The Issue This is a challenge to action of the Gilchrist County School Board in its act of abolishing the Petitioner's employment position with the School Board as Occupational Specialist. In particular, Petitioner alleges that this action constituted rule within the meaning of Section 120.-52(15), Florida Statutes. Further, it is alleged that that rule activity did not comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Finally, Petitioner claims that the rule enactment or activity was arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact The parties have agreed by stipulation in the course of this hearing that the entire record, to include testimony and exhibits presented in the companion case, Hazel Bowdoin v. School Board of Gilchrist County, Florida, D.O.A.H. Case No. 82-1375, becomes part of the record in this proceeding and may be utilized by the Hearing Officer in arriving at the decision in this cause. The parties have also stipulated to the standing of this Petitioner to challenge the alleged activity in the abolishment of the Occupational Specialist position as being a rule. The parties are satisfied on the subject of the notice of hearing as established in a stipulation entered into at hearing. In a concluding stipulation, the parties agree that the decision to abolish the position of Occupational Specialist held by the Petitioner was not a decision which complied with the formal rule-making procedures set forth in Section 120.54 Florida Statutes. Petitioner is the holder of a Rank III Teaching Certificate, issued by the State of Florida. The certification recognizes her as an Occupational Specialist. On July 8, 1974, she was granted a continuing contract of employment with the Gilchrist County School Board as an Occupational Specialist in the Trenton and Bell schools within the Gilchrist County School District. A copy of that contract may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, admitted into evidence. The contract by its terms states at Paragraph 9, "This contract shall not operate to prevent discontinuance of a position as provided by law." It is the discontinuance or abolishment of the position of Occupational Specialist held by the Petitioner that occasioned the formal hearing in this cause. Since being granted the position of Occupational Specialist in permanent status, Petitioner has performed those duties described in the job description, a copy of which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Those functions include career planning for students, considering their personal problems, preparing them for assessment tests and the execution of job application forms. In the school year 1981-82, Petitioner worked three- fifths of her time in Trenton High School and two-fifths in Bell High School. In her capacity, Respondent considered her to be acting as the equivalent of a guidance counselor. She has never been certified by the State of Florida as a guidance counselor. Around the beginning of April 1982, the Superintendent of Schools in Gilchrist County, Ray Thomas, decided that the position of Occupational Specialist held by the Petitioner should be abolished. At that time, and at all relevant times, this position of Occupational Specialist was the only position of its type in the Gilchrist County School System. The basis for the abolition or discontinuation of the position concerned anticipated revenue shortfalls or budget inadequacy for the upcoming school year 1982-83, pursuant to information from persons within the State of Florida responsible for educational funding. In arriving at his decision, Thomas sought comment from Robert Ervin, the principal at Bell High School and James Surrency, the principal at Trenton High School. Ervin was asked if the guidance responsibility at Bell High School could best be achieved by the provision of a full-time guidance counselor. Thomas gave the impression to Surrency that the basis for requesting the discontinuation of the position of Occupational Specialist pertained to funding. No particulars were revealed to the principals on the question of the financial position of the school system facing the advent of the 1982-83 school year. Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, admitted into evidence, are the comments of the Trenton and Bell principals on the subject of the abolition of the position of Occupational Specialist. Ervin accepted the idea of abolishing the Occupational Specialist. Ervin accepted the idea of abolishing the Occupational Specialist position based upon his belief that a full-time guidance counselor would be provided to his school as contrasted to the half-time guidance counselor and two-fifths time work of the Petitioner during the school year 1981-82. In his remarks, Surrency indicates reconciliation to the idea of losing the three-fifths time that the Petitioner was spending at Trenton High; however, he indicates his preference to have the Occupational Specialist position remain if it could be afforded. In the school year 1981-82, Trenton had a full-time guidance counselor in addition to the work being done by the Petitioner. After receiving the comments of the principals and in keeping with his choice, the superintendent of schools wrote to the Petitioner on April 21, 1982, advising her that he would recommend to the School Board, effective the beginning of the school year 1982-83, that the position of Occupational Specialist not be filled and offering Bowdoin a leave of absence without pay for one year. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. On April 22, 1982, the recommendation of the Superintendent was presented to the School Board and in the course of that meeting, the Petitioner was represented by counsel. Action on this recommendation by the superintendent was tabled. On May 3, 1982, the Superintendent wrote the School Board and modified his position on the question of Occupational Specialist from one recommending that the position of Occupational Specialist not be filled in 1982- 83 school year to one of recommending the discontinuance of the position for economic and curriculum reasons, stating that the duties of that position could be assumed or transferred to the guidance counselor at each school in Gilchrist County. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. On May 4, 1982, consideration was given to the suggestion of total abolishment of the position of Occupational Specialist and the School Board in a 3 to 2 vote determined to abolish the position of Occupational Specialist. This action was in keeping with Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. Prior to the vote, no specific information was imparted by the Superintendent or other school officials as to the financial benefits to be derived from the action or effect of the abolishment in terms of curriculum changes. The school board simply accepted the Superintendent's word that it was necessary to abolish the position for financial reasons. (The Superintendent, since taking office in 1981, has abolished other positions within the-Gilchrist County School System, such as assistant principal at Trenton High School, general supervisor of instruction, food services supervisor, brick and block masonry teacher, librarian at Trenton High School and has left vacant teachers's aide positions.) At the May 4, 1982, meeting, Petitioner asked for and the Board agreed to afford a formal hearing to the Petitioner to challenge the abolishment of the Occupational Specialist position. Again, on June 1, 1982, a request was made in the Petitioner's behalf to have a grievance hearing before the board concerning the board's decision to abolish the job and it was determined that that grievance hearing should be held on July 6, 1982. On July 6, 1982, the Board requested the Superintendent to prepare a list of vacancies which Mrs. Bowdoin might be certified for, the salary schedules related to those