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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs ERIC KACHNYCZ, LLC, D/B/A DONE RIGHT IRRIGATION AND LIGHTING, 16-000762 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Feb. 11, 2016 Number: 16-000762 Latest Update: Aug. 12, 2016

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Eric Kachnycz, LLC d/b/a Done Right Irrigation and Lighting (“Done Right”), should have a penalty assessed against it by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department”), and, if so, the amount of such penalty or assessment.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the State agency responsible for, inter alia, ensuring that all businesses operating in this State have workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Done Right is a duly-formed and validly-existing limited liability company in the State of Florida. It was formed on July 27, 2004, for the purpose of conducting any and all lawful business. At the time of its formation, Eric Kachnycz was the only listed manager or managing member of the company. His address was listed as 9 Twin River Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida. The registered agent for the company was listed as Betty C. Kachnycz, at the same address. In 2011, Daniel Dupuis was added as a managing member of the company. His address was listed as a post office box in Ormond Beach, Florida. By way of a document filed with the Secretary of State, Division of Corporations, on March 1, 2016, Daniel Dupuis was withdrawn as a managing member of the company. On January 14, 2016, Kent Howe, a compliance investigator with the Department, conducted an investigation at 316 Ocean Dunes Road in Daytona Beach, Florida. Upon arrival at the site at around 11:00 a.m., Mr. Howe noted the presence of a large white truck and work trailer parked in front of the residence. The truck and trailer were imprinted with the name and contact information for Done Right. Mr. Howe saw a person (later identified as Daniel Dupuis) engaged in repair work on a sprinkler or irrigation system in the front yard of the residence. After about ten minutes observing Mr. Dupuis, Mr. Howe approached and asked him for whom he worked. Mr. Dupuis responded that he worked for Done Right and that Mr. Kachnycz owned and operated the business. There was another person at the job site who Mr. Dupuis identified as the owner of the residence. That person, with whom Mr. Howe did not converse, was observed walking into and out of the house and, just before Mr. Howe left the site at 1:00 p.m., was seen using a shovel to back-fill some of the irrigation ditches that had been dug.1/ Mr. Howe tracked down and called Mr. Kachnycz to inquire as to the existence of workers’ compensation insurance for his employees, including Mr. Dupuis. Mr. Kachnycz said that the only two persons associated with Done Right, he and Mr. Dupuis, had existing exemptions from workers’ compensation coverage. Further, Mr. Kachnycz said the he had personally applied for the exemptions himself. Mr. Howe checked the Department’s compliance and coverage automated system (CCAS) to verify the exemptions. He found that Mr. Kachnycz had a current exemption, but Mr. Dupuis’ exemption had expired on April 26, 2015, approximately nine months previous. Exemptions have a two-year term once granted, but may be renewed on-line prior to their expiration. Mr. Kachnycz obtained an exemption in 2004 and has renewed it every two years thereafter. Mr. Dupuis obtained his first exemption in February 2011, but did not timely renew it before it expired two years later. He then obtained an exemption in April 2013, but it expired in 2015. He did not have an exemption in place on January 14, 2016, while working at the job site. He did, however, apply for an exemption just two days later, i.e., on January 16, 2016. After verifying the corporate information for Done Right and checking CCAS to see if any other insurance coverage was in place, Mr. Howe determined that Done Right was not in compliance with workers’ compensation insurance requirements. The information gathered by Mr. Howe was presented to his area district manager, who approved the issuance of a stop work order. Mr. Howe prepared the SWO (along with a request for business records) and hand-delivered the documents to Mr. Dupuis at the job site. Mr. Howe attempted to serve the registered agent of Done Right, Betty C. Kachnycz, at her residence but Mr. Kachnycz said she was working out of town at her job as a registered nurse. So, instead of hand-delivery, Mr. Howe sent a copy of the SWO and request for business records to Mrs. Kachnycz via certified mail. The documents were delivered and signed as accepted by Mrs. Kachnycz on January 23, 2016. Subsequently, Mr. Howe had a conversation with Mr. Kachnycz concerning the possibility of Mr. Kachnycz signing a Conditional Agreed Release from the SWO. A blank copy of that agreement was provided for Mr. Kachnycz’ review, but he never signed the agreement. Mr. Howe later had another conversation with Mr. Kachnycz during which the latter inquired about the “criminal” charges against him related to the SWO. Mr. Howe knew nothing of any criminal charges and no evidence of such was offered at final hearing. Mr. Howe had no further contact with Mr. Kachnycz. Mr. Kachnycz ultimately asked for a formal administrative hearing to contest the SWO and penalty assessment, resulting in the instant case. During the preparation phase prior to final hearing, the Department continued to attempt to obtain the business records for Done Right. The Department served interlocking discovery on Done Right to obtain the business records along with other information. Mr. Kachnycz, however, steadfastly refused to provide the records unless, in his words, “[the records are] not used against me in a court of law.” During his deposition in this matter, Mr. Kachnycz reiterated his demand that his business records not be used against him in this proceeding, a clear indication of Mr. Kachnycz’ lack of understanding of