Findings Of Fact On August 17, 1992, Petitioner Donald filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging that Respondent Winn Dixie was guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit, racial discrimination in failure to "promote" Petitioner from a part-time position to a full-time position because he is black, the most recent non-promotion date being July 22, 1992. After investigation, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered and mailed a Notice of Determination: No Cause and Determination: No Cause on March 23, 1993. That Notice contained the following pertinent language: If redetermination is not requested, the Request for Hearing/Petition for Relief must be filed within 30 days of the date of mailing of this Notice and should be in compliance with the provisions of Rule 22T-9.008 and Chapter 22T-8, Florida Administrative Code . . . Failure of Complainant to timely file either a request or petition will result in the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 22T-9.006, Florida Administrative Code. (See "Exhibit A" attached to, and incorporated in, this Recommended Order). Petitioner mailed his Petition for Relief and it was stamped in as filed at the Florida Commission on Human Relations on April 28, 1993. The Commission did not enter an order of dismissal or otherwise reject the petition as untimely. On May 5, 1993, the Commission transmitted the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S. On May 5, 1993, and simultaneously with its transmittal of the Petition to DOAH, the Commission served/mailed the Petition to Respondent with a Notice to Respondent of Filing of Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. The Commission's transmittal of Petition had included a Notice to Respondent containing the following specific language: You are required to file an answer with the Commission within 20 days of the date of service of the Petition. Your attention is directed generally to Chapter 22T-8, Florida Administrative Code, which pertains to general procedures before the Commission. You are also referred to Rule 22T-9.008(5) which sets forth those matters which must be included in the Respondent's answer. Please note that the filing of a motion to dismiss does not toll the time for filing an answer. (See "Exhibit A" to this Recommended Order). On May 11, 1994, DOAH's Clerk mailed an Initial Order to both parties. The parties were charged by Rule 60Q-2.003(6), F.A.C. and by DOAH's Initial Order in this case with serving upon each other a copy of every pleading either party filed with DOAH. The Initial Order also permitted the parties to advise the undersigned hearing officer of dates and locations they preferred for scheduling the de novo evidentiary hearing on the merits. Petitioner responded to the Initial Order. Respondent did not. Respondent also filed no Answer to the Petition for Relief within 20 days as required by Rule 22T-9.008, F.A.C., [renumbered 60Y-5.008(5)(a), F.A.C.]. If a Respondent fails to file a timely answer, such failure shall be deemed to constitute an admission of the material facts alleged in the petition. See, renumbered Rule 60Y-5.008(5)(d) F.A.C. By DOAH Notice of Hearing mailed May 27, 1993, the cause was scheduled for formal hearing on the merits for October 18, 1993. Simultaneous with that Notice of Hearing, an Order of Prehearing Instructions was entered and mailed. The Order of Prehearing Instructions was directed to both parties and was very specific as to what was required of them, including but not limited to listing witnesses and exhibits, clarifying which issues of material fact were disputed, and listing any pending motions. A copy of the entire order is attached and incorporated in this Recommended Order by reference as "Exhibit B". A joint prehearing stipulation was not timely filed as required by the order of prehearing instructions, and neither party filed a unilateral statement on or before September 29, 1993 as permitted by the order of prehearing instructions. In short, neither party timely complied with the first Order of Prehearing Instructions. On October 1, 1993, certain unsigned, confusing, contradictory, and incomplete papers were filed. This filing, which turned out to be filed by Petitioner (see Finding of Fact 22) among other things requested that the hearing officer subpoena the listed witnesses, listed "stipulations" not signed by anyone, and listed motions never filed at DOAH. This ambiguous item not only was unsigned, but did not reflect who, if anyone, it had been served upon. Common practice and procedure require subpoenas to be sent by DOAH to a party for service by that party on witnesses, and subpoenas may not be served upon witnesses by the hearing officer. The October 1, 1993 filing prompted the entry and service upon both parties of an order on October 12, 1993 which had attached to it the unsigned filings of October 1, 1993. The October 12, 1993 order, with the unsigned and ambiguous attachments is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit C". That order cancelled the October 18, 1993 formal hearing on the merits, subject to rescheduling of the formal hearing on the merits upon clarification of the unsigned papers filed. This order was entered instead of automatically precluding either party from presenting evidence, an option permitted by the prior Order of Prehearing Instructions. The order gave both parties an equal opportunity to do what was procedurally necessary to advance the case to formal hearing on the merits. The October 12, 1993 order granted both parties 45 days in which to confer with one another and file the joint prehearing stipulation contemplated by the prior order of prehearing instructions and to submit several agreeable dates for rescheduling formal hearing on the merits. In further pertinent part, the October 12, 1993 order provided that if a joint stipulation could not be agreed upon between the parties, they could still proceed to formal hearing on the merits by timely submitting unilateral statements listing their respective exhibits and witnesses. The order also went on to specifically provide as follows: Failure of either party to submit at least the names of witnesses to be called by that party and a list of exhibits to be introduced by that party will result in exclusion of that evidence at formal hearing in this cause. Under the terms of the October 12, 1993 order, the date for filing of unilateral witness and exhibit lists was November 26, 1993. Neither party timely filed witness or exhibit lists. On December 14, 1993, which was eighteen days after the last date for compliance with the October 12, 1993 order had passed with Petitioner and Respondent each failing to timely comply therewith, another order was entered. That order advised the parties that since, by the terms of the October 12, 1993 order, both parties were now precluded from presenting any evidence in support of, or contrary to, Petitioner's claim, it appeared that there was no need to conduct an evidentiary hearing. However, the order also granted the parties 30 days in which to show cause why Petitioner's Petition for Relief should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the October 12, 1993 order. A copy of the December 14, 1993 order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit D". That same day, Petitioner filed a request for 22 blank subpoenas and to reschedule formal hearing, but no witness or exhibit list. A copy of this item is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit E." The date for filing of responses to the December 14, 1993 order to show cause was January 13, 1994. Respondent did not file any response to the December 14, 1993 order or the December 14, 1993 pleading. 1/ However, on January 13, 1994, Petitioner timely filed a paper captioned "Pleadings Motions". This paper, a copy of which is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit F," was similar, but not identical to, the unsigned papers filed October 1, 1993. It again requested subpoenas be served by the hearing officer, listed names and addresses of potential witnesses, and requested that the case not be dismissed because Petitioner was without legal counsel and because it is "a very hard case". It specifically stated, "Please consider hearing my testimony and others on this matter." Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading could be read as a motion to allow Petitioner to testify and present witnesses and exhibits. In an abundance of caution, the undersigned mailed a copy of it to Respondent on January 18, 1994. Respondent did not file any response to Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading. As required by law, the undersigned had served Respondent with all DOAH orders and notices. Also, in an abundance of caution, the undersigned had served Respondent with Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading and the unsigned October 1, 1993 papers at the address of record for Respondent's "in-house" counsel, which name and address was provided in the Florida Commission on Human Relations referral papers. No documents were returned to the Division of Administrative Hearings, creating the legal presumption that all materials had been received by Respondent. Still, Respondent had failed to comply with any DOAH order whatsoever and for nine months had not taken any affirmative action to defend against the Petition for Relief. No Answer to the Petition for Relief, timely or otherwise, had ever been filed by Respondent. The record, as reviewed by the undersigned as of February 3, 1994, also indicated that Petitioner's original Charge of Discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations had been directed to Respondent, not at a Jacksonville address, but at a Quincy address. Therefore, because the law and the undersigned are loathe to cut off any legitimate litigation, and in a further abundance of caution, the undersigned determined that Petitioner and Respondent should have one last opportunity to explain why they had not timely complied with prior orders and why, if at all, a formal hearing with witnesses and exhibits on the merits of the Petition for Relief should be rescheduled. To that end, and still in an abundance of caution, an order was entered on February 3, 1994, a copy of which order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit G". The decretal portion of that order read: A hearing on the limited issue of whether or not either party should be permitted to present evidence at a rescheduled formal hearing will be held at 10:00 a.m., March 1, 1994, at the Division of Administ- rative Hearings, the DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida.* Witnesses need not appear at that time. Only parties or their legal counsel shall appear. Failure of Petitioner to appear in person or through legal counsel at that date, time and place WILL result in dismissal of this cause. Failure of Respondent to appear in person or through legal counsel at that date, time and place WILL result in the exclusion of all of Respondent's witnesses and evidence. 4. [sic] Whether or not a formal hearing on the merits will be rescheduled at all will be determined by an order entered after the undersigned has heard what the parties may have to say at the hearing now scheduled for March 1, 1994. (Emphasis in the original). Still in an abundance of caution, the foregoing order was served by the undersigned upon Respondent at both its Quincy and Jacksonville addresses. No court reporter was present at the March 1, 1994 interlocutory hearing. Petitioner appeared and represented himself at the March 1, 1994 hearing. Respondent's "in-house" counsel from Jacksonville did not appear at the Tallahassee hearing but authorized Winn-Dixie's District Manager W. E. Carroll and its Quincy Store Manager Terry Miller to appear. Mr. Carroll works in Tallahassee. Mr. Miller drove 23 miles from Quincy for the hearing. After examination by the undersigned in open court pursuant to Rule 60Q-2.008, F.A.C., Mr. Carroll was accepted as a qualified representative for Respondent. Inquiry was also made by the undersigned at the March 1, 1994 hearing as to any reason a formal hearing on the merits should be rescheduled. Each prior order and pleading 2/ was explored orally in open court. Oral argument was also invited as to why either party should be permitted to present evidence. Oral admissions and stipulations of the parties were received. At that hearing, Petitioner contended that he had not understood the prior orders and that the unsigned papers filed October 1, 1993 (see Findings of Fact 8-9 supra.) were his attempt to provide a witness list. Petitioner also contended that he thought he was represented by legal counsel at one point and to support that assertion, he presented a December 6, 1993 letter he had received from Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. The original of this letter (exhibit) is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit H". At that hearing, no clear explanation was given of why Respondent had failed to Answer the Petition for Relief and also had filed no response to any prior DOAH order or pleading by Petitioner. Still in an abundance of caution, and because the undersigned is loathe to enter defaults or impose sanctions at any time, each party was permitted 10 days after the March 1, 1994 formal hearing in which to file any further written clarification of the record or pleadings. Petitioner filed a response dated March 10, 1994 on March 10, 1994, but Respondent still filed no Answer to the Petition for Relief, despite numerous questions by the undersigned at the March 1, 1994 hearing concerning what facts asserted in the Petition for Relief were admitted and which were denied by Respondent and inquiring why no Answer had been filed by Respondent. On March 4, 1994, Respondent filed a written response dated March 3, 1994. A copy of Petitioner's March 10, 1994 response, without attachments, is attached and incorporated herein as "Exhibit I." A copy of Respondent's March 4, 1994 response, without attachments, is attached and incorporated herein as "Exhibit J." Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter ("Exhibit J") was directed primarily to providing the hearing officer with a history of settlement negotiations and copies of proposed settlement documents. This is a practice contrary to Section 90.408, F.S., The Florida Evidence Code. Respondent had filed no Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Relief and no Answer, and although by rule, even a motion to dismiss may not toll the 20 days provided by rule for Respondent to answer the Petition for Relief, Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter response also raised, for the first time, the untimeliness of the Petition for Relief as grounds to dismiss this cause. However, Respondent's March 4, 1994 allegations based on untimeliness of the Petition were not persuasive, in that the rule that Respondent cited in support thereof applied only to what the Florida Commission on Human Relations or its Executive Director may do either sua sponte or upon motion regarding Requests for Redetermination. The rule cited therein was inapplicable to the legal principle for which Respondent cited it. Therefore, Respondent's argument against the Petition was incorrect or incomplete. Also, due to the complexity of the several statutes and rules involved, ruling on the issue of untimeliness vel non of the Petition for Relief required the taking of factual evidence. For instance, there is a Commission rule which tolls the 30 days for filing the Petition if the Petitioner applies for, or the Commission grants, an extension of time for filing the Petition. Consequently, Petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to present all the facts concerning his filing of the Petition in response to the allegations of the Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter. The representations of Respondent's qualified representative at the March 1, 1994 hearing and the materials filed after that hearing by Respondent's "in house" counsel ("Exhibit J") did not show good cause why Respondent should be permitted to put on a defense by way of undisclosed oral testimony or exhibits. Likewise, Petitioner did not demonstrate by his oral argument, exhibit, and post-hearing response ("Exhibit I"), any legal good cause why his noncompliance with prior orders should be excused so as to permit him to call any witnesses or put in evidence any exhibits not disclosed to Respondent. More specifically, the date and contents of the December 6, 1993 letter to Petitioner from Legal Services (original is "Exhibit H" hereto) did not support Petitioner's oral assertions at the March 1, 1994 hearing that he had been represented in this case by legal counsel, had relied on a lawyer to meet his November 26, 1993 filing date, or that Legal Services' retention of his documents at a critical time had prevented his timely compliance with any of the prior orders herein. Accordingly, an order was entered on April 21, 1994. A complete copy of that order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit K". That order provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The representations of Respondent's qualified representative at the March 1, 1994 hearing and the materials filed after that hearing by Respondent's legal counsel have not shown good cause why Respondent should be permitted to put on a defense by way of undisclosed oral testimony or exhibits. Likewise, Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause why his noncompliance with prior orders should be excused so as to permit him to call any witnesses or put on any exhibits not disclosed to Respondent. However, since Petitioner clearly has always been an appropriate witness and his oral testimony could be reasonably anticipated by Respondent, a formal evidentiary hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. will be convened solely for the taking of Petitioner Donald's oral testimony, subject to cross examination by Respondent. Also, the materials filed by Respondent's counsel after the March 1, 1994 hearing state for the first time that Respondent believes the Petition for Relief is subject to discretionary dismissal for untimeliness, pursuant to Rule 22T-9.07 F.A.C. [new number, if one exists, was not given]. However, Respondent still did not see fit to put this observation or belief in the form of a motion. Jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time. The jurisdictional issue requires evidence to sustain a motion, if a motion is made. Should Respondent see fit to defend on that issue by motion and evidence, Respondent remains free to do. (Emphasis supplied) Simultaneous with the entry of the April 21, 1994 Order, a Notice of Hearing was mailed to the parties. It provided for a formal hearing on June 13, 1994 and stated the issues as: "As set forth in the order entered simultaneously herewith. [The only witness will be K.E. Donald.]" Despite the language employed in the April 21, 1994 order, which still permitted Respondent to assert the untimeliness of the petition for Relief as a bar or jurisdictional issue, Respondent did not file a written motion or submit supporting documentation (evidence) on that issue prior to the June 13, 1994 formal hearing. At formal hearing on June 13, 1994, Respondent moved orally to dismiss the Petition for Relief due to its late filing. Hearing Officer Composite "Exhibit A" was admitted in evidence. Hearing Officer Composite "Exhibit A" consisted of The Florida Human Relations Commission Transmittal of Petition (one page), Charge of Discrimination (one page), Petition for Relief (three pages), Notice of Determination: No Cause (two pages) and Determination of No Cause (two pages). The original of this composite exhibit as received in evidence at formal hearing is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit A" to this Recommended Order. At formal hearing, Petitioner testified that he had not moved the Florida Commission on Human Relations for an order extending his time to file his petition, no order extending time had been entered, and he had neither a postmark nor any clear recollection of the date he mailed his Petition to the Commission. If Florida Commission on Human Relations Rules 60Y-4.004, 60Y- 4.007(1), 60Y-4.008(2), F.A.C., are not applicable, the Petition for Relief should have been filed with the Commission on April 22, 1993, a Thursday, and was filed late by six days, since it was filed with the Commission on April 28, 1993, the following Wednesday. These foregoing rules provide that when a document is received by mail, the date of filing shall relate back to the date of the postmark, provide three days for mailing where notice is mailed, and provide an extra day for filing when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. If those rules apply, then the Petitioner's delay is shorter than six days or indeterminable. The Petition for Relief was admittedly received by Respondent's "in- house" counsel on or before May 6, 1993. Respondent was specifically asked by the undersigned hearing officer how the late filing of the Petition for Relief had prejudiced Respondent's position. Respondent asserted that Respondent could not have foreseen that Petitioner would ultimately have been permitted to testify on his own behalf, and that, but for the Petition for Relief being filed six days late, Respondent might have filed an answer, would not have assumed that the Petition was barred and would not have, due to a conflict in the rules, failed to respond to all pleadings and orders, might