positions, a list of programs offered other than K-12 and the state certification requirements for those positions and the name of those persons filling the positions at the time. On July 20, 1982, the Board considered the level III grievance of the Petitioner in the presence of the Petitioner's attorney on the topic of an alternative placement of the Petitioner and the salary associated with that placement. On August 3, 1982, the Board entered a written resolution of decision pertaining to the level III grievance pertaining to the Petitioner, a copy of that resolution being found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. In this resolution, the School Board properly identified that the Petitioner could not be placed as a guidance counselor in that she did not hold a master's degree required for such position. In lieu, of the position of Occupational Specialist which had been abolished by the School Board on May 4, 1982, by its August resolution, the Board offered the position of Teacher's Aide at Trenton Elementary School, with a substantial reduction in salary from approximately $15,000 a year to approximately $6,300 a year. This position of Teacher's Aide was reserved until August 16, 1982. Petitioner did not elect to accept the position of Teacher's Aide and has been unemployed since August 1982. In the course of an August 11, 1982 meeting, the Superintendent reported to the Board that the Petitioner had "responded" at a level IV grievance procedure. On August 31, 1982, the Board was asked to consider litigation which had been presented to it by the Superintendent. On September 2, 1982, in an Executive Board session of the School Board of Gilchrist County, discussion was made of certain civil litigation brought by Petitioner against the Board. On October 5, 1982, an update was given to the Board concerning that case of the Petitioner versus the Board. Another update was made on October 5, 1982. On December 7, 1982, the Board was made aware of the fact that the case was to be considered in arbitration. (Various minutes of School Board meetings as described in this paragraph are more completely set forth in Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, admitted into evidence.) The matter was presented before the American Arbitration Association and the Arbitrator in his report absolved the Board of any violation related to the job abolition. The copy of that report may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence. The date of the report is July 21, 1983. As stated before, the Bell High School in 1982-83, employed a full-time guidance counselor in substitution for an approximately half-time guidance and two-fifths time from Bowdoin the prior year. The Trenton school went from a 1981-82 school year in which a full-time counselor and three-fifths of Bowdoin's time was devoted to counseling activities to a full-time counselor, an aide working two-thirds time mostly in a clerical capacity and some assistance by a vocational teacher in school year 1982-83. Had Bowdoin returned as an aide to the Trenton school in 1982-83, she would have been used in the guidance department in the same role as she had been given as Occupational Specialist. There was a revenue surplus left at the end of the 1982-83 school year and it was sufficient to have allowed the funding of the position of Occupational Specialist for the 1982-83 school year; however, that surplus was less than the 1981-82 school year by approximately $65,000. This funding difference in the face of providing essentially the same services in the school system, pointed out the more difficult economic circumstance that Thomas had made mention of in his initial decision to abolish the position of Occupational Specialist. In the 1982-83 Schools year, employees in the school system received salary increases. At the conclusion of the 1981-82 school year, there were approximately 900 students at the Trenton school which included grades K-12. According to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, excerpts from the standards of the Commission on Secondary Schools of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, schools of a population of 750-999 need two guidance professionals. Therefore, the reduction of one and three-fifths counselors in 1981-82 to one counselor and something less than three-fifths in 1982-83 was contrary to the statement of standards. This excerpt is at 4.10.0, Figure 1, minimum personnel requirements. Respondent replies to that assertion through its Exhibit No. 9, which are excerpts of the standards for unit schools by the Commission on Secondary Schools and Commission on Elementary Schools of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. At Page 9, 9.16.0-9.16.2, Respondent argues that one guidance counselor suffices for any school with a membership of 500 or more students up to 999 students. Without determining which of these guidelines related to accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools is correct, it suffices to say that the changes that were made by the School Board in abolishing the position of Occupational Specialist as it might affect accreditation were made in good faith in that it can arguably be said that Trenton school, having 900 students, only needed one guidance counselor to meet conditions of accreditation. There were no curriculum changes made in the 1982-83 school year as a result of abolishing the Occupational Specialist position. There were curriculum changes but they were not the result of any influence provided by the abolishment of the Occupational Specialist job.
The Issue The issue is whether, as the district school board alleges, an elementary school teacher choked one of her students in class——an allegation which, if proved, would give the district just cause to dismiss the teacher from her position.
Findings Of Fact The Broward County School Board ("School Board" or the "district"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Broward County Public School System. At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent Ava E. Williams ("Williams"), who holds an active Florida Educator Certificate, was employed as a third-grade teacher at Watkins Elementary School. She had taught at that school for the preceding 13 years and been an employee of the district since 1998. During the 2018-2019 school year, one of the students in Williams's class was a boy named P.P. After school on Friday, September 14, 2018, P.P. told his mother that, earlier during the day, Williams had choked him in class. P.P.'s mother and sister accompanied P.P. to school later that day, or the following Monday, to report this allegation to Assistant Principal Shereen Reynolds. P.P. claims that when he returned to class after the meeting with Ms. Reynolds, Williams called P.P. a "lying, fat pig" for turning her in. The undersigned rejects this allegation, which is uncorroborated, as not credible. Sometime later, on September 17, 2018, Ms. Reynolds told Williams about P.P.'s allegation that she (Williams) had choked P.P. the Friday before. The next day, Tuesday, Williams encountered her colleague, Shawony Russell, in the hallway. Williams——who was acquainted with, but not close to, Ms. Russell——knew that Ms. Russell had been P.P.'s teacher the previous school year, when P.P. was in the second grade. There is no dispute that Williams spoke briefly to Ms. Russell at this time. Ms. Russell asserts, however, that Williams admitted to her that she had choked P.P., whereas Williams adamantly denies having made such a confession. For reasons that will be discussed, the undersigned deems Williams's account of this conversation to be the more credible and thus rejects Ms. Russell's testimony to the contrary. After conducting an investigation, the district determined that Williams was guilty of having choked P.P. while screaming at him, "Do you hear me?"