The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, Daniel James Bradley's, application for licensure as a resident life including variable annuity and health insurance agent should be denied for the reasons stated in Respondent, Department of Financial Services', Notice of Denial dated April 26, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents in the State of Florida pursuant to the authority granted in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On January 3, 2004, Mr. Bradley filed an on-line application with the Department seeking licensure as a resident life including variable annuity and health insurance agent. The on-line application form included the following question: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered?. Mr. Bradley answered "No," which was a false answer. The Department conducted an internal investigation during the application process, and the criminal history check obtained by the Department revealed that in 1995 Mr. Bradley was charged with two counts of Obtaining Property for Worthless Check(s) (one check in an amount over $150 and one check in an amount less than $150). On May 31, 1995, in State of Florida v. Daniel J. Bradley, Case No. 94-2473F, in the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County, Florida, Mr. Bradley appeared before Judge Robert B. Bennett and entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Obtaining Property For a Worthless Check (over $150), which is a third degree felony in violation of Subsection 832.05(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). Judge Bennett withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed a fine and court cost in the amount of $250 that was paid by Mr. Bradley. Mr. Bradley testified that during the 1995 period, he was in the midst of a domestic dispute that was finalized in a dissolution of marriage, when he wrote two checks to Sears. He explained further that at the time the checks were written, sufficient funds were in the joint checking account at the bank, but his then-estranged wife withdrew all bank funds without his knowledge or consent resulting in the overdrafts. Explaining his "no" response to the criminal history question on his on-line licensure application form, Mr. Bradley asserted a lack of fully understanding the (intended) meaning of the term "punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more." Mr. Bradley testified that he "did not know, and had no reason to know, [or be concerned] that the worthless check charge to which he pled nolo contendere was punishable by imprisonment of one year or more," even though he knew the crime was a third- degree felony. Continuing, Mr. Bradley explained in detail his ongoing domestic entanglement then, as well as his financial obligations now. Mr. Bradley explained that he has undertaken the obligation to care for his parent(s) and his need for income to pay for his children's education. In effect, Mr. Bradley offered an "excusable neglect and a lack of knowledge" explanation for the "no" answer on his on-line licensure application form. Mr. Bradley earnestly insisted that it was not his "intent" to mislead, conceal, or lie about the criminal background question. He explained in detail that he "did not understand nor was he advised by his attorney, Susan Maulucci, or the Sarasota County Circuit Court that any offense that he had been accused or pled guilty to was punishable by a term of incarceration of one or more years." In conclusion, Mr. Bradley stated, "[I]f I had previous knowledge of such information I would never have answered incorrectly. If the question had addressed a felony charge punishable by one or more years, I would have certainly answered yes based on the assumption of a felony being the subject of the question not the period of punishment." It appears from his post-hearing submittal that he was under the impression that the term "felony" is missing from the question and that by the omission, he was somehow misled. The blame-shifting inference Mr. Bradley sought is that it was the omission by the Department to include the word "felony" in its application form that misled him. This suggestion is rejected. Mr. Bradley's explanation becomes even more suspect when one considers: his knowledge and experience as a military police officer; at the time he signed the plea document, it was clear that he was facing up to five years in prison for the crime(s) with which he was charged; when arrested on both misdemeanor and felony check charges, he spent the night in jail; and finally, he signed two bonds, one for the misdemeanor charge and a separate bond for the felony charge before he was released from jail. Mr. Bradley was individually and personally responsible for the accuracy of his answer. His misrepresentation of the truth by answering "no," if not intentional, supports the inference of a reckless or careless disregard as to the truth of the matter asserted. At the time he answered "no" on his application form, Mr. Bradley knew, without a doubt, that he had pled "no contest" to a felony worthless check charge in the Sarasota County Circuit Court in Florida. During his court appearance, he was identified and was personally informed by the presiding judge that he faced a felony charge, and he agreed to enter his plea of nolo contendere to that felony charge. On May 31, 1995, in open court, Mr. Bradley signed an "Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights" form that contained in paragraph 1, the following statement: "I am pleading to the charge of worthless check (2 counts), and I understand the maximum penalty provided by law is five (5) years prison." (Emphasis added.) After the court accepted his plea, sentenced him, and imposed court costs, Mr. Bradley signed the court's acknowledgement reflecting the disposition of the proceeding. Only after completion of the foregone process was Mr. Bradley free to leave the courtroom.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing the Petition herein filed by Petitioner, without prejudice, for Petitioner to reapply as provided in the Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(4). DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found Upon the suggestion of a special investigator with the Department of Insurance, a letter dated April 23, 1984, and signed by Northeast Regional Director Thomas P. Poston was written to the respondent at the address listed for him in the Tallahassee licensing office. This letter advised the respondent that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer had received complaints from Orange and Seminole Counties that he was recruiting clients during initial court appearances and that this appeared to be a violation of Section 648.44(b) of the Florida Statutes. The letter admonished respondent to immediately terminate such solicitation and advised him that any additional complaints would bring further action. The evidence does not establish whether respondent received this letter of April 23, 1984. The respondent was involved in another administrative proceeding with the petitioner, the facts of which were not brought into evidence in the instant proceeding. In the former proceeding, Case No. 84-L-3155, a Consent Order was entered which required respondent to pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 