The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated various election laws and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician. For many years, he practiced as a heart surgeon in Springfield, Illinois. After developing a hand tremor resulting from a medical condition, Respondent relocated to Naples, where he had vacationed for several years. In early 1996, after moving to Naples, Respondent opened a walk-in clinic in Naples. At all material times, Respondent has worked at the clinic about 60 hours weekly. Respondent has never assumed responsibility for financial matters or record-keeping at his home or in his office. At home, these responsibilities are borne by his wife of 28 years. At the office, these responsibilities are assumed by his office manager. Prior to fall 1996, Respondent had never had any significant experience in politics. However, dissatisfied with aspects of the training and qualifications of certain personnel who responded to emergency medical calls, Respondent decided to run in the fall 1996 election for Seat 3 of the North Naples Fire and Rescue Commission. On July 1, 1996, Respondent obtained a "candidate packet" from the Filing Officer of the Office of the Collier County Supervisor of Elections. The packet contained considerable information, including treasurer's report forms; a list of key dates, including filing deadlines; a Division of Elections Candidate Handbook; copies of Chapters 99, 105, and 106, Florida Statutes; itemized contribution forms; and itemized expenditure forms. Without studying any of the information, Respondent signed and filed a Statement of Candidate on the same day that he picked up the candidate packet. The signed Statement of Candidate acknowledges that Respondent received, read, and understood the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. On the same day, Respondent signed a form appointing himself as his campaign treasurer and designating The Huntington Bank as his campaign depository. The campaign bank account, which was a checking account, was titled, "Dr. Robert C. McGann Campaign Account for North Naples Fire District" and bore account number 02628208279. The only authorized signatories on the account were Respondent and his wife. The same bank also handled the checking account for Respondent's medical practice. On July 18, 1996, Respondent signed and filed a form titled, "Acknowledgment by Candidate." In this form, Respondent acknowledged that he had reviewed and understood various items, which he initialed. These initialed items included two items concerning the deadlines for filing campaign treasurer reports. On the same day, the Filing Officer provided Respondent with a two-sided document titled, "State of Florida 1996 Calendar and Election Dates." This document summarizes the deadlines for filing election reports and provides report-filing deadlines. For the First Primary, the filing deadlines are: August 2 for the period from July 1 through July 26; August 16 for the period from July 27 through August 9; and August 30 for the period from August 10 through August 29. For the Second Primary, the filing deadlines are: September 13 for the period from August 30 through September 6 and September 27 for the period from September 7 through September 26. The State of Florida 1996 Calendar and Election Dates requires that each candidate whose candidacy terminates as of the Second Primary must file his or her final report by December 30, 1996. Respondent filed six campaign treasurer reports. He signed each of the reports and filed each of the reports on time. The first allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent failed to timely deposit timely campaign contributions. Petitioner proved that Respondent failed to timely deposit campaign contributions on several occasions. However, Petitioner failed to prove that any of these failures was willful. The modest amounts do not invite a finding of willfulness, nor do the identities of the contributors, none of whom appears to be someone whom Respondent would wish to hide from public scrutiny. The preponderance of the evidence suggests only that Respondent's failures to timely deposit campaign contributions were due to his carelessness, and nothing in the record suggests that this carelessness was studied, purposeful, or otherwise calculated to avoid the requirements of the law. The second allegation is that Respondent failed to include his political party affiliation in a political advertisement. Petitioner proved that Respondent published at least two political advertisements that failed to disclose his political party affiliation. However, Petitioner failed to prove that these nondisclosures were willful. The nondisclosures occurred during the Republican primary elections. Failing to alert potential voters of Respondent's political affiliation could only hurt Respondent, as potential voters who found his campaign literature appealing might not be able to find the particular race in which Respondent was involved. In a larger sense, concealing his Republican affiliation hurt Respondent because he was running in a largely Republican area. The third allegation is that Respondent failed to use, in his political advertisements, the word "for" between his name and the office for which he was running. The stated purpose of this requirement is to alert potential voters that a candidate is not an incumbent. Petitioner proved that Respondent published at least two political advertisements that failed to include the word "for" between his name and the office for which he was running. However, Petitioner failed to prove that the failures were willful. The first advertisement ran during the First Primary, which included Respondent, the incumbent, and another challenger. The advertisement showed the incumbent's name followed by: "Incumbent- committed to the status quo." The advertisement showed the other challenger's name followed by: "Union Candidate." The advertisement showed Respondent's name followed by: "Candidate for Change." The whole thrust of Respondent's campaign in the First Primary was to change the policies of the North Naples Fire and Rescue Commission. Emphasizing his outsider status through the use of "for" would have served this purpose. The omission is thus due to neglect, not willfullness. The second advertisement evidently ran during the Second Primary because it mentions only the challenger, who eventually won this primary. The advertisement again emphasizes the outsider status of Respondent as an agent for change. Given this campaign theme, it is impossible to infer willfulness, rather than carelessness, in the failure of this advertisement to include "for" between Respondent's name and the position that he was seeking. The fourth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent made expenditures from campaign funds other than by a check drawn on his campaign depository. Petitioner proved that Respondent made the following expenditures with funds not drawn from his campaign depository: $23 and $110 to Home Depot, $29 to Sam's Club, $6.15 to Mary Morgan, $25 to Office Depot, $30.60 to Office Depot, and $28 to Kinko's. Respondent reported each of these expenditures, but the campaign checking account does not reveal payments of these sums. However, Petitioner failed to prove that these acts were willful. With the exception of $6.15 given to Mary Morgan, the recipients of these sums are commercial establishments that provide goods and services of obvious usefulness to a political campaign. Mary Morgan is the Supervisor of Elections, whose office received $6.15, apparently in payment of some filing fee. Also, these relatively modest sums qualify as petty cash expenditures. The fifth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent signed a check drawn on the campaign depository without sufficient funds on deposit in the campaign depository to pay the full amount of the check, to honor all outstanding checks, and to pay all previously authorized but unpaid expenses. Petitioner proved that Respondent's wife, who was an authorized signatory on the campaign checking account, signed a $507.15 check to Sir Speedy. The check is dated August 1, although the evidence does not establish that Sir Speedy received the check on that date. However, the evidence does establish that Sir Speedy presented the check for payment on August 6, at which time the bank honored the check and paid Sir Speedy $507.15. The bank statement for the campaign checking account reveals that the bank credited the account with a $500 deposit on August 2, leaving a balance of $2.30. The next activity was August 6, when the bank debited the account for the Sir Speedy check in the amount of $507.15, leaving a negative balance of $4.85, which increased the next day to a negative balance of $7.35 after the application of monthly checking fees. Although Respondent is responsible for the acts of his wife, as his agent in making this expenditure, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent or his wife willfully delivered a campaign check without sufficient funds. If this had been their intent, their effort was stymied by the bank's honoring the check. In fact, they had no such intent. Although they probably did not know that this check would cause a negative balance of a few dollars, it is more likely that they delivered the check knowing that the bank would honor the check because the account had sufficient funds or, if it did not, it was short only a few dollars and the bank, consistent with its policy on their accounts, would nonetheless honor the check. Additional evidence that this was bank policy is the absence of any overdraft fee on the August or September bank statement. The sixth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent failed to report a contribution required by law to be reported. Petitioner proved that Respondent received numerous contributions that he failed to report, including $500 from himself on August 2, $1000 from himself on August 19, $100 from Barry or Diane Flagg on August 16, $50 from Gordon Radcliff in late September, $50 from Thomas Jewell on September 26, $50 from David Grieder on September 26, and $100 from Peter or Carol Boyd on September 26. The evidence in support of the allegation that Respondent failed to report a contribution consists of seven contributions over a seven-week period. These omissions totaled $1850 out of a total reported contributions of $9414.75 (including $4500 in loans from Respondent); in other words, Respondent failed to report nearly 20 percent of the contributions. Bank records for the campaign checking account record only $6820 in deposits. Reporting contributions is arguably the most basic requirement of the applicable law. Respondent's reports reveal a knowledge of the requirement to report contributions. Respondent even testified that he understood that he was required to report contributions, as well as expenditures. Although he reported numerous contributions, he failed to report a considerable amount of contributions under circumstances that reveal that this failure to report was willful. The seventh and eighth allegations are, respectively, that, "on six occasions" each, Respondent certified to the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete and falsely reported or failed to report information required by law. Petitioner has proved numerous inaccuracies and omissions in the campaign reports filed by Respondent. To the extent that the seventh and eighth allegations cover the sixth allegation, Petitioner has proved a willful violation, but the same acts and omissions cannot provide grounds for double discipline under two different statutes. To the extent the seventh and eighth allegations cover other acts and omissions, besides the mere failure to report contributions, Petitioner has failed to prove willfullness. To the contrary, the many inaccuracies and omissions (apart from the violations covered by the sixth allegation) again appear to be the product of Respondent's carelessness, rather than a studied attempt to avoid complying with the reporting requirements imposed by law. Petitioner infers willfullness from Respondent's failure to respond to six certified letters from the County filing officer alerting him to the deficiencies in his previously filed reports. The cited deficiencies consist mostly of 22 contributions or expenditures lacking a date, six contributions or expenditures lacking an address (i.e., one contributor for which Respondent previously supplied an address, Office Depot for which Respondent supplied an address on a later report, the County Supervisor of Elections (twice; this is the employer of the filing officer), Kinko's in Naples, and Desk Top Results in Naples). There are two problems in using the unanswered letters as grounds for inferring willfullness. First, the letters ignore most of the deficiencies on which Petitioner relies. Most of these ignored items are facially evident, and the filing officer's failure to mention them does not assist Petitioner's effort in showing willfullness. Such items include the wrong reporting timeframes; the failure to identify the report as quarterly, first primary, etc.; and the failure to indicate whether the report is an original or amendment. Second, the letters only raise two claimed deficiencies--the failure to disclose dates and addresses for contributions and expenditures. Even as to these matters, the letters provide no basis for an inference of willfullness for several reasons. First, the filing officer sent all of the letters on the same date, December 6. The most recurring failing cited in the letters is the absence of dates for contributions and expenditures. The record suggests that Respondent's carelessness in recordkeeping rendered impossible any accurate amendment of his reports to add the dates. The situation might have been different if the filing officer had sent such a letter after Respondent had filed the first report without the required dates. As to that report, it would have been more likely that Respondent could have reconstructed the dates. As to subsequent reports, it is much more likely that the carelessness defense would have been unavailing, after Respondent would have received a specific demand for this information. Given the outcome of the case, the Administrative Law Judge has examined the sealed exhibit containing copies of Respondent's personal income tax returns for 1996 and 1997. There is no indication in these tax returns that a fine of $1000 would be excessive.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order imposing a $1000 fine against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven Christensen, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael T. McGuckin Assistant General Counsel Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Robert B. McKay Carney & McKay 1140 Franklin Avenue, Suite 201 Garden City, New York 11530
