The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, W. Gerry Hargrove, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is housed in Tamoka Correctional Institution. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the proposed rule amendment at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing visiting hours and privileges and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Proposed Amendment to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. Section 944.23, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: The following persons shall be authorized to visit at their pleasure all state correctional institutions: The Governor, all Cabinet members, members of the Legislature, judges of state courts, state attorneys, public defenders, and authorized representatives of the commission. No other person not otherwise authorized by law shall be permitted to enter a state correctional institution except under such regulations as the department may prescribe. . . . [Emphasis added]. Pursuant to the authority of Sections 944.09 and 944.23, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has adopted Chapter 33-5, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, the following: Upon being committed to the custody of the Department, each inmate shall be given the opportunity to submit a list of persons from whom he wishes to receive visits. The initial list . . . shall be limited to members of the inmate's immediate family. Once the inmate has been assigned to a permanent institution, additional relatives and friends, business associates and others may be considered, but only after a criminal history background inquiry has been made. Rule 33-5.006(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (7) Inmate visits with approved family members or friends should be encouraged for the positive purpose of maintaining home and community ties, which after release should provide a deterrent to recidivism. To the extent that it is safe and practicable to do so, such visiting should be allowed to take place in a relaxed atmosphere. Rule 33-5.006, Florida Administrative Code, also provides certain circumstances when a person may be excluded from an inmate's visitors list. For example, persons convicted of a felony may be excluded. Rule 33-5.006(5), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, is titled "Visitation Denial." Pursuant to this rule, it is provided that visitation may be denied under certain circumstances, i.e., if a visit would present a clear and present danger to the security and order of an institution. Rule 33-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, also provides: (3) No visit should be denied: . . . . (c) for any reason unrelated to the security, order or rehabilitative objectives of the institution. At issue in this proceeding is a proposed amendment to Rule 33- 5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code: (8)(a) An unmarried i[I]nmate[s] [not married] may be allowed to have one single non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval. A married inmate may be allowed to have one single, non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval, if a pending divorce or separation of long duration can be verified and the spouse is removed from the list. Married or unmarried inmates may have non- immediate family member couples on the visiting list after approval, but the member of the couple who is the opposite sex of the inmate may not visit the inmate without the spouse. New proposed language of the rule is denoted by underlining and words or letters removed are indicated by brackets. In this proceeding the Petitioner has only challenged proposed paragraph (c) of Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rule Amendment"). The Respondent has indicated it proposed the addition of paragraph (c) to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, because of security concerns. As explained by a representative of the Respondent the following are those security concerns: One spouses (i.e., the wife) may be visiting an inmate without the knowledge of the other spouse (i.e., the husband). If the husband becomes aware of the fact that his wife is visiting an inmate the husband may become alarmed and complain to the Respondent and his wife about the visitation. When the husband complains to his spouse or the Respondent and the inmate learns of the problem, the inmate may become upset. The Respondent indicated that there have been a few instances where inmates who, upon learning that husband of the inmate's visitor has been making it difficult for the visiting spouse to continue with visitation, have attempted to escape to get to the husband. The evidence failed to prove that there is a significant security problem if inmates are allowed to have visitation from a married visitor without requiring that both spouses visit the inmate at the same time. The evidence concerning escape attempts (at best, 5 to 10 attempts during the past thirty years) was speculative. No specifics concerning such attempts were provided when the Petitioner asked for specifics. Nor did the evidence prove that the Respondent's security is inadequate to handle the relatively low number of such escape attempts or that any such escape attempt has been successful. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Proposed Rule Amendment included a "Summary of the Estimate of Economic Impact of the Rule". Although the Petitioner challenged the adequacy of the Respondent's determination of the economic impact of the Proposed Rule Amendment, the evidence presented during the final hearing of this case failed to prove that the economic impact statement was inadequate.
The Issue Whether Respondent timely filed a request for an administrative hearing, and, if not, whether the doctrine of equitable tolling provides a defense to the applicable deadline for filing a petition for hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with enforcing workers’ compensation coverage requirements in Florida including the requirement that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. See § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. On November 10, 2015, following an investigation to determine whether Respondent had secured sufficient workers’ compensation insurance coverage, the Department served a Stop-Work Order on Respondent. Gene Brimmer, an investigator with the Department, personally served the Stop-Work Order on Respondent. Mr. Brimmer hand-delivered the Stop-Work Order to Daniel Hedman, Respondent’s owner. With the Stop-Work Order, Mr. Brimmer also provided Mr. Hedman a document entitled Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. The Department requested certain financial documents to calculate the appropriate penalty. Mr. Brimmer and Mr. Hedman met on November 25, 2015. At this meeting, Mr. Hedman produced a number of Respondent’s bank statements and payroll records for the Department’s consideration in its penalty calculation. Mr. Brimmer and Mr. Hedman met again on December 29, 2015. At this meeting, Mr. Brimmer personally served on Respondent an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (the “Penalty Assessment”). The Penalty Assessment levied a total penalty of $58,944.86 against Respondent. On the back of the Penalty Assessment document was a page entitled “Notice of Rights.” The Notice of Rights advised Respondent, in pertinent part: You have a right to administrative review of this action by the Department under sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. To obtain review, you must file a written petition requesting review. * * * You must file the petition for hearing so that it is received by the Department within twenty- one (21) days of your receipt of this agency action. The petition must be filed with Julie Jones, DFS Agency Clerk, Department of Financial Services, 612 Larson Building, 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0390. FAILURE TO FILE A PETITION WITHIN THE TWENTY- ONE (21) DAYS CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF YOUR RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE AGENCY ACTION. Mr. Brimmer explained the Notice of Rights to Mr. Hedman. Mr. Brimmer discussed the 21-day deadline for Respondent to request a hearing with the Department to