and placed him on probation for a period of one year with the condition that he strictly adhere to the Florida Insurance Code. On or about December 4, 1984, Kenneth Martin was working on the property of Ray Dittmore. Respondent had previously, in July of 1984, written three bailbonds for Mr. Martin, all of which had been forfeited due to Mr. Martin's failure to appear in court. Upon learning of the whereabouts of Mr. Martin, respondent sent his employee, George Burfield, to Mr. Dittmore's property to apprehend Martin and return him to custody. Mr. Dittmore was present when Mr. Burfield arrived to take Martin into custody and felt that Mr. Burfield had misconducted himself during the apprehension process. After the incident, Dittmore telephoned respondent to complain about the conduct of his employee Burfield. Later that same day, Mr. Dittmore went to the Orange County Jail with his attorney, Warren Linsey, for the purpose of posting a cash bond for Kenneth Martin. There were prisoners confined in the Orange County Jail on December 4, 1984. While Mr. Dittmore was at the booking window counting his money, approximately $3,000.00, respondent approached him. Mr. Linsey recalls that respondent immediately introduced himself as a bondsman and offered his services. George Cox, also a bondsman, was present and recalls that when respondent saw Mr. Dittmore counting money at the window, respondent approached him, stated that he was a bail bondsman and informed him that Dittmore did not have to post the cash and could use him (respondent) instead. Mr. Dittmore recalls that after he told the deputy that he wished to bond out Kenneth Martin, respondent approached him at the window and asked him if he was the Dittmore he had spoken to earlier that day. Dittmore then recalls that respondent told him he didn't have to put up $3,000.00 because respondent could sell him a bond. According to Mr. Dittmore, respondent also told him that he wouldn't bond Martin out, that Dittmore was "dumb" for doing so and would end up losing his money. Respondent, who had previously written about $1,800.00 worth of bonds on Kenneth Martin and only received $216.00 as a remission for returning him to custody on December 4, 1984, recalls the incident at the Orange County Jail with Mr. Dittmore as follows. From his nearby position at the booking window, he could overhear and see that a "Dittmore" was there to post a bond for Kenneth Martin. After inquiring of Mr. Dittmore if he was the same Dittmore he had spoken with earlier, respondent introduced himself, apologized for what had happened earlier that day, begged him not to bail Martin out and told him he was foolish for doing so. He does recall later saying to George Cox that there were better ways to invest cash. Because respondent had previously lost money on Kenneth Martin, he had no intention of writing another bond on him on the same date he had been responsible for Martin's return to custody. Joseph Barrow was arrested on May 29, 1985, and was taken to the Seminole County Jail. At the time of his arrest, he had been drinking alcoholic beverages. Although subpoenaed to appear as a witness in this administrative hearing, Joseph Barrow was released and was not called upon to testify by the petitioner. According to sworn testimony taken on January 28, 1986, Joseph Barrow recalls that after he was fingerprinted at the Seminole County Jail on the evening of May 29, 1985, he called home to have his wife contact a bail bondsman to get him out of jail. He does not know if his family did contact a bondsman that night. However, he did speak with a bail bondsman that night at the jail, but could not remember his name. The description of the bondsman given in Joseph Barrow's statement of January 28, 1986, matched the respondent's physical appearance at the hearing. Joseph's wife, Michele Barrow, testified that her husband telephoned her the night he was arrested and asked her to find a bondsman. Neither the time of that telephone conversation nor the family's immediate response to that request were established at the hearing. On May 30, 1985, James Barrow, Joseph's brother; Donna Brino, Joseph's sister; and Michele Barrow, Joseph's wife, were at the Seminole County Jail for the purpose of getting Joseph out of jail. There were prisoners confined at the jail on that date. James recalls that, as he was standing in line to obtain information regarding his brother, respondent was also waiting in line and asked him why he was there. James replied that he was there to get his brother out of jail and asked respondent if he was a bondsman. Respondent stated that he was and asked James who his brother was. After James told respondent that his brother was Joe Barrow, respondent referred to a white piece of paper and replied that he had talked to Joe the previous night and had advised him to wait until the hearing that morning to see if his bond would be reduced. When James learned that he would need $250.00 to get his brother out of jail, he left the jail and went to the bank. When he returned to the jail, respondent approached him and asked him if he had gotten the $250.00. James recalls that when he replied that he had, respondent said "Well, give me the money, and I'll get your brother out of jail." James did not give respondent the money because his sister and sister-in-law who were standing behind respondent, were shaking their head "no." Joseph told James that he had spoken to a bondsman the night before, but could not remember the bondman's name. Michele Barrow recalls that as James was waiting in line at an information window, respondent approached him, asked if he needed a bondsman, and told James that he had spoken to Joseph the night before. At that point in time, Donna Brino, Joseph's sister, was on the telephone trying to contact a bondsman. Donna Brino did not hear the conversation which occurred between James Barrow and the respondent prior to James leaving the jail for the bank. She was aware that Joseph had spoken to a bondsman the night before and that he did not remember who that was. Because of her use of pronouns in lieu of names, Ms. Brino's description of the events which transpired on May 30th at the Seminole County Jail is unclear. She apparently telephoned Action Bail Bonds and left a message. While waiting for the message to be returned, she saw Bruce Moncrief, another bondsman, and spoke with him about writing her brother's bond. She stated that after she had already made arrangements with bondsman Bruce Moncrief, respondent told her she was stupid for using Moncrief and attempted to obtain the money from her brother James. Respondent testified that he was called to the Seminole County Jail by someone in the Barrow family on the evening of May 29, 1985. He went to the jail and spoke with Joseph Barrow. Upon learning that Joseph could not then afford to arrange for the $5,000.00 bail which had been set, respondent advised Joseph to wait until the next day when the amount of bail would be reduced. Respondent states that Joseph told him that his brother would get some money and would be contacting him. Respondent told Joseph that he would be at the jail the next day for the first appearances. Respondent also states that Joseph's brother, James, called him the next morning and he told James that it was better to wait until the first appearance and the reduction of the bond, that he would be at the jail for first appearances and that he would meet him there at that time. Respondent admits that he did approach James at the Seminole County Jail because he looked like his brother, Joseph, and said "I'm the one you're looking for. I talked to you this morning." After Joseph's bond was reduced to $2,500.00, respondent communicated this to James, and James left to go to the bank to get the money. At this point, respondent believed that he was going to write the bond, so he began preparing the papers and waited 30 to 45 minutes for James to return with the money. It was not until James returned from the bank that respondent learned he was not going to write Joseph's bond and that the family had obtained Mr. Moncrief instead.