery. The only supporting documentation is an exhibit to an affidavit sworn to by Mr. Dunn and attached to the petition.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's contractor's license based upon the alleged violations of Sections 489.129(1)(h) and (m), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (the "Board") as a certified general contractor having been issued License No. CG C024612. Respondent has been a licensed contractor since 1983. On May 3, 1991, the Board filed a Final Order in Board Case Nos. 89-009986 and 89-013330 imposing a reprimand against Respondent. The Final Order was issued as part of the settlement of an amended administrative complaint filed against Respondent by Petitioner regarding certain unrelated transactions. Respondent was the qualifying agent for Willie William Construction Company, Inc. until October 1985. At that time, as a result of a corporate name change, Respondent became the qualified agent for Ashar Construction Company. On February 21, 1985, the Unsafe Structures Board of the Building and Zoning Department for Dade County advised Ruby Delancy that a hearing would be conducted on March 12, 1985 to determine whether a one story framed residence that Mrs. Delancy owned at 1005 NW 58th Street in Miami (the "House" or the "Property") should be demolished. The Notice indicated that the structure was "open, vacant, vandalized, filled with combustible materials; posing a serious fire hazard. Structure is a danger to human life and public welfare." The Notice estimated the present value of the building at $16,080 and the estimated cost of repairs at $51,120. The County's records indicate that a Notice of Violation regarding the Property had been issued to the owner on October 31, 1984. Facing imminent demolition of the House, Mrs. Delancy began to investigate possible ways to get the House repaired. She filed an application with the City of Miami for a low income, low interest loan that was funded through Federal HUD Community Development Funds. Her efforts to obtain funding to repair the House, delayed the proceedings that had been initiated to demolish the structure. In September of 1985, the City approved Mrs. Delancy for a grant of $10,000 and loan of $20,000 to repair the House. Mrs. Delancy has no other funds to pay for repairs to the Property other than the $30,000 she was obtaining through the City Program. Under the City's program, Mrs. Delancy was responsible for selecting a contractor. Mrs. Delancy contacted Respondent, who inspected the Property and prepared a construction estimate which was submitted to the City. Respondent entered into a contract (the "Contract") dated September 20, 1985 with Mrs. Delancy for home improvement work on the House. The total contract price was $29,870, which was to be paid in two installments: $10,835 on or before December 31, 1985 and a final payment of $19,035 on or before March 3, 1986. The evidence established that Respondent was initially reluctant to enter into the Contract and at least two other contractors refused to undertake the work given the limited funds available. However, Respondent agreed to take the job because of Mrs. Delancy's insistence and because of Respondent's sympathy for Mrs. Delancy's desperate situation in view of the imminent demolition of the House. The evidence also established that Mrs. Delancy requested Respondent to undertake additional work and/or services that were beyond the scope of the Contract. Among the extra items undertaken by Respondent was replacement of the floor in the family room. Additional expenses were also incurred because of unanticipated problems encountered during the renovation. For example one side of the house gave way during the renovation work. Upon investigation, it was discovered that there was no footing. Respondent was required to shore up that side of the House. In addition, the electrician was unable to get a meter because there was an outstanding electric bill for the Property. Respondent paid the old bill in order to get the meter connected. Similarly, she paid the gas company to get the stove hooked up. It does not appear Respondent received any additional compensation for the extra work. Except for $345 that Respondent paid for utilities on behalf of Mrs. Delancy, the evidence at the hearing was insufficient to place a dollar value on these extra services and expenses. The first installment under the Contract of $10,835 was paid to Respondent on or about December 31, 1985. In approximately January of 1986, Mrs. Delancy's son, Gerald Delancy, who had been living out of the state, returned to Miami and became involved in overseeing the construction on behalf of his mother. Gerald Delancy was not pleased with the quality of the construction and a great deal of tension developed between Gerald Delancy and Respondent. The final payment request form was submitted on February 20, 1986. Mrs. Delancy signed a document (the "Certificate of Completeness") indicating that the work was completed and the final payment was made to Respondent by the City on March 3, 1986. Gerald Delancy was present when his mother signed the Certificate of Completeness. She signed this Certificate against the advice of her son. At the time the document was signed, Respondent agreed in principal to complete any remaining work. The City Inspection Form which was posted on the project fails to indicate that a final inspection approval was obtained from the City. In addition, the evidence established that required roof inspections were not obtained prior to the final structural inspection. Gerald Delancy prepared a punch list of items which he felt were incomplete and submitted it to Respondent. It does not appear that this list was prepared until July of 1986. Because of the dispute between Respondent and