The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Center Lake Owner's Association, Inc. ("Center Lake"), discriminated against Petitioner, James Schweim ("Schweim"), on the basis of his purported disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Schweim is a white male who at all times material hereto resided at Center Lake. Schweim provided some evidence of his medical condition at final hearing, but did not affirmatively establish a disability, per se. Notwithstanding that fact, a review of the facts will be made concerning the merits of Schweim's claim. Center Lake is the homeowner's association for the Center Lake subdivision located in Manatee County. The association has been in existence since 1986. The subdivision is subject to various deed restrictions as set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Centre1/ Lake, recorded at O.R. Book 1168, Page 1508, in the public records of Manatee County, Florida. Of significance to this proceeding, Section 11 of the deed restrictions is relevant. Section 11, as it will be referred to herein, states in whole: Vehicles. No vehicle of a subdivision resident shall be parked in the subdivision except on a paved driveway, or inside a garage. No vehicle shall at anytime be parked on grass or other vegetation. No trucks or vehicles which are used for commercial purposes, other than those present on business, nor any trailers, may be parked in the subdivision unless inside a garage and concealed from public view. Boats, boat trailers, campers, vans, motorcycles and other recreational vehicles and any vehicle not in operable condition or validly licensed shall be permitted in the subdivision only if parked inside a garage and concealed from public view. No maintenance or repair of any boat or vehicle shall be permitted upon any Lot except within an enclosed garage. Beginning some time in 2004, Schweim and Center Lake commenced a dispute concerning Schweim's alleged violation of the provisions of Section 11. Specifically, Schweim was accused of parking a recreational vehicle (the "RV") on his property in violation of the deed restriction. There is no dispute between the parties that Schweim owns a 23-foot recreational vehicle, which is kept on his property (at 3550 65th Avenue Circle East). As a result of the 2004 dispute, the parties entered into a Settlement Stipulation signed by Center Lake and its attorneys on December 6 and 7, 2004, respectively. Schweim's attorney signed the document on November 24, 2004; Schweim and his wife signed on that same date. The Settlement Stipulation was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. Schweim asserted that the version of the Settlement Stipulation entered into evidence was not the version he signed, but the most persuasive evidence is that it is the same version. Schweim does not agree that all the terms and conditions in the Settlement Stipulation were extant at the time he signed, but he could not produce a copy of any other version of the document for comparison. In the Settlement Stipulation, Schweim agreed to move the RV from his property and not to bring it onto the property except for loading or unloading. In exchange, Center Lake agreed to voluntarily dismiss its then-pending lawsuit against Schweim. Despite the resolution of the aforementioned lawsuit, Schweim did not remove his RV from his property. Instead, Schweim kept the RV on the property and, ultimately, filed a discrimination action against Center Lake because of their efforts to have him remove the RV. That action is the subject of the instant proceeding. Schweim does not dispute that he is keeping the RV on his property in violation of the deed restrictions. Rather, Schweim suggests that he should be allowed to do so on three bases: One, that he is proposing a fence on his property that will cover the RV and make it hidden from view from the street; Two, that there are other residents of the subdivision who are also in violation of the deed restrictions; and, three, that he is disabled and needs the RV parked on his property to accommodate his disability. As to his first reason, Schweim's proposal is simply that, a proposal. There is no evidence that the fence proposed by Schweim would satisfy the requirements of the deed restriction. Further, Center Lake has no confidence, based on its history with Schweim, that he would follow through with the proposal. There is some evidence that other residents in the area appear to be in violation of the deed restrictions. However, there was no evidence presented at final hearing that those residents had refused to move their vehicles upon filing of a complaint. That is, the homeowner's association tends not to take any action unless a homeowner files a formal complaint concerning a violation. In Schweim's case, several complaints were filed as to his RV. There was also some discussion at final hearing as to the appropriate licensure for the RV. Any