The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice (“Respondent” or “Department”), is liable to Petitioner, Tequilla Lockwood (“Petitioner”), for employment discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes (2019).1
Findings Of Fact The Department is a criminal justice agency of the State of Florida, whose mission is to increase public safety by reducing juvenile delinquency through effective prevention, intervention, and treatment services, designated to strengthen families and turn around the lives of troubled youth. See § 20.316, Fla. Stat. Petitioner is a Black female, age 61,2 who has been employed by the Department as a secretary specialist, in career service, in the Office of 2 Respondent’s age is as stated in her Petition filed on September 10, 2020. Probation and Community Intervention (“Probation”), Northwest Region, Circuit 2, since February 9, 2007. Petitioner was hired as a secretary specialist, in Position No. 80019949, at an initial salary of $20,734.74, or $797.49 biweekly. State Personnel System The Department is a state agency in the State Personnel System (“SPS”), which is the employment system for the Executive Branch of state government and its applicable pay plans. Section 110.2035, Florida Statutes, authorizes the SPS classification and compensation program for positions in the career service, selected exempt service, and senior management service. In addition, Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-31, Classification Plan, addresses management of the classification system, and rule 60L-32, Compensation and Benefits, addresses management of salary and other benefits. “Compensation” within the SPS is governed by section 110.2035, as is the classification system. In addition, rule 60L-32 establishes the policies and procedures applicable to all occupations in the SPS. In the broadband system of the SPS, pay is determined through a salary range or pay band. Pay bands establish the lowest base pay and the highest base pay for a particular class code. The pay band for a Department secretary specialist is $797.49 to $1,379.66 biweekly, or an annual salary from $20,734.74 to $35,871.09. Upon appointment, a state agency sets an employee’s base rate of pay within the pay band for the broadband level to which appointed. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-32.001. An agency may increase an employee’s base rate of pay within the established pay band at any time, based upon documented justification, provided funds are available for the increase, and the increase is not specifically prohibited by law. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-32.0011. Pursuant to the “DJJ Delegation of Pay Authority,” effective July 1, 2016, and the “DJJ Spending Guidelines for FY 2019-2020,” effective July 1, 2019, Respondent authorizes increases to an employee’s rate of pay for a variety of reasons, including added duties and responsibility, receipt of a competitive job offer, and merit. A position with a Competitive Area Differential (“CAD”) designation is one that has been approved by the Department of Management Services (DMS) and the Legislature to receive a pay additive which is designed to attract and retain workers in geographical areas where other employers pay comparatively more for similar jobs. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-32.0012(1)(h). Allegation of Paycut Prior to her employment with the Department, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) as a data entry operator, at a salary of $20,478.38, or $787.63 biweekly. When Petitioner was hired by the Department, although she was hired at the lowest base pay for a secretary specialist, she received a slight increase in salary ($256.36) from her prior position with DCF. Allegation of Failure to Increase Compensation During her employment, the Department has increased Petitioner’s annual salary. On October 1, 2013, her salary was increased to $22,134.84. On October 1, 2017, her salary was increased to $23,534.94. As of January 10, 2020, Petitioner’s base rate of pay was $905.19 biweekly. As of October 1, 2020, Petitioner’s base rate of pay is $943.66 biweekly. Based upon a biweekly base pay of $943.66, paid 26 times in a year, Petitioner’s current annual salary is $24,535.16. Allegation of Discrimination in Starting Salary At the time Petitioner filed her Complaint alleging that younger, White secretary specialists were being hired at a greater rate of compensation, Petitioner offered no comparators. As a result, the EEO Officer, Aldrin Sanders, conducted a statewide data comparison for Department secretary specialists. As of January 9, 2020, the Department had 84 employees in secretary specialist positions. Of those employees, one was Asian, 41 were Black, nine were Hispanic, and 33 were White. Mr. Sanders determined that Petitioner’s salary was higher than all secretary specialists hired after her, with the exception of four—one Black and three White—whose salaries were equal to that of Petitioner. Mr. Sanders further determined that all 34 secretary specialists whose salaries were higher than Petitioner’s—18 of whom were Black, five Hispanic, and 11 White—were hired before Petitioner. Furthermore, five of those with higher salaries were part of the 2010-2011 Statewide Workforce Reduction efforts and were demoted from other positions to the secretary specialist position, and one was a voluntary demotion with a five percent decrease in salary pursuant to spending guidelines. Additionally, the data obtained by Mr. Sanders indicated that, on average, secretary specialists who are 40 years of age or older made $63.45 more than their counterparts who are 39 and under; and Black secretary specialists, on average, made $8.09 more than their non-Black counterparts. At the final hearing, Petitioner identified particular Department secretary specialists as comparators for her claims of unlawful discrimination. She highlighted specific positions from the spreadsheet