the administrative process. There is no basis in law for such a demand by a party to an administrative proceeding. Mr. Kachnycz also invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and otherwise refused to answer questions posed to him during the deposition.2/ Review of an entity’s business records by the Department allows it to assess the amount of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for the business. A review also allows the Department to determine whether a penalty should be imposed at all. Had Done Right provided its business records in the instant case, it may have resolved the dispute without the necessity of a final administrative hearing. We shall never know. Based upon the absence of business records for Done Right, the Department used its existing rule constructs to formulate the amount of the penalty to be assessed. Anita Proano, an employee in the Department’s bureau of compliance, established a penalty using standard guidelines. Since Done Right did not provide business records for review, the imputed method was employed.3/ First, the payroll was calculated by using the average weekly wage in effect at the time of the issuance of the SWO and, per statute, multiplying by two. Class Code 5183-–under the construction umbrella, but specifically including irrigation and lawn sprinkler systems-– was assigned to the work being done by Done Right. The period of non-compliance was set at September 3, 2015, through December 31, 2015, and January 1, 2016, through January 14, 2016. Those are the dates within the Department’s two-year audit period that Done Right was deemed to be out of compliance. The imputed gross payroll amount was $29,571.77 for the first period of non-compliance and $3,450.04 for the second period. Those figures, divided by 100, resulted in the amounts of $295.72 and $34.50, respectively. The approved manual rate set for the two periods was $5.46 and $5.11, reflecting the rates for Class Code 5183. The premium owed by the employer for the first period was calculated at $1,614.62 and the premium it should have paid for the second period was $176.30. Those amounts, multiplied by two, resulted in assessed penalties of $3,229.24 and $352.60, for a total penalty of $3,581.84. Done Right presented no evidence to contest the amount of the penalty or the calculation thereof. Instead, Mr. Kachnycz inquired of the Department’s witnesses whether they had signed loyalty oaths and, if so, if they remembered what was in the oath. He expressed his displeasure at the process for penalizing small businesses and invoked his Constitutional rights (State and Federal), but provided no evidence germane to the issues of this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing a penalty of $3,581.84 against Respondent, Eric Kachnycz, LLC, d/b/a Done Right Irrigation and Lighting. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2016

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68440.10440.107440.38
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs BEVERLY JEAN PHILLIPS, 01-003127PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 10, 2001 Number: 01-003127PL Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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SARAH H. HOYLE vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-001111 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001111 Latest Update: Aug. 21, 1980

Findings Of Fact Petitioner retired from employment with the State of Florida effective January 1, 1976, and began drawing retirement benefits on that date. During 1979, she worked for the South Florida State Hospital, her former employer, on a temporary basis while continuing to receive retirement compensation of $235.46 monthly. At the request of the South Florida State Hospital, Petitioner worked from June 7 through August 10, and September 7 through December 6, 1979. On September 28, she reached five hundred hours of employment for the calendar year. Therefore, Petitioner exceeded five hundred hours of state employment during the months of September, October, November, and December, 1979. Respondent seeks return of retirement compensation for the last three days of September and for all of the months of October, November and December, plus ten percent annual interest. This amounts to $729.93 in retirement compensation plus $36.04 interest through April 30, 1980.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner be ordered to repay the State of Florida retirement compensation in the amount of $729.93 plus ten percent interest compounded annually. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-1777 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Sarah H. Hoyle 1201 S.W. 17th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Christopher M. Rundle, Esquire South Florida State Hospital 1000 S.W. 84th Avenue Hollywood, Florida Mr. A. J. McMullian, III State Retirement Director Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Florida Laws (1) 121.091
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MYRON ROSNER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 17-000662 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 31, 2017 Number: 17-000662 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 2018