Gerald Delancy as to what was required under the Contract, a copy of the punch list was also sent to the City. The punch list prepared by Gerald Delancy included a number of items which were beyond the scope of the Contract. For example, with respect to the plumbing, the complaints included the following: the water pressure was to low on the water line, the kitchen sink was too small, and the bathroom vanity was substandard. The Contract did not provide for a bathroom vanity. There were also complaints about ants and roaches and "missing shower rods and towel racks" even though these items were not specifically included within the Contract between Respondent and Mrs. Delancy. The City sent its estimator to the House to review the punch list items. The City's estimator felt that Respondent should provide another coat of paint and should complete some other minor repair work, but the estimator did not concur in many of Gerald Delancy's complaints. The City's rehabilitation estimator met with Respondent and Gerald Delancy at the House on July 15, 1986. At that meeting, Respondent agreed to correct certain matters and asked for one month to complete the work. On August 1, 1986, the work was not completed and Respondent requested an additional 30 days. On August 13, 1986, Respondent stated that she did not have the money to complete the work. According to the City's estimator, the cost to repair the construction deficiencies he noted would be approximately $2,500 to $3,000 as of the date of the hearing. During this period in August, Respondent did send some workers back to the house to complete some additional work. A dispute arose between those workers and Gerald Delancy. The exact nature and reasons for this dispute are not clear. Ultimately, Gerald Delancy refused to allow the workers to perform any work because he did not feel he received adequate answers to his inquiries as to the nature of the work they intended to perform. After the City refused to concur in all of his complaints, Gerald Delancy hired a building inspection company. He paid that company $534 and it rendered a report dated August 4, 1986 which detailed many other deficiencies in the construction. It is not clear whether this report was ever presented to Respondent. On or about November 3, 1986, Mrs. Delancy, at the urging of her son, filed a lawsuit against Respondent. On or about August 8, 1989, Mrs. Delancy obtained a final default judgement against Respondent in the amount of $65,000 plus costs of $102.50. Respondent claims that she was unaware of the lawsuit and the default final judgement until Petitioner's investigator questioned her about it on September 25, 1990. As of the date of the hearing in this case, Respondent has not appealed the judgement nor has she attempted to have it set aside or vacated. In addition to alleged construction defects, the default judgement included claims against Respondent for allegedly mishandling certain household goods and other property owned by Mrs. Delancy. The evidence presented in this case was confusing and inconclusive as to the nature and justification for these claims by the Delancys for property which Respondent was allegedly storing for Mrs. Delancy. Apparently, Respondent agreed to assist Mrs. Delancy by moving some of the furniture out of the house and placing it in storage during construction. The contract did not require Respondent to provide any moving or storage services and there is no evidence that Respondent was paid for this work. Some or all of the property that was moved out of the house was lost, stolen or destroyed. There is a dispute between the parties as to circumstances surrounding the loss of this property. The evidence presented in this case was insufficient to establish what happened to the property, who was responsible for it and/or how much it was worth. It does appear that the default judgement against Respondent includes a very high assessment for the property involved. However, as noted above, that judgement has not been vacated or appealed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint, finding the Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing the following disciplinary action against the Respondent: Imposition of an administrative fine of $1,000. Suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of one year, followed by two years probation under such terms as may be imposed by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 93-6438 Only Petitioner submitted a proposed recommended order. The following rulings are made with respect to the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4, 11, and 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 through 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14 through 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16 through 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg. 401 NW 2nd Ave., Ste N-607 Miami, FL 33128 Agnes Sangster 9925 NW 25th Ave. Miami, FL 33147 Jack McRay Acting General Counsel Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg. 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Richard Hickok, Exec. Dir. Construction Industry Licensing 7960 Arlington Expressway, Ste 300 Jacksonville, FL 32211-7467
