The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? him? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against
Findings Of Fact Respondent is now, and has been since September 23, 1991, a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson (holding license number 0579778). On September 30, 1993, his license became "involuntary inactive." His license was reactivated effective November 22, 1994, and remained active through September 30, 1995. Respondent's license is currently in "involuntary inactive" status. In January of 1994, Respondent was hired to (and thereafter did work) as a real estate salesperson for 4% Realty, Inc. (4%). The decision to hire Respondent was made by Frank Eckert, 4%'s broker. At no time did Respondent advise Eckert that he (Respondent) did not have an active real estate salesperson's license. On January 26, 1997, and January 27, 1997, Respondent provided $500.00 to 4% (in the form of two checks made out to 4%, one, dated January 26, 1994, in the amount $300.00 and the other, dated January 27, 1994, in the amount of $200.00). The $500.00 represented a deposit made by Respondent in connection with a proposed real estate transaction involving Respondent (as the buyer) and Mark Solowitz (as the seller). By letter dated March 3, 1994, Respondent notified Solowitz that, as of January 26, 1994, there was “on deposit in 4% Realty, Inc., Escrow account a total sum of $500.” The real estate transaction between Respondent and Solowitz was never finalized. After the transaction failed to close, Eckert returned Respondent’s $500.00 deposit to Respondent. On or about October 12, 1994, Respondent applied and interviewed for a salesperson position in the Weston office of Prudential Florida Realty (Prudential). The interview was conducted by Dorothy McCullough, the branch manager of Prudential's Weston office. Respondent made certain statements during the interview with which McCullough was "not comfortable." At the conclusion of the interview, McCullough told Respondent that she would "get back to him" and "let him know" of her decision. At no time did McCullough hire Respondent or authorize him to use Prudential's forms or stationary or to act as an agent for Prudential. On or about October 13, 1994, Respondent submitted to First Atlantic Realty (First Atlantic), on behalf of prospective tenants, an offer to lease property (located at 3350 Ivy Way in Miramar) listed by First Atlantic. Respondent purported to be acting as a representative of Prudential. When McCullough discovered what Respondent had done, she telephoned him to make sure that he understood that he had not been, nor would he be, hired by her to work for Prudential. Subsequently, First Atlantic's broker, Roger Herman, learned that the prospective tenants on whose behalf Respondent had submitted the offer had already moved into the rental property notwithstanding that their offer (which was "extremely weak") had not been accepted.3 Herman thereupon went to the rental property "to find out what was going on." He attempted to communicate with the prospective tenants, but was unsuccessful because they spoke ”very little English." He then telephoned the police. Upon arriving on the scene, the police spoke with the prospective tenants and persuaded them to vacate the premises. On or about October 24, 1994, Respondent submitted to First Atlantic, on behalf of the same prospective tenants, another offer to lease the property at 3350 Ivy Way. On this occasion, however, Respondent was acting as a salesperson in the employ of 4%. Herman responded to this second offer by contacting the Department by telephone and discussing the situation with a Department representative. During the discussion, Herman was advised by the Department representative that Respondent did not possess an active salesperson's license. Herman then telephoned Eckert and informed him of Respondent's licensure status. After speaking with Herman, Eckert telephoned the Department and received confirmation that Respondent did not have an active salesperson's license. Eckert then contacted Respondent and advised him that his employment with 4% was terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations described in Conclusion of Law 41 of this Recommended Order and revoking his real estate salesperson's license for having committed said violations.DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April 1997.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Donald E. Swagler is now and was at all times material a licensed real estate broker or broker/salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0139756, in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint, respondent Donald Swagler was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker for and an officer of respondent Swagler Realty, Inc., which is now and was at all times material a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0169035, in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material, Fern Z. Taylor was a licensed real estate broker with an office in Bonita Springs, approximately a twenty-minute drive south from the offices of Swagler Realty Company in Ft. Myers. On April 10, 1980, Andrew W. Kuchmaner was working part-time as a licensed real estate salesman in the employ (as that term is defined in Section 475.01(2), Florida Statutes) of Swagler Realty Company. Kuchmaner was a new salesman and had not yet had occasion to present a buyer's purchase offer to a client seller. During the early months of 1980, Kuchmaner was also working in the employ of, and receiving a salary from, Jim Walter Homes Company. Philip R. and Susan B. Workman first met Kuchmaner in January or February 1980 while visiting a Jim Walter's Homes sales office in Ft. Myers where he was working in his capacity as a Jim Walter Homes salesman. Kuchmaner advised the Workmans to find and purchase a lot for the Jim Walter home they had selected, and then they could purchase the Jim Walter home. Jim Walter Homes Company requires lot ownership prior to building one of their homes. Prior to selecting a lot, the Workmans had already decided on the Jim Walter home they were going to purchase, and Kuchmaner was going to do the paperwork for Jim Walter. Throughout the first quarter of 1980, the Workmans searched for a lot on which to construct their home in the Bonita Springs area of southern Lee County. During their search, the Workmans came upon a vacant lot with a sign saying it was for sale by Fern Z. Taylor. Upon seeing her real estate for sale sign, the Workmans went to Fern Taylor's office to inquire about the property and seek her assistance in their purchase of a lot in the Bonita Springs area. Fern Taylor advised the Workmans that, in addition to the lot they had already seen bearing her sign, she had Dust that morning listed and had for sale another lot in the Bonita Springs area which they would be interested in seeing. Earlier that same morning, Taylor took a long distance telephone call from a Charles A. Bennett, a resident of