Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an attorney. He was admitted to practice law in Florida in 1949. During most of his career, the Petitioner was employed in legal capacities by agencies of the State of Florida. He has served as counsel to the State Road Department, the predecessor of the present Department of Transportation; the Legislative Reference Bureau; and the House of Representatives. While he was in these positions, Petitioner participated in various programs that preceded the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). During 1970, Petitioner left state employment and opened an office in which he engaged in the private practice of law. Among Petitioner's clients were the City of Tallahassee and Tallahassee Memorial Hospital (TMH). Prior to January 1, 1974, Petitioner's representation of TMH was handled in the same manner as that of Petitioner's other clients. Petitioner would bill TMH on an hourly basis for legal work that he performed. Beginning January 1, 1974, Petitioner's relationship with TMH changed and became more in the nature of an employment relationship and less in the nature of a private legal representation. The position of General Counsel of TMH was regularly established. The General Counsel reported directly to the hospital board and provided legal assistance to the hospital. The arrangement was that Petitioner would be paid a monthly "salary" based upon fifty hours of legal representation. The salary was fifty hours times $37.50. This amount was paid directly to the Petitioner in the form of a payroll check which came from the hospital's regular payroll account. The Petitioner maintained his private law practice. The "salary" from the hospital, however, was deposited directly in the Petitioner's personal account and was not deposited in his law firm account. In 1975, the arrangement changed so that Petitioner would perform 65 hours per month of legal representation to the hospital and be compensated at a rate equivalent to 65 times $37.50. While the rate of compensation changed on several occasions, Petitioner's relationship with the hospital remained essentially the same until June, 1978. During this period Petitioner never spent less than the minimum number of hours working for TMH. When more than the minimum number of hours was required, Petitioner would bill the hospital as if it were a regular client of his firm at an hourly rate which was initially $37.50. During this period, TMH was a municipal hospital. Its day-to-day activities were managed by a hospital board and an executive director, but the hospital's operations were controlled by the City Commission of the City of Tallahassee. When Petitioner negotiated with the hospital for changes in his hourly billing rate, or his salary, he negotiated with the City Commission. When he billed for hours over the minimum, the bill was sent to the City Commission. When the Petitioner entered into the new arrangement with TMH on January 1, 1974, he enrolled in the Florida Retirement System by completing the appropriate enrollment forms. The forms were provided to him by TMH which participated in FRS. The forms were submitted to FRS by TMH. Petitioner thereafter negotiated directly with personnel at FRS concerning credits for his military service and for certain work that he had performed with the Legislative Reference Bureau for which he had not previously been credited. Petitioner was enrolled in FRS, and no one at FRS questioned his eligibility. From January 1, 1974 until June 20, 1978, money was deducted from "salary" checks paid the Petitioner by TMH for participation in FRS. FRS accepted these contributions and annually sent Petitioner a statement of his account. Petitioner's credits with prior state retirement plans were accepted by FRS, and as of January 1, 1974, his participation in FRS vested. As General Counsel of TMH, Petitioner was responsible for all of the hospital's legal work. His work included legal representation in the areas of general contract, contract litigation, personnel problems, Title VII Civil Rights Actions, malpractice actions, collection work and Worker's Compensation Claims. Petitioner was not free to reject any part of the hospital's legal work. Petitioner was allowed to maintain his outside law practice, but conflicts of time were to be resolved in favor of the hospital. Petitioner answered directly to the hospital board and his position was parallel to that of the hospital's executive director. Petitioner did not personally perform all of the hospital's legal work. He performed a majority of it, but he did from time to time assign hospital work to other members of his law firm. Whether work would be assigned to another member of his firm was a matter within Petitioner's discretion. While Petitioner testified that he accrued annual leave and sick leave in the manner of any other hospital employee, it does not appear that he ever took any. Petitioner testified that he never worked less than the minimum hours for which he was paid a "salary" in performing the hospital's legal representation. Petitioner performed legal work for the hospital at the hospital, at his private law office, and at various other locations. While the hospital provided him with isolated volumes, he maintained his own law library and utilized his own materials and clerical assistance. The Petitioner treated his relationship with the hospital as if it were a private representation. It appears that the purpose for the change in his relationship with TMH which occurred on January 1, 1974, was to improve Petitioner's retirement status. On October 21, 1975, Petitioner wrote to the City Commission of the City of Tallahassee as follows: "As you know, my compensation as City Attorney is based on a formula by which I