Findings Of Fact Florida law requires that persons employed to serve in instructional capacities in the public schools hold valid certificates to teach. The Respondent, Florida Department of Education, is charged by statute with the responsibility of issuing such teaching certificates, and with the concomitant responsibility to suspend or revoke teaching certificates under appropriate circumstances. Sections 231.14 - 231.28, Florida Statutes. Purporting to act under authority of this statutory framework, the Respondent has adopted Rules 6A-4.37, and 6B-2.01 through 6B-2.17, Florida Administrative Code, as its rules establishing practices to be followed in suspending or revoking teaching certificates. The Respondent's rules establish a procedure whereby a teacher charged with conduct that would justify suspension or revocation of a teaching certificate is presented with the options of taking no action, which results in informal procedures at which the appropriate penalty is the only issue; or of requesting a hearing. If a hearing is requested, the teacher is permitted to choose between a hearing conducted by a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings as provided in Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, or a hearing conducted by a panel of the Professional Practices Council ("PPC" hereafter). Rule 6A-4.37(2) provides in pertinent part as follows: When the commissioner of education finds that probable cause exists, he shall direct a filing of a formal petition against the certificate holder for the revocation or suspension of a teacher's certificate, together with a form permitting waiver of a hearing officer pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, as hereinafter provided. If section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, shall be waived by both the respondent and the chairman of the professional practices council by executing and filing the waiver form with the commissioner of education within twenty (20) days from service of the petition upon the respondent, the commissioner of education shall direct the chairman of the professional practices council to prosecute the matter before a hearing panel of three members of the professional practices council each of whom has not participated in nor was an informed party in any preliminary investigation of the cause. If section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes, is not waived by the parties, the matter shall be prosecuted before a hearing officer of the division of administrative hearings. The professional practices council may retain an attorney to prosecute the cause. The professional practices council may retain a different attorney to advise the hearing committee and act as a law officer for said committee. On completion of the hearing as hereinafter set forth, the hearing panel or officer, shall transmit through the commissioner of education to the state board of education a transcript of the proceedings and a report, which shall contain specific findings of fact, conclusions of law, interpretations of rules and a recommended order. The state board of education shall review the transcript of testimony and the report. The waiver form utilized is as follows: WAIVER OF RIGHT TO A HEARING BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS IN PREFERENCE TO A HEARING BEFORE A PANEL OF THE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES COUNCIL In the matter of the revocation of the teaching certificate of and pursuant to the provisions of 120.57, Florida Statutes, I hereby waive my right to a hearing before a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. In the alternative I do hereby request that this matter be heard before a panel of professional educators from the membership of the Professional Practices Council as provided in 6A-4.37, Rules of the State Board of Education. DATE RESPONDENT The remaining paragraphs of 6A-4.37 delineate specific procedures to be followed whether the hearing is conducted by a Hearing Officer, or by a PPC panel. The rule was adopted at a May, 1977 meeting of the State Board of Education. Prior to its adoption, public hearings were conducted, and members of the public, including the Petitioner, were allowed an opportunity to comment. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee of the Florida Legislature reviewed the rule. The rules set out at Chapter 6B-2.01 through 6B-2.16, Florida Administrative Code, establish additional procedures for public hearings conducted by the PPC. These rules pertain to teaching certificate suspension or revocation proceedings and to other matters. They are in large part inconsistent with the provisions of Rule 6A-4.37, and with the Administrative Procedure Act (Ch. 120, Florida Statutes). The rules are no longer followed by the PPC except those provisions which relate to the appointment of a law officer to aid a PPC panel in conducting hearings. The Respondent has been in the process of revising these rules for more than one year. Rule 6B-2.17 relates to probable cause hearings to be conducted by an executive committee. The rule is somewhat vague, but it appears to relate to proceedings under Section 231.57, Florida Statutes, rather than teaching certificate suspension or revocation proceedings. The rule does not relate to the issue of whether a final hearing will be conducted by a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, or a panel of the PPC. During 1977, three-member PPC panels conducted thirteen hearings in teaching certificate suspension or revocation proceedings. Fourteen such hearings were conducted by Hearing Officers. During 1978, eighteen were conducted by PPC panels, and eleven by Hearing Officers. The Petitioner, Florida Education Association/United AFT-AFL-CIO, is a statewide organization composed of persons involved in the field of education. The members are primarily teachers. The Petitioner is a confederation of local affiliates. Its local affiliates serve as collective bargaining representatives for teachers in approximately half of the local school districts in Florida. Among the Petitioner's functions are to protect its members, and members of the teaching profession with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment as teachers. The Petitioner provides services which local affiliates are largely unable to perform, including legal assistance and lobbying assistance. In many instances the Petitioner provides legal counsel to its members in connection with teaching certificate suspension or revocation proceedings. At the Petitioner's October, 1978 convention, its members authorized Petitioner's executive council to examine the status of the PPC, and to take steps to clarify the role of the PPC. The instant rule challenge was authorized by the executive council in accordance with that mandate of the membership. There are approximately 90,000 teachers in Florida. The Petitioner represents approximately 30,000 of them.