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint against the respondent be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this day of September, 1986. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-0462 The proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner and the respondent have been carefully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner 6 and 7. Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 8 and 9. Rejected. These ultimate conclusions are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 11. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 19 and 20. Rejected as Unsupported by the evidence. Respondent - Respondent's proposals contain unnumbered and mixed factual findings and legal conclusions. Each of the topics included has been addressed in either the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, except: Page 2, first paragraph Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Page 4, last full paragraph Rejected, Unsupported and irrelevant in light of factual findings and legal conclusions. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Thornburg, Esquire Bill Gunter Department of Insurance Insurance Commissioner Legal Division and Treasurer 413-B Larson Building Department of Insurance Tallahassee, Florida 32301 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was found guilty of breaking and entering in 1974, and was charged with burglary and attempted escape in 1976. The burglary charge was, upon adjudication reduced to trespassing and too attempted escape charge was dropped. Respondent's license application form contains the question, "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" Details are required if a "yes" answer is given. Petitioner disclosed the 1974 breaking and entering conviction but did not include either of the 1976 charges or the 1976 misdemeanor conviction. However, this was not an attempt by Petitioner to withhold information, but was rather a misunderstanding of the request to list all felony charges regardless of disposition and not merely those involving felony convictions. Petitioner's reputation for truthfulness was attested to by the police officer who arrested him in 1974 and 1976, and monitored his subsequent rehabilitation. Petitioner readily admitted the acts for which he was arrested in 1974, and has never been otherwise known to lie. Petitioner, who was 26 years old at the time he filed his application in April of 1980, has overcome his earlier difficulties. Since 1976, he has completed a drug therapy program, taken mental health technician courses at a community college, and worked as a counselor and supervisor in a community mental health facility. He is currently a convenience store manager in Fort Pierce, and recently trained part-time with a local insurance agency in anticipation of licensing.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Ricky D. Brown for filing for examination as ordinary-combination life including disability agent be granted. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon Country, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ricky D. Brown 601 North 15th Street Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 Leon Rolle, Esquire Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner 220 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, for the reasons alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated February 10, 1984, the Petitioner should revoke the Respondent's license and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent or impose some lesser penalty authorized by statute.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted into evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact: 1/ On June 16, 1982, the Respondent, Shelby Dewey Blackman, executed an Application for Qualification as Nonresident Life Agent, which application he thereafter caused to be filed with the Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer. In that application Mr. Blackman stated that his residence address and his business address in his state of residence were both "2549 New York Avenue, Pascagoula, Miss. 39567." (Pet. Ex. 1; Tr. 12-13) The Department of Insurance and Treasurer does not issue Nonresident Life Agent licenses to people who are in fact residents of the State of Florida. Such licenses are only issued to people who are nonresidents of this state. Applicants for Resident Life Agent licenses are required to take an examination prior to licensure. Applicants for Nonresident Life Agent licenses are not required to take an examination prior to licensure. The Department would not have issued a Nonresident Life Agent license to Mr. Blackman if the Department had known that Mr. Blackman was a Florida resident. (Tr. 14) As a result of the filing of the application described above, the Department issued to Mr. Blackman a license as a Nonresident Life and Health Agent for the American Sun Life Insurance Company, which was the only company he was authorized to write insurance for in the State of Florida. When Mr. Blackman received his license, the license listed the name of the the only company he was authorized to write insurance for in this state. Licensees who are authorized to represent more than one insurance company in this state receive a separate license for each company they are authorized to represent. Mr. Blackman had only the one license to represent one company. (Pet. Ex. 1 and 2; Tr. 14-18) At all times material to this case, Mr. Blackman was a resident of Santa Rosa County, Florida. Specifically, Mr. Blackman was a resident of Santa Rosa County, Florida, at the time he applied for and was issued a Nonresident Life and Health Agent license and at the time of writing the four insurance applications which are described hereinafter. (Pet. Ex. 3; Tr. 20-21, 53) Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South does not currently hold, and has never held, a Certificate of Authority to write insurance in the State of Florida. In November of 1982 Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South was licensed to write insurance in the State of Alabama and Mr. Blackman was authorized by Continental to write insurance for Continental in the State of Alabama. (Pat. Ex. 8; Tr. 24-25) During November of 1982, Mr. Blackman wrote four applications for health insurance policies to be issued by the Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South. One was an application dated November 2, 1982 from Mr. Thomas J. Barrow. Another was an application