The Issue The issue in this case is whether to grant the petition challenging the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-302.111(2).
Findings Of Fact At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was on probation and under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Petitioner obtained a form pro se motion for early termination of probation from the Leon County circuit court clerk's office. The form contained fields for Petitioner's probation officer and the assistant state attorney to object or not object to early termination and to comment. Petitioner presented the form to his probation officer, who had her supervisor fill in the probation officer's field. The supervisor indicated neither an objection nor lack of objection. She commented that she was leaving it to the court to determine if Petitioner had met the vehicle impoundment condition of his probation, but that Petitioner had met all other requirements to be considered for early termination of probation. A hearing was scheduled on Petitioner's motion in June 2013. The judge notified the assistant state attorney assigned to the case and asked her to appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the assistant state attorney objected to early termination of Petitioner's probation. At some point in time, the assistant state attorney also checked the field on the form motion indicating her objection to early termination. The judge denied the motion. Petitioner blames the denial of his motion on subsection (2) of rule 33-302.111, which states: Before a correctional probation officer considers recommending an offender for early termination of supervision, the following criteria shall be met: Completion of one-half of the supervision period; Payment in full of restitution, fines, and court costs; Cost of supervision is current; All special conditions of supervision are fulfilled; A Florida Crime Information Center/National Crime Information Center (FCIC/NCIC) records check reveals no new arrest during the course of supervision of which the sentencing or releasing authority has not been previously notified; and No violations of supervision are pending. In order for an officer to request an early termination of supervision from the sentencing or releasing authority, approval must be obtained from the officer's supervisor, the State Attorney's Office, and the victim, if the offense involved a victim. If the State Attorney's office denies the request, or the victim opposes the early termination, the department will not proceed with the early termination recommendation. The officer shall not disclose a victim's objection to the offender. The officer shall notify the offender of the judge's decision upon receipt of the judge's response. If the offender was adjudicated guilty, the officer shall review the restoration of civil rights process with the offender. He contends that subsection (2) of the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the statutory grant of rulemaking authority and enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. See § 120.52(8)(b) & (c), Fla. Stat. (2013). Specifically, Petitioner contrasts the rule with section 948.04(3), Florida Statutes, which states: If the probationer has performed satisfactorily, has not been found in violation of any terms or conditions of supervision, and has met all financial sanctions imposed by the court, including, but not limited to, fines, court costs, and restitution, the Department of Corrections may recommend early termination of probation to the court at any time before the scheduled termination date. Although on the precise subject as the rule, section 948.03(4) is not cited in the rule as either the rulemaking authority or the law implemented. Instead, the rule cites section 944.09, Florida Statutes, for both.
Findings Of Fact I find the following facts based on the facts admitted by both parties in the Prehearing Stipulation filed on May 22, 1987. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 33, as found in the Florida Administrative Code Annotated, through the March 1987 supplement, is true and correct. The Petitioner's current address is Douglas M. Jackson, Inmate Number 823916, Florida State Prison, Post Office Box 747, Starke, Florida 32091. The Respondent's name and address is Florida Department of Corrections, 1311 Winewood Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500. The Department rule on which an administrative determination is sought is Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007, "Inmate Grievance Procedure." The statutory provision on which the above Department rule is based is Section 944.331, Florida Statutes, which states: The department shall establish by rule an inmate grievance procedure which shall conform to the Minimum Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures as promulgated by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s. 1997e. The ten (10) days in Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(13), which deals with the filing of appeals of grievances, are "10 calendar days." This can include two weekends (a total of four days) when mail is not normally picked up at the prisons or delivered in the Office of the Secretary. If an inmate receives his institutional response on a Friday that is dated for the previous day (Thursday), his response must be received in Tallahassee by the following Friday. (The second Sunday following would be ten (10) days from the date of the institutional grievance, but the Central Office Inmate Grievance Administrator does not work on Saturday or Sunday to receive and log inmate grievance appeals). Florida Administrative Code Rules 33-3.007(6)(a) and (7) require the availability of grievance forms at all Department institutions. If the inmate needs a day to obtain a grievance appeal form and prepare it, he will not be able to mail his appeal until Sunday. But, there is no mail service on Sunday so his grievance appeal will not be mailed until Monday at the earliest. This means the grievance appeal must get from the prison to the Office of the Secretary in four (4) days or it will be denied as out-of-time. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(8) provides that: An extension of the 15-day period [to file at the institutional level] will be granted when it is clearly demonstrated by the inmate to the satisfaction of the Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent that it was not feasible to file the grievance within the 15- day period. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(15), which covers the filing of the grievance appeal, imposes an absolute requirement of ten (10) calendar days. No possibility exists under the rule, as promulgated, for the slightest extension of time for any possible reason, no matter how meritorious it might be. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007 does not inform the inmate that he must utilize the grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies before he can file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the loss of gain time or confinement as a result of a disciplinary proceeding. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007 has been submitted to the United States Department of Justice for certification approval under the provisions of Section 944.331, Florida Statutes and 42 U.S.C. s. 1997e. Florida Administrative Code Rules 33-3.0025(11)(c), 33-3.012(1)(b)3, 33-3.012(4)(e), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 33-22 have not been submitted to the United States Department of Justice for certification approval.