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, should pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to Crudele under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, after Crudele appealed and reversed the Department's Emergency Order of Suspension.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1996, the Department issued an Emergency Order of Suspension of Crudele's eligibility for licensure and license as a Florida life insurance agent and life and health insurance agent. The Emergency Order of Suspension was based on alleged violations of the insurance code in connection with the surrender of insurance annuities for purchase of a startup company's unsecured promissory notes. It stated: Based on the foregoing specific facts and for the reasons of protecting the insurance-buying public and insurers from further harm, preventing further abuses of fiduciary relationships, and preventing further defrauding of insureds and insurance companies by the [Petitioner], the Insurance Commissioner finds that [Crudele] constitutes and is an immediate and serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating and justifying the Emergency Suspension of all licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations heretofore issued to [Crudele] under the purview of the Department of Insurance. The danger, more specifically, is to the insurance-buying public which must place its trust in the honesty and competence of insurance agents. The trust involves the responsibility that insurance agents have for fiduciary funds accepted by them and insurance matters entrusted to them. The danger is clear and present that failure to properly handle such funds and matters may cause serious losses and damage to the insurance-buying public. Prior to issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department received two verified complaints--one by the alleged victim, and the other by her adult daughter. The complaints alleged essentially: Crudele was introduced to Mary Clem, an 84 year-old widow of a tenant farmer, by Charles Perks, Clem's insurance agent, in 1992. In 1992, Crudele and Perks solicited and sold Clem two annuities for a total of $50,000, representing Clem's life savings from working in sick people's homes as a nurses aide. A year after selling the annuities, Crudele and Perks returned to Clem and convinced her to invest the money she had in her annuities into a new company called Zuma that was to recycle automobile tires into useful products. Crudele and Perks represented that Zuma was a "sure fire business." They said they were offering Clem the opportunity to get "in on the ground floor" and that the stock would then go on the open market and double in value. Clem did not have a great deal of education and had no experience investing in stocks or bonds. Her sole source of income was Social Security plus her modest savings. She conceded that when she was offered a 12% interest rate, she found the offer too irresistible to refuse. Neither Crudele nor Perks gave Clem a prospectus or any other descriptive brochure about Zuma. Clem purchased a total of three Zuma promissory notes at three separate times for a total of $60,000. This represented the bulk of her retirement savings. Clem acted based on her trust and confidence in Crudele and Perks. Clem later went to a lawyer to draft a will. The lawyer became very concerned about Clem's purchases of the Zuma promissory notes and her inability to understand the nature of the transaction. Clem was not getting any of her payments from Zuma as promised. Clem was "going out of her mind" with worry. She summoned her daughter, Roberta Anderson, to come down to Florida from Indiana to investigate the matter. Anderson was unable to contact Crudele, and he did not contact her. Anderson and Clem were not aware of any efforts on Crudele's part to recover the funds or otherwise remedy the situation. After a great deal of effort, Anderson was able to recover approximately $23,000 of her mother's money. Crudele apparently played no part in helping Anderson recover the $23,000. The Zuma notes went into default, and apparently the remainder of the money was lost. Clem suffered a very serious financial loss that, given her circumstances, she could ill afford. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Department based its Emergency Order of Suspension on the Clem and Anderson verified complaints. There was no evidence of any other basis for the Emergency Order of Suspension. There was no evidence as to whether the Department conducted any investigation of any kind prior to entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension. Nor is there any evidence as to the Department's decision-making process. The Emergency Order of Suspension stated: (1) that it was being issued pursuant to "sections 120.59(3) [and] 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], Florida Statutes [1995]; (2) that Crudele had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]"; and (3) that Crudele "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes [1995], and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." The Emergency Order of Suspension also stated that an Administrative Complaint