dated November 4, 1982, from Mr. Jimmie R. Williams. The last two were applications dated November 12, 1982, from Mr. Henry E. Marshall and Mr. Ercy L. Henderson, respectively. All four of the applications were written and signed in Jay, Florida. No part of the transactions which culminated in the writing of the four applications took place in the State of Alabama. On three of the applications Mr. Blackman wrote that the application was written and signed in Brewton, Alabama, and on one of the applications Mr. Blackman wrote that the application was written and signed in Flomaton, Alabama. The statements that the applications were written and signed in Alabama were false statements that Mr. Blackman knew to be false statements. (Pet. Ex. 4, 5, 6, 7; Tr. 37-38, 42, 49, 53-54) The false statements written on the four applications described above were relied upon by the Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South and were, therefore, material misrepresentations. If Mr. Blackman had truthfully written on the applications that they were written and signed in the State of Florida, Continental would not have issued policies on the basis of those four applications because Continental was not licensed to write insurance in the State of Florida. The MM-6 policy is an insurance policy that Continental markets in Alabama and the false statements on the applications which indicated that the policies were applied for and completed in Alabama induced Continental to issue the policies. (Tr. 25-27, 32, 34-35)
Recommendation For all of the reasons set forth above, and particularly because of Mr. Blackman's demonstrated disregard for the truth, I RECOMMEND that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order revoking Mr. Blackman's license and eligibility to hold a license. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of July, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9575 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edward Willison Carroll, III, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a Credit Life, including Credit Disability Insurance Agent; General Lines - Property, Casualty, Surety and Miscellaneous Lines Agent; General Lines - Motor Vehicle Physical Damage and Mechanical Breakdown Agent; Ordinary Life, including Health Insurance Agent; Health Insurance Agent; and Automobile and Inspection and Warranty Association Salesman. On March 10, 1980, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as a General Lines Agent (Property, Casualty, and Miscellaneous Lines) . Question number 13 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. On May 28, 1982, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as an Ordinary Life including Disability Agent. Question number 15 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. Respondent's answers to question 13 on the March 10, 1980, application and question 15 on the March 28, 1982, application were false. On December 11, 1970, the State Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, filed an information with the circuit court which charged that respondent did on December 3, 1970, in Leon County, Florida ... knowingly commit a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of Alice Leigh Divita, a female child under the age of fourteen years, to-wit: of the age of six years, without intent to commit rape upon said child, contrary to Section 800.04, F.S. On March 9, 1971, respondent entered a plea of guilty to the crime of fondling, as charged in the information. The court withheld adjudication of guilty and imposition of sentence, and placed respondent on probation for a period of three years. At hearing, respondent conceded that he had been charged with the aforementioned felony. He averred, however, that his failure to disclose such charge on his applications was not intended to be deceitful but was premised on his belief that he could properly answer no to such inquiries because adjudication of guilty had been withheld. While respondent may reasonably have believed that he could respond in the negative to an inquiry concerning felony convictions, his contention that he held an honest belief that he could also respond in the negative to inquiries about whether the had ever been charged with a felony is not persuasive. But for the foregoing charge, respondent has not been charged or convicted of any other felonies. Nor, has the respondent been shown to have engaged in any improprieties as an insurance agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered suspending respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure for three months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1988. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2 & 3. Addressed in paragraph 2. 4 & 5. Addressed in paragraph 3. 6. Addressed in paragraph 5. 7 & 8 Addressed in paragraph 6. 9 & 10. Addressed in paragraphs 7 and 8. 11. Addressed in paragraph 9. 12-14. Rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas L. Neilson, Esquire 105 West Fifth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 The Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied to the Respondent for licensure as a general lines, and a life and health insurance agent on or about February 8, 1990. By letter dated May 17, 1990, the Petitioner was informed that his applications for examination were denied based upon a finding that he lacked fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the insurance business. Petitioner timely requested a hearing to determine if he is qualified to take these licensure examinations. On or about January 3, 1986, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to two counts in a superseding indictment filed in Case Number 84-00603(S)-05 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Based upon this plea, the Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to defraud an insurance company and filing a false insurance claim, each count being a felony involving moral turpitude. He was sentenced to three years probation, and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000. Special conditions of probation included prohibiting the Petitioner from engaging in the insurance business, and requiring that he make restitution to the Hartford Insurance Group in the sum of $1,778.08. On or about August 15, 1986, the Insurance Department of the State of New York revoked the Petitioner's insurance broker's license, based upon his felony conviction as set forth above. The Petitioner successfully completed his period of probation in New York on January 2, 1989, including payment of the $10,000 fine and restitution in the amount of $1,778.08. On or about September 22, 1989, the Board of Parole of the State of New York issued a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities to the Petitioner which removes bars to employment and licensure automatically imposed by the laws of the State of New York as a result of his conviction. However, this Certificate specifies that it shall not prevent any administrative or licensing body or board from relying upon this conviction as a basis for the exercise of its discretionary power to refuse to issue a license. The Petitioner failed to disclose on his applications for examination that his insurance broker's license in New York had been revoked. In fact, he specifically