Arizona. Bennett said he had a lot he wanted to sell and gave Taylor the price ($7,000) and a description--Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park No. 2, in Bonita Springs. Bennett had not seen the property in some time and gave no landmarks or street address for Taylor's guidance. Back in 1925, Rosemary Park No. 2 was subdivided into eight blocks of 24 140' x 50' lots each and two larger blocks containing 16 larger 162' x 300' lots each. One of the smaller lots bore the legal description: "Lot 20, Block E of Rosemary Park No. 2 according to the Plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 6 at Page 30, of the Public Records of Lee County. This is the lot Bennett owned and was trying to sell. It is located on First Street. In 1926, Rosemary Park No. 2 was re-subdivided. The two larger blocks of the prior subdivision were re-subdivided into eight blocks of 24 140' x 50' lots each. Unfortunately, in a stroke of singular lack of vision, the new blocks and lots were designated with the same letters and numbers already assigned to the smaller blocks and lots in the original 1925 subdivision. As a result, there is another lot in Rosemary Park No. 2 designated as Lot 20, Block E: Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park, resubdivision of the East 1/2 of No. 2, according to the plat thereof, as recorded in Plat Book 8, Page 32, in the Public Records of Lee County, Florida. This other Lot 20, Block E, is owned by the Fyfes of Maine and is on Fifth Street. Taylor, who was quite busy, quickly checked a plat book in her office to locate the lot and the tax rolls to attempt far to verify Bennett's ownership and left to put her sign on the lot she thought Bennett owned and was trying to sell. Through a combination of the confusing legal description, the incomplete description and paucity of information Bennett gave Taylor, and Taylor's admitted negligence, Taylor put her for sale sign on the Fyfes' lot on Fifth Street instead of on Bennett's lot on First Street. Taylor had no listing agreement with the Fyfes, and the Fyfes' property was not for sale. Fern Taylor drew a map for the Workmans providing them with directions to this purportedly newly listed lot on which she had placed her "For Sale" sign. In reliance on Fern Taylor's map and representations as to her listing agreement, the Workmans drove to the Fifth Street lot and viewed the property as well as Fern Taylor's "For Sale" sign. Approximately one week after seeing the Fifth Street lot, the Workmans summoned Andrew Kuchmaner to Bonita Springs to view the lot and give them his opinion as to how the Jim Walter home they had previously selected would sit on the lot. The Workmans had their minds pretty well made up that they wanted to purchase the Fifth Street lot before summoning Kuchmaner. Kuchmaner never took the Workmans to any property but, upon their request, traveled to Bonita Springs to meet them and was thereupon shown the Fifth Street lot. While viewing the Fifth Street lot, Kuchmaner advised the Workmans that the Jim Walter's home they had selected would sit nicely on that lot. He also told the Workmans for the first time that he had a real estate license and would be glad to help them out with placing an offer for the lot on their behalf. The Workmans used Kuchmaner to make their $6,000 offer on the lot to save time because it was late in the afternoon and they lived in North Ft. Myers. When Fern Taylor first met Kuchmaner, he had been represented to her by the Workmans as a Jim Walter salesman. Kuchmaner went to Taylor's office and requested she prepare the contract because he would have to go all the way back to Ft. Myers to write it up. Taylor provided Kuchmaner with the legal description "Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park #2" and advised him he would have to write his own contract. Kuchmaner also proposed to Taylor that they not tell Swagler or Swagler Realty about the sale so they could divide Swagler's quarter of the 10 percent commission ($150 of the total $600 commission). Taylor refused and told Swagler what had happened. Swagler had an angry confrontation with Kuchmaner and was about to fire him, but Kuchmaner begged for a second chance and promised not to try to cut Swagler out of a commission again. Swagler relented and kept Kuchmaner on as a salesman. Kuchmaner filled out a contract on a Swagler Realty form and brought it to Donald Swagler for his review. He advised Swagler that he had gotten the legal description from Fern Taylor and had been to see the property. Swagler generally does not sell property in the Bonita Springs area and is not familiar with the area. He relied on Taylor to provide an accurate legal description of the property being sold. Kuchmaner hand delivered the contract offering to purchase the Bennett parcel to Taylor. Taylor checked the contract before she sent it to Bennett to see that the legal was the same that she had, and it was. She also checked it again when it was sent back from Bennett. Fern Taylor had received and checked the contract, title insurance binder, seller's closing statement and a copy of the warranty deed from Bennett to Workman prior to the closing The Workmans had the property they thought they were purchasing surveyed by William R. Allen, a registered and licensed land surveyor. He received the request to survey the property from Susan Workman. Over the phone, she advised Mr. Allen she had purchased a lot in Rosemary Park, Specifically lot far 20, block E. Mr. Allen informed Mrs. Workman that there are two Block E's in Rosemary Park and that they should be careful. He inquired as to which street she had purchased property on and was told, "We're on Fifth Street." Allen surveyed the Fifth Street lot and certified his survery, using the actual legal description of the Fifth Street (Fyfes') lot. Allen never saw any document with the legal description of the Bennett lot. Fern Taylor did not know that the Workmans had ordered a survey and did not see a copy of the survey until well after the closing. Although she attended the closing, she saw no discrepancies among the documents cursorily reviewed at the closing. Neither did the Workmans or the closing agent. The evidence was not clear whether there was a copy of the survey among the documents at the closing. The lender (Jim Walter Homes) and the title insurance company got a copy of the survey before closing. Neither of their professionals noticed that the legal description on the survey (the Fyfe lot) did not match the legal description on the deed and other documents (the Bennett lot). When a real estate broker has placed his sign ("For Sale") on a parcel of property, it is a reasonable conclusion that he is authorized to sell that parcel. It is customary for a broker to rely on the listing broker to provide a correct legal description for the property they have listed. At no time before the closing did Swagler or Kuchmaner have reason to suspect that the Workmans were purchasing a parcel of property different from the parcel they believed they were purchasing. Neither Swagler nor Kuchmaner were at the closing of the Workmans' purchase. But their presence would not have made any difference. It is not the real estate broker's or salesman's lob to scrutinize the documents being signed to make sure the legal descriptions on all the documents match (unless he has reason to believe the legal descriptions might be wrong.) He has the right to rely on the other professionals--the listing broker (especially since Fern Taylor was familiar with the Bonita Springs area and Swagler was not), the lender's attorney, the title company, the closing agent and, if any, the surveyor and the buyer's attorney. Fern Taylor and perhaps others were culpably negligent. Swagler and Kuchmaner were not. What happened to the Workmans is not their fault.