——or words to that effect. On this basis, the district seeks to terminate Williams's employment. Although the district advances several theories in support of its intended decision, Williams concedes that the allegations against her, if proved, would afford the district just cause for dismissal. Her defense is that the allegations are untrue. At hearing, only two witnesses to the alleged incident testified, namely Williams and P.P. Their respective accounts differ in material respects. Williams was by far the more credible witness, and her testimony is accepted over P.P.'s. Although, as the fact-finder, the undersigned is not obligated to explain why he has found one witness to be more believable than another, in this instance a few comments are in order, given that the School Board largely grounded its case on P.P.'s testimony. To begin——and this is undisputed——P.P. is a liar. That is a harsh word, "liar," one that the undersigned does not use lightly, especially with reference to a child witness. But here it is an accurate description. P.P. admitted under oath that he tells lies quite often, including to teachers. He has lied to get other students in trouble, among other things. This, alone, was enough to make the undersigned hesitate to take P.P.'s word about a charge that, if true, would cost a person her job——and might even end that person's professional career. Beyond that, P.P.'s description of the incident makes little sense and is difficult to imagine. P.P. claims that on the morning in question, Williams lined up the students in her class to walk with them to the cafeteria for lunch, except for P.P., who stayed behind because Williams, who thought P.P. had thrown a chair, was walking quickly towards him, after telling the other students to go. According to P.P., after everyone else had left, Williams stood in front of him and touched his throat with her open hand for one second, never squeezing, pushing, or making any movement at all——nor causing any pain—— before withdrawing. The undersigned does not believe that this is likely what happened. Williams's account, in contrast, is easy both to follow and to picture occurring. She recalls telling the children to clean up for lunch that morning, which all of them proceeded to do, except for P.P., who just sat at his desk and refused to move. Another student said something to P.P. that made P.P. mad, and he pushed a chair at the student. At this, Williams walked over to P.P. and asked him to get in line for lunch, but P.P. would not budge. Without touching P.P., Williams raised her voice and said to him loudly, "Do you hear me now?" She instructed the other students to leave for lunch and began walking towards the door herself. P.P. followed Williams and then exited the classroom ahead of his teacher, who had waited at the door for him. At this point, the incident was over. The undersigned credits Williams's testimony and finds that the incident likely took place as described in this paragraph. Apart from the eyewitness testimony, the only other significant evidence that the district offered was Williams's alleged admission. As mentioned above, P.P.'s second-grade teacher, Ms. Russell, testified that, during a conversation in the hallway on September 18, 2019, Williams confided to Ms. Russell that she had "choked" P.P. The undersigned does not believe that Ms. Russell's testimony is historically accurate in this regard. Credibility determinations such as this are the undersigned's prerogative to make without elaboration, but, as promised, a brief explanation will be given. There are three main reasons why the undersigned has found it unlikely that Williams said to Ms. Russell, "I choked him." First, Ms. Russell was not a confidant of Williams. Ms. Russell acknowledged this, saying she was surprised that Williams would tell her such a thing and agreeing that it "[m]ade no sense." Indeed, it makes so little sense that Ms. Russell's description of the confession strains credulity. Why on earth would Williams tell someone whom she had no particular reason to trust that she had choked a student——a gratuitous confession that could have ruinous consequences, including potentially a criminal prosecution? Stranger things happen, of course, but the odds are against an unsolicited, unexpected admission of this nature. Second, Ms. Russell claims that Williams said she had "choked" P.P. This is the word P.P. used in making his allegation against Williams, and it is the term that the district has used in charging and prosecuting Williams. Yet, if P.P.'s testimony were true (which it probably isn't), the contact that Williams made with P.P.'s throat could not reasonably be described as "choking." The term "choke" in this context obviously denotes the application of pressure around the victim's neck or throat to impede breathing and blood flow. What P.P. described, in contrast, was a brief (one second), painless touch without any constriction about his neck whatsoever. Thus, if Williams had touched P.P. (she probably didn't), and if, further, she had confessed as much to Ms. Russell (which is unlikely), it is highly improbable that Williams would have admitted doing something far worse than that which P.P. claims happened——which was, again, that Williams merely brushed the boy's neck with the palm of her hand.1/ Finally, Ms. Russell did not act like Williams had admitted having attacked a student. Imagine that you are an elementary school teacher and that one day, out of the blue, a colleague of yours, someone whom you do not know well, tells you that she has choked a third-grade student. Wouldn't you want to know what had happened? Ms. Russell didn't. More important, wouldn't you feel the need to report this potential child abuse to appropriate authorities for investigation, right away? Ms. Russell didn't. Ms. Russell did not take any immediate action because "[w]e were heading out to recess. I like to go outside and get my sun and just relax." Therefore, Ms. Russell testified, "I didn't call anyone. I didn't do anything. I was going back outside to relax." In fact, Ms. Russell never reported Williams's alleged admission to the school administration or the Department of Children and Families, even though she knew that, as a teacher, she had a legal duty to report child abuse upon becoming aware of reasonable cause to suspect that such has occurred. See § 39.201, Fla. Stat. Promptly going outside to relax in the sun and forget the matter is not the response one reasonably would expect from a teacher whose co-worker has just confessed to choking a student. Williams's description of the hallway encounter between her and Ms. Russell rings true. As stated, Williams knew that Ms. Russell had taught P.P., and she wanted to find out what Ms. Russell's experience with P.P. had been like. Seeing Ms. Russell in the hallway, Williams took the opportunity to inquire. There is no dispute that Ms. Russell told Williams that P.P. performed below grade level academically, had behavioral issues, and lied a lot.2/ Williams recalls telling Ms. Russell that, indeed, P.P. is a liar "because he said I choked him." The undersigned finds that the alleged "admission" is nothing but a truncated version of this statement, in which Williams described P.P.'s charge, not her own conduct. Determinations of Ultimate Fact The district has failed to prove its allegations against Williams by a preponderance of the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Broward County School Board enter a final order exonerating Ava E. Williams of all charges brought against her in this proceeding, reinstating Williams to her pre-dismissal position, and awarding Williams back salary as required under section 1012.33(6)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2020.