The Issue Whether Respondent, a pari-mutuel wagering occupational licensing holder, committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent held pari-mutuel wagering license number 0680747-1081. Prior to November 14, 1994, Kenneth Manness, a blacksmith who does business as Better Hooves, Inc., provided services and supplies at the request of Respondent for horses which Respondent kept and raced on the grounds of the Pompano Park Harness Track during the 1994 meet. Mr. Manness, d/b/a Better Hooves, Inc., made repeated demands for Respondent to pay the bills that had been submitted to him for these services and supplies. Respondent failed to pay this debt. This debt was for services and supplies that directly relate to racing at a pari-mutuel facility within the State of Florida. Mr. Manness, d/b/a Better Hooves, Inc., filed suit against Respondent based on this indebtedness in the County Court of Broward County, Florida where the proceeding was assigned Case Number CO-NO-94-001685. On November 14, 1994, a default judgment was entered against Respondent in the County Court proceeding. The Court found that Respondent was indebted to Mr. Manness, d/b/a Better Hooves, Inc., in the principal amount of $1,332.30 and ordered Respondent to pay that amount plus costs in the amount of $115.00, for a total of $1,437.30. Interest was to accrue at the rate of 12 percent per annum. As of the date of the formal hearing, Respondent had paid none of this indebtedness.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that Respondent's pari-mutuel wagering occupational license be revoked. It is further recommended that Respondent be given leave to apply for licensure after he submits proof that the judgment described in this Recommended Order has been fully satisfied. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Darby, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Mr. Claude D. Richards 10 Parkwood Road Westbury, New York 11590 Royal H. Logan, Acting Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent has held a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (license number 0609951-1081) issued by Petitioner. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent and Steven Zenker were part-owners of a race horse (named Sixty- Five Roses) that Respondent and his wife, Deedre Johnson, trained at Pompano Park. Pompano Park is a harness racing facility operated by Pompano Park, Inc., the holder of a pari- mutuel permit authorizing it to conduct harness racing in the State of Florida. In April of 1997, Sixty-Five Roses sustained an injury while racing at Pompano Park. The horse was treated over a three-day period (April 12 through April 14, 1997) by Dr. Jonathon Cohen, a veterinarian employed by Dr. Paul R. Plante and Associates (PRPA). The total charge for the veterinary services rendered by Dr. Cohen was $257.00. On April 25, 1997, PRPA sent Ms. Johnson and Mr. Zenker separate bills, each for $128.50 (one-half the total charge). Ms. Johnson's bill was sent to her and her husband's Vernon, New York address (where they reside from the end of April until November each year). The bills indicated that "[a]ny account with an outstanding balance on the 25th of the month [would] be charged a 1.5% late fee or a minimum $5.00 rebilling charge." On or about May 5, 1997, Mr. Zenker paid PRPA the $128.50 he had been billed. The $128.50 that PRPA had billed Ms. Johnson, however, was not paid. PRPA sent Ms. Johnson a statement each month requesting payment. 1/ In or around November or December of 1999, Dr. Cohen, during an encounter with the Johnsons at Pompano Park, handed them a copy of the last monthly statement that had been sent and told them that they needed to make payment. Not having received any payment from the Johnsons, in early 1999, PRPA filed suit against Respondent in Broward County Court Case No. CONO 99-0010 to recover monies owed for the veterinary services provided by Dr. Cohen on April 12 through April 14, 1997, in connection with the treatment Sixty-Five Roses. On March 2, 1999, the following Default Judgment was entered in Broward County Court Case No. CONO 99-0010 against Respondent: This action having come on for consideration, and it appearing to the court the above-named Defendant [Respondent] was duly served with statement of claim and it appearing further that the said defendant failed to appear in said action and the court finding that the said Defendant is justly indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of $244.50. It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged that the said Plaintiff, Dr. Paul Plante and Associates, do have and recover from said Defendant the sum of $128.50 for damages, besides the sum of $116.00 for costs of this suit, and the sum of $0 for interest, all of which shall bear interest at the rate of 10% for the current year and thereafter at the prevailing rate per year as provided for by Florida Statute, for all of which let execution issue. Respondent has not made any payments to PRPA to satisfy this judgment, nor has he sought to have the judgment set aside.