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against respondents, Donald E. Swagler and Swagler Realty Company, in this case. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of February, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3502 These rulings on proposed findings of fact are made in compliance with Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Accepted and incorporated. 5. Rejected as contrary to facts found. (Kuchmaner did not "solicit" or "obtain" them.) 6.-14. Accepted and incorporated. 15. Rejected as contrary to facts found. (Taylor's "investigation" or "attempt" to ascertain the legal description was deficiently and negligently performed.) 16.-17. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as incomplete ("compare the deed" with what?); second sentence, rejected because it was not proved Taylor had access to a copy of the survey before the closing. Rejected as unnecessary and potentially misleading. (A Final Judgment was entered; Taylor paid the portion against her; the other defendants have not paid the portions against them.) Rejected. Swagler Realty Company was a defendant in the case; Donald E. Swagler was not. 21.-24. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proved whether they "failed," "refused" or "neglected." (The fact is that neither has paid the Workmans any money in satisfaction of the portion of the Final Judgment against Swagler Realty Company.) Accepted but unnecessary. B. Respondents' Proposed Findings Of Fact. 1. Accepted but unnecessary. 2.-10. Accepted and incorporated. 11. Accepted but unnecessary. 12.-23. Accepted and incorporated. 24.-28. Accepted and incorporated. 29. Accepted but unnecessary. 30.-36. Accepted but cumulative. 37.-42. Accepted and incorporated, along with additional findings. 43. Accepted but unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Fl 32802 J. Michael Hussey, Esquire 3443 Hancock Bridge Parkway Suite 501 North Ft. Myers, Fl 33903 Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl 32301 Wings S. Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Fl 32802
The Issue Whether Respondent abandoned a construction job, and whether Respondent failed to include a statement of consumer's rights in a contract; if so, whether (and what) discipline should be imposed against Respondent's general contractor's license.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent was a Florida-licensed general contractor, holding license number CGC 1509917. At all times material to the instant case, IGK held a certificate of authority authorizing it to engage in contracting in Florida through a qualifying agent. Respondent was the licensed primary qualifying agent for IGK. On or about December 20, 2007, Respondent entered into a contract to renovate Kevin Barrington's residence, located at 1315 Lenox Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. The written contract did not contain a statement explaining a consumer's rights under the Florida Homeowners Construction Recovery Fund, as then required by section 489.1425. At hearing, Respondent produced a copy of a statement that explained a consumer's rights under the Florida Homeowners Construction Recovery Fund, and testified that he had attached this statement to the written contract. The statement produced by Respondent at hearing was dated December 24, 2011, four days after the contract was executed, and signed only by Respondent. Barrington testified that he never received the statement. The undersigned finds Barrington's testimony credible, and finds that the statement was not contained in the written contract as required by statute. Respondent has never been disciplined for a violation of section 489.1425. The initial contract price for the residential renovation totaled approximately $114,320.00. Several change orders increased the final contract price to approximately $148,603.25. On December 20, 2007, Barrington paid Respondent an initial payment of $46,968.00. Respondent began work on the renovation project in January, 2008. Barrington rented an apartment while the home was under construction. Between December, 2007, and June, 2008, Barrington made several payments to Respondent. By June, 2008, Respondent had received approximately $155,505.81, which was more than the original contract price, and more than the amount agreed to with the additional change orders. By August, 2008, Respondent was struggling financially. IGK experienced a significant decline in business and was forced to lay off employees. On August 23, 2008, Barrington sent Respondent an e-mail, stating, in part: I wanted to summarize our meeting yesterday. I appreciated your honesty, and I believe we came to a resolution that satisfies both our objectives; remodel 1315 Lenox Avenue with high quality standards in a timely manner. Due to unforeseen market conditions, we are not able to continue work within the confines of the existing contract dated 12/20/2007 between IGK and Kenneth Barrington. Therefore, we agreed to the following course of action. . . . If the stated objectives are completed on August 29th to Kenneth Barrington's satisfaction, we decided to terminate the existing contract and have my legal team draft a new contract between IGK and Ken Barrington that outlines the remaining scope of services and payment plan. The payment plan will be arranged as a loan between IGK and Ken Barrington where Ken Barrington will act as Lender and IGK as Borrower, IGK will be responsible to perform the duties outlined in the scope of services and payback monies at a specified date. Loan payments distributed to IGK are intended solely for the purpose of paying for the labor and materials used at 1315 Lenox Ave. On September 17, 2008, Respondent emailed Barrington, stating, in pertinent part: As discussed many times, I am trying to do the right thing and complete your project. However as stated before we are not in complete projects (sic) that were underbid last year. You are well aware that we came in below everyone else. At the time business was good and we could afford to work on a very low mark up. I tried...however and unfortunately the business environment has change (sic) and we can not (sic) do it any longer!!! . . . As it stands, for us