The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Community Housing Initiative, Inc. (Respondent), committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Karen Lee Krason (Petitioner), in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On or about June 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Commission. Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found that Respondent had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. DOAH issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Lee Krason 1715 Erin Court Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 COPIES FURNISHED BY CERTIFIED MAIL Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 3033 College Wood Drive Melbourne, Florida 32941 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 3000) Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. Post Office Box 410522 Melbourne, Florida 32941-0522 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2997) Michael Rogers, Officer/Director Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 1890 Palm Bay Road, Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2980)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Cordell John, (Landlord) discriminated against Petitioner, Denise Johnson- Acosta (Johnson) on the basis of her or her daughter’s alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Johnson is a Hispanic woman. She has asthma and other medical conditions. Johnson has a teenage daughter, Ashley Denise Rivera. Ashley has a seizure disorder and has bipolar disorder. Johnson is engaged to Alexis Pons. The Landlord is an African-American male. He owns the property located at 13847 Beauregard Place in Orlando, Florida (the Property). The Property is a single-family residential townhouse. At some unspecified time during calendar year 2012, Johnson approached the Landlord expressing an interest in leasing the Property. At that time, another tenant was living in the Property but was in the process of moving out. The Landlord showed Johnson the Property. Johnson expressed her complete satisfaction with the Property and that she would like to lease it (and possibly buy it in the future). At first sight, Johnson liked everything about the Property except for the back yard. On September 10, 2012, the Landlord emailed a Rental Application to Johnson. The email advised Johnson that there would be a $50 application fee which must be paid when the application was delivered. In response to the email, Johnson confirmed that she wanted to view the Property on the upcoming Thursday. On September 11, 2012, Johnson filled out the Rental Application and provided it to the Landlord for review. The application listed Johnson as the primary tenant and Ashley and Pons as additional residents. The application also noted that Johnson had a pet, a petite Chihuahua, which would be living in the unit. After reviewing the application, the Landlord notified Johnson via email that he would need pictures of the Chihuahua. He also asked how much the dog weighed. The Landlord also told Johnson that the rent would be $1,250 per month and that a $200 nonrefundable pet fee must be paid. Johnson replied that the dog weighed four pounds. She was concerned that the Landlord was now quoting $1,250 per month when earlier discussions had indicated the rent would be $1,200 per month. Johnson thanked the Landlord and agreed to provide a picture of the dog. The Landlord replied to Johnson that when pets are involved, the rent is increased slightly. Johnson and the Landlord had a conversation on September 17, 2012. By email dated September 18, 2012, Johnson told the Landlord that she had decided to withdraw her application because of “multiple misunderstandings” between the parties. At some point thereafter, Johnson decided to go through with the lease after all. On October 20, 2012, Johnson did a walk-through inspection of the Property. By way of her signature on the walk-through check list, Johnson agreed that the living room, kitchen, dining room, both bathrooms, both bedrooms, and all other portions of the Property were satisfactory. The only caveat was that there was stain on a counter in the kitchen area. Johnson said she would “advise at time of move” as to her feelings about the parking areas and the patio/terrace/deck area. On November 2, 2012, Johnson and the Landlord entered into a binding Residential Tenancy Agreement. Johnson initialed each page and signed the agreement. The agreement was witnessed by two individuals. On or about that same date, Johnson gave the Landlord several money orders: A $250 money order for the pet deposit; $50 for Pons’ application fee, and $880 for prorated rent for November. Johnson did not complain about the pet deposit at that time. Johnson moved into the Property on or about November 2, 2012. About two months later, on January 1, 2013, Johnson mailed a letter to the Landlord via certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter advised the Landlord that Johnson would be moving out of the Property on or before January 14, 2013. The letter cited several bases for the decision to move out, including: Air condition vents were “visibly covered with dust and dark surroundings”; Johnson and her daughter have severe allergies; Johnson has acute asthma and bronchitis; and The dwelling is unlivable. Johnson also claimed many violations of Florida law by the Landlord concerning the lease, including: Taking a deposit for a pet when that pet was in fact a companion dog. (Johnson submitted a letter into evidence from a behavioral health care employee. The letter, dated some five months after Johnson vacated the unit, said that Ashley would benefit from having a companion dog as she did not have many friends. There was no evidence that the Chihuahua was ever registered or approved as a companion dog.); Smoke alarms which were not in working order; Electrical breakers tripping throughout Property; Unreimbursed expenses, e.g., for changing locks; Failure to put Pons on the lease agreement despite doing a background financial check on him; and Harassment from Bank of America employees trying to collect the Landlord’s mortgage payment for the Property. In the letter stating she would be moving, Johnson expressed her sorrow that the housing situation did not work out. She then set forth the amount of deposit money she believed should be returned to her. In response, she received a letter from the Landlord’s counsel advising that her security and pet deposits had been forfeited. On January 4, 2013, the Landlord posted a notice on the Property door demanding payment of outstanding rent within three days. In lieu of payment, Johnson could vacate the premises within three days. Johnson vacated the premises. On January 14, 2013, Johnson did an exit walk-through of the Property, along with the Landlord, his mother, and Pons. At the completion of the walk- through, Johnson turned over the keys for the Property to the Landlord. Johnson claims discrimination on the part of the Landlord because he failed to recognize or accept the companion dog, failed to put Pons on the lease agreement, and failed to make accommodations for Johnson’s claimed health conditions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Denise Johnson-Acosta in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cordell John 2921 Swoops Circle Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Denise Johnson-Acosta Post Office Box 453347 Kissimmee, Florida 