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and suspending his occupational license "for a period of no less than 10 days and continuing until the Respondent provides proof that he has satisfied his outstanding financial obligation" to PRPA. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for a waiver of his 1996 conviction for cruelty to animals in order to receive a pari- mutuel wagering occupational license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an applicant for a pari-mutual wagering occupational license who wishes to be licensed as a greyhound owner in Florida. Respondent is the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, an executive agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's application, filed June 27, 2002, candidly disclosed a previous felony conviction of cruelty to animals. On or about June 20, 1996, Petitioner was, in fact, found guilty of a third degree felony (cruelty to animals: refusing medical care to a greyhound) under Section 828.12(2), Florida Statutes, by a jury in the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County in Case No. 96-30581CFAES. He was 26 years old at the time. Petitioner's conviction for cruelty to animals arose from the death of a greyhound puppy named "He's My Denny." The puppy was in Petitioner's care at the Daytona Beach Kennel Club. "He's My Denny" was bred and raised to be a racing greyhound. As a result of his aforementioned felony conviction, Petitioner served 57 days in the Volusia County Jail and the balance of five years via out-of-state probation. Petitioner entered into a Consent Order with the Division, whereby he was declared to be ineligible for any pari- mutuel occupational license under Section 550.105, Florida Statutes, for three years. On July 1, 2002, after his three-year suspension had run, Petitioner requested a waiver of his conviction of cruelty to animals, for the purpose of re-licensure. Stephen Toner, an Investigator for the Division, interviewed Petitioner on August 5, 2002, regarding his request for a waiver. During the interview, Mr. Toner completed a waiver interview form. Each page, with the exception of the last page of the form which contained Mr. Toner's comments, was initialed and dated by Petitioner. In commenting upon the interview and its form at hearing, Petitioner expressed concern that Mr. Toner had misunderstood him during the interview when he said something to the effect of "If I had known there would be this much trouble with such serious consequences, I would have just put the dog down." I accept that Petitioner meant, by this, or similar language, that he would have humanely euthanized "He's My Denny," rather than allowing the beast to suffer. However, this information is largely irrelevant. Petitioner received the Division's letter of license denial on September 20, 2002. The National Greyhound Association will not permit Petitioner to register a greyhound for racing purposes in any state unless the State of Florida will re-license him. Therefore, Petitioner is effectively precluded from his chosen line of work throughout the United States, by Florida's denial of his occupational license application. After being denied re-licensure by the Division, Petitioner received a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights, dated October 25, 2002. The Certificate states, in pertinent part: "grants [Petitioner] restoration of civil rights, except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm for any and all felony convictions in the State of Florida." Petitioner testified, without refutation, that, except for his cruelty to animals conviction, he has had no other trouble with the law except that when he was 19 years old, he was caught driving without a license and represented himself to police as his older brother, who did have a driver's license. At hearing, Petitioner did not list, or elaborate on, any signs of good moral character or rehabilitation since his 1996 Florida conviction for cruelty to animals.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for a pari-mutuel occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: David J. Gibby 6278 Stanleyville Drive Rural Hill, North Carolina 27045 Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue Whether Respondent is entitled to a refund of license fees and late penalties.
