The Issue The issue in the case is whether, under the provisions of Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes, the Department of Revenue may apply bank account funds identified as belonging to Kim Sheldon towards an unpaid child support obligation.
Findings Of Fact By Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage dated August 9, 1995 (Case No. 95-742-CA-01, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Hernando County, Florida), Kim C. Meccariello was divorced from Dale W. Meccariello. Kim C. Meccariello subsequently remarried and is known as Kim C. Sheldon. As part of the settlement agreement in the 1995 divorce, Kim C. Sheldon (Petitioner) became obligated to pay monthly child support in the amount of $472.82. On November 1, 1999, the Department of Revenue (Department) became involved in this matter when the Petitioner's former husband apparently filed a "Request for Participation in Central Depository Program Pursuant to Florida Statute 61.13" seeking to have the Department collect unpaid child support on his behalf. By form letter dated December 1, 1999, the Department notified the supervisor of the Support Division, Hernando County that payments in the case should be redirected to the Department. The Petitioner asserts that she did not get a copy of this notice. The certificate of service indicates a copy was mailed to her. The Petitioner asserts that because she did not get the notice, the child support debt accounting fails to include payments made directly to her former husband, but has no documentation of the form or amount of such payments. There is no documentation that any direct payments were made. The evidence fails to establish that such direct payments occurred. Although the exact amount of unpaid child support owed by the Petitioner is disputed, the evidence clearly establishes that her unpaid child support debt clearly exceeds the amount of funds at issue in this proceeding. By Notice of Freeze dated July 7, 2000, the Department directed the MacDill Federal Credit Union to freeze the Petitioner's funds in the institution based on an unpaid child support obligation in the amount of $6,619.48. The Department subsequently received a letter on MacDill Federal Credit Union letterhead, dated July 11, 2000, and indicating that the Petitioner had two accounts at the institution: a savings account (#126552-01) containing $495.65; and a checking account (#126552-15) containing $1,123.42. By Notice of Intent to Levy dated July 14, 2000, the Department notified the Petitioner that the funds had been frozen and advised her of her right to challenge the action. The Petitioner requested a formal hearing. A letter from Strategic Outsourcing, Inc., dated July 18, 2000, states that the Petitioner's husband is an employee of Nicon, Inc., and that his wages are direct deposited into MacDill Federal Credit Union account #126522 on a weekly basis. Strategic Outsourcing, Inc., apparently handles payroll processing for Nicon, Inc. By Notice of Special Account release dated July 26, 2000, the Department notified the MacDill Federal Credit Union that all but $550.00 in the checking account (#126552-15) was released. The $495.65 in the savings account remained frozen. The total amount of currently frozen funds is $1,045.65. By Notice of Extension of Freeze dated July 27, 2000, the Department notified the MacDill Federal Credit Union that the Petitioner was challenging the Department's freeze and that the funds should remain frozen until the matter is resolved. The Petitioner and her current spouse are joint holders of the accounts at the MacDill Federal Credit Union. Because her husband did not have time to open the accounts, the Petitioner opened the accounts by herself, and her husband was added about a week later. The Department's decision to release the checking account funds (except for $550.00) was apparently based on conversations with the couple and upon receipt of the letter from Strategic Outsourcing, Inc. The funds were released based on the Department's determination that, other than $550.00, the checking account funds were directly attributable to the Petitioner's husband's income. The Department asserts that the currently frozen funds should be used to satisfy, in part, the Petitioner's unpaid child support obligation. The Petitioner asserts that since February 2000, she has been unemployed, that none of the funds in the accounts are attributable to her earnings, and that the funds should not be used to satisfy her unpaid child support obligation. According to the bank statement for the period March 1, 2000, to March 31, 2000, the balance in the checking account on March 1, 2000, was $862.10. There is no evidence that the March 1 balance did not include funds earned by and attributable to the Petitioner. According to account statements, a total of $2,170.97 in unidentified deposits were made to the account between March 1, 2000, and July 15, 2000, including a $958.97 cash deposit on April 24, 2000, a $162.00 cash deposit on May 8, 2000, a $500.00 check deposit on June 8, 2000, and a $550 deposit of unidentified type on July 3, 2000. At the hearing, the Petitioner and her husband testified that deposits into the checking account not directly attributable to his income were made by grown children residing at home and contributing towards household expenses which were allegedly paid from the husband's income. Other deposits were claimed to be small loans or gifts from family members. There was no documentation offered at the hearing to support the testimony. None of the children or relatives testified at the hearing. The evidence fails to establish that the deposits in the joint account came from adult children or other relatives. According to the bank statement for the period April 1, 2000, to April 30, 2000, a deposit on April 21, 2000, of $627.00 described as "US TREASURY 220" was a tax refund. The Petitioner's husband asserted that based on income, the refund was "90 percent" attributable to him. There was no documentation offered at the hearing to support the testimony. The evidence fails to establish that the tax refund deposited into the joint account is not attributable to the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue issue a FINAL ORDER directing that $1,045.65 currently held at the MacDill Federal Credit Union be applied towards meeting the Petitioner's unpaid child support obligation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel V. Fajardo, Esquire 610 West Azeele Street Tampa, Florida 33606 Albert Thorburn, Esquire Florida Department of Revenue Post Office Box 8030 4070 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of family child day care centers in this state. Respondent, Elizabeth Horton, has, since before January 31, 1992, operated the Little Darling Horton-Cotton Family Day Care at 3710 11th Street East in Bradenton, Florida. The location is Mrs. Horton's home, and she resides there with Alfrader L. Cotton, her companion, Craig E. Horton and Sheldon G. Horton, her sons, and Tangela D. Horton, her daughter. In January, 1992, Mrs. Horton