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has just cause to suspend Respondent from work without pay and to terminate his employment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Richard Rahey “Respondent" or "Mr. Rahey" was employed by the Palm Beach County School District "Petitioner" or the “District” as a school monitor and behavior intervention associate at Benoist Farms Elementary School (Benoist) during the 2008-2009 school year. He also served as a parent liaison and the President of the Parent Teacher Organization (the "PTO"). In January 2009, District Police began an investigation of bank accounts associated with Benoist when a check that was sent by an organization that subsidizes after school care was not received by the director of Benoist's after school program. Detective Robert Walton found that the check in the amount of $2,314.47 was deposited in an account at a different bank from the one used for Benoist school accounts. Only Mr. Rahey had access to the other account called the "Benoist Farms Elementary PTO" account (the "PTO account"). When asked about the check intended for the after school program, Mr. Rahey said he found it in his school mailbox, so he deposited it. Detective Walton had investigated Mr. Rahey for PTO bank account irregularities in 2005. At that time, Mr. Rahey was an employee and PTO President at Seminole Trails Elementary School ("Seminole Trails"). Although the evidence was insufficient to refer the matter for criminal prosecution, Mr. Rahey was found to have failed "to safeguard money designated for children." A letter of reprimand dated June 15, 2005, warned him as follows: You are directed to familiarize yourself with the established procedures and protocol for handling funds and deposits. You are further reminded that the district's best practices with regard to the collection and deposit of money must be followed. You are advised that any future failure to follow the aforementioned direction will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Detective Walton had more reasons to investigate Mr. Rahey's finances further after finding in public records that Mr. Rahey's home was in foreclosure and that he had filed for bankruptcy. At Detective Walton's request, a subpoena was issued for records from the PTO account and from Mr. Rahey's personal bank account. A number of checks from the PTO account were written to Sam's Club, so Detective Walton requested and received an itemized printout of purchases made using a tax- exempt Benoist PTO Sam's Club membership. When Detective Walton examined the accounts and purchases, he found what appeared to be unauthorized and unexplained purchases, and checks made to cash that totaled in excess of $3,600.00 over a period of time from January 2008 to April 2009. When questioned in May 2009, Mr. Rahey told Detective Walton that he did not remember or was not sure about some of the purchases. He insisted, however, that they were legitimate expenditures for the school, but his records were insufficient to support his claims. Mr. Rahey only had his handwritten ledger to show the purposes of the expenditures. During the questioning, he also acknowledged that Detective Walton had told him in 2005 that the same kind of record-keeping was inadequate for a school organization. This time Detective Walton determined that there was sufficient evidence to refer the case for criminal prosecution.1 Dr. Ruth Ann Miller was the Principal at Benoist. Detective Walton questioned her about certain items, including a PTO account check written for a "microwave for Dr. Miller." Dr. Miller had not authorized Mr. Rahey to buy a microwave and did not have the microwave. When she confronted Mr. Rahey, he initially denied having used funds from the account for his personal use. The District provided Mr. Rahey a copy of the Detective Walton's investigative report and invited Mr. Rahey to attend a Pre-disciplinary Meeting that was held on October 2, 2009, which he did. At the meeting and during the hearing, Mr. Rahey admitted his mistakes, apologized, and blamed his actions on his difficult financial situation as a single parent whose former spouse had stopped paying child support. Superintendent Arthur C. Johnson, by letter dated February 12, 2010, notified Mr. Rahey that he would recommend to the Board at its meeting on March 3, 2010, that he be suspended without pay and that his employment be terminated. As grounds for his action, the Superintendent listed conversion of District funds and/or property, ethical misconduct, failure to exercise best professional judgment, failure to properly control District funds, falsification of documentation, and theft. The following specific policies and statutes were also cited: School Board Policies 1.013 - Responsibilities of School District Personnel and Staff; 2.32 - Personal Business on School Time; 2.16 - Fund Raising Activities by School; 3.27 - Suspension and Dismissal of Employees; and Florida Statutes Section 817.034(4)(a)3. - Organized Fraud; and Section 812.014 - Grand Theft. As a result of budget cuts at Benoist, Mr. Rahey transferred to Bear Lakes Middle School where he was employed as a school monitor until he was dismissed from employment in April 2010. He has continued to serve as a volunteer parent liaison and business partner coordinator at Bear Lakes Middle School where he has the full support of the principal, Dr. Anthony Lockhart. His effectiveness has been compromised. Dr. Lockhart, for example, monitors Mr. Rahey's activities to make sure that he does not handle any money. Although he has confessed to committing the violations of policy and the crimes as charged, Mr. Rahey maintains that his employment should not be terminated because he has done so many worthwhile things to assist the schools. He has increased the number of volunteers and business partners at Bear Lakes. He was instrumental in having one business partner donate $10,000.00 for computers. Over the ten years that he has worked for and volunteered in District schools, Mr. Rahey has received excellent evaluations. He has been volunteer of the year once and has been nominated employee of the year four times. Mr. Rahey helped solicit school supplies and uniforms for new students in the District who were evacuated from Haiti following the earthquake. He has received absolution from his church pastor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order that suspends Respondent from employment without pay and terminates his employment with the District. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, the following facts are found: Respondent, Lloyd R. Day, has been employed by the Madison County School Board in the position of Finance Officer since May, 1971. He has been continuously employed in this position through a series of one-year contracts. On April 2, 1982, the School Board, upon recommendation of Petitioner, reemployed Respondent for the period commencing July 1, 1982, and continuing through June 30, 1983. Petitioner, Randall M. Buchanan, became Superintendent of Schools in Madison County in 1977. His duties are defined by law and rules promulgated by the School Board of Madison County. As part of his duties as Director of Finance, Respondent invested the idle funds of the Madison County District School Board following his employment in May, 1971, and continued to perform this function until approximately October, 1980. At the time Petitioner became Superintendent, he requested that employees write down their current duties to assist him in learning their functions. He retained this information in his own office files. This informal job description established that the finance officer was responsible for investment of all idle funds. Two other job descriptions for the position of finance officer also existed, one in the personnel office, which assigns responsibility for the investment of idle funds to the Finance Director, and one filed with the Public Employees Relations Commission, which does not include this specific function