receive a salary for the first fifty (50) hours per month of time spent working on City business, with the remainder paid at an hourly rate. In no month have we spent less than 99 hours devoted to City business. I would like your permission to modify our arrangement to reflect the first 65 hours spent as salary and the remainder at an hourly rate. This would in no way affect the amounts being paid by the City to me, but would make a difference in my retirement benefits. Further, since I am not on City retirement, this would in no way affect the actuarial or fiscal soundness of the City's retirement program. Let me reiterate that what I desire is merely a bookkeeping change and will in no way increase the amount that the City is paying for representation. If you have any questions, please advise." This letter related to Petitioner's representation of TMH, and was written on Petitioner's law firm stationery. This letter and other correspondence between Petitioner and the administrator at TMH indicate that Petitioner's relationship was not directly with TMH, but rather was with the City Commission of the City of Tallahassee. It further appears that he viewed his arrangement with TMH as "merely a bookkeeping" arrangement that would favorably impact his retirement benefits. Petitioner's relationship with TMH was in the nature of a private legal representation. While some aspects of the relationship were in the nature of an employment relationship, on balance it appears that that was arranged for the purpose of allowing Petitioner to participate in FRS, rather than for the purpose of changing the relationship. The Division of Retirement conducted an audit of Petitioner's retirement status with FRS. On June 20, 1978, the Division advised Petitioner that he did not meet criteria for membership in FRS, and that he would not be entitled to retirement benefits from FRS based upon the work that he had performed for TMH. The Division has apparently returned contributions that were made on the Petitioner's behalf to the Petitioner or to TMH. In the last paragraph of his June 20 letter, the State Retirement Director stated: "I am sure you are aware there are certain administrative proceedings available to you under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1977) if you are dis- satisfied with my decision. I would be most appreciative if you would please notify me promptly if you decide to pursue one of those avenues." Petitioner did not request an administrative hearing until August 11, 1981. He initially decided not to pursue the matter further, and he requested a hearing only after he became convinced that other persons in similar circumstances were allowed to participate in FRS. While Petitioner testified that he heard from several persons whose circumstances were the same as his that they were allowed to participate in FRS, there is no evidence in the record of this matter from which it could be determined that anyone has been treated differently than Petitioner. Prior to 1979, there were no written memoranda or instructions issued by the Division of Retirement as guidelines for determining the eligibility of attorneys or other professionals for enrollment in FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Proceeding filed by Bryan W. Henry, and denying him reinstatement into the Florida Retirement System for the period January 1, 1974 through June, 1978. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Donohue, Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Mick & English, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner satisfies the eligibility requirements in Subsection 121.081(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), to purchase past service credit in the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a State Certified Paramedic by Harbor City Volunteer Ambulance Squad, Inc. (HCVAS), in Brevard County, Florida, from sometime in December 1976 through September 30, 1999. From October 1, 1999, through the date of the formal hearing, Petitioner was employed as a county employee in an identical capacity with Brevard County Fire Rescue (BCFR). Petitioner's employment with HCVAS and BCFR was continuous, with no break in service. Petitioner performed identical services with HCVAS and BCFR and had identical duties and responsibilities. At BCFR, Petitioner received credit for 80 percent of the seniority and leave accrued while Petitioner was employed with HCVAS. From sometime in October 1992 through September 30, 1999, HCVAS furnished emergency and non-emergency ambulance service in an area the parties refer to as the central part of Brevard County, Florida, that is legally described in Petitioner's Exhibit A (the service area). HCVAS furnished ambulance service pursuant to a contract with the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners (the County). HCVAS was an independent contractor with the exclusive right to provide ambulance service in the service area. The County, rather than HCVAS, provided emergency ambulance service for that part of the County outside the service area. A company identified in the record as Coastal Health Services provided non-emergency ambulance service outside the service area. HCVAS was an "employing entity which was not an employer under the [FRS]," within the meaning of Subsection 121.081(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2005). HCVAS was a private, non-profit company rather than a government entity. However, employees of HCVAS were not volunteers, but were full-time employees of HCVAS. HCVAS paid its employees, including Petitioner, from funds received from the County. The County retained exclusive control of communication and dispatching of emergency calls for the entire County, including the service area. The County