answered "no" to the question on these applications concerning whether his license had ever been revoked in another state. The Petitioner did disclose on his applications for examination that he had been charged with a felony in New York, and indicated that he had entered a plea to a single charge. He stated on his applications, however, that he had not been convicted by any court. The Petitioner claims that he did not know that his New York license had been revoked. Rather, he testified that he had sought to surrender his license in New York after his conviction in 1986, and thought that the administrative action had been concluded with his license surrender. He claims he never was notified of any hearing, and did not receive a copy of the order of revocation issued by the Insurance Department in New York. The Petitioner also claims that he entered his plea of guilty as a matter of convenience in order to avoid a long and expensive trial, and on the advise of his counsel. He maintains that he did not file a false insurance claim and did not conspire to defraud any insurance company. Rather, he testified that he was very ill at the time, and did not expect to live. In order to avoid the strain and expense of a trial, and since he did not believe he would ever again be physically able to engage in the insurance business, he agreed to resolve the criminal charges against him with a plea of guilty to two counts in the superseding indictment issued against him. Finally, he testified that he indicated on his applications that he had not been convicted by any court since he had not had a jury trial, and he was under the impression that a person can be convicted only if found guilty by a jury. Based upon his demeanor at hearing, it is found that the Petitioner is a credible witness and that his claims that he did not know his New York license had been revoked and that he thought a person could only be convicted if found guilty by a jury are truthful. Nevertheless, the Petitioner was in error regarding both claims, and as a result, he answered questions on his applications in a false and incomplete manner. He was convicted on two felony counts, and his license was revoked in New York based on those convictions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the determination that he is not qualified to take the examination for licensure as a general lines, and a life and health insurance agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Rejected as a summary of the evidence (Exhibit P-2) and not a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted and Rejected, in part, in Finding 6. Adopted, in part, in Finding 2, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary, simply a summation of testimony, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding 8. Rejected in Finding 9. Rejected as a comment on the record and not a proposed finding of fact. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark E. Berman, Esquire 2450 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 401 Hollywood, FL 33020 Gordon Thomas Nicol, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, PLaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities’ (Agency’s) intended action to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner is a 29-year-old male who lives in Leesburg, Florida, with his wife, Jasmine Hall. Petitioner has four daughters whom he is actively engaged in parenting.2/ Petitioner is employed by a bail bond agency owned by his father-in-law. Petitioner is pursuing his bachelor’s degree in organizational management at Lake Sumter State College and anticipates graduating Spring 2017. Petitioner is the second oldest of five children raised by their mother, not knowing their fathers. Petitioner described his childhood as difficult, being raised without a male role model and in a rough area of town where violent crime was prevalent. Petitioner explained that he was studious, made good grades, and worked odd jobs throughout his childhood and young adulthood to help support the family. Despite his work ethic and good grades, he did make some poor decisions and fell in with the wrong crowd. Petitioner was exposed to violent acts in his community. In one incident, Petitioner witnessed his best friend being shot in the head at a nightclub. Petitioner has overcome many of the hardships he encountered in his childhood and desires to improve the future for himself and his children, provide for his family with a steady full-time job, and be financially secure, rather than living paycheck-to-paycheck as his mother did. The Disqualifying Offense On April 24, 2011, following a visitation with his two children at the time, Petitioner returned the children to their mother’s home. The details of the disqualifying offense are in dispute, but the record supports the following findings. Petitioner and the children’s mother became involved in a verbal altercation, during which Petitioner threw a can of soda at her. The record did not clearly establish that the soda can struck the children’s mother, but did establish that soda was splashed on her. After throwing the soda, Petitioner entered his vehicle with the intention to leave. The children’s mother followed him and hit the driver’s side window of Petitioner’s vehicle, causing the driver’s door to close before Petitioner’s hand was completely inside the vehicle. This angered Petitioner, who then exited the vehicle. The victim ran away from Petitioner, who proceeded to the victim’s vehicle and kicked the side of her vehicle leaving a dent in the vehicle. Petitioner then left the scene. Petitioner’s children, who were inside their mother’s home, did not witness the incident. According to the police report of the incident, the victim had no physical marking on her body, but her shirt was wet at the shoulder consistent with being hit with a soda can. On May 11, 2011, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to one count of domestic battery and one count of criminal mischief in an amount of $200 or less. Adjudication was withheld and Petitioner was ordered to serve 12 months’ probation, which terms required him to make restitution for the property damage, attend a batterer’s intervention course, maintain no contact with the victim, and incur no new law violations. Petitioner was granted early termination of probation on November 7, 2011, having complied with all terms of the probation. Subsequent Criminal History Petitioner has had no criminal history subsequent to the disqualifying offense. Petitioner has been cited for a number of traffic infractions since the incident: three for speeding, one for running a stop sign, and one for driving without a seatbelt.3/ Petitioner was also cited for driving without a license in May 2014. Petitioner’s license was in effect, but he failed to have it on his person at the time of the traffic stop. Petitioner has disposed of all his traffic infractions. Subsequent Employment History Petitioner has been continuously employed since the disqualifying offense, mostly as a laborer. He has unloaded trucks and tracked inventory for Target, cleaned the plant and maintained machines for American Cement Company, and worked as a day laborer for Labor Ready. Petitioner began working for Angle Truss in June 2015 in truss fabrication. Angle Truss is owned by Petitioner’s