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner effectively elected to move her retirement account from the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Pension Plan to the FRS Investment Plan prior to her retirement from state employment or, if not, whether Respondent, State Board of Administration (“SBA”) is estopped from claiming that Petitioner did not successfully elect to move her retirement account into the FRS Investment Plan.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Adrian Wagner began her state employment on April 22, 1994, with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which was renamed the Department of Children and Family Services after a 1996 reorganization. Since 2012, the agency has been named the Department of Children and Families. Upon her hiring, Ms. Wagner was enrolled in the Pension Plan, which was the only retirement program available for eligible employees in 1994. In 2002, the Investment Plan was made available for employees participating in the FRS. Ms. Wagner was provided a three month window, from December 1, 2002, through February 28, 2003, to switch to the Investment Plan. The Plan Choice Administrator did not receive an election from Ms. Wagner during the three month period. Therefore, Ms. Wagner remained in the Pension Plan by statutory default. See § 121.4501(4)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Wagner changed employers but remained in the FRS system until her last day of employment on April 3, 2019. At the time of her retirement from FRS-eligible employment, Ms. Wagner was working for the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office. On March 4, 2019, Ms. Wagner logged onto the FRS website, MyFRS.com, from her home computer. Her intention was to use the second election opportunity afforded by section 121.4501(4)(f), Florida Statutes, to move from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner recalled clicking a green button to change her plan, which took her to a page that read, “ready to make a decision” to change from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. It set out the steps needed to make the change. Ms. Wagner testified that she clicked on a green arrow that said, “change your plan,” which took her to a page that set forth the amount of money she would have in the Investment Plan. She continued to a page showing the different plans available to participants in the Investment Plan. The website advised her to contact an Ernst and Young (“EY”) financial planner to discuss her plan options. Ms. Wagner testified that a few minutes later she used the phone number provided by the MyFRS.com website to contact the EY financial planners. She testified that the EY planner with whom she spoke was named “Josh.” The EY call summary log for Ms. Wagner was entered into evidence. The log is a record of every phone call between EY and Ms. Wagner. It includes the date and time of the call, the name of the EY employee who spoke to Ms. Wagner, and a brief summary of their discussion. The EY call summary log identified the EY planner who spoke with Ms. Wagner at 12:10 p.m., on March 4, 2019, as Joshua Kantrowitz. Ms. Wagner testified that Mr. Kantrowitz told her that he could not see in his computer that she had made the switch to the Investment Plan. While Mr. Kantrowitz waited, Ms. Wagner clicked several “back” buttons on the MyFRS.com website. She then went through the same page progression she had done previously to make her plan selection. Ms. Wagner recalled finalizing her decision by clicking a button that read “send,” or “submit,” or “continue.” Ms. Wagner testified that Mr. Kantrowitz told her that he could now see that she had elected to change her retirement from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. They discussed fund options, tax questions, and penalties for taking funds out of the Investment Plan. Mr. Kantrowitz verified Ms. Wagner’s email address so that he could send her an FRS Investment Beneficiary Form. Ms. Wagner understood Mr. Kantrowitz to say that she would not be able to see that she had changed to the Investment Plan on the website for about a month. The conversation was interrupted when the phone connection was lost. Ms. Wagner testified that it was her understanding that she had successfully changed her retirement from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan, and that this change had been confirmed by Mr. Kantrowitz. A transcript of the conversation between Ms. Wagner and Mr. Kantrowitz was entered into evidence. The transcript does not confirm every aspect of Ms. Wagner’s recollection. The transcript records that Ms. Wagner told Mr. Kantrowitz that she “just switched over from the FRS Pension Plan to the Investment Plan.” Mr. Kantrowitz asked when she made the switch. Ms. Wagner responded, “I just hit it today. Did it today.” She added that she made the election “about ten minutes ago.” The transcript clarifies that Mr. Kantrowitz accepted, but did not confirm, Ms. Wagner’s statement that she made the switch to the Investment Plan. After Ms. Wagner told him that she made the switch only 10 minutes ago, Mr. Kantrowitz stated: Okay. And you did it by--basically, you know, if you do--you know, it’s still being processed at the moment. Basically, you know, in the next month, it’s going to make that conversion. In order to, you know, switch and make that choice, you know, the types of investments you’re putting into. Okay. So I do want to keep you aware of that if you did fill it out today, okay. Mr. Kantrowitz never confirmed that the second election had been completed nor did he state whether he could or could not see the change on his computer. Mr. Kantrowitz simply accepted Ms. Wagner’s word and went on to tell her what would happen next if she indeed made the change. Mr. Kantrowitz did state that the conversion would be made in the next month, confirming in part Ms. Wagner’s recollection that she was told that it would be a month before she could see the switch to the Investment Plan on the website. Again, however, this statement was contingent: if Ms. Wagner made the change, the conversion would take about a month. The EY call summary log entry for the March 4, 2019, conversation, presumably completed by Mr. Kantrowitz, records Ms. Wagner’s “Question or Problem” as “made a switch to the FRS IP. [D]oesn’t plan to work in the FRS anymore.” The log records the “Resolution” with a series of four bullet points: talked about IP. taxation, timelines, HIS. says she spoke with admin and they said she would hit NRA at April 1 for 25 YOS SR. she did the 2nd election online and was defaulted into the FRS RDF. needs to set up beneficiaries sending out beneficiary form It could be argued that the second bullet point confirms that Ms. Wagner successfully completed the second election into the Investment Plan. However, when read in tandem with the transcript, Mr. Kantrowitz’s notes clearly set forth his summary of the conversation as it occurred, not his independent conclusion that Ms. Wagner had completed the second election. After the call with Mr. Kantrowitz was dropped, Ms. Wagner called back to inquire as to her exact retirement date. She spoke briefly with another EY planner, Zach Brown, who told her that the Division of Retirement keeps the record of official years of service for employees. Mr. Brown transferred the call to the Division of Retirement. The transcript indicates that Ms. Wagner remained on hold for some time, then hung up before speaking with a Division of Retirement representative. Ms. Wagner testified that on March 18, 2019, she again contacted the EY financial planners. She spoke for roughly a half-hour with a woman whose name she did not recall. The woman verified Ms. Wagner’s personal account information. After being verified, Ms. Wagner asked tax and health care subsidy questions and stated that she planned eventually to move her Investment Plan account from EY to an outside investment firm. Ms. Wagner testified that the EY planner never stated that she was not enrolled in the Investment Plan. The EY call summary log does not show a phone call from Ms. Wagner on March 18, 2019. Ms. Wagner testified that on March 19, 2019, she met with Shawn Powers, the human resources manager for the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, to discuss Ms. Wagner’s impending retirement. As Ms. Powers filled out a retiree insurance data sheet, Ms. Wagner told her that she had enrolled in the Investment Plan. Ms. Powers cautioned her about the risks involved in the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner assured her that she understood the risks. Ms. Powers checked the “Investment Plan” box on the insurance form. Ms. Wagner signed the form, attesting to her understanding that she had made the election to move from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner testified that, after the March 4, 2019, conversation with Mr. Kantrowitz, she received several emails from EY financial planners. She understood these emails as indirect confirmation that she had successfully elected to move to the Investment Plan. During cross-examination, Ms. Wagner conceded that none of these communications affirmatively stated that she was now in the Investment Plan. The third-party Plan Choice Administrator for the Investment Plan is Alight Solutions. FRS members who wish to utilize their second election have multiple options: they may complete and mail in a hard copy form; they may submit a second election form on the MyFRS.com website; or they may log into their account on the MyFRS.com website and go through the process of submitting and confirming their second election online. Fla. Admin. Code R. 19-11.007(3). If an FRS member successfully utilizes the online MyFRS.com process for submitting a second election, an “election confirmation” page appears that informs the member that the election has been received by Alight Solutions. Ms. Wagner had no specific recollection of receiving an electronic confirmation that her election to move to the Investment Plan had been successfully submitted or that it had been received by Alight Solutions. If an FRS member successfully submits an election form to Alight Solutions, a hard copy letter is mailed to the member confirming receipt. Ms. Wagner had no specific recollection of receiving any type of correspondence confirming receipt of her Investment Plan election via conventional mail. Ms. Wagner retired from the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office on April 3, 2019. The parties stipulated that the SBA has no record of receiving a second election from Ms. Wagner during her term of employment with an FRS-participating employer. On April 8, 2019, Ms. Wagner logged onto the MyFRS.com website and saw that she was still enrolled in the Pension Plan. Ms. Wagner immediately phoned the number for the EY financial planners and was transferred to a “solutions person” named Nichole. Ms. Wagner explained to Nichole that on March 4, 2019, she had elected to move her retirement account from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan via the MyFRS.com website. She provided Nichole with the chronology of events from March 2019 as she remembered them. Nichole told Ms. Wagner that she would research the matter and get back to her within two weeks. Ms. Wagner testified that on or about April 22, 2019, Nichole phoned her to say that she could find