34745 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin or race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Manuel Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") is a middle- aged white man of (in his words) "Spanish and Italian" descent who at all times relevant lived in Vero Beach, Florida. Respondent Indian River County Habitat for Humanity, Inc. ("Habitat"), is a nonprofit charitable corporation that makes interest-free loans to qualified applicants for the purchase of affordable housing, which the buyers, in return, must help build or renovate. In or around December 2018, Rodriguez submitted a "pre- screening" application for a Habitat home. By letter dated January 3, 2019, Habitat informed Rodriguez that, according to the information he had provided, he fell "within the income guidelines." This meant that Rodriguez could progress to the next step (group orientation) of the multi-step application process. As it happened, however, he did not make it all the way. In a letter dated February 19, 2019, Habitat told Rodriguez that his application could not be approved because his monthly income was insufficient to cover the estimated debt service. Rodriguez presented no evidence at hearing suggesting that Habitat had denied his application for any reason other than the one given to him, namely that "you [Rodriguez] do not earn enough to support a mortgage." Rodriguez was not satisfied with this rationale and arranged to meet with a Habitat employee named David Willis to discuss the matter. Rodriguez believes that Mr. Willis was rude and disrespectful to him. Further, Rodriguez testified that, during their conversation, Mr. Willis used the phrase, "you people." Clearly, this is a potentially offensive remark, and Rodriguez was, in fact, offended by it. When pressed, however, Rodriguez admitted that he did not consider the comment to have been a slur against Spanish or Italian people; rather, he took it as a more focused insult——against, for example, disputatious people. In any event, there is no evidence that Mr. Willis intended to disparage an ethnic or racial group. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of Habitat's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Rodriguez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus. Thus, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Habitat did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Habitat not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Rodriguez no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, on the basis of her race, violating Subsections 760.23(1), (2), or (4), Florida Statutes (2002). If discriminatory conduct has been proven, whether quantifiable damages, or other allowable remedies, have been proven under Section 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, is a Caucasian female who, at one time, qualified for housing assistance under the Section 8 Rental Voucher (Voucher) Program and is a protected person under the FHA. Respondent, Osceola County Housing Authority, is a department of the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and is the local housing authority (HA) under the Federal FHA. In 1997, Petitioner participated in the Voucher program, which is administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Vouchers are portable, which allows a participant to move to another jurisdiction and request a transfer from one local HA to another. A portability packet of necessary paperwork is prepared by the originating HA and mailed directly to the receiving HA to facilitate the transfer and to prevent fraud. If the receiving HA accepts the transferred Voucher to administer, the originating HA pays the receiving HA 80 percent of the administrative fee it receives from HUD, in addition to the rental and utility assistance payments. Petitioner had a valid Voucher in 1997 that was administered at the local level by the Maryland Housing Opportunity Commission located at 10400 Detrick Avenue, Kensington, Maryland 20895 (Maryland). Petitioner requested Maryland to transfer her Voucher to the City of Kissimmee, Florida (Kissimmee), in 1997, which was the local HA for Osceola County, Florida, at that time. Kissimmee accepted the Maryland Voucher on August 28, 1997, and agreed to administer it on behalf of Maryland. Respondent assumed responsibility for the Voucher program from Kissimmee on October 1, 2000. From 1997 to the present, Kissimmee and Respondent contracted with HUD for a total of 193 Vouchers. This does not include any transferred Vouchers administered through the portability requirements of the HUD program. Kissimmee created a waiting list in 1998 that contained more than 500 names of eligible participants for the 193 Vouchers. The waiting list has not been reopened since it was created. The list was created and is administered in a nondiscriminatory and race-neutral manner by the HA. Respondent accepts and administers transferred Vouchers and currently administers in excess of 700 such Vouchers. A transferred Voucher does not affect the 193 contracted Vouchers. A participant must be recertified annually to keep one of the 193 Vouchers. As participants surrender one of these 193 Vouchers, a new participant is awarded the Voucher from Respondent's waiting list. As participants surrender one of the 700 transferred Vouchers, Respondent has no authority to award it to anyone, whether on the waiting list or not. Petitioner was never on Respondent's waiting list, since Petitioner's Voucher was a transferred Voucher from Maryland. On or about July 13, 2000, Petitioner requested Kissimmee to transfer her Voucher to the County of Fairfax, Department of Housing, Fairfax, Virginia (Virginia). Kissimmee prepared the transfer packet and mailed it to Virginia at Petitioner's request. Petitioner moved from Virginia back to Osceola County in early May 2001. Petitioner testified that when she moved back to Osceola County, she brought her paperwork with her. She then requested Respondent, in a letter dated May 10, 2001, to reinstate her transfer Voucher from Virginia. Petitioner testified that she included her paperwork with the letter. However, there is no credible evidence to support her position. Petitioner has not shown that she had a valid portable Voucher from another HA to transfer to Respondent when she returned from Virginia in May 2001, nor did she offer proof that she requested Virginia to mail her voucher and transfer request directly to Respondent, as HUD policy requires. Respondent has never received paperwork for a transfer Voucher for Petitioner from another jurisdiction, including Maryland or Virginia, after Kissimmee transferred Petitioner's Voucher to Virginia in 2000. Respondent cannot reinstate a Voucher from another HA. Respondent has policies and procedures in place to prevent racial discrimination. Respondent denied Petitioner's request based upon its policies and procedures. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner based upon her race. Petitioner is not eligible for one of the 193 Vouchers Respondent is contracted for through HUD. Respondent does not have any Vouchers available to award to Petitioner and has not reopened the waiting list since it was created in 1998. Petitioner has failed to produce any evidence that Respondent racially discriminated against her in regard to the administration of the Voucher program or failed to rent her a dwelling unit for which she was eligible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patricia McDonough 5121 Violet Lane Kissimmee, Florida 34758 Scott Polodna, Esquire Osceola County Housing Authority One Courthouse Square, Suite 4200 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Hernando County Housing Authority (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in a discriminatory housing practice against Peggy Troiano (Petitioner) on the basis of her disability by refusing to provide Section 8 funding for a housing unit being occupied by Petitioner and the housing unit's owner, Petitioner’s daughter, Julia Williams.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by HUD and administered by Respondent. Petitioner is an individual claiming that she is disabled because of a toxic injury that requires her to live isolated in a non-toxic environment. Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s claim of disability and it is, therefore, found that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of applicable law. Julia Williams is Petitioner’s daughter who, at all relevant times, owned the house located at 15141 Pomp Parkway, Weeki Wachee, Hernando County, Florida (“15141 Pomp Parkway unit”). Ms. Williams is specially trained to deal with toxic injury and is paid through a federally-funded, consumer-directed program to provide assistance to Petitioner. Respondent is a public housing agency that administers the Section 8 Housing Program as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which recodified the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. As a recipient of funding from HUD for its Section 8 Program, Respondent is required to comply with HUD Section 8 regulations, as well as all Federal, State, and local fair housing laws and regulations. In order to receive funding from HUD, Respondent is required to sign an annual contributions contract (ACC) wherein it agrees to follow the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). If Respondent does not follow the C.F.R. or HUD’s guidelines, HUD has the right to terminate Respondent’s Section 8 program funding. In addition, HUD could make Respondent repay any funding used for ineligible housing. On March 17, 2014, during the annual reexamination for her Section 8 voucher, Petitioner signed, under the penalty of perjury, a summary report which identified her as the only household member permitted to live in any unit under her Section 8 voucher. Around the time of the annual reexamination, Petitioner was living at a unit on Philatelic Drive with plans to move into and rent a unit at 15141 Pomp Parkway. The Pomp Parkway unit was owned, but not being occupied, by Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams. In April of 2014, Petitioner asked Respondent for permission to rent the unit from her daughter. Petitioner and her daughter spoke with Respondent’s officials about her request. Generally, a public housing agency, such as Respondent, cannot approve a unit for participation in the Section 8 program if it is owned by a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, sister, or brother of any member of the participant’s family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.306. Respondent, however, ultimately approved Petitioner’s rental of the Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 program, even though it was owned by Petitioner’s daughter, pursuant to a limited exception under 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d), which provides an express exception to the rule if “the [public housing agency] determines that approving the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d). Also, during April of 2014, Petitioner and Ms. Williams were working on constructing a caregiver suite for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit and had discussions with Respondent’s staff about it. There are documents purportedly created during this time frame summarizing several conversations between Respondent, Petitioner, and Ms. Williams. The documents state that Respondent’s officials had a conversation with Petitioner and her daughter wherein they discussed the requirements for a live- in aide and that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that Ms. Williams could never live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Respondent also contends that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that, even if Ms. Williams was approved as a live-in aide, Ms. Williams could not live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On the other hand, Petitioner contends that the alleged conversations warning her that her daughter could not reside in the home did not occur during this time frame, and that she and her daughter continued to renovate the house to specifications suitable to accommodate Petitioner's disability with the expectation that her daughter would ultimately be able to reside in the home after renovations were complete. Upon consideration of the credibility of the witnesses and timing of the purported documents, the undersigned finds that the testimony and documents regarding these alleged April conversations are unreliable and do not support a finding that the conversations and warnings actually occurred during the April time frame. The evidence is also insufficient to support Petitioner's contention that Respondent was somehow responsible for Petitioner's expectation that her daughter would be able to both act as Petitioner's caregiver and live in the home while Petitioner was receiving rent vouchers under the Section 8 program. Petitioner was the only person that Respondent approved to live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under her Section 8 voucher. In May of 2014, Petitioner’s daughter entered into a one-year residential lease with Petitioner and a Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP Contract) with Respondent. According to the HAP Contract, Petitioner was the only person able to reside in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without the express, written consent of Respondent. At the time the HAP Contract was signed, Petitioner advised Respondent that she would be the only person living in the unit. Ms. Williams, as the landlord, signed a check cashing agreement with Respondent wherein she agreed Petitioner would be the only person occupying the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Also, Petitioner’s income verification summary report provides that Petitioner is the only person allowed to live in a unit covered by her Section 8 voucher. In early May of 2014, Ms. Williams moved into the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without notice to Respondent. Petitioner has never received written approval from Respondent to have Ms. Williams live and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 voucher program. By letter dated June 17, 2014, Petitioner submitted an HCHA Live-in Aide Request Verification Form, along with letters from her doctor. Petitioner also requested that her daughter Julia Williams serve as her live-in aide. Approval for a live-in aide is a different process than the approval process to have someone added to the household. While Petitioner's request for a live-in aide stated that Petitioner was living at 15141 Pomp Parkway, it did not mention that Petitioner's daughter was the owner of the dwelling, nor did it include a specific request that Ms. Williams be allowed to move into and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that