The Issue Whether Petitioner forfeits his rights to benefits under the Florida Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact On May 5, 2011, Petitioner was mayor of North Miami Beach, Florida. During Petitioner’s employment as mayor with North Miami Beach, he was a member of the Florida Retirement System. On or about October 17, 2012, Petitioner was charged by Information with nine criminal counts in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. On February 24, 2016, pursuant to a written Plea Agreement, Rosner entered a plea of guilty to Count 11/ Unlawful Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behavior, in violation of section 838.016(2), in Eleventh Circuit case F12023663. That same day in the Eleventh Circuit case F12023663, Judge Martin Bidwill issued the following orders: an Order Ratifying Terms of Plea Agreement; a Disposition Order specifying Rosner’s plea to Count 1 Unlawful Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behavior; and a Finding of Guilt Order to Count 1 Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behav[ior]/Influence. The October 17, 2012, Information detailed the factual basis of Rosner’s plea and conviction in Count 1.2/ Petitioner illegally received unpaid campaign advertising from Martin Outdoor Media, which had a continuing contract with the City of North Miami Beach while Petitioner served as mayor. Count 1 provides in relevant part, the following: COUNT 1 MYRON JOEL ROSNER, on or about May 5, 2011, in the County and State aforesaid, being a public servant to wit: MAYOR OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH did unlawfully, feloniously, and corruptly request, solicit, accept, or agree to accept any pecuniary or other benefit not authorized by law, to wit; UNPAID CAMPAIGN ADS, for the past, future, or future exertion of any influence upon or with any other public servant regarding any act or omission which said public servant represented as being within the official discretion of a public servant, to wit: CONTINUE ALL MARTIN OUTDOOR MEDIA CONTRACTS WITH THE CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, in violation of s. 838.016(2), Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.3/ Rosner was notified by certified letter dated April 20, 2016, of the Division's proposed action to forfeit his Florida Retirement System rights and benefits pursuant to sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5)(f). The notice provided the following basis for the proposed action: . . . . as a result of your guilty plea in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, for acts committed in connection with your employment with the City of North Miami Beach. Specifically, on or about October 18, 2012, in Case Number F12-023663 (2012-CF_023663), you were charged by information, in relevant part, with unlawful compensation or award for official behavior, a second degree felony in violation of section 838.016(2), Florida Statutes, based on conduct which occurred on or about May 5, 2011. On or about February 24, 2016, you entered a guilty plea for one count of unlawful compensation or award for official behavior, a second degree felony in violation of section 838.016(2), Florida Statutes, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. By Petition dated May 9, 2016, Rosner contested the Notice and challenged the forfeiture.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of a specified offense committed prior to retirement pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his Florida Retirement System rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2017.

Florida Laws (7) 112.3173120.569120.57121.091838.016838.15838.16
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs PIERSON COMMUNITY PHARMACY, INC., 09-006370 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Nov. 18, 2009 Number: 09-006370 Latest Update: Jul. 12, 2010

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2009), by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that Florida employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. See § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent is a Florida for-profit corporation providing pharmacy services. Respondent has business locations at 842 West Plymouth Avenue, Deland, Florida, and 112 East First Avenue, Pierson, Florida. Respondent's Pierson business site sells a small amount of food like bubble gum and other sundries. Activities at the Pierson location include filling prescriptions, compounding and blending drugs, and dispensing drugs or medicine to walk-in customers and patients. The patients are referred from a health care clinic known as Northeast Florida Health Services (NEFHS). The patients are federally qualified as indigent pursuant to a federal poverty calculation. Respondent's Deland location deals solely with prescription drug transactions to indigent patients who are referred by NEFHS. The Deland business site is very small and has no walk-in customers or food or other sundries for sale. At the end of the month, Respondent sends a bill to NEFHS for the prescriptions dispensed by Respondent at both locations. NEFHS than reimburses Respondent for its services. Respondent pays its employees at both locations out of a single checking account. Only one tax identification number is used for both business locations. On October 27, 2009, Hector Beauchamp, one of Petitioner's workers' compensation compliance investigators, received a referral, indicating that Respondent was operating without workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees. After receiving the referral, Mr. Beauchamp used the website of the Department of State, Division of Corporations, to obtain Respondent's federal employer identification number. The Department of State website showed that Respondent became Pierson Community Pharmacy, Inc., on March 3, 2005. The website also indicated that Respondent had two corporate officers, John Eidt and Hanan Francis. Next, Mr. Beauchamp contacted Samantha Nixon, one of Petitioner’s penalty calculators, to research Respondent's unemployment compensation tax information on the Department of Revenue's website. Ms. Nixon's research revealed that Respondent employed in excess of four employees for each quarter in the past three years. Mr. Beauchamp also consulted Petitioner's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) database. The CCAS database lists the workers' compensation insurance policy information for Florida employers together with any workers' compensation exemptions for corporate officers. The CCAS database accurately revealed that Respondent had no workers' compensation insurance policy in place for its employees and no workers' compensation exemptions for either Mr. Eidt or Ms. Francis as corporate officers. This was true from October 29, 2006, through October 28, 