The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on his disability by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Fresenius Medical Care, provides dialysis treatment to end-stage renal disease patients. During the time relevant to this proceeding, Respondent operated 11 clinics in the Northwest Florida and South Alabama area. The Florida clinics were located in Pensacola, Navarre, Destin, Fort Walton Beach and Crestview. The South Alabama clinic was located in Andalusia. “Dialysis” is the cleansing of the body of unwanted toxins, waste products, and excess fluid by filtering the blood of patients through the artificial membrane of a dialysis machine. Purified water and dialysate are used during the process. Dialysis treatment is necessary when a patient’s kidneys are inadequate or no longer capable of acting as a filter to remove waste and fluids from a patient’s blood. While the frequency of treatment can vary for each patient, patients typically received dialysis at Fresenius’ clinics three times a week for four hours. The treatment requires piercing the skin and blood vessel so that each patient is intravenously attached to a dialysis machine. Because dialysis involves piercing the skin and blood vessels, as well as the removal and replacing of a person’s blood, patients are at an increased risk of infection. In order to protect patients from infection, proper maintenance, testing, and sanitation of the equipment used during dialysis is of primary importance. As such, dialysis is highly regulated by state and federal agencies responsible for health, safety, privacy, and reimbursement for health care. In order to fulfill its obligations to its patients and regulators, Fresenius maintained a Code of Business Conduct that outlined policies and procedures which every employee was required to follow. These policies and procedures were based on federal regulations enforced by the Centers for Medicare and Medical Services (CMS). The Code required that maintenance, sanitation, and tests for contaminants be regularly performed according to the schedules established for such procedures. The Code of Business Conduct also required all of Respondent’s employees to maintain accurate and complete records. In particular, biomedical equipment technicians were required to maintain logbooks of all the maintenance and tests done on each piece of equipment used in the dialysis process. Documentation was required to ensure that state and federal reporting requirements for maintenance and testing on dialysis machines was done. Documentation of every task performed by a biomedical technician was also required for review by Respondent’s internal and external auditors. Failure to perform these functions could subject Respondent to fines and other government actions, including loss of its Medicare certification and a shutdown of its clinics. Respondent also maintained a “Continuous Quality Improvement” (CQI) program which was designed to review indicators of the quality of treatment Respondent’s patients were receiving. These quality measures were reviewed by a CQI committee. The CQI committee was an interdisciplinary team consisting of the Medical Director, the doctor responsible for overseeing the medical care provided in a clinic; the Area Manager, the person responsible for managing all aspects of a clinic’s operations; the Clinical Manager, the registered nurse responsible for nursing care and technical services at a clinic; and the Biomedical Technician, the person responsible for maintaining, sanitizing, and testing the dialysis equipment at a clinic. Periodic meetings were held by the CQI committee to review all aspects of dialysis at a clinic. The periodic meetings included a review of machine maintenance, machine sanitation, and culture tests done on dialysis machines at a clinic, as well as a review of logbooks maintained by the biomedical technician, if necessary. The periodic meetings also included a review of all adverse events and all patient incidents that occurred at a clinic. Additionally, to ensure quality dialysis services, all of Respondent’s employees received initial and annual compliance training, which addressed relevant changes to Respondent’s policies, as well as state and federal laws. Petitioner, David J. Normandin, was a certified Biomedical Equipment Technician and nationally certified Biomedical Nephrology Technician. Petitioner received extensive training as a Biomedical Technician, including training on national standards for nephrology technicians and national protocols for testing, maintenance, and documentation of these efforts. Additionally, Petitioner received both initial and annual on-the-job training from Fresenius regarding required maintenance, sanitation, and record-keeping responsibilities. Petitioner worked for Respondent on two separate occasions. Initially, he worked at one of Respondent’s clinics in North Carolina, where he was a Chief Technician. Later, Petitioner moved to Florida and was employed by Renal Care Group as a Biomedical Technician. Eventually, Renal Care Group was purchased by Respondent in April 2006. After the purchase, Petitioner remained employed with Respondent as a Biomedical Technician until his termination on February 6, 2008. As a Biomedical Technician, Petitioner was assigned responsibility for three clinics. Petitioner’s responsibilities included providing preventive maintenance, troubleshooting, repairing, cleansing, and disinfecting of the clinic’s dialysis machines and water treatment equipment. His responsibilities also required taking water cultures and testing the water systems to ensure that the equipment and water were free from bacterial growth and pathogens. Without such maintenance, sanitation, and