listing the Department’s secretary specialists statewide, which was included as a part of Mr. Sanders’ report. Petitioner also submitted into evidence screenshots about employee salaries from the website, “Florida has a Right to Know,” https://www.floridahasarighttoknow.myflorida.com/search_state_payroll. The secretary specialist in Position No. 80004540 is a Black female, 26 years old, who was hired by the Department on November 9, 2018, at a starting base pay rate of $877.24 biweekly. That rate is higher than Petitioner’s starting base pay rate of $797.49 biweekly in 2007. That position is in Probation Circuit 11, Dade County, as of November 7, 2020. According to the screenshot from “Florida Has a Right to Know,” the secretary specialist in that position has an annual salary of $25,077.26, higher than Petitioner’s current salary of $24,535.16. The secretary specialist in Position No. 80048017 is a Black female, 37 years old, who was hired by the Department on August 16, 2019, at a base pay rate of $877.24 biweekly. The secretary specialist in that position was initially hired by the State of Florida on December 7, 2007, but the evidence is insufficient to determine which agency previously employed her, her position title, or her salary. That position is in Probation Circuit 17, Broward County, as of September 5, 2018. According to the screenshot from “Florida Has a Right to Know,” the secretary specialist is reported as having a current annual salary of $24,077.04, which is lower than Petitioner’s current annual salary. The secretary specialist in Position No. 80002854 is a Black female, 37 years old, who was hired by the Department on November 9, 2018, at a base pay rate of $877.24 biweekly. That position is in Probation Circuit 15, Palm Beach County, as of November 6, 2018. According to the screenshot from “Florida Has a Right to Know,” the secretary specialist is reported as having an annual salary of $24,077.04, which is lower than Petitioner’s current annual salary. According to a screenshot from “Florida Has a Right to Know,” a secretary specialist in Position No. ***002456, by the name of Kenneth David Devilling, assigned to Department Community Interventions & Service, purportedly earns $29,050.84. That position is not in Probation. Petitioner introduced no competent evidence on which to base a finding of either the race or age of that particular secretary specialist. When an employee is hired, they negotiate their salary with the hiring manager. Determining an employee’s salary is a subjective process. Managers can adjust starting salaries within the pay bands based on consideration of many factors, including the type of appointment; the knowledge, skills, and abilities (“KSAs”) required of the position; the KSAs possessed by the employee; difficulty in recruitment for the position; geographic location of the position; years of service and experience of employees; licensure; certification and registration requirements; collective bargaining agreements; layoff, etc. These factors are not to be considered all- inclusive, and each appointment or employment decision may vary because of the different factors from one situation to another. Regional Structure of Probation Probation is divided into North, Central, and South regions. Probation North region is further divided into Northeast and Northwest regions. The Northwest region encompasses judicial circuits 1, 2, 3, and 14. Gwen Steverson has served as Northwest Regional Director for Probation since March 2019. Ms. Steverson reports directly to Assistant Secretary Paul Hatcher, who supervises and manages Probation statewide. Ms. Steverson’s duties and responsibilities include assisting the assistant secretary in directing and operating all activities within the Probation Northwest region; ensuring that Probation’s programs are administered in accordance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations; managing her assigned circuits; and managing all human resource decisions. Ms. Steverson has three counterparts: Jill Wells, regional director for Probation Northeast; Cathy Lake, regional director for Probation Central; and Wydee’a Wilson, regional director for Probation South. Each regional director has ultimate responsibility for the Probation regions, and the judicial circuits therein, to which they are assigned. Secretary specialist positions in the South Region are subject to a CAD to account for cost-of-living differences in that region, compared with Central and North. The record does not contain competent evidence to determine the amount of the differential. Ms. Steverson has ultimate management authority only in Probation Northwest for recruitment, selection, hiring, and salary offers to job candidates and pay raises to employees. She has no management authority in the other Probation regions or in any other Department program areas with respect to job candidates and employees. Likewise, other Department managers have no authority concerning job candidates and employees in Probation Northwest. Petitioner is employed as the sole secretary specialist in Probation Northwest, Circuit 2, Gadsden County Office, in Quincy, Florida. There are other secretary specialist positions in Circuit 2, and the Northwest Region more broadly, but the evidence was insufficient to determine how many positions and to which circuits they are assigned. Petitioner’s duties and responsibilities as secretary specialist include the following: managing the office; serving as a receptionist for Probation Circuit 2 by receiving and routing all incoming calls; receiving and directing visitors; ensuring that office supplies are maintained and stocked; performing background juvenile records checks for law enforcement and/or other agencies; running monthly caseloads and distributing daily court dockets to supervisors; performing data entry tasks, including maintaining required tracking logs, such as Pre-Disposition Reports (PDS) and Rep-Release Notification (PRN) logs, and entering “at larges” in the Juvenile Justice Information System (JJIS); and performing other duties as assigned. Ms. Steverson has management authority over Juvenile Probation Officers (“JPOs”) in the Probation Northwest Region. The duties and responsibilities of a JPO differ greatly from those of a secretary specialist. Key JPO duties are case management of a youth and their family, including understanding the court process; attending court for a youth that has been arrested; arranging for all assessments, whether mental health or substance abuse, to determine the needs of the youth and the family; making referrals to Department contract providers, based upon the results of the assessments; ensuring that all court-ordered sanctions are completed by the youth; filing violations of probation; conducting face-to-face visits; working with the schools; and carrying the youth through the process. The qualifications for JPOs differ from those for a secretary specialist. A JPO must have a bachelor’s degree; successfully complete the JPO Academy Certification process within the first 180 days of employment; obtain certifications in Protective Action Response (PAR), Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), and First Aid; and be trained in the Detention Risk Assessment Instrument (DRAI). A secretary specialist in Probation is required to have a high school diploma and is not required to successfully complete the trainings or obtain the certifications required for a JPO. Petitioner complained that she was performing the functions of a JPO, for which additional compensation was due her, such as interpreting arrest affidavits, “at larges,” entering charges in the Department system for four counties, documenting status of prior cases in the case notebook, etc. However, Petitioner did not prove that these tasks were outside of her assigned job duties. Ms. Steverson testified, credibly, that Petitioner has not been working “out of class,” that is, Petitioner has not been performing job duties above and beyond those in her position description.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commission issue a final order finding that the Department of Juvenile Justice did not discriminate against Petitioner, Tequilla Lockwood, based upon either age or race, and dismiss Petition for Relief No. 2020-21773. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Tequilla Y. Lockwood 351 Carter Road Quincy, Florida 32351 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Suite 3200 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's license to practice medicine for violation of Section 458.331(1)(b) and (kk), Florida Statutes (2005)?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state department charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is Gina Marie Dieudonne, M.D. Respondent is a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida, having been issued license ME 89209. Respondent's mailing address-of-record is 48 Goldfield Cove, Jackson, Tennessee 38305. The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) is the licensing authority regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Illinois. On or about January 4, 2006, the IDFPR entered an Order indefinitely suspending Respondent's license to practice as a physician and surgeon in the State of Illinois. The IDFPR disciplined Respondent for failing to pay Illinois individual income tax for the tax years of 1999 and 2003. On March 27, 2006, Respondent executed a Petition for Restoration in front of a Notary Public in Illinois, seeking to have her Illinois license to practice medicine reinstated. On or about July 10, 2006, the Respondent signed a Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement that, if approved by the IDFPR, would lift the suspension and allow the Respondent to renew her Illinois license, while placing her Illinois medical license on indefinite probation, until such time as the Respondent satisfactorily completed the payment of delinquent state income taxes and satisfactorily completed repayment of her Illinois Student Assistance Commission student loans outstanding. The Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement was approved by the Medical Disciplinary Board on August 2, 2006. On or about October 18, 2006, the Director of the IDFPR signed an Order adopting the Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement, subject to the terms therein, including the indefinite probation. The January 4, 2006, Order entered by the IDFPR, which indefinitely suspended Respondent's license to practice as a physician and surgeon in the State of Illinois, constitutes disciplinary action against the Respondent's Illinois medical license. The October 18, 2006, Order entered by the IDFPR adopting the Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement, subject to the terms therein, including the indefinite probation, constitutes disciplinary action against the Respondent's Illinois medical license. Respondent failed to report, in writing, to the Board within thirty (30) days of the January 4, 2006, suspension of her medical license by the IDFPR. Respondent reported the October 18, 2006, order of stipulated indefinite probation of her medical license by the IDFPR to the Board on February 12, 2007. The report letter dated February 12, 2007, had a copy of the disciplinary documents from Illinois attached to it and was received by DOH Licensure Services Unit on February 15, 2007. On April 3, 2007, an order was entered by IDFPR terminating the earlier order of probation on Respondent's Illinois' license pertaining to Respondent's failure to repay student loans. Other restrictions imposed on the license remained in force and effect. Prior Disciplinary History Respondent's Illinois medical license was subjected to disciplinary action in two prior cases. In Case No. 92-2870 Respondent's Illinois medical license was placed on probation by terms of a Consent Order signed by Respondent on September 14, 1992, for failure to repay student loans. The probation was terminated by Consent order approved March 26, 1993. In Case No. 96-4999, an Order was issued, effective July 31, 1996, ordering that her license not be renewed for failure to repay student loans. Her license was restored by Order to Restore dated August 20, 1996.