2009. Additionally, the CCAS database did not reveal any utilization of employee leasing by Respondent. Mr. Beauchamp also researched the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI) on-line database. Using Respondent's name and federal employer identification number, the database showed no record of a Florida workers' compensation insurance policy for Respondent. On October 28, 2009, Mr. Beauchamp visited both of Respondent's business locations. At the Pierson location, Mr. Beauchamp observed five individuals working behind a Plexiglas partition filling prescriptions. Mr. Beauchamp spoke with Mr. and Mrs. Francis. They confirmed that Respondent did not have workers' compensation insurance in place. Mr. Beauchamp then issued and served a Stop-Work Order. He also issued and served a records request. On October 29, 2010, Respondent provided Petitioner with the following records: (a) corporate tax records for 2007 and 2008; (b) a workers' compensation insurance application submitted after the issuance of the Stop-Work Order; and (c) payroll summaries for October 2006 through October 2009. The records confirmed that Respondent had employed more than four employees for the prior three years. On October 30, 2009, Petitioner issued and served the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. That order was followed by the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on March 15, 2010. Ms. Nixon calculated the gross payroll for Respondent's employees for the relevant time period. The gross payroll amounts for Ms. Francis from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008, and April 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009, were limited to the average weekly wage in effect at the time the Stop-Work Order was issued, multiplied by 1.5 for those periods pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035(2). As a corporate officer, Ms. Francis' actual earnings were in excess of these amounts. However, Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(2) limits the amount of a corporate officer's income upon which workers' compensation penalties may be assessed to 1.5 times the average weekly wage in effect at the time a Stop-Work Order is issued or actual earnings, whichever is less. Using the classification codes in the NCCI Scopes® Manual, Petitioner accurately assigned the occupation classification code 8045, which corresponds to "Store: Drug Retail." Classification code 8045 is "applicable to store locations where the employer's books of accounts reflect at least 40 percent gross receipts in prescription sales and less than 50 percent gross receipts in the service of food." Prescription sales intended for the patients of health care facilities are included even though the facility is billed instead of the individual patient. Ms. Nixon then divided the payroll for each year by 100 and multiplied that figure by the approved manual rates adopted by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation for 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 for classification code 8045. That product was then multiplied by 1.5 to find the penalty for the period for the three-year period. The total penalty is $13,996.60.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, issue a final order affirming the Stop- Work Order and Second Amended order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $13,996.60. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Eidt Pierson Community Pharmacy Inc. 112 East 1st Avenue Pierson, Florida 32180 Justin H. Faulkner, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Julie Jones, CRP, FP Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57440.02440.05440.107 Florida Administrative Code (2) 69L-6.01269L-6.035
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs PROFESSIONAL STAFFING AND PAYROLL SERVICES, LLC, 15-004527 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 14, 2015 Number: 15-004527 Latest Update: Apr. 11, 2016

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for its employees in violation of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014), and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement that employers in the State of Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage for their employees, pursuant to chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, is a registered Florida limited liability company. At all times relevant to this proceeding, its business address was 1400 Colonial Boulevard, Suite 260, Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent actively engaged in business during the period from February 1, 2015, to June 17, 2015. On June 2, 2015, Petitioner's compliance investigator, Jack Gumph, conducted a workers' compensation compliance investigation at a worksite located at 8530 Palacio Terrace North, Lot 67, Hacienda Lakes, Naples, Florida. At the worksite, Gumph observed five workers nailing down plywood on the trusses of the roof of a house under construction. One of the workers, Fernando Fernandez, identified himself as the job foreman. Mr. Fernandez and the other four workers were employed by J.S. Valdez, Inc. ("JSV"). These workers were engaged in carpentry work installing plywood. This type of carpentry work is classified as National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") class code 5403 and is considered a type of construction activity under Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021(2)(cc). The evidence established that JSV was a client company of Global Staffing Services, LLC ("GSS"), and that GSS supplied the workers to JSV. The evidence further established that all five workers Gumph observed at the Palacio Terrace jobsite were employees of GSS. Using the State of Florida's Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS") computer database, Gumph determined that JSV did not have workers' compensation insurance covering any of its employees, and that GSS had workers' compensation coverage only for two secretarial/clerical employees. Through research in