The Issue Whether Respondent's teaching certificate should be revoked pursuant to Chapter 231, Florida Statutes, as set forth in petition, dated November 8, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Robert Marshall Stabler holds Florida Teaching Certificate No. 306751, Graduate, Rank III, valid through June 30, 1981, covering the area of elementary education. He was so licensed on May 9, 1979. (Stipulation.) Respondent was employed in the public schools of Brevard County at Pineda Elementary School, Cocoa, Florida, as a teacher from 1971 to May 1979. Respondent was also employed by Brevard Community College to instruct inmates at the Brevard Correctional Institution at Sharpes, Florida, for several years prior to May 9, 1979. (Testimony of Fisher, Brock, Curtis.) In late April 1979 a correctional officer at the Brevard Correctional Institution received information from a confidential informant, who was an inmate, that Respondent would bring marijuana into the institution on May 9, 1979. On that date, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Respondent entered the correctional facility and was advised by a correctional officer that college instructors were going to be searched that evening. Respondent was asked to submit to such a search and he consented to the same. Respondent was thereupon directed to the nearby "shakedown" room where his briefcase was opened and three packages wrapped in white paper were discovered. At this time, Respondent stated "That's just for my own use." A white envelope containing thirteen five dollar bills was also found in the briefcase. A narcotics officer of the Brevard County Sheriff's Department thereupon weighed and made a standard field test of the material contained in the packages and determined that it was cannabis in excess of 100 grams. The officer then placed Respondent under arrest for introducing contraband upon the grounds of a correctional institution. The packages were thereafter submitted to the Sanford Crime Laboratory for analysis and it was determined that they contained a total of 106.6 grams of cannabis and that two of these packages contained more than five grams of cannabis leaf material. (Testimony of Fisher, Pierce, Steger, Thomas, Boling, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-4.) The regulations of the Brevard Correctional Institution authorize a search of visitors which is normally conducted on a random basis. If consent to search is not given, the non-consenting individual is not permitted to enter the institution. (Testimony of Thomas.) Respondent received outstanding teacher performance evaluations at Pineda Elementary School during prior years and is considered by his principal to be an above-average teacher. Another faculty member at the school characterized him as an "excellent" teacher. He excelled in dealing with students with disciplinary problems and had excellent relations with both students and faculty personnel. He was also considered by his supervisor and a fellow instructor to be the most outstanding teacher at the Brevard Correctional Institution who was highly successful in motivating his students. (Testimony of Curtis, Brock, Walker, Weimer, Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1.)