submitted an application for a license to operate a family day care center at the stated location and listed the others noted above as residents. Thereafter, on July 9, 1992, June 28, 1993, July 11, 1994, July 18, 1994 and December 21, 1995, Mrs. Horton submitted application forms for renewal of her license. On each of the renewal application forms, those same individuals were listed as residents of the home. Mrs. Horton's brother, L. H., was not listed as a resident or in any capacity on any of the application forms. On or about December 3, 1993, a report of abuse of a minor female, A. M., born on February 12, 1984, was received in the Department. The substance of the allegation was that A. M., along with her little brother, born on March 6, 1985, were placed by their mother at the Respondent's home from about 5:00 PM until early the next morning each week night, while their mother was at work. The report further alleged that Mrs. Horton's brother, L. H., had molested A. M. while she was staying in the Horton home. He was alleged to have awakened her in the middle of the night while she was asleep in the Horton daughter's bedroom on the pretext of taking her to the bathroom, but fondled her breasts and vaginal area. This report was investigated by personnel of the Department and was classified as verified. A report of neglect was entered against Mrs. Horton arising out of her failure to supervise the children and a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings, after a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, entered a Recommended Order recommending that the Department enter a Final Order amending the proposed confirmed report to a classification of unfounded and expunging Mrs. Horton's name from the case record and all Department records. The Hearing Officer found, however, that L. H. had committed the abuse, and this determination was subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department in the Final Order entered in this case. In 1989, L. H. was found guilty in the Circuit Court in Manatee County of lewd and lascivious acts in the presence of a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, a felony, and was sentenced, among other things, to community control for two years followed by seven years probation. After his arrest for the assault on A. M., on June 28, 1995, his prior sentence was increased to seven years in prison. He was also tried in Circuit Court for Manatee County for sexual battery, and was, on that same date, sentenced for the second offense to life imprisonment, with the provision he serve no less than twenty-five years. Whenever an individual is issued a license to operate a family day care center, that person is provided with a copy of a handbook containing the rules of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services relating to the licensing and operation of those facilities. Included within that pamphlet is a copy of Department rule 10M-10.002, dealing with personnel, which requires that all persons who are members of the operator's family or who reside in the day care home must be screened as must be persons providing substitute care in the absence of the operator. The evidence regarding the status of L. H. is contradictory. A. M. indicates that L. H. would be at the center from about 10:00 PM at night, after Mrs. Horton picked him up at work; would be there when she, A. M., went to bed at some time after 9:00 PM and before 11:00 PM; and, most of the time, would also be there then next morning, having spent the night in the bedroom of Mrs. Horton's son, Craig. A. M. cannot recall if L. H. ate his meals at the Horton home or took his showers there, but she recalls that he did cook there several times. She never saw him change or wash his clothes there and she never saw any of his clothes in the closet. Though she contends she was never left alone with L. H. by Mrs. Horton, she claims she was touched on her private parts by him on several occasions in the early hours of the morning, while the others in the house were sleeping. A. M.'s mother does not know if L. H. lived at the Horton child care center or not. He was there sometimes at night when she dropped the children off, and he was always there when she picked them up the next morning. To the best of her knowledge, the children were never left alone with him. Mrs. Horton, on the other hand, while admitting she knew that her brother had been convicted of a felony regarding a sexual offense against a minor child, categorically denies that L. H. lived at her home. She admits that he visited there from time to time and admitted to Ms. Winfrey, the child care supervisor from the Department, that he spent the night there from time to time as well. According to Mrs. Horton, L. H. lived with their parents in a home in the next block east on 11th Street East. Respondent admitted at hearing to picking him up from work around 9:00 PM at times, but not regularly. She contended at hearing he would come to the house to watch TV and to play games with her son, but rarely did he stay and never did he spend the night. The probation officers who visited L. H. would sometimes come to her house to see him but would never come in. None of the probation officers ever said anything to her about L. H.'s being at her home with children being present. At no time until the report of abuse was filed did she have any idea that L. H. was behaving improperly with any children in her charge. When she found out what he had done, she told him not to come back to that house. Mrs. Horton's daughter, age 17, claims that L. H. did not live at the care center at any time. He did not wash his clothes there or do anything which indicated he lived there. Since she was older, she stayed up later than A. M., going to bed around 10:00 PM or so. As she recalls, L. H. would usually leave the house about 10 or 11:00 PM and she would see him leave often. She did not often go to bed while he was still there. Taken together, the evidence establishes that while L. H. may not have resided at the house on a permanent basis, he was there frequently enough to be considered a member of the family as defined in the Department rules.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying Elizabeth Horton renewal of her license to operate a family day care center. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative services, Room 500 400 West Dr. M. L. King, Jr. Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33614 Elizabeth Horton 3710 11th Street East Bradenton, Florida 34208 Alfrader Cotton Qualified Representative 3710 11th Street East Bradenton, Florida 34208 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building Number Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building Number Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) whether Petitioner owes overdue child support arrears; and (2) whether Respondent is authorized to levy Petitioner’s bank account at the MacDill Federal Credit Union, Tampa, Florida, and apply the funds to reduce or satisfy Petitioner’s past due child support obligation.