seeking final disciplinary action would be filed within 20 days. On July 15, 1996, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint on essentially the same allegations as those in the Emergency Order of Suspension. Crudele sought judicial review of the Emergency Order of Suspension in the District Court of Appeal, First District. On August 19, 1997, the court issued an Opinion reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension because it did not "set forth particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing." The court's Mandate issued on September 4, 1997; it referred to the court's Opinion and commanded that "further proceedings, if required, be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of Court, and the laws of the State of Florida." The Administrative Complaint filed against Crudele was given Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case No. 97-2603. On February 17, 1998, a Final Order sustaining some of the charges and suspending Crudele's license and eligibility for licensure for six months was entered in Case No. 97-2603.
The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's license to practice medicine for violation of Section 458.331(1)(b) and (kk), Florida Statutes (2005)?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state department charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is Gina Marie Dieudonne, M.D. Respondent is a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida, having been issued license ME 89209. Respondent's mailing address-of-record is 48 Goldfield Cove, Jackson, Tennessee 38305. The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) is the licensing authority regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Illinois. On or about January 4, 2006, the IDFPR entered an Order indefinitely suspending Respondent's license to practice as a physician and surgeon in the State of Illinois. The IDFPR disciplined Respondent for failing to pay Illinois individual income tax for the tax years of 1999 and 2003. On March 27, 2006, Respondent executed a Petition for Restoration in front of a Notary Public in Illinois, seeking to have her Illinois license to practice medicine reinstated. On or about July 10, 2006, the Respondent signed a Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement that, if approved by the IDFPR, would lift the suspension and allow the Respondent to renew her Illinois license, while placing her Illinois medical license on indefinite probation, until such time as the Respondent satisfactorily completed the payment of delinquent state income taxes and satisfactorily completed repayment of her Illinois Student Assistance Commission student loans outstanding. The Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement was approved by the Medical Disciplinary Board on August 2, 2006. On or about October 18, 2006, the Director of the IDFPR signed an Order adopting the Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement, subject to the terms therein, including the indefinite probation. The January 4, 2006, Order entered by the IDFPR, which indefinitely suspended Respondent's license to practice as a physician and surgeon in the State of Illinois, constitutes disciplinary action against the Respondent's Illinois medical license. The October 18, 2006, Order entered by the IDFPR adopting the Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement, subject to the terms therein, including the indefinite probation, constitutes disciplinary action against the Respondent's Illinois medical license. Respondent failed to report, in writing, to the Board within thirty (30) days of the January 4, 2006, suspension of her medical license by the IDFPR. Respondent reported the October 18, 2006, order of stipulated indefinite probation of her medical license by the IDFPR to the Board on February 12, 2007. The report letter dated February 12, 2007, had a copy of the disciplinary documents from Illinois attached to it and was received by DOH Licensure Services Unit on February 15, 2007. On April 3, 2007, an order was entered by IDFPR terminating the earlier order of probation on Respondent's Illinois' license pertaining to Respondent's failure to repay student loans. Other restrictions imposed on the license remained in force and effect. Prior Disciplinary History Respondent's Illinois medical license was subjected to disciplinary action in two prior cases. In Case No. 92-2870 Respondent's Illinois medical license was placed on probation by terms of a Consent Order signed by Respondent on September 14, 1992, for failure to repay student loans. The probation was terminated by Consent order approved March 26, 1993. In Case No. 96-4999, an Order was issued, effective July 31, 1996, ordering that her license not be renewed for failure to repay student loans. Her license was restored by Order to Restore dated August 20, 1996.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts found and the conclusions, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered reprimanding Respondent's medical license, imposing an administrative fine of $4,000.00, and placing Respondent's license on probation until she presents evidence to the Florida Board of Medicine that her Illinois medical license is free and unencumbered. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2008.