Recommendation That Respondent's teaching certificate be revoked for a period of four years. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May 1980 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh Ingram, Administrator Professional Practices Council Room 3, 319 West Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Craig Wilson, Esquire 315 Third Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. V. Richards, Esquire 1526 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against her and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, including the "[s]tipulated [f]acts" contained in the parties' Prehearing Stipulation,2 the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 18, 2003, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. She holds Correctional Certificate Number 229286. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections (Department) as a correctional officer and assigned to the South Florida Reception Center (SFRC), a "transient institution for inmates that are [transferring] from one facility to another." Sergeant Shirley McLain is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, employed by the Department as a correctional officer and assigned to SFRC. Respondent and Sergeant McLain have known each other since the time they attended the correctional academy together. In August of 2005, Respondent was responsible for supervising inmates working on the "outside grounds" of SFRC, while Sergeant McLain oversaw the operations of the SFRC property room, where personal items taken from inmates are brought and stored until they are returned or other otherwise disposed of. Sergeant McLain "never supervised" Respondent. In August of 2005, Ricardo Bigio was an inmate at SFRC. Shortly after his arrival at the facility, he had a watch and chain confiscated from him. He was permitted to send these items home. Two days later, Sergeant McLain found Inmate Bigio in possession of another watch and another chain. Upon being told by Inmate Bigio, in response to her questioning, that he had obtained these items "through visitation," Sergeant McLain informed him, since these items were brought into the institution "illegally," they were "now contraband" and he could not have them "sen[t] . . . home." At the suggestion of a fellow inmate, Inmate Bigio approached Respondent and asked her to "speak to Sergeant McLain to see if she would let [him] send [this confiscated] jewelry home." During their conversation, Respondent mentioned to Inmate Bigio that "her dad needed a car." Inmate Bigio told Respondent that, if Respondent spoke to Sergeant McLain about his jewelry, he "would be able to send her to somebody [he knew in the used car sales business] to get a good deal on a car" for her father. Respondent agreed to help Inmate Bigio by speaking to Sergeant McLain about sending his jewelry home. Respondent and Inmate Bigio then went to Sergeant McLain's office, where Respondent asked Sergeant McLain if she would "let[] [Inmate Bigio] send this chain and this watch home," an act that that Respondent believed was within Sergeant McLain's power as the officer in charge of the SFRC property room. Sergeant McLain responded to Respondent's request in the negative. Respondent said, "Okay," and then left with Inmate Bigio. Respondent returned to Sergeant McLain's office with Inmate Bigio "off and on" for the next three or four days to repeat her request that Sergeant McLain allow Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home. On each occasion, in response to the request, Sergeant McLain reiterated that the jewelry "was contraband and [therefore Inmate Bigio] could not send it home." On August 10, 2005, approximately a week after she had first raised the matter with Sergeant McLain, Respondent once again asked Sergeant McLain to permit Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home. This time, in making her request, Respondent revealed her motivation for interceding on Inmate Bigio's behalf. She explained to Sergeant McLain that, if Sergeant McLain granted the request and allowed Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home, Inmate Bigio would make the necessary arrangements with his "people [who] own[ed] a car lot" to enable Respondent to purchase for her father a $5,000.00 car for only $2,000.00. Respondent provided this explanation as to why she was taking up Inmate Bigio's cause in the hopes that Sergeant McLain's having this information would make Sergeant McLain more inclined to grant the permission Respondent was requesting on Inmate Bigio's behalf. Sergeant McLain was taken aback that Respondent would strike such a deal with an inmate. She advised Respondent, as she had in response to Respondent's previous requests, that Inmate Bigio would not be permitted to send his jewelry home.3 Sergeant McLain subsequently reported the incident to the SFRC assistant warden. Inspector Arlethia Clark with the Department's Inspector's General Office subsequently investigated the matter. As part of her investigation, Inspector Clark interviewed Respondent on November 17, 2005. Respondent was placed under oath for the interview. Respondent told Inspector Clark that Sergeant McLain, in describing her August 10, 2005, conversation with Respondent, had "twisted the story around." Respondent knowingly made the false claim that she had gone to Sergeant McLain merely to report the illicit offer that Inmate Bigio had made and to seek guidance from Sergeant McLain "as a supervisor" as to what to do, not to persuade Sergeant McLain to allow Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home so that she would be able to purchase a car for her father at a discount (which, in fact, contrary to Respondent's sworn statement to Inspector Clark, was the actual reason she had gone to Sergeant McLain). Inspector Clark also interviewed Inmate Bigio and Sergeant McLain. Based on the findings of her investigation, Inspector Clark "found that there was bartering between, or an attempt to barter between," Inmate Bigio and Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of Allegations One and Two and, based on these findings of guilt, revoke her certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 2007.
