The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent, KaShamba Miller-Anderson, violated section 112.3145(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), by willfully failing to file a 2015 CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests”; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently a member of the Riviera Beach City Council. As a member of the Riviera Beach City Council, Respondent served as a “local officer” as defined in section 112.3145(1)(a), throughout the year 2015. Respondent was aware that she was required to file a CE Form 1 every year, including for the year 2015. Financial disclosures are filed in order to allow the public to monitor public officials and employees for any conflicts of interest that may arise. The requirement that financial disclosures be filed is intended to deter corruption and increase the public’s confidence in government. In 2016, Respondent received e-mails at the address kmiller@rivierabch.com. She received regular mail at the address 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404. The CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests,” for calendar year 2015 was required to be filed on or before July 1, 2016. There is a grace period for filing the form that expired on September 1, 2016. After the expiration of the grace period, an automatic fine of $25 per day was imposed for each day the form is late, up to a maximum fine of $1,500. The maximum fine accrued on October 31, 2016. The Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections (Palm Beach SOE) office sent Respondent the original blank 2015 financial disclosure form, along with the requirements for filing the form, before June 1, 2016. She was instructed to file her completed form no later than July 1, 2016. Respondent failed to file her 2015 CE Form 1 by either July 1, 2016, or September 1, 2016. Respondent received notice from the Commission regarding her failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. On July 31, 2016, the Palm Beach SOE sent a delinquency memorandum to Respondent at 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 by certified mail. The mail was unclaimed. The July 31, 2016, memorandum included the following statement: Pursuant to State law, please be advised that although you are delinquent in filing Form 1, a grace period is in effect until September 1, 2016. If your form is not received by September 1, 2016, we will be required by law to notify the Commission on Ethics of the delinquency. A fine of $25 for each day late will be imposed, up to the maximum penalty of $1500. In addition, pursuant to enacted legislation, the Commission on Ethics must initiate investigations of delinquent filers in certain circumstances. This can result in you being removed from your public office or employment. Respondent took no action to file her form by September 1, 2016. If she had done so, it would have been considered timely. Commission staff sent Respondent a courtesy letter on September 7, 2016, and advised her that she was accruing a fine of $25 per day for failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The Commission also e-mailed Respondent on September 20, 2016, using the e-mail address kmiller@rivierabch.com. Respondent accrued the maximum fine of $1,500 as of October 31, 2016, as authorized by section 112.3145(7)(f), for failing to file her CE Form 1 for the year 2015. On November 4, 2016, the Commission again e-mailed Respondent at the same e-mail address, advising her that the maximum fine had accrued and she still needed to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The November 4, 2016, e-mail attached a blank 2015 CE Form 1 and a form to appeal her fine. Respondent did not avail herself of the opportunity to appeal the fine that had accrued. On February 21, 2017, the Commission sent Respondent a Notice of Assessment of Automatic Fine by certified mail, using the 430 West 28th Street address. Respondent acknowledged receipt of the February 2017 notice. This e-mail also provided the appeal process for contesting the maximum fine. Respondent did not pay the fine at that time because she did not have the funds to do so. She believed, in error, that she now could not file the 2015 CE Form 1 until she paid the fine. Her belief, however misplaced, was sincere. On June 16, 2017, the Commission mailed Respondent a Notification of Issuance of Default Final Order at the 430 West 28th Street address. The Notice was not returned to the Commission as undeliverable. On June 22, 2017, Respondent paid the $1,500 fine. On June 28, 2017, Respondent filed her CE Form 1 for calendar year 2015. Respondent did not have a particularly compelling reason for not timely filing her 2015 CE Form 1. Her position on the city council is a part-time position, for which she is not assigned an assistant. She admitted at hearing that the notice and the form simply got lost on her desk, and she did not make it a priority. However, Respondent claims that while filing her 2015 CE Form 1 was not the priority it should have been, she never intended not to file the form, and she never indicated to anyone that she would not do so. Respondent filed her 2015 CE Form 1 and paid the fine prior to the finding of probable cause in this case. There are some differences between the financial disclosure Respondent filed when she initially ran for office and the one filed for 2015. Those differences however, are not so great as to support an inference or finding that she was attempting to hide something by not filing timely. The term for which Respondent was elected expired on March 21, 2018. She was re-elected for another term which began March 21, 2018.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that no violation of section 112.3145(8)(c) has been demonstrated. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A. 131 North Gadsden Street (32301) Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact By application dated September 10, 1987, petitioner, John K. Whitaker, III, sought licensure as a real estate salesman by examination with respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). The application was received by the Division on September 14, 1987. Question six on the application requires the applicant to state whether he or she "has ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld." Petitioner gave the following response: Yes. DUI and DWI 1981 and 1982. Upon further investigation by the Division, it learned that Whitaker had been arrested for a DUI in 1982 and that no arrest had occurred in 1981. However, it also learned that Whitaker had been arrested for the following incidents: March 17, 1984 - Arrest for resisting police officer with violence. April 17, 1984 - Arrest for forgery - possession of forged or altered driver's license August 31, 1984 - Burglary of a dwelling; adjudication withheld. August 31, 1984 - Grand larceny; adjudication withheld. August 31, 1984 - Arson; adjudication withheld. Armed with this new information, respondent advised petitioner by letter dated December 2, 1987 that his application had been denied. This decision was later reaffirmed by letter dated February 4, 1988 and cited respondent's "criminal record" as the basis for the agency's denial. That prompted this proceeding. Petitioner, who is now twenty-nine years old, is a December, 1982 graduate of Florida State University with a degree in economics. After graduation, he worked eight months as a stockbroker for Alan Bush Brokerage Company in West Palm Beach, Florida. In 1983 petitioner began receiving medical treatment for what he thought was depression. As a part of the treatment, he took an antidepressant drug. He later learned he had a manic-depressive condition, a more serious mental illness, and the antidepressant medication was actually aggravating this condition. Before his real illness was discovered, Whitaker experienced manic episodes which were manifested by grandiose ideas, slurred speech and extremely poor judgment. As a result, Whitaker was arrested in 1984 for the series of incidents enumerated in finding of fact 3. The first two charges were dismissed while adjudication of guilt was withheld as to the remaining three charges. For those latter charges, Whitaker was placed on five years' probation, or to and including August, 1989. Whitaker stated he did not intend to lie about these matters and did not list the 1984 arrests on his application because he thought that if a charge was dropped, or adjudication of guilt withheld, he did not have to disclose the matter. Since having his illness properly diagnosed in 1984, Whitaker has taken medication (lithium) to prevent the recurrence of the symptoms and sees a physician at least once a month. He must remain on medication for the rest of his life in order to control the illness. With the exception of one flare-up about a year ago, his condition has stabilized. After his arrests in 1984, Whitaker was hospitalized for a period of time and then moved into a halfway house. He now lives in his own apartment. He has held several jobs, including a food service job in a West Palm Beach hospital and a timeshare unit salesman for his uncle in California. Presently, he is employed in a public relations capacity for a consumer club in West Palm Beach. He eventually wants to enter the real estate business, and for this reason, desires a license. Because his mother is a broker-realtor in Palm Beach Gardens, he expects no difficulty in obtaining a real estate position. Petitioner presented the testimony of his mother, a retired business executive and a family friend who is also a real estate salesman. The mother described the nature of petitioner's illness while the retired executive recalled petitioner as having "industrious," self-motivating" and "honest" characteristics and being a terrific salesman. The family friend described petitioner's present conduct to be normal now that he had controlled his illness. Finally, a number of letters were offered by various local businessmen, including one from a professional golfer and businessman (Jack Nicklaus), a physician, a stockbroker and a financial planner. However, all letters predate petitioner's arrests and therefore are irrelevant to the issue in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of John K. Whitaker for licensure as a real estate salesman by examination be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June 1988.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses described in the administrative complaint filed against him? If so, what penalties should be imposed by the Florida Real Estate Commission?