vehicle not properly licensed is not allowed to be parked in the subdivision based on the deed restrictions. However, Schweim says the license is currently up-to-date and that is no longer an issue. Concerning Schweim's disability, he presented the following facts: At age 23, Schweim suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen, causing long-term damage; In 1991, Schweim had a ruptured disc; Surgical fusion of his disc was performed in 2002 and again in 2004; In 2009, Schweim underwent a lumbar fusion. As a result of those events, Schweim has what he describes as an acute medical condition limiting his ambulatory abilities. At the final hearing, Schweim negotiated the hearing room slowly and with some difficulty. Judy Schweim, a nurse, testified that she transports Schweim to doctor's appointments and other medical situations. At times, Schweim's back will "go out," and she is responsible for getting him to medical treatment as soon as possible. Schweim produced evidence that he has received a Florida parking permit for disabled persons. The application for the permit indicates his condition as "severe limitation in a person's ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." A doctor's order dated May 6, 2004, indicates that it is "medically necessary for [Schweim] to have ready access to a walk-in vehicle to accommodate his disability." An August 19, 2010, memo from Dr. Tally at the Neuro Spinal Associates, P.A., and a September 27, 2010, memo from the Dolphin Medical Group, state essentially the same thing. None of the hearsay documents were sufficient to establish a disability, per se. Schweim says that his disability makes it necessary for him to have the RV parked in his yard so that, when necessary, he can use it to get medical treatment. Schweim says that when his back goes out, he needs a vehicle that he can walk into while standing up. He cannot sit down into an automobile at those times. The incidences of Schweim's debilitating back pain only occur every couple of years. When not experiencing that pain, Schweim is able to drive his red car, described by neighbors as a "hot rod," without any problem. Schweim drove a motorcycle for years, but says he has not driven it for quite some time. Schweim said that an ambulance was not a viable option for him when he has the back pain, because the ambulance will not take him where he needs to go, i.e., straight to a particular doctor, rather than the emergency room. There is no competent evidence to support that contention. Schweim candidly admits that the only time he needs the RV is when he has an episode with his back and that such episodes are few and far between. And while it is true that an episode may occur at any time, there is insufficient evidence to support Schweim's claim that the RV is integral to him receiving prompt and appropriate medical care.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, James Schweim, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
Findings Of Fact 1. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor who had a predetermination/liberty interest (name clearing) hearing held on August 24, 2012. After that hearing, he was terminated effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012 and notified of that fact via correspondence dated August 27, 2012. (See, e.g., Exhibit 4). 2. On September 4, 2012, Emmons submitted a written request to ECUA’s Director of Human Resources and Administrative Services (hereinafter “HR Director”) appealing disciplinary action taken against him in his employment with ECUA. 3. That same date, ECUA requested the services of an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) from the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue a Recommended Order to ECUA’s Executive Director pursuant to the Administrative Law Judge Services Contract previously entered into between ECUA and DOAH. 4. DOAH assigned an ALJ to preside over the matter, who in turn issued a Notice of Hearing scheduling an evidentiary hearing to take place beginning at 10:00 a.m. on October 15, 2012 in ECUA’s Board Room. 5. ECUA was present and ready to proceed with the evidentiary hearing at the appointed time and place, yet neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf appeared. Furthermore, no one had heard from Emmons. 6. After waiting fifteen (15) minutes after the designated start-time for the hearing, neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf had been heard from. 7. Thereafter, the ALJ called the hearing to order, and ECUA proffered witness testimony and admitted exhibits into the record. The record established the following: a. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor in ECUA’s Sanitation Department. b. On March 28, 2012 Emmons was notified by a Sanitation Equipment Operator under his supervision that his truck (Truck #43B), had broken down. After Emmons arrived on the scene in ECUA Truck #11C, he went to sleep while on duty. c. Emmons slept for approximately twenty to thirty minutes, and his vehicle, Vehicle #11C, was idling with the air conditioner on throughout this time. d. While Emmons slept, an ECUA employee photographed him. e. This was not the first time Emmons had slept while on duty; instead, in the Summer of 2011 Emmons was observed sleeping in his ECUA-assigned vehicle by another ECUA employee. f. Furthermore, within the past twelve months Emmons was observed by ECUA employees reclined with his eyes closed for an extended period of time on two other occasions during the past twelve months. g. Additionally, in 2010 a photograph of Emmons apparently sleeping on duty was brought to one of his superiors’ attention. In this instance, Emmons was cautioned that it was completely unacceptable for a supervisor to be sleeping anywhere 3 at any time while on duty and that if this were to happen again disciplinary action would be imposed. h. ECUA issued a written notice of predetermination hearing to Emmons on August 21, 2012 regarding contemplated disciplinary action for violations of Section B-13A(4), [Conduct Unbecoming an ECUA Employee], Section B-13A(18) [Loafing], Section B-13A(21) [Neglect of Duty], Section B-13A(25) [Sleeping on Duty], and Section B-13A(33) [Violation of ECUA rules or policies] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. i. Section B-37(A) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual additionally provides that ECUA employees shall avoid unnecessary vehicle idling and prohibits allowing a vehicle to idle solely to operate the air conditioner for the comfort of the vehicle’s occupants. j.._ Emmons knew of the above-referenced provisions of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual by virtue of the fact that he had received it, as well as the fact that the substantive provisions of it applicable to his sleeping on duty had been previously discussed with at least one of his superiors. k. Upon proper notice a predetermination hearing was held on August 24, 2012, and thereafter a written notice of disciplinary action was issued to Emmons on August 27, 2012 notifying him that his conduct violated Sections B-13A(4), (18), (21), (25), and (33) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. 8. The hearing was closed at approximately 10:27 a.m. 9. Based upon a review of the record, the evidence shows that Emmons’ conduct was violative of Sections B-13A(4) [conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee], 4 Section B-13A(8) [loafing], Section B-13A(21) [neglect of duty], Section B-13A(25) (sleeping while on duty], Section B-13A(33) [violation of ECUA rules or policies], and Section B-37 [vehicle and equipment idle reduction] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 5, 6). The evidence further shows that you were aware of these provisions within the Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 7). 10. Two days later, on September 17, 2012, R. John Westberry, Esq., entered an appearance on behalf of Emmons and filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal on his behalf. In neither of these filings was any justification proffered for Emmons’ having failed to appear at the scheduled evidentiary hearing. Additionally, good cause was not shown for Emmons’ attorney having failed to appear at the hearing (although it is unclear whether the attorney had been retained at that time). 1. Nevertheless, on October 18, 2012 the ALJ rendered an Order Closing File ostensibly dismissing the matter.
Conclusions Petitioner, Emerald Coast Utilities Authority (hereinafter either "ECUA" or “Petitioner”), terminated Respondent, Michael A. Emmons (hereinafter either "Emmons" or “Respondent”), from his employment with ECUA effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012. Emmons timely requested a hearing in order to appeal his termination, and his case was forwarded to Florida Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a hearing and issue findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. After being properly noticed, a formal hearing was held in this cause on October 15, 2012 in Pensacola, Florida, before Diane Cleavinger, Administrative Law Judge with the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, which Emmons elected not to attend. . Three days later, on October 18, 2012, Judge Diane Cleavinger submitted an Order Closing File, which for reasons set forth below is deemed a Recommended Order. Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(10, Florida Statutes, the Parties had 15 days within which to submit written exceptions to the Recommended Order. That time-frame has expired, with only Petitioner’s having filed a submission. Emmons also filed no response to Petitioner’s exceptions. See Rule 28-106.217(3), Florida Administrative Code (affording a party 10 days from the filing of the other party’s exceptions to respond to those exceptions).