required HCVAS to maintain communication equipment that was compatible with the central communication system. On October 1, 1999, the County effected an "assumption of functions or activities" from HCVAS within the meaning of Subsection 121.081(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2005). The County allowed the contract with HCVAS to expire on September 30, 1999. On April 13, 1999, the County authorized BCFR to provide emergency ambulance service to the service area previously served by HCVAS. The County also authorized the county manager to purchase rescue units and equipment and required the county manager to give first priority to units and equipment of HCVAS. Eligibility for HCVAS employees such as Petitioner to participate in the FRS arose through the assumption of HCVAS functions by the County. The County did not employ HCVAS employees, including Petitioner, as a result of competitive selection. The primary conditions of employment for HCVAS employees such as Petitioner were that each HCVAS employee must apply for employment with the County no later than May 29, 1999; possess a valid Florida driver's license; and pass a criminal background check. The County directed its Public Safety Department (Department) to give special consideration to HCVAS employees, including Petitioner, by hiring as many HCVAS employees as possible. Applications for employment from the general public were to be accepted only if employment positions remained unfilled after placing all qualified HCVAS employees in available positions. Approximately 95 HCVAS employees, including Petitioner, applied for employment with the County. The County employed approximately 90 of the 95 applicants. The five applicants who were not employed were rejected because the applicants either did not possess a valid Florida driver's license or did not pass the criminal background screening. Rejection of an applicant required approval of two supervisors. On October 1, 1999, the County recognized past service with HCVAS by new employees such as Petitioner. The County credited each new employee with seniority, annual leave, and sick leave based on a contractual formula negotiated with the labor union equal to 80 percent of seniority, annual leave, and sick leave earned while employed by HCVAS. On October 1, 1999, former HCVAS employees employed by the County, including Petitioner, became entitled to participate in the FRS system through the "assumption of functions or activities" by the County from HCVAS "which was not an employer under the system" within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2005). On the same date, Petitioner became a member of the special risk class of FRS and is "entitled to receive past-service credit . . . for the time" Petitioner "was an employee of [HCVAS] . . . the "other employing entity." On November 6, 2003, Petitioner applied to purchase credit in the FRS for his past service with HCVAS. On December 23, 2003, Respondent denied Petitioner's request on the ground that a "merger, transfer or consolidation" of functions between units of government did not occur. On January 8, 2004, Petitioner provided Respondent with a written reply. The reply explained that the application to purchase credit for past service was based on the County's assumption of functions or services by an employing entity that was not an employer under the FRS and not on a merger, transfer, or consolidation of functions between units of government. By letters dated April 16 and May 25, 2004, Respondent issued written statements of proposed Final Agency Action. On April 16, 2004, Respondent based its proposed agency action on the express ground that a "merger, transfer or consolidation" had not occurred when the County undertook emergency ambulance service in the service area. On May 25, 2004, Respondent added the additional ground that an assumption of functions did not occur between governmental units because HCVAS was a "not-for- profit corporation" and not a "unit of government."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's application to purchase credit in the FRS for past service with HCVAS. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Adrienne E. Trent, Esquire Allen & Trent, P.A. 700 North Wickham Road, Suite 107 Melbourne, Florida 32935 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is formerly the president of Brevard Ambulance Service, Inc., (BAS) a privately held corporation which contracted with Brevard County to provide the County with certain ambulance services within its territorial jurisdiction. The precise nature of the services and the business relation between BAS and the County is set out in a series of contracts covering the periods from October 1, 1969 to September 30, 1977. While employed as President and sole shareholder of BAS, Petitioner provided services to the Brevard County Civil Defense Agency as the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) coordinator. In the event of a disaster preparedness exercise, a national emergency, a space launch, or upon several other extraordinary occurrences, he was required to coordinate BAS's activities with the authorities in the County Civil Defense Office as well as with other ambulance service providers throughout Brevard and adjoining counties. The purpose of this coordination effort was to help assure that ambulance service was available when and where it was needed without undue delay. Brevard County is an unusually long county covering a distance in excess of 50 miles and thus required these coordination efforts. Petitioner rendered these coordination services to Brevard County Civil Defense Agency from 1961 until November 3, 1977, when he resigned his position with BAS and sold its assets. He became a full time employee of Brevard