dispute the Penalty Assessment. In addition to the Penalty Assessment and Notice of Rights, Mr. Brimmer provided Mr. Hedman with a Penalty Audit Summary Report. This report included a Department auditor’s review of Respondent’s payroll records. The auditor noted that the records Mr. Hedman provided in November 2015, did not account for Respondent’s total labor costs for the preceding years. The Penalty Audit Summary Report informed Mr. Hedman that, to recalculate the penalty, a cash ledger would be required to remove the imputed payroll amount. In light of the Penalty Audit Summary Report, during the December 29, 2015, meeting, Mr. Brimmer informed Mr. Hedman that the Department would be willing to review additional business records and consider whether to recalculate the penalty. Mr. Brimmer told Mr. Hedman that he could have 20 business days to produce more records. Mr. Brimmer, however, never guaranteed that the additional documentation would result in a reduced penalty. Neither did Mr. Brimmer represent that that Department would issue another penalty assessment order or another Notice of Rights under which Respondent could file a request for an administrative hearing. Twenty-one days after December 29, 2015, was January 19, 2016. On January 22, 2016, within 20 business days from his meeting with Mr. Brimmer on December 29, 2015, (but, 24 days after receiving the Notice of Rights) Mr. Hedman provided additional business records to Mr. Brimmer on Respondent’s behalf. Mr. Brimmer testified that if the Department had recalculated the penalty based on Respondent’s supplemental business records, it would have issued another penalty assessment order. The new penalty assessment order would have included a new Notice of Rights and another 21-day period within which Respondent could file a petition for hearing. Unfortunately for Respondent, the additional business records Mr. Hedman produced did not change the Department’s mind. On February 2, 2016, Mr. Brimmer e-mailed Mr. Hedman informing him that the Department would not be adjusting the Penalty Assessment. As an additional consequence, because Mr. Hedman did not submit a written request for a hearing by January 19, 2016, Respondent missed the 21-day deadline to file a petition for administrative hearing to contest the Penalty Assessment. Upon receiving Mr. Brimmer’s e-mail, Mr. Hedman panicked. He called Mr. Brimmer on February 9, 2016, to discuss the status of the Penalty Assessment. Mr. Brimmer advised Mr. Hedman to review the Notice of Rights. At the final hearing, Mr. Hedman testified that, based on his conversation with Mr. Brimmer on December 29, 2015, he understood that he had 20 business days to challenge the Penalty Assessment. Mr. Hedman explained that, by providing additional business records, he thought he had complied with what was needed to contest the penalty. Mr. Hedman claimed that if Mr. Brimmer had not requested additional records, he would have filed a petition for hearing within 21 days. Following his telephone conversation with Mr. Brimmer on February 9, 2016, Mr. Hedman prepared a letter to the Department requesting a hearing to contest the Penalty Assessment. In his letter, Mr. Hedman stated: When I turned in those records [on January 22, 2016] Agent Brimmer stated this should “take care of things” so I thought things were being taken care of and I was waiting for a response. The response by e-mail didn’t come . . . until Feb. 2, 2016. * * * After speaking with Agent Brimmer and explaining that I didn’t know I needed to apply for a hearing, since he had told me submitting the requested records should “take care of things,” and furthermore certainly was never told anything about a 21-day deadline for requesting such, Agent Brimmer said he agreed and suggested I write to apply for a hearing. The Department received Mr. Hedman’s request for a hearing on February 16, 2016. Based on the evidence set forth at the final hearing, the Department established that Respondent did not file its petition requesting an administrative hearing with the Department within 21 days of Respondent’s receipt of the Penalty Assessment. Therefore, the legal issue to determine is whether Respondent’s petition should be dismissed as untimely filed, or whether Respondent may circumvent the filing deadline based on the defense of equitable tolling.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order dismissing Respondent’s request for an administrative hearing as untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2016.
The Issue The matters to be determined in this case concern an administrative complaint which has been filed against Monroe Monford a/k/a Monroe Monford, Jr. seeking to take disciplinary action based upon the allegation that the Respondent, by the entry of a plea of guilty to a violation of Section 893.13(1)(e) Florida Statutes, possession of cocaine, has thereby violated Sections 455.227(1)(c) and 465.016(1)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Monroe Monford also known as Monroe Monford, Jr. is a pharmacist licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, License No. 0009494 whose address is 3822 Elbert Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida 32208. In June of 1982 an investigation was conducted by the Duval County Sheriff's office, Duval County, Florida leading to the arrest of the Respondent. The arrest occurred at 5929 Ramona Boulevard in the Days Inn Motel. A monitor had been placed in the room where a suspected drug transaction was to occur and it was determined that the Respondent was involved in that transaction to the extent of conducting a test to ascertain if the substance being purchased was actually cocaine. It was later determined to be cocaine. Another individual who was in the room with Monroe Monford, one Eddie Lee Tuff, went to a car to obtain money that was being paid for cocaine. Subsequent to that time law enforcement officials entered the room which was under surveillance and found Monroe Monford on the bed counting the money in question. Monford was arrested for a violation of Section 893.135, Florida Statutes, trafficking in a controlled substance, namely cocaine. In response to charges which were brought against Respondent in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82- 5383CFS, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the sale of cocaine and received a period of probation of five years, assessment of court costs in the amount of $12,153 and as a special condition of probation, was prohibited from practicing pharmacy in Florida or any other state while serving the probationary term. The offense to which he plead guilty was a violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes. Respondent was not adjudged guilty of the violation of law to which he plead, imposition of the sentence having been withheld pending the satisfactory completion of the probationary period. The date of the court disposition of the case was October 15, 1982.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact DFS is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating insurance adjusters and agents pursuant to chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes. On April 20, 2016, Petitioner filed with DFS his application to become licensed as an all-lines adjuster in the state of Florida. On the second page of the application form, Petitioner answered “yes” to the question asking whether he has ever pled nolo contendere, no contest, or guilty to, or ever had adjudication withheld for, or ever been convicted of or found guilty of, any felony crime under the laws of any state. Despite answering yes to that question, on the third and fourth pages of the application, Petitioner answered “no” to the following three questions: First, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) fell within the following categories: any first-degree felony; a capital felony; a felony involving money laundering, fraud of any kind, or embezzlement; or a felony directly related to the financial services business. Second, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s), if not falling in one of the above categories, were crimes involving moral turpitude. Lastly, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) were within the category of “all other felonies.” The