tests, it was dangerous for a patient to be intravenously hooked up to a dialysis machine that had not been properly tested or maintained. Every patient with whom the dialysis equipment might come into contact would be affected. Indeed, the consequences of not performing required routine testing, sanitation, maintenance, and record-keeping tasks were serious. At Fresenius’ clinics, Biomedical Technicians worked independently and were assigned to specific clinics. However, Biomedical Technicians assigned to other clinics sometimes helped other technicians when needed to complete their required duties. Such help only occurred if the foreign technician was available and not busy with meeting responsibilities for their own clinics. Petitioner admitted that the other technicians were usually “slammed” with the work at their own clinics and not generally available to help at Petitioner’s clinics. Indeed, the evidence did not demonstrate that other qualified technicians were generally or routinely available to assist Petitioner in his job duties. Similarly, the evidence did not demonstrate that it was reasonable for Respondent to hire additional technicians to help Petitioner perform his job duties. Petitioner was required to provide a monthly summary or technical report to the CQI committee for each clinic to which he was assigned. As part of the report, Petitioner was required to self-report what maintenance and tests were completed, and what maintenance and tests remained to be completed at each clinic. Petitioner was also required to self- report if he was behind in the performance of his routine job duties so that help might be provided, if it was available. If Petitioner failed to properly report any compliance deficiencies, such deficiencies would not normally be discovered until the Regional Technical Manager, Todd Parker, conducted an internal audit of the clinic or an unannounced CMS survey was performed. When he was initially hired by Respondent, Petitioner was responsible for the clinics in Fort Walton Beach, Crestview and Andalusia. At times, Petitioner assisted in or was responsible for the maintenance of two additional facilities in the area. These additional assignments generally occurred when Respondent was understaffed or training new staff. However, by April or June 2007, Petitioner was only responsible for the three clinics in Fort Walton Beach, Navarre, and Destin. The evidence did not show that Petitioner was responsible for more clinics than any other Biomedical Technician. Joan Hodson was the Clinic Manager for Respondent’s Fort Walton Beach clinic. As of April 2007, Petitioner’s direct supervisor was George Peterson, who in turn reported to Mr. Parker. Joan Dye was the Area Manager. Petitioner testified that he informed his employer in 2003 that he had a bad back. Petitioner admitted that he continued to perform his job duties without significant difficulty. There was no evidence that demonstrated his complaints were more than ordinary complaints about a sore back or that such complaints rose to the level of or were perceived as a handicap by his supervisors. However, sometime in 2007, Petitioner was diagnosed with two herniated discs and began having difficulty keeping up with his job duties. In March 2007, Petitioner was the on-call technician for emergency calls from the clinics in the area. He did not respond to several calls from the area clinics. These clinics complained about the missed calls to Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker during the March CQI meeting in Pensacola. As a consequence, Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker called Petitioner into the office to discuss the missed calls and to address the issue that his work was falling behind. They asked Petitioner if there was a problem. At the time, Petitioner was not under any medical restrictions from a healthcare provider. Petitioner informed Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker that he was on medications for his back which caused him to sleep very deeply and not hear the phone ring when clinics called. He also told them that he was having a hard time keeping up with his work because of the pain from his back. As a result of the meeting, Petitioner was taken off “call” duty and was no longer responsible for responding to other clinics’ calls for assistance. Petitioner was also informed that he would be provided help when it was available so that he could catch up on his assignments. Additionally, Petitioner was asked to provide a doctor’s note concerning his back condition and any limitations he might be under due to his back. This meeting was the first time Petitioner informed his employer that he had a serious back problem. On April 24, 2007, Petitioner provided Respondent with a doctor’s note concerning his back. The doctor’s note stated that for two months Petitioner was not to lift over 30 pounds, and was not to engage in repetitive bending, stooping, or kneeling. Petitioner was released to full duty on June 24, 2007. This is the only doctor’s note Petitioner ever provided to Respondent. Importantly, these restrictions did not impair Petitioner’s ability to document all of the jobs he had performed or to accurately self-report when specific maintenance and tests were not done or were behind. On October 3, 2007, Mr. Parker performed a technical internal audit of the Navarre clinic which was assigned to Petitioner. At the time, Petitioner was responsible for the Navarre clinic. The audit revealed that Petitioner had performed no dialysis and end toxin testing for the clinic during the year. These tests were required to be performed every six months. Moreover, Petitioner failed to disclose to anyone that he had not performed