but contains an "other assigned duties" clause. The School Board has not adopted an official job description for the position of finance officer. This evidence, the testimony of Petitioner and Respondent, as well as the accepted practices within the school system established that Respondent was responsible for this function. He exercised his duty to invest idle funds of the Madison County District School Board from January, 1977, until approximately October, 1980, and did an excellent job investing during that period. His efforts enabled the Madison County District School Board to construct a half- million dollar football stadium with interest earned on such investment of idle funds in the Board's capital outlay account. During the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1979, and ending June 30, 1980 (1980 fiscal year), Respondent made 102 separate investments of idle School Board funds in certificates of deposit and repurchase agreements. As a result, the Madison County School Board earned interest income of $245,862.51. Respondent was criticized, however, in the audit report prepared by the Auditor General's Office for his investment practices during the 1980 fiscal year due to his failure to follow-up investments made by telephone with written confirmation or documentation. Respondent was so angered and upset with the auditor's criticism of the manner in which he made investments in the 1980 fiscal year that he told the auditor he would leave the School Board's funds in a passbook savings account rather than comply with the auditor's recommended investment procedures. With the exception of three certificates of deposit and one repurchase agreement, Respondent did in fact leave the funds in a passbook savings account at the Bank of Greenville, which paid a rate of 5.25 percent. As a result, interest income in the 1981 fiscal year (which ended June 30, 1981) totaled only $104,976.52, approximately $140,000.00 less than that which was earned in the 1980 fiscal year. In the report of the Auditor General for the 1981 fiscal year, the auditor noted on page 4, paragraph (13),that the Madison County District School Board lost approximately $92,000.00 in interest income as a result of failing to invest School Board funds in accordance with State Law. Section 236.24(2) , Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1980, provides that a District School Board may invest funds not needed for immediate cash requirements in savings accounts only if the interest rate received is not less than prevailing US. Treasury Bill rates. Respondent was knowledgeable of that fact, having attended the Summer Conference of the Florida School Finance Officers Association in Orlando, Florida, in June, 1980. Following his return from that meeting, Respondent prepared a memorandum to Superintendent Buchanan dated July 8, 1980, in which he stated: At a meeting held in Orlando, Florida, by the Department of Education, recent legislation was discussed and explained to us. One Bill (CSSB 559)(Chapter 80-103, effective July 1, 1980) pertained to the subject of investment of public funds. The explanation given us at this meeting was that we are precluded from investing in time deposits unless the rate of return equals US. Treasury Bill rates. Respondent's memorandum went on to indicate that the Florida Bankers Association's interpretation of the new law was in agreement with that of the Department of Education. Respondent concluded his memorandum by stating "future investments must yield at least US. Treasury Bill rates or we must invest in US. Treasury Bills. By memorandum dated August 25, 1980, Respondent advised Superintendent Buchanan of the investment of School Board funds in two certificates of deposit. in addition, he advised the Superintendent that on August 25, 1980, he talked to personnel at the Department of Administration, Local Government Surplus Trust Fund, to request a quote on the amount of funds which he was putting up for bid. Respondent notes in his memorandum that when he received the response from the Local Government Surplus Trust Fund, they quoted rates substantially higher than the rates quoted by local banking institutions. Acting on this information, Respondent prepared an agenda item requesting that the Madison County District School Board authorize investments with the Local Government Surplus Trust Fund. At its meeting on September 4, 1980, Respondent appeared before the Board and explained the request to them. The Board voted to authorize investment of funds in the Local Government Surplus Trust Fund unless the Hoard obtain a rate of interest from a local banking institution of within one-half percent of that paid by the Fund. Although he received authorization by the Board on September 4, 1980, to invest funds with the Local Government Surplus Trust Fund, Respondent took no further action to initiate any such investments and, in fact, made no investments with the Fund until after the Madison County District School Board received the official audit report for the 1981 fiscal year from the Auditor General in June, 1982. Respondent claimed that the idle funds were not invested in other investment forms due to workload, lack of direction and a preexisting directive by the Petitioner not to place funds out of the county. These assertions are not credible and are rejected. Rather, Respondent left funds in passbook savings because of the audit criticism over his failure to confirm and document verbal fund transactions. Because of Respondent's failure to properly invest idle funds, the School Board lost approximately $92,000.00 in the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1981. Petitioner claimed that he was not aware of either the problem or its magnitude until after receipt of the final audit in June, 1982, one year later. However, in October, 1981, auditors from the Auditor General's Office met with Petitioner and Respondent and criticized the manner in which funds had been invested and the revenues received from such investments. The testimony of an employee of the Auditor General established that he told Petitioner of the problem and that he acknowledged it. In January, 1982, a second auditor meeting with the Petitioner took place, this time with School Board member Albert W. Waldrep present. Again, Petitioner was told of the problem and its magnitude in terms of dollars and cents. School Board member Claude Pickles, on his volition, met with representatives from the Auditor General's Office on January 26, 1982, and was similarly informed. Petitioner took no disciplinary action against Respondent until after the audit criticism was reported in the local newspaper in Madison County in June, 1982. In April, 1982, Petitioner had recommended the reemployment of Respondent and the School Board renewed his contract. At the time of Respondent's reemployment, the Superintendent and at least two of the five School Board members were aware of the audit criticism relating to the investment of funds. Still it was not until the newspaper reported the audit criticism that Petitioner or the School Board acted to discharge Respondent. There was no evidence of any prior disciplinary action against Respondent, nor had he ever received a written performance evaluation during his employment with the Madison County School Board.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner suspend Respondent without pay for a period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: David Holder, Esquire Post Office Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John D. Carlson, Esquire 1030 E. Lafayette Street, Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randall M. Buchanan, Superintendent Madison County School Board Madison, Florida 32340 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's employment contract with Petitioner should be terminated for violation of School Board policies.