questions asking how to categorize the felony crime(s) that Petitioner acknowledged on page two of the application correlate to the statute prescribing a range of consequences depending on the type of felony criminal background an applicant has. According to the statute, an applicant with felony criminal history falling in the first group above (first degree felony, etc.) is permanently barred from applying for licensure in Florida as an insurance agent or adjuster. For an applicant whose felony criminal history does not fall in the first group, but is categorized as a felony (or felonies) involving moral turpitude, the statute provides for a long period of disqualification. If an applicant’s felony criminal history does not fall in either of the first two categories, then a shorter period of disqualification is provided by the statute. See § 206.207, Fla. Stat., adopted in its current form in 2011 (with one immaterial amendment in 2014 to change a statutory cross-reference). Petitioner’s admitted felony history must, of necessity, fall within one of the three groups: the felony history must have involved one or more felonies identified for permanent bar, other felonies involving moral turpitude, and/or all other felonies. The application answers were internally inconsistent and at least one of the answers on pages three and four was wrong. At hearing, Petitioner did not offer any explanation for his incorrect answer(s).1/ Petitioner did not file with his April 2016 application submitted to DFS, and did not offer into evidence at hearing any proof of the felony criminal history to which he admitted in his application. Petitioner gave little information at all about his criminal background at hearing. He testified that he identified his prior criminal history on page two of the application (by answering “yes” to the question asking whether he had ever been convicted, etc. of any felony crimes). The only detail he was asked by his counsel to address was as follows: Q: Now the criminal history that you identified, is that something that occurred a while ago? A: Yes, sir. Q: And can you give me the approximate time period? A: The offense? It was in 1994, I believe. Q: Okay. And do you recall when you finished all your restitution and probation concerning any of these prior convictions? A: 1999. (Tr. 32). Petitioner later acknowledged on cross-examination, as suggested by his attorney’s attempted correction in his follow-up question, that there was not just one (“the”) offense--there was more than one offense and more than one conviction. Other than correcting that error, Petitioner volunteered no information regarding his prior convictions. He did, however, offer into evidence documentation generally corroborating his testimony regarding when he completed probation for his prior convictions. Two letters from New Jersey Superior Court personnel state that court records reflect that Mr. Bivona completed three different probationary terms associated with three different indictment numbers, as follows: for indictment number 96-03-0031-I, probation was completed as of August 9, 1999; for indictment number 95-10-0453-I, probation was completed as of May 2, 1999; and for indictment number 95-05-0206-I, probation was completed as of September 27, 1998. Although Petitioner offered no details or documentation for his prior felony convictions, either with his application or at hearing (other than the letters documenting when he completed probation), Petitioner said that he had previously provided documentation to Respondent regarding his felony convictions, a fact confirmed by Respondent. Respondent had in its files certified copies of court records for Petitioner’s felony convictions in New Jersey, obtained by Respondent in 2010 in connection with a prior license application by Petitioner.2/ Respondent offered into evidence at hearing certified copies of court records regarding Petitioner’s felony criminal history, including indictments issued by grand juries setting forth the original charges, and the subsequent judgments of conviction issued by New Jersey Superior Court judges. Because Respondent was willing to use the criminal history documentation previously provided by Petitioner that was already in Respondent’s files, Respondent did not require Petitioner to obtain or submit the same documentation again in connection with his new license application.3/ The indictment numbers identified in the three judgments of conviction match the three indictment numbers contained in Petitioner’s exhibit offered to prove when he completed his probationary terms for his prior convictions. Thus, although Petitioner was evasive at hearing, unwilling to identify the court records of his prior convictions, the records themselves establish the missing information about Petitioner’s felony criminal history that Petitioner only alluded to at hearing. In a September 28, 1995, judgment of conviction issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold, New Jersey Superior Court for Somerset County, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-05-0206-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: four counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; one count of unlawful theft or receipt of a credit card, a fourth-degree felony; four counts of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of theft by deception, a fourth-degree felony. For sentencing purposes, the court merged nine of the counts into count two (one of the charges for fraudulent use of a credit card), and imposed the following sentence: three years of probation, restitution of $271.60, a $500.00 fine, and other monetary assessments. On May 3, 1996, another judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold. The judgment of conviction shows that Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-10-0453-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; and one count of theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was incarceration for 180 days in the county jail, a three-year probationary term, restitution of $380.02, and monetary assessments. On August 9, 1996, a judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Marilyn Hess, New Jersey Superior Court for Hunterdon County. As shown on the judgment of conviction, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 96-03-00031-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: one count of theft by deception, a third-degree felony; one count of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of credit card theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was a three-year probationary term, restitution of $2,488.30, and monetary assessments. As noted, Mr. Bivona testified that he completed the probationary terms for his prior convictions in 1999. He provided documentation corroborating that he served the three probationary terms and completed them on three different dates in 1998 and 1999, the last of which was August 9, 1999. No evidence was presented to prove that Mr. Bivona has paid all restitution, fines, and other monetary assessments imposed in the three judgments of conviction, and, if so, when all payments were completed. Petitioner’s application was initially denied by DFS because of Petitioner’s felony criminal history. DFS determined that at least two of the judgments of conviction, and possibly all three, were for felony crimes involving fraud. DFS did not undertake a review of Petitioner’s rehabilitation from his past crimes or his present trustworthiness and fitness to serve as an insurance adjuster, because in DFS’s view, Petitioner was subject to the statutory permanent bar from applying for licensure. DFS did not determine that Petitioner did not otherwise meet the requirements for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster. At hearing, neither party went into any detail regarding the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Instead, the focus of both Petitioner and Respondent was on whether Petitioner’s criminal history renders him disqualified from applying for licensure as an adjuster, either permanently or for a period of time, and, if the latter, whether mitigating circumstances reduce the disqualifying period. No evidence was offered of aggravating circumstances. Respondent has not disputed