Findings Of Fact On April 21, 1994, a circuit court judge in the Circuit Court, in and for Duval County, Florida (Circuit Court), issued Final Judgment determining paternity and establishing support in Case No. 94-929-FM, in the case of Loquita D. Taylor and the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Donald L. Baldwin. The Final Judgment established that Petitioner was the legal parent of Ashley Marie Taylor, born March 25, 1993, and that Petitioner owed to the State of Florida $1337.00 in public assistance. The Final Judgment ordered Petitioner to pay $35.00 per week child support through the court support depository. In October 1998, Petitioner made one lump sum payment of $3,983.85 towards his child support. At the hearing held December 2, 1998, in Case No. 94-929-FM, the court-appointed Hearing Officer held Petitioner “in willful indirect contempt of this Court for failure to pay child support as ordered while having the ability to pay.” Based on the child support payment records of the court depository, the court-appointed Hearing Officer found Petitioner was “in arrears in Court ordered child support in the amount of $5,858.15 through the payment due December 2, 1998.” On December 14, 1998, the Circuit Court adopted the Recommendations of its Hearing Officer as its order. In paragraph 12 of those Recommendations, which became order of the Circuit Court, the Circuit Court suspended enforcement of Petitioner’s ongoing child support, so long as the minor child received Social Security on behalf of Petitioner, but ordered Petitioner “to pay $140.00 per month towards the arrearages.” The Mandatory Addendum to the December 14, 1998, Circuit Court Order on Motion for Contempt instructed Petitioner to “immediately notify” the Clerk of the Court and the Department of Revenue, Office of Child Support Enforcement “in writing, of any change of residence or employment. Failure to receive notice of a future hearing because of a party’s failure to comply with this requirement will not be a defense. . . ." (emphasis in original) In 1999, according to the records of the Clerk of the Court, Petitioner made only two payments, for a combined total of $560.00, towards his December 2, 1998, arrears of $5,858.15. These two payments brought his outstanding arrears to $5,298.15. Petitioner made his last child support payment towards the arrears on May 7, 1999. To collect the unpaid arrearages, the Department sent a Notice to Freeze to the MacDill Federal Credit Union in Tampa, Florida, on August 3, 2000. In the notice, which was sent by certified mail, the Department advised the MacDill Federal Credit Union that Petitioner had a past due and/or overdue child-support obligation of $5,289.15 as of August 3, 2000. Moreover, the Department directed the bank not to transfer, dispose of, or return any credits, debts, or other personal property owned by or owed to Petitioner. On August 7, 2000, the MacDill Federal Credit Union verified that it had frozen the savings account identified as belonging to Petitioner. Petitioner had $2,814.41 in his savings account. On August 10, 2000, the Department sent a Notice of Intent to Levy by certified mail to Petitioner at his last known address. That notice provided in pertinent part the following: You are hereby notified that pursuant to Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes, the Department of Revenue intends to levy on credits, or personal property belonging to the obligor named above [Petitioner], or debts owed to the obligor. The property consists of liquid assets and is in the control of MACDILL FCU. This action is taken for nonpayment of child support by the obligor in the amount of $5,289.151 as of 08/03/2000. You are hereby notified that you may contest the agency’s action to levy on the above referenced property. You may do so by either filing an action in Circuit Court or by requesting an administrative hearing. If you wish to request an administrative hearing, you must file your petition for hearing, in writing, in accordance with the Notice of Rights attached to this Notice. If you elect to file an action in Circuit Court, your complaint must be filed with the Clerk of Court within twenty-one (21) days of your receipt of this notice. . . . You may NOT request both an administrative hearing and a hearing in circuit court. * * * NOTICE TO A NONOBLIGOR JOINT OWNER: If you claim you have an equal right to all of the money levied upon in a joint account, these hearing rights apply to you. (Emphasis in original.) Attached to the Notice of Intent to Levy were a Notice of Rights form that detailed the due process rights as provided for in Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes and a copy of Rules 28-106.201 and 28-106.301, Florida Administrative Code. On or about August 21, 2000, Petitioner timely filed an initial Petition for Formal Hearing (Petition), which requested a “formal hearing concerning the Notice of Intent to Levy.” On or about August 21, 2000, the Department issued and sent a Notice of Extension of Freeze to the MacDill Federal Credit Union. The notice advised the bank that Petitioner had “filed an action in the circuit court or under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, to contest the Department of Revenue’s intention to levy upon assets as specified in the Notice of Freeze.” The Department further directed the MacDill Federal Credit Union not to transfer, dispose, or return any credits, debts or other personal property owned/controlled by Petitioner and in the bank’s possession and control. Finally, the Notice of Extension of Freeze stated that the Notice remained effective “until final resolution of the circuit court or Chapter 120 action, and the Department issued a Notice of Levy or a Notice of Full or Partial Release of Freeze.” The Department dismissed the initial Petition without prejudice because it was not in substantial compliance with either Rule 28-106.201 or, alternatively, Rule 28-106.301, Florida Administrative Code, and allowed Petitioner an opportunity to file an amended petition. Petitioner timely filed an amended Petition (Amended Petition), which was in substantial compliance with the Rules. On or about November 2, 2000, the Department referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing. Petitioner submitted as a late-filed exhibit a Billing Statement, dated March 7, 2001, and a Pay Stub from the Social Security Administration concerning benefits of $1,664.00 paid in error to Petitioner and requesting repayment in full either “right away” or by “smaller amount monthly over a longer period of time.” The Payment Stub that accompanied the Billing Statement indicated that the overpayment could be repaid by check, by money order, or by MasterCard, Visa, or Discover. The statement from MacDill Federal Credit Union for October 1, 2000, through December 31, 2000, supplied by Petitioner indicates that he had a savings account balance of $2,862.22. Petitioner's uncontroverted testimony was that he is totally disabled, and his sole income is from Social Security. Petitioner asserted all the money in the account was from Social Security payments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order that (1) levies such funds as available in Petitioner's savings account at the MacDill Federal Credit Union up to the amount of his arrears; (2) applies the funds to reduce Petitioner's past due child support obligation; and (3) credits Petitioner for said payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 2001.