these tests even though he had the opportunity to self-report during CQI meetings or at any other time. Again, Petitioner met with Mr. Parker and Ms. Dye. When asked to explain why the tests had not been performed at the Navarre clinic, Petitioner told Mr. Parker and Ms. Dye that he “did not know” he had to do them, and that he had simply “misunderstood” the requirements. Petitioner’s claim was not credible. His supervisors found Petitioner’s explanation to be suspect, since he had previously completed dialysis and end toxin testing at both Navarre and the other clinics he was responsible for. In a memo he later prepared as to why he had not conducted the tests, Petitioner wrote: “so much to do, so far behind.” Petitioner never mentioned his back as an excuse for why he had not performed the tests in his meeting with Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted that he simply “forgot” to conduct the dialysis tests. Clearly, Petitioner’s failure to perform his duties was not related to his back. Similarly, his failure to self-report with any specificity was not related to his back. Ms. Dye instructed Petitioner to complete the test samplings for the clinic that day. Ms. Dye also instructed Petitioner to maintain samplings per the policies at all of his clinics going forward. Petitioner also was instructed by Ms. Dye that he had to immediately test all of the machines at the Fort Walton Beach and Destin clinics for which he was responsible. Petitioner asked Mr. Parker for assistance in catching up on the dialysis testing at the Navarre clinic. Mr. Parker came to the clinic and performed half of the tests, while Petitioner performed the remainder. In November 2007, Petitioner saw a surgeon for his back and, for the first time, was specifically informed by a physician that he would need back surgery. It was anticipated that the surgery would be performed sometime after the first of the year. Petitioner told his employer about his need for surgery. They encouraged Petitioner to do whatever he needed to do to take care of his health, and take any necessary time off. Petitioner chose to continue to work. A CQI committee meeting for the Fort Walton Beach clinic was scheduled for Thursday, January 24, 2008. Prior to the meeting, Joan Hodson, the Clinical Manager for the clinic, asked Petitioner to meet with her early in the morning to review the clinic’s dialysis culture logbook. Petitioner missed the meeting and arrived after noon, with no explanation. He told Ms. Hodson that all cultures were good. Later, at the CQI committee meeting, Petitioner reported to the Medical Director, Dr. Reid, that all the cultures looked good. In reviewing, the printout report for the cultures, Dr. Reid noticed that one of the samples was high and asked that it be redrawn. Petitioner told Dr. Reid and the committee that he had already performed a redraw. He left the meeting to go get proof of the redrawn results. Petitioner’s claim that he did not tell the committee that he had already redrawn the culture and had the results is not credible. Petitioner left the CQI meeting and never returned. Later, Petitioner admitted he had not redrawn the sample. He was instructed to redraw the sample immediately. The day after the CQI meeting, Ms. Hodson called Petitioner asking for the redraw results. Petitioner still had not performed the redraw claiming that he was “too busy.” He was again instructed to immediately perform the redraw. Ms. Hodson called Petitioner the following day, inquiring about the redraw, but did not receive a return call. That weekend, Mr. Parker also called Petitioner to ensure that the redraw was done or would be performed immediately. During the call Mr. Parker informed Petitioner of the seriousness of his failure to redraw the culture immediately as he had been instructed to do and the inappropriateness of his actions regarding the culture before, during, and after the CQI meeting. Mr. Parker also instructed Petitioner to call Ms. Dye about the redraw results. Petitioner again did not perform the redraw as instructed. Ms. Dye also left Petitioner a voicemail to call her about the redraw. Petitioner never called Ms. Dye back. Petitioner’s repeated and willful failure to comply with his supervisors’ instructions was not related to his back. On January 30, 2008, as a consequence of Petitioner’s failure, Petitioner was relieved of his duties for the Destin clinic. He was also given a written warning in a Corrective Action Form (CAF), based on the incidents from January 24, 25, 26, and 28, 2008. The CAF specified “Expectations for Change,” which identified problems with Petitioner’s performance. Ms. Dye reviewed the CAF with Petitioner and instructed him that these problems had to be addressed immediately. These expectations included: Perform all culture draws according to FMC Technical Manual and review this with the Clinical Manager. Immediately report any cultures that are outside the FMS limits and any redraws to the CM. . . . When Dave is at the clinic, he will be expected to redraw any culture that day, if necessary; At CQI monthly meetings, will ensure that all cultures are reported correctly and proper protocol is followed. A Technical CQI summary monthly report and a Spectra monthly summary culture report must be presented to the CM and MD for review and signature; Implement a basic monthly schedule and submitted to his CM’s by the 1st day of each month, will ensure that if he is not at a specific location according to his schedule, he will contact the CM or the Charge Nurse of that clinic to inform them of his location. If called or paged by any clinic, or a member of management, he must respond within 15 minutes from the time he received the call or page; Will follow