the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations Sunbiz database ("Sunbiz"), Gumph discovered that GSS was part of three related——as Gumph characterized it, "commingled"——business entities; these entities were GSS, Global Staffing Payroll, LLC ("GSP"), and Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, the named Respondent in this case. Ivan Hernandez was shown in Sunbiz as being the managing member of GSS and GSP. At that time, the managing member of Respondent was shown as being Martha Coloma. Gumph suspected that Respondent was leasing construction workers, who are engaged in hazardous work, through a staffing company that was characterized as a secretarial/clerical business (NCCI code 8810)——a substantially less hazardous occupation. The effect of classifying of these business as "secretarial/clerical" is that a much lower workers' compensation premium rate applies.2/ Gumph prepared requests for production of business records ("RPBR") for each of the related business entities and visited the business address listed in Sunbiz for GSS to personally serve them on Hernandez. The business was located in a strip mall that housed various types of businesses. As he was entering the business, he noted that the name shown at the entrance was "Professional Staffing." The business manager explained that GSS was opened in 2013, and that on February 1, 2015, the business name had been changed to Professional Staffing and Payroll Services——the named Respondent in this proceeding. Upon inquiry, Gumph was told that Hernandez was "out of state." Almost as soon as he left Respondent's business office, Gumph received a call from Hernandez, who confirmed that he was the owner and chief executive officer of both GSS and Respondent. Gumph scheduled an appointment with Hernandez for June 16, 2015. However, Hernandez did not keep that appointment or call Gumph back to reschedule the appointment. It was obvious to Gumph that Hernandez was avoiding him. In researching the Sunbiz records for Respondent, Gumph also noted that on June 16, 2015, the managing member's name had been changed from Martha Coloma to Ivan Hernandez. He also rechecked the CCAS and NCCI databases for Respondent and noted that only a few days before, a workers' compensation policy had been issued for Respondent. The policy listed the business as "secretarial/clerical" and had a total exposure of $143,000 to cover four secretarial/clerical employees. He also noted that GSS had a workers' compensation policy that was effective from August 15, 2014, to August 15, 2015, and that this policy did not cover any additional insured entities, so its coverage did not extend to Respondent or its employees. Gumph contacted Martha Coloma, who was employed by All Florida Financial Services, LLC, a payroll preparation and bookkeeping firm. Coloma told Gumph that in January 2015, Hernandez had asked her to amend the Sunbiz records for Respondent to be shown as Respondent's managing member. Coloma also told Gumph that Hernandez requested that she find a Professional Employer Organization ("PEO") leasing company that would secure workers' compensation coverage for approximately 40 to 50 of his employees who were engaged in construction work.3/ Coloma was unsuccessful, so Hernandez directed her to obtain another policy for secretarial/clerical employees. She obtained the policy covering the four secretarial/clerical employees. Thereafter, Gumph spoke directly with Hernandez, who confirmed that he employed 40 to 50 construction workers. He told Gumph that he had tried to obtain a policy but had been unable to do so. On June 17, 2015, Gumph issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent, and also served a RPBR on Respondent. In response, Respondent provided business records consisting of bank statements from a Regions Bank account covering the period from February 1, 2015, to February 28, 2015. Respondent did not provide any copies of checks written during this period. Respondent also provided business records consisting of bank statements and copies of checks from a Fifth Third Bank payroll account for Respondent for the period of March 1, 2015, through June 17, 2015. The evidence establishes that between February 1, 2015, and June 12, 2015, Respondent employed 437 employees—— the great majority of whom worked in construction jobs——for whom Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage. For the period between June 13, 2015, and June 17, 2015, Respondent secured workers' compensation coverage for four secretarial/clerical employees. Based on the business records provided, Lynne Murcia, Petitioner's penalty auditor, calculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. Pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d)1., the penalty for failing to secure workers' compensation is equal to two times the amount the employer would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll during the period for which the employer failed to secure coverage during the two-year period preceding issuance of the Stop-Work Order. Here, because Respondent became a business entity on or about February 1, 2015, the penalty period applicable to this proceeding commenced on February 1, 2015, and ran through June 17, 2015, the date on which the Stop-Work Order and Penalty Assessment were served on Respondent.4/ Respondent did not obtain any exemptions from the workers' compensation coverage requirement for the period between February 1, 2015, and June 17, 2015. The business records Respondent provided in response to the RPBR were not sufficient to enable Petitioner to calculate Respondent's payroll for the period commencing on February 1, 2015, and ending on February 28, 2015. Accordingly, Petitioner imputed the gross payroll for Respondent's employees identified in the taxable wage report for the period covering February 1, 2015, through February 28, 2015, the statewide average weekly wage effective at the time of the Stop-Work Order, multiplied by two. The imputed wages for these employees over this period amounted to $2,544,907.68. For the period