The Issue The issues in this proceeding are: What is the amount of child support arrearages and/or past-due support presently owed by Petitioner? Whether the Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Program is authorized to employ the remedy of garnishment as set forth in Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts On January 29, 1982, a Final Judgment was issued in the case of Linda Tillman v. Robert C. Tillman, Case No. 81-20402, in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida (Broward County Circuit Court). Pursuant to this Final Judgment, Petitioner, Robert C. Tillman, was ordered to pay $103.00 per week in current child support commencing January 22, 1982, for three minor children. On June 12, 1985, the Broward County Circuit Court issued an Order to Transfer in Linda Tillman v. Robert C. Tillman, Case No. 81-20402, to Palm Beach County, Florida. On August 18, 1987, an Order Granting Respondent's Motion for a Decrease in Child Support was filed in the case of Linda Tillman and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Robert Tillman, (hereinafter Tillman v. Tillman) Case No. 85-5064, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (Palm Beach County Circuit Court), under which Petitioner's current child support obligation was reduced to $65.00 per week because one of the parties' children had come to live with Petitioner. Additionally, child support arrearages of $4,121.64 were established and Petitioner was ordered to pay an additional $10.00 per week in liquidation of the arrearages. On July 20, 1990, an Order Adjudicating Respondent in Contempt was filed in the Palm Beach Circuit Court in Tillman v. Tillman, under which Petitioner was found in civil contempt of court for willfully failing to satisfy his child support obligations. Petitioner's child support arrearages were determined to be $3,935.42 as of May 10, 1990, and he was ordered to continue to pay $65.00 per week in current child support and increased arrearages payments of $15.00 per week. On March 11, 1993, an Order Adjudicating Respondent in Contempt was filed in the Palm Beach Circuit Court in Tillman v. Tillman under which Petitioner again was found in civil contempt of court for willfully failing to satisfy his child support obligations. Petitioner's child support arrearages were determined to be $5,102.59 as of February 18, 1993, and he was ordered to continue to pay $65.00 per week in current child support, increased arrearages payments of $35.00 per week, and $500.00 as a partial lump-sum payment on arrearages to purge his contempt. On November 6, 1995, an Order Adjudicating Respondent in Contempt was filed in the Palm Beach Circuit Court in Tillman v. Tillman under which Petitioner again was found in civil contempt of court for willfully failing to satisfy his child support obligations. Petitioner's child support arrearages were determined to be $8,298.93 as of October 17, 1995. He was ordered to continue to pay $65.00 per week in current child support and $10.00 per week plus a $150.00 lump-sum payment on arrearages to purge his contempt. On March 19, 1996, an Order Adjudicating Respondent in Contempt was filed in the Palm Beach Circuit Court in Tillman v. Tillman under which Petitioner again was found in civil contempt of court for willfully failing to satisfy his child support obligations. Petitioner's child support arrearages were determined to be $8,829.74 as of May 25, 1995. He was ordered to continue to pay $65.00 per week in current child support and $20.00 per week plus a $500.00 partial lump-sum payment on arrearages to purge his contempt. On August 8, 2001, the Department mailed a Notice of Freeze (NOF) in an amount up to $2,254.96 to the South Atlantic Federal Credit Union in Boca Raton, Florida, by certified mail, return receipt requested, regarding any accounts of Petitioner. The credit union received the NOF on August 10, 2001. On August 15, 2001, the Department mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy (NOIL) in an amount up to $2,254.96 to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested. Petitioner received the NOIL on August 18, 2001. The NOF and NOIL mailed by the Department satisfied the statutory notice requirements of Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes. Petitioner filed a Request for Administrative Hearing dated August 30, 2001, which was received by the Department on September 18, 2001. The Department sent a Notice of Extension of Freeze (NOEOF) in an amount of up to $2,254.96 to South Atlantic Federal Credit Union on September 12, 2001. The Department dismissed Petitioner's August 30, 2001, Request for Administrative Hearing as legally insufficient. Petitioner filed a timely and legally sufficient Revised Petition for Hearing dated January 7, 2002, which was received by the Department on January 16, 2002. On June 10, 2002, a Recommendation of Hearing Officer and an Order Granting Motion to Correct Ledger and to Determine Arrears were filed in the Palm Beach Circuit Court in Tillman v. Tillman, under which Petitioner's child support arrearages were determined to be $6,344.12, all of which was past due as of May 15, 2002. Petitioner was ordered to pay $50.00 per month in liquidation of his arrearages. The official payment records of the Palm Beach County Clerk of Court established that Petitioner owed child support arrearages/past-due child support in Tillman v. Tillman of $6,194.12 as of November 25, 2002. The Department faxed and mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, an Amended Notice of Freeze (Amended NOF) in an amount up to $6,094.12 to South Atlantic Federal Credit Union on October 16, 2002. The credit union received the Amended NOF on October 18, 2002. The Department faxed an Amended NOIL to Petitioner in an amount up to $6,094.12 on October 18, 2002, and mailed a copy to Petitioner on October 19, 2002.2/ The Department faxed and mailed an Amended Notice of Extension of Freeze (Amended NOEOF) in an amount up to $6,094.12 to South Atlantic Federal Credit Union on December 20, 2002. Facts Based Upon the Evidence of Record Petitioner made five timely monthly payments of $50.00 in Tillman v. Tillman between May 15, 2002, and November 25, 2002. Petitioner made two more timely monthly payments of $50.00 between November 25, 2002 and January 17, 2003, reducing the amount he owed in child support arrearages/past-due in Tillman v. Tillman to $6,094.12 as of January 17, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Program enter a final order that levies upon the funds in the Petitioner's credit union account up to the amount of $6,094.12; applies the funds to reduce Petitioner's accrued child support arrearage; and credits Petitioner for the amount so applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2003.