father-in-law, Pernell Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell testified on Petitioner’s behalf. Mr. Mitchell was, until recently, a law enforcement officer with the Leesburg Police Department, and served as school resource officer and D.A.R.E. instructor at Petitioner’s elementary school.4/ Mr. Mitchell has known Petitioner since Petitioner was in the fifth grade. Mr. Mitchell has chosen to personally mentor Petitioner, and has had significant interactions with him over the past seven or more years. Mr. Mitchell owns a bail bonding agency. As of the date of the hearing, Petitioner was employed at Mr. Mitchell’s bail bond agency. Mr. Mitchell finds Petitioner trustworthy enough to leave him in charge of the agency when Mr. Mitchell is out of town. Mr. Mitchell also owns Wings of Love, a group home and Medicaid Waiver provider in Leesburg, Florida. Mr. Mitchell hosts his group home clients at his personal residence for a family dinner once each week. Petitioner and his family attend the dinners, along with the clients’ families. Petitioner interacts with the clients during dinner, and often plays basketball or other games with them following dinner. Mr. Mitchell describes Petitioner as caring, patient, and compassionate with the clients. He has observed that the clients gravitate toward him because he treats them with respect. Subsequent Education and Personal History Petitioner has attained significant educational goals and taken on many new responsibilities since the 2011 incident. In 2012, Petitioner joined Citadel of Hope, a church in Leesburg. The following year, Petitioner joined the church’s security team, volunteering to guard doorways and patrol the parking lot during services. In 2014, Petitioner joined the church’s outreach ministry, which raises funds to support missionaries abroad and to provide food and toiletries for the local community in need. Petitioner completed an Associate in Arts degree from Lake Sumter State College in May 2014, and an Associate in Science degree (Criminal Justice Technology) from the college in August 2015. Petitioner continues to pursue his education, and anticipates completing his Bachelor’s degree in organizational management in the spring of 2017. Petitioner has continuously maintained his employment while in school. James Cason, a librarian at the college, submitted a character reference letter for Petitioner’s exemption application. Mr. Cason became familiar with Petitioner through Petitioner’s use of the library during 2014 and 2015. In the letter, Mr. Cason described Petitioner as determined and having a positive attitude. Mr. Cason was impressed with Petitioner’s character, his dependability, and his ability to manage his school and work schedules. In 2014, Petitioner voluntarily took a parenting class. After pursuing premarital counseling, Petitioner married his wife, Jasmine Hall, in June 2015. Together, Petitioner and his wife, along with the birth mother, are raising his four children. Petitioner’s Exemption Request On his exemption questionnaire, Petitioner described the events of the disqualifying offense as follows: On 4/24/11, the mother of my kids and I had a verbal disagreement as I attempted to return my children home after my weekend visitation. She became irate [and] slammed the car door on my wrist. At that point, I threw the remainder of my soda on her. Although it was wrong at the time I thought it was better than physically retaliating and striking her. I also put a small dent in her vehicle before I left. I was subsequently arrested 15 minutes later. Petitioner indicated that there were no stressors in his life at the time of the incident, but that he “was just a little upset about having [his] wrist shut in [his] car door.” Michael Sauvé is the Agency’s deputy regional operations manager for the central region. Mr. Sauvé reviewed Petitioner’s exemption request and made the recommendation to the director to deny the request. According to Mr. Sauvé, he recommended denial of Petitioner’s exemption request because, in his application, Petitioner was not forthcoming with the details of the offense, minimized the offense, shifted blame to the victim, and did not genuinely express remorse. Further, due to the number of moving violations for which Petitioner has been cited since the disqualifying offense, Mr. Sauvé doubts Petitioner’s ability to safely transport clients. Mr. Sauvé questioned the veracity of Petitioner’s account of the disqualifying offense, particularly with Petitioner’s claim that he sustained an injury to his wrist during the altercation. He speculated that Petitioner fabricated the injury “after the fact” to justify his actions on the day in question. In support of this opinion, Mr. Sauvé twice pointed to the fact that the police report contains no documentation of Petitioner’s injury. He testified that “[i]f there was something in the police report that talked about the wrist, if there was something in any of the other documents that we saw that mentioned this injury to his wrist, I would feel a lot differently than I do today.”5/ Petitioner testified that he did report his injury to the arresting officer, who did not include it in the report. Petitioner also credibly described, in some detail, how the injury to his wrist occurred during the altercation with the victim. The evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner fabricated the injury. Next, in Mr. Sauvé’s opinion, Petitioner’s response that he “put a small dent in her vehicle” was an attempt to minimize the damage he caused to the victim’s vehicle. Mr. Sauvé explained, “The criminal records show that it--the criminal mischief charge was $500 in property damage. I don’t know very much about cars, but that seems like it might be more than a small dent.” While the arresting officer estimated the damage to the vehicle at $500, Petitioner was actually charged with criminal mischief in the amount of $200 or less. No automobile repair expert is needed to establish that a small dent may very well cost at least $200 to repair. Mr. Sauvé’s conclusion, that Petitioner’s response was an attempt to minimize the damage, is inconsistent with Petitioner’s response to question four, in which he acknowledged causing approximately $500 in property damage to the victim’s car. It is illogical to conclude that Petitioner was attempting to minimize damage to the vehicle in his answer to question one, when three questions later, Petitioner disclosed the exact amount of vehicle damage reported on the arrest affidavit. Mr. Sauvé was particularly troubled by Petitioner’s answer to question number four, which required the applicant to explain the “[d]egree of harm to victim or property (permanent or temporary), damage or injuries[.]” In response to that question, Petitioner wrote, “There was no harm to the victim. There was approximately $500 worth of property damage to the victims [sic] car that I made restitution for.” Mr. Sauvé questioned Petitioner’s conclusion that there was no harm to the victim. He explained, as follows: If I give him the benefit of the doubt by his statements and I go back to his account that’s set forth on page 27, question 1, it-- it doesn’t sound to me like there was no harm that the [mother of his children] encountered. She--he took a soda and threw it at her. When you throw