The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent for her acts as a correctional officer in association with an inmate?
Findings Of Fact In response to requests for admissions, Respondent admitted the following: The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 6, 1992, and was issued correctional number 94229. Between June 1 and July 31, 1994, the Respondent was employed as a Correctional Officer with the North Florida Reception Center. On October 16, 1995, during an interview with Inspector H. McBride, the Respondent denied knowing Inmate Dean Richardson. (D) On October 16, 1995, during an interview with Inspector H. McBride, the Respondent denied knowing Toyia Kelly. E) On March 6, 1996, Respondent resigned her position at North Florida Reception Center. Between June 1, 1994 and July 31, 1994, Inmate Dean Richardson was committed to the North Florida Reception Center as a permanent inmate. In that period Respondent came in contact with Mr. Richardson in her capacity as a correctional officer and his capacity as an inmate at North Florida Reception Center. Their contacts occurred while Respondent was on duty as a correctional officer. In a conversation that took place between Respondent and Mr. Richardson in a recreation room within the prison, Respondent told Mr. Richardson that she was "having a problem moving." Mr. Richardson responded by offering to give Respondent money. At first Respondent declined the offer. A week to two weeks later after Mr. Richardson "pushed the issue," Respondent agreed to accept the money. Mr. Richardson had approached Respondent about a dozen times before Respondent was willing to accept the money. Under the terms of their arrangement, Respondent gave Mr. Richardson a post office box address to send the money and a name at that address. The name was Toyia Kelly. In furtherance of the agreement between Mr. Richardson and the Respondent, Mr. Richardson caused a $200 draft from his inmate bank fund to be sent to Toyia Kelly on June 8, 1994, at the address Respondent had provided . After Mr. Richardson sent the $200, he asked Respondent if Respondent had received the money. She answered "no." This conversation took place within the institution where Mr. Richardson was housed. When Respondent told Mr. Richardson she did not receive the $200, Mr. Richardson told Respondent that he would send more money. Mr. Richardson did send more money, but this time he sent the money to a different post office box than before. Respondent had provided Mr. Richardson the new post office box address. On June 24, 1994, Mr. Richardson withdrew $150 by draft from his inmate bank fund and paid it to the order of Toyia Kelly at the new post office box address. Mr. Richardson did not confirm with Respondent whether Respondent had received this $150 that had been paid directly to Toyia Kelly. Of his own volition Mr. Richardson determined to send an additional $150 by a draft from his inmate bank fund. Again this was paid to the order of Toyia Kelly at the second post office box address that had been provided by Respondent. This draft was made on July 11, 1994. On this occasion Mr. Richardson asked Respondent if she had received the second $150 draft. In response Respondent nodded her head in the affirmative.