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be exempt from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency is the state entity which supports vulnerable persons with various developmental disabilities. The Agency contracts with direct service providers and is responsible for regulating the employment of persons serving in positions of trust with these providers. The ARC of Martin County, Inc. (the ARC), is a service provider for the Agency. Ms. Ford applied with the ARC to become an after-school counselor, a position of trust which requires completion of level 2 background screening. The Department of Children and Families conducts initial screening on behalf of the Agency. Background screening and local criminal records revealed a history of involvement with law enforcement, as Ms. Ford admitted in her exemption request paperwork and her testimony at hearing, summarized below. On September 30, 2011, Ms. Ford entered a plea of guilty to forgery, driving on a suspended license, and providing a false name to law enforcement, for events that took place on April 9, 2010. Forgery, a felony of the third degree, is a disqualifying offense for employment in a position of trust. She was ordered to pay court fees and costs, and was put on probation for a period of 18 months for that offense. In her responses in the Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford gave few details as to the events surrounding the disqualifying offense itself. She stated only that she was a witness to an accident on March 20, 2011, almost a year after the forgery incident, and, after identifying herself to the police, was arrested on an outstanding warrant from Martin County for the forgery charge. Ms. Ford wrote in her own words:2/ The forgery was do to traffic when I was pulled over and I gave my sister name to the officer. The officer then allowed me to go to go. I didn't know I had a warrant for Martin County until the night of the crash. In response to inquiries concerning another arrest for driving with a suspended license and providing a false name to a law enforcement officer while being arrested or detained a couple of months later on May 9, 2011, Ms. Ford wrote: I was on my to work and I was running late so I then was doing over milage and I was pulled over and gave officer a other name, cause I didn't want to be late for work. At hearing, in response to inquiries concerning her arrest for shoplifting on January 22, 2013, Ms. Ford acknowledged shoplifting a medical device for her daughter from Wal-Mart. Ms. Ford completed all confinement, supervision, and nonmonetary conditions imposed by the court for her disqualifying offense by March 29, 2013. Mr. Gerry Driscoll is the regional operations manager for the Southeast Region of the Agency. He has served in his current position for three years and has been employed with the Agency for seventeen years. Mr. Driscoll credibly testified that the Agency has responsibility for a very vulnerable population, many of whom are unable to later tell others about the actions of their caregivers. This population is thus very susceptible to exploitation. Mr. Driscoll noted that the Agency must consider any prior criminal conduct or dishonesty very carefully. In her written submission to the Agency, Ms. Ford did not recognize that she caused any harm or injury to any victim. However, at hearing, she admitted that she caused injury to her sister when she provided and signed her sister's name to law enforcement after being detained or arrested on more than one occasion. Ms. Ford submitted three identically worded "form" character reference letters to the Agency, stating generally that she is a responsible, reliable, and honest person. The letters do not indicate the employment status or positions of the individuals signing the references. Ms. Ford further stated that she was remorseful. In her Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford wrote: Yes my remorse is I accepting made bad choose in my life and I accept full responsibility for the actions that I made. I want to move forward and put the pass behind me so I can make a better future for me and my kids. Ms. Ford seems sincere in her desire to assist vulnerable persons and asks for a chance to work with them to demonstrate that she is rehabilitated. However, the statute requires that rehabilitation be shown first; only then may an exemption for disqualification be granted. While Ms. Ford stated that she is rehabilitated, she offered little evidence to clearly demonstrate that. She completed a home health aide course in 2012, but has not participated in other counseling or coursework since the disqualifying offense. Ms. Ford's recent work history includes employment as an administrative assistant with Florida Community Health Centers, Inc., from October 8, 2014, to October 5, 2015, and employment as a mental health technician with Sandy Pines Residential Treatment Center from July 18, 2008, to January 7, 2014. Passage of time is a factor to be considered in determining rehabilitation, and the last disqualifying offense was over five years ago. However, Ms. Ford's history since her disqualifying offense includes more to reflect incidents and does not contain sufficient positive indications of rehabilitation. Ms. Ford failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated and that she will not present a danger if she is exempted from her disqualification from employment in a position of trust.