have secured "out of house" counsel, would not have expended the cost of trying to negotiate a settlement with Petitioner after the cancellation of the October 18, 1993 formal hearing, and would not have incurred "enormous expense" during the Florida Commission on Human Relations' investigatory phase, in sending Messrs. Carroll and Miller to the March 1, 1994 DOAH hearing, and in filing its only written materials on March 4, 1994. Since the investigatory phase before the Florida Commission on Human Relations predated that agency's March 23, 1993 Determination of No Cause and also predated the filing of the April 28, 1993 Petition for Relief, that portion of Respondent's argument related to incurring enormous expense is patently absurd, as is Respondent's assertion that Respondent could not have foreseen that Petitioner would be permitted to testify on his own behalf. The expense incurred by Respondent in having one layman travel twenty three miles to Tallahassee and the other travel across town to formal hearing, even considering the value of those gentlemen's time to the corporation, and in having "in-house" counsel file Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter is de minimus, and these expenses have no nexus to the lateness by six days of the April 28, 1993 Petition for Relief. Respondent failed to demonstrate how the filing of the Petition for Relief on April 28, 1993 instead of on April 22, 1993 could have reasonably prevented Respondent from filing an Answer within 20 days as required by Rule 22T-9.008(5), F.A.C., [now renumbered as 60Y-5.008(5), F.A.C.], and as specifically instructed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations in its Transmittal of the Petition to Respondent. (See Finding of Fact No. 4, supra and "Exhibit A"). Respondent also failed to demonstrate how, under the circumstances of the language contained in the Florida Commission on Human Relations Transmittal of Petition and the DOAH orders, Respondent could have been misled by conflicting language in Rules 22T-9.07 [now renumbered 60Y- 5.007(9) and (12)], 22T-9.08 [now renumbered 60Y-5.008(1) and (5)] and 60Q- 2.004(5), F.A.C., 3/ into not answering the Petition for Relief for more than thirteen months, indeed, never answering it, or how such circumstances prevented Respondent responding to other motions and orders or prevented Respondent from obtaining "out of house" counsel. Settlement negotiations are not cognizable by the trier of fact, are always undertaken at the parties' mutual risk, and have never been deemed sufficient to toll filing dates. See, Section 90.408, F.S. After Respondent had been given the opportunity to present any further evidence on its oral motion to dismiss the Petition for Relief, the oral motion to dismiss was taken under advisement for resolution in this Recommended Order. (See Conclusions of Law, infra.) Respondent then orally moved for clarification of the April 21, 1994 Notice of Hearing and Order Limiting Scope of Formal Hearing, which was resolved by rereading that order and notice into the record. Respondent next orally moved for leave to present witnesses, contrary to the decretal portion of the April 21, 1994 order. No good cause was shown to vacate the April 21, 1994 order limiting evidence. To permit Respondent to put on undisclosed witnesses while Petitioner was precluded from doing so after Petitioner had appeared at formal hearing believing that Respondent's failure to answer constituted an admission of the material facts alleged in the petition and Petitioner had come prepared only for direct and cross-examination of himself would be unduly prejudicial. The motion was denied. The facts that Rule 60Y-5.008(5)(d) F.A.C. presumes admitted under the unanswered Petition for Relief are those set out in the Petition itself. They are fully set out in "Exhibit A" hereto and provide, in part, as follows: "The company had followed discriminatory hiring assignment and promotion policies against minority group members on an equal basis with white people. My fourteenth amendment were [sic] violated. That white get hired off the street and get full time without any training, the first day. * * * Discriminatory hiring, firing, assignment and promotion policies against Negroes using their position and power to destroy black worker jobs in order to bestow them on white workers." ("Exhibit A") Petitioner's unrefuted testimony elaborated on the foregoing admitted facts to show that Respondent employed fifteen or more employees and that Petitioner, a black male, had been employed part-time for nearly four years by Respondent in its Quincy store managed by Mr. Terry Miller; Mr. Miller's assistant had hired Petitioner as a member of a truck unloading crew. Petitioner also showed that other white workers were hired off the street without job training for full-time positions. However, Petitioner was hired by Mr. Miller as a full-time employee effective June 9, 1994, four days before formal hearing. Petitioner admitted that at some time before June 9, 1994, he had been "written up" for not meeting the employer's dress code and appearance standards and had also been "written up" for not meeting the employer's performance standards of moving at least 45 cases per hour. Petitioner maintained, without refutation, that these "write-ups" were unwarranted, pretextual citations because he was black. Petitioner testified, without refutation, that on at least one occasion he was "written up" in a category that did not include his regular job duties. This admission is no different that the expanded allegations included in an attachment to the Petition ("Exhibit A"), all of which allegations have been admitted by Respondent by its failure to answer the Petition. Petitioner also conceded, upon cross-examination, that in July 1992 there were some black full-time associates in the Quincy store and that promotions have been based on job performance, not seniority. However, no similarity of these other black full-time employees' employment situations or job duties was drawn to compare with Petitioner's personal employment situation or job duties. Consequently, the "write-ups" of Petitioner are found to be pretextual reasons for the employer's refusal to promote him. No stipulation or order bifurcating damage evidence from evidence of discrimination was entered in this case. Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to "compensation" from July 22, 1992 to June 9, 1994, but he presented no evidence of his pay rate per hour in either the full time or part time positions, nor any other nexus upon which lost compensation damages could be calculated. There also is no record evidence of what increases and/or decreases occurred in pay, pay rate, or emoluments for either position over that period of time. Likewise, there is no record evidence of how many hours Petitioner worked or could have worked in either the part-time or full-time position so that damages based on a pay differential can be calculated. Respondent orally moved to dismiss for failure of Petitioner to state a prima facie case. That motion was also taken under advisement for resolution in this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order FINDING: That Petitioner has shown a prima facie violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, Section 760.10 F.S. [1989], to wit: failure of a covered employer to "promote" Petitioner-employee to a full-time position because he is black; That Respondent has articulated, but has not substantiated, legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions complained of; and That Petitioner has shown the articulated reasons to be pretextual; AND ORDERING: That Respondent employ Petitioner in a full-time position. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 1994.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.009(8) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact Based on the Stipulation of Facts and on the joint exhibits received into evidence at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties FDF is a political committee registered pursuant to Section 106.03, Florida Statutes, to advocate a change in the way Florida draws legislative and congressional district lines. FDF is engaged in developing and implementing initiative petitions to place constitutional amendments on the ballot to provide standards by which state legislative and federal congressional district boundaries are drawn. The Division of Elections is a division within the Department of State, the head of which is the Secretary of State. § 20.10, Fla. Stat. The challenged rule, relevant statutes, and rule and legislative history Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.009(8), which is the subject of this rule challenge, provides: “Bundling: No initiative petition form circulated for signature may be bundled with or attached to any other petition.” The rule was adopted on March 16, 2006, as part of a number of amendments to Florida Administrative Code Rules 1S- 2.0011, 1S-2.009, and 1S-2.0091. Fla. Admin. Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 10, Mar. 10, 2006, p. 1131. According to the Notice of Proposed Rule published November 23, 2005, "the proposed amendments reflect changes in practice and procedure and implement changes made during the 2005 Legislative Session in Chapter 2005-278, Laws of Florida, that pertain to the procedures governing submission and approval of initiative petitions and ballot position assignments for constitutional amendments" and "update the rule to reflect current practices, procedures, and legislative changes relating to the procedures governing the submission and approval of initiative petitions and ballot position assignments for constitutional amendments." Fla. Admin. Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 47, Nov. 23, 2005, pp. 4308 - 4312. The Department received no comments or objections from the public or from the Florida Legislature’s Joint Administrative Procedures Committee during the rulemaking process for Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.009. The specific authority for Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.009 is identified in the Florida Administrative Code as Sections 20.10(3), 97.012(1), 100.371(3), (7), and 101.161(2), Florida Statutes. The law implemented is identified as Sections 100.371 and 101.161, Florida Statutes. As noted above, the amendments to Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.009 were enacted to implement Chapter 2005-278, Laws of Florida, which was effective January 1, 2006. This law revised the procedures by which constitutional amendments by initiative are placed on the ballot and included amendments to Section 100.371, Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this proceeding, one of the amendments deleted former Section 100.371(2), Florida Statutes (2005), and re-numbered former Section 100.371(3), Florida Statutes (2005), as Section 100.371(2), Florida Statutes (2006). No changes were made to the text of the newly re-numbered Section 100.371(2), Florida Statutes. Section 100.371(2), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Secretary of State shall adopt rules pursuant to s. 120.54 prescribing the style and requirements of such form." This language has been in Section 100.371, Florida Statutes, since the statute’s inception in 1979. The only substantive change occurred in 2002 when the current term “adopt” replaced its predecessor term “promulgate” in the sentence. The amendments to Section 100.371, Florida Statutes, in Chapter 2005-278, Laws of Florida, did not address bundling of initiative petitions nor did the amendments provide any rulemaking authority to the Department regarding constitutional amendment initiative petition forms other than that already included in Section 100.371(2) and (7), Florida Statutes. During the 2006 legislative session, bills were introduced that would have amended Section 100.371(2), Florida Statutes, to include a provision that "[t]he form shall consist of a single card or sheet of paper unconnected with any other card or sheet of paper and must be circulated for signatures in this context." Pertinent to these proceedings, the Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for Committee Substitute for one of the bills introduced during the 2006 legislative session, Senate Bill 720, contained the following: During the 2004 election cycle, numerous stories appeared in newspapers concerning fraud in the petition process to place constitutional amendments on the ballot. Two petition gatherers were arrested in Santa Rosa County for over 40 counts each of uttering a forged document. Several other elections supervisors found petitions signed with the names of dead voters. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) issued a press release in October of 2004 indicating that it had received numerous complaints relating to voting irregularities, and had initiated several investigations. Specifically, the FDLE created regional elections task forces to address the issue of voter fraud in a statewide manner. While the FDLE did not reveal details of the investigations, it noted that the investigations focused on the following conduct: In some cases, persons who believed they were signing petitions later found out that their signatures or possible forged signatures were used to complete a fraudulent voter registration. In other instances, it appears that workers hired to obtain legitimate voter registrations filled in the information on the registration forms that should have been completed by the registrants. On several occasions, workers appear to have signed multiple voter registrations themselves using information obtained during the registration drive. In many of the situations complained about, the workers were being paid on the basis of each registration form submitted. (Footnotes omitted.) Similar language was contained in the House of Representatives Staff Analysis for Committee Substitute for the other bills, CS/HB 773. On April 19, 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted unfavorably on the passage of Senate Bill 720, and the bill never made it to the Senate floor for consideration. CS/HB 773 was placed on the House Calendar on April 11, 2006, but it died on the House Calendar on May 5, 2006. No legislation providing that “[t]he form [of an initiative petition] shall consist of a single card or sheet of paper unconnected with any other card or sheet of paper and must be circulated for signatures in this context” was enacted into law during the 2006 Legislative session or in any subsequent session of the Legislature. Since the 2006 regular legislative session, the Florida Legislature has met in regular session and in four special sessions in 2007. In 2007, the Legislature made several amendments to Section 100.371, Florida Statutes, but no amendments to Section 100.371(2), Florida Statutes, were enacted. See Ch. 2007-30, § 25, at 19-21, Laws of Fla. Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.009 was amended on October 15, 2007, but Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S- 2.009(8) remained unchanged. The Department received no comments or objections from the public or the Florida Legislature’s Joint Administrative Procedures Committee during the rulemaking process for Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S- 2.009 when it was amended on October 15, 2007. Definitions The following terms have the definitions as stated: Bundle: "A group of things fastened together for convenient handling." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. "Several objects or a quantity of material gathered or bound together." Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed. 1999). Attached: "Joined, connected, bound." Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed. 1999). Style: "A particular manner or technique by which something is done, created, or performed." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. "A particular type or sort, with reference to form, appearance, or character."; "To design or arrange in accordance with a given or new style."; "To bring into conformity with a specific style." Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed. 1999). Requirement: "Something required." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. "Something required."; "A requirement is some quality or performance demanded of a person in accordance with certain fixed regulations." Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed. 1999). Substantial effect of rule on FDF In a letter hand-delivered on October 31, 2006, Mr. Ben Wilcox, Chairman of Floridians for Fair Elections, submitted to the Department four initiative petitions concerning legislative and congressional district boundaries for approval as to format. Mr. Wilcox stated in the letter that Floridians for Fair Elections intended "to bundle these proposals as a package for gathering signatures." In a letter dated November 2, 2006, the Department informed Mr. Wilcox that the four petition forms did not meet the format requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S- 2.009 and the Form DS-DE 19 incorporated into the rule. The Department's letter also stated that the rule "provides that no initiative petition form circulated for signature may be bundled with or attached to any other petition form." In a letter hand-delivered to the Department on August 7, 2007, Barry Richard, on behalf of Floridians for Fair Elections, submitted four constitutional amendment initiative petition forms concerning legislative and congressional district boundaries. The letter stated: The box in the upper left-hand corner for insertion of the voter’s identifying information will be carbon treated so that the voter only has to fill it out one time for all four petitions. However, the signatures will not copy from one form to another and each signature line can be seen only by lifting the preceding page. This has been done to avoid the fraud potential that was inherent in the bundled forms used in the past and now prohibited by your rules. On behalf of Floridians for Fair Elections, Mr. Richard sought the Department's approval to use NCR paper to print and circulate the proposed initiative petitions. The petitions were not attached to one another. Rather, they were presented as separate pages with three holes punched, to be placed in a loose-leaf, three-ring binder notebook for signature. The loose-leaf notebook design would permit the elector to fill-in identifying information on the top petition, and that information would be transferred by carbon to the petitions underneath the top petition. The signature line was not carbon treated and no signature could be transferred to any of the petitions underneath. The top petition would be shorter in length than the other three petitions; however, the signature line on the other three petition forms was not visible without lifting the preceding petition form. The elector would be able to review the text of the petition by lifting the preceding petition form. In an e-mail dated August 14, 2007, the Department informed Mr. Richard that the information he orally provided the Department regarding the manner in which the petitions would be presented to the voters, that is, fastened in a three ring binder, would fall within the rule’s prohibition against being "bundled with or attached to any other petition form." In a letter dated September 17, 2007, Mr. Richard submitted to the Department on behalf of Floridians for Fair Elections two constitutional amendment initiative petition forms relating to legislative and congressional redistricting. Nothing was stated about bundling these petitions and each was on regular, letter-sized paper. In a letter dated September 19, 2007, hand-delivered to Department on September 20, 2007, Floridians for Fair Elections notified the Department that it had changed its name to FairDistrictsFlorida.org. The Department acknowledged the name change in a letter dated September 24, 2007. In an e-mail dated September 25, 2007, FDF re- submitted the two petition forms to correct format mistakes on the petitions that Mr. Richard had presented on behalf of FDF's predecessor, Floridians for Fair Elections. After making further corrections, FDF re-submitted for approval the two initiative petitions via e-mail on September 27, 2007. In letters dated September 28, 2007, the Department notified FDF that the format of its two initiative petitions was approved and that they had been assigned serial numbers 07-15 and 07-16. (A scrivener’s error exists on Petition 07-15 -- the "Date Approved" at the bottom of the form should read "9/28/07," not "7/28/07.").
The Issue Whether it is appropriate for Respondent to remove Petitioner from the rolls of eligible voters in Polk County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a registered voter in Polk County, Florida. Respondent is the elected public official in Polk County, who ensures that all voter registration and list maintenance procedures in Polk County are conducted in compliance with any applicable requirements of the Statewide Voter Registration System and acts as the official custodian of documents received related to the registration of electors and changes in voter registration status of electors in Polk County. On or about July 28, 2009, Respondent received notice from the Florida Department of State that Petitioner was a registered voter who was potentially ineligible to vote due to a felony conviction. On June 26, 2006, Respondent was convicted of a felony: Section 784.021, Florida Statutes--Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. The State of Florida, Office of Executive Clemency, has not restored Respondent's civil rights for his conviction for the felony listed in paragraph 4. Petitioner did not present any evidence that the information relative to his felony conviction was inaccurate or that he had been granted clemency and had his civil rights restored.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Polk County Supervisor of Elections, make a final determination that Petitioner, Morgan Valez-Rosario, is ineligible to vote in the State of Florida and remove his name from the voter registration rolls. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Lori Edwards Polk County Supervisor of Elections 250 South Broadway Post Office Box 1460 Bartow, Florida 33831-1460 Morgan Velez-Rosario 3644 East Johnson Avenue Haines City, Florida 33844