whether, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal history, Petitioner otherwise qualifies for licensure. Therefore, it is inferred that Respondent was and is satisfied that, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal background (including questions about rehabilitation, trustworthiness, and fitness), Petitioner otherwise meets the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Petitioner presented evidence addressed to the mitigating factors in Respondent’s rule to shorten the period of disqualification in certain circumstances, where there is no permanent bar. Petitioner testified that he moved to Florida with his wife in 1998 (apparently before he had completed his probationary terms for at least two of his convictions). He and his wife started a business in the Sarasota area, a corporation that has operated under two different names, but has remained essentially the same since 1998. The business has always been small; although it has gone up and down in size over the years, Petitioner said that the business has had at least five employees for over three years. Since 1998, the nature of his business has been to provide technical support and assistance to insurance adjusters. The business has not been engaged in the actual adjuster work; instead, his clients are licensed adjusters who perform the actual adjuster work. Petitioner testified that he has been employed by the corporation he owns, working at least 40 hours per week for a continuous two-year period within the five years preceding the filing of his application. This parrots one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, and although no documentation of his employment hours was provided for any period of time, the undersigned accepts Petitioner’s testimony as sufficient under the mitigation rule. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. To meet another mitigation factor, Petitioner submitted five letters of recommendation in evidence. Three of those letters appear to be from someone who has known Petitioner for at least five years (one undated letter states that the author has known Petitioner for three years; another letter, more of a business reference from an insurance company representative in Maryland, does not state how long the author has known Petitioner). Those letters that are dated bear dates after the license application was submitted and initially denied, but there is no impediment to receiving and considering them in this de novo hearing. The letters meet the requirement in Respondent’s rule for mitigation. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. Although the letters satisfy one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, the contents of the letters are hearsay, as none of the authors testified. The matters stated in the letters, for the most part, do not corroborate any non- hearsay evidence, except in a few immaterial respects (such as that Petitioner runs his own business and has daughters who play volleyball). Petitioner did not present any testimony from witnesses at hearing who could attest to his character, his business reputation, or his trustworthiness. Petitioner testified that he does volunteer work on a “sporadic” basis. He is active as a volunteer for his three daughters’ schools and travel volleyball activities, and he also works with youth groups in his church. Although Petitioner testified that he believes he has volunteered at least 180 hours over the three years preceding the filing of his application, Petitioner did not present any documentation from one or more charitable organizations confirming the number of his volunteer hours. It is undisputed that Petitioner held an insurance adjuster license in Florida for some period of time, until, according to DFS, the license expired by operation of law. Although Petitioner admitted that since 1998, his business has not been engaged in insurance adjuster work, merely holding a license appears to at least superficially satisfy a mitigation factor in Respondent’s rule. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner has been arrested or charged with any criminal violations since he completed his third probation in August 1999, more than 17 years ago. The length of time without any additional criminal incidents is a positive consideration. Notably lacking from Petitioner were: an explanation for the circumstances underlying the multiple crimes he committed that involved fraud, theft, forgery, and deception, through use of other people’s credit cards and checks; express acceptance of responsibility for his criminal past; the expression of genuine remorse for his wrongdoing; and an explanation as to why his criminal history should not present concerns if Petitioner becomes authorized to engage in insurance adjusting. As Petitioner acknowledged, a licensed adjuster “would negotiate settlement [of claims under insurance policies], would offer payment, [and] would have authority to write payment and receive payments” (Tr. 35), placing the adjuster in a position of trust and responsibility in dealing with other people’s money. Simply noting that it has been a good number of years since Petitioner completed his probations, that he is running his own business (that does not engage in insurance adjusting), that he has a family, that he is involved with church, and that he does volunteer work is not enough, when Petitioner’s past crimes and the concerns they present go unexplained, to support a finding of rehabilitation, moral fitness, and trustworthiness today. It may well be that Petitioner could prove these things if he had addressed them; it may have been an unfortunate strategic choice to avoid any mention of Petitioner’s past crimes in anything but the most general and vague terms. Perhaps in light of decisional law discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, Respondent’s licensure application form asks applicants who disclose criminal history whether they have had their civil rights restored. Petitioner answered yes. He was asked to explain, and his response was: “Rights were restored and I have the ability to vote and act as a standard US Citizen.” (Pet. Exh. 11 at 4). In the initial review of Petitioner’s application, DFS staff apparently accepted Petitioner’s representation that his civil rights had, in fact, been restored.4/ However, in a “deficiencies” listing at the end of the application, DFS noted that Petitioner failed to provide a certificate of civil rights restoration, or other proof of restoration of his civil rights. Petitioner’s application was not denied because of these omissions, and Petitioner’s failure to provide such evidence in his application would not have been an impediment to receiving and considering proof of restoration of Petitioner’s civil rights at hearing, had such evidence been offered. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to prove that his civil rights were restored. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that he ever applied for restoration of his civil rights, or that his civil rights have been restored by order of the governor in the exercise of clemency power. Instead, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a Florida voter status printout showing that he is an active registered voter. The exhibit was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Petitioner was registered to vote in Florida. However, this fact is insufficient to support an inference that Petitioner’s civil rights must have been restored or he would not have been allowed to register to vote. If Petitioner has actually had his civil rights restored, there would be direct evidence of that, and Petitioner had no such evidence. It is equally or more plausible that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida by mistake; Petitioner acknowledged that he represented in his voter registration application that his civil rights were restored (just as he represented to DFS in his license application). Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida because Florida gave full faith and credit to what New Jersey had done. This argument was unsupported by evidence of how Petitioner became registered to vote in Florida. Regarding what was done in New Jersey, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a “voter restoration handbook” from the state of New Jersey, which indicates as follows: “In New Jersey, any person who is no longer in prison or on parole or probation, can register to vote. . . . In New Jersey, unlike some other states, those who have been convicted of felony offenses in the past are not forever barred from voting. . . . Any ex-felon who has satisfactorily completed the term of his or her sentence can register to vote.” (Pet. Exh. 7, admitted for a limited purpose, at 1 - 2). The rest of the handbook simply describes how one goes about registering to vote in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law, then, one particular civil right--the right to vote--is taken away from convicted felons only until they complete their sentence, parole, and probation. This is confirmed by a New Jersey statute that has been officially recognized, providing that the right of suffrage--the right to vote--is taken away from any person “[w]ho is serving a sentence or is on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this or another state or of the United States.” § 29:4-1(8), N.J. Stat.5/ The right to vote is only one of the civil rights that may be lost by reason of being convicted of a crime. For example, under another New Jersey law officially recognized in this proceeding, persons convicted of a crime are disqualified from serving on a jury. See § 2C:51-3b., N.J. Stat. Petitioner presented no evidence to prove that he ever sought or received a restoration of his civil rights by executive order of the governor pursuant to an exercise of executive branch clemency power, either in the state of New Jersey or in Florida. In New Jersey, restoration of civil rights and privileges (one of which may be the right to vote) is accomplished pursuant to section 2A:167-5, New Jersey Statutes, officially recognized in this proceeding and providing in pertinent part: Any person who has been convicted of a crime and by reason thereof has been deprived of the right of suffrage or of any other of his civil rights or privileges . . . may make application for the restoration of the right of suffrage or of such other rights or privileges . . . which application the governor may grant by order signed by him. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Florida Constitution vests in the executive branch the following clemency powers: [T]he governor may, by executive order filed with the custodian of state records, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of two members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses. (emphasis added). Art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const. Petitioner admitted that he did not apply to the governor for a restoration of civil rights in New Jersey, and he has no order from the governor restoring his civil rights. Similarly, Petitioner did not apply for and receive an order from the governor restoring his civil rights in Florida. Instead, he admitted that he is relying on whatever happened in New Jersey. The following testimony reveals Petitioner’s misconception of the process in New Jersey for restoration of civil rights: Q: Okay. Mr. Bivona, what’s your understanding of how your civil rights were restored in New Jersey? A: My understanding is that once probation and restitution and everything is completed, that civil rights are restored in the State of New Jersey. Q: And did that happen, to your knowledge? A: The completion? Q: Yes. A: Yes, sir. I also verified that with the State of New Jersey. I called them. The Court: I can’t consider that.[6/] A: I understand. I’m sorry. The Court: Do you have any exhibits that show that civil rights have been restored? Mr. Terrell: There’s a handbook from New Jersey that’s also how the rights are restored. [Pet. Exh. 8, in evidence for limited purpose] (Tr. 44).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines insurance adjuster. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Darryl McGlamry, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. The Challenged Rule, Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code. On January 23, 1991, the Respondent filed Rule 33ER91-1. This emergency rule was filed by the Respondent to alleviate problems created by a high increase in the number of close custody inmates caused by changes in the Respondent's rules during 1990. Pursuant to Section 120.54(9)(c), Florida Statutes, Rule 33ER91-1 was only effective for ninety (90) days. Therefore, Rule 33ER91-1 was due to expire on or about April 24, 1991. On April 23, 1991, the Respondent filed the Challenged Rule. The Challenged Rule is identical in its terms to Rule 33ER91-1. The Challenged Rule should have expired on July 22, 1991. The instant challenge was instituted on May 8, 1991, before the Challenged Rule expired. The amendments to Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, filed by the Respondent on July 1, 1991, do not repeal the effect of the Challenged Rule prior to July 1, 1991.
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) Whether Respondent violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act by engaging in conduct unbecoming a public servant; (2) Whether Respondent violated the Pinellas County Sheriff rule relating to effectiveness in assigned duties; and (3) if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is employed by Petitioner as a detention deputy and has been so employed for more than 11 years. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was assigned to the Pinellas County Detention Center (Jail). Detention deputies are correctional officers and, as is the case with all detention deputies, Respondent is responsible for the care, custody, and control of inmates incarcerated at the Jail. On April 26, 1999, Respondent was assigned to the third shift, Special Operations Division, and was a corporal supervising the booking area. In connection with that assignment, Respondent's job responsibilities included booking inmates into the Jail. One part of the booking process required that detention deputies obtain certain information from individuals taken into custody in order to complete the necessary paperwork. While the information was being obtained, inmates are instructed to stand behind a blue line on the floor. As part of the booking process, detention deputies inventory the property in the possession of an inmate and make a written record of that property and "pat down" the inmate. Following these procedures, the inmate is seen by a nurse. However, if the nurse is unavailable, the inmate is told to wait in Pre-booking Cell 4 (Cell 4). Detention Deputy Robert McQuire was also assigned to work the third shift in the booking area of the Special Operations Division on April 26, 1999. On April 26, 1999, during the third shift, Jay McMillen (McMillen) was booked into custody at the Jail on the charge of driving without a valid driver’s license. Upon arrival at the Jail, he was taken to the booking area, instructed to stand behind the blue line on the floor near the counter in the booking area, and asked for information required to complete the inmate property form. Both Respondent and McGuire participated in booking McMillen but McGuire asked the inmate most of the questions. During the booking process, McMillen cooperated with Respondent and McGuire and provided the information required to complete the booking form. Moreover, McMillen complied with orders given to him by the detention deputies. Although McMillen occasionally wandered a few feet away from the booking counter, he would immediately return to the area behind the blue line when so instructed. While being booked, McMillen never threatened either Respondent or McGuire. Furthermore, McMillen never physically resisted the actions of the detention deputies or exhibited physical violence. During the course of the booking process, Respondent undertook a routine pat down search of McMillen. As a part of that process, McMillen again complied with Respondent’s instructions to assume the appropriate position. While engaging in the pat down, some slight movement of McMillen’s leg occurred. However, at the time of this movement by McMillen, Respondent took no action to restrain McMillen. After the pat down was completed, McMillen was then told to sit on the bench in the booking area and to remove his shoes