to complete the project as mentioned above, we will have to receive a payment in the amount of $20,000.00. You may of course decide to hire to have some one (sic) else finish the project, by (sic) I believe your cost will be in excess of $40-$50k. By September, 2008, approximately 60 percent of the renovation project had been completed. On September 23, 2008, Respondent emailed Barrington stating, in part: Good morning Ken, We are still awaiting your decision in regards to which way your [sic] ant [sic] to go with your project. I do understand and per your advise [sic], that you are trying to hire other contractors to finish your project. However, if you decide to take/hire another contractor, you must apply for a change of contractors [sic]to, either [sic] another contractor or to yourself as a owner/contractor. No one, including yourself can do work, under our permits and/or call for inspections!!! Please refrain from trying to hire my employees to do unlicensed side jobs, they will not, and if they do they lose their jobs and/or be liable for prosecution by the state/county for working without a license and permit. Respondent, having indicated to Barrington that he needed more money to complete the project, and expressing a willingness to complete the renovation project, was clearly awaiting Barrington's decision as to the renegotiation of the contract. Barrington began to interview other contractors in October, 2008. On October 10, 2008, Barrington sent Respondent Change of Contractor forms to sign and have notarized. On October 14, 2008, Respondent signed the forms and had them notarized. Also on October 14, 2008, Barrington sent Respondent a letter, stating, in pertinent part: I, Ken Barrington, property owner of 1315 Lenox Ave [sic], Miami Beach, FL 33139, am notifying you that your services are hereby terminated from our project/permit #s: B08014536, B0801910, B0804552, BE080944, BE082572, BMS0801808. You are being terminated because: You have acknowledged that you are no longer capable of completing the project according to our agreed upon contract. You are no longer authorized to enter my property. On or about November 11, 2008, Barrington entered into a contract with a new contractor, Strategic Engineering, to complete the renovation project. The renovation project was complete by July, 2009, when Barrington was able to move into his home. Respondent and Barrington began to communicate again around this same time. Respondent informed Barrington that Respondent could return to work on the home, but that IGK was filing for bankruptcy. Respondent suggested that a Mutual Release be executed. On September 23, 2009, Barrington and IGK entered into a Mutual Release, intended to effect the elimination of any obligations by either party. Respondent never expressed any intention to abandon the project; rather, Barrington terminated Respondent shortly after Respondent expressed a willingness to complete the project despite his financial difficulties. During the time when Respondent was awaiting Barrington's decision as to the offer to renegotiate the contract price, Barrington elected to terminate Respondent, and did so. Barrington also forbade Respondent from entering the property. Thus, Respondent's separation from the project was caused by Barrington's actions, not by his own volition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a Final Order: (1) dismissing Counts Two and Three of the Administrative Complaint; (2) finding Respondent guilty of violating section 489.129(1)(i), by failing to comply with section 489.1425, Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; (3) fining him $250.00 for having committed this violation; and (4) ordering him to reimburse the Department for investigative and prosecutorial costs related to this violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA ENCISO VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2011.
Findings Of Fact In 1976, while working as a licensed pharmacist in the State of Florida and as the owner of two pharmacies in Miami, Florida, Petitioner engaged in a course of conduct which resulted in his selling approximately 300,000 pills of highly addictive controlled substances to a drug dealer. Petitioner attempted to cover-up his criminal activity through his record keeping. On February 24, 1977, Petitioner's license to practice pharmacy in the State of Florida was revoked by Respondent. The basis for the revocation was Petitioner's failure to properly maintain records for the dispensing of Schedule II and Schedule III controlled substances. The hearing officer described in his recommended order Petitioner's conduct as being "... a gross violation of the provisions of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes ..." The Final Order entered by Respondent on February 24, 1977, adopted the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, and the recommendations of the hearing officer as its Final Order and revoked the license of Petitioner. On May 10, 1977, Petitioner was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida of having violated the, provisions of Title 21 U.S.C., Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 843(a)(4), by having conspired to possess with intent to distribute various Schedule II controlled substances; by having distributed various Schedule II controlled substances; and by having furnished false and omitted information on required records. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years with a three year special parole term upon his release from prison. On February 11, 1982, Petitioner received an early parole of his seven year sentence. On May 17, 1984, Petitioner began his term of special parole. On June 18, 1986, Petitioner received an early termination of his special parole period, which completed his sentence. In 1981, Petitioner's license to practice pharmacy in the State of New York was revoked by the New York Commissioner of Education based on his conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In 1984, Petitioner applied for restoration of his right to practice pharmacy in the State of New York. On April 24, 1986, the New York Commissioner of Education modified the prior order of revocation so as to allow Petitioner to commence practicing pharmacy in New York subject to certain terms and conditions. Petitioner has met all of the requirements set forth in the order of the New York Commissioner of Education and is free to practice pharmacy in the State of New York without restriction. Since the restoration of his license in New York, Petitioner has been actively engaged as a pharmacist and has served as a supervising pharmacist for approximately the last two years. Through December 15, 1989, Petitioner has completed thirty (30) hours of continuing education. Petitioner also applied for the reinstatement of his license to practice pharmacy in the State of Florida in 1981, 1987, and 1989. The 1981 request to appear before Respondent in support of his application for reinstatement was denied with the