a more systemic time schedule and will incorporate his time with his monthly schedule. Will make himself readily available to be present, if one of his clinics develops a problem in the early morning hours, if necessary; and When on-call, the 15-minute rule also applies. If not on-call, no matter which clinic calls, will return the call or page and assist the clinic, inform them who is on-call and/or attempt to resolve the problem over the phone. That same day, January 30, 2008, Petitioner received a Developmental Action Plan from Mr. Peterson. Five goals and an Action Plan were identified that Petitioner had to meet within time frames set during the next 90 days. Goals in the Plan included incorporating all of his monthly cultures into the FMC (Fresenius Medical Care) logbook and developing a basic monthly preventive maintenance culture and disinfect schedule for all facilities. By March 31, 2008, the Technical Manager would evaluate and review the goals accomplished by Petitioner to determine if further action was necessary. Petitioner admitted that although he had been obligated to self-report all of the deficiencies in the Corrective Action Form at the CQI meeting in January 2008, he failed to do so. Petitioner testified that he told Ms. Hodson that he was “very much behind” on performing his job duties. He also admitted that he never provided her with any specifics as to the tasks he had not performed. Additionally, he admitted that, “I don’t even know all of the things that I was behind on” and “I don’t know which [logbooks] I’m missing.” The internal audit at the Fort Walton Beach clinic and Petitioner’s actions regarding the redraw of the culture caused Ms. Dye to be concerned about the integrity of the job Petitioner was performing at all three of his clinics. Based on Petitioner’s lack of honesty with the CQI committee, Ms. Dye was legitimately concerned that Petitioner was covering up his failure to do his work and that the safety of patients was at risk. As a result, Mr. Parker performed an audit of the Fort Walton Beach clinic on February 6, 2008. The audit revealed that no dialysate cultures had been performed since October 2007; two out of 31 machines lacked proper documentation of any preventive maintenance having been performed; no preventive maintenance logs were available for the building maintenance and ancillary equipment; two new machines had no documentation; and no electrical and safety checks had been performed since April 2007. All of these tasks were required to have been completed by Petitioner, and Petitioner’s failure to complete them was a serious violation of his job duties. Indeed, these deficiencies placed the Fort Walton Beach clinic in immediate jeopardy of being fined and shut down by CMS. A shutdown would have left 80 of Respondent’s patients without dialysis treatment and placed them at risk for illness and possibly death. The audit also uncovered that the written summaries Petitioner had submitted to the CQI committee in October, November, and December 2007, and the verbal reports he had given to the committee at those monthly meetings, indicating that the preventive maintenance logs were up to date, were in fact incorrect. Again, Petitioner’s failure to document was a serious violation of Petitioner’s job duties and was not related to his back condition. By this time, Ms. Dye had legitimately lost all faith in Petitioner’s honesty. She suspected that Petitioner had falsified certain records because he could not produce various records when he was asked to produce them and only later did the requested records appear. In short, Petitioner’s supervisors had lost faith in Petitioner and could no longer trust him to self-report or to inform others when his duties were not being performed. On February 6, 2003, Ms. Dye presented Petitioner with a second Corrective Action Form, noting the issues generated by the internal audit and suspending Petitioner from work. The CAF was reviewed and signed by Petitioner. Based on what was discovered from the Fort Walton Beach clinic audit, Ms. Dye ordered an audit of Petitioner’s other clinics, Navarre and Destin. The same issues and deficiencies were discovered at those clinics: 1) the dialysate cultures at the Navarre and Destin clinics had not been performed since October 2007; 2) no safety checks had been performed on four out of 18 machines at the Navarre clinic, and none had been performed at the Destin clinic since July 2007; and 3) preventive maintenance was late on five machines at the Navarre clinic and six at the Destin clinic. The audit confirmed once more that Petitioner had misled the CQI committee members during the January CQI meetings for those clinics by not reporting in his written summary or verbal report any deficiencies. In addition, although Ms. Dye had instructed Petitioner just the week before to immediately perform dialysate cultures at all of his clinics, Petitioner had failed to perform any of those cultures and ignored the instructions of his supervisors. Petitioner was given a final Corrective Action Form by Ms. Dye on February 8, 2008. Ms. Dye reviewed the audit results with Petitioner, as well as the Corrective Action Form, which he signed. Petitioner was terminated the same day. Petitioner was fired after being on the Developmental Action Plan for one week because he had misled the CQI committee in his reports, failed to self-report the extent of the job duties he had not performed to the committee, and had not performed any testing of his dialysate cultures and electrical safety checks or reported that he could not perform those tasks. Such reporting was not related to Petitioner’s back condition. Moreover, misleading the CQI committee was not related to any back