commencing on March 1, 2015, and ending on June 17, 2015, Respondent provided records sufficient to enable Petitioner to determine Respondent's actual gross payroll. For this period, Respondent's gross payroll amounted to $1,202,781.88. The evidence shows that for the period from February 1, 2015, through June 12, 2015, Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for any of its employees. On June 13, 2015, Respondent secured workers' compensation covering four secretarial/clerical employees. This coverage did not extend to Respondent's employees engaged in work other than secretarial/clerical work. For the period from June 13, 2015, to June 17, 2015, Respondent's gross payroll was calculated as $22,507.37. In calculating the applicable penalty, Respondent received a credit of $923.98 for the premium paid on the policy secured on June 12, 2015. This amount was deducted from the penalty owed. In calculating the penalty, Murcia determined the NCCI class code applicable to each employee according to his or her job, and applied the pertinent approved NCCI rates to determine the amount of the evaded premium for each employee. Pursuant to this method, Murcia calculated a total penalty of $645,019.36, which was reflected in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. In sum, Petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees, in violation of chapter 440. The clear and convincing evidence further establishes that Petitioner correctly calculated a penalty of $645,019.36 to be assessed against Respondent pursuant to sections 440.107(7)(d)1. and 440.107(7)(e) and rule 69L-6.028.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order determining that Respondent Professional Staffing and Payroll Services, LLC, violated the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, to secure workers' compensation coverage and imposing a penalty of $645,019.36. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2016.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68440.02440.10440.107440.12440.38
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs ALFRED STRANGE, D/B/A, AL'S PAINTING SERVICE, LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND AL'S PAINTING SERVICE, LLC, 13-001212 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port St. Joe, Florida Apr. 05, 2013 Number: 13-001212 Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2013

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by failing to secure the payment of workers? compensation as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and if so, what penalty is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (the Department), is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement that employers in the State of Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation for their employees. Mr. Alfred Strange was a managing member of Respondent Al?s Painting Service, LLC (the LLC), which had been created at least as early as 2004. The LLC was administratively dissolved on September 24, 2010, for failure to file an Annual Report. After this date, no further Annual Reports were filed. As a managing member of the LLC, Mr. Strange had initially obtained an exemption from workers? compensation coverage beginning on October 21, 2004, which was renewed once for a two-year period and finally expired on October 20, 2008. Mr. Frederick Crutchfield, another managing member of the LLC, had an exemption which expired on November 20, 2008. After this date, no further Requests for Exemption were filed by the company or its officers. Mr. Strange and Mr. Crutchfield did not have exemptions in effect from January 8, 2010, until September 24, 2010, when the LLC was dissolved. Mr. Carl Woodall is a senior investigator with the Division of Workers? Compensation. Mr. Woodall was appointed as an investigator on July 2, 2007, and was appointed as a senior investigator, Position Number 43003044, on September 1, 2012. He has been involved with over 400 enforcement cases under chapter 440. The position description for Position Number 43003044, effective September 1, 2012, provides in relevant part: The incumbent in this position is responsible for conducting investigations for the purpose of ensuring employer compliance with the workers? compensation requirements; entering and inspecting any place of business at any reasonable time for purpose of investigating employer compliance; examining and copying business records; and issuing, serving, and enforcing stop-work orders, penalty assessment orders, and any other orders required under s. 440.107 F.S. On January 7, 2013, Investigator Woodall conducted a site visit to a commercial building at 20721 Central Avenue East, Blountstown, Florida. Outside this address, there was a van with advertising on its side showing a man painting with a paint roller, the words “Al?s Painting,” and a phone number. Inside, he encountered Mr. Strange painting the east wall of the building. Investigator Woodall was wearing a shirt displaying a seal with the words “State of Florida Workers? Compensation Investigator” emblazoned on it. Investigator Woodall showed Mr. Strange his identification, which contained his name and identification number 03044, and indicated that he was a senior compliance investigator with the Division of Workers? Compensation. In response to questions from Investigator Woodall, Mr. Strange provided identification in the form of his driver?s license and stated that he had been working at the Central Avenue address for a few days and was painting only part of the building. Mr. Strange stated that he was being paid $15.00 per hour and that he had been paid once by check. Mr. Strange provided a business card to Investigator Woodall. Investigator Woodall testified that Mr. Strange may have told him that he had an old card in the van and Investigator Woodall remembered that Mr. Strange did go to the van and look for something. The business card that was provided to Investigator Woodall was printed with “Al?s Painting Service, LLC.” It is not clear that Mr. Strange