Recommendation Upon consideration the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which revokes Respondent's correctional certificate number 94299. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sandra Griffin 2852 Wayne Drive Lake City, Florida 32055 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in the case of Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Rippy commenced her employment with the Department on June 30, 2000, as a correctional officer, at the Florida State Prison Work Camp at Starke, Florida. She was terminated on June 19, 2001. The Department of Corrections is a state agency that is charged with providing incarceration that supports the intentions of criminal law, among other things. The Florida Commission on Human Relations administers the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. When Ms. Rippy was hired as a correctional officer on June 30, 2000, she, and the Department, believed she was subject to a one-year probationary period. During that time, the parties believed she could be terminated without cause. Subsequent to her employment she had unscheduled but excused absences on as many as 15 occasions. On June 12, 2001, Ms. Rippy requested that her supervisor, Lt. J. L. Oliver, approve leave for her to commence Sunday, June 17, 2001. Lt. Oliver did not approve this request because to approve the request would cause the staffing level at the facility to recede below permitted limits. On Saturday June 16, 2001, at 6:00 p.m., Ms. Rippy called Sergeant K. Gilbert, Third Shift Control Room Sergeant, and told him that she was taking medication prescribed by a doctor that she had seen that day and that she would be sleeping and that as a result, she would be unable to report to work on her shift which began at midnight, June 17, 2001. She also volunteered that she would bring in a doctor's note excusing her absence. On Monday, June 18, 2001, Lt. Oliver asked her if she had a doctor's note explaining her absence on June 17, 2001. She replied that she had not been ill as reported to Sergeant Gilbert, but had in fact attended a party. She told him that she had not seen a doctor, was not on medication, and had attended a "bachelorette party" on June 17, 2001. In other words, she admitted that she had lied about the reason for her absence. She admitted this, under oath, at the hearing. Lt. Oliver informed her that it was his intention to charge her with unauthorized absence without pay, and possibly to take other disciplinary measures. Subsequently, persons higher in the chain-of-command decided to terminate Ms. Rippy. This decision was made because she had excess absences and because she had lied to persons in authority. This occurred 11 days before everyone believed she would have attained the status of permanent career service. On June 21, 2001, Correctional Officer Corey M. McMurry (Officer McMurry), a white male, was arrested in Starke, Florida, for driving under the influence of alcohol. As a result, on July 11, 2001, he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to twelve months supervised probation, and suffered other court-ordered sanctions. Officer McMurry, at the time of his arrest, was a probationary employee. He was served a written reprimand because of his conviction of driving under the influence on December 19, 2001. Ms. Rippy testified, without foundation, that Officer McMurry's probation terminated on November 15, 2001, and that the Department did not learn of his arrest until December 2001. Ms. Rippy's testimony provides a plausible explanation for why more than five months expired from the time of his conviction until the issuance of the written reprimand. Ms. Rippy believes that the circumstances surrounding her offense were substantially similar to those of Officer McMurry. However, the chronic absenteeism of an employee, including unexcused absences, is more likely to disturb the good management of a correctional facility than an employee being convicted of driving under the influence on one occasion. Assistant Warden Doug Watson believes that correctional officers should be trustworthy. He believes that the credibility is critical and that lying is an extremely serious offense, when committed by a correctional officer. Ms. Rippy was paid $13.30 per hour and received substantial fringe benefits when she worked for the Department. Following her termination she was unemployed until January 2002, when she began working for a Wendy's restaurant for $5.75 per hour. In April 2002, she obtained employment with a private security company named Securitas. She started at $6.40 and received an increase to $7.00 per hour at a subsequent unknown date, and she continues to be employed with the company.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that a final order be entered which dismisses Ms. Rippy's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Henderson, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Juliette C. Rippy 1622 Northeast 19th Place Gainesville, Florida 32609 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Ernest Brown is a registered real estate salesman holding a registration issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Brown received notice of the instant hearing as required by the statutes and rules. His probation officer testified she had contacted him and he had advised her that he would not attend the proceedings. Brown was placed on probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, on January 25, 1989 (see Exhibit 2). Paragraph 10 of the conditions of probation requires that Brown serve 180 days in the Pinellas County Jail on weekends from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday. Because of the appeal of his case, Brown did not begin serving this jail term until August 24, 1989. He has served 72 of the 180 days according to the records of his probation officer. Brown is currently in the custody of the State's probation department.
Recommendation The Board's counsel advised the Hearing Officer after hearing that Respondent had surrender his license. This constitutes an ex parte communication of which notice is hereby given to all parties. This fact is immaterial to consideration of the matter at hand. The Board has long taken the position, quite correctly, that surrendering of a license did not impair jurisdiction to consider violations of its statutes by a licensee while licensed. Similarly, surrender of a license cannot terminate the Hearing Officer's consideration of the matter after hearing. The instant case was duly heard and the Recommended Order prepared prior to receipt of any pleadings relative to surrender by Brown of his license. At this point, the Board may accept surrender of the license and dismiss the Administrative Complaint, in which case Brown would be considered not to have had any disciplinary action against him, or the Board may enter its final order based upon the record and this Recommended Order. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the license of Ernest Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Ernest B. Brown 2027 Thirteenth Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33172