something at someone and physically injure them, whether or not it’s something that just leaves a bruise or anything, that’s scary.6/ Apparently, Mr. Sauvé would have liked Petitioner to state, in answer to this question, that Petitioner scared the victim. The victim may have indeed been fearful, but the question does not ask the applicant to speculate as to the victim’s state of mind at the time of the incident. The question is phrased to elicit factual information from the applicant. Petitioner’s statement that the victim suffered no physical harm is both factual and supported by the police officer’s observation at the scene that the victim had no physical markings on her.7/ Mr. Sauvé’s recommendation to deny the exemption request was further influenced by his belief that the children witnessed the altercation between their parents. He testified as follows: It’s especially scary when the children that he just finished his visitation with were potentially within earshot. The statements in the police report indicate that the children were--they had just went [sic] inside the house. So if they’re outside--in my mind, was trying to envision the circumstances. And in my mind, I saw them outside, the children inside. I don’t know if they heard. I don’t know what happened.8/ The only evidence on this issue is the arresting officer’s statement, as advised by the children’s mother, that the children went inside the house before the altercation took place. There is no evidence to support a finding that the children either witnessed or overheard the altercation between their parents. Mr. Sauvé’s speculation, or his “envision[ing of] the circumstances,” is irrelevant. The factual circumstances surrounding the incident are relevant, not what Mr. Sauvé saw in his mind. Finally, in Mr. Sauvé’s opinion, Petitioner’s answers on the questionnaire do not express remorse for the disqualifying offense. In particular, Mr. Sauvé pointed to the following two statements made by Petitioner on the questionnaire: (1) “Although it was wrong at the time I thought it was better than physically retaliating and striking her”; and (2) “I regret that I reacted during the situation as opposed to calling the police and filing a report for the physical pain that I endured.” In Mr. Sauvé’s opinion, the first statement was “peculiar and off putting” and he was concerned that five years after the incident, Petitioner would remark (in Mr. Sauvé’s words), “well, I didn’t hit her.” On the one hand, Petitioner’s statement does appear to minimize the offense. However, it cannot be overlooked that, on the continuum of battery offenses, throwing soda at a person (with a force such that it leaves absolutely no physical mark) is on the lower, or minimal, end of the scale. On the other hand, the first statement documents Petitioner’s awareness that he had other choices available to him during the incident, and that, even during the heat of the moment, Petitioner exercised some degree of restraint. Throwing the soda was indeed a better choice than hitting the mother of his children. The second statement is indeed concerning. It is flippant and may be interpreted to shift blame to the victim. It is understandable how Mr. Sauvé could have been persuaded, based solely on these two statements, that Petitioner was not sincerely remorseful for his offense. Fortunately, the undersigned had an advantage not afforded the Agency--live testimony from the Petitioner in connection with his application. Final Hearing At the final hearing, Petitioner exhibited none of the flippant attitude that might be gleaned from the two statements discussed above. Petitioner took responsibility for his actions and admitted that he knew it was wrong to throw the soda on the victim. In fact, Petitioner testified that he never should have let the incident escalate and he should have avoided reacting at all. Petitioner presented as a soft-spoken, intelligent, and earnest individual, whose concern for both his family and the developmentally-disabled community was profound and genuine. His testimony underlined his motivation to improve his circumstances, attain meaningful employment, and provide a better quality of life for his family. Petitioner was justifiably proud of the educational achievements he has attained since the offense. His dedication to school was equaled by his dedication to the church and the ministries with which he has chosen to volunteer. While the Agency did consider a character reference letter from Mr. Mitchell, which was included in Petitioner’s application, the Agency did not have the benefit of Mr. Mitchell’s live testimony. The letter did not cover the extent of the relationship between Mr. Mitchell and the Petitioner, nor Mr. Mitchell’s dedication to mentoring Petitioner over the last several years. Mr. Mitchell’s testimony was both credible and compelling. He exhibited a deep understanding of the negative social circumstances Petitioner has overcome, and wisdom regarding the excellent role model Petitioner could serve for young black men and boys. The fact that Mr. Mitchell has been, since June 2015, Petitioner’s father-in-law, does not diminish the credibility of his testimony. To the contrary, the fact that Petitioner has so recently married into Mr. Mitchell’s family is strong evidence of the trust and confidence that has been earned by Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Mitchell is Petitioner’s current employer, a fact not evident from his character reference letter. As an employer, Mr. Mitchell has been in a position to observe Petitioner’s ability to cope with stressful situations in a business setting. Mr. Mitchell’s account of Petitioner’s interaction with current clients at Wings of Love was also unavailable to the Agency during formulation of its intended decision to deny. This testimony was compelling as it underscores Petitioner’s compassion toward persons with developmental disabilities, and his demonstrated ability to deal with them respectfully. In addition, Petitioner introduced in evidence three letters of reference which were not included with his application. The most significant of the letters was submitted by Tanya Harris-Rocker. Ms. Harris-Rocker was one of Petitioner’s college instructors with whom he remains in contact. She described Petitioner as both diligent and personable. Ms. Harris-Rocker observed that Petitioner meets deadlines, submits quality work, and puts in many hours toward his studies. She highlighted Petitioner as an independent thinker and praised him for his ability to separate himself from his peers who have chosen less productive paths. Ms. Harris-Rocker attested to Petitioner’s goals of attaining educational achievements and providing an exemplary role model for his children. Despite the isolated incident occurring more than five years ago, Petitioner has a cordial relationship with the mother of his children and they work cooperatively to raise their children in a positive environment. Petitioner is determined to give his children the stability and support of two loving, devoted parents, an advantage he was denied. The record is devoid of evidence that Petitioner would pose a threat to residents of a group home for the developmentally disabled.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities be entered granting Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 2016.