County on November 4, 1977, in the newly created position of Emergency Medical Services Director. Petitioner did not automatically secure this position. He was required to make application, be interviewed, compete with other applicants and be formally selected. There was no carry-over in benefits such as health insurance or accumulated leave from his prior position with BAS. Further, ambulance operations were not taken over on November 4, 1977 by Brevard County, but continued to be provided exclusively on a contract basis until March 1, 1978, when the County initiated its own service. In 1978, Petitioner made his first inquiry to FRS concerning his eligibility to purchase past service credit as EMS coordinator under Subsection 121.081(1)(g) Florida Statutes (F.S.) and Rule 22B-2.03(3), Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). Respondent initially declared Petitioner eligible to purchase past service credit based on the limited information furnished to it in 1978. At that time, Petitioner made no effort to go forward with the proposed purchase. In 1981, Petitioner attempted to purchase the credit and Respondent sought verification as to how petitioner had become a County employee, whether he had actually received a salary for the EMS Coordinator duties and whether an assumption of services had occurred. Finally, on June 20, 1983, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was not eligible to purchase past service credit. Petitioner received salary payments during the period from 1961 through 1977 from his employer BAS and estimates that approximately 5 percent of his time was spent in EMS coordination duties. He reasons that 5 percent of the salary which he earned between 1961 and 1977 was salary for EMS coordination functions, but he admits that the assignment of 5 percent of his salary was not made until 1978 when he first inquired into his eligibility to purchase past service credit. Petitioner had given no previous consideration to being paid for the EMS coordination duties and no specific payments for this function were provided by the County contracts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request to purchase past service retirement credit. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire Post Office Box 5286 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William A. Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to service credit in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from June 1, 1995, through August 2001.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a school psychologist, certified by the Florida Department of Education. From June 1995 through August 2001, Petitioner performed duties as a psychologist under "purchase of services agreements" with SBAC to perform special needs assessments for gifted children. These formal contracts were executed between Petitioner and SBAC in and for each successive school year during that period. Although there was the expectation that a new contract would be negotiated/signed each year, there was no guarantee to that effect. The annual contracts for June 1995 through August 2001, between SBAC and Petitioner provided that Petitioner was to assume all risks, and that he was a "consultant." They further provided that he was to be paid at a rate of $150.00 for each assessment he completed. Either party to the contract could terminate it on 30 days' notice. In pertinent part, the annual contracts described Petitioner as an independent consultant and not an employee in the following terms: * * * The CONSULTANT is an Independent Consultant and will perform all services at the Consultant's risk, assuming full responsibility for completion of the services stipulated below: Psychoeducational evaluations of students referred for determination of eligibility to the Gifted Program as shall be requested by the Board through its Director of Exceptional Student Education or Lead School Psychologist. All psychoeducational evaluations shall be completed within 30 days of having been received by the CONSULTANT. All reports and billing for services rendered by the CONSULTANT shall be submitted in a timely manner. All reports are to be submitted in triplicate. * * * CONSULTANT also acknowledges that in rendering the services provided herein, the CONSULTANT will be acting as an Independent Consultant, and not as an employee of the School Board of Alachua County. (Emphasis added.) The contracts contained no specific provision for reimbursement of Petitioner's expenses. However, a calculated amount for travel expenses was built into the fee of $150.00 per child. SBAC did not consider Petitioner an "employee" during the period of his annual contracts, because he was not filling a regularly established position. Accordingly, SBAC did not report to FRS any retirement information/contributions on the amounts it paid Petitioner during this period. Likewise, during the specified period, Petitioner received no paid leave or other employee benefits from SBAC. Also, SBAC did not provide unemployment compensation coverage or workers' compensation coverage for Petitioner during the specified period. While under contract as an independent consultant, Petitioner did not report his time to SBAC via a timesheet or otherwise. Rather, he was paid for each completed assessment under the terms of his respective contracts. He was only required to file his test results within five business days of the date he assessed a student. Between 1995 and 2001, SBAC reported Petitioner's pay for federal income tax purposes by Form 1099, rather than by Form W-2. A 1099 form is traditionally used for occasional employees and for independent contractors. W-2 forms are used for regular employees. Petitioner reported his income from SBAC as "other