following entry in the minutes of Respondent's 1981 meeting under the entry "Requests to Appear Before the Board to Petition for Reinstatement of Licenses": 3. Monroe Schiffman - Denied. The Board further instructed that due to the nature of the violations indicated at the time his license was revoked, that if at any time in the future a petition was to be considered by the Board the office must provide the Board Members with copies of the entire file for their review and consideration. Petitioner was notified by letter that his 1987 application for reinstatement was denied by a letter dated July 27, 1987, to Petitioner's attorney. This letter provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Your client's Petition for Reinstatement was presented to the Board at the June board meeting for review. Based upon the investigative file and Administrative Complaint filed in the above-referenced case, it was the decision of the Board to deny this request. Attached to the request for the assignment of a hearing officer filed by Respondent with the Division of Administrative Hearings in this matter, is a letter which is not among the documents attached to the Stipulation and Agreement filed by the parties. This letter provides, in pertinent part, as follows: At the February 1989 meeting of the Board, the Board Members had an opportunity to review your application to participate in the June 1989 licensure examination. Because of the disciplinary action taken against your license in the past, the Board has denied your request to sit for Florida's examination to become relicensed in this State. The Board of Pharmacy intended in 1977 when it revoked Petitioner's license that reinstatement of his license would never be available to him. No conditions were imposed as to reinstatement of Petitioner in the order of revocation entered by Respondent in 1977 because the Board of Pharmacy did not intend for Petitioner to ever be eligible for reinstatement. Respondent has adopted no rules which establish criteria for the reinstatement of previously revoked licenses to practice pharmacy in the State of Florida. Petitioner relies primarily on his own affidavit, prepared after his application was considered by Respondent, in support of his application for reinstatement. The other documents upon which Petitioner relies were prepared for and relate to the reinstatement proceedings brought in the State of New York, or were prepared for and relate to the 1987 reinstatement proceedings brought in Florida. This evidence fails to establish Petitioner's rehabilitation or his ability to safely practice pharmacy in the State of Florida. There is no contention by Petitioner that Respondent failed to review all information pertinent to this application and available to it before its determination to deny the application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Pharmacy, enter a final order which denies the application for reinstatement of his licensure as a pharmacist in the State of Florida submitted by Petitioner, Monroe C. Schiffman. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-2130 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. These proposed findings of fact are incorporated as part of the preliminary statement. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraph 2 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 3 and 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 5-10 are adopted in material part by paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted in part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the second sentence of paragraph 11 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 12 are adopted in part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the second sentence of paragraph 12 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are adopted in material part by paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 14 and 15 are rejected as being contrary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The contentions of the parties are discussed in the conclusions of law portion of the recommended order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 2 are discussed in the conclusions of law portion of the recommended order but are rejected as findings of fact. The proposed findings of fact in the second sentence of paragraph 2 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4 and 5 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Rubinstein, Esquire Young, Stern & Tannenbaum, P.A. 17071 West Dixie Highway North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 John J. Rimes, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rod Presnell, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a Florida-licensed yacht salesman, should be disciplined for violation of Rule 61B- 60.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, DBPR, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (the Division) was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and discipline of yacht salespersons and brokers in this state and the regulation of the yacht-brokering profession. Respondent, Justo Lamar (Lamar), has been licensed as a yacht salesperson since November 1976. Prior to this action, Lamar has never been the subject of disciplinary action arising out of the practice of his profession. This action was precipitated by a yacht owner, Juan A. Galan (Galan), who unsuccessfully attempted to sell his yacht to a client of Lamar's. In July 1998, Galan listed his yacht, the Caliente, for sale through Ardell Yacht and Ship Brokers (Ardell). The listing resulted in negotiations for the purchase of the Caliente by one Larry Griggs (Griggs), a prospective customer represented by Lamar. At all times relevant to this case, Lamar was acting as a sales agent for Allied Marine and its broker, Dwight Tracy (Tracy). As set forth in more detail below, the negotiations between Galan and Griggs took place over a three-month period from October 1998 through December 1998 with no meeting of the minds. On July 12, 1999, some seven months after negotiations between Griggs and Galan terminated, Galan lodged a complaint with DBPR. Although the complaint was ostensibly directed against salesman Lamar and broker Tracy, each and every allegation in the complaint was directed to the broker's conduct, not Lamar's. Galan, who did not testify at final hearing, alleged in his complaint that "Broker presented a contract representing that deposit had been received/deposited (upon acceptance). In fact, broker never deposited check and we wasted our time and money on survey/sea trial as buyer was not (at that time or any time later) financially capable of buying boat @ $1.75 million." Galan provided some, but by no means all, of the documents which revealed the details of the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations between Galan and Griggs. In the narrative portion of his complaint, Galan asserted that he lost money on sea trials and implied, without actually stating, that the Caliente had been