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the local school board responsible for hiring, firing and overseeing all employees working for the School Board and/or within the Lee County Public School system (also called the "School District" herein). Respondent is an employee of the School Board, serving as an electronics field technician in the School Board's maintenance department. Respondent has worked for the School Board off and on since 1996, when he was a school bus driver. He has been an electronics technician since 2000. In that position, Respondent oversees the maintenance and repair of clocks, alarms, intercoms, scoreboards, sound and lighting systems, burglary systems, and the like for all schools within the School District. Respondent has never received any form of discipline from the School Board. His record is clear, and he has been commended for his work. His work ethic was viewed by others as consistent with that of similarly-situated employees (although Respondent may take more breaks than others). School District maintenance workers work an eight-hour work day, commencing at 7:00 a.m. (per provisions of the SPALC Contract and Collective Bargaining Agreement). Each worker is expected to arrive at the maintenance area on Canal Street (hereinafter "Canal Street") and be ready to commence work by 7:00 a.m., each morning. The work day generally starts with a briefing of sorts to make sure each worker is aware of his/her tasks for the day. After the briefing, workers pick up tools and supplies from various locations around the Canal Street area and then proceed to the first school site requiring performance of an assigned task. A work day for Respondent could involve driving to any one of the numerous school campuses within the School Board's jurisdiction. Workers are given 30 minutes for lunch each day, including the time it takes to drive to and from the lunch site. In addition, workers are allowed two 15-minute breaks, one in the morning and another in the afternoon. Again, the break time includes the time taken to drive to a break site, if the employee decides to take a break at other than the place he/she is working at that time. Employees are not permitted to do personal business or make unauthorized stops during the work day without prior permission from a supervisor. Respondent is a member of the U.S. Naval Reserve and currently holds the rank/level of E5. He attends regular weekend drills each month and also spends two weeks each year on temporary active duty. Respondent has been in the reserves throughout his tenure with the School Board. There has never been an issue between Petitioner and Respondent concerning Respondent's military status or his taking two weeks each summer to attend to his military duties. Respondent is proud of his military service, as evidenced by the fact that he wore his military uniform during both days of the final hearing.1 In May 2008, Respondent spent 17 days on active duty, serving in Bahrain. This was Respondent's active duty requirement for calendar year 2008. However, he then volunteered for an additional period of active duty in July 2008. This second active duty stint was done in furtherance of his military career and at the suggestion of a superior officer. It was strictly voluntary, but Respondent felt somewhat compelled to "volunteer" based on his superior's comments. Respondent then did his second active duty stint beginning June 28, 2008, and ending July 27, 2008. This period of time coincided with the maintenance department's busiest time for its electronics technicians. The maintenance department annually used the time in between school terms to get various maintenance items completed while it would be the least disruptive to students in the classrooms. The summer period is used to "clean up" things that remain pending from the school year. It is clear that Respondent's supervisors were not happy that Respondent had volunteered to be absent during this busy time, but Respondent was allowed to go on active duty anyway. This left the School Board short-handed as to its needed electronics technicians for that period of time. Respondent's supervisor expressed concern to Respondent about this second period of active duty, specifically that it was occurring during the summer break. Respondent recognized the strain this additional leave put on his co-workers and apologized for that fact. Respondent assured his supervisor it would not happen again. Upon his return from the voluntary active duty, Respondent was told that he was being placed on "suspension of driving privileges," meaning that he could not drive School Board vehicles until further notice. This suspension was based on information gleaned from review of data generated by a new tracking system being used in School Board maintenance vehicles (which will be discussed below). Respondent is of the opinion that the suspension was some sort of retaliation for his having gone on the second active duty tour during June and July. The Global Positioning System--Background Beginning in May 2008, the School Board decided to install global positioning system (GPS) devices in all of its maintenance vehicles. The installation began with 50 randomly selected vehicles of the 150-vehicle fleet. The purpose of the GPS devices was to track School Board vehicles and assure that all vehicles were being utilized properly and in accordance with School Board policies. This measure was prompted by repeated complaints from the public about maintenance vehicles being seen involved in non-school activities or at non-school locations. The GPS system in Respondent's maintenance vehicle was installed on May 22, 2008. The signal from the GPS was instantaneous, but required calibration and installation of certain software before it could be effectively utilized. The GPS became fully functional on June 20, 2008, at 10:07 a.m. The GPS system tracked the location, speed, and duration of stops for the vehicle. This data was maintained on a computer server which could print maps showing a vehicle's movements on any given day or time. The maps could be annotated with the vehicle's speed, length of stay at any one location, and actual driving route. On or about June 27, 2008, William G. Moore, director of School Support for the School Board, was being given a course on the use of the new GPS system and how it worked. During his training, Moore randomly selected some vehicles to review, solely for the purpose of ascertaining how the system tracked and recorded information. One of the vehicles Moore randomly selected was vehicle No. 423, which turned out to be Respondent's work van. Moore did not know Respondent personally and did not know to which of the 150 or so School Board vehicles any one person was assigned. Moore then selected June 26, 2008, randomly as a record to review as part of his training. The June 26, 2008, record for vehicle No. 423 immediately raised red flags in Moore's mind. He observed that the vehicle was at a non-school site for over three hours (although it was later determined to be a training site and a legitimate stop). The vehicle was also shown entering a residential community (although again it was later determined that the driver had permission for that trip). However, based on his initial determination that something was amiss and not having any explanation for those instances, Moore decided to more fully examine the route history for vehicle No. 423. First, he determined that this vehicle was assigned to Respondent. (The vehicle will hereinafter be referred to as the work van.) Moore's further investigation turned up a number of questionable stops and trips by the work van during the period June 20 through June 27, 2008. The findings of his investigation will be set forth in pertinent part below on a day-by-day basis, coupled with explanations from Respondent as to each day's