no record of anything Ms. Wagner claimed to have done on the MyFRS.com website. Nicole told Ms. Wagner that she would need more time, possibly another two weeks, to do further research on the matter. Ms. Wagner told Nichole how upset she was. Nichole assured Ms. Wagner that she would do her best to find out what happened. Nichole also stated that she would send Ms. Wagner a form to request that the SBA intervene. Ms. Wagner subsequently filed a Request for Intervention, which was received by the SBA on May 17, 2019. Ms. Wagner testified that after she filed her Request for Intervention, but before the SBA responded, she attempted to contact Nichole. Her call was answered by an unnamed EY planner who stated that he would remain on the line while putting her through to a solutions person. Ms. Wagner began speaking with the solutions person but was interrupted by the EY financial planner, who stated that he had found notes by Mr. Kantrowitz indicating that she had changed from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. It is highly likely that the unnamed EY financial planner was referencing the EY call summary log notes quoted at Finding of Fact 18. As found above, Mr. Kantrowitz’s contemporary notes reflected what he was told by Ms. Wagner. The notes do not constitute an independent confirmation that Ms. Wagner successfully completed her second election. The SBA submitted into evidence a spreadsheet titled “Participant Web Activity Detail.” SBA witness Allison Olson testified that this document was produced by Alight Solutions in response to her request for all records of Ms. Wagner’s March 4, 2019, activity on the MyFRS.com website. Ms. Olson is the Director of Policy, Risk Management, and Compliance in the Office of Defined Contribution Programs. She credibly testified that she is familiar with reading the Alight Solutions spreadsheets and that she saw nothing on Ms. Wagner’s page indicating that Alight Solutions received her Investment Plan election. Petitioner’s information technology expert, Philip Schwartz, testified that the document provided by Alight Solutions was a “program log,” a high level program that runs to handle a particular task such as an accounting function. Mr. Schwartz testified that he suggested to his client that she request the “server log” for the relevant date. The server log captures every keystroke and click made by a user such as Ms. Wagner, even in situations in which the server is too busy to complete the requested function. Mr. Schwartz believed the program log was insufficient because it showed only which page of the website Ms. Wagner was on at a given moment, not which buttons she clicked or whether she had hit the “send” button. Mr. Schwartz’s suggestion was that Ms. Wagner might have done everything necessary to complete the second election but that the MyFRS.com server may not have recorded her election. The server log would have provided a more accurate representation of Ms. Wagner’s intentions. Ms. Olson testified that, after an informal hearing attempting to resolve the case, she requested a server log from Alight Solutions. The company responded that it did not have the server log. Ms. Olson testified that the program log would indicate the second election had it been completed by Ms. Wagner. Ms. Olson stated that FRS members are always advised to follow through and make sure their election has been received. Mr. Schwartz testified that there is no industry standard as to the length of time a program log should be kept. He has known companies to hold them for as long as a year, but has also known companies to keep them for only 90 days. Mr. Schwartz testified that there is no legal requirement for a company such as Alight Solutions to maintain a program log at all. Mr. Schwartz testified that he did not have enough knowledge of Alight Solutions’ terminology to state whether the program log indicated that Ms. Wagner’s election had been received. Thus, there is no evidence to contradict Ms. Olson’s credible testimony that the Alight Solutions program log did not indicate receipt of Ms. Wagner’s Investment Plan election. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Ms. Wagner intended to make her second election on March 4, 2019, and to move her retirement account from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. The preponderance of the evidence also establishes that Ms. Wagner failed to complete her second election and that Alight Solutions, the Plan Choice Administrator for the Investment Plan, did not receive her election.1/ The evidence was insufficient to show that the SBA or any entity or person acting on its behalf or as its agent made any representation to Ms. Wagner that her second election had been received by the Plan Choice Administrator.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Florida Retirement System Investment Plan Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2020.
The Issue The issues presented for determination are whether Respondent violated Subsections 106.11(3) and 106.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order of Probable Cause dated May 22, 2001, and the Statement of Findings dated April 3, 2001.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing all charges against Petitioner, Bruce Grady. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herron, Esquire Mark Herron, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 701 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, Brian Pitts, treasurer for Justice-2-Jesus, a political committee, willfully violated Section 106.07(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to file a Campaign Treasurer's Report for the first quarter of 2008 (referred to herein as the 2008 Q1 CTR).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is the treasurer for Justice-2-Jesus, a political committee that registered with the Division of Elections (Division) on December 12, 2007. Justice-2-Jesus registered by filing an "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committees and Electioneering Communication Organizations" form, or Form DS-DE-6. Justice-2-Jesus designated Respondent, Brian Pitts, as its treasurer. Respondent signed the document, giving as his address 1119 Newton Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida. Also on December 12, 2007, Justice-2-Jesus filed a "Registered Agent Statement of Appointment," Form DS-DE 41, naming Calvester Benjamin-Anderson as its registered agent. Respondent signed the document and gave 1119 Newton Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida as the address of the registered agent. The Division sent a letter, dated December 14, 2007, to Respondent acknowledging receipt of the Form DS-DE-6 and providing information about the Division's electronic filing system for CTRs. The letter informed Respondent that all political committees that file reports with the Division are required to do so by means of the electronic filing system. The Division's letter concluded with the following paragraph, set out in bold type: All of the Division's publications and reporting forms are available on the Division of Elections' web site at http://election.dos.state.fl.us. It is your responsibility to read, understand, and follow the requirements of Florida's election laws. Therefore, please print a copy of the following documents: Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, 2006 Committee and Campaign Treasurer Handbook, 2007-2008 Calendar of Reporting Dates, and Rule 1S- 2.017, Florida Administrative Code. The Division's letter also enclosed a sealed envelope containing PIN numbers to allow Respondent secure access to the Division's electronic filing system in order to submit CTRs for Justice-2-Jesus. A CTR lists all contributions received and expenditures made during a given reporting period. The 2008 Q1 CTR is the report that a campaign treasurer should have filed on behalf of his committee at the close of the first quarter of 2008. Respondent's 2008 Q1 CTR was due to be filed on or before April 10, 2008. Candidates and political committees have been required to file their CTRs electronically since 2004. § 106.0705(2), Fla. Stat. The CTR data may be uploaded using any of several proprietary programs that have been approved by the Division. These programs carry a fee for their use. As an alternative, the treasurer may enter the CTR information directly into the Division's electronic filing system at no cost. The Division has published an online "Electronic Filing System (EFS) User's Guide" (the Guide) to explain the use of the electronic filing system. The Guide contains help menus to assist the user in completing the data entry for a CTR. The Guide is available in a PDF format that can be read online or downloaded to the user's computer at no cost. A user may also make a public records request to the Division for a hard copy of the Guide. The Division will provide the hard copy at a cost of $0.20 per double-sided page, or approximately $4.80 for the 47-page Guide. On or about April 11, 2008, the Division sent Respondent a letter informing him that it had not received the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus, which had been due on April 10, 2008. On or about April 25, 2008, the Division sent Respondent a second letter informing him that it had not received the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. Both letters were sent to 1119 Newton Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida, the address provided by Respondent on the Form DS-DE-6 for Justice-2-Jesus. Neither letter was returned to the Division as undeliverable or unclaimed. At the hearing, Respondent did not deny receiving these letters in April 2008. On or about July 10, 2008, the Division sent to Calvester Benjamin-Anderson, the registered agent for Justice-2- Jesus, a final notice that Respondent had failed to file the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. The letter was sent certified mail, return receipt requested. Ms. Benjamin-Anderson signed for the letter on or about July 14, 2008. Respondent testified that he attempted to hand-deliver a paper copy of the 2008 Q1 CTR to the Division, but that a Division employee told him that he was required to file all reports for his committee electronically. The Division's records indicate that Respondent had filed Justice-2-Jesus' 2007 Q4 CTR and its 2007 SR2 report2/ electronically, prior to the due date for the 2008 Q1 CTR. Erin NeSmith, a supervisor in the Bureau of Election Records, testified that Respondent came into the Division's offices on November 20, 2008. Respondent asked Ms. NeSmith questions about the 2008 Q1 CTR. She told him that the matter had already been referred to the Commission because Respondent had not filed the report despite repeated notices, but that Respondent still needed to file the 2008 Q1 CTR. Respondent explained to Ms. NeSmith that he had not filed the report because he had been busy and had a lot of items to pull together for the report. As of August 10, 2009, Respondent had yet to file the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. At the hearing, Respondent testified that he had at least 50 contributions and 80 to 100 expenditures to report for the first quarter of 2008. Respondent testified that the due date for the 2008 Q1 CTR fell during the legislative session, when Respondent was extremely busy at the Florida Capitol. The Division's offices are open only during normal business hours, when Respondent was unavailable, and thus Respondent was unable to phone the Division for assistance in preparing the reports. Respondent defended his subsequent failure to file the report as something in the nature of a protest against the Division's electronic filing requirement and its alleged refusal to provide him with a paper copy of the Guide to facilitate his preparation of the report. Respondent complained that the vendors who provide Division-approved data uploading programs charge prohibitively expensive fees. He further complained that the alternative means of filing, direct entry of the data onto the Division's electronic filing system, is difficult and confusing without a paper copy of the Guide for assistance. Respondent acknowledged the availability of the Guide in printable PDF format, but asserted that purchasing printer cartridges and paper sufficient to print the Guide and other necessary Division handbooks would cost between $80.00 and $120.00. Respondent did not acknowledge the Division's willingness to print the Guide for $0.20 per double-sided page pursuant to a public records request. Respondent testified that he has assisted several other persons in preparing and filing their electronic reports to the Division. On behalf of Justice-2-Jesus, Respondent has electronically filed several reports to the Division subsequent to the due date for 2008 Q1 CTR. Willfulness is a question of fact. § 106.25(3), Fla. Stat. See Beardslee v. Fla. Elections Comm'n, 962 So. 2d 390, 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); McGann v. Fla. Elections Comm'n, 803 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 provides: For purposes of imposing a civil penalty for violating