taken off the market during the pendency of negotiations with Griggs. For reasons which remain unclear, the Division did not focus its investigation on Tracy, who was the obvious target of Galan's complaint. Instead, it targeted Lamar, who was an obvious add-on target of Galan's ire. The exhibits reveal a complex series of offers and counteroffers and jockeying for negotiating advantage, not just between Galan and Griggs as prospective Seller and Buyer of the Caliente, but also between Lamar and the two brokers, all three of whom stood to profit if the transaction were consummated. Negotiations for the Caliente began in late October 1998. On October 30, 1998, Lamar's client Griggs, through a corporation he controlled, issued a $150,000 check for "Deposit, 72' (sic) Caliente Sportfisherman." This check accompanied a Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998, offering to purchase the Caliente for $1,500,000. That same day, Galan's representatives faxed Lamar to advise that Griggs' offer was insufficient. Lamar forthwith provided the check to his broker, Tracy. Negotiations between Galan and Griggs continued in November. Galan chose to by-pass his own Broker and negotiate directly with Lamar over lunch on November 18, 1998. Lamar wrote Galan's demands on the back of a restaurant placemat. The primary sticking point was Galan's insistence on a "bottom line" of $1,665,000 to him, after all commissions and other expenses, if any, were paid. Griggs nevertheless persevered in his effort to buy the Caliente for $1,500,000. On November 24, 2000, Griggs executed another Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement in which he offered an entity called Majua, Inc., of which Galan was President, the opportunity to sell the Caliente to Griggs for $1,500,000. Galan signed the November 24 agreement, but added an addendum which materially changed the terms. The addendum unilaterally purported to raise the sales prices to Galan's previously stated "bottom line" of $1,665,000. Thanksgiving passed, and negotiations wore on. On December 4, 1998, Griggs executed a third Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement, raising his offer to $1,755,000. The new offer expressly stipulated that Griggs' $150,000 earnest money check could be deposited when and if all parties executed this new proposed agreement. Like the October 29 and November 24 brokerage purchase and sale agreements, the December 4 document never ripened into a contract. The December 4 document was a clear and unembarrassed reminder from Griggs that an earnest money check had been written by Griggs, but was not on deposit, and was not going to be on deposit until such time as Galan had signed off on the contract as written by Griggs. Galan nevertheless permitted a sea trial of the Caliente in furtherance of negotiations, now in their fifth week. Also as part of the negotiating process, Galan permitted some, but not all, of the inspections requested by Griggs. Expenses for the sea trial and inspections were borne entirely by Griggs. By Christmas Eve, relations between the parties had deteriorated to the point where Lamar retrieved the check from the Allied Marine corporate files and returned it to Griggs. At no time did negotiations with Lamar's client Griggs preclude or interfere with efforts by Galan to negotiate with and sell the Caliente to any other prospective purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DBPR enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified general contractor holding license number CG C008351. Respondent obtained Osceola County Building Permits and agreed to help property owners construct improvements or additions to four motels located in Osceola County, Florida. (Testimony of Record, Popesco, Matay, Solms, respondent.) Specifically, on January 29, 1980, respondent pulled Osceola County Building Permit ("building permit") No. 364-80B to construct the Record Motel, an 11-unit motel owned by Frank B. Record. On March 17, 1981, respondent pulled building permit No. 694-81B to construct a five-unit addition to the Record Motel; on January 30, 1980, he pulled building permit No. 2613-80B to add eight units to the Lakeview Motel owned by Michael Popesco; on February 2, 1980, he pulled building permit No. 2996-81B to construct a 20-unit motel known as The Key Motel, owned by Reinhold Matay; on April 8, 1981, he pulled building permit No. 3087-81B to construct a second floor addition to The Key Motel; and on March 2, 1981, he pulled building permit No. 3038-81B to construct a 20-unit motel known as the Siesta Motel, owned by Herbert Solms. (Stipulation dated June 30, 1982.) II. Respondent had a similar working arrangement with each motel owner, none of whom were licensed contractors. As the general contractor, he pulled the necessary building permits. He would perform the carpentry work on each project. The owners actively supervised and participated in their building projects. After consulting with respondent, they solicited, selected, and awarded bids to electrical, masonry plumbing, paving, and drywall subcontractors. They paid subcontractors directly and supervised their work daily. Respondent, however, would inspect the job sites intermittently, usually on weekends, sometimes during the week. But he did not directly and actively supervise the subcontractors; some were even unaware that he was the general contractor for the job. (Testimony of Record, Popesco, Matay, Solms; P-3, P- 10.) No evidence was presented to establish that the owners, for compensation, constructed these improvements for others or for resale to others. All the buildings were constructed in a satisfactory manner. The buildings passed all inspections, and the owners are entirely satisfied. (Testimony of Record, Popesco, Matay, Solms, respondent.) The owners of the various motels did not act as "contractors" within the meaning of Section 489.105(3), Florida Statutes (1981).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against respondent be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1982.