Findings Of Fact The Parties HRS receives federal funds through the Social Services Block Grant for the purpose of purchasing child day care services for certain clients of the agency. HRS District V issued its RFP for those services for fiscal year 1986/1987 on March 28, 1986. The statement of purpose for the RFP provides: The Department is requesting proposals to provide child day care services in Pasco and Pinellas Counties through one or more central agencies as defined in the Rules of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Chapter 10M-11, Section 11.02[sic] and HRSM 175-14. It is the Department's intent to contract with no more than three (3) central agencies. A potential provider may submit a proposal to provide services in any or all of the following components: The development and provision of infant care, preschool care and school age care in predominantly rural Pasco County. The provision of preschool care and school age care in predominantly urban Pinellas County. The provision of infant care in Pinellas County that is compatible with the unique county licensing program requiring the care of infants in family day care homes. Since only two infants may be in care in each home, a minimal percentage of pre- schoolers will be allowed in this com- ponent. * * * [Respondent's Exhibit #1, p3-4] On April 29, 1986, proposals were received as follows: Project Playpen proposed providing infant and some preschool care in Pinellas County with administrative costs of 4 percent. Latchkey proposed to provide all three components with administrative costs of 12 percent. RCMA proposed providing infant, preschool and school age care in Pasco County with administrative costs of 11 percent. Project Playpen has been providing infant and some preschool care in Pinellas County since 1972. Latchkey has provided after school and some preschool care in Pinellas County for seven years, and has provided after school care in Pasco County for two years. Also for two years Latchkey has provided the infant and preschool care in Pasco County through a subcontract with RCMA. Latchkey is a central agency in District V. After the proposals were received, the HRS evaluation committee met to distribute evaluation sheets and copies of the proposals to its five members. The members then individually reviewed the proposals. On May 5, 1986, the committee met again to resolve areas of doubt and determine the final score for each proposal. As to the Pasco County component the total score derived for RCMA was 384 points; the total score for Latchkey was 355.4; the total available score was 410. Signature Authority The RFP addresses the need for an appropriate signature on the proposal in two places: On page 16, Paragraph L., "Required Copies of the Proposal", sub- paragraph 2. provides, All copies must bear the original signature of an official of the provider agency who is authorized to bind the Provider to the proposal. If the signature is that of an agency, individual other than the President or Chief Executive Officer of the Board, the proposal must be accompanied by a written delegation of authority from the governing board. On page 23, in the proposal evaluation check list, paragraph 1., "Proposal Requirements" provides "(Any one 'No' statement for the following items will automatically disqualify the proposal)." Subparagraph C, on page 24, asks, "Is the proposal signed by a duly authorized officer of the applicant organization?" [Respondent's Exhibit #1] The RCMA proposal was signed by Wendell N. Rollason as Executive Director. He is not a member of the RCMA state board of directors and the proposal did not include a separate board statement of authority. The organizational chart and position description included in the proposal indicate that the Executive Director alone is responsible directly to the Board of Directors. Through delegation or directly, he supervises all RCMA staff. He must keep the RCMA Board fully informed but must [A]ssume and accept full responsibility for all activities, planned or not of the Redlands Christian Migrant Association and its several subdivisions." [Respondent's Exhibit #5, pp. 187-188] The evaluation committee assumed that Mr. Rollason was the chief executive officer, as there was nothing to indicate otherwise and the position description defined a very authoritative position. [tr. - 70] After Latchkey's protest raised the issue of signature authority, the President of the RCMA board, Wm. H. Krome, executed an affidavit stating: May 27, 1986 To Whom It May Concern: For much of the past twenty years I have been associated with Redlands Christian Migrant Association, Inc. as a Board Member. For the last six years I have served as President. I have participated in each writing or rewriting of the Corporation's By-Laws, the latest being two years ago. In 1966 , we employed Mr. Wendell N. Rollason as our corporation's chief executive officer, with the appropriate title Executive Director. It seems unnecessary to add that he is the chief executive officer of the Board, of the senior staff, of the programming and any and all functions and appendages of the Corporation. That is exactly what the use of "Corporation" in the below quoted R.C.M.A. By-Laws means: Article IV Section 2 Paragraph (b) Select or dismiss the Executive Director of R.C.M.A. who shall have responsibility of the day-to-day operations of said Corp- poration without interference by State Board or Directors or its individual members. I might add in all of R.C.M.A.'s dealings with agencies, colleges, or local, state, and federal authorities this is the first time Mr. Rollason's full authority as chief executive officer of the R.C.M.A. and its Board of Directors has ever been challenged. [Petitioner's Exhibit #1] The RCMA by-laws provide for the Board to approve a maximum dollar amount for contracts which may be negotiated and executed by the Executive Director without prior approval, and the Board may authorize the Executive Director to sign contracts annually for ongoing renewable contracts. [Pet. Ex #3, p3] Central Agency The RFF sought proposals from central agencies as defined in HRS rule 10M-11.002 Florida Administrative Code. That rule provides that "central agencies" are "...agencies which operate or subcontract to [sic] three or more centers and render