Findings Of Fact On September 6, 1988, a lien on License No. 68-01319, Series 4-COP, was recorded with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Respondent). The named lienholder was Francis D. Sawyer (Petitioner). Framay, Inc., d/b/a Thirsty Parrot was the holder of License No. 68-01319. On May 21, 1990, an administrative action was filed by the Respondent against Framay, Inc., d/b/a Thirsty Parrot. The administrative action, alleged that Framay failed to maintain the license in an active status. Framay never requested a hearing and a Final Order was entered on September 25, 1990, revoking License No. 68-01319. On November 8, 1990, the Respondent filed a Notice to Show Cause alleging failure to comply with the terms of the September 25, 1990 Final Order. On May 6, 1991, a second Final Order was entered revoking License No. 68-01319. In February 1992, the Respondent was contacted by attorney Stanley Chapman as counsel to Petitioner, Sawyer. Petitioner claimed that the Respondent had failed to provide him a point of entry as lienholder to foreclose his lien, and sought to have the license "reinstated in escrow" in order to allow him to proceed in foreclosure. After some discussion, the Respondent agreed to cooperate with Petitioner's efforts to foreclose by not opposing a summary judgement motion filed by Petitioner. Normally, foreclosure of a lien on a revoked license is permitted only when the lienholder brings an action within 12 days of an order or revocation. Even though the time had expired, the Division nonetheless permitted Sawyer to foreclose on the license because Sawyer had a legitimate claim and the Division's interests would not be adversely affected by ignoring the 12 day time frame. In August 1992, Petitioner, through his attorney Stanley Chapman, filed a complaint to foreclose his lienholder's interest in the license. Framay, Inc., d/b/a Thirsty Parrot, Wayne F. Sawyer and the Division were named as defendants. The Petitioner foreclosed on License No. 68-01319 and a Final Judgment of Foreclosure and Transfer of Beverage License was entered on January 27, 1993. Upon the entry of foreclosure, Petitioner, as required by the Respondent, filed an application for the delinquent renewal of License No. 68- 01319. The delinquent renewal of the license required that past due license fees totalling $5,512.50 for the years 1990-1991, 1991-1992, and 1992-1993 be paid to activate the license. Petitioner requested that the Respondent waive the payment of delinquent annual license fees and penalties which the Respondent was seeking prior to issuing the license to any transferee. The Respondent denied the request to waive applicable fees and required payment of delinquent renewal fees in the amount of $5,512.50. Petitioner paid the fee under protest, claiming that the fee was not applicable to this transaction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly,
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to issuance of an occupational license, pursuant to section 550.105, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, John A. Short, is an applicant for a general individual occupational license, pursuant to section 550.105(2)(a), which would authorize him to work as a blacksmith and farrier at licensed pari-mutuel facilities in Florida.4/ Respondent is the state agency charged with issuing occupational licenses to employees of pari-mutuel wagering facilities in the state of Florida pursuant to chapter 550. Petitioner's Application for Occupational License and Waiver On December 11, 2017,5/ Petitioner filed with Respondent DBPR PMW-3120, Individual Occupational License Application, seeking to obtain a pari-mutuel wagering general individual occupational license. Also on December 11, 2017, Petitioner filed DBPR PMW-1380, Request for Waiver, seeking a waiver, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(c) and rule 61D—5.006, of disqualification from occupational licensure under section 550.105(5)(b) on the basis of a felony conviction. In his license application filed on December 11, 2017, Petitioner disclosed that he had a prior felony conviction that was adjudicated on September 22, 1998, in Jefferson County, Kentucky.6/ Subsequently, on March 5, 2018, Petitioner filed an amended application page on which he disclosed two other criminal offenses: receiving stolen property, and possession of marijuana. Both of these offenses, which were misdemeanors, were adjudicated on November 24, 1991, in Kentucky. On June 13, 2018, Petitioner participated in a waiver interview conducted by Respondent, as required under rule 61D-5.006. At the interview, Petitioner disclosed that he had several other criminal convictions, some of which had not been listed on his license application. In the Denial Letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that it was denying his application on the basis of his felony conviction for third degree assault on a police officer and his failure to disclose all of his convictions on his license application. Respondent also notified Petitioner that it was denying his request for a waiver. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing As noted above, Petitioner is a blacksmith and farrier, and he currently works in that trade in Florida, where he now resides full time. Specifically, Petitioner works with Marshall Hudson, also a blacksmith and farrier, who is a subcontractor to the Wellington Equestrian Federation at Equestrian Sport Productions in Wellington, Florida. Petitioner has worked with Hudson for four or five seasons, shoeing horses of many different breeds, including thoroughbreds, quarter horses, standardbreds, walking horses, saddlebreds, and carriage horses, at the barns, showgrounds, and other venues at which the horses are located. The competent, credible evidence establishes that Petitioner is, or has been, licensed by the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission as a blacksmith and farrier over a period of several years,7/ with the exception of a short period in 2016 during which his license had lapsed. Pursuant to his Kentucky occupational license, Petitioner is, or has been, authorized to conduct his trade at licensed racing facilities in Kentucky, including Churchill Downs and other tracks. Petitioner credibly testified——and no countervailing evidence was presented——that he has never been subject to licensure discipline during the entire time he has been licensed in Kentucky. Petitioner's Criminal Offenses At the final hearing, Petitioner was forthright regarding his criminal record. He testified that he had been convicted of third degree assault on a police officer, a felony, in Jefferson County, Kentucky in 1998,8/ and credibly explained the circumstances surrounding that conviction. His account of that incident provided at the final hearing is consistent with that provided in his June 13, 2018, waiver interview.9/ Petitioner also readily acknowledged that he had been convicted of numerous misdemeanor offenses, some of which have been expunged from his criminal record. These include theft by deception, receiving stolen property, shoplifting, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of marijuana, driving under the influence, and several traffic—related offenses. With the exception of the possession of marijuana and some traffic—related offenses, Petitioner's criminal offenses were committed during the 1990s. His most recent arrest was in 2011, for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, which was resolved by paying a $150.00 fine. Since then, Petitioner has not been convicted of any crimes.10/ There was no evidence presented showing that Petitioner has ever engaged in criminal activity regarding pari— mutuel wagering, gambling, bookmaking, cruelty to animals, or that is a capital offense.11/ Evidence Regarding Petitioner's Character Hudson testified regarding Petitioner's character. He attested that Petitioner is a good person who has a talent for working with horses. He has never known Petitioner to have a conflict with any owner, rider, or veterinarian in connection with any of the horses that Petitioner has worked with over the years. At the final hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that in 2016, he engaged in pari-mutuel work for a short period of time in Kentucky without being licensed. Petitioner's Kentucky Horse Racing Commission occupational license had lapsed while he was not working in—state. He renewed it later that year, but during the time his license had lapsed, he occasionally worked at Churchill Downs in order to make enough money to apply for a new occupational license. On those occasions, he rode into the facility in the truck of another racetrack employee who was licensed, and no one questioned his presence because they knew him from having previously worked there, while he was licensed. He acknowledged that he knew he was legally required to hold a license to gain access to the backside of pari-mutuel racetracks in Kentucky, but testified that it was commonplace for unlicensed persons to work in the backside at Churchill Downs, except on large racing event days. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has ever accessed the backside of, or engaged in activities requiring occupational licensure at, pari-mutuel facilities in Florida while not being licensed to do so.12/ Findings of Ultimate Fact Petitioner's Felony Conviction As discussed above, Petitioner readily acknowledged that he was convicted of third degree assault on a police officer, a felony, in Kentucky in 1998. Respondent is authorized, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(b), to deny Petitioner's application for an occupational license on the basis of his felony conviction. Waiver of Disqualification from Licensure Section 550.105(5)(c) authorizes Respondent to waive licensure disqualification under section 550.105(5)(b) if "the applicant establishes that she or he is of good moral character, that she or he has been rehabilitated, and that the crime she or he was convicted of is not related to pari—mutuel wagering and is not a capital offense." As discussed above, there is no evidence showing that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime involving pari—mutuel wagering or that is a capital offense. Therefore, the question becomes whether the preponderance of the evidence shows that Petitioner is rehabilitated and of good moral character such that, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(c) and rule 61D—5.006, he is entitled to a waiver from licensure disqualification. The question whether a person is rehabilitated from his or her criminal conviction primarily focuses on the person's behavior subsequent to committing the offense, rather than focusing solely——or even primarily——on whether the person committed the offenses.13/ As discussed above, Petitioner was forthright in acknowledging that he had committed numerous criminal offenses in the past——one of them a serious felony that, pursuant to statute, has effectively excluded him from obtaining an occupational license. This is his only felony offense, and was committed over 20 years ago. Although Petitioner committed several offenses subsequent to his 1998 felony conviction, they were misdemeanors, the majority of which were committed in the 1990s and many of which subsequently have been expunged from his record. His most recent offense, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, for which he paid a small fine to resolve, occurred in 2011, some eight years ago. There is no evidence that he has engaged in criminal behavior since then. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner is rehabilitated from his 1998 felony in Kentucky, which is the basis on which Respondent has proposed to deny his occupational license application. See J.D. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 114 So. 3d 1127, 1131 (whether an applicant is rehabilitated is an issue of ultimate fact to be determined by the trier of fact). Marshall Hudson, a colleague with whom Petitioner has worked for a few years now, vouched for Petitioner's character. Petitioner testified, credibly, that he has never had any "problems" associated with his work as a blacksmith and farrier. Respondent presented no evidence to the contrary. Petitioner admitted to working without a license in the backside of Churchill Downs in Kentucky for a short time, approximately three years ago. The evidence establishes that he did so because he needed the work in order to make enough money to apply for an occupational license, since his had lapsed while he had not been working in—state. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Petitioner would accept the opportunity to make money that would enable him apply for an occupational license that would allow him to legally practice his trade. Once Petitioner had earned enough money to obtain an occupational license, he did so. It is further noted that there was no evidence presented that Petitioner has since engaged in the unlicensed practice of his trade in Kentucky or in any other state. The evidence also does not show that Petitioner has ever engaged in the unlicensed practice of his trade at licensed pari—mutuel facilities in Florida. Importantly, too, no evidence was presented showing that Petitioner has ever engaged in conduct involving gambling, bookmaking, or cruelty to animals, and none of his criminal offenses involved pari—mutuel wagering——conduct that would rightfully raise significant concerns as to whether he should be licensed. Based on these considerations, the undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner is of good moral character for purposes of obtaining a waiver, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(c) and rule 61D—5.006. See Albert v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enf., 573 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)(except where a specific provision of statute has categorically——i.e., absolutely and without qualification—— disqualified an applicant from consideration for licensure, the question of what constitutes "good moral character" is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact).14/ Failure to Disclose Criminal History Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's application on the basis that he did not disclose his entire criminal history, as required by the "Background Information" section of the occupational license application form. The evidence establishes that Petitioner did not disclose his entire criminal history on the application form filed on December 11, 2017, as supplemented on March 5, 2018. However, this is a de novo proceeding designed to formulate agency action, not review action taken earlier and preliminarily. As such, Petitioner was entitled to present, at the final hearing in this proceeding, information regarding his criminal history additional to that provided in his application. At the final hearing, in response to Respondent's questioning in its case in chief, Petitioner testified regarding each criminal offense he had committed. Petitioner's testimony regarding his complete criminal history at the de novo final hearing in this proceeding satisfies the requirement in the occupational license application Background Information section, that his complete criminal history be disclosed. Accordingly, failure to disclose his criminal history is not a basis for denying his application pursuant to section 559.791.
Conclusions For Petitioner: John A. Short, pro se 3701 Quantum Lakes Drive, Suite 109 West Palm Beach, Florida 33426 For Respondent: James A. Lewis, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399—2202
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2019.
The Issue The following issues were raised in the facts presented at hearing: Was Combs' affidavit executed in accordance with provisions of Section 215.19, Florida Statutes? Were the construction projects upon which Combs worked exempt from the provisions of Section 215.19, Florida Statutes? Did Combs settle the claims presented?
Findings Of Fact Keith Dwaine Combs was an employee of Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc., on three related projects at Broward County Community College, the trustees of which were the contracting authority. Combs' duties were those of a sheet metal worker. He was paid $5.50 per hour. The prevailing wage for these projects for sheet metal workers was $10.55 per hour as established by the Department of Commerce. Combs worked 240 hours on these projects and prepared an affidavit claiming he was under paid $1,212. Combs then worked an additional 80 hours on a related prevailing wage job and amended his original affidavit by adding the additional 80 hours and $404 to the amount of his claim. Combs initiated these additions to his original affidavit and resigned the affidavit, claiming a total of $1,616. Combs did not have the affidavit renotarized after he had made the amendments. Combs filed his claim with District Board of Trustees for Broward County Community College. Combs then entered into negotiations with Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc., and eventually accepted payment of $597 less FICA and withholding taxes in settlement of his claims, and executed a release of all pending claims against Acco.
Recommendation The Hearing Officer recommends that the claim of Keith Dwaine Combs be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Byrd Booth, Jr., Esquire 2900 East Oakland Park Boulevard Post Office Drawer 11088 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 Jeff M. Brown, Esquire 3705 North Federal Highway Post Office Box 1138 Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Mr. Luther J. Moore Administrator of Prevailing Wage Division of Labor 1321 Executive Center Drive, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301