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts found and the conclusions, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered reprimanding Respondent's medical license, imposing an administrative fine of $4,000.00, and placing Respondent's license on probation until she presents evidence to the Florida Board of Medicine that her Illinois medical license is free and unencumbered. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact in the recommended order are supported by competent, substantial evidence. They are adopted with modification together with the following supplemental findings of fact and as such both constitute the complete set of findings of fact for purposes of this final order. Albury also engages in the private practice of law as a member of a law firm. He devotes a majority of his working hours in that practice and is prohibited from representing other school boards because of his work relationship with the Monroe County School Board (the School Board). Until 1980 or 1981, Albury utilized his private law office and his private secretary to perform his duties as school board attorney. There is no evidence that this was for the convenience of the School Board, and it was a known fact that he performed his work from his private law office. The new school board office was renovated in 1980 or 1981, but no office was set up for Albury until late 1983. At that time, one room was made available to both the school board members and to Albury as school board attorney who jointly shared the one room. Prior to late 1983, that room was used by a school board employee who retired in mid-1983. Albury spends very little time in this office since a majority of his duties are performed elsewhere. Until relatively recently, Albury's private secretary did most of his secretarial work in connection with his school board representation. She was a long time employee and very familiar with his working habits, etc. When he left his employment, his new secretary who was less familiar with his habits and school board matters did less work in this area. Consequently, Albury used any one of three school board secretaries for assistance. He does not supervise any of the three secretaries and must request permission from their supervisors before having them perform work for him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order declaring Hilary U. Albury eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System both before and after July 1, 1979. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1984.
The Issue The issue to be determined is the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs to be awarded to Petitioners pursuant to section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes (2012).
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Okaloosa County and Nassau County, filed a challenge to existing rules of the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes, on the basis that the rules conflicted with section 985.686, Florida Statutes, the law implemented. Okaloosa Cnty. & Nassau Cnty. v. Dep’t of Juv. Just., DOAH Case No. 12-0891RX (Fla. DOAH July 17, 2012). The Petition specifically alleged that “Petitioners are obligated to pay their attorneys a reasonable fee and are entitled to recover their reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees under section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes,” and requested an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the same. On July 17, 2012, after a final hearing, the undersigned entered a Final Order invalidating the Challenged Rules and determining that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs was appropriate based on section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Jurisdiction was retained to determine the appropriate amount of fees and costs. The Department appealed the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 12-0891RX, and on June 5, 2013, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed by written opinion the Final Order. Dep’t of Juv. Just. v. Okaloosa Cnty., Case No. 1D12-3929, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA June 5, 2013). Petitioners established by affidavit (attached to their Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs) that they were billed a total of $89,580.00 in attorneys’ fees for services directly related to prosecuting DOAH Case No. 12-0891RX. The hourly rates charged for the work of the attorneys involved in the case, as well as the amount of time expended on each task, are reasonable. Since Petitioners incurred attorneys’ fees and costs well in excess of $50,000.00, they are seeking the maximum attorneys’ fees and costs award allowable pursuant to section 120.595(3), which is $50,000.00. While no formal written stipulation as to the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees and costs has been filed in this case, there is no indication in this record that the Department disputes the reasonableness of the $50,000.00 award being sought by Petitioners. To the contrary, Petitioners filed a series of e-mail communications between counsel for Petitioners and the Department reflecting that the Department “does not dispute the 50K figure and will pay it” after the appeal is resolved if the Department does not prevail. In addition, the Department’s Motion to Deny the Awarding of Attorneys’ Fees contains the statement that “Respondent stipulated to awarding Petitioners $50,000.00 in attorneys’ fees ” Petitioners have established that the requested award of $50,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs is reasonable.