ever held himself out as doing business under the name “Al?s Painting Service, LLC” in obtaining the work at Central Avenue or at any time after the LLC was dissolved. Investigator Woodall checked workers? compensation information for Al?s Painting Service, LLC, by accessing the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) maintained by the Department. The database indicated no workers? compensation coverage was in effect for the LLC. It indicated that Mr. Strange and Mr. Crutchfield were managing members of the LLC but that their exemptions had expired in 2008. Information in the CCAS is submitted by insurance companies and the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI). Investigator Woodall also accessed the Department of State, Division of Corporations? website. That database indicated that Al?s Painting Service, LLC, had been dissolved on September 24, 2010. On January 7, 2013, at approximately 12:40 p.m., Investigator Woodall personally served a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment on Mr. Strange and the LLC, along with a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. Mr. Strange was actively involved in business operations in Florida during the period of January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013, inclusively. Mr. Strange operated within the construction industry during the period of January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013, inclusively. Mr. Strange was an "employer" during the time period of January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013, inclusively, as that term is defined in section 440.02(16). Mr. Strange neither obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage under chapter 440 for any of the individuals listed on the Penalty Worksheet, nor verified that any of those individuals or corporations had workers' compensation coverage before contracting with them for construction services at any point in time during the period of January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013, inclusively. Class Code 5474, used on the penalty worksheet attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and as defined by the NCCI SCOPES Manual, is the correct occupational classification for Alfred Strange, d/b/a Al's Painting Service, LLC, a Dissolved Florida Limited Liability Company. None of the employees listed on the Penalty Worksheet of Exhibit C were covered by workers' compensation insurance obtained through an employee leasing company for the period of January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013. Alfred Strange and Frederick Crutchfield were "employees" of Alfred Strange, d/b/a Al's Painting Service, LLC, a Dissolved Florida Limited Liability Company, as that term is defined in section 440.02(15), during the period of January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013, whether continuously or not. Neither Alfred Strange nor Frederick Crutchfield was an independent contractor of Alfred Strange, d/b/a Al's Painting Service, LLC, a Dissolved Florida Limited Liability Company, as that term is defined in section 440.02(15), during the period of January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013. Remuneration was paid to Alfred Strange and Frederick Crutchfield during January 8, 2010, through January 7, 2013. The Request for Admission that the approved manual rates applied on the Penalty Worksheet attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were correct was deemed admitted pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.370.1/ The penalty shown in column „g? of the Penalty Worksheet attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is the correct penalty for the employees listed there. Mr. Strange did not provide the Department any of the records requested in the Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. The imputed salary amounts for each employee listed on the penalty worksheet of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment equal the statewide average weekly wage multiplied by 1.5.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers? Compensation, enter a final order determining that Respondent Mr. Alfred T. Strange violated the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, to secure workers' compensation coverage, and imposing upon him a total penalty assessment of $28,175.64. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2013.

Florida Laws (11) 120.569120.6840.02440.02440.05440.10440.107440.12440.13440.16440.38
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PANHANDLE LAND & TIMBER COMPANY, INC. vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, 00-000755F (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 15, 2000 Number: 00-000755F Latest Update: Oct. 31, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).

Florida Laws (8) 120.56120.569120.595120.68253.12957.10557.111933.07 Florida Administrative Code (1) 18-21.019
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF WORKERS` COMPENSATION vs ANTONIO POWELL, 00-004246 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Oct. 17, 2000 Number: 00-004246 Latest Update: May 25, 2001