condition Petitioner had. Both were egregious and terminable offenses by Petitioner. After Petitioner was terminated in February 2008, he applied for unemployment compensation and for multiple jobs. He never informed any prospective employer that he was disabled or needed an accommodation. Once he ultimately had surgery in March 2008, Petitioner told Respondent that he was better and could work, and he asked for his job back. Eventually, Petitioner went to massage therapy school, obtained his license, and worked sporadically as a massage therapist. Prior to the hearing, Petitioner completed work as a team leader with the Census Bureau. These facts demonstrate that Petitioner’s back condition was not a handicap. There was no evidence that Petitioner was terminated for a handicap or a perceived handicap, and the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard N. Margulies, Esquire Jackson Lewis 245 Riverside Avenue, Suite 450 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 R. John Westberry, Esquire 7201 North 9th Avenue, Suite A-4 Pensacola, Florida 32504 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this instance are promoted in keeping with an administrative complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent, charging violations of Sections 943.13 and 943.145, Florida Statutes. These allegations relate to the claim that Respondent was involved in a liaison with a prostitute in which he exchanged Valium for sex. The encounter between the Respondent and the prostitute is alleged to have occurred while the Respondent was on duty. This Valium was allegedly obtained from an automobile which was examined as part of the Respondent's duties as a law enforcement officer. It is further alleged that the Valium should have been turned in as part of his responsibilities as a law enforcement officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a holder of a certificate as law enforcement officer, Certificate No. 98-10527. That certificate is issued by the State of Florida, Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, and Respondent has held that certificate at all relevant times in this proceeding. Respondent has been employed as a police officer by the Daytona Beach, Florida, Police Department in the relevant time period and it was during that tenure that Respondent is accused of having committed the offense as set forth in the administrative complaint. Debbie Ofiara is the only witness to the Respondent's alleged indiscretion while on duty. Ms. Ofiara is an admitted prostitute, who has drug problems so severe that she required specific program treatment to address them. In particular, that drug difficulty relates to the drug Dilaudid. In addition, Ofiara has served six months in jail for grand theft, a felony conviction. At the time of the alleged incident with the Respondent she was under the influence of drugs and was under the influence of drugs when she reported that incident to a police investigator in the Daytona Beach Police Department. When testimony was given at the hearing, Ofiara was attending a drug program while awaiting a sentence for a drug offense related to cocaine. She had pled guilty to that drug charge, a felony. Ofiara has been arrested for prostitution, arrests made by the Daytona Beach Police Department on three different occasions. She had been arrested for hitchhiking by Officer Cadenhead prior to the incident which underlies the administrative charges and indicates that she "took offense" at the arrest. Moreover, she acknowledges some past concern about her treatment in encounters with Officer Gary Gallion of the Daytona Beach Police Department in his official capacity. Ms. Ofiara claims that sometime in November 1982, in the evening hours, the Respondent, while on duty as a police officer, in uniform and driving a marked patrol car, approached Ofiara and made arrangements to meet her. She further states that this rendezvous occurred in Daytona Beach, Florida, and that in exchange for Valium tablets which the Respondent had obtained from an examination of a car he had been involved with in his police duties, which tablets were not turned in, Ofiara performed oral sex for Respondent's benefit. Some time later, Ofiara related the facts of the encounter with Officer Cadenhead to an internal affairs investigator with the Daytona Beach Police Department, Lieutenant Thomas G. Galloway. She also gave Galloway a bottle which she claimed was the bottle in which the Valium was found. The vial or container was not examined for any residue of the substance Valium or examined for fingerprints of the Respondent. Following Galloway's investigation of the allegations, the Daytona Beach Police Department determined to terminate the Respondent from his employment. That termination was effective February 11, 1983. Respondent was subsequently reinstated after service of a four-week suspension without pay by order of the City of Daytona Beach Civil Service Board, effective March 9, 1983. Having considered the testimony of Ms. Ofiara and the testimony of the Respondent in which he denies the incident with her, and there being no corroboration, Ms. Ofiara's testimony is rejected for reasons of credibility. As a prostitute, drug user, felon and person with a certain quality of animosity toward the Respondent and in consideration of the demeanor of the accusing witness and Respondent, her testimony is rejected.