The Issue The central issue in this cause is whether Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned his career service position at Children, Youth, & Families Services.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner was employed as a counselor working with the District XI Children, Youth, & Families (CYS) Services. Petitioner was assigned to monitor approximately twenty-five foster care children. After some past employment disputes, Petitioner was reinstated by the Department effective March 31, 1987. Petitioner returned to work on April 17, 1987, however, he was not satisfied with the working environment. In a memorandum dated April 22, 1987, Petitioner alleged: The same pattern of capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory practices which led to my previous illegal dismissal from services at a time I was disable, as the result of an accident which had occurred while fulfilling my duties for this Department, are still present. All my fundamental rights have been thoroughly violated. Even workman compensation has been denied to me. With so painful experience and in light of outstanding losses I have consequently suffered, any idea of subsidizing HRS with my own car, car insurance, car repairs and advance funding for gasoline purchase as an obligatory condition for employment at CYF is being rejected as unfair practices; and violate the equal Employment Opportunity Laws. Various efforts made to have this abusive situation corrected have been met with the flagrant opposition of fierce administrators of this department, totally obstinated not to let fairness and logic prevail. In light of all these facts, it is my conclusion that my interests can be better preserved by my abstention from any involvement at HRS until these matters are properly attended by your diligence in the best of the delays, or by a court of law. In consequence effective Friday April 24, 1987 I have decided to temporarily not to be in attendance at Unit 462 Foster Care. In response, the District Program Manager for Social Services, Frank Manning, wrote to Petitioner on April 23, 1987, and advised him that failure to report to work as scheduled would be cause for action pursuant to Chapter 22A- 7.010(2). Petitioner failed to appear or to call in to work for hour consecutive work days, to wit: April 27-30, 1987. Petitioner was not authorized to take leave during the time in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order affirming the decision that Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned from the Career Service. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Morton Laitner, Esquire Dade County Health Unit 1350 North West 14th Street Miami, Florida 33215 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louis C. Germaine 308 Northeast 117th Street Miami, Florida 33161 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Petitioner established "just cause" to terminate Respondent from her teaching job.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Harter is a special education teacher in the School District. She is a long-time Polk County, Florida, resident and has worked for the School District since 1985. The School Board is responsible for the operation, control, and supervision of free public schools in Polk County, Florida. On December 10, 2010, Ms. Harter entered a guilty plea for leaving the scene of an accident, which is a third-degree felony, and resisting or obstructing an officer without violence, which is a first-degree misdemeanor. The circuit court withheld adjudication and sentenced Ms. Harter to 36 months’ probation on the felony charge, a short period of incarceration in the county jail, community service, fines, and restitution. As of the hearing date, Ms. Harter had successfully completed her community service hours and was successfully completing the remainder of her probation. Polk County School Board Policy 6Gx53-3.001 (School Board Policy 3.001) sets out the Employment Procedures followed by the School Board. In pertinent part, School Board Policy 3.001(V)(C)(4)(a), provides that: "criminal offenses listed below will render applicants and employees ineligible for employment with Polk County Public Schools. WILL NOT HIRE OR EMPLOY -- Felony convictions including, but not limited to the following: . . ." The School Board Policy then lists 49 enumerated crimes that specifically make a person ineligible for employment. School Board Policy 3.001(V)(C)(4)(d)4, also provides that a person may be considered for employment with the School District on a "case-by-case basis" when a person is "on probation [for] (Crimes not listed above)." Mr. Farinas, the School District director of employee relations, credibly testified that, it is the School Board's practice to automatically terminate employees who plead guilty to a felony charge, no exception. The School Board does not employ anyone who has a felony conviction. Further, the School Board, in considering whether or not to grant a "case-by-case" analysis for employing a person who has been convicted of an offense not listed in the School Board Policy, has limited its consideration to misdemeanors. The record, however, shows that the School Board has not been presented the question of whether or not to consider a person for continued employment, who has a felony conviction for a crime not listed in the School Board Policy and is serving a probationary sentence. Ms. Harter has worked for the School District in many different capacities since 1985. It was undisputed that Ms. Harter was an exemplary special education teacher, who is respected by her peers and students. Ms. Harter has a long, successful record of working with emotionally-handicapped students. As Mr. Darby, an assistant principal who supervised Ms. Harter stated, "without Julie's influence, a lot of those students would have never made it through high school." It was undisputed that Ms. Harter is a "very dedicated and responsible teacher." For example, Ms. Whiteley credibly testified that Ms. Harter "knew all of her students, knew everything about her students, and worked very hard to get them to be successful, and also job placements." The record clearly shows that Ms. Harter is a dedicated special education teacher who loved her students and did an excellent job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that the School Board established "just cause" to terminate Ms. Harter and that Ms. Harter's employment be terminated. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is entitled to recover an alleged overpayment of $499.76 in salary previously paid to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employs Petitioner as a Juvenile Detention Officer in Sarasota, Florida. On October 1, 2004, Respondent issued a warrant to Petitioner for the payroll period from September 10 through 23, 2004. The gross amount of the warrant was $1,132.73. After authorized deductions, including taxes and retirement contributions, the net pay to Petitioner was $773.87. The warrant overpaid Petitioner in the amount of $499.76. The warrant paid Petitioner for 60.5 hours of overtime, but Petitioner actually worked only 27.25 hours of overtime. Respondent overpaid Petitioner for 33.25 hours of overtime. During the payroll period at issue, Respondent paid Petitioner a standard hourly rate of $10.85. The hourly rate for overtime was $16.275, equal to the mathematical product calculated when the standard hourly rate of $10.85 is multiplied by a factor of 1.5. The amount of overpayment for 33.25 hours may be calculated mathematically as $541.14, equal to the product determined when 33.25 of overtime is multiplied by the hourly rate of $16.275. The difference between $541.14 and $499.76 is not explained in Respondent's PRO, and Respondent did not order a transcript of the testimony of Respondent's witness during the hearing. The worksheet exhibits purporting to explain the difference are partially unclear copies of the original worksheets. The difference between $541.14 and $499.76 cannot be explained in this Recommended Order based on the available evidence. However, Respondent stipulates that the net overpayment is $499.76. Respondent explicated the reason for the overpayment as a problem encountered during the period in which Respondent converted its payroll system from the Cooperative Personnel System (COPES) to the People First system. In an effort to avoid delays in payroll payments to employees, Respondent requested managers and supervisors to ensure that their employees submit estimated time sheets in advance of the due date. Compliance with the request required employees to estimate their hours for the payroll periods August 27 through September 9, 2004, and September 10 through 23, 2004. For the latter of the two payroll periods, the supervisor for Petitioner submitted an estimated time sheet for Petitioner. Petitioner did not sign the estimated time sheet because Petitioner was not working on the date the supervisor submitted the estimated time sheet. The estimated time sheet predicted Petitioner would work 33.25 hours of overtime during the payroll period. Petitioner actually worked 27.25 hours of overtime during that period and subsequently submitted a corrected time sheet showing the 27.25 hours of overtime actually worked. Respondent paid Petitioner for 60.5 hours of overtime, including both the estimated and actual overtime worked. Respondent is entitled to reimbursement for the amount of overpayment that Petitioner received.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Respondent overpaid Petitioner in the amount of $499.76 and ordering Petitioner to repay the amount of overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Schembri, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Mary Linville Atkins, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Steven Kelm 4589 Las France Avenue North Port, Florida 34286
The Issue Whether petitioner should receive a federal income tax refund HRS has intercepted and proposes to apply against petitioner's public assistance child support obligation, even though he has fully complied with the judgment establishing the obligation?
Findings Of Fact On May 16, 1984, HRS obtained a final judgment of paternity against Jimmie L. Henry, petitioner in these proceedings. Henrietta Payne and State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Jimmie Henry and Woodrow Grissett, No. 81-10950-CA (4th Cir.). The judgment declared Mr. Henry the father of Shea Bernard Anderson, established the "sum of $2656.00 ... as a public assistance child support obligation owed by Jimmie Henry to the State of Florida," ordered petitioner to pay $150 support payments for the child monthly, and ordered that "with each payment [the petitioner] shall make an additional payment of $25.00 per month until the [public assistance child support] obligation ... is paid in full." The public assistance child support obligation arose because of payments HRS made, before paternity was determined, for the benefit of Shea Bernard Anderson under the Aid for Dependent Children program, payments which were "IV-D services" provided by a "IV-D agency." Since entry of the final judgment of paternity, petitioner, who has since married and had other offspring, has made every payment required by the judgment, when required. As of September 11, 1988, his public assistance child support obligation had been reduced from $2,656.00 to $1,374.40. HRS has intercepted all of the federal income tax refund owed petitioner for calendar year 1987, which amounts to $664, and proposes to apply it against his public assistance child support obligation.