Chapter 104 or 106, F.S, the following definitions shall apply: A person acts "willful" or "willfully" when he or she knew that, or showed reckless disregard for whether his or her conduct was prohibited or required by Chapter 104 or 106, F.S. "Knew" means that the person was aware of a provision of Chapter 104 or 106, F.S., understood the meaning of the provision, and then performed an act prohibited by the provision or failed to perform an act required by the provision. "Reckless disregard" means that the person disregarded the requirements of Chapter 104 or 106, F.S., or was plainly indifferent to its requirements, by failing to make any reasonable effort to determine whether his or her acts were prohibited by Chapter 104 or 106, F.S., or whether he or she failed to perform an act required by Chapter 104 or 106, F.S. The evidence established that Respondent was well aware of the requirement to file the 2008 Q1 CTR on behalf of Justice-2-Jesus. Shortly after Respondent filed the committee's initial paperwork, the Division sent him an acknowledgement letter directing him to the Division's website for information about the electronic filing of campaign treasurer's reports. Respondent could have downloaded the Guide or any other Division publication. At the hearing, Respondent claimed no lack of knowledge of the filing requirements. After he failed to file the 2008 Q1 CTR, Respondent received two letters from the Division notifying him of the failure. Despite these notices, Respondent never filed the report. The evidence established that Respondent electronically filed two reports with the Division prior to the due date of the 2008 Q1 CTR, and filed several electronic reports after the due date of the 2008 Q1 CTR. These facts demonstrate Respondent's knowledge of the filing requirements and ability to prepare an electronic report. Respondent has acted willfully in his failure to file the 2008 Q1 CTR for Justice-2-Jesus. At the hearing, Respondent asserted that Justice-2- Jesus was indigent, but offered no financial data to support the assertion.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Respondent committed the violations of Sections 106.07(5) and 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), as set forth in the Order of Probable Cause and accompanying Statement of Findings issued by the Florida Elections Commission on August 13, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent John Morroni is a member of the Florida House of Representatives, representing District 50. He was first elected in 1992, and has been reelected subsequently. In 1995, Representative Morroni was serving his second term and beginning his reelection campaign for 1996. Representative Morroni appointed Robert P. Symanski, a certified public accountant, as his campaign treasurer. Representative Morroni designated himself as deputy treasurer for the campaign. Prior to the commencement of each campaign, Representative Morroni signed a "Statement of Candidate" form, attesting that "I have received, read, and understand the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes." Thomas Carey is a trial lawyer from Clearwater. Representative Morroni had known Mr. Carey before 1992. After Representative Morroni was elected, Mr. Carey served as the liaison between the Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers and Representative Morroni. Mr. Carey is nationally known as a leader in efforts to prevent drunk driving, having served as a local and a national officer of Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Mr. Carey had worked with Representative Morroni in connection with drunk-driving issues. Representative Morroni was reelected without opposition in 1994. After that election, Mr. Carey approached Representative Morroni and offered to throw a kick-off party for his next campaign, telling Representative Morroni to let him know when the time was right to plan such a function. At some point in the summer of 1995, Representative Morroni called Mr. Carey and told him the time was right to plan the kick-off party for the 1996 campaign. Mr. Carey told Representative Morroni that his home could not be used for the party, but that his sister’s house would be ideal for the party. Mr. Carey and Representative Morroni decided that the party would be held on the last week of August. Mr. Carey obtained the consent of his sister, Patricia Rowan, and her husband, Dr. Patrick Rowan, to use their home on Clearwater Beach for the party. The Rowans also agreed to contribute $500 each as an in-kind contribution to defray the costs of the party. In July 1995, Mr. Carey was in the midst of a large jury trial, and did not have the time to oversee the details of the party. At this time, Mr. Sandy Golden was working as a volunteer for Mr. Carey on drunk driving issues, and was beginning to take on some paid personal duties for Mr. Carey. Mr. Carey delegated the planning of the party to Mr. Golden and his friend, Marilyn Curtis. Mr. Golden testified that he had nothing to do with the planning of the party, beyond getting his friend Ms. Curtis involved. Mr. Golden testified that he found Ms. Curtis and that Mr. Carey hired her to coordinate the party. Mr. Carey testified that he had no recollection of "hiring" Ms. Curtis. He testified that he believed Ms. Curtis was volunteering her services, and that it was only after the fact that he agreed to pay her, at the urging of Mr. Golden. Ms. Curtis testified that she had no discussions with Mr. Carey concerning payment for her services. She testified that Mr. Golden assured her that she would be paid. Mr. Carey testified that at the outset he established a budget of $1,500 for the party, and that he based this number on the fact that he and each of the Rowans could lawfully provide $500 as in-kind contributions to the Morroni campaign. Neither Mr. Golden nor Ms. Curtis remembered a firm dollar amount being established before the party. Ms. Curtis telephoned Representative Morroni to obtain a list of invitees and other information for the party. Representative Morroni testified that he knew Ms. Curtis had planned major events for corporate clients, including the president of Outback Steakhouse, and he was concerned that his campaign kickoff party not be too ostentatious. Representative Morroni cautioned Ms. Curtis that this was not a fundraiser, but a party for his campaign co-chairs and friends, and that a "fancy" party was not required or wanted. Ms. Curtis designed and mailed the invitations. She was reimbursed for the printing and mailing of the invitations by personal check from Mr. Carey, in the amount of $106.44, dated August 16, 1995. The party was held at the Rowans’ house on August 26, 1995. Mr. Carey testified that he arrived early and was presented with invoices from the various vendors who provided goods and services for the party. It is undisputed that Mr. Carey paid the following amounts by personal checks dated August 26, 1995: $52.50 for valet parking services; $296.80 for bartending services; and $900 for catering services and dinner buffet; $100 for photography services. By check dated September 13, 1995, Mr. Carey paid an invoice of $79.18 for floral arrangements. At Mr. Golden’s urging, Mr. Carey wrote a check for $300 to Ms. Curtis to compensate her for 15 hours' work on the party, at a rate of $20 per hour. This check was written on August 27, 1995, the day after the party. Thus, Mr. Carey wrote checks totaling $1834.92 to cover expenses for the party, including the $300 payment to Ms. Curtis and the late payment of $79.18 to the florist. There was some dispute at the hearing as to how Mr. Carey came to write these checks and whether he was reimbursed for his outlay of all the expenses for the party. Representative Morroni testified that it was obvious the party cost more than the $500 an individual is allowed by law to contribute, and that he remembered a passing conversation in which he complimented Mr. Carey on the party and expressed the hope that someone was sharing the expenses with him. Representative Morroni testified that a more detailed discussion as to the division of expenses would have been improper, given that this was a party and there were 28 other campaign people present. He also considered Mr. Carey to be knowledgeable and experienced in political matters, and thus not in need of a lecture about contribution limits. Mr. Golden testified that he was present during the brief conversation between Mr. Carey and Representative Morroni. Mr. Golden’s recollection was similar to that of Representative Morroni. Mr. Golden recalled Representative Morroni complimenting Mr. Carey on the party, then reminding Mr. Carey of the $500 limitation and telling Mr. Carey to be sure he "split out" the costs of the party. Mr. Carey testified that a more detailed conversation took place. As noted above, Mr. Carey testified that he had established a $1,500 budget for the party, based on $500 contributions from him and from each of the Rowans. As the invoices rolled-in during the party, Mr. Carey became concerned that the $1,500 budget was going to be exceeded, and concerned as to the logistics of paying the invoices. Mr. Carey testified that he discussed these matters with Representative Morroni in the presence of Mr. Golden and Mrs. Rowan. One option discussed was for Mr. Carey and the Rowans to write $500 checks to the Morroni campaign, which would in turn pay the invoices. Another option was to divide each invoice three ways and write three separate checks to cover each one. Mr. Carey testified that Representative Morroni suggested that, because Mr. Carey had already paid some of the invoices, he keep writing his personal checks to cover them, then have the Rowans reimburse him. Mr. Carey thought this the most workable option, and so continued paying the invoices by personal check. Mr. Carey testified that the group still had to deal with the contingency of the expenses exceeding the $1,500 budget. Mr. Carey testified that, at Representative Morroni’s suggestion, Mr. Golden agreed that any amount over $1,500 would be attributed to him, and that Mr. Golden would reimburse Mr. Carey by working for him without pay on drunk-driving issues. Mr. Golden flatly denied ever agreeing to such an arrangement or agreeing to make a contribution of any kind to the Morroni campaign. As noted above, Representative Morroni testified that he had no recollection of this detailed conversation taking place, let alone suggesting the payment/reimbursement plan outlined by Mr. Carey. Representative Morroni’s testimony, as corroborated by Mr. Golden's, is credited on this point. Representative Morroni testified that he had a difficult time getting hold of Mr. Carey to obtain the contribution details for inclusion in his campaign finance report. As the reporting deadline approached, Representative Morroni made several telephone calls to Mr. Carey. At length, he reached Mr. Carey, who gave him the needed information over the telephone. Representative Morroni relayed the information to Mr. Symanski, his campaign treasurer, who in turn included the information in the campaign treasurer’s report for the period July 1, 1995 through September 30, 1995, filed October 10, 1995. Mr. Carey testified that he had no clear recollection of providing the numbers to Representative Morroni, and that he believed Mr. Golden had provided the information to the Morroni campaign. Mr. Carey testified that if he did call Representative Morroni with the information, he simply would have been relaying information provided to him by Mr. Golden. Representative Morroni’s testimony is credited, and it is found that Mr. Carey provided the numbers to Representative Morroni. It was undisputed that the figures included in the referenced treasurer’s report accurately reflected Mr. Carey’s oral report to Representative Morroni. The relevant figures related to the kick-off party were as follows, all listed as "in-kind contributions" and dated August 26, 1995: Name Amount Description Dr. Patrick Rowan $500 Kick-off Party Expenses Mrs. Patrick Rowan $500 Kick-off Party Expenses Mr. Tom Carey $500 Kick-off Party Expenses Ms. Marilyn S. Curtis $79.26 Kick-off Party Expenses Mr. Sandy Golden $300 Kick-off Party Expenses Thus, the total reported expenses for the party were $1,879.26, as compared to $1,834.92 in actual paid invoices. Representative Morroni testified that he took these figures from Mr. Carey at face value, seeing no reason to question their accuracy or completeness. He knew that all the individuals listed as contributors were present at the party and were involved in its organization. Representative Morroni testified that he took down the figures and reported them directly to Mr. Symanski. Mr. Symanski testified that he had no previous experience serving as a campaign treasurer, and felt that it was not his position to "challenge" someone who claimed to have made an in-kind contribution. His practice was to refer any questions regarding in-kind contributions to Representative Morroni. Mr. Symanski testified that $1,800 "seemed like a lot more than what we would have spent, but if that’s what they said they spent, that’s