The Issue Is Respondent obligated to pay $1,100.00, pursuant to a September 8, 2000, Notice of Penalty Assessment Order because on August 30, 2000, he was an employer engaged in the "construction industry" as that term is defined by Section 440.02(7), Florida Statutes (2000), and had one or more employees.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for their employees. On August 30, 2000, Lisa Lyonais, Petitioner's investigator, conducted an on-site inspection of a single-family residence under construction in Ocala, Florida. She was accompanied by investigators of the Department of Insurance. Ms. Lyonais observed three persons working inside the house. One person was cleaning-up and sweeping. Ms. Lyonais determined this person to be an employee of Nadeau Construction Unlimited, Inc. (Nadeau). Due to what the other two persons told her, Ms. Lyonais pursued an investigation of Respondent. The building permit posted on the job board outside the house listed Nadeau as the general contractor and as the owner of the house. Ms. Lyonais telephoned Mr. Nadeau. Mr. Nadeau came to the job site and spoke with Ms. Lyonais. Due to what Mr. Nadeau told her, Ms. Lyonais contacted Respondent. Ms. Lyonais interviewed Respondent when he arrived at the job site. Respondent admitted then, and at hearing, that he was laying tile in the house; that he did not have a workers' compensation exemption; and that he did not carry workers' compensation insurance. Respondent's sister-in-law had requested that Mr. Nadeau hire Respondent to lay the tile in the house which Mr. Nadeau was constructing for her. A price for the tile- setting had been agreed-upon between Mr. Nadeau and Respondent prior to Respondent's commencing the work. By his answers to Requests for Admission, Respondent admitted this agreement constituted a "contract." He enlisted the help of his "church brothers," Brown and Sims, who were the two men originally interviewed on the job site by Ms. Lyonais. On August 30, 2000, Ms. Lyonais served on Respondent a Request for Business Records, so that she could determine whether Respondent was required to provide workers' compensation insurance. Respondent provided no records. Petitioner is the state agency authorized to issue workers' compensation exemptions and to which insurance carriers report that they have issued workers' compensation insurance policies to employers. Petitioner's electronic data base of this information allows its investigators to determine whether a particular employer has obtained an exemption or secured workers' compensation insurance. Ms. Lyonais verified on this electronic data base that Respondent had not secured workers' compensation insurance. Based on her observations on the job site, the search results of Petitioner's data base, and her understanding of the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, Ms. Lyonais issued a Stop Work Order on August 30, 2000, for Respondent's failure to secure workers' compensation insurance for himself and his two employees, Brown and Sims. On September 7, 2000, Respondent signed an Employer Payroll Affidavit in which he declared that he was a sole proprietor, that he had employees, and that he did not currently have workers' compensation insurance. Respondent also completed an Employee Payroll Worksheet in which he indicated that he employed the other two tile workers, Brown and Sims, whom he would pay $300.00 and $80.00 respectively, once he was paid by Mr. Nadeau. Mr. Nadeau paid Respondent $1,800.00, by business check dated September 8, 2000, for ceramic tile labor. Respondent endorsed the check and used some of the proceeds to pay Brown and Sims. The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) classifies types of employment and prescribes workers' compensation insurance premium rates for those classifications. Petitioner has adopted NCCI's SCOPES Manual by rule. See Rule 38F-5.111, Florida Administrative Code. Tile setting is classified by the SCOPES Manual under class code 5348 (stone, mosaic or terrazzo or ceramic tile work). The premium rate for each $100.00 of compensation paid under class code 5348 is 0.116. Ms. Lyonais calculated the evaded premium, or the premium that Respondent would have paid had he secured workers' compensation insurance, by multiplying the gross compensation to employees by the premium rate, resulting in a total of $208.80. She calculated the statutory penalty as twice that amount ($417.60) or $1,000.00, whichever is greater, and assessed $100.00 for each day the employer operated in violation of the Workers' Compensation Law. There is some evidence that Respondent, Brown, and Sims worked more than one day at the job site. Although an assessment might have been made for every day which Respondent, Brown, and Sims worked the job site, Petitioner is satisfied with assessing a $100.00 penalty only for the one day of August 30, 2000. At hearing, Respondent did not refute the foregoing formula or Ms. Lyonais' calculations, noted that he had paid the $1,100.00 penalty to Petitioner when it was assessed and that to do so had been a hardship on his family. He asserted that he had made an honest mistake because he felt he was working for his sister-in-law, whom he believed to be the homeowner. Respondent's wife also testified that the house belonged to her sister. However, Respondent presented no corroborative documentary evidence that his sister-in-law, in fact, owned the house at any time material. He also did not present any documents to refute the building permit. (See Finding of Fact No. 4). Respondent did not suggest that he had filed proof with the Agency of his financial ability to pay compensation, which filing, under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, is an alternative to securing coverage through an insurance company. Respondent did not suggest that he, Brown, or Sims had filed an election not to be covered by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation enter a Final Order declaring Respondent to have been a statutory employer on August 30, 2000; ratifying the $1,100.00 penalty assessment; and denying Respondent any refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2001.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57440.02440.05440.10440.107440.38 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.204
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OLAN B. WARD, SR.; MARTHA P. WARD; ANTHONY TARANTO; ANTOINETTE TARANTO; J. V. GANDER DISTRIBUTORS, INC.; J. V. GANDER, JR.; AND THREE RIVERS PROPERTIES, INC. vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, 00-000828F (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Apalachicola, Florida Feb. 22, 2000 Number: 00-000828F Latest Update: Oct. 31, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).

Florida Laws (8) 120.56120.569120.595120.68253.12957.10557.111933.07 Florida Administrative Code (1) 18-21.019
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