The Issue Whether Respondent, Arlene Schwartz, willfully violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which prohibits an officer or employee of the state, or of any county or municipality, from using his or her official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination of office, or coercing or influencing another person's vote or affecting the results thereof.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, documentary evidence, entire Transcript of Proceedings, and the facts admitted in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent, Arlene Schwartz, as Mayor of the City of Margate, Florida, was a municipal officer on October 27, 2000, when she wrote a letter signed by her as Mayor, Margate, Florida, on official City of Margate stationery, endorsing Howard Forman for Clerk of Court, Broward County, Florida. Respondent has 10 years of experience as a candidate, elected official or member of municipal boards. Eugene Steinfeld was City Attorney, City of Margate, for 24 years; as such he gave advice to the Mayor and Commissioners of the City of Margate about their responsibilities under the Florida Ethics Code and Elections Laws. In 1994, in his capacity as City Attorney, Mr. Steinfeld authored a City of Margate Resolution which authorized the Mayor, Vice Mayor and City Commissioners "to use a facsimile of the official seal of the City of Margate in correspondence, promotion, or advertising when they are promoting the City of Margate. " On January 24, 2000, in his capacity as City Attorney, Mr. Steinfeld sent an inter-office memorandum to Respondent and others advising "there is no prohibition for endorsing a candidate for City Commission by another candidate for City Commission . . . ; it is only where a candidate expends money for another candidate or contributes things of value to another candidate that is prohibited, pursuant to FS. 104.071." In September 2000, Mr. Steinfeld had a conversation with Respondent wherein she asked if she would be permitted to endorse a candidate for a board position in a development district. In advising her that she could, he recalled saying, "You do not lose your freedom of speech when you become an elected official." On October 23, 2000, Respondent attended a meeting of the Margate Democratic Club where Howard Forman, a candidate for Clerk of Court, Broward County, spoke. As a State Senator, Mr. Forman had assisted the City of Margate even though Margate was not in his Senate District. Respondent orally endorsed Mr. Forman at the meeting and offered her assistance. On October 25, 2000, Respondent's office received a telephone call from Iris Siple who worked in Mr. Forman's campaign. Respondent returned the call on October 26, 2000, and was asked to write a letter endorsing Mr. Forman on city stationery. The letter was written on October 27, 2000, and later faxed to Mr. Forman's campaign headquarters. Mr. Forman's campaign reproduced the letter and mailed approximately 700 copies to potential voters. Respondent received no remuneration or benefit for writing the endorsement letter. Respondent acknowledged that she had no specific discussion with the City Attorney regarding the appropriateness of using city stationery in the endorsement letter. Nevertheless, she believed that writing the endorsement letter was something that she could do without violating the law. Based on the evidence presented, including the resolution allowing the use of the seal in correspondence promoting the city, the memorandum and advice given by the City Attorney, and her reliance on the request made by Mr. Forman's campaign office for a letter on city stationery, the undersigned finds that Respondent's belief that she had done nothing inappropriate in writing the endorsement letter to be credible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Arlene Schwartz, did not violate Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Bogenschutz, Esquire Bogenschutz & Dutko 600 South Andrews Avenue Suite 500 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-2802 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent, Katherine Harris, violated the provisions of Section 106.08, Florida Statutes, by making payments of organizational dues from her campaign account prior to the 1998 election.
Findings Of Fact As to the Merits: At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Commission was the state agency responsible for the oversight of public elections in this state. Respondent was a candidate for public office whose activities were subject to scrutiny by the Commission. The Division of Elections (Division) was a branch of the office of the Secretary of State. Respondent initially notified the Division on June 8, 1997 that she was seeking re-election to the Florida Senate seat she then held. However, on November 19, 1997, she filed the appropriate forms with the Division to signify her candidacy for the office of Florida Secretary of State. At or near each filing, Respondent filed with the Division a "Statement of Candidate" in which she stated she had received, read, and understood the requirements of Section 106, Florida Statutes. From April 1997, through mid-March 1998, 21 separate checks were written by her campaign treasurer on Respondent's campaign account with the Barnett Bank for dues payments to organizations. This is the issue here. The organizations to which the checks were written are organizations established for the public good. The checks in issue are as follows: CH # DATE PAYEE AMT 0101 04/03/97 Charlotte County 9.00 Republican Club 0102 04/03/97 Peace River Federated 5.00 Republican Women 0103 04/03/97 Manasota Republican 11.00 Women's Club Fed. 0104 04/03/97 Venice-Nokomis Fed. 11.00 Women's Club 0105 04/03/97 Sarasota Bay Republican 5.00 Women's Club 0106 04/03/97 West Charlotte 5.00 Republican Club 0108 06/05/97 Bernice Furrow 25.00 0109 07/03/97 Venice Area C of C 50.00 0110 08/06/97 Charlotte County C of C 65.00 0111 08/11/97 Republican Women's Club 10.00 of Sarasota 0112 09/04/97 Sarasota Bay Republican 15.00 Women's Club 0114 10/29/97 Taxpayer's Association of Sarasota County 12.00 0120 11/30/97 Sarasota Republican Club 15.00 0162 02/11/98 Mid-County Republican 15.00 0163 02/11/98 Club Venice-Nokomis Federated 7.50 0164 02/11/98 Republican Club West County Republican 5.00 0165 02/11/98 Club Siesta Key Republican 6.00 0189 03/03/98 Club Sarasota County Young 30.00 0199 03/09/98 Republicans Republican Women's Club 10.00 of Sarasota 0204 03/16/98 Republican Women's Club 15.00 0206 03/16/98 of Lakeland Federate Manasota Republican 10.00 Women's Club Federate All of the checks except number 0108 were for dues to the organization shown, and totaled $325.00. Check number 0108, in the amount of $25.00, was made to Bernice Furrow, and the memo space on the instrument indicates it was issued in reimbursement of dues to the Peace River Forum. These checks were written at the direction of Respondent. Clifford M. King, the maker of the checks in question, is an attorney admitted to practice in Florida in 1988. He served as campaign treasurer for Respondent during her successful campaign for the Florida Senate in 1994, and was her attorney and campaign treasurer during her campaign for Secretary of State. His major areas of practice include business transactions, estate planning, and probate. He has not worked for any other candidate nor has he ever been employed by any other client to give advice on elections law. Nonetheless, he considered himself to be qualified to advise Respondent on the Florida Election Code during her campaigns. It is so found. To prepare for giving that advice, Mr. King reviewed the Florida Statutes pertinent to elections and the campaign handbook prepared and issued by the Division of Elections. However, he did not read any opinions issued by the Division or opinions of the Attorney General dealing with elections law. When issues arose with which he did not feel comfortable, he would seek the advice of the Division of Elections. Mr. King cannot recall whether it was Respondent or one of her campaign workers who asked him if it were permissible to spend campaign funds for dues, but he is sure the question was asked. In response, he advised that to do so was a permissible expenditure of the campaign. Mr. King recalls that this same issue arose during the 1994 campaign at which time, based on his research of the statutes and the Division's campaign handbook, and after consultation with individuals involved in other campaigns, he concluded that expenditures for dues were permissible and he so advised Respondent. Though Mr. King recalls having discussed with Respondent the issue of the permissibility of writing these checks, he did not advise her of the specific provisions of the elections statute in issue here. He was satisfied at the time he advised Respondent and wrote the checks in issue, that it was lawful and permissible to do so. The Division's investigator, Mr. Smith, contacted representatives of most, if not all of the organizations to whom the checks in issue were written. All checks except the one to Ms. Furrow, were in payment of membership dues paid by all members. Mr. Young could find no instance where a specific benefit accrued to Respondent as a result of her payment of dues which was not received by every other member of the organization, candidate for public office or not. It is so found. As to the Motion for fees: After the Order of Probable Cause involving Respondent was served on Respondent, she requested a formal hearing. This hearing was initially denied by the Commission on the grounds that Respondent had failed to identify issues of fact requiring formal hearing. However, this decision was subsequently reversed and the matter was referred for formal hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. While the discovery process was being carried out, it became known that Respondent had twice been advised by Mr. King, her attorney, that the donations/dues payments from campaign funds in issue were permissible expenditures. When this information became known to the Commission's counsel, counsel prepared a Motion to Dismiss the Order of Probable Cause and recommended that action to the Commission. The basis for the recommendation was a lack of evidence to demonstrate that Respondent's actions were willfully illegal. Notwithstanding its counsel's advice, the Commission determined to proceed with the action on the basis that a majority of the Commissioners considered Respondent's counsel/campaign treasurer, the individual who had given the advice to Respondent, a "straw man" whose testimony by deposition was for the sole purpose of exonerating Respondent. That conclusion is not supported by the evidence of record, however.