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent was first licensed as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida on May 26, 1983. On March 31, 1985, his license reverted to involuntarily inactive status because of his failure to take the necessary measures to seek its renewal. As of June 26, 1989, he had made no effort to reactivate his license. By information filed May 22, 1986, in Palm Beach County Circuit Court, Respondent was charged with having committed various criminal acts in connection with a mortgage investment scam. Counts 3, 7, and 9 of the information contained the following allegations: [I]n the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, on June 15, 1983, EDWARD E. DIAMOND, salesperson, offered for sale to FLORENCE PATRIANI a security to wit: an equal dignity mortgage and note which security was not registered as required by Chapter 517 of Florida Statutes, contrary to Florida Statutes 517.07 and 517.302, [I]n the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, on July 18, 1983, EDWARD E. DIAMOND, salesperson, offered for sale to SAPENOFF and HARRIS, P.A., PROFIT SHARING ACCOUNT, a security to wit: an equal dignity mortgage and note which security was not registered as required by Chapter 517 of Florida Statutes, contrary to Florida Statutes 517.07 and 517.302, [I]n the county of Palm Beach and State of Florida, on January 21, 1984, EDWARD E. DIAMOND, salesperson, offered for sale to VINSON HARPER and MARJORIE H. HARPER, a security to wit: an equal dignity mortgage and note which security was not registered as required by Chapter 517 of Florida Statutes, contrary to Florida Statutes 517.07 and 517.302[.] On May 18, 1987, Respondent pled guilty to these three counts of the information. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was placed on probation. The remaining charges against Respondent were dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the instant administrative complaint against Respondent on the grounds of mootness. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of July, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: STEVEN W. JOHNSON, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 400 WEST ROBINSON STREET ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32801 EDWARD E. DIAMOND 5519 FAIRWAY PARK DRIVE BOYNTON BEACH, FLORIDA 33437 DARLENE F. KELLER DIVISION DIRECTOR FLORIDA DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 400 WEST ROBINSON STREET POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent’s license as insurance agent should be revoked for providing false answers under oath to questions regarding his criminal history on his application for licensure.
Findings Of Fact On March 28, 2000, Respondent executed under oath an application for licensure. Included on the application were the following questions: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not a judgment of conviction has been entered? Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not a judgment of conviction has been entered? As to both of these questions, Respondent answered-- falsely--"No." Respondent was subsequently licensed as an insurance agent. Had he accurately answered these questions, his application for licensure would have been denied. By way of defense, Respondent contends that he was misled by comments made by the trial judge who sentenced him. Respondent testified that at the time he executed his application, he believed, based upon what the judge had said at sentencing, that the charges to which Respondent had pleaded no contest did not constitute a felony and did not carry a sentence of greater than one year in prison. A transcript of Respondent's sentencing would provide a verbatim record of what the judge said, and would afford the fact finder an opportunity to form an opinion as to whether Respondent could have reasonably believed that he could appropriately answer "no" to the above-quoted questions. All criminal sentencing hearings in Florida are, as a matter of course, attended by a court reporter. However, Respondent did not introduce a transcript of his sentencing into evidence in this hearing, nor did he provide an explanation as to why a transcript could not be made available. Neither did Respondent offer any testimony other than his own in support of his claim that he had been misled by the sentencing judge as to the nature of the charges to which he plead and/or the maximum sentence permitted under the law. Respondent's own memory as to the details of his crime and punishment was very poor. Thus, there is no factual basis upon which it can be concluded that Respondent's failure to accurately respond to questions regarding his criminal history may be attributed to the failure of the judge who sentenced him to clearly communicate, rather than Respondent's own negligence in responding to the questions concerning his criminal background. It is noted on the face of the application that it is the applicant's burden to provide accurate information, and the failure to do so will result in a denial of licensure. Even if the evidence established that Respondent's misstatements were made in good faith, the outcome of this proceeding would be the same. As noted above, under Florida law, a "yes" answer to either of the above-noted questions would have required the state to deny Respondent's application for licensure.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order revoking Respondent's license and eligibility for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Terry Butler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 James E. Loper 4105 North University Drive Number J-206 Sunrise, Florida 33351 James E. Loper 18217 Northwest 61st Place Miami, Florida 33015 Honorable Tom Gallagher Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Scott William Katz (Katz), applied to Respondent, Florida Real Estate commission (Commission), for licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter of June 5, 1987, the Commission advised Katz that his application was denied because he had been disbarred from the Florida Bar Association and the Oklahoma Bar Association. Katz filed a timely request for formal hearing to contest the Commission's action. The proof established that by order of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in The Florida Bar v. Katz, 491 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 1986), Katz was disbarred from the practice of law. The Court's opinion reads, in pertinent part: In Count I, the Bar charged respondent with violating several disciplinary rules