activities. Friday, June 20, 2008 At 10:07 a.m. (when the GPS first started working), the work van was departing from Ft. Myers High School ("Ft. Myers High") en route to Estero High School ("Estero"). Upon arrival at Estero, the van remained parked for five minutes, then left the parking lot and drove around the building to the front entrance of Estero for a period of one minute. Leaving Estero, the work van headed to a residential neighborhood known as the Bimini Circle Subdivision, where it stayed for 11 minutes. The work van then proceeded to a 7-11 Store where it remained for 35 minutes. The next stop was back at Estero where the work van remained for one hour and 46 minutes. At 2:00 p.m., the work van left Estero, stopped briefly at the 7-11 Store, then returned to Canal Street at 2:59 p.m. The School Board perceived several violations of policy gleaned from the information on the GPS for the work van during the June 20, 2008, work day: First, the work van was at Estero for a total of two hours and 13 minutes on this date. The total time at Ft. Myers High for this date is not detailed by the GPS, but would presumably be approximately two and a half hours, i.e., allotting time for driving from Canal Street up until the GPS turned on at 10:07 a.m. Respondent's daily activity log indicates five hours at Estero and three hours at Ft. Myers High. Respondent took two unauthorized stops at a store, presumably for personal reasons, and then spent 11 minutes at a residence during work hours. Respondent took in excess of 30 minutes for his lunch hour (35 minutes at a location, plus an undisclosed amount of time driving to and from that location). Respondent took a longer route back to Canal Street than necessary, presumably wasting time. (Employees were expected to work the entire day, then return to Canal Street precisely at 3:00 p.m. A 30-minute debriefing session, return of tools, etc., would occur and then employees would be released from duty at 3:30 p.m. Employees were told repeatedly NOT to return to Canal Street until 3:00 p.m.) Respondent explained his actions and refuted the School Board's concerns as follows: Upon leaving Canal Street that morning, Respondent went directly to Ft. Myers High and remained there until 10:07 a.m. The rest of his day, approximately five hours, was dedicated to work at Estero, but included travel time, breaks, and lunch. The two hours and 13 minutes actually at Estero should be supplemented by driving time to the school from Ft. Myers, driving time to his breaks and lunch, driving time to and from his personal errand, and driving time back to Canal Street. Respondent remembers asking for and receiving permission to stop by his wife's house (the residence in the Bimini Circle Subdivision) to retrieve his wallet. The stops at 7-11 Stores were for lunch and two allowable breaks. The longer route back to Canal Street was taken in order to avoid an accident on the shorter route. During June of 2008, technicians would fill out their daily work logs using rounded estimates of time. They made no attempt to precisely state exact periods of time spent at any one job site. Rather, the daily logs were a very general statement of which job sites had been involved in the employee's work that day. (This procedure has subsequently changed, but was extant at all times relevant hereto.) It is clear Respondent took a longer than allowable lunch break on this date. Further, the time taken for breaks, if drive time was included, was in excess of the allotted amounts. It is clear Respondent was actually at Estero for only about half the time recorded on the daily work log. However, under the procedures in place at that time, the work log time entry was not dispositive of his actual time at the site. Monday, June 23, 2008 On this date, the School Board gleaned the following violations of policies from its review of the GPS log: Respondent was at Estero for two hours and nine minutes, but his daily work log indicates six hours at Estero and two hours at Gateway Elementary. The work van made stops at McDonalds and Bank of America on the way to Estero, then at the Bimini Circle address for eight and a half minutes after leaving Estero. Petitioner says any stops for personal business are strictly prohibited while in a School Board vehicle. After a 47-minute stop at Dairy Queen, the work van then proceeded to Gateway where it stayed for approximately two hours. Upon leaving Gateway, the work van stopped at Home Depot--an unauthorized stop--for about 18 minutes. Respondent provides the following explanation and rebuttal concerning the School Board's concerns for that day: Again, his work sheet indicates the correct amount of time actually at Gateway. The remainder of his day, including all travel, breaks, and lunch, was allocated on this time sheet to Estero no matter how long he was actually there. The stops at McDonalds and Bank of America were simply to allow his co-worker (Sheryl Reed) to get an iced tea and to get money for lunch. Respondent maintains that these types of stops were not specifically prohibited and were common practice. Respondent maintains the stop at his wife's house was his break time (although a stop at McDonalds and Bank of America had already occurred that morning). The 47-minute lunch hour was caused by Respondent simply losing track of time. That is, he admits that it was a longer lunch break than allowed, but it was not done intentionally. The stop at Home Depot was to obtain a coaxial wire needed for the Estero job, but the wire was not available. Employees are allowed to shop at local retail stores to acquire equipment or supplies not available through the School Board. However, all such purchases must be made by way of a purchase card (P-Card) so that purchases can be tracked. There is no P-Card receipt for the Home Depot visit on this date, but Respondent maintains that is because no purchase was made. That is, the coaxial wire he was looking for was not available. Reed said that Respondent made personal purchases from Home Depot and Lowe's on occasion during the summer of 2008 (because he was in the process of remodeling his house). He had purchased floor tiles and other items a couple of times a week that summer. However, she cannot remember whether he purchased anything on that particular date. Respondent admits that he did make purchases of home improvement products during work hours and transported the products in the work van to his house. He does not remember making any such stops for purposes during the week of June 20 through 27, 2008. Tuesday, June 24, 2008 On this date, Respondent's daily work log indicates three hours spent at Gateway and five hours spent at Island Coast.2 The GPS indicates the work van was at Gateway for three hours and at Island Coast for one hour and 40 minutes. The School Board also found the following other policy violations: A stop at Weaver's Corner for 36 minutes and 40 seconds, presumably a long lunch made longer by travel time to and from the lunch venue. An unauthorized visit for eight minutes and 40 seconds at a bank. A visit to a gas station for eight minutes, then a short drive to another gas station for five minutes. Respondent provides the following explanation and rebuttal to the School Board's findings: As before, the extended period of time for the Island Coast job site includes travel, breaks, and lunch. However, it would have been more accurate on this day to have split the two job sites equally. The stops at the gas stations were intentionally made so as not to return to Canal Street before the allotted 3:00 p.m., return time. Respondent does not provide any explanation for the longer than allowable lunch break. Wednesday, June 25, 2008 There were three stops on this date listed on Respondent's daily work log: Island Coast (4 hours), Dunbar Community (2 hours), and Ft. Myers High (2 hours). The GPS indicates