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing its Order of Probable Cause in this matter. An award of attorney's fees and costs to Respondent is unwarranted and rejected. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Phyllis Hampton, Esquire David F. Chester, Esquire Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Richard E. Coates, Esquire Christopher B. Lunny, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. 106 East College Avenue Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven K. Christensen, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), by voting on a December 9, 2009, motion on whether to investigate his actions, and if so, what is an appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent served as a member of the Deltona City Commission (City Commission). Respondent is subject to the requirements of Part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for public officers and employees, for his acts and omissions as a member of the City Commission. Background On August 18, 2008, the City Commission approved a multi-million dollar Land Purchase Contract by which the City of Deltona (the City) was to acquire property from Howland Crossings, LLC. Respondent was an opponent of the purchase of the property by the City from Howland Crossings, LLC. As a condition for closing on the property, Howland Crossings was obligated to obtain a permit from the St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD). On November 29, 2009, Respondent filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with the SJRWMD in opposition to the issuance of the permit. On December 8, 2009, the City Manager, Faith Miller, sent a memorandum to the Mayor and City Commissioners which addressed Ms. Miller's concern with Respondent having filed the Petition for Administrative Hearing related to the proposed purchase of the property. The Vote in Question Also on December 8, 2009, the City Mayor, Dennis Mulder, wrote a memo to Commission members informing them that he had decided to call a special meeting for the following day. The memo stated in its entirety: I've decided to call a Special Meeting for Wednesday, December 9, 2009 at 4:30 pm in the Commission Chambers regarding Commissioner Zischkau's petition with SJRWMD (St. Johns River Water Management District). Items for exclusive discussion will be: Potential Formal Request by Commission to have Commissioner Zischkau withdraw his petition with SJRWMD. Conflict letter received by City Manager regarding Mr. Fowler and solutions. Concerns regarding possible violations of the City of Deltona Charter and/or Florida laws of various nature, yet undefined, and possible processes that may be taken by the Commission. Thank you, Mayor Mulder Marsha Segal-George served in the capacity of acting City Attorney at the December 9, 2009, City Commission meeting at issue here. Ms. Segal-George has worked in local government for over 30 years, having served as a county attorney, county manager, city attorney, and city manager. According to Ms. Segal-George, it is customary to receive an agenda package prior to the commencement of a meeting of a public body to review in advance. She did not receive any materials to review prior to the December 9 meeting in question. Before the meeting commenced, Ms. Segal-George talked to the Mayor briefly to express her concerns and discomfort that she did not have any documents regarding the meeting, as it was her responsibility to advise the Commission and it "creates a very--kind of uncomfortable feeling for the lawyer, because we like to be prepared and we like to be able to advise our client." Documents were distributed by the mayor after the meeting started. These documents comprised three proposed motions under the heading "Potential Motions offered by the Mayor for special meeting of December 9, 2009." Item C, the motion at issue in this proceeding, reads as follows: I move that due to possible past, present and future conflict that the City Manager quickly hire an attorney or firm she feels is experienced enough, affordable and has not done work for the City in the past to assist this Commission thru (sic) her on helping to determine whether the actions of Commissioner Zischkau violated the City Charter, or any other laws or rules and, if applicable, any and all methods of resolution that are available to the City Commission. In addition, for the purity of this process and its results once this person or firm is hired, no Commissioner or the Mayor, or officer, permanent or acting, of the City, other than the City Manager, shall contact this attorney or firm. The results shall be released to the Commission as a body at one time for consideration. Ms. Segal-George was "shocked" by this motion, in that the city attorney had not been consulted with regards to these issues and "they were fairly serious issues . . . it is not the type of thing that you would put in the hands of a city manager. . . it would be something that the attorney . . . would be involved, and so I was shocked by it." When asked during her deposition if she had thought at that time that Respondent or anyone else had a conflict of interest regarding the vote, would she have interrupted and said something about it, she replied. "Yes, I would have. And I didn't." It continues to be Ms. Segal-George's opinion that Respondent did not have a conflict of interest when he voted on the motion at issue.1/ Respondent voted against the motion. However, the motion passed with a vote of 4-3. Prior to the vote, Commissioner Zischkau did not state publically to the assembly the nature of the vote or the nature of any potential interest he might have in the matter. The fact that this motion related to Commissioner Zischkau was abundantly clear from the wording of the motion itself to anyone reading it or hearing it read at the meeting. As a result of the passage of the motion, a law firm other than the one serving as City Attorney was hired by the City Commission to provide a legal opinion as to whether Respondent violated the City Charter and the provisions of the Ethics Code. The conclusion reached by this law firm was that Respondent's actions did not violate either the City Charter or the Ethics Code.2/ Randall Morris has served as a City Commissioner of the City of Lake Mary, Mayor of the City of Lake Mary, County Commissioner for Seminole County, Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners of Seminole County, and on numerous other public bodies. In his experience, receiving an agenda packet with proposed motions at the dais with no advance notice of what he would be receiving and what will be voted upon " . . . would be extraordinary, and in my experience, I've never experienced that." The weight of the evidence does not establish the allegation that Respondent's vote in question inured to his private gain or loss when he voted on the motion to retain counsel to investigate his actions regarding filing a petition with the SJRWMD relative to the purchase of land from Howland Crossings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED: That the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Herbert S. Zischkau, did not violate section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Barbara J. Staros Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent, John J. Fugate, Sheriff of DeSoto County, willfully violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), which prohibits an officer or employee of the state, or of any county or municipality, from using his or her official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination of office or coercing or influencing another person's vote or affecting the results thereof.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At the time of hearing, Respondent, John J. Fugate, was the incumbent Sheriff of DeSoto County, Florida. He was first elected in November 2000 and took office in January 2001. At the times pertinent to this case, Sheriff Fugate was a candidate for re-election, having filed the initial paperwork appointing a campaign treasurer and naming a depository for campaign contributions on May 20, 2003. Also on May 20, 2003, Sheriff Fugate submitted his signed "Statement of Candidate," pursuant to Section 106.023, Florida Statutes (2003). This document attested that Sheriff Fugate had received, read, and understood "the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003)." These statutory provisions were included in the "2000 Candidate Handbook On Campaign Financing," published by the state Division of Elections and given to Sheriff Fugate by the local Supervisor of Elections, when Sheriff Fugate filed his paperwork for the 2000 election. The "2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook" was given to Sheriff Fugate when he filed his re-election paperwork with the local Supervisor of Elections and also included the provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003). During the Commission's investigation, Sheriff Fugate admitted that he had also read Chapter 104, Florida Statutes (2003), and believed he understood its provisions. Though Sheriff Fugate had filed the papers establishing his candidacy for re-election, some Sheriff's Office employees openly questioned whether he really intended to stand for re-election. These questions stemmed from the fact that Sheriff Fugate's teenage son had been killed in an automobile accident in 2002. Sheriff Fugate was aware of these questions and was concerned that loyal employees were unsure of his intentions. For some time, Sheriff's Office employees had also been discussing the status of Major William Wise, the second-in- command to Sheriff Fugate. Major Wise had been the chief deputy under Sheriff's Fugate's predecessor, was kept in that position by Sheriff Fugate, and was very popular among the Sheriff's Office employees. Major Wise was a participant in the State of Florida's Deferred Retirement Option Program ("DROP"), which he believed would require him to separate from the Sheriff's Office for one year upon his official retirement