for inspection. McMillen immediately complied with this instruction. After Respondent completed the search of the shoes, he then ordered McMillen to have a seat in Cell 4. When Respondent ordered McMillen to Cell 4 to await nurse screening, McMillen complied with that order. While McMillen was walking toward Cell 4, McMillen made a single verbal statement to Respondent. The statement by McMillen was inappropriate and unnecessary. In the statement, McMillen referred to Respondent as "bitch." In response to McMillen's statement, Respondent turned from his original direction of returning to the booking counter and followed McMillen into Cell 4. It was Respondent’s intent at that time to remove McMillen from Cell 4 and to transport him to C Wing, an area used for inmates who were agitated or upset and needed a "cooling down" period. Respondent’s decision to remove McMillen from Cell 4 to the C Wing was based solely upon the tone of McMillen’s voice and was not the result of any aggressive physical act taken by McMillen or a verbal threat made by McMillen. Respondent followed McMillen into Cell 4 without the benefit of assistance from another detention deputy. In fact, prior to acting upon his decision to remove McMillen from Cell 4, Respondent did not advise McGuire or any other detention deputy of his intent or ask for assistance. Although Respondent did not advise any detention deputy that he was going into Cell 4, McGuire apparently observed Respondent proceeding toward Cell 4, and within approximately nine seconds, followed Respondent into the cell. At the time Respondent entered Cell 4 there was another inmate in the cell. Once in Cell 4, McMillen complied with Respondent’s instruction to face the wall and place his hands behind his back. However, while Respondent was handcuffing McMillen, McMillen exhibited an aggressive move toward him. As a result of McMillen's aggressive move, Respondent exercised force in restraining McMillen, engaging in an arm hold and forcing McMillen to the ground. Once on the ground, McMillen did not resist further and cooperated in the efforts of Respondent and McGuire to return him to his feet. During the process of Respondent's utilizing this force, McMillen suffered a cut over his right eye that required medical attention. McGuire then assisted Respondent in the handcuffing and transporting of McMillen. McMillen was then transported to C Wing where he was seen by a nurse, his restraints were removed, and he was left in a cell. McMillen did not resist further at that time and complied with the instructions of Respondent. Following the incident described in paragraph 16, Respondent and McGuire reported the incident as a use of force. Their incident reports were reviewed by Respondent’s supervisor, Sergeant Richard Leach, who approved the use of force and completed his own report. Prior to completing his report, Sergeant Leach attempted to speak with McMillen, but McMillen refused to discuss the matter with him. Sergeant Leach discussed the incident with Respondent and McGuire, but did not review the videotapes of the pre-booking area for the time period during which the incident occurred. It was later that Sergeant Leach was advised there was a problem with regard to the use of force. After reports were completed and submitted, the videotapes made in the pre-booking area of the incident were reviewed by Lieutenant Alan Harmer, pursuant to the procedures utilized at the Jail. Lieutenant Harmer also reviewed the incident reports prepared by Respondent and McGuire and the use- of-force report prepared by Sergeant Leach. Upon reviewing the tapes, Lieutenant Harmer determined that the events leading up to the use of force and the use of force itself violated Sheriff’s Office rules. As a result of Lieutenant Harmer's preliminary determination, an internal investigation was conducted by the Administrative Inquiry Division (AID) of the Sheriff’s Office pursuant to the referral by Lieutenant Harmer. Sworn statements were taken by investigators, including statements of Respondent, McGuire, and the inmate in Cell 4 at the time of the altercation. In his sworn statement, Respondent alleged that McMillen was verbally abusive during the course of the booking process and that he further was uncooperative and had initiated an act of possible physical resistance by moving his leg in a manner possibly designed to strike Respondent. After completing its investigation, the AID presented its entire investigative file to the Administrative Review Board (Board) without conclusion or recommendation. Sergeant Leach was among the officers sitting on the Board. Although Sergeant Leach had initially approved the use of force when he reviewed the reports of Respondent and McGuire, he voted to discipline Respondent based upon his observations from the videotapes of the incident. The Board met and after reviewing the materials provided by AID and giving Respondent the opportunity to respond further, the complaint was sustained. Specifically, the violations determined by the Board to have occurred were: Violation of Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida 90-395, Section 6, subsection 4: conduct unbecoming a public servant; violations of the provisions of law or the rules and regulations and operating procedures of the Office of the Sheriff; Violation of rule and regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, General Order 3-1.3 (Level Three violation), 067, relating to a member’s effectiveness in their assigned duties. On April 26, 1999, you unnecessarily caused a use of force by entering a cell and confronting an inmate. Further, you exposed yourself to undue risk by entering the cell without appropriate back-up. Under the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Guidelines, a sustained finding of one Level Three violation is the basis for assigning 15 disciplinary points. As a result, Respondent was assessed 15 disciplinary points. Sheriff’s Office General Order 10-2 identifies a disciplinary range for a total point assessment of 15 points to be a minimum discipline of a written reprimand and a maximum discipline of a three-day suspension. In the instant case, Respondent was assessed the maximum discipline, a three-day suspension. The conduct engaged in by Respondent in following McMillen into Cell 4 and then engaging in a physical altercation with McMillen based solely upon a single comment by McMillen, regardless of the extent to which the comment constituted a vulgar insult directed toward Respondent, did not constitute a good correctional practice. Moreover, such conduct is not consistent with the training or conduct expected of correctional officers. The role of correctional officers in a volatile situation is to calm the situation and to maintain control, not to act to aggravate or to escalate the dispute or to allow the inmate to control the situation via verbal comments. Proper correctional practice would have been to allow McMillen to remain in Cell 4 for sufficient time to cool off and calm down before initiating further contact with him. Similarly, the actions of Respondent in following McMillen into the cell by himself rather than obtaining assistance prior to entering the cell, are also contrary to good correctional practice. Again, this conduct by Respondent served only to potentially escalate and aggravate the confrontation, rather than to calm the situation. Moreover, it is also good correctional practice to have two detention deputies transport an inmate. This is particularly so considering the presence of another inmate in Cell 4 at the time Respondent entered the cell. There was no need for Respondent to enter the cell with McMillen or to initiate physical contact with McMillen, and his actions are contrary to Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Policy and Procedure File Index No. DCB 9.29 that requires that detention deputies refrain from one-on-one confrontations with inmates that may lead to physical confrontations. The actions of Respondent created a situation that led to a use of force and injury to McMillen that could have been avoided had Respondent effectively performed his duties as a detention deputy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the conduct alleged in the charging document and upholding Respondent’s