The Issue Whether Rocco R. Sodomire (Respondent) violated Section 489.129(1)(c) and (r) and Section 455.227(l)(o), Florida Statutes, and if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice contracting.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a Certified Residential Contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CR CO57213. At all times material hereto, Respondent was not licensed to do any swimming pool/spa contracting in the State of Florida. On or about November 1996, Respondent submitted a proposal to Vincent Neglio for the construction of a 28' x 14' in-ground swimming pool, a deck, and a screen enclosure at a cost of $15,000.00. Shortly thereafter, pursuant to the proposal, Respondent began construction of a swimming pool and deck at Mr. Neglio's residence. Prior to completion of the pool project, Mr. Neglio paid Respondent a total of $14,200.00. Although Respondent received $14,200.00 from Vincent Neglio, he never completed the pool project. Respondent presented the proposal for the pool project to Mr. Neglio; accepted money from Mr. Neglio as payment for work on the project; distributed funds to other contractors who worked on the pool project; and performed work on the pool project at Mr. Neglio's home. On August 4, 1997, the County Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida, Small Claims Division (Case Nos. 97-2569SP-RRS and 97-2570-SP-RRS), entered a Record of Agreement between Respondent and Mr. Neglio whereby Respondent was to pay Mr. Neglio a total of $2,600.00 to settle the dispute involving the aforementioned pool project. On January 13, 1998, the County Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida, Small Claims Division, in the above-referenced cases entered a Final Judgment by Default against Respondent in favor of Vincent Neglio in the amount of $2,600.00, the payment amount required in the Agreement, as a result of Respondent's failing to pay monies based on the Agreement referenced in paragraph 6. To date, Respondent has failed to make any payments to Vincent Neglio based on the Small Claims Court Record of Agreement, referenced in paragraph 6 or the Final Judgment by Default referenced in paragraph 7.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order that: (1) finds Respondent committed the offenses alleged in Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint and imposes a $500.00 fine for these violations; (2) requires Respondent to pay restitution to Vincent Neglio in the amount of $2,600.00; and (3) requires Respondent to pay to Petitioner $858.97, the costs incurred by Petitioner in the investigation and prosecution of this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul F. Kirsch, Esquire Leonardo N. Ortiz, Qualified Representative Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rocco R. Sodomire 3520 Southeast 2nd Avenue Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Fred J. Will was a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0142418, t/a Will Realty, 326 1/2 South Beach Street, Daytona Beach, Florida 32014. At all times material to this proceeding, Richard P. Pollock was a licensed real estate salesman in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0139861, c/o Fred J. Will, t/a Will Realty, 326 1/2 South Beach Street, Daytona Beach, Florida, with a last listed home address of Post Office Box 2085, Flagler Beach, Florida 32036. Either in late December 1987 or early January 1988, Pollock approached Will with the idea of opening a real estate office using Will's real estate broker's license wherein Pollock would run the office since Will was currently employed managing the self storage facility of Regency Health Care Centers, Inc. In late January 1988, Will filed a Request For License or Change of Status Form using license number 0142418 wherein he advised the Petitioner that he would be operating under Will Realty located at 326 1/2 South Beach Street, Daytona Beach, Florida. Upon opening the offices at 326 1/2 South Beach Street, Will opened an operating or business bank account and an escrow bank account for the Will Realty at the Commercial National Bank (Commercial) Only Will was authorized to write checks on the excrow account. There was insufficient evidence to show whether any funds were ever deposited in the business or escrow account at Commercial. Once the office and bank accounts were opened, Will left the daily operation of the office to Pollock and was at the office only a couple of times between the time it was opened in late January 1988 and when it was closed around April 23, 1988. The "agreement", as such, between Will and Pollock was a 50/50 "split" once the business "got going". Will did not receive any compensation from Pollock for the "use of his license". Will did not receive any money from Pollock in regard to Will Realty, personally or for deposit in either bank account at Commercial. The "agreement" was that Will would allow Pollock to "work under" his real estate broker's license. Will did not have any knowledge of the advertising being used by Pollock for Will Realty such as newspaper ads or business cards until just before the office closed in April 1988. Will did not have any knowledge of the forms being used by Pollock for Will Realty such as contracts or agreements for advance fee arrangements or receipts evidencing payment of such fee until just before the office closed in April 1988. Additionally, Will did not have any knowledge of the advance fee arrangement which Pollock may have had with prospective tenants as payment for securing rentals until just before the office closed in April 1988. Will did not have any knowledge of Pollock opening the bank accounts at Coast Federal Savings and Loan Association (Coast) in the name of Will Realty until just before the office closed in April 1988. None of the funds received by Pollock from prospective tenants while with Will Realty were deposited in the accounts at Commercial. Nor did any of the funds collected by Pollock from prospective tenants while he was with Will Realty go to Will personally. During the latter part of March 1988, Donna Elliott approached Pollock through Will Realty for the purpose of finding a home to rent. Pollock arranged for Edward R. Brown to show Elliott a home he had for rent. Elliott eventually rented this home and gave Pollock a check in the amount of $100.00 dated March 26, 1988 as a deposit on the home. On March 31, 1988 Elliott mailed Pollock another check in the amount of $1,000.00 as rent for the Brown home. The funds from these two checks were deposited in the account at Coast. Brown experienced some difficulty in getting Pollock to pay the deposit and rent collected from Elliott. However, once Will became aware of the situation he demanded that Pollock pay over the deposit and rent and, as a result of Will's effort Brown received $575.00 from Pollock. After paying Brown the $575.00 Pollock disappeared and Brown demanded the balance from Will since Pollock was working under Will's real estate broker's license. At first, Will agreed but later on advice of counsel declined to pay on the basis that it was not his responsibility. Brown filed suit and was awarded a judgment for the balance which Will paid. Around the middle of April 1988 Diane Smith approached Pollock for the purposes of renting a home. Smith paid Pollock an advance fee of $75.00 for service to be rendered by Pollock in securing her a rental home. However, before Pollock found a rental home for Smith he disappeared without returning Smith's fee. Within a short period after Smith paid the advance fee she went to the office of Will Realty only to find it closed and Pollock gone. There was no evidence that Smith made a demand on Will for the return of the advance fee paid to Pollock. After Will became aware of the situation he called Petitioner's Orlando office and was informed by Judy Smith that he should close the office immediately. Will followed this advice and closed the office sometime around April 23, 1988. As soon as Will began to receive complaints from Pollock's clients he got involved with Pollock and attempted to correct the problems but Pollock disappeared before Will could correct the situation. There was insufficient evidence to show that while Pollock was at Will Realty, any of his prospective tenants, other than Smith, specifically Catherine Vick, failed to receive reimbursement for any advance fee paid to Pollock where rentals were not obtained for the prospective tenant. Will was not directly involved with any of the transactions between Pollock and the prospective tenants and did not have any knowledge of these transactions until shortly before Pollock disappeared and Will Realty was closed.