The Issue Whether a vessel is owned by Petitioner, Jonathan Selby, and is a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2020), and City of Riviera Beach Derelict Vessel Policy, No. 4.2., and therefore, subject to the provisions of section 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of the 1987 Wellcraft marine vessel, Florida Boat Registration Number FL5632FV (HIN: WELC24661687)(the “vessel”), that sunk on the north side of the Riviera Beach Marina. Riviera Beach Marina is in the City of Riviera Beach. The vessel broke free from a mooring in a storm and is now in a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition. Therefore, the vessel is a “derelict vessel” as defined in section 823.11(1)(b)1., and the City of Riviera Beach Derelict Vessel Policy, No. 4.2. There was no evidence presented that the vessel became derelict because of the negligence of Petitioner.
The Issue Should the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the Commission) impose discipline on Respondent in association with his law enforcement certificate?
Findings Of Fact The Commission has the power to certify and revoke the certification of law enforcement officers. § 943.12(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer. At times relevant to the inquiry he served in that capacity in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Based upon the record, it is inferred that his employment was in association with what has been identified as the Volusia County Beach Patrol (Beach Patrol). That organization was constituted of law enforcement officers and other employees, to include an ocean rescue life guard and EMT. The latter employment position was referred to in the organization as a Beach Safety Specialist. The accusations against Respondent in this case involve conduct seen by and directed to two females, Captain Tamara Marris, a law enforcement officer and Beach Patrol Specialist Christine Dobmeier. Both worked for the Beach Patrol at times relevant to the inquiry. The incidents that form the basis for this complaint took place in a building (the station) utilized by the Beach Patrol. The basic design of the building is set out in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered one, admitted. The drawing or diagram is not to scale. It does reflect the location of a locker room, the door to that locker room, a bathroom and an office in the building. It also shows the location of Respondent's locker within the locker room. The door into the locker room is kept shut. It has a combination lock on it that must be unlocked to gain access to the locker room. In the summer 2004, Respondent and Captain Marris finished their duty shift at the beach and returned to the station. They were the only employees in the station at the time. Respondent was in the locker room, which was not intended to be a dressing room. The bathroom is the place where people change their clothes from the duty clothing into other attire. Respondent was facing his locker wearing only a towel when Captain Marris entered the locker room. While in the locker room Respondent's genitals were exposed to her view. On this first occasion Captain Marris thought that the exposure was just an accident. On a second occasion when the two officers, Captain Marris and Respondent were closing the shift, Captain Marris walked into the locker room and Respondent dropped the towel he was wearing exposing himself, that is exposing his genitals. The second incident took place in approximately August 2004. There was a third incident at the station between Respondent and Captain Marris. This time before Captain Marris entered the locker room, she said some words to the effect, "Hey, are you decent," to which Respondent replied, "Yeah, come on in." When she entered the room, Respondent dropped his towel to pull up his shorts and she saw his genitals again. In her mind, with the third incident having transpired, she concluded that Respondent's actions were deliberate. As a consequence beyond that point, when Captain Marris needed to put her work gear away in the locker room, she would wait until Respondent left the station. On the third occasion which occurred sometime around September 2004, Respondent and Captain Marris were alone as they had been on the prior two occasions. When Captain Marris determined in her mind that the Respondent was acting intentionally in exposing his genitals, she considered this to be vulgar or indecent. She did not believe that anything in the conduct was legitimate. Certainly by the third occasion, if not before, Respondent's conduct could be seen as intentional and without legitimate purpose. Christine Dobmeier was subject to Respondent's inappropriate conduct. She was a full-time ocean life guard and EMT in the position Beach Safety Specialist. She had similar experiences with Respondent to those between Respondent and Captain Marris. As Ms. Dobmeier recalls, ordinarily the male personnel would wear "life guard baggies" at work. At times the male employees would wrap a towel around the life guard baggies. This reference is understood to mean some form of pants or shorts worn by the male personnel which they would cover with a towel. In July or August 2004 around closing time, Ms. Dobmeier entered the locker room where Respondent was located. He was wearing a towel when she entered the room. At that moment his towel fell exposing his genitals. She stated, "I am so sorry" and walked out. On that occasion the door to the locker room had been open when she entered. A couple of weeks later Ms. Dobmeier entered the locker room. This time the locker room door had been closed. She did not bother to knock because most people in her experience would change their clothes in the bathroom. She pushed the lock mechanism which made a loud noise. She entered the room and saw Respondent, who was wearing only a T-shirt. Respondent was facing his locker. When Ms. Dobmeier entered the room he turned toward her, exposing his genitals. Ms. Dobmeier apologized for seeing Respondent in his undressed state and immediately