the work van was at Island Coast for two hours and 11 minutes; at Dunbar Community for 11 minutes and 20 seconds; at Villas Elementary for one hour and 14 minutes; then at Ft. Myers High for four minutes and 40 seconds. Other perceived policy violations included: A short stop at a bank in the Wal-Mart parking lot upon leaving Canal Street. A lunch stop of 42 minutes and 30 seconds, not counting driving time to and from the restaurant. Another stop at Bank of America for in excess of ten minutes. A short, seven and a half-minute stop at a shopping center. Respondent provided the following in rebuttal and response to the School Board's perceived violations of policy: The quick stops at the banks were not prohibited and were common practice. They may have been part of Respondent's break time on that date. The lunch hour ran over, but was not excessive or intentional. It may have also included part of a break he never took that day. Thursday, June 26, 2008 This is the date that Moore initially reviewed in his training session that raised red flags concerning Respondent's time issues. On this date, the daily work log indicates seven hours in training and one hour at Villas Elementary. The School Board's concerns about this date are set forth above, but would also include: An authorized trip during the lunch hour for Respondent to retrieve a lap top which was being delivered by overnight delivery (so the computer would not be left sitting on the front porch). This trip which took approximately 18 minutes, of which 30 seconds was spent stopped at his house. Respondent also took time for lunch before returning to the training site. A circuitous, out-of-the-way route between the training site and the next job site (Villas Elementary). A short stop at a 7-11 Store and then a longer-than- usual route back to Canal Street. Respondent's explanation and rebuttal to the School Board's concerns were as follows: Respondent had permission to make a quick visit to his home during the lunch hour to see why his home alarm had activated. (He does not remember anything about a lap top or a need to retrieve it.) Respondent says that in the 30 seconds his work van was at the house, he exited the vehicle, walked to the house, unlocked the door and entered, turned off the alarm (which had been activated by his dog, who had escaped from his kennel), put his dog back in its kennel, re-set the alarm and left. Respondent was able to do his personal errand and get to the restaurant and eat lunch with his co-workers within the time (one hour) allotted for lunch that day by the trainer. The circuitous route was for the purpose of delivering some money to his daughter at her school. She was waiting for him outside, and he didn't even have to stop the work van to hand off the money. Rather, his daughter reached out and grabbed the money as he rolled past. The stop at the 7-11 Store was to use the rest room. Respondent's testimony concerning the stop at his house is not entirely believable. It would seem to take more than 30 seconds to accomplish the things that he did. However, inasmuch as he made the stop and was still able to join his co-workers in time for lunch, the reason for his home visit is immaterial. Also, the rolling delivery of money to his daughter is very unusual, but there is no evidence that the exchange did not take place in that fashion. Friday, June 27, 2008 This day's daily work log indicates three work sites: Dunbar Middle School (4 hours), Ft. Myers High (2 hours), and Cypress High School (Cypress High)(2 hours). The GPS indicates 33 minutes and 50 seconds at Dunbar; one hour and 47 minutes at Ft. Myers High; and five minutes and 50 seconds at Cypress High. The work van then went back to Dunbar for one hour, 51 minutes and 30 seconds. The School Board's other concerns about time and travel on this date are as follows: After leaving Canal Street that morning, the work van made stops at McDonalds for three minutes and at Lowe's for 15 minutes. There is a stop of one hour and eight minutes at a shopping plaza, presumably a long lunch hour. Respondent's response to the allegations of policy violations for this day are as follows: The McDonalds visit was again an allowable stop (as he understood the policies) for his assistant to get an iced tea. The Lowe's stop was for the purpose of getting concrete anchors needed for a School Board job, but none were available and so no purchase was made on the P-Card. The long lunch hour was just that; he was not thinking clearly because this was just one day prior to going on active duty and he was preoccupied with those thoughts. The extra driving time was due to the fact that after leaving Dunbar, Respondent was called on the radio to go back there for an emergency job. The daily work logs do not correspond exactly with Respondent's work day because that was not the purpose of the logs. The logs were, at that time, simply an indicator of which schools had been visited on any given day. There was no effort by anyone to be exact or precise with the times recorded on the daily logs. The daily logs are essentially of no value in determining where an employee might have been at any point in time on any given day. There is no way to reconcile the GPS times with the daily work logs. Each employee is expected to work a full day. If the number of tasks assigned during the morning meetings at Canal Street did not fill a technician's day, he/she was expected to locate additional work or do work on an on-going project to fill the day.3 Nonetheless, it is often difficult to coordinate a day's activities to make the assignments equate to the exact hours and minutes in a work day. A large part of an employee's time during the work day is spent driving his/her vehicle. The driving time is supposed to be factored into the time spent on a particular work site. Thus, if it took 30 minutes to get to a work site, that time would be added to the time spent actually at the site. Then, when driving to a subsequent work site, the drive time would be assigned to that next site, etc. Employees are on their honor to take breaks and lunch only when allowed and for the time allotted. There is no time clock, so each person must attempt to keep time themselves so as to honor the allotted times. This is often difficult due to slow service at a restaurant, inability to take breaks at a particular time, or other factors. The GPS system has provided the School Board with an effective tool for monitoring its employees' movements and location. However, at all times relevant hereto, the GPS system was in its infancy and the School Board was still learning how to assimilate and read the data generated by the system. Thus, Respondent's activities from June 20 through June 27, 2008, were examined in a way no other employee's had been looked at heretofore. It is, therefore, hard to make a comparative determination of Respondent's actions versus an established norm. Nonetheless, the School Board's findings are supported by the GPS data. That is, the daily work logs are not consistent with time actually spent at particular job sites. Respondent's lunch breaks exceed the allotted 30-minute time period almost every day that was examined. There are stops at local establishments that are not part of the employee's work duties. Some of the routes taken by an employee are not the shortest routes, although it is impossible to ascertain whether they are the best routes based on other extraneous factors. The time spent on breaks, versus travel time, is hard to ascertain with any degree of certainty.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Lee County School Board, rescinding the notice of termination and imposing a less stringent penalty, e.g., a period of probation, a letter of reprimand and/or some remedial training, against Respondent, Christopher Rasmussen. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2009.