what I recorded." He testified that the $500 allocations for the party did not raise concerns in his mind, because he knew beforehand that the costs of the party would have to be split up in some fashion. Both Representative Morroni and Mr. Symanski testified that, as a general matter, they reported in-kind contributions based upon the word of the contributor. They did not ask for receipts or other verification of the amount claimed by the contributor, provided those amounts seemed reasonable. Neither man was aware of any legal requirement that a candidate or campaign obtain documentation of the value of in-kind contributions. Other factual issues were raised by the parties that are ultimately tangential to the resolution of this case but nonetheless require resolution to complete the record. First, the Commission questions the veracity of Mrs. Rowan’s testimony regarding the $500 contributions made by her and her husband, because Dr. and Mrs. Rowan initially executed affidavits, on forms sent by the Commission’s investigator, attesting that they made no contributions to the Morroni campaign. Mrs. Rowan’s explanation of this seeming contradiction is credited. She testified that her husband has been extremely ill, having been diagnosed with a brain tumor in January 1998. In fact, as of the date of the hearing, Dr. Rowan had already outlived his initial prognosis of one year. The Rowans learned of Dr. Rowan’s condition at roughly the same time they executed the original affidavits. Mrs. Rowan testified that under the circumstances neither she nor Dr. Rowan paid much attention to the affidavits. Mrs. Rowan testified that someone later mentioned to her a newspaper article listing her as a contributor to the Morroni campaign. The article jogged her memory regarding the party and caused her to execute a corrected affidavit reflecting her $500 in-kind contribution. She had no explanation as to why the corrected affidavit was not provided to the Commission until the date of the hearing. On the date of the kick-off party, Mrs. Rowan wrote a check to her brother, Mr. Carey, in the amount of $4,200. She testified that $1,000 of this amount was the contribution of her and her husband to the party expenses, and the remainder was payment for legal services performed by Mr. Carey. Her testimony is credited on this point. Respondent presented testimony regarding a subsequent falling-out between Mr. Carey and Mr. Golden over tactics in the crusade against drunk driving, as well as testimony regarding Mr. Golden’s feeling that Representative Morroni had "sold out" on the drunk-driving issue. Respondent’s purpose was to provide an ulterior motive for Mr. Golden’s filing the confidential complaint in this matter some two years after the events occurred, and to at least imply that Mr. Golden is mentally unstable and unreliable as a witness. It is found that the facts concerning the Carey/Golden feud, all of which occurred after the events here at issue, are irrelevant to this proceeding, except as they provide some indicia that both Mr. Carey and Mr. Golden have reasons, rational or otherwise, to make each other look as bad as possible. Mr. Golden’s motive in filing the confidential complaint is irrelevant. As to Mr. Golden’s reliability as a witness, the only relevant point on which his testimony is contradicted concerns whether he agreed to have the party expenses exceeding the purported $1,500 budget attributed to him, to be "worked off" at a later time. For the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law below, it makes no difference to the resolution of this case whether Mr. Golden or Mr. Carey is credited as to whether this arrangement was made. The relevant point is whether Representative Morroni was aware of any such arrangement, such that he could be found to have willfully signed a false or incorrect report. Representative Morroni’s testimony that he was not aware of such an arrangement is credited.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent, Representative John Morroni. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael T. McGuckin Assistant General Counsel Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Chris Haughee, Esquire Greene, Donnelly & Schermer 102 West Whiting, Suite 201 Tampa, Florida 33602-1480 Barbara Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven Christensen, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent accepted campaign contributions and made expenditures before designating a campaign treasurer and campaign depository, signed a check without sufficient funds written on a campaign account with insufficient funds to cover the check, and accepted a campaign contribution in excess of the legal limit in violation of Subsections 106.021(1)(a), 106.11(4), and 106.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the campaign laws of the state. During 2006, Respondent attempted, unsuccessfully, to qualify as a candidate for the United States Congress and then campaigned for election to the state Legislature. Sometime in 2006, Respondent attempted to qualify as a candidate for the United States House of Representatives, District 12. On May 15, 2006, Respondent accepted two checks from Mr. Kent Lilly, an attorney in Bartow, Florida. One check was a campaign contribution of $500.00. Mr. Lilly intended the other check to be a loan of $5,000.00. Although the loan from Mr. Lilly satisfied the definition of a campaign contribution in Subsection 106.011(3)(a), Mr. Lilly and Respondent understood that Respondent was to repay the loan from subsequent campaign contributions. Respondent learned by letter dated May 18, 2006, that he did not qualify as a candidate for federal office because the qualifying papers he filed did not contain an original signature. Respondent decided to campaign as a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives, District 63. Respondent retained the campaign funds contributed by Mr. Lilly in a bank account divided into two sub-accounts. The two sub-accounts are identified in the record as the Sub 1 and Sub 2 accounts. The Sub 1 account contained funds collected for the Congressional campaign, and the Sub 2 account contained funds collected for the state legislative campaign. Respondent did not designate a campaign treasurer and depository for the state legislative campaign until July 19, 2006. Respondent signed the Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Candidates (the DS-DE 9) form on July 5, 2006. The DS-DE 9 form designated Ms. Shirley Goodwine as the campaign treasurer. Respondent filed the DS-DE 9 form with the state’s Division of Elections on July 13, 2006. The original DS-DE 9 form was insufficient. The original form did not include the name of the political office sought and the date of Ms. Goodwine’s signature. Respondent filed an amended DS-DE 9 form on July 19, 2006. The amended form corrected the errors in the original form and was sufficient to designate a campaign treasurer and depository for state office. On July 6, 2006, Respondent accepted a contribution to his Sub 2 account before designating a campaign treasurer and depository. Respondent transferred $2,000.00 from the Sub 1 account to his Sub 2 account. The funds came from the loan from Mr. Lilly. The $2,000.00 contribution was excessive, within the meaning of Subsection 106.19(1)(a). It exceeded the maximum allowable contribution of $500.00 by $1,500.00. On July 12, 2006, Respondent expended $16.80 from his Sub 2 account before designating a campaign treasurer and depository. The charge to his account in the amount $16.80 was for checks to be used on the account. On July 18, 2006, Respondent signed a check in the amount of $1,859.76, which was drawn on the Sub 2 account. Insufficient funds were available to cover the check. The check was payable to the state Division of Elections and was intended to pay the qualifying fee to run for state office. On July 22, 2006, Respondent signed a check drawn on the Sub 2 account without sufficient funds. The check was payable to Publix Supermarket for $100.00. Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. Petitioner previously fined Respondent for filing campaign treasurer reports late. Respondent has not paid the previous fines. Respondent reports his net worth to be $103,000.00. Respondent has not repaid the loan from Mr. Lilly. Respondent submitted no evidence of mitigating factors that may have reduced the fine proposed by Petitioner. Respondent committed the foregoing acts willfully within the meaning of former Section 106.37, which was in effect at the time Respondent committed the acts. Respondent committed the acts with reckless disregard for whether the acts were prohibited by relevant campaign laws of the state.
The Issue Whether WKDR II, Inc. (WKDR), is jurisdictionally time-barred from bringing the challenges in Case Nos. 21-0844 and 21-0845 to contest the Department of Revenue's (Department) tax assessment and subsequent freeze of WKDR's bank account to attempt to collect on the assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Department administers Florida's sales tax statutes and performs audits to ensure compliance with sales tax laws. WKDR is a Ford franchise car dealership operating as LaBelle Ford. WKDR is organized as an "S" corporation and is wholly owned by Douglas Plattner (Mr. Plattner). WKDR's address is 851 South Main Street, LaBelle, Florida 33935 (851 South Main Street). Mark Smith (Mr. Smith) is a self-employed certified public accountant (CPA) at the firm of Smith and Waggoner CPAs. He is the CPA for Mr. Plattner and WKDR. Mr. Smith's business mailing address is 115 Tamiami Trail North, Suite 7, Nokomis, Florida 34275 (115 Tamiami Trail). On or about March 21, 2019, the Department began a sales tax audit of WKDR for the period of March 1, 2016, through February 28, 2019 (audit period). WKDR was notified of the audit through a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, dated March 21, 2019. Jeff Barnard (Mr. Barnard) was a tax auditor for the Department. Mr. Barnard was responsible for examining the books and records of various taxpayers for compliance with Florida tax laws. Mr. Barnard retired from the Department in May 2021. He was employed by the Department for 30 years. He spent the last 15 years with the Department as a Tax Auditor IV—the most senior tax auditor position at the Department. Mr. Barnard was responsible for the tax audit of WKDR for the audit period. On or about July 30, 2019, Mr. Smith sent the Department a fully executed Power of Attorney/Declaration of Representative form (POA form) to appear as WKDR's representative in connection with the Department's audit. The POA form was completed and signed by WKDR's owner (Mr. Plattner) and its CPA (Mr. Smith). The POA form gave Mr. Smith authority to speak and act on WKDR's behalf for the Department's audit. The POA form correctly states the mailing addresses of both WKDR and its CPA/representative, Mr. Smith. It also correctly states the e-mail address and fax number for Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith entered WKDR's address in section 1 of the POA form. The POA form included spaces for a contact person's name, telephone number, and fax number at WKDR, but those spaces were left blank in the form signed by Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner. The POA form signed by both Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner set forth the name, address, telephone number, and fax number of Mr. Smith’s CPA firm in section 2 of the POA form. Section 6 of the POA form provides as follows: Notices and Communication. Do not complete Section 6 if completing Section 4. Notices and other written communications will be sent to the first representative listed in Part I, Section 2, unless the taxpayer selects one of the options below. Receipt by either the representative or the taxpayer will be considered receipt by both. If you want notices and communications sent to both you and your representative, check this box. If you want notices or communications sent to you and not your representative, check this box. Mr. Smith completed section 6 by checking option "a," indicating that they wished to have notices and communication sent to both the taxpayer (WKDR) and the representative (Mr. Smith). Mr. Smith's e-mail address was added on the POA form by the Department's employee, Lisa Weems, after she called Mr. Smith's telephone number to obtain his e-mail address. All other information was added by Mr. Smith after consultation with Mr. Plattner, before they both signed the form. Throughout the audit, the Department's auditor, Mr. Barnard, primarily communicated with WKDR through its designated representative—Mr. Smith—at his mailing address and e-mail address. This included multiple requests for documents. At times, Mr. Barnard communicated directly with Mr. Plattner while copying Mr. Smith on the correspondence. Mr. Barnard sent a letter dated November 14, 2019, by regular mail, to WKDR at 851 South Main Street, with a copy to Mr. Smith at 115 Tamiami Trail. Mr. Smith testified that he received and read this letter. The November 14 letter provided WKDR and Mr. Smith with notice that, as things stood on that date, a NOPA was imminent. The letter stated, in pertinent part: On September 20th, we wrote you a letter requesting the information needed to complete the audit of WKDR II Inc. and the DR54 Formal Notice of Demand to Produce Certain Records. The letter stated that your failure to provide the information be [sic] September 27, 2019 may result in an assessment. That is, the implementation of alternative audit procedures to estimate a liability based on the best available information. As of the date of this letter you have not complied with our request. Therefore, enclosed is the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (DR1215) and the audit work papers, which are an estimate based upon the best information available as provided in Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes. You have 30 days to review the audit adjustments, which expires on December 16, 2019. * * * If we do not hear from you by December 16, 2019, the audit file will be sent to Tallahassee so that the Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) can be issued to you. The NOPA is the formal notice of the amount due. The NOPA will also provide the procedures for filing informal and formal protests. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, which was included with the November 14 letter, listed a "balance due through 11/14/2019" of $1,157,025.16. This sum included taxes of $801,967.01, a penalty of $200,491.75, and interest of $154,566.40. The notice also explicitly laid out WKDR's opportunities to informally protest this preliminary sum through a conference with the auditor or the auditor's supervisor. It provided that after the 30-day informal conference period expired, a NOPA would be issued. On December 20, 2019, Mr. Barnard sent an e-mail to Mr. Plattner with a copy to Mr. Smith. Attached to the e-mail was a letter of the same date. The letter provided as follows: On November 14, 2019, a Notice of Intent to Make Tax Audit Changes (DR-1215) was issued with additional tax due of $801,967.00. The 30 day informal protest period with the Service Center was up December 13, 2019.[2] Although your representative, Mark Smith, did provide some sales invoices after issuance of the DR-1215 they did not represent a full month of invoices as requested. Please be advised all sales invoices for December 2018 must be provided by January 3, 2020 for any changes in the assessment to be considered. These invoices should consist of same for all new and used vehicle sales, parts sales, service invoices/tickets, and autobody invoices for December 2018. As indicated in the December 20 letter, one month before the NOPA was issued, Mr. Barnard notified Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner that the 30-day informal protest period expired on December 13, 2019. Mr. Smith's testimony on this matter was evasive. At first, he acknowledged that he received the December 20 letter. However, after objection from WKDR's counsel, Mr. Smith backtracked and denied receipt. His attempted denial was not credible and is not credited. The undersigned finds that Mr. Smith received the December 20 letter. Mr. Barnard sent another letter, dated January 7, 2020, by regular mail to Mr. Plattner, and by e-mail to both Mr. Plattner and Mr. Smith, which stated as follows: Please be advised the information necessary to make an adjustment to the audit results issued on November 14, 2019 has not been provided. As stated in our December 20, 2019 letter this information was sales invoices for all new and used vehicle sales, parts sales, service invoices/tickets, and autobody invoices for the entire month of December 2018. 2 The Notice of Intent to Make Tax Audit Changes sent on November 14 provided a deadline of December 13 for the 30-day informal conference period, while the e-mail sent on December 20 referenced a deadline of December 16. The discrepancy in the December 20 letter is immaterial as both deadlines (December 13 and 16) had passed by the date of the December 20 letter. The audit will be closed and a Notice of Proposed Assessment will be issued shortly. Once again, Mr. Smith’s testimony was evasive. After seemingly admitting he received and read the January 7 letter, Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive the January 7 letter. The undersigned found Mr. Smith's testimony on this point wholly untruthful. At the hearing, during cross-examination, the Department's counsel asked Mr. Smith about his actions and impressions after receipt of the January 7 letter in the following exchange: Q. Let's go to Exhibit 22, which is Bates Number 00081. This is another e-mail sent to you on January 7th, 2020 to Mr. Plattner showing a carbon copy to Mr. Mark Smith CPA POA. The third sentence states; "The audit will be closed and a notice of proposed assessment will be issued shortly." Does that mean that the audit is still open or the audit is closed? A. That, like I said, I mean, I've -- I've dealt with audits where they say they're going to do this and do that and it's taken them two years to send anything. Q. This letter dated January 7th, 2020 does not give a new deadline, does it? A. It does not appear to but -- yeah, it does not appear to. Q. In fact, it says the audit is closed. That means that it's done, right? A. No. I don't -- I -- not necessarily. Q. It also says that the notice of proposed assessment will be issued shortly. So you knew at this time, the NOPA was imminent, right? A. Not necessarily. Q. Is there any language in this letter indicating that WKDR has any more time to provide additional documents? A. I've worked with the State before and they've provided us additional time quite often. Q. In fact, the auditor did provide you a deal -- a great deal of additional time to have the audit, didn't he? A. Well, we provided him so many documents that we thought he needed more time too. The whole tenor of Mr. Smith's testimony was to acknowledge that he read and understood the January 7 letter to say the NOPA was imminent, but that he knew from his experience the NOPA was "not necessarily" imminent. Notably, when asked if he knew at that time that the NOPA was imminent, Mr. Smith did not say that he did not know that because he did not receive or read the January 7 letter when it was sent to him by e-mail. Mr. Smith provided answers to these and several other questions about what he did or did not do in response to the January 7 letter. It was not until after an objection by WKDR's counsel that, as before, Mr. Smith backtracked to say that he did not receive the letter. In making the finding that Mr. Smith was untruthful when he testified that he had not received the January 7 letter, the undersigned had the distinct opportunity to observe the demeanor of Mr. Smith during testimony on this issue. He was not credible and his belated denial is not credited. The undersigned finds that Mr. Smith received the January 7 letter, reviewed it, and hoped that he could buy more time as he had thought he might be able to. Testimony of Lisa Weems Ms. Weems is a Revenue Specialist III for the Department. She has worked for the Department, in its Compliance Standards Section, for over 15 years. In addition to other tasks, Ms. Weems is responsible for printing NOPAs to send out to taxpayers and their representatives. Ms. Weems testified in great detail about the process she uses to send out NOPAs. When a NOPA is issued, it is uploaded to the Department's system overnight and cannot be printed until the following morning. Because of this, Ms. Weems sends out NOPAs only four days a week—Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays. Ms. Weems prints and mails out approximately 400 NOPAs per week. On the day of the final hearing, she had mailed out 88 NOPAs. Ms. Weems has a system in place to keep track of the NOPAs she sends out. Ms. Weems clearly and credibly testified about the process she used to send out NOPAs and when and by what means she used to send the NOPA to WKDR and its representative in this case. Each NOPA is mailed out in a packet that includes four documents: the NOPA, NOPA Remittance Coupon, Tax Audit Satisfaction Survey, and a document titled How to Pay Your Audit Assessment and Notice of Taxpayer Rights. The packets are sent by USPS first-class mail. WKDR's NOPA was issued on January 13, 2020. It had to load in the Department's system overnight, so it was printed on January 14, 2020. WKDR's NOPA assessed taxes of $801,967.01, a penalty of $200,491.75, and interest of $166,431.12, for a total due by WKDR of $1,168,889.88 following the audit.3 3 The amount of the taxes assessed and penalty remained the same as was listed in the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes. The amount of the interest had increased. The interest listed in the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes was for the period up to November 14, 2019. The NOPA specified that the deadline to request a formal hearing before DOAH was May 12, 2020, or 60 days from the date the assessment becomes a final assessment. The Notice of Taxpayer Rights provided detailed instructions on how to contest the assessment and provided further details on the timelines and deadlines to do so. Ms. Weems sent WKDR and Mr. Smith copies of the NOPA by USPS first-class mail on January 14, 2020. On January 14, 2020 (the day after the NOPA was uploaded), Ms. Weems printed an original and copy of WKDR's NOPA. She placed the original NOPA and the other three documents in a window envelope, addressed to WKDR at 851 South Main Street. A copy of the NOPA, along with the three other documents, were placed in another envelope, addressed to Mark Smith, CPA, at his business mailing address, 115 Tamiami Trail. Ms. Weems testified that she created a mail log sheet, wrapped the log sheet around the envelopes, and placed both of these NOPA envelopes in the outgoing mail basket. After placing the items in the outgoing mail basket, a Department employee from Building L picks up the outgoing mail and mails it out. Ms. Weems testified that she has mailed NOPAs this way for over 10 years. Ms. Weems testified that it was her practice, and what she was taught by the Department, to send NOPAs that had assessments for over $100,000.00 by fax and e-mail, in addition to regular mail.4 WKDR's assessment was for an amount greater than $100,000.00. On January 16, 2020, Ms. Weems sent a copy of the NOPA to Mr. Smith by fax transmission. 4 It must be noted that the Department's internal policy to send NOPAs with assessments over $100,000.00 by e-mail and fax is an unadopted rule; however, it is not necessary to rely on it as the basis for the determination in this matter. See § 120.57(1)(e)1., Fla. Stat. Ms. Weems sent the fax to Mr. Smith's fax number, which was provided on the POA form. Ms. Weems used a fax coversheet when sending the fax. The coversheet recorded several important pieces of information. It provided the case number and the taxpayer's name (WKDR). Two boxes on the fax coversheet were checked—a box indicating there was a "POA" (Power of Attorney) in the file and a box indicating the NOPA was to be sent to the "POA." Ms. Weems also made some notes on the fax coversheet. She wrote: "original notice mailed 1/14/20," "email: mark@swagcpa.com," and "(8) pages." Ms. Weems testified that the reference to eight pages represented the amount of pages she faxed. These pages included the four documents sent by USPS first-class mail mentioned above. After faxing the documents to Mr. Smith's fax number, Ms. Weems received a fax transmission report. The report indicated "Results OK." The term "OK" on a fax transmission report is generally accepted as meaning that the transmission was completed successfully. On January 16, 2020, Ms. Weems also sent a copy of the NOPA and Notice of Taxpayer Rights to Mr. Smith by e-mail. Ms. Weems sent the e-mail to Mr. Smith at mark@swagcpa.com—the e-mail address she obtained from Mr. Smith's office, and which he confirmed was his through testimony at the hearing. The e-mail's subject line stated "Audit Number 200262550-010 WKDR II, INC." The e-mail stated as follows: Please respond back to me by e-mail letting me know you did receive the Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) and Taxpayer Rights by Email and Fax please. Good afternoon, Mr. Smith. I'm e-mailing you the Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) & Taxpayer Rights. I also faxed you the Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) & Taxpayer Rights to fax number 941-866-7691. The Original Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) & Taxpayer Rights was mailed out on 1/14/2020. Any questions call the Nopa Line at 850-617-8565. Thanks, Lisa Weems. The e-mail included an attachment labeled "3125_001.pdf." Ms. Weems testified that the attachment was a copy of the NOPA and Taxpayer Rights. Ms. Weems requested a "delivery receipt" and "read receipt" through her e-mail platform for the e-mail she sent to Mr. Smith. This was her customary practice when sending e-mails. A few seconds after sending her e-mail, she received a "delivery receipt" confirmation that the e-mail was delivered to mark@swagcpa.com. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Weems received a "read receipt" confirmation that her e-mail was received by Mr. Smith and was "read." The use of delivery and read receipts are not novel practices. Delivery and read receipts are used by a sender of an e-mail to confirm that the e-mail sent has been delivered to the addressee and, subsequently "read," that is, opened by the recipient. Ms. Weems keeps a monthly log of the NOPAs she sends out by fax and e-mail. Ms. Weems's monthly log for January 2020 includes entries that confirm she sent the WKDR NOPA by e-mail and fax to Mr. Smith at the contact information he provided. In addition to her personal monthly log, Ms. Weems also used SAP—a Department computer system that employees work in every day—to document her activities. On January 16, 2020, Ms. Weems made a notation in SAP that stated as follows: "I faxed the Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) & taxpayer rights to Mark Smith on 1/16/20 to fax number 941-866- 7691. I e-mailed the Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) and taxpayer rights to Mark Smith on 1/16/20 to e-mail address (mark@swagcpa.com). See attachments and notes." Testimony of Mark Smith Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive the NOPA by USPS first- class mail, fax, or e-mail. If the undersigned took Mr. Smith's testimony as true, all three of the Department's avenues of sending the NOPA failed. Mr. Smith testified that the NOPA, sent by USPS first-class mail, in the same fashion used for several other letters that he had received from the Department, was not received. Other than Mr. Smith's denial, WKDR provided no evidence that the NOPA and accompanying documents Ms. Weems mailed in separate packages to WKDR at its address and to WKDR's representative's address were not received. Mr. Smith testified that during the time the NOPA was sent, his business utilized an electronic faxing service called MyFax.com. Through this service, he received faxes in e-mail format, with the contents of the fax attached to the e-mail as a PDF document. Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive the fax from Ms. Weems. Mr. Smith also testified that he rarely read faxes because "90 plus percent of our faxes are payroll-related" and belonged to his business partner. Mr. Smith did not credibly explain how he comes to know about the ten percent of faxes directed to him. While perhaps his business partner screens faxes, it is inconceivable that a business firm would not ensure that incoming faxes are directed to the person to whom they are sent. That is particularly true where, as here, Mr. Smith has provided his business fax number as a means to give him notices regarding WKDR's audit. Although the Department provided documentation of a delivery and read receipt of the NOPA sent by e-mail to Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive it. Mr. Smith offered no credible explanation for the delivery and read receipts. Once again, it is not credible that a CPA who serves as the POA for taxpayer WKDR would not be reviewing e-mails delivered to his e-mail address, when his office has provided that e-mail address to the Department. Notably, he acknowledged reviewing other e-mail communications from the Department with regard to WKDR's audit. Mr. Smith's feigned ignorance of an e-mail delivered to him and opened by him is not credible and is not credited. The competent substantial evidence establishes that the Department mailed the NOPA to both Mr. Smith and WKDR at the addresses provided on the POA form. The testimony that Mr. Smith did not receive the NOPA is not credible. WKDR did not deny that it received the NOPA mailed to it; WKDR offered no testimony on the subject.5 The NOPA was mailed to the same addresses provided by Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner on the POA form and used by the Department to successfully communicate with Mr. Smith during the audit. WKDR and Mr. Smith were on notice that a NOPA was forthcoming. The Department advised WKDR and Mr. Smith by letter through regular mail and e-mail, on at least two occasions, that a NOPA was going to be issued and that the Department anticipated an assessment of additional taxes of approximately $801,967.00. The Department provided notice of the NOPA in a manner reasonably calculated to inform WKDR and its representative of WKDR's rights and of the deadlines to take action to protect those rights. WKDR and the Department communicated frequently during the audit, but after issuance of the NOPA, communications with WKDR and Mr. Smith ceased for several months. Mr. Smith did not reach out to the Department to find out why communications ceased. The reasonable inference is that Mr. Smith was fully aware of why the previous communications during the audit stopped: because the audit had culminated 5 In its post-hearing submittal, WKDR argued that the NOPA mail should have been sent to Mr. Plattner. But the NOPA package was addressed to WKDR, the taxpayer, at the mailing address given on the NOPA. WKDR had the opportunity in the POA form to designate Mr. Plattner as the taxpayer contact person but chose not to do so. in the NOPA and it was up to WKDR to contest the NOPA in a timely hearing request. On or around February 18, 2021, the Department issued an NIL against WKDR, by which it notified WKDR that it intended to freeze funds from WKDR's bank account in the amount of $999,999.99. The NIL provided that WKDR had 21 days from the date of receipt of the NIL to dispute the matter. On February 19, 2021, WKDR submitted a petition for a chapter 120 administrative hearing to challenge the NOPA. WKDR's petition challenging the Department's NOPA was filed with the Department 403 days after the date on the NOPA (January 13, 2020) and 286 days after the deadline for filing a petition to request an administrative hearing had passed. On February 23, 2021, WKDR timely filed a petition for an administrative hearing to dispute the NIL. WKDR's dispute of the NIL is solely based on its challenge to the NOPA, and its claim that it did not receive the NOPA when issued the year before. WKDR failed to timely exercise its opportunity to protest the amount of the Department's assessment, the underlying audit findings, and the methods the Department used to reach the amount in the assessment. There is no claim by WKDR in this case that the content of the Notice of Taxpayer Rights was unclear regarding the deadline to request a hearing or the manner in which a hearing must be requested; its claim is solely that it did not receive the NOPA and the accompanying Notice of Taxpayer Rights, a claim which is not credible. In sum, the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that the Department sent the NOPA to WKDR's representative by USPS first-class mail, e-mail, and fax, and to WKDR directly by USPS first-class mail; and that Mr. Smith received the NOPA by USPS first-class mail, e-mail, and fax, and that WKDR received the NOPA by USPS first-class mail. WKDR did not submit a timely request for hearing to dispute the NOPA.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Michael J. Bowen, Esquire Akerman LLP 50 North Laura Street, Suite 3100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 For Respondent: J. Clifton Cox, Esquire John G. Savoca, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order dismissing DOAH Case Nos. 21-0844 and 21-0845. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2021. Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Kristian Oldham, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Jacek Stramski, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Doug Plattner 3118 Walter Travis Drive Sarasota, Florida 34240 James H. Sutton, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, PA 8875 Hidden River Pkwy, Suite 230 Tampa, Florida 33637-2087 J. Clifton Cox, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Allison M. Dudley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John G. Savoca, Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael J. Bowen, Esquire Akerman LLP 50 North Laura Street, Suite 3100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 James A. Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner, James P. Appleman, "willfully" violated Subsections 106.021(3), 106.07(5), and Section 106.1405, Florida Statutes, as alleged by Respondent, Florida Elections Commission, in its Order of Probable Cause; and whether or not Petitioner, James P. Appleman, "knowingly and willfully" violated Subsections 106.19(1)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes, as alleged by Respondent, Florida Elections Commission, in its Order of Probable Cause.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, documentary evidence, record of proceedings, and the facts agreed to by the parties in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: In 2000, Petitioner was reelected to the office of State Attorney, Fourteenth Judicial Circuit. Prior to his reelection in 2000, Petitioner had been elected to the same office in 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. Petitioner, on February 1, 1999, signed a Statement of Candidate indicating that he had received, read, and understood Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. During the 2000 campaign, Petitioner made the following purchases using his personal funds in the form of cash, check or charge upon his personal credit card: a. Purchase 1: 7/12/99 Down payment/purchase of vehicle- $525.00 b. Purchase 2: 7/12/99 Purchase of vehicle/tax and title-$602.85 c. Purchase 3: 1/07/00 Bay Pointe Properties-$100.35 d. Purchase 4: 1/13/00 Delchamps Liquors-$58.50 e. Purchase 5: 1/22/00 Delchamps Liquors-$135.10 f. Purchase 6: 1/22/00 Cafe? Thirty A-$144.11 g. Purchase 7: 1/30/00 Pineapple Willy's-$17.45 h. Purchase 8: 5/05/00 Skirt/Jones of New York-$104.00- blouse/Jones of New York-$63.00 i. Purchase 9: 5/09/00 Tie/Dillards-$30.00-tie/Dillards- $40.00-misc. Big & Tall/Dillards- $8.75 j. Purchase 10: 5/23/00 Blazer/Polo Store-$199.99-short sleeve shirt/Polo Store-$39.99- short sleeve shirt/Polo Store- $39.99-short sleeve shirt/Polo Store-$39.99-shorts/Polo Store- $29.99 k. Purchase 11: 5/05/00 Casual bottoms/Brooks Brothers- $34.90-casual bottoms/Brooks Brothers-$34.90 casual bottoms/Brooks Brothers-$34.90 l. Purchase 12: 5/05/00 Shorts/Geoffrey Beene-$24.99- shorts/Geoffrey Beene-$24.99 m. Purchase 13: 5/05/00 Sport coat/Dillards-$195.00 n. Purchase 14: Telephone expense-$23.49 o. Purchase 15: 8/11/00 Tie down/Wal-Mart-$19.96-security chain/Wal-Mart-$19.26 p. Purchase 16: 8/11/00 Trailer hitch ball-$16.99 q. Purchase 17: 8/12/00 Event admission-$60.00 r. Purchase 18: 8/23/00 Liquor purchase/Delchamps-$37.41 s. Purchase 19: 8/30/00 Gas purchase/Shop a Snack-$20.00 t. Purchase 20: 8/30/00 Event admission-$40.00 u. Purchase 21: 8/30/00 Event admission/DEC-$15.00 v. Purchase 22: 8/26/00 Sign charge-$20.64 w. Purchase 23: 8/30/00 Auto insurance charge-$100.00 x. Purchase 24: 9/02/00 Gas purchase/Happy Stores-$34.00 y. Purchase 25: 9/02/00 Campaign staff/meal/food-$140.00 z. Purchase 26: 9/04/00 Ice purchase/Winn Dixie-$6.36 aa. Purchase 27: 9/05/00 Gas purchase/Swifty Store-$25.00 bb. Purchase 28: 9/06/00 Meal purchase/ St. Andrews Seafood House-$27.52 cc. Purchase 29: 9/08/00 Posthole digger-$42.90 dd. Purchase 30: 9/08/00 Lunch for sign crew-$20.14 None of these purchases were individually listed on Petitioner's Campaign Treasurer's Reports. Petitioner was reimbursed for each of the above- referenced expenditures by a check written on the campaign account, which was listed as an expenditure on Petitioner's Campaign Treasurer's Reports filed with the Division of Elections as follows: Date Name and Address of Person Receiving Reimbursement Purpose Amount 07-17-99 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 02-11-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 Reimb. Cmpgn. Vehicle Expenses Reimb. Cmpgn. Expenses $1,127.85 $830.81 06-10-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 08-07-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 Reimb. Cmpgn. Expenses Reimburse vehicle & Phone exp. $1,000.00 $400.00 08-30-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 09-08-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 Reimbursement/ Campaign Expense Reimbursement Camp. Expense $670.51 $295.92 On July 18, 2000, a campaign check for $140.99 was written to Winn Dixie. This check was reported on Petitioner's Campaign Treasurer's Report with the purpose listed as being "Campaign Social Supplies." The Winn Dixie purchase included the following items: A cat pan liner. 