left the room. There was a third incident involving Respondent and Ms. Dobmeier, a few weeks after the second incident. This time Ms. Dobmeier knocked on the locker room door and Respondent told her to enter the room. When she did he was standing naked and she walked right back out. Later, Ms. Dobmeier asked Respondent about the third incident and said, "Why did you tell me to come in," and Respondent in reply, as Ms. Dobmeier explains, "Just kind of laughed." After the third incident Ms. Dobmeier felt that the Respondent intended the conduct in exposing himself. There was a fourth incident in the locker room. This time Ms. Dobmeier knocked on the locker room door and did not hear anything in response. She activated the locking mechanism and Respondent was found in the room with his penis erect facing her. He asked Ms. Dobmeier whether he, as Ms. Dobmeier states, indicating Respondent, "Was as large as my boyfriend." This is understood to mean a comparison between Respondent and Ms. Dobmeier's boyfriend as to their genitals. No other persons were in the station when this encounter took place. Ms. Dobmeier considered the Respondent's exposure of his genitals as vulgar. As a result of the last encounter Ms. Dobmeier decided not to enter the locker room while Respondent was at the station. At the beginning of 2005 there was another incident. This time Respondent grabbed Ms. Dobmeier's breast after a swim drill. The incident took place in the locker room with the door open and 10 to 12 lifeguards in the main area outside of the room. Only Respondent and Ms. Dobmeier were in the locker room when he performed this act. His action was not invited or acquiesced to. Ms. Dobmeier responded by telling Respondent, "Don't ever touch me again" and walked away.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding violations of the statutes and rule referred to and revoking Respondent's law enforcement certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2006.
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for a Class "G" license, statewide gun permit, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that petitioner's application for a Class G" statewide gun permit was properly filed with the Department of State, Division of Licensing. The application was not entered into evidence; however, the parties stipulated that the only bases for the denial of the license were those stated in the letter of February 16, 1987. On April 7, 1969, petitioner was adjudicated guilty of the offenses of breaking and entering an automobile and petty larceny. Petitioner was placed on probation for a period of five years. On April 16, 1987, petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of battery and was placed on probation for a period of six months. Respondent testified that between 1969 and 1974, while he was on probation, he tried to get his civil rights restored but that he has never been able to determine the status of his civil rights. Petitioner presented no evidence establishing that his civil rights had been restored. No evidence was presented at this hearing regarding the factual circumstances surrounding petitioner's arrest and conviction for breaking and entering an automobile. In his proposed findings of fact, petitioner describes facts from a document he describes as "listed as Item 4, Case Number 85-67 in a hearing held in 1985 on file with the Division of Administrative Hearings." However, no evidence regarding the breaking and entering conviction was submitted at this hearing, and a document submitted during the course of some prior hearing cannot be used to establish factual findings in this proceeding. Petitioner is the owner of Sun Coast Securities, Inc. His company provides security for major events needing crowd control, and a primary employer is the Florida State Fairgrounds. Petitioner has a Class "D" license and an agency license. On the night of October 31, 1986, petitioner was hired by the owner of Yesterday's Lounge to provide security at a Halloween party. Samuel Valez was one of the customers at the Halloween party. The Halloween party was supposed to start at about 9:00 p.m. However, Mr. Valez and a few of his friends got to the bar about 7:00 or 7:30 p.m. Mr. Valez had several drinks during the course of the evening. At some time after 10:00 p.m., Mr. Valez got into a dispute with a bartender. Petitioner thought he saw Mr. Valez take a swing at the bartender. However, Ms. Spalding, who was sitting at the bar, did not see any incident with the bartender. Ms. Ryan observed the dispute with the bartender and stated that Mr. Valez did not hit anyone but was having a disagreement over the service of the drinks. In any event, Mr. Valez was asked to leave the premises by the owner. Mr. Valez was intoxicated. Petitioner and the owner escorted Mr. Valez outside. After they got outside, petitioner and Mr. Valez exchanged a few words. Petitioner pushed Mr. Valez and then hit him in the face. Ms. Imschweiler, Ms. Spalding, and Ms. Ryan all observed the incident. None of the three saw Valez attempt to hit anyone, either petitioner or the owner of the lounge. Ms. Ryan testified that petitioner hit Valez more than once. After Mr. Valez had fallen, petitioner grabbed Valez by his ankle and dragged him across the parking lot ground. Mr. Valez kept stating he didn't want to fight, but every time he tried to get up petitioner pushed him to the ground again. Mr. Valez was bleeding. Ms. Ryan described Valez as having been beaten to a pulp. Petitioner contended that he was merely protecting the owner, that Mr. Valez had taken a swing at the owner, and that petitioner grabbed Valez' arm to prevent the owner from being hit. He also testified that Mr. Valez tried to hit him, and he hit Mr. Valez in self-defense. However, none of the witnesses saw Mr. Valez swing at anyone. The witnesses characterized petitioner's attack on Mr. Valez as unprovoked. Petitioner is 5'10" and weighs 300 pounds. Petitioner does power lifting and holds state and national records. He can squat lift 830 pounds. Mr. Valez is approximately 5'7" tall and weighs about 140 pounds. As a result of the altercation with Mr. Valez, petitioner was arrested and charged with aggravated battery. Petitioner ultimately pleaded nolo contendere to simple battery. The evidence presented at the hearing established that petitioner's attack on Mr. Valez was not in self-defense or in the defense of his client.