administrative, supervisory, training and technical assistance activities necessary to insure the provision of services at the required level of standards." HRS considers RCMA a central agency. It operates as a central agency in several areas of the state and operates far more than three child care centers throughout the state. It also provides administrative, supervisory, training and technical assistance activities. [tr. - 105, Respondent's Ex #5] School Age Child Care Component RCMA's discussion of school age child care in Pasco County was minimal and the proposal lost points accordingly. [tr - 49]. However, the component is addressed in the proposal. The preference of RCMA was that Latchkey continue its existing school programs as part of Latchkey's proposal, but if that were not feasible RCMA would seek to continue the established programs. [Respondent's exhibit #5, p. 12] Under program objectives, RCMA states that it will expand types of child care services to include school age care as necessary as need is determined by waiting lists. [Respondent's Exhibit #5, p. 18] Data from the 1985 waiting lists indicates that the need for expanded school age care is miniscule (5 percent), compared to preschool (64 percent) and infant Care (31 percent). [Respondent's exhibit #5, pp 40-43] Evaluation of Latchkey: Component vs. Overall The RFP is explicit with regard to HRS' intent to enter into up to three contracts for child care in District V. Its instructions to bidders provide that complete proposals are not necessary for each component but that certain portions of the RFP must be addressed separately for each component. [Respondent's Exhibit #1, pp3, 17] At the bidders' conference attended by Linda Morelock, Latchkey's Executive Director, HRS' representative did not indicate the Department was soliciting an overall proposal rather than the components called for in the RFP. [tr. - 63] At the conference Linda Morelock asked whether the submittals had to be separate packages or could they be included in one notebook for more than one proposal. She was referred to page 17 of the RFP, and was told that the proposals could be packaged together so long as the sections within the package were clearly indicated. [tr. - 44,45] HRS does not, in any district in the state, limit its contracts for child care to a single central agency. There are three central agencies in Palm Beach County alone. [tr. - 106] Latchkey characterized its proposal as an "overall" proposal for all three components in the RFP. It contends that its proposal should have been scored as a whole, rather than by each component.
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services may intercept Daniels' income tax refund. However, this turns on the issue of whether Daniels has been delinquent in excess of 3 months. Factually, Daniels owed money for aid provided his child. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has obtained a judgement in the amount of $6,673 upon which Daniels is to make payments of $25/month. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services argues that Daniels owes and has been delinquent on the $6,673 since the order was entered. Daniels argues that he is not over three months in arrears on his payments of $25/month. The evidence introduced by Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services shows Daniels is in arrears only $27.91 on his payments on the judgement. The issue is whether Section 45 CFR Section 303.72 requires a delinquency in payments required to be made on the amount of money established in a court order.
Findings Of Fact On October 10, 1981, Carol Renee Neal assigned to the State of Florida her rights to child support for Latoya v. Daniels, acknowledged child of Ira Clayton Daniels. An Order was entered on January 14, 1985, which established that Ira Clayton Daniels owed the State of Florida $6,673 for a public assistance child support obligation and provided that Ira Clayton Daniels would pay $25/month until the $6,673 was repaid. The records of the Department, Daniels' Exhibit 1, reflect Daniels has made regular payments on the debt, and at the time of the hearing owed $27.91 arrearage on the debt. Daniels was less than three months in arrears on his payments established by the Order referenced above.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, the claim against Ira Clayton Daniels should be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED 16th day of September 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Schulman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Child Support Enforcement Program 105 East Monroe, Suite 101 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Frederick J. Simpson, Esquire HRS District IV Legal Counsel Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Ira C. Daniels 8904 Greenleaf Road Jacksonville, Florida 32208
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s application to adopt a minor child should be denied because it is in the best interest of the child.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, in accordance with chapters 39, 63, and 409 Florida Statutes (2013),3/ is the agency tasked with, among other things, the responsibility to deny or approve adoption applications. The minor child was born in May 2013 and placed in Petitioner’s home in that same month.4/ At all times relevant to this case, the minor child’s biological parents were unable or unwilling to take responsibility for their child. Termination of parental rights was completed in October 2013. Petitioner is the minor child’s step-grandmother. Petitioner filed an application to adopt the minor child on November 25, 2013, listing her address as 4203 East Hanna Avenue, Tampa, Florida. A home study, which is an assessment of the potential adoptive parent’s home environment, parental capacity to support the child and the relationships with individuals both inside and outside the home of the potential adoptive parent, must be conducted prior to an adoption. On November 26, 2013, the home study was conducted at the Hanna Avenue address. Several areas of concern were noted in the home study; the home was cluttered and dirty with soiled dishes in the sink and fast food bags and wrappers throughout the home. On February 11, 2014, the AARC met to review Petitioner’s