pertaining to conflicts of interest and secrets of clients. Initially, respondent represented a wife in a dissolution of marriage action. He obtained a final judgment on her behalf which provided for child support as well as other relief. Respondent continued to represent the wife, filing a motion to modify the final judgment and a motion for contempt wherein various arrearages in child support were alleged. Approximately two years later, respondent commenced proceedings against his former client on behalf of her ex-husband, seeking a reduction in child support payments. These payments were part of the very relief sought and obtained by respondent on behalf of the wife in the original dissolution proceedings. Respondent's former client did not consent to respondent's representation of her former husband and indicated that such consent would not have been given if sought by respondent. In Count II, the Bar charged that respondent coerced an agreement from a former client to pay damages on a claim which had no legal basis.... * * * In Count III, the Bar charged that respondent misrepresented material facts in a sworn pleading in order to obtain the relief sought. Cadet Joseph K. Barbara had retained respondent when he was dismissed from West Point. Respondent filed a sworn motion before a federal court requesting the issuance of a temporary order restraining West Point from dismissing the cadet. The pleading contained the representation that West Point had no objection to the issuance of such an order. The federal judge entered the order on the basis of respondent's misrepresentation of the position of the West Point authorities. Upon finding respondent guilty of all charges, the referee recommended disbarment, stating: The cumulative guilt of the three different transgressions indicated a gross callousness and indifference to the entire Code of Professional Responsibility. In Count I, he must be presumed to have divulged secrets of his client's to the client's adversary. In Count II, he outrageously and successfully pressured his client to wrongfully agree to pay him money when his client had no legal obligation to do so. Certainly moral extortion if nothing else. He deliberately lied under oath to a Federal Judge who relied upon such falsehood in issuing the order. Certainly a lawyer can do little more culpable and destructive to the court system. The example set by Respondent must be dealt with harshly to prevent those considering such conduct in the future. Accordingly, the Court concluded: We approve the referee's findings of guilt on Count I of the Bar's complaint and find that respondent violated disciplinary Rule 1- 102(A)(5)(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct contrary to the administration of justice); Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) and (B) (a lawyer shall not knowingly use a client's confidence or secret to the advantage of another without full disclosure), Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) and (B)(a lawyer shall decline proffered employment if a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected), and Disciplinary Rule 9-101 (a lawyer shall avoid even the appearance of impropriety). We approve the referee's findings of guilt on Count II and find that respondent violated Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.02(3)(a) prohibiting conduct contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals. We approve the referee's findings of guilt on Count III, finding that respondent violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(1)(a lawyer shall not violate a discipline rule); Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3)(a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4)(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); Disciplinary Rule l- 102 (A)(5)(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6)(a lawyer shall not engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law); Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5)(a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of law or fact in representing a client); and Florida Bar Integration Rules 11.02(3)(a) and (b)(a lawyer shall not commit acts contrary to honesty, justice, good morals, or commit a crime). Predicated on his disbarment from the Florida Bar Association Katz was, effective February 19, 1987, disbarred from the Oklahoma Bar Association. At hearing, Katz offered no proof of subsequent good conduct and reputation, or any other reason sufficient to demonstrate that the interests of the public and investors would not likely be endangered by the granting of registration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Petitioner, Scott William Katz, for licensure as a real estate salesman be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott William Katz 361 Midpines Road Palm Springs, Florida 33461 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and/or costs, pursuant to section 120.595(4); and, if so, the amounts of attorney's fees and/or costs to which he is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 3, 2017, DOAH entered an Amended Final Order in Case No. 16-6127RU, determining that a portion of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Procedure Manual TL-10, dated April 30, 2014, and Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18, dated October 20, 2014 (hereafter, the "Unadopted Rules"), are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). "Stephen J. Williams, as a Trustee for the Sparkhill Trust," is Petitioner in this proceeding, and also was Petitioner in Case No. 16-6127RU. Petitioner appeared in Case No. 16-6127RU as a trustee of the Sparkhill Trust ("Trust"), which holds title to the motor vehicle for which a certificate