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying petitioner's application for a Class "G" license. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1988.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. The above-styled case involves a revocation of license, a fine, and a survey fee. 2. A previous case was filed against this Respondent also involving the revocation of the license: Agency for Health Care Administration v. Angel Aides Center, Inc. d/b/a Boynton Beach Assisted Living, AHCA No. 2011012687, Case No.: 12-12-246PH. 3. On April 30, 2013, the Agency entered a Final Order in the above described case [AHCA No: 2011012687, Case No.: 12-246PH] adopting the findings of facts and the conclusions of law set forth in the Recommended Order issued by the Agency’s informal hearing officer, which upheld the revocation. 4. The Respondent appealed the Final Order to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Fourth District Court of Appeal Case No.: 4D 13-1733. 5. On or about June 24, 2013, the parties agreed to place the case in abeyance while the appeal was being reviewed by the Fourth District Court of Appeals. 6. On September 18, 2014, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the Agency’s Final Order revoking the Respondent’s license 7. On November 17, 2014, the Respondent filed a Joint Notice of Dismissing its Request for a Formal Hearing with the DOAH and the Administrative Law Judge issued an order closing the file and relinquishing jurisdiction to the Agency. (Ex. 2) Filed December 24, 2014 3:16 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 8. The assisted living facility license of Respondent is REVOKED. 9. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $5,500.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this /7_ day of Drandre 2014. Elizabeth Du , Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. ‘The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct, of this Final er was served on-the below-named persons by the method designated on this 1? fay of et _ 2014. Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 2 Jan Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Catherine Anne Avery, Unit Manager Assisted Living Facility Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Finance & Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) | Arlene Mayo Davis, Field Office Manager Local Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Lourdes A. Naranjo, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Louis V. Martinez, Esq. Louis V. Martinez, P.A. 2333 Brickell Avenue — Suite A-1 Miami, Florida 33129 | (U.S. Mail) John G. Van Laningham Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) _ oe NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity.-- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attomey may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed 4 3 provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed chiropractic physician in the state of Florida with license number CH 0003034. Respondent treated Mr. Richard Turner several times between February 3, 1988 and February 13, 1988. Respondent had treated Turner previously and, in fact, had been Turner's chiropractic physician for several years before treating him on this occasion. Turner had health care coverage through the Daytona Beach Community College Health Care Plan. However, Turner had not met the $200.00 annual deductible at this time. Therefore, Respondent allowed Turner to pay $20.00 per visit to be applied to the portion of his bill not covered by insurance. Turner furnished Respondent's office with certain information concerning his insurance coverage and was made aware by Respondent's office that a claim for reimbursement would be filed with Turner's insurance carrier as had been done on previous occasions. Respondent filed a claim for reimbursement with the Daytona Beach Community College Health Care Plan for services rendered Turner but failed to provide a copy of this billing to Turner until some 2 to 3 months after filing with the insurance carrier. Respondent was not reimbursed for these services by Turner's insurance carrier or Turner; therefore, a claim was filed in the County Court of Volusia County, Florida against Turner. The court awarded the Respondent a judgment in the amount of the unpaid balance, plus costs.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Board enter of Final Order reprimanding Respondent, Michael A. Petker for his failure to strictly comply with Section 460.413(1)(bb), Florida Statutes. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5267 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia Shaw, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0760 Paul Bernardini, Esquire LaRue Bernardini, Seitz & Tresher Post Office Drawer 2200 Daytona Beach, Florida 32015-2200 Lawerence A. Gonzalez, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Pat Guilford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Chiropractic 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