application to adopt the minor child. Petitioner was present at the AARC meeting. The following concerns were expressed during the AARC meeting: Petitioner’s monthly expenses far exceed her income; Petitioner has a criminal history and is currently on probation for the last offense, and served 10 days in jail in January 2014 without telling Respondent where she was and who was attending the minor child; Petitioner has significant health issues including congestive heart failure, diabetes, high blood pressure and a bulging disc in her back; Petitioner is legally married but has been separated from her husband for over 20 years without any knowledge of whether her husband is alive or dead; and there have been multiple abuse reports, although some indicators of abuse were not substantiated. Additionally, Petitioner has moved from the residence where the home study was conducted in November. That move to a different address invalidated the home study and another home study would have to be conducted to evaluate Petitioner’s current living situation. Petitioner’s expenses, as she detailed, far exceed her income. Petitioner receives approximately $820 a month in income, yet her living expenses include $800 rent, $150 in utility services, and $50 for water. Currently, Petitioner’s two daughters and their children (each daughter has a child) live with her in a three-bedroom home. Petitioner has her own bedroom. Each daughter has her own bedroom which is shared with her child. One daughter, (B), currently works at a hotel. Daughter B supplements Petitioner’s income to run the household. However, Daughter B has indicated she wants to move out. She has not given a specific move date. The other daughter, (M), was arrested in May 2014 for allegedly stealing electricity from Tampa Electric. The charge was dropped when Daughter M paid the electrical bill and court costs. That daughter is applying for a job but is without an income to support herself and her child at this time. Respondent does not consider income from persons other than the applicant in its review of potential adoptive parent’s application. In November 2010 Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to allegations of fraudulent use of a credit card and grand theft. The circuit court in Hillsborough County withheld adjudication of guilt, but placed Petitioner on 24 months of probation with the requirement to re-pay the money and all mandatory court costs. Petitioner has been arrested three times on violation of probation (VOP) for her failure to timely pay the costs. Petitioner’s last arrest, in January 2014 resulted in a ten-day jail term for the VOP. Although Petitioner’s adult daughters were tending to the minor child, neither Petitioner nor her daughters notified Respondent that Petitioner was not available for the minor child’s needs. Petitioner anticipates paying the remainder of the costs within the next few weeks when one of her daughters receives her income tax refund. Petitioner has significant health concerns. While at work several years ago, Petitioner sustained a back injury, a bulging disc. She is not seeking rehabilitation for her back, and is not planning on returning to work. Petitioner confirmed she has a history of high blood pressure and congestive heart failure, although she is currently feeling well. Additionally, Petitioner verified that she takes insulin four times a day to control her diabetes. Petitioner married D.B. on June 28, 1993. Petitioner has obtained the form to file for a divorce, but to date no petition for divorce has been filed by either Petitioner or D.B. Petitioner has had several reports of child abuse since 1990; however, some of those reports have been unsubstantiated. Petitioner and the minor child have lived in no less than three different homes over the past year. Petitioner submitted her adoption application while residing at one home and Respondent conducted the requisite home study at that location. However, even before the AARC meeting could take place, Petitioner had moved to another home, thus voiding the home study. Petitioner’s frequent moves does not provide a stable living environment for the minor child. Ms. Spofford has worked as a guardian ad litem (GAL) for over three years. A GAL advocates for the best interest of the child and may, at times, express different advocacy positions than the biological parents, potential adoptive parents, caregivers or, as in this case, Petitioner. GAL Spofford was appointed as the minor child’s GAL approximately three weeks after his birth, and she has visited with the minor child at least once a month since that appointment. GAL Spofford makes both announced and unannounced visits to Petitioner’s home to visit with the minor child. As a small baby, the minor child was not mobile, and GAL Spofford was not as concerned about his home environment. However, the minor child is now mobile and GAL Spofford has a lot of concerns. On one particular unannounced visit, GAL Spofford was allowed into the home by a three- or four-year old child, when no adult was present.5/ GAL Spofford picked up the minor child and discovered he had a wad of paper in his mouth, which GAL Spofford removed. In this one instance alone, the supervision of the minor child and the other young children was inadequate. Based on the totality of the circumstances, GAL Spofford believes it is in the minor child’s best interest to be adopted by another family. There is no dispute that Petitioner loves the minor child. Petitioner has cared for the minor child since his discharge from the hospital. Petitioner’s witnesses were unified in their observations of how Petitioner loved the minor child and looks out for his interest. Although Petitioner wants to adopt and care for the minor child, current circumstances do not render that a viable option. Respondent has a formidable task in ascertaining the best interest of any child. It requires a look into the future and a prediction of what will happen. Petitioner’s past indiscretions do not lend themselves to a stable and secure environment for the minor child. It is in the minor child’s best interest to be adopted by someone other than Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application to adopt the minor child. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2014.