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the mitigating circumstances surrounding this case, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Fred J. Will guilty of violating Section 475.25(1) (d) and (e), Florida Statutes, and for such violation impose an administrative fine of $500.00 and issue a reprimand. In recommending the reprimand I have taken into consideration the harshness of a suspension or revocation and feel that under the circumstances of this case that a reprimand and a fine is more appropriate. See: Webb v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 351 So.2d 71 (2 DCA Fla. 1977). It is further RECOMMENDED that Counts VI, IX and XIV of the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearing this 22nd day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert W. Elton, Esquire 648 S. Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32014 Fred J. Will 2281 Carmen Daytona Beach, Florida 32119
Findings Of Fact Florida Development and Sales Corporation (FDS) at all times here involved was a registered real estate corporate broker. Lawrence F. Taylor, at all times here involved, was a registered real estate broker and an Active Firm Member for FDS and Universal Realmark, Inc. Michael W. Levine, at all times here involved, was a registered real estate salesman for Universal Realmark, Inc., corporate broker. Florida Development and Sales was a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Realmark, Inc. The two corporations occupied the same offices, had the same corporate officers, and used the same telephone numbers. Correspondence went out from either corporation on FDS stationery, and all employees of both corporations were paid by check drawn on FDS account. FDS entered into a non-exclusive brokerage agreement on August 2, 1971 (Exhibit 5) with Lake Lucie Estates, Inc., the owner of unimproved land it desired to sell in 1 1/4 acre tracts. Pursuant to said agreement the broker advertised and sold, generally by agreement or contract for deed and generally to out-of-state buyers, these 1 1/4 acre tracts. In 1973 Universal Realmark, Inc. acquired all of the stock of FDS and accepted the obligations of FDS under supplemental agreement dated May 23, 1973 (Exhibit 6). The brokerage agreement above referred to was undisturbed. By order dated May 6, 1974 the Commissioner of Securities, State of Missouri ordered St. Lucie Estates, Inc., and FDS, their representatives, inter alia, to cease and desist the offer and/or sale in Missouri of any agreement for deed securities. Chapter 409, Laws of Missouri, contain the Missouri Uniform Securities Act. Therein security, in 409.401(1), is defined to mean any contract or bond for the sale of any interest in real estate on deferred payments or on installment plans when such real estate is not situated in this state Section 409.201 makes it unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale securities in Missouri without being registered to do so and Section 409.301 makes it unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in Missouri unless: (1) The security is registered, or (2) The security or transaction is exempted under Section 409.402. Pursuant to these and other provisions of the securities law the cease and desist order was issued and served by certified mail on Lake Lucie Estates, Inc. and FDS. Section 409.410 of the Missouri Statutes provides that any person who has been personally served with a cease and desist order and thereafter willfully violates same shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three year, or both. The Act further provides for personal service upon an out-of-state violator of the act by serving the commissioner who sends notice of the service to the out-of-state violator. Here the Respondents acknowledged receipt of the cease and desist order. Subsequent to the receipt of the Missouri cease and desist order Levine negotiated agreement for deeds with three purchasers in Missouri of Lake Lucie Estates, Inc. property. On one of these the purchaser's check was made payable to Lake Lucie Estates, Inc. and the checks for the other two were made payable to FDS. During his interrogation by the investigator, Levine acknowledged that he was aware of the cease and desist order at the time he negotiated the three agreements for deed. He obtained his list of people to call from the office, i.e. FDS/Universal Realmark. At the hearing Levine did not remember whether or not he was aware of the cease and desist order at the time he negotiated the Missouri contracts. He did remember receiving a commission on each sale by check drawn by FDS although he was registered as a salesman under Universal Realmark, Inc. As noted above Lake Lucie Estates had a brokerage agreement with FDS and no such agreement was ever negotiated with Universal Realmark. Lake Lucie Estates would have no objection to Universal Realmark selling its property. Respondent Taylor was the Active Firm Member of FDS and Universal Realmark. He was serving in that capacity with Universal Realmark when FDS was acquired. At the same time he operated his own real estate broker's office on Miami Beach, spending part of his time supervising the activities of each office. Taylor's initial statements to the investigator that he learned of the Missouri cease and desist order in June 1974 upon his return to the office from a stay in the hospital was repudiated at the hearing when he stated he learned of the Missouri order only a few hours before he talked to the investigator in October, 1974. Taylor also testified that he never authorized Levine to sell under his brokerage even though Taylor was the Active Firm Member of Universal Realmark and Levine was registered under the corporate broker, Universal Realmark. Taylor's main concern appeared to be to insure that the salesmen for these out-of-state land sales adhered to the script that had been prepared for them and from time to time he monitored their conversations. When he realized that the alleged violations of the real estate license law were being investigated he resigned from FDS and Universal Realmark because "they were violating my trust". When the requests for renewal of the FDS corporate broker's registration was submitted in September, 1974, Taylor signed same a Vice President of FDS and the Active Broker of the corporation.