of title was denied by Respondent and its agent, the Lee County Tax Collector, in 2014. As previously found in Case No. 16-6127RU, Petitioner also is the beneficiary of the Trust. Petitioner is not licensed to practice law in Florida, and has neither alleged nor shown that he was licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in Florida at any point during the pendency of Case No. 16-6127RU.2/ Petitioner received a law degree from the University of Connecticut School of Law and is licensed to practice law in Connecticut, New York, and the District of Columbia; however, he currently is suspended from practicing law in those jurisdictions. Petitioner also is a lawyer on the Roll of Solicitors in England and Wales, but is not currently authorized to practice in those jurisdictions because he does not hold a practicing certificate. Petitioner asserts in the Motion that he is an attorney acting in a representative capacity as a trustee on behalf of the Trust. Petitioner filed a document titled "Declaration of Stephen J. Williams in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs" ("Declaration") in support of the Motion. Although the Declaration represents that it is made "under penalty of perjury," it does not constitute a legally sufficient oath or affidavit because it does not comply with the requirements of section 92.50(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, it does not contain a jurat or certificate of proof or acknowledgement authenticated by the signature and official seal of a judge, clerk or deputy clerk of court of record in this state, or a United States commissioner or notary public in this state, as required by the statute.3/ Petitioner attached an itemized timesheet to the Declaration. The timesheet lists, for each item for which attorney's fees are sought, the date and description of the legal services alleged to have been rendered for the particular item, and the amount of time alleged to have been spent per item. The timesheet represents that a total of 54.8 hours were spent in prosecuting Case No. 16-6127RU. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a $350.00 per hour attorney's fee, multiplied by a 1.5 loadstar multiplier, and a contingency multiplier of three, for a total of $86,310.00 in attorney's fees. Attached to the Declaration is email correspondence sent to Petitioner by Kiara Guzzo, Respondent's Public Records Coordinator, stating that Petitioner owed $119.73 for Respondent's response to Petitioner's public records request. In the Declaration, Petitioner states that "[t]he attached email of Guzzo email [sic] accurately indicates the out-of-pocket expenses which have been paid." Pursuant to his statement in the Declaration, Petitioner is "exclusively engaged in the practice of law." Pursuant to his statement in the Declaration, Petitioner undertook the prosecution of Case No. 16-6127RU on a contingency basis, with his attorney's fees being "limited to that approved by this tribunal."4/ Petitioner previously challenged the Unadopted Rules in two DOAH proceedings, Case Nos. 14-6005RU and 15-0484RU.5/ Thus, as far back as 2014, Respondent was on notice that its statements (i.e., the Unadopted Rules) may constitute unadopted rules.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Petitioner's application for licensure as a Real Estate Salesman should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the Petitioner and his demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. On approximately February 12, 1987, Petitioner filed an application to take the Florida real estate salesman's examination. In answering Question #6 of the application, regarding applicant's criminal record, Petitioner answered in the affirmative. Petitioner set forth the details, stating: "On May 14, 1985, plead (sic) nolo contendere to the offense of sexual battery. Through plea bargaining was sentenced to 10 years probation, which I am currently in good standing. Case was instituted by my sons (sic) girlfriend, who was living in my home. I had no witnesses in my behalf, made plea through the Public defenders (sic) office (I was not guilty)." (Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1) During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that he affirmatively responded to Question #6 on the license application and, in explanation, states that he was unable to retain an attorney when charged and he, upon advice of a public defender, entered the nolo contendere plea as a "plea of convenience". Petitioner did not present any witnesses at the hearing other than his testimony on his behalf. Petitioner denied that he was guilty of the crime that he was charged and related that his son and his girlfriend lived with him from approximately 1969 through 1980. Sometime during 1980, the son became a "problem child" and was unmanageable. For that reason, the son was placed in the care and custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Petitioner again took custody of the son when he reached his seventeenth birthday so that the son and his girlfriend could live with him during commencing September 30, 1983. Approximately one year later, during April, 1984, he was charged with the crime of sexual battery. In mitigation, Petitioner avers that he is in good standing with his probation officer and that he was formerly a police officer with the Miami Police Department. Petitioner offered no corroborating witnesses or other independent evidence to refute the charges or to otherwise offer testimony as to rehabilitation of his character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: Petitioner's application to take the Real Estate License Examination be DENIED. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Assistant Attorney General Suite 212, 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 William F. Demler 11532 Terra Bella Boulevard Plantation, Florida 33325 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0760 William ONeil Department of Professional Regulation General Counsel 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0860