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) whether Petitioner is delinquent in child support payments; and (2) whether Respondent is authorized to levy Petitioner's two bank accounts and apply the funds to reduce Petitioner's past due child support obligation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is the father of a child born in Connecticut in 1986. On May 2, 1990, a Connecticut court ordered Petitioner to pay child support of $72.00 per week for the support of his child. The court also found that Petitioner had a child support arrearage of $3,797.11 and ordered that he pay an additional $15.00 per week to reduce the arrearage. Petitioner moved to Florida in early 1994. On November 13, 2001, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Manatee County, Florida, received a request from the State of Connecticut to register and enforce a foreign support order against Petitioner. The adjudicated arrearage in child support was $25,179.87, as determined by the State of Connecticut. On December 11, 2001, Petitioner was sent a Notice of Registration of Foreign Support Order. The notice, sent by certified mail, was received at Petitioner's then current residence address. On January 23, 2002, an Order Confirming Registration of Foreign Support Order was entered; Petitioner was ordered to pay $90.48 per week beginning January 25, 2002. On July 12, 2007, the State of Connecticut certified that as of July 12, 2007, Petitioner had a $23,853.56 child support arrearage. Petitioner stipulated that the child support arrearage was at least $23,000.00. On September 8, 2006, the Department sent a Notice to Freeze to the Bank of America; on the same day a Notice of Freeze was sent to Regions Bank. In the notices, sent by certified mail, the Department advised the banks to hold up to $25,725.26 of Petitioner's funds until further notice. Bank of America responded indicating that Petitioner had $1,270.95 in his account; Regions Bank reported $591.42. On September 15, 2006, the Department sent two Notices of Intent to Levy by certified mail to Petitioner. The notices provided, in pertinent part, the following: You are hereby notified that pursuant to Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes, the Department of Revenue intends to levy on credits or personal property belonging to the obligor named above [Petitioner], or debts owed to the obligor. This property consists of liquid assets and is in the control of [appropriate bank]. This action is taken for nonpayment of child support by the obligor in the amount of $25,725.26 as of [appropriate date]. You are hereby notified that you may contest the agency's action to levy on the above referenced property. You may do so by either filing a petition in the existing Circuit Court case, . . . or by requesting an administrative hearing. If you wish to request an administrative hearing, you must file your petition for hearing, in writing, in accordance with the Notice of Rights attached to this Notice. Although Petitioner testified that he did not receive the notices, neither was returned by the postal service. On October 2, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing (Petition), in response to each Notice of Intent to Levy. In October 2006, the Department issued and sent Notices of Extension of Freeze to each bank indicating that Petitioner was challenging the Notices of Intent to Levy. The monies on deposit in each bank were the result of payments received by Petitioner for his labors as a lawn caretaker.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Revenue, enter a final order that: (1) levies an amount up to $23,853.56 in each of the Petitioner, Michael K. Dugdale's, two bank accounts at Bank of America, N.A. and Regions Bank; (2) applies the funds to reduce Petitioner's past due child support obligation; and (3) credits Petitioner for said payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Enrique Rivera, was married to Emma Rivera on April 15, 1973, and of that marriage two children were born, Lisa and Tomas. A Final Judgement of Dissolution of Marriage was entered on September 8, 1980 in Dade County, Florida. On March 14, 1980, however, Petitioner's then spouse, Emma Rivera obtained an order of support in the 264th District Court of Bell County, Texas, (Texas) whereby she was awarded $75 every two weeks per child for child support for petitioner's two children. The child support payments were to commence on March 15, 1980. (Respondent's exhibit 1). The final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered by the circuit court of Dade County, Florida, on September 8, 1980, required petitioner to pay the sum of $75 every two weeks for child support based on the order of support issued in Texas. (Respondent's exhibit 2). During late 1987, petitioner, received a pre-offset notice from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicating that it would intercept and apply an IRS tax refund to fully or partially satisfy a past due child support obligation. (Respondent's exhibit 2). Petitioner signed a judgment agreement in Texas during 1980 wherein he agreed to pay child support in the amount of $75 per child every two weeks to Emma Rivera for the support of his minor children. (Respondent's exhibit 3). On January 9, 1980, Emma Rivera signed a uniform reciprocal enforcement of support petition seeking an order of support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). Respondent, through its URESA Division, obtained copies of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the support petition and the account master record display of the Clerk of the Court, Central Depository of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, Family Division. Based on information obtained from those copies, petitioner owed Emma Rivera child support arrearage in the amount of $14,436 as of July 15, 1988. (Respondent's composite exhibit 3). Petitioner disputes that he owes any child support arrearage and contends that the judgment agreement he signed in 1980 was altered after he signed it and that subsequent court orders relied upon that judgment to establish an incorrect amount for child support. Petitioner maintains that there was a typographical error in the Texas support order and that he was only obligated to pay $75 per month for each of the two children for a total of $150.00 per month. The agreement Petitioner signed in Texas however obligated him to pay child support in the amount of $75 per child every two weeks for his minor children. That support obligation shows that petitioner owes Emma Rivera a child support arrearage in the amount of $14,436 as of July 15, 1988. Petitioner sought an amendment to the Texas order of support and he has been unable to obtain any amendment to that order as of the date of this administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a final order recommending that the Internal Revenue Service forward the sum collected from its intercept to the respondent forthwith for payment toward satisfaction of the child support arrearage due and owing Emma Rivera. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip J. Coniglio, Esquire 12595 North East 7th Avenue North Miami, Florida 33161 JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1988. Deborah Magid, Esquire Assistant State Attorney Child Support Enforcement Division 1490 North West 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 R. S. Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Fort Knox Executive Center 2727 Mahan Drive Suite 309 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