suspension for three days from his employment as a detention deputy with the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: William E. Laubach, Esquire Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association 14450 46th Street, North Suite 115 Clearwater, Florida 33762 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler and Evans Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Office of Pinellas County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616 Jean H. Kwall, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin, Richard Edward Jackson and Jeffery Lynn Fowler, are inmates under the supervision of the Respondent. Petitioners Halpin and Fowler are incarcerated at Glades Correctional Institution. Petitioner Jackson is incarcerated at Martin Correctional Institution. The Respondent is the Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-6.003, 33-6.0045 and 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rules govern transfers of inmates and custody classification of inmates. The Challenged Rules were amended by the Respondent after the Respondent enacted and applied several emergency rules governing inmate transfers and custody classification of inmates. These emergency rules were adopted during 1990 and 1991. The Petitioners have alleged that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious as applied to the Petitioners . . . ." The Petitioners have also alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because they were amended "through prohibited acts as defined in Chapter 120.54(9)(c), Fla. Stat., when the Respondent ran two emergency rules (33ER91-1 & 33ER91-2) back-to- back so that Amended Chapter 33-6, etc. (1991) could be implemented."
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Petitioner was an inmate incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution within the custody and control of the State of Florida, Department of Corrections. Respondent stipulated at final hearing that Petitioner has "standing" to maintain the rule challenge proceeding. The parties also stipulated that the rule under challenge in this proceeding is a rule adopted by Respondent in accordance with the settlement reached in a previous administrative rule challenge proceeding in which Petitioner was a party. The parties further stipulated that ". . . inmates within the Respondent's care enjoy meaningful access to the courts." There are presently approximately 2,500 inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution. There is one Xerox machine located in the law library at Union Correctional Institution, and the librarian has two inmate clerks assigned to assist in the operation of the library. There is insufficient money in the library budget to fund either additional copying machines or additional personnel to assist in copying materials other than those authorized under Respondent's rule.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 15A-9.006(2) (the Rule) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to section 120.52(8)(b), (c), and (d), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact An IID is: A breath alcohol analyzer connected to a motor vehicle's ignition. In order to start the motor vehicle engine, a convicted person must blow a deep lung breath sample into the analyzer, which measures the breath alcohol concentration. If the breath alcohol concentration exceeds the fail point on the [IID], the motor vehicle engine will not start. Fla. Admin. Code R. 15A-9.003(13). Rule 15A-9.005, which is entitled, "Specifications," provides in part: All [IIDs] will be required to meet or exceed the standards set forth in the model specifications published in the Federal Register, Volume 57, No. 67, pages 11772- 11787 by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Technical specifications for the operation and installation of the [IID] shall be described in the contract between [Respondent] and the manufacturer(s). The [IIDs] alcohol fail point shall be the level specified by Section 316.1937, Florida Statutes. Rule 15A-9.005(4), (5), and (6) establishes performance specifications for failed-point tests on initial startup and rolling retests and for an emergency bypass. Rule 15A-9.007, which is entitled, "Certification," provides: Each manufacturer under contract with [Respondent] will submit certification from an independent laboratory certifying that their [IID] has been tested in accordance with the model specifications published in the Federal Register, Volume 57, No. 67, pages 11772-11787 by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the [IID] meets or exceeds those specifications, as well as criteria set forth in the contract with [Respondent]. The manufacturer shall be responsible for the continuing certification of [IID] service providers for use of an approved [IID]. Rule 15A-9.003(6) defines "certification" as the "testing and approval process required by [Respondent]." Rule 15A-9.003(16) defines "manufacturer" as the "actual producer of the [IID] who assembles the product and who may provide distribution and services." Rule 15A-9.003(21) defines "service provider" as the "retail supplier of the approved [IID]." Rule 15A-9.008 addresses the installation and removal of IIDs. Rule 15A-9.008(1) requires the "manufacturer or his [sic] representative" to install the IID in accordance with the guidelines of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Rule 15A-19.008(2) requires the "service provider" to develop and deliver an IID orientation to the convicted person. Rule 15A-9.009 addresses the servicing of IIDs. Rule 15A-9.009(2) requires the "service provider" to service the IID at the intervals stated in the contract with Respondent, calibrate the IID, retrieve data from the IID and timely submit the data to Respondent, and check for signs of tampering with the IID. Rule 15A-9.009(5) requires an IID to record the time and date of each breath test, the breath alcohol level of each test, and the time and date of any attempt to tamper with the IID. Rule 15A-9.009(6) requires the "manufacturer or service provider" to maintain a toll-free 24-hour emergency telephone support service and fix or replace any nonoperational IID within 48 hours of any call. Rule 15A-9.006, which is entitled, "Procedure for [IID] Approval," provides: All ignition interlock devices used pursuant to Sections 316.193 and 316.1937, Florida Statutes, must be approved by the department. The department shall contract with a manufacturer or manufacturers of ignition interlock devices for the services and commodities required for implementation of Sections 316.193, 316.1937, and 316.1938, Florida Statutes. The department shall maintain a list of approved ignition interlock devices. For the specific authority and laws implemented, Rule 15A-9.006 cites the same authority: sections 316.193, 316.1937, and 316.1938, Florida Statutes, and Federal Register Volume 57, Number 67, pages 11772-11787. Section 316.193 imposes penalties for DUI offenses. For second and third DUIs, convicted persons must have installed "an [IID] approved by [Respondent] in accordance with s. 316.1938." Section 316.1937 authorizes a court to order the installation of an IID under circumstances other than those described in section 316.193. Section 316.1937 provides that the court may prohibit the convicted person from operating a motor vehicle unless it is equipped with a "functioning [IID] certified by [Respondent] as provided in s. 316.1938 " The most relevant statute to this case is section 316.1938, which provides: [Respondent] shall certify or cause to be certified the accuracy and precision of the breath-testing component of the [IIDs] as required by s. 316.1937, and shall publish a list of approved devices, together with rules governing the accuracy and precision of the breath-testing component of such devices as adopted by rule in compliance with s. 316.1937. The cost of certification shall be borne by the manufacturers of [IIDs]. No model of [IID] shall be certified unless it meets the accuracy requirements specified by rule of [Respondent]. [Respondent] shall design and adopt by rule a warning label which shall be affixed to each [IID] upon installation. The label shall contain a warning that any person tampering, circumventing, or otherwise misusing the