in October 2004. However, in October 2003, Major Wise learned that there was a way for him to reduce his separation to 30 days and still retain his full retirement benefit. Sheriff Fugate decided to prepare a letter to all Sheriff's Office employees that would convey both his re-election intentions and the good news concerning the fact that Major Wise would not have to vacate his position. The letter was written on stationery with a header reading, "Re- Elect Fugate for Sheriff," along with Sheriff Fugate's mailing address and phone number. The text of the letter read as follows: It hardly seems possible that the second half of the third year of this term of office is upon us and I can only concur with the saying that "time stands still for no one." For those that have been here for a while, we have made giant strides for the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office in the past two and a half years and for the newer employees, with your help and our combined efforts, I look forward to more success in the future. Thank you for your help and I truly appreciate the service given to the citizens of DeSoto County. In anticipation of running for a second term of office and as legally required, I have opened my official campaign account. This is the first step in any campaign and this announcement is not to be construed as a request for a contribution to my campaign. I, like you, have been in an employment position when the incumbent was seeking another term of office and can personally relate to pressure applied to assist with the campaign. Please understand that I will, and do value your support in any way that you may be inclined to offer. I also encourage anyone that feels that I have not earned your support in any way in the performance of my duty to feel free to talk to me and you can be assured that it will remain professional and will not be made personal. On another note, I know that there has been some question as to what was going to happen to the position of Major due to Major Wise being in the Drop program and it coming to an end. It is with great pleasure that I announce that a way has been found for Major Wise to continue in his position and he has made the decision to do so. Major Wise has contributed a great deal to this office and I am very pleased that he will be staying with us. If anyone has any questions about this letter, I remind you of our "open door" policy and invite you to feel free to stop by and visit with me. Again, thank you and I look forward to our working together to build a better office for the employees and the community. Beneath Sheriff Fugate's signature was the following: "Pd. Pol. Adv. Paid For In-Kind By John J. Fugate. Approved by John J. Fugate (D)." Sheriff Fugate's review of the Candidate Handbooks led him to conclude that he should not use the Sheriff's Office or DeSoto County resources in preparing or distributing his letter and that none of the costs involved in preparing or distributing the letter should be borne by the Sheriff's Office or the County. Thus, Sheriff Fugate drafted the letter on his home computer. He printed approximately 120 copies of the letter on his home printer, using paper and ink that he purchased at Wal- Mart. On his campaign treasurer's report for the third quarter of 2003, Sheriff Fugate reported the cost of ink and paper associated with this letter as an in-kind contribution from himself to his campaign. Sheriff Fugate brought the copies of the letter to the Sheriff's Office and placed one copy in the pay envelope of each Sheriff's Office employee. At the DeSoto County Sheriff’s Office, it was common practice for items other than pay checks to be included in the pay envelopes. Such items had included advertising circulars and public service memoranda, but not political advertisements. The Sheriff's Office had no specific policy setting forth what may or may not be placed in the pay envelopes, nor was there any particular procedure for obtaining approval of what was to be placed in the pay envelopes. Neither Sheriff Fugate, Major Wise, nor payroll supervisor Kathy Willcutts could recall a request to place an item in the pay envelopes ever having been denied. The pay envelopes, including Sheriff Fugate's letter, were distributed to the Sheriff's Office employees in the usual manner, either at the front desk in the Records Division for pickup or in the employee's mail slot. The employees received Sheriff Fugate's letter upon retrieving their paychecks on or about October 2, 2003. Several Sheriff's Office employees testified at the hearing. None of these employees felt that Sheriff Fugate was attempting to influence their vote or pressuring them to make a monetary contribution to his campaign. Lieutenant Carol Williamson is a 28-year Sheriff's Office employee and has worked for five different sheriffs. Lt. Williamson testified that in the past, she has been essentially ordered to campaign for her bosses, but that she did not consider Sheriff Fugate's letter to be anything other than informational. Deputy Mark Lawrence testified that "I read it, said 'okay,' and threw it away." Sheriff Fugate disclaimed any intent to influence his employees' votes or pressure them for campaign contributions. During his career, he had been forced to campaign for his elected superiors. Because of this experience, Sheriff Fugate did not wish to place his own employees in the position of feeling coerced to support him. Sheriff Fugate testified that he used campaign letterhead and included the "paid political advertisement" disclaimer because his reading of the statutes led him to conclude that those items were legally required on any correspondence referencing his campaign. Nevertheless, Sheriff Fugate maintained that his letter was intended solely to convey information, not to coerce or influence anyone's vote. Sheriff Fugate's testimony is supported by the letter itself, which expressly stated that he was not seeking contributions to his campaign and that employees should feel no pressure to support his candidacy. Nonetheless, Sheriff Fugate's letter was clearly an attempt to favorably influence his employees, albeit a low-key one that did not demand support in the apparent manner of previous sheriffs. The letter solicited the support of Sheriff's Office employees, "in any way that you may be inclined to offer." The letter may not have been coercive, but it was disingenuous for Sheriff Fugate to suggest that the letter was not designed to influence his employees in the upcoming election. Sheriff Fugate was cognizant of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003), and its prohibition on the use of "official authority or influence for the purpose of . . . coercing or influencing another person's vote . . . ." However, Sheriff Fugate believed, mistakenly but in all good faith, that his placement of the letters was allowed under another provision of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003): The provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to prevent any person from becoming a candidate for and actively campaigning for any elective office in this state. All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates. For reasons expressed in the Conclusions of Law below, Sheriff Fugate's good faith belief that his actions were within the ambit of the statute negates any suggestion that he "willfully" violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). Sheriff Fugate did not seek advice from the local Supervisor of Elections or an advisory opinion from the state Division of Elections pursuant to Subsection 106.23(2), Florida Statutes (2003), because he believed that he understood the application of the relevant statutes to his situation, including Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, John J. Fugate, did not violate Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), as alleged, and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004.
The Issue Whether Rule 22B-1.055(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact By letter dated April 17, 1985, A. J. McMullian III, State Retirement Director, advised C. H. Wigley, Jr., Acting Executive Director of the Escambia County Utilities Authority (ECUA) that the individual petitioners were eligible for inclusion in the Regular Class, but not the Elected State Officers' Class, of the Florida Retirement System. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. "The major difference between the Elected State Officers' Class and the Regular Class is the ESOC members . . . receive a higher retirement benefit . . . for the same number of years of service." (T. 38) To finance higher benefits the public employer pays a higher amount, set on "an actuarily sound basis." Deposition of Andrew J. McMullian, III, page 19. A few years back, "Escambia County and the City of Pensacola, felt it was time . . . to combine . . . utilities' systems into one agency. The City had just completed construction of a twenty-million-gallon-a-day treatment plant and had excess capacity. [Unincorporated] Escambia County had the . . . customers but not the facilities . . ." (T. 74) "Escambia County was faced with extending or having to go to the bond market to borrow significant money to buil[d] treatment facilities . . . [but] it was more practical that the City and County get together." (T. 88) By special act the legislature created the ECUA to purchase and operate the water and sewer systems that had belonged to both City and County, and to exercise "all powers with respect to water and sewer, and such other additional utilities as may be hereafter designated . . . which are . . . could be, or could have been but for this act, exercised by the City of Pensacola or Escambia County, Florida." Ch. 81-376, Section 3, Laws of Florida (1981). The ECUA came into existence on October 1, 1981, (T. 90) and now provides natural gas service (T. 95) at least outside the franchised area of the City of Pensacola. Ch. 85-410, Section 5(r), Laws of Florida (1985). The ECUA is authorized to provide utility services to the extent of its capacity to do so even in areas outside Escambia County. Ch. 85-410, Section 5(q), Laws of Florida (1985). By passing a resolution and signing an agreement effective October 1, 1982, (T. 108), the ECUA joined the Florida Retirement System and "decided to purchase past service back to October, '81, for all employees who were employed as of October 1st, '82." (T. 107) See Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Beginning with the 1984 elections, candidates for the ECUA Board had to meet the same qualifications as candidates for county office and had to live in the county commission district they sought to represent. Each of the five single-member districts has the same boundaries as the corresponding county commission district. Terms of ECUA board members are staggered just as county commissioners' terms are and, beginning in January 1987, all members will be elected for four-year terms, as county commissioners are. Each ECUA board candidate is subject to state election laws governing filing papers, qualifying fees and the like, to the same extent as candidates for county office are; and each takes an oath before entering upon the duties of the office. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2. The "Florida Retirement System . . . is a statewide consolidated system that covers public programs and employee groups on all levels of government, state, county, school board, cities, special districts Deposition of Andrew J. McMullian, III, page 13. State retirement programs before the Florida Retirement System, which came into existence on December 1, 1970, did not distinguish between elected officials and regular employees. Deposition of Ruth Sansom, page 16. After the Elected State Officers' Class had been created, the law was again amended, effective July 1, 1981, to make "county elected officials, including any sheriff, tax collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, clerk of the circuit court, county commissioner, school board member, or elected school board superintendent," Section 121.052(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), eligible for participation in the Elected State Officers' Class. Chapter 81-214, Laws of Florida (1981). Aside from holders of the offices named, the Comptrollers of Orange and Escambia Counties and the Mayor of Metropolitan Dade County are enrolled in the Elected State Officers' Class. (T. 40) Respondent viewed the Mayor of Metropolitan Dade County as differing in name only from a county commissioner and allowed participation in the Elected State Officers' Class on that account. (T. 50) With respect to the Orange and Escambia County Comptrollers, "the majority in one case of the duties of the Clerk were transferred to the Comptroller and in the other case, it seems like it gas about a 50/50 split of the prior duties being transferred over to the Comptroller." (T. 50) In these circumstances respondent decided that "based on the functions that they were performing, the duties of the office, that whether the title said Comptroller or Clerk, they essentially fit the definition." (T. 50) In response to a question from respondent's Assistant Director, Lew Dennard, respondent's chief legal officer, Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., wrote a memorandum dated October 20, 1981. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 1. As phrased by Mr. Aikens, the question was whether the statutory language "limits membership in the Elected State Officers' Class to those elected county officers who are enumerated in Section 121.052(1)(g)"? In the memorandum, Mr. Aikens declared himself of the opinion that the language "any county elected officer" was intended to establish the class of individuals eligible for participation in the Elected. State Officers' Class; and the term "including" followed by an enumeration of elected county officers was merely intended to be descriptive of the individuals eligible for inclusion in the Elected State Officers' Class as county elected officers. Accordingly, the class is not exhausted by the enumeration found in subsection (g). Other elected county officers are also includable in the Elected State Officers Class. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On November 6, 1984, however, respondent promulgated Rule 22B-1.05, Florida Administrative Code, which did not make participation in the Elected State Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System mandatory for any county officer and provided: Effective July 1, 1981, participation in the Elected State Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System shall be optional for the following elected county officers: sheriff, tax collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, clerk of the circuit court, county commissioner, district school board member, and elected district school board superintendent. The elected officer may transfer to and participate in the Elected State Officers' Class by submitting an application to the Administrator within one year from July 1, 1981 if already in office on that date, or within one year from the date of election if elected after July 1, 1981. Officers appointed to fill an unexpired term may join the Elected State Officers Class under this provision. An elected county officer who transfers to the Elected State Officers' Class and who fails to win reelection to an elected office shall cease to be a member of the class. If the member returns to a position covered under the Florida Retirement System he shall receive credit thereafter based on the class of membership of his position. 22B- 1.055(2)(d) In the substantial interest proceedings, Case No. 85-1718, respondent has taken the position that this rule provision, along with the statutory language it implements, preclude petitioners participation in the Elected State Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System.
The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, W. Gerry Hargrove, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is housed in Tamoka Correctional Institution. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the proposed rule amendment at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing visiting hours and privileges and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Proposed Amendment to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. Section 944.23, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: The following persons shall be authorized to visit at their pleasure all state correctional institutions: The Governor, all Cabinet members, members of the Legislature, judges of state courts, state attorneys, public defenders, and authorized representatives of the commission. No other person not otherwise authorized by law shall be permitted to enter a state correctional institution except under such regulations as the department may prescribe. . . . [Emphasis added]. Pursuant to the authority of Sections 944.09 and 944.23, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has adopted Chapter 33-5, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, the following: Upon being committed to the custody of the Department, each inmate shall be given the opportunity to submit a list of persons from whom he wishes to receive visits. The initial list . . . shall be limited to members of the inmate's immediate family. Once the inmate has been assigned to a permanent institution, additional relatives and friends, business associates and others may be considered, but only after a criminal history background inquiry has been made. Rule 33-5.006(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (7) Inmate visits with approved family members or friends should be encouraged for the positive purpose of maintaining home and community ties, which after release should provide a deterrent to recidivism. To the extent that it is safe and practicable to do so, such visiting should be allowed to take place in a relaxed atmosphere. Rule 33-5.006, Florida Administrative Code, also provides certain circumstances when a person may be excluded from an inmate's visitors list. For example, persons convicted of a felony may be excluded. Rule 33-5.006(5), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, is titled "Visitation Denial." Pursuant to this rule, it is provided that visitation may be denied under certain circumstances, i.e., if a visit would present a clear and present danger to the security and order of an institution. Rule 33-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, also provides: (3) No visit should be denied: . . . . (c) for any reason unrelated to the security, order or rehabilitative objectives of the institution. At issue in this proceeding is a proposed amendment to Rule 33- 5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code: (8)(a) An unmarried i[I]nmate[s] [not married] may be allowed to have one single non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval. A married inmate may be allowed to have one single, non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval, if a pending divorce or separation of long duration can be verified and the spouse is removed from the list. Married or unmarried inmates may have non- immediate family member couples on the visiting list after approval, but the member of the couple who is the opposite sex of the inmate may not visit the inmate without the spouse. New proposed language of the rule is denoted by underlining and words or letters removed are indicated by brackets. In this proceeding the Petitioner has only challenged proposed paragraph (c) of Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rule Amendment"). The Respondent has indicated it proposed the addition of paragraph (c) to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, because of security concerns. As explained by a representative of the Respondent the following are those security concerns: One spouses (i.e., the wife) may be visiting an inmate without the knowledge of the other spouse (i.e., the husband). If the husband becomes aware of the fact that his wife is visiting an inmate the husband may become alarmed and complain to the Respondent and his wife about the visitation. When the husband complains to his spouse or the Respondent and the inmate learns of the problem, the inmate may become upset. The Respondent indicated that there have been a few instances where inmates who, upon learning that husband of the inmate's visitor has been making it difficult for the visiting spouse to continue with visitation, have attempted to escape to get to the husband. The evidence failed to prove that there is a significant security problem if inmates are allowed to have visitation from a married visitor without requiring that both spouses visit the inmate at the same time. The evidence concerning escape attempts (at best, 5 to 10 attempts during the past thirty years) was speculative. No specifics concerning such attempts were provided when the Petitioner asked for specifics. Nor did the evidence prove that the Respondent's security is inadequate to handle the relatively low number of such escape attempts or that any such escape attempt has been successful. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Proposed Rule Amendment included a "Summary of the Estimate of Economic Impact of the Rule". Although the Petitioner challenged the adequacy of the Respondent's determination of the economic impact of the Proposed Rule Amendment, the evidence presented during the final hearing of this case failed to prove that the economic impact statement was inadequate.