income," i.e. self-employment income. In a similar vein, SBAC withheld no taxes, Social Security, or Medicare deductions for Petitioner during this period. SBAC made no matching contributions for Social Security or Medicare. During the specified period, Petitioner was hired solely for special needs assessments. The time frame for testing by SBAC was established by law. Other than special needs assessments, Petitioner had no duties for SBAC, but he was assigned cases by SBAC as necessary to meet its caseload and time frame. Petitioner was only called upon when SBAC's school psychologists, who filled regularly established positions, were not available or could not timely meet the demand for assessments in a school year of 10 months' duration. Petitioner was required to hold a professional license as a psychologist to perform his SBAC contracts, and he was expected to perform his services for SBAC within the standards of his profession. His contracts provided for him to render personal services, and he could not hire an assistant or subcontract out his duties to another psychologist. SBAC could not instruct Petitioner how to do his job as a professional psychologist or what decision or recommendation to reach on any child. However, SBAC told him which text to use, and he was initially trained by another school psychologist on the testing instrument required by SBAC. Petitioner also received initial training from SBAC on how to report his assessments, and SBAC provided him with test kits and word processing assistance for each child assessment. SBAC set the format for his reports and provided him with a template therefor. Petitioner was not regularly provided office space by SBAC. However, he was allotted a room on each school's premises for each test, as he traveled from school to school within the county, and he had to do his testing on a day the specified child was in school and that school was open. Each test had to be completed within 30 days of its assignment, per his contracts. Petitioner was free to schedule one or more of his assessments on the dates most efficient for him, provided he met his deadlines. Petitioner's efforts for SBAC during this period might be described as "frequently recurring, but not regular." Petitioner never worked for SBAC more than four consecutive months during the entire time period at issue. During that period, he was on his own for defending his test results. Petitioner was required to carry his own professional liability insurance during the time in question, whereas then and now, SBAC "covered" their employees' liability insurance. Between 1995 and 2001, Petitioner was free to offer his professional services to other clients besides SBAC, but he chose not to do so. There was no profit or loss involved for SBAC or Petitioner in Petitioner's 1995-2001 service. Petitioner had to invest none of his personal funds to do his assessments. In September 2001, Petitioner was hired by SBAC in a half-time, regularly established position with all benefits, including sick leave, personal leave, and FRS membership. Upon that event, his duties were altered to include rendering any psychological assistance required by any SBAC school in which he was working. He is now reimbursed for travel by submitting request forms. He has continued to meet that job description and has filled that regularly established position to date. SBAC requested, and in 2002, received a letter-opinion from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) interpreting various federal statutes and regulations. That IRS letter-opinion concluded that during the period in question, the Petitioner was an "employee" of SBAC; that various federal forms might require filing or amending by SBAC; and that SBAC and Petitioner might need to pay yet-to-be determined amounts. That IRS opinion is based on facts submitted by SBAC and not necessarily in evidence; is based on federal laws which are not determinative of the Florida retirement issue before this forum, and was not necessarily final. Accordingly, it is not binding in the instant case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for membership and service credit in the FRS from June 1, 1995, through August 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Leonard D. Jackson 2731-B Northwest 104th Court Gainesville, Florida 32606-7174 Alberto Dominguez, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Conclusions There is competent substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Miami-Dade County owed a duty of care that was breached when its bus driver ran a red traffic signal, directly and proximately causing the Claimant’s permanent and severe injuries. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LOBBYIST’S FEES: In compliance with Section 768.28(8), Florida Statutes, but not with Section 3 of this claim bill, Claimant’s attorney has submitted a closing statement affirming that the attorney’s fees are 25 percent of the amount of the award, and that the lobbyists' fees are an additional 6 percent. The Claimants have entered into an agreement to pay costs that was approved by the guardian and the court. Costs are expected to range between $25,783.29, the amount as of January 15, 2007, to $75,783.29 by the end of the claim bill process. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: This is the first time that a claim bill has been filed to compensate Schneidine Theogene. RECOMMENDATIONS: For the reasons set forth in this report, I recommend that Senate Bill 56 (2008) be reported FAVORABLY. Respectfully submitted, cc: Senator Dave Aronberg Representative Carlos Lopez-Cantera Faye Blanton, Secretary of the Senate Eleanor M. Hunter Senate Special Master House Committee on Constitution and Civil Law Mark Kruse, House Special Master Counsel of Record