device is guilty of a violation of law and may be subject to civil liability. The document at Federal Register, Volume 57, Number 67, pages 11772, et seq., is a notice of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of technical specifications for IIDs (Model Specifications). Model Specifications applies to the manufacture, testing, calibration, data-reporting, and tamper-monitoring of IIDs. IIDs are manufactured by 16 corporations in the United States. Most, if not all, states operate IID programs for DUI offenders. Petitioner is a manufacturer and service provider of IIDs. Its sole manufacturing facility is in Cocoa, Florida, where Petitioner employs 30-35 persons. About 35,000 of Petitioner's IIDs are in use in 25 states, but not Florida. Intervenors, which are affiliated corporations, are manufacturers and service providers of IIDs. (References to Intervenors will include either Intervenor, as appropriate.) Pursuant to the contract described below, Intervenors have provided IID services to over 6000 convicted persons in Florida. Intervenor is a manufacturer and service provider of IIDs and presently operates in 46 states. Respondent has tentatively selected Intervenor as the sole vendor for the state of Florida in the 2013-14 procurement described below. In 2003, Respondent issued an invitation to negotiate for IIDs and IID services. Following a tentative award to Intervenors, a vendor challenged the award, arguing, at least in part, that Respondent lacked the authority to limit the number of IID service providers. In a settlement, Respondent awarded the south region of Florida to Intervenors and the north region of Florida to the bid protestor, which was #1 A Lifesafer, Inc. (Lifesafer). In 2004, Respondent entered into contracts for IIDs and IID services with these vendors. As extended, the 2004 contracts are set to expire on March 31, 2014. Respondent issued a Request for Proposals on July 3, 2013 (RFP). Providing for the replacement of the 2004 contracts described in the preceding paragraph, the RFP is to enable Respondent to select up to two vendors to "implement and operate an [IID] Program" in Florida. RFP Attachment C-19 provides that the term of the new contract(s) shall be five years with an "anticipated" renewal term of another five years.2/ The RFP calls for responses detailing, among other things, the IID hardware by name and model, which must comply with Model Specifications requirements; software to provide Respondent with online access to data downloads from IIDs; installation; service, inspection and monitoring; contractor staffing; training of staff; security and fraud prevention; and transition services for IID convicted persons being serviced by a party to the current IID contract. No one filed a specifications challenge to the RFP. Respondent received four responses; they were from Petitioner, Intervenors, Intervenor, and Lifesafer. Petitioner, Intervenors, and Lifesafer have challenged the tentative award to Intervenor, and these bid protests are pending at DOAH as DOAH Case Nos. 13-3924BID, 13-3925BID, and 13-4037BID. Respondent acknowledges that the procurement of IIDs and IID services by contract provides it more flexibility than if it specified requirements and performance standards by rule. Respondent concedes that other states allow IID service providers to operate IID programs with open competition. Respondent contends that procuring these IID services by statewide or regional contract ensures the delivery of services to rural areas that otherwise might be underserved, the delivery of uniform services throughout the state, the transmission from the IID service provider of compliance data that would be jeopardized if numerous IID service providers operated in the state, the existence of a process for the removal of an IID service provider that did not discharge its responsibilities in a timely and competent fashion, and the familiarity among Respondent's limited staff with the limited makes of IIDs in use in Florida.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent, Fred Joseph Turner, M.D., violated section 456.072(1)(c) and (x), Florida Statutes (2017), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of medical doctors pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a medical doctor licensed by DOH since April 29, 1991. He holds license number ME59799. On or about July 21, 2015, the Grand Jury for the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, issued an indictment against Respondent and Rosetta Valerie Cannata in case number 8:15-cr-264-T-23AAS, charging violations of Title 8, United States Code sections 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(l) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), and Title 21 United States Code sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. The indictment also sought forfeiture of various items of value should Respondent be convicted. At some point, there was a superseding indictment, but that indictment is not of record in this proceeding. The case was tried by jury, and although it is unclear when the jury trial took place, an Order of Forfeiture entered October 13, 2017, states that a jury found Respondent guilty of six counts in the superseding indictment, and that the United States had established that Respondent had obtained $232,020.02 from the offenses for which he was convicted. The Judgment in Case Number 8:15-cr-264-T-23AAS was entered December 6, 2017. The Judgment indicates that a jury found Respondent guilty of counts one through six of the superseding indictment, as follows: Count I for conspiracy to distribute and dispense and cause the distribution and dispensing of oxycodone, hydromorphone, morphine, and hydrocodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. sections 846 and 841(b)(1)(C); Counts II through V for distributing and dispensing and causing the distribution of hydrocodone (Count II), oxycodone (Count III), morphine (Count IV), and oxycodone and hydromorphone (Count V), in violation of 21 U.S.C. sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and Count VI for conspiracy to smuggle an alien into the United States, in violation of Title 8 U.S.C. section 1324(a). Count VI is irrelevant to the charges in this case. The Judgment sentenced Respondent to 151 months in federal prison, followed by 36 months of supervised release. It also provided that Respondent forfeited the items named in the preliminary Orders of Forfeiture, i.e., property up to $232,020.02. Respondent did not notify DOH or the Board of Medicine of his conviction. Controlled substances can only be prescribed by specified licensed health care providers, such as medical doctors, who hold a current drug enforcement agency (DEA) registration. Without a medical license and a DEA registration, a person cannot dispense or prescribe controlled substances, and therefore, could not commit the crimes for which Respondent was found guilty. Respondent responded at length to the charges in the Administrative Complaint. He vigorously disputes the basis for the conviction, but not the conviction itself. Respondent claims that the evidence against him is based upon alteration of records and test results by a DEA informant who worked in his office. However, from his statements, it is clear that the conviction was based upon activity occurring in his practice. The convictions for which Respondent has been convicted relate to the practice of medicine or the ability to practice medicine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that Respondent violated section 456.072(1)(c) and (x), and revoking his license to practice medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Joseph Turner, Jr. M.D. #62779-018 Federal Prison Camp 110 Raby Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32509 William Edward Walker, Esquire Department of Health Bin C-65 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Major Ryan Thompson, Esquire Department of Health Bin C-65 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Claudia Kemp, JD, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health Bin C-03 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Louise Wilhite-St Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health Bin C-65 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