she owned. Upon receipt of the written request for a live-in aide by Petitioner, Respondent began its investigation to determine whether Petitioner met the qualifications for a live-in aide and whether Ms. Williams met the qualifications to serve as a live- in aide. Respondent has implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 into its written policy regarding live-in aides, which provides: LIVE-IN ATTENDANTS A family may include a live-in aide provided that such live-in aide: Is determined by the [public housing agency] to be essential to the care and well-being of an elderly person, a nearly-elderly person, or a person with disabilities, Is not obligated for the support of the person(s), and Would not be living in the unit except to provide care for the person(s). Under the C.F.R., a public housing agency is required to approve a live-in aide, if needed, as a reasonable accommodation for an elderly or disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 982.316 (“The PHA must approve a live-in-aide if needed as a reasonable accommodation” to a family with an elderly or disabled person.). By letter dated June 27, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner of the approval of her request for her daughter to serve as her live-in aide. Although Respondent was aware that a home occupied by an owner was not eligible for a Section 8 voucher at the time it gave its permission for Petitioner's daughter to serve as Petitioner's live-in aide, the letter did not speak to that issue. Rather, the June 27, 2014, letter, signed by Donald Singer, stated: Pursuant to your letter dated June 17, 2014 requesting a reasonable accommodation for a live in aide. Your letter also ask [sic] that the live in aide be your daughter, Julia Williams based upon her qualifications as presented. After reviewing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) regulations for Live-in Aides and the Housing Authority's Section 8 Program Administrative Plan for Live in Aides our office has determined that your daughter, Julia Williams meets the program qualification(s) to act as your Live in Aide. Therefore our office is approving Julia E. Williams as your Live in Aide effective immediately. Should you have any questions regarding this action/letter please contact our office at 352-754-4160. By email on August 11, 2014, Petitioner notified Mr. Singer that she and her live-in aide, Julia Williams, intended to live at the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On August 11, 2014, Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams was still the owner of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Under 24 C.F.R. § 892.352, a unit being occupied by its owner is deemed “ineligible” and a public housing agency is prohibited from providing funding for such unit. The C.F.R. provides a limited exception for shared housing that allows an owner to occupy a unit funded by Section 8. Under that limited exception, however, the Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.615(b)(3). Based upon the prohibition under the C.F.R. which forbids a public housing agency from funding a unit occupied by an owner who is a blood relative of the Section 8 participant, by letters dated August 22, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner and Ms. Williams that the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was “ineligible housing” that could not be funded. The letters also informed Petitioner that Julia Williams' approval as a live-in aide did not supersede HUD regulations and that, because Julia Williams was occupying the unit, Respondent was terminating the HAP contract effective September 30, 2014. The only reason Respondent terminated the funding for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was because the C.F.R. does not allow Respondent to continue funding a unit occupied by its owner. Prior to the August 22nd letters, Respondent was advised by HUD that Respondent did not have any discretion in funding “ineligible housing.” HUD approved the draft of the August 22nd letters. The evidence does not support a finding that either Respondent or HUD waived or should otherwise be prevented from applying the limitations and requirements of the law that a Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. Respondent would have been willing to continue Petitioner’s housing assistance as long as Petitioner met program requirements and the housing was deemed eligible housing under the C.F.R. through the issuance of a new three-bedroom voucher for a different unit, or by having Petitioner live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without Ms. Williams both owning and occupying the unit. By letter dated August 27, 2014, Respondent provided Petitioner with a new Section 8 voucher and voucher packet information so that Petitioner could start searching for a new rental unit where Ms. Williams could continue to serve as Petitioner’s live-in aide under Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher. The new voucher was required to be returned to Respondent by September 30, 2014. There was no testimony that Petitioner returned the new Section 8 voucher to Respondent by September 30, 2014, or that Ms. Williams moved out of 15141 Pomp Parkway by that date. On September 4, 2014, before the funding was terminated for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit, Petitioner filed a complaint for discrimination. Petitioner emailed a signed three-bedroom voucher on October 30, 2014, a month after funding under the new voucher expired, for the rental of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that had already been deemed ineligible housing as defined by 24 C.F.R. § 982.316. That voucher is not valid and the facts fail to support a finding that Respondent’s refusal to allow Petitioner to participate in the Section 8 voucher program while occupying a unit owned and occupied by her daughter was because of Petitioner’s disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 22nd day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020) (FFHA), was timely filed.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2020 versions.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above. The Lease Petitioner, Ross Couples, leased a house located at 11635 Meadowrun Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property), from Respondent Xuan Ren. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed the Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA) and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease arrangements. On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner executed a year lease for the Property from January 15, 2018, to January 15, 2019. The lease included the following provision for its renewal: 18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. … A new lease is required for each period of lease. At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner another lease agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another 12-month lease, nor did Petitioner move out. As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month-to- month arrangement.4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the HOA. On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager and Respondent Cloud. In that email, Petitioner made numerous complaints and mentioned the need for a larger hot water heater for his hydrotherapy tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a new lease. On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the current leasing arrangement had 4 No written lease agreement for the month-to-month arrangement was offered into evidence. been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before May 15, 2019. Petitioner did not move out of the Property on or before May 15, 2019. On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action against Petitioner in the appropriate court. A final judgment in the eviction action was rendered on June 6, 2019, and a writ of possession was issued for the Property on June 7, 2019. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019. Housing Complaints Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents. On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner, and specifically finding "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. … No evidence was found to support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict him." The HUD Letter does not indicate Petitioner could re-open the HUD case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. It does not mention the FFHA or FCHR, and it does not provide any instruction or information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing discrimination laws.5 Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jordan, told him he had a year from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork." 5 The HUD Letter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint. This proceeding does not involve either of those situations. Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission.6 It is unclear when this conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan's role was at HUD, and whether the discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is hearsay and not corroborated by any non-hearsay evidence or documentation. There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of possession of the Property to file an FFHA discrimination complaint with FCHR. The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing Commission" on June 10, 2020, regarding his FFHA claim. He admits he did not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rather, at that time, he spoke with an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out and returned. There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in his Response that he filed the Complaint with FCHR on June 10, 2021. Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint is dated July 22, 2020, and indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the Complaint on July 21, 2020. Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020. Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified the Complaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020. 6 The undersigned is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See § 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “Commission” to mean the Florida Commission on Human Relations).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2021. Ross Joseph Couples Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Teuber Law, PLLC Post Office Box 49885 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Timothy Cloud D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Mahshie & DeCosta 1560 Matthew Drive, Suite E Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Suite 202-200 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Xuan Ren D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Paul Edward Olah, Esquire Law Offices of Wells Olah, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 808 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by allegedly excluding Petitioner from participating in a homeowner’s meeting on January 14, 2009, or ejecting Petitioner from the meeting, based on Petitioner’s religion and alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.37 and Subsections 760.23(2), 760.23(8), 760.23(8)(2)(b), and 784.03(1)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if not, whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a condominium association defined in Section 718.103, Florida Statutes. Respondent manages a condominium development, identified in the record as Tregate East Condominiums (Tregate). Tregate is a covered multifamily dwelling within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Jewish male whose age is not evidenced in the record. A preponderance of the evidence presented at the final hearing does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, medical, or mental disability, or perceived disability. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner in the association meeting on January 14, 2009. In particular, the fact-finder reviewed the videotape of the entire meeting that took place on January 14, 2009. The meeting evidenced controversy, acrimony, and differences of opinion over issues confronting the homeowners present. However, the video tape did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on Petitioner’s religion, ethnicity, or alleged handicap. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), this Recommended Order finds that Petitioner has participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009). The evidence submitted by Petitioner presented no justiciable issue of fact or law. Petitioner provided no evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a handicap defined in Subsection 760.22(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claims to have a disability based on migraine headaches but offered no medical evidence to support a finding that Petitioner suffers from migraine headaches or any medical or mental disability. Petitioner’s testimony was vague and ambiguous, lacked precision, and was not specific as to material facts. Petitioner called four other witnesses and cross-examined Respondent’s witnesses. Petitioner’s examination of his witnesses and cross-examination of Respondent’s witnesses may be fairly summarized as consisting of comments on the answers to questions and argument with the witnesses. Petitioner repeatedly disregarded instructions from the ALJ not to argue with witnesses and not to comment on the testimony of a witness. Petitioner offered no evidence or legal authority that the alleged exclusion from the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, was prohibited under Florida’s Fair Housing Act.3 Petitioner offered no evidence that he is a “buyer” or “renter” of a Tregate condominium within the meaning of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner is not a buyer or renter of a Tregate condominium. Petitioner attended the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, pursuant to a power of attorney executed by the owner of the condominium. If a preponderance of the evidence were to have shown that the owner’s representative had been excluded from the meeting, the harm allegedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would have been suffered vicariously by the condominium owner, not the non-owner and non-renter who was attending the meeting in a representative capacity for the owner. The condominium owner is not a party to this proceeding. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has standing to bring this action. Petitioner was neither an owner nor a renter on January 14, 2009. Petitioner’s only legal right to be present at the meeting was in a representative capacity for the owner. The alleged exclusion of Petitioner was an alleged harm to the principal under the Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding, and Petitioner is the non-prevailing party. Petitioner has participated in two or more similar proceedings involving Respondent. The parties resolved those proceedings through settlement. The resolution is detailed in the Determination of No Cause by the Commission and incorporated herein by this reference. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees totaling $3,412.00 and costs totaling $1,001.50. No finding is made as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees costs because Respondent did not include an hourly rate and did not submit an affidavit of fees and costs. However, the referring agency has statutory authority to award fees costs in the final order pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and requiring Petitioner to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts to be determined by the Commission after hearing further evidence on fees and costs in accordance with Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling based on her race, in violation of Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2015).
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the exhibit admitted into evidence and testimony offered by witnesses at the final hearing. Ms. Smith is a Black female and currently resides in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber Properties is a company that manages Oak Glade located at 3427 Southwest 30th Terrace, Gainesville, Florida 32608. Respondent provides residential rental apartments in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber is the owner of Saul Silber Properties. Ms. Smith is a former resident of apartment number 54I of Oak Glade.1/ Ms. Smith rented the apartment pursuant to a residential lease agreement entered into on January 15, 2014.2/ The lease was for a one-year renewable term. Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent issued her a Notice of Non-Renewal of her lease agreement on the basis of her race. The Commission issued a “No Cause” determination and Ms. Smith filed a Petition for Relief, which is the matter before the undersigned. During her tenancy at Oak Glade, Ms. Smith had raised numerous complaints with the property manager regarding matters involving her neighbor, Anne E. Dowling. Ms. Dowling, who was White, was a former resident of apartment number 54H. Ms. Smith’s issues with Ms. Dowling included complaints concerning smoking, loud music, non-residents living in the apartment, the number of visitors outside Ms. Dowling’s apartment, and Ms. Dowling’s cat scratching her car. All of the complaints were addressed and resolved by the property manager. The incident that led to the major blow-up between the neighbors involved Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter. Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter were involved in a verbal altercation after Ms. Smith verbally reprimanded Ms. Dowling’s granddaughter (age range of 7-9 years old) and her friend. Ms. Smith testified that the two girls turned their backs to her, bent over, and wiggled their buttocks in a side-to-side motion. Ms. Smith understood this gesture to be disrespectful and a suggestion to “kiss their behinds.” Ms. Dowling’s daughter was not a resident of the apartment complex. The altercation was so loud that Ms. Osteen heard people “screaming” while she was in her office. Ms. Osteen discovered Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter involved in a screaming match. Ms. Osteen later consulted with the senior property manager about the incident and it was determined that both Ms. Dowling and Ms. Smith would be issued a Notice of Non-Renewal. On March 15, 2016, Respondent issued Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling a Notice of Non-Renewal, which was posted on the door of each tenant’s respective apartment. The notices did not state a reason for non-renewal. Ms. Dowling’s lease would expire effective May 30, 2016; and Ms. Smith’s lease would expire effective December 30, 2016. Prior to expiration of her lease, Ms. Dowling advised Ms. Osteen that she was terminally ill and requested that she be permitted to stay at Oak Glade. Ms. Dowling explained that her support system was located in the area and due to financial limitations, moving from the complex would create a hardship for her. For these reasons, Ms. Dowling was permitted to enter a new lease and was moved to a different apartment. The decision to permit Ms. Dowling to remain at the complex was made by the senior property manager. Ms. Dowling passed away approximately four months later, on September 28, 2016. Other than her mistaken belief that Ms. Dowling did not receive a Notice of Non-Renewal, Ms. Smith did not offer any evidence to support her claim of housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: finding that Respondent, Saul Silber Properties, LLC, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Ms. Smith; and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2017H0320. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin and in retaliation for his opposing discriminatory practices in connection with his rental of an apartment, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born in Brazil. He resides in an apartment in St. Monica Gardens in Miami Gardens, Florida. St. Monica Gardens provides housing subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for low- income, elderly residents. St. Monica Gardens is owned and operated by Respondent, which is a not-for-profit corporation, and managed by Catholic Housing Management, which is a management company owned by the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Catholic Housing Management manages 17 buildings accommodating over 2500 persons from all over the world. Residents at St. Monica Gardens, including Petitioner, receive free lunches through the charitable offices of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Petitioner has objected to the quality and operation of this free-food program. On one occasion, Petitioner complained that a food server used the same-colored gloves that are used to perform maintenance duties, and an unauthorized person was allowed to remain in the food-preparation and -service areas. However, these complaints do not establish that Catholic Charities fails to serve St. Monica Gardens residents safe food, lawfully prepared. On September 16, 2016, Catholic Charities was conducting an annual verification audit of residents at lunch that day. Petitioner angrily confronted a Catholic Charities food-service worker, demanding that he be given immediate access to his free lunch. Other residents, mostly Cuban, objected to Petitioner's behavior, although, on this record, their objections appear to be based on Petitioner's discourtesy, not national origin. Respondent conducted an informal investigation of the incident and issued a notice to Petitioner that this confrontational behavior was in violation of his lease. There is no evidence of any discrimination against Petitioner, nor is there any evidence that Respondent took any adverse action against Petitioner or his lease or occupancy of his apartment at St. Monica Gardens. Petitioner complained to HUD, but Respondent did not discriminate or take adverse action against Petitioner for this complaint either.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on May 1, 2017. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Robert E. Meale Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Everdan Sales Correia Apartment 217 3425 Northwest 189th Street Miami Gardens, Florida 33056 (eServed) Thomas H. Courtney, Esquire J. Patrick Fitzgerald & Associates, P.A. 110 Merrick Way, Suite 3-B Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discriminatory housing practices based on his race or his handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this cause, Petitioner was a tenant of a rental apartment located at 284 South First Street, Apartment 6, Macclenny, Florida (the Apartment). Petitioner?s tenancy was established by a lease agreement with a final effective date of November 24, 2009. Petitioner moved out of the apartment on May 3, 2012. Respondent is a Florida Limited Liability Company. Among its other holdings, Respondent owns four 4-plex units located on First Street, Second Street, and Third Street in Macclenny, one of which includes the Apartment. The racial make-up of the tenants occupying Respondent?s apartments in the vicinity is roughly 50 percent African-American and 50 percent Caucasian. Petitioner is African-American. Petitioner has an unspecified mental condition. He takes medications for management of his symptoms, and receives periodic visits from Ms. Gadsby to ensure that he is complying with his medication regimen. Petitioner does not receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. Petitioner holds a bachelor?s degree in criminal justice from Benedict College in South Carolina. As part of the application for rental of the Apartment, Petitioner was asked “[h]ave you been arrested or had criminal charges filed against you? (If yes, please list them).” In response to the application question, Petitioner answered “yes Trepass [sic.].” The trespass charge was related to a misdemeanor incident that occurred at an unspecified time in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner failed to disclose a felony conviction for an incident that had occurred in South Carolina. Petitioner stated that he thought the requirement to disclose criminal charges applied only to charges arising from incidents having occurred in Florida. However, nothing in the application can be read to support that limitation. As such, Petitioner materially falsified his lease application. Petitioner cut hair for members of his church, neighbors, family, and friends at the Apartment, and had done so for the two-and-one-half years of his tenancy. He equipped the Apartment with a barber chair and a small waiting area. He accepted “donations” of food, clothes, and cash for his services. The cash receipts were used to pay his electric and water bills, among other things. Thus, despite its small scale and limited clientele, Petitioner operated what can only be described as a barbershop from the Apartment. The Lease Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent provides that the Apartment was not to be used “for any other purpose than as a private dwelling unit.” The Lease Agreement also provides that Petitioner was to comply with all applicable building and housing codes. The Macclenny Code of Ordinances, Part III, Section 4-105, provides that home occupations are subordinate and incidental to a residential neighborhood, but that certain occupations, including barbershops, “shall not be considered as home occupations under any circumstance.” Thus, Petitioner?s operation of a barbershop from the Apartment was a violation of the Lease Agreement. There were no apparent landlord/tenant disputes involving Petitioner?s tenancy until late 2011. Mr. Stivender testified that he began to receive periodic complaints from tenants in the area regarding the Apartment, including cars being parked on the grass and in the road, loud music, and people milling about the premises. He testified that at least one tenant advised Respondent that she was afraid to venture out of her apartment due to the number of people in the area. The testimony of Mr. Stivender regarding complaints of other tenants would be hearsay if taken for the truth of the matters asserted. However, the undersigned accepts his testimony as evidence, not of the facts surrounding the alleged complaints, but of a non-discriminatory reason for actions to be described herein, most notably the events of March 6, 2012. At the end of October 2011, Petitioner was cited by Respondent for having more than one car regularly parked at the Apartment. Petitioner?s car was not in running condition. The other cars parked at the Apartment belonged to friends or relatives. Petitioner subsequently sold his vehicle, and would borrow his father?s or his cousin?s car when needed. The incident caused bad feelings between the parties. On November 1, 2011, Respondent sent a notice to each of its tenants in Macclenny. Although the notice was precipitated by the complaints against Petitioner and Respondent?s observations of activities in and around the Apartment, the notice was not limited to Petitioner. The notice cited provisions of the common lease agreement regarding the use of the premises and tenant conduct, and advised that excessive noise, driving on the grass, and “loitering” would be cause for eviction. The notice further advised that the landlord would “be patrolling the area on a regular basis at night to check for violations.” On March 6, 2012, Mr. Ferreria was driving by the Apartment at approximately 10:30 p.m. There were, along with Petitioner and his daughter, three guests at the Apartment, Bianca Gaines-Givens, Jacoby Givens, and Misty Lee. They were playing music on an electronic keyboard. Mr. Ferreria stopped his car on the side of the road. He called his property manager, Mr. Stivender, and advised him that he was going to go speak with Petitioner about the noise coming from the Apartment. Mr. Stivender works for a gas company, and was at work routing gas trucks. Mr. Stivender advised that he was going to come to the Apartment, and asked Mr. Ferreria to wait for him before speaking with Petitioner. Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens left the Apartment after Mr. Ferreria?s arrival in the neighborhood, and noticed Mr. Ferreria sitting in his vehicle. They drove away from the Apartment, but decided to return shortly thereafter. By the time they returned, Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender were leaving. Thus, they did not witness the confrontation described herein. After Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens drove off, Mr. Ferreria, disregarding Mr. Stivender?s request, went to the Apartment and knocked on the door. It was, by then, approximately 10:45 p.m. When Petitioner answered the door, the two immediately began a heated discussion over the music and the cars. Ms. Lee went to the back of the Apartment when Mr. Ferreria arrived. She heard yelling, but heard nothing of a racial nature. Shortly after Mr. Ferreria arrived at the Apartment, Mr. Stivender arrived on the scene. Mr. Stivender is a solidly built man, and could be an intimidating presence under the right circumstances. These were the right circumstances. Mr. Stivender physically moved Mr. Ferreria out of the way, and came between Mr. Ferreria and Petitioner. He was primed for a confrontation. He had his hand in his pocket, but testified convincingly that he was not armed.1/ He and Petitioner had a loud and angry exchange of words, and Mr. Stivender forcefully suggested to Petitioner that it would probably be best if he moved out of the Apartment. After Mr. Stivender appeared on the scene, Ms. Lee came out from the back of the Apartment. She recognized Mr. Stivender as Respondent?s “office manager.” She noted that Mr. Stivender had his hand in his pocket, and was talking loudly and pointing his finger in Petitioner?s face. Ms. Lee went outside and spoke with Mr. Ferreria. She testified that Mr. Ferreria indicated that some of the neighbors were afraid of Petitioner because of the noise and the number of people who hung around the Apartment. The confrontation ended with Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender leaving the premises. The police were not called. The next morning, Petitioner called Ms. Gadsby. Petitioner frequently called Ms. Gadsby when he was feeling “stressed.” She went to see him that morning, and testified that he was very upset over the events of the previous evening. She returned that afternoon for a “well-check,” and he was doing better. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner called the Baker County Sheriff?s Office to report the March 6, 2012, incident. A deputy went to the Apartment, spoke with Petitioner and Ms. Lee, took their sworn statements, and prepared an offense report. The description of the incident as reflected in the report, including statements made by Petitioner and Ms. Lee, did not contain any account of racial threats or epithets, or any allegation of discriminatory intent based on race or handicap.2/ Other than Mr. Stivender?s statement made in the heat of the March 6 argument, Respondent made no effort to evict or otherwise remove Petitioner from the Apartment. On March 31, 2012, Petitioner noticed water coming from behind a wall of the Apartment. He called Respondent, and Mr. Stivender came to the Apartment to inspect. Mr. Stivender first suspected that the air-conditioning unit was leaking. The air conditioner was turned off and Mr. Stivender left, intending to contact an air-conditioning repair service. By 6:00 p.m. on March 31, 2012, the rate of the leak was such that it was determined that a water pipe had burst under the foundation of the Apartment. Petitioner did not know where the shut-off valve was located, and was unable to stop the flow, which began to cover the floor in several rooms of the Apartment. Mr. Stivender returned to the Apartment, and determined that a car owned by one of Petitioner?s guests was parked on the grass, and was over the meter box with the shut- off valve. The car was moved, and the water turned off. Respondent called a plumber to fix the pipe. Since the pipe was under the foundation, and in order to avoid breaking up the slab, the repair was accomplished by re-routing the pipe in the wall of the Apartment. The repair entailed cutting an access hole in the drywall. That hole was not immediately repaired. Respondent also called Servpro to perform water cleanup services. The standing water was vacuumed up, and large fans and dehumidifiers were placed in the Apartment to dry it out. While the repairs and drying activities were ongoing, Respondent paid for Petitioner and his daughter to stay in a motel in Macclenny. They were there for three to four days. Respondent paid Petitioner?s power bill for the days that Petitioner was unable to use the Apartment. Petitioner returned to the Apartment, and stayed there for some time. He was upset that the access hole for the pipe repair had not been closed up, and that the baseboards had not been replaced in some areas. On April 9, 2012, Petitioner wrote to Respondent about the effects of the water leak. After thanking Respondent for the “compassion” shown to Petitioner and his family during the event, he complained about the damage to his personal property resulting from the water leak, and an odor “suggesting the presence of mold.” He stated his belief that his daughter?s preexisting asthma was aggravated by the smell in the Apartment. In his April 9, 2012, letter, Petitioner also stated that “due to my mental health condition, I am on prescribed medicine that has now been adjusted to assist me through this stressful situation.” Petitioner?s statement, which was not accompanied by any form of medical evidence, was not sufficient to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner had a record of having, or was regarded as having, any form of mental disability. Mr. Stivender testified that no one ever advised Respondent that Petitioner had a mental disability, and that Respondent had no such knowledge. The April 9, 2012, letter being insufficient on its own to convey such information, Mr. Stivender?s testimony is credited. On May 3, 2012, Petitioner moved out of the Apartment. He had been served with no eviction notice or other written request to vacate. Petitioner gave no notice to Respondent, but dropped off his key at Mr. Ferreria?s business on the day he moved out. Mr. Stivender testified that Petitioner left the Apartment in a filthy, deplorable condition. As a result, Respondent withheld Petitioner?s $400.00 security deposit to offset the costs of returning the Apartment to rentable condition. Petitioner testified that the Apartment was not in poor condition when he moved out, and that some of the damage was the result of the pipe leak. However, Petitioner did not testify, or even suggest, that the decision to withhold the deposit was the result of any racial hostility or animus, or of any reaction to his handicap. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence that he was treated differently under similar circumstances than were tenants of Respondent who were not African-American, or who did not have comparable mental disabilities. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent undertook any act pertaining to Petitioner?s occupancy of the Apartment based on Petitioner?s race. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent knew of Petitioner?s mental disability or handicap, or that Respondent regarded Petitioner as having any such mental disability or handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Petitioner?s race or handicap caused or contributed to the March 6, 2012, confrontation. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the confrontation resulted from noise, issues with cars and parking, and complaints directed to Petitioner by other tenants. Petitioner failed to prove that he was ready, willing, and able to continue to rent the Apartment, but that Respondent refused to allow him to do so. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took any action to evict him from the Apartment, or to otherwise intentionally interfere with Petitioner?s occupancy of the premises. To the contrary, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent took reasonable and appropriate steps to repair and remediate the Apartment after the water line break, and provided no-cost accommodations to Petitioner while the Apartment was not habitable. The repairs may not have been completed to Petitioner?s satisfaction, but any such deficiency was not the result of discrimination against Petitioner based on his race or his handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent?s decision to withhold his security deposit was based on Petitioner?s race or handicap. In sum, the evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his race or his handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2013H0034. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