Findings Of Fact On March 23, 1992, Petitioner executed and subsequently submitted to Respondent agency his sworn application for licensure as a life and variable annuity and health insurance agent. On November 9, 1992, the Respondent notified Petitioner by Denial Letter that his application for licensure had been denied because his nondisclosure of past felony convictions and his representation that he had no such convictions was deemed a material misrepresentation and because the convictions themselves constituted a bar to licensure. The denial named the convictions and cited applicable statutes. On his application, Petitioner had been asked several questions in a run-on sentence. He filled in the answer NO to each element of the sentence as follows: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude NO, or a felony NO or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or conviction has been entered? NO" However, on June 3, 1985, Petitioner was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia with one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, a felony punishable by one year or more of imprisonment in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2, and one count of Travel in Interstate Commerce With Intent to Promote, Manage, Establish and Distribute Cocaine, a felony punishable by one year or more imprisonment in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 1952(a)(3) and (2). On August 23, 1985, Petitioner was found guilty and convicted of the foregoing felony charges and was sentenced to five years in federal prison followed by a special parole term of three years. At the time of formal hearing, Petitioner was serving his probationary term and was under parole supervision. On July 23, 1987, Petitioner was found guilty of criminal contempt of court in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 401 and Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and was sentenced to ninety days imprisonment. Petitioner has made significant amendment of life and life-style since his incarceration and during parole. He is gainfully employed, happily married, and the father of a seventeen month old child. He seeks employment in the insurance industry to further better himself and contribute to society. He testified that he answered the first part of the question as "no" because he did not consider his crimes to be crimes of moral turpitude, which, in his opinion, would be such crimes as fraud or child molestation. As to the rest of the question, he stated that he had no recollection of answering "no," but admitted he signed the application verifying the answer, "no" as true. He suggested that he may have been interpreting each successive element of the question as relating back to "crimes of moral turpitude," when he answered "no".
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order ratifying its denial of Petitioner's application for licensure. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of May, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-2060 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner's proposals are not numbered and constitute only admissions and argument. The admissions have been incorporated in the findings of fact as appropriate. The paragraphs of argument are rejected as argument and because they are not proposed findings of fact. Respondent's PFOF: Respondent's proposed findings of fact 1-9 are accepted in substance except where unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 John R. Dunphy, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Carlos A. Salas 10150 Arrowhead Drive East Unit #5 Jacksonville, FL 32257
Findings Of Fact On October 19, 1982, the Petitioner Mikal Talib Hamin applied for licensure as a general lines insurance agent. The Respondent Department of Insurance denied the Petitioner's application on March 29, 1983, due to his failure to inform the Department on other applications for insurance licensure that he had been charged with or convicted of a felony. This denial was based on the Petitioner's previous applications for licensure as an ordinary life insurance and health insurance agent in which the Petitioner informed the Department that he had neither been charged with nor convicted of a felony. On March 3, 1973, the Petitioner, then known as Michael Thomas Hanks was convicted of robbery in the criminal court of record, Dade County, Florida, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The Petitioner was released from prison on October 25, 1977 and was on parole supervision until October 25, 1979. When the Petitioner was convicted, he was 17 years old. Since his release from prison, the Petitioner has obtained his GED, been steadily employed and has encountered no other problems with the criminal justice system. The Petitioner is married and is three semesters away from obtaining a college degree in Business Administration. Due to the Petitioner's positive adjustment to parole, Martin Carroll, the Petitioner's parole officer recommended that the Parole Commission terminate the Petitioner's parole ahead of schedule. The Parole Commission granted early termination and the Petitioner's civil rights were restored effective March 22, 1979, by the Office of Executive Clemency. On January 24, 1982 and March 26, 1982, the Petitioner applied for licensure as a disability and ordinary life agent, respectively. Both of these applications asked the Petitioner whether he had been charged with or convicted of a crime and on both applications he stated "no". The Petitioner subsequently sat for these exams, passed the exams and was licensed as a disability and ordinary life agent. In completing these applications, the Petitioner consulted Jeff Dickerson, an insurance agent for whom be worked at the time, who advised the Petitioner that he need not disclose his previous conviction because of the length of time that had passed and the fact the Petitioner was only 17 when the conviction occurred. The Petitioner followed this advice and did not disclose his past felony conviction on his applications. Subsequently, the Petitioner went to work for another insurance agent, Hakim Shaeed, and applied for licensure as a general lines agent. In completing this application, the Petitioner consulted Shaeed, who informed him that the prior felony conviction should be disclosed to the Department. The Petitioner informed the Department of the misstatement on his prior applications, pending application and his felony conviction by letter to Joe Crutchfield, dated March 21, 1983. On November 15, 1978, the Petitioner changed his name from Michael Thomas Hanks, the name under which he was convicted, to Mikal Talib Hamin. The Petitioner submitted letters from Nashid Sabir, Esquire, Lorrett Duffy, Personnel Administrator, Broward Cablevision, Alphonse Wright, Coordinator Drug Abuse and Prevention Program, Liberty City Youth, Hakim Fakir, P.U.L.S.E. Coordinator, and B. W. Smith, an insurance agent, attesting to his good character and reputation in the community.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 83-1435 dated July 13, 1983, be dismissed. Mikal Talib Hamin be allowed to sit for examination as a general lines agent. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th this day of September, 1983.