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty and responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Iris Adames, is now and was at all times material hereto, a registered real estate appraiser in the State of Florida, having been issued license number RI0003454. On or about March 21, 1996, Respondent filed an application (dated March 8, 1996) with the Department for licensure as a registered real estate appraiser. Pertinent to this case, item 11 on the application required that Respondent answer yes or no to the following question: Have you ever 1) been convicted of a crime, 2) pled nolo contendere to any crime? (This question applies to any violation of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses --but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations-- regardless of whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled or were pardoned.) Respondent responded to the question by checking the box marked "N[o]." The application concluded with the applicant's signature immediately below the following affirmation: . . . I have read the questions in this application and have answered them completely and truthfully to the best of my knowledge. . . . Contrary to Respondent's response to item 11 on the application, the proof demonstrates that on October 23, 1995, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the crime of uttering a worthless check, a first degree misdemeanor, in the Circuit Court, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Brevard County, Florida, Case No. 94-23154-CF-A. The court entered an order withholding adjudication of guilt, placed Respondent on probation for a period of six months, and imposed a fine and costs totaling $105.65. On September 18, 1997, the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Florida Real Estate Commission or FREC) issued an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, as a licensed real estate salesperson. That complaint alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: At the time Respondent made application for a real estate license, Respondent was asked to indicate whether or not [s]he had "ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld. This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state, or nation . . . without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled or pardoned." Respondent checked the "No" box. (Licensure Application, at Question 9). Respondent swore and attested that all answers and information contained in h[er] application were true and correct. Respondent's signature was duly notarized. On or about October 23, 1995, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of writing a worthless check, a first degree misdemeanor (§ 832.05, Fla. Stat.) A true and correct copy of the Order of Judgment is attached hereto, incorporated herein and made a part hereof by reference as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. Further, in connection with this investigation, mail addressed from Petitioner to Respondent was returned by the U.S. Postal Service noting that Respondent has moved without any forwarding address. COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of obtaining a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of § 475.25(1)(m), Fla. Stat. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of failing to timely advise Petitioner of a change of mailing address in violation of Rule 61J2-10.037, Fla. Admin. Code and, therefore, in violation of § 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat. WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests the Florida Real Estate Commission to issue a Final Order as final agency action finding the Respondent(s) guilty as charged. The penalty for each count or separate offense may range from a reprimand; an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.00 per violation; probation; suspension of license, registration or permit for a period not to exceed ten (10) years; revocation of the license, registration or permit; and any of or all of the above penalties as provided by § 455.227 and § 475.25(1), Fla. Stat. and Fla. Admin. Code R. 61J2-24.001. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner requests an award of costs as provided by § 455.227(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent did not formally respond to the Administrative Complaint and on February 18, 1998, the Florida Real Estate Commission held a hearing on Petitioner's Request for an Informal Hearing and Motion for Final Order. Respondent was served with a copy of the notice of hearing and failed to appear. By final order dated February 18, 1998, and filed March 9, 1998, the Florida Real Estate Commission resolved the case, as follows: Upon a complete review of the evidence presented by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, the Florida Real Estate Commission finds: That the Respondent was properly served with the Administrative Complaint and failed to request a hearing or otherwise respond to the service of Administrative Complaint. See s. 120.60(5), Florida Statutes, and Rules 28- 5.111 and 28-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. That there are no disputed issues of material fact and, therefore, the Petitioner's Motion for an Informal Hearing, pursuant to s. 