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Ms. Jennifer Ford's application for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: On August 31, 1988, Respondent was authorized by the Board Of Medicine (Board) to provide respiratory care services in this state under license number TU C000050, a license she still holds. Respondent did not take a licensure examination. She was granted her license based upon her pre-October 1, 1987, respiratory therapy work experience pursuant to Section 468.357(3)(a), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87- 553, Laws of Florida. In December, 1990, Respondent sought to renew her license. As part of the renewal process, she submitted to the Board a signed Affirmation of Eligibility for License Renewal, which read as follows: I HEREBY AFFIRM THAT I HAVE MET ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSE RENEWAL SET FORTH BY THE DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION AND/OR THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD INDICATED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS NOTICE. I UNDERSTAND THAT WITHIN THE UPCOMING RENEWAL PERIOD, IF MY LICENSE NUMBER IS SELECTED FOR AUDIT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION AND/OR PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD, I MAY BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT I HAVE MET ALL APPLICABLE LICENSE RENEWAL REQUIREMENTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT PROOF MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION AND/OR PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD AT ANY TIME AND THAT IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN ALL DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING MY AFFIRMATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR LICENSE RENEWAL. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SUCH REQUIREMENTS IS IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES AND STATUTES GOVERNING MY PROFESSION AND SUBJECTS ME TO POSSIBLE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND FURTHER, THAT ANY FALSE STATEMENT IS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 455.227, FLORIDA STATUTES, SUBJECTING ME TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS WELL AS THOSE PENALTIES PROVIDED BELOW. I AFFIRM THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT AND RECOGNIZE THAT PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTION ON MY LICENSE AND/OR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 455.2275, FLORIDA STATUTES. At the time she made the foregoing affirmation, Respondent believed that she had met all of the requirements for the renewal of her license, including those relating to continuing education. She did not intend to deceive or mislead the Board regarding her eligibility for license renewal. Based upon her review of the copies of the statutory and rule provisions with which the Board of Medicine had previously provided her, Respondent was under the impression that she needed to have earned only 24 hours of continuing education credit biennially in order to be eligible for license renewal. She had earned 31 hours of such credit, 15 in 1989 and 16 in 1990, and therefore thought that she had met the continuing education requirement for eligibility for license renewal. She was unaware that Chapter 468, Part V, Florida Statutes (1987), had been amended by Chapter 87-553, Laws of Florida, to require licensed respiratory care practitioners in her situation to complete 20 contact hours of approved continuing education courses each year. Notwithstanding that she had completed less than 20 contact hours of approved continuing education courses in both 1989 and 1990, Respondent's license was renewed based, in part, upon the representations made in her Affirmation of Eligibility for License Renewal. The Board subsequently selected Respondent for audit and asked her to submit documentation establishing her compliance with the continuing education requirements referenced in her Affirmation of Eligibility for License Renewal. Due to illness and other extenuating circumstances, Respondent was initially unable to provide any documentation in response to this request, however, she ultimately provided certificates of completion for each of the continuing education courses she had taken in 1989 and 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent did not violate Section 468.365(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; (2) dismissing said charge; (3) finding that Respondent violated Section 468.365(1)(j), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and (4) disciplining Respondent for having violated Section 468.365(1)(j), Florida Statutes, by placing her on probation for a period of one year during which she must, in addition to meeting the 20 contact hour per year continuing education requirement prescribed by Section 468.357(3)(a), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-553, Laws of Florida, complete 9 extra contact hours of approved continuing education course offerings and provide the Board with documentation, in the form of receipts, vouchers, certificates or other like papers, verifying her completion of these additional 9 contact hours. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of April, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1992. 1/ See Chino Electric, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 578 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Nagashima v. Buck, 541 So.2d 783, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). 2/ That Respondent was not aware of the 20 contact hour per year continuing education requirement prescribed by Section 468.357(3)(a), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-553, Laws of Florida, does not excuse her failure to have complied with this requirement. See Moncrief v. State Commissioner of Insurance, 415 So.2d 785, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)(licensed bail bondsman could be found guilty of employing an unlicensed runner, notwithstanding his belief that "he was not required to have [the runner] licensed;" "the courts universally recognize that ignorance or mistake of law will not excuse an act in violation of the laws so long as the laws clearly and unambiguously proscribe the conduct alleged"). COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur B. Skafidas, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pamela Sue Morgan 7324 S.W. 25th Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33317-7005 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