4 cans of cat food. A box of dryer sheets. A package of kitty litter. f. A jug of laundry detergent. The total cost of these items was $33.88. Petitioner signed all of his Campaign Treasurer's Reports, certifying as to their accuracy. The July 18, 2000, purchases at Winn Dixie were made by Mrs. Appleman, Petitioner's wife, and were a result of an inadvertent error. Immediately realizing that she had purchased personal items with campaign funds, she brought the matter to Petitioner's attention. Petitioner took possession of the Winn Dixie cash register receipt for the purchases; on the receipt he circled the inappropriate purchases with a pen, noted the total amount of inappropriate purchases on the receipt adding his initials, submitted the cash register receipt to his campaign treasurer, and several days later wrote a check reimbursing the campaign for the inappropriate purchases. During the campaign, Petitioner made 30 purchases listed in paragraph 3, supra, with personal funds, i.e., cash, personal check, or personal credit card, for which he provided receipts, and sought and received reimbursement from campaign funds by campaign check. These 30 purchases were not individually reported as expenditures on Campaign Treasurer's Reports during the reporting periods during which the purchases were made, but were reported as reimbursements as reflected in paragraph 4, supra. No evidence was presented that suggested that Purchases 3-7, Purchase 14, Purchases 17-22, or Purchases 24-30 listed in paragraph 3, supra, were not for campaign-related purposes. During the April 1 through June 30, 2000, campaign reporting period, Petitioner purchased 16 items of clothing (listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchases 8-13) for which he received reimbursement from campaign funds by campaign check. Petitioner and his wife testified that these items of clothing were used exclusively for campaign functions and purposes. Admittedly, each of the items of clothing could be used for non- campaign functions and purposes. However, the Campaign Treasurer's Reports reflect that in excess of $1,100 of "campaign shirts" were purchased during the campaign, supporting Petitioner's contention that he, his wife and campaign workers were all attired, while campaigning, in a color-coordinated "uniform of the day": red shirts, and tan/khaki trousers or walking shorts. This is further supported by photographs admitted into evidence. I find credible and accept the testimony of Petitioner and his wife that the items of clothing in the questioned purchases were used exclusively for campaign functions and purposes and not to "defray normal living expenses." During the August 12 through August 31, 2000, campaign reporting period, Petitioner purchased the following items for which he received reimbursement from campaign funds by campaign check: trailer hitch ball, trailer security chain, and sign tie-downs (listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchases 15 and 16). These three items were clearly used for campaign purposes and not to "defray normal living expenses." On August 30, 2001, Petitioner received a campaign check from the campaign treasurer reimbursing him for several campaign expenses he had paid. Among these campaign expenses, Petitioner sought reimbursement for $100 for "auto insurance" (listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchase 23). From the onset of his campaign, Petitioner had consistently either paid his automobile liability insurer, United Services Automobile Association, directly with a campaign check or sought reimbursement for payments he personally made for liability insurance on his personal vehicle or the "campaign Jeep" for automobile liability insurance cost attributable to the use of the motor vehicles in the campaign. Automobile liability insurance expense is a legitimate campaign expense and can reasonably be considered an actual transportation expense exempt from the statutory prohibition against payments made to "defray normal living expenses." On July 12, 1999, Petitioner purchased a 1997 Jeep to be used as a campaign vehicle (the down payment, tax and tag are listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchases 1 and 2); thereafter, loan payments to Tyndall Federal Credit Union and automobile liability insurance payments to United Services Automobile Association for the campaign vehicle were paid by the campaign treasury. On December 7, 1999, the 1997 Jeep was sold/traded to a third party for a 1999 Honda which was not used as a campaign vehicle. The Tyndall Federal Credit Union lien was transferred to the 1999 Honda. After December 7, 1999, the 1999 Honda was driven by Petitioner's adult stepdaughter. At the time of the transfer of the vehicles, Petitioner and his wife agreed that she would reimburse the campaign $800 which was determined to be the value lost by the campaign when the 1997 Jeep was traded. Petitioner later determined that he should reimburse the campaign an additional $525, the amount of the down payment paid when the 1997 Jeep was purchased in July 1999. On June 2, 2000, Petitioner's wife tendered a personal check drawn on her personal account to the campaign account for $800, which was reported under an entry date of June 5, 2000, on the Campaign Treasurer's Report for the period ending June 30, 2000, as a "REF" made by Petitioner. On March 14, 2001, Petitioner tendered a personal check to the campaign account for $617. This included $525 for the 1999 Jeep down payment reimbursement and an automobile liability insurance refund. Prior to the June 5, 2000, "REF" entry on the Campaign Treasurer's Report, there had been no report reflecting the sale of the campaign vehicle. The sale of the 1999 Jeep should have been reported on the Campaign Treasurer's Report for the period ending December 31, 1999; it was not. Petitioner certified that he had examined the subject Campaign Treasurer's Report and that it was "true, correct and complete" when, in fact, it was not as it did not reflect the sale of the campaign vehicle or the failure of Petitioner to pay the campaign treasury either $800 or $1,325, the amount Petitioner ultimately determined the campaign treasury should have been reimbursed as reflected by his late reimbursements.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, James P. Appleman, violated Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, on one occasion and Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, on one occasion and assess a civil penalty of $1,000 for the violation of Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, and a civil penalty of $2,400 for violation of Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes; and dismissing the remaining alleged violations of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, against him as asserted in the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: David F. Chester, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello and Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a consumer's certificate of exemption from sales tax as a "charitable institution" as that term is defined by Section 212.08(7)(o)2b., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a nonprofit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida as a corporation. Petitioner has applied to Respondent for a certificate of exemption from sales and use tax based on its claim that it is a "charitable institution" within the meaning of, and pursuant to the provisions of, Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. 2/ The Internal Revenue Service has determined that Petitioner is exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3). Edy Sanon, Petitioner's executive director, testified in general terms as to the services performed by Petitioner to persons of Haitian descent. Based on that general testimony, it cannot be determined with any degree of certainty the precise services performed by Petitioner. Mr. Sanon testified that his organization provides translation services and referral services that assist Haitian immigrants in adjusting to life in the United States, becoming employable, and obtaining services from various government agencies. Petitioner engages in fund raising and searches for governmental grants for a center where people can come for help. The extent of its resources expended on fund raising was not established. Mr. Sanon testified that Petitioner provides its services free of charge and that it served approximately 800 clients last year. Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, imposes a tax on sales, use and other transactions. Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida charged with administering Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and its duties include the issuance of certificates of exemption from tax pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to its rule-making authority, Respondent has adopted Rule 12A-1.001, Florida Administrative Code, to implement the provisions of Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes. Although Petitioner has been recognized as a nonprofit organization by the Internal Revenue Service, Petitioner must receive a certificate of exemption from Respondent to be exempt from Florida's tax on sales, use, and other transactions imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The provisions of Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12A-1.001, Florida Administrative Code, provide the criteria for the exemption sought by Petitioner. Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, an exemption from sales tax as follows: (o) Religious, charitable, scientific, educational, and veterans' institutions and organizations. There are exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter transactions involving: * * * b. Sales or leases to nonprofit religious, nonprofit charitable, nonprofit scientific, or nonprofit educational institutions when used in carrying on their customary nonprofit religious, nonprofit charitable, nonprofit scientific, or nonprofit educational activities . . . * * * The provisions of this section authorizing exemptions from tax shall be strictly defined, limited, and applied in each category as follows: * * * b. "Charitable institutions" means only nonprofit corporations qualified as nonprofit pursuant to s. 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and other nonprofit entities, the sole or primary function of which is to provide, or to raise funds for organizations which provide, one or more of the following services if a reasonable percentage of such service is provided free of charge, or at a substantially reduced cost, to persons, animals, or organizations that are unable to pay for such service: * * * (IV) Social welfare services including adoption placement, child care, community care for the elderly, and other social welfare services which clearly and substantially benefit a client population which is disadvantaged or suffers a hardship . . . 3/ Rule 12A-1.001(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code, implements the provisions of Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (g)1. "Charitable institutions" means only nonprofit corporations qualified as nonprofit pursuant to s. 501(c)(3), United States Internal Revenue Code, 1954, as amended, and other nonprofit entities that meet the following requirements: the sole or primary function is providing a "qualified charitable service" as defined in this subsection; and a reasonable percentage of such service is provided free of charge, or at a substantially reduced cost, to persons, animals, or organizations that are unable to pay for such service. * * * 3.a. For the purpose of this subsection the following terms and phrases shall have the meaning ascribed to them except when the context clearly indicates a different meaning: I. "Persons unable to pay" means persons whose annual income is 150 percent or less of the current Federal Poverty Guidelines . . . * * * "Substantially reduced cost" means the normal charge, market price, or fair market value to a purchaser or recipient, diminished in an amount of considerable quantity. "Sole or primary function" means that a charitable institution, excluding hospitals, must establish and support its function as providing or raising funds for services as outlined in subparagraphs 1. and 2. above, by expending in excess of 50.0 percent of the charitable institution's operational expenditures towards "qualified charitable services", as defined in subparagraph 2.a. - g. within the charitable institution's most recent fiscal year. Petitioner established that it is a nonprofit organization. Petitioner did not present any financial data at the formal hearing. In the absence of that financial information, it cannot be found that Petitioner disburses more than fifty percent of its expenditures to provide or raise funds for a provider of a statutorily listed service. The absence of that information is fatal to Petitioner's application. 4/ The unchallenged testimony of Mr. Sanon was sufficient to establish for the purposes of this proceeding that Petitioner does not charge for its services. Petitioner did not establish at the formal hearing the ability of any of its client to pay a reasonable fee for the services provided by Petitioner. The general testimony of Mr. Sanon failed to establish that the translation, referral, and other services provided by Petitioner are "social welfare services" within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. 5/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that denies Petitioner's application for a certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1998.