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, is granted. That the Petitioner has established a prima facie case. That the facts and legal conclusions contained in the Administrative Complaint are adopted as true and that violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, have occurred, as stated in the Administrative Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and made a part hereof. Therefore, the Commission ORDERS that the license of Iris Amor Adames be revoked. This Order shall be effective on date of filing with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. However, any party affected by this Order has the right to seek judicial review, pursuant to s. 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Within 30 days of the filing date of this Order, review proceedings may be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, at Suite 309 North Tower, 400 West Robinson Street, Orlando, Florida 32801. At the same time, a copy of the Notice of Appeal, with applicable filing fees, must be filed with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. In her response to Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and again at hearing, Respondent explained she entered the plea of nolo contendere to the worthless check charge based upon advice of her court-appointed counsel even though (in her opinion) she was innocent of the charge. As for her negative response to the question posed on the application, Respondent averred she understood the judge to have directed her attorney to have her records sealed, she assumed he had done as directed, and consequently gave what she understood was an appropriate response to the question on the application. See Section 943.059(4), Florida Statutes. Here, Respondent's explanation for her failure to disclose her plea on her application is credited, and it is resolved that, at the time she submitted her application, Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive those who would be reviewing the application. In so concluding, it is observed that Respondent's testimony was candid and her understanding of the disposition of the matter (and the propriety of her response to the question on the application) was, given her unfamiliarity with such matters, reasonable. 1/ Count II of the Administrative Complaint sought to take disciplinary action against Respondent based on the Final order of the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) which had disciplined (revoked) Respondent's licensure as a real estate sales person. As heretofore noted, that final order was premised on Respondent's failure to respond to a two-count Administrative Complaint. Count I was predicated on the same issue raised by the Department in the instant case, and Count II was premised on Respondent's "fail[ure] to timely advise [FREC] of a change in her mailing address." Here, Respondent explained her failure to respond to the FREC complaint as follows: . . . when I called Tallahassee, they told me that you have 48 hours to respond, or get a lawyer. I say excuse me, I cannot just go and get a lawyer. Because, why? Because, now in 1998, since December 1997, I've been into a domestic violence case, and I almost -- Me and my daughter almost got killed. And, in the meantime, the father of my child took my car, took every means for me to make my living. I was almost fighting all the time. December, January, February, I was fighting eviction. I was fighting the court. And, all the problems. And, I have all the paperwork here. And, I cannot take more stress. Now, you ask me my life -- My life, and the life of my child is priority. I cannot just go, and hire a lawyer. I don't have the money. I don't have the means. You have to give me more time. And to say that I am sorry it's only 48 hours, you should had [sic] been in response to this before, and that's it. When she told me that, what else can I do? So, I said well, fine. One day I will go back, and try to reopen the case. There is nothing that I can do at this moment. (Transcript, pages 28-30.) With regard to her failure to keep FREC informed regarding her current address, Respondent explained: The reason I didn't keep changing my addresses is because my realtor appraiser license, the person who supervised my work, Gary Eilen, he's the father of my child, he's the person who I get the injunction for. That's why sometimes I just tried to disappear from his life. And, when -- That's one of the complaints that I don't keep moving with my addresses, but he [could] get it from the state [if she informed the state of her new address. Therefore, for safety reasons, she chose not to notify FREC of her new address]. (Transcript, page 39.) Respondent's testimony was candid and credible, and her domestic problems (at the time of the FREC proceeding) well- documented. See Respondent's Exhibit 4. Had Respondent the means and opportunity to contest the FREC complaint, the conclusion of that proceeding would, most likely, have mirrored the conclusions reached in this case. In sum, given the conclusion reached here that (by her response to the application at issue in this case) Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive the Department, a de minimus penalty should be imposed as a consequence of the FREC Final Order, which was essentially entered by default and premised on the same issue (of non- disclosure) raised in this case (and resolved favorably to the Respondent).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which finds Respondent not guilty of violating of Subsection 475.624(12), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order find the Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 475.624(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and that for such violation Respondent receive a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1999.