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) whether Riverside Village Partners, LTD. (Riverside or Petitioner), has, or had at the time of application, a present plan to convert its proposed development to any use other than affordable residential rental property; (2) whether Provincetown Village Partners, LTD. (Provincetown or Petitioner), has, or had at the time of application, a present plan to convert its proposed development to any use other than affordable residential rental property; (3) whether Riverside irrevocably committed to set aside units in its proposed development for a total of 50 years; and (4) whether Provincetown irrevocably committed to set aside units in its proposed development for a total of 50 years.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, Provincetown Village Partners, LTD., is a Florida limited partnership with its business address at 1551 Sandspur Road, Maitland, Florida 32751, and is in the business of providing affordable housing units. Petitioner, Riverside Village Partners, LTD., is a Florida limited partnership with its business address at 1551 Sandspur Road, Maitland, Florida 32751, and is in the business of providing affordable housing units. Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Florida Housing), is a public corporation that administers governmental programs relating to the financing and refinancing of affordable housing and related facilities in Florida pursuant to Section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2003). Florida Housing's Financing Mechanisms To encourage the development of affordable rental housing for low-income families, Florida Housing provides low-interest mortgage loans to developers of qualified multi-family housing projects. In exchange for an interest rate lower than conventional market rates, the developer agrees to "set-aside" a specific percentage of the rental units for low-income tenants. Through its Multi-Family Mortgage Revenue Bond (MMRB) program, Florida Housing funds these mortgage loans through the sale of tax-exempt and taxable bonds. Applicants then repay the loans from the revenues generated by their respective projects. Applicants who receive MMRB proceeds are required to execute a Land Use Restriction Agreement (LURA or Land Use Restriction Agreement), which is recorded in the official records of the county in which the applicant’s development is located. Through the State Apartment Incentive Loan (SAIL) program, Florida Housing funds low-interest mortgage loans to developers from various sources of state revenue, which are generally secured by second mortgages on the property. Applicants who receive SAIL proceeds are required to execute and record a LURA in the county records as with MMRB's Land Use Restriction Agreements. Florida Housing also distributes federal income tax credits for the development of affordable rental housing for low-income tenants; those tax credits are referred to as "housing credits." Generally, applicants who utilize tax-exempt bond financing for at least 50 percent of the cost of their development are entitled to receive an award of housing credits on a non-competitive basis. These non-competitive housing credits are received by the qualified applicant each year for ten consecutive years. Typically, applicants sell this future stream of housing credits at the initiation of the development process in order to generate a portion of the funds necessary for the construction of the development. The Application, Scoring, and Ranking Process Because Florida Housing’s available pool of tax-exempt bond financing and SAIL funds is limited, qualified projects must compete for this funding. To determine which proposed projects will put the available funds to best use, Florida Housing has established a competitive application process to assess the relative merits of proposed projects. Florida Housing’s competitive application process for MMRB and SAIL financing is included with other financing programs within a single application process (the 2003 Universal Application) governed by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapters 67-21 and 67-48. The 2003 Universal Application form and accompanying instructions are incorporated as Form "UA1016" by reference into Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67-21 and 67-48 and by Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-21.002(97), and 67-48.002(111), respectively. For the 2003 Universal Application cycle, each applicant who completed and submitted Form UA1016 with attachments was given a preliminary score by Florida Housing. Following the issuance of preliminary scores, applicants are provided an opportunity to challenge the scoring of any competing application through the filing of a Notice of Possible Scoring Error (NOPSE). Florida Housing considers each NOPSE filed and provides each applicant with notice of any resulting change in their preliminary scores (the NOPSE scores). Following the issuance of NOPSE scores, Florida Housing provides an opportunity for applicants to submit additional materials to "cure" any items for which the applicant received less than the maximum score or for which the application may have been rejected for failure to achieve "threshold." There are certain portions of the application which cannot be cured; the list of noncurable items appears in Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-21.003(14) (for MMRB applicants) and 67-48.004(14) (for SAIL applicants). Following the cure period, applicants may again contest the scoring of a competing application by filing a Notice of Alleged Deficiencies (NOAD), identifying deficiencies arising from the submitted cure materials. After considering the submitted NOADs, Florida Housing provides notice to applicants of any resulting scoring changes. The resulting scores are known as "pre-appeal" scores. Applicants may appeal and challenge, via formal or informal hearings, Florida Housing’s scoring of any item for which the applicant received less than the maximum score or for any item that resulted in the rejection of the application for failure to meet "threshold." Upon the conclusion of the informal hearings, and of formal hearings where appropriate, Florida Housing issues the final scores and ranking of applicants. Applicants are then awarded tentative MMRB and/or SAIL funding in order of rank; Florida Housing issues final orders allocating the tentative funding and inviting successful applicants in the credit underwriting process. If an applicant who requests a formal hearing ultimately obtains a final order that modifies its score and threshold determinations so that its application would have been in the funding range had the final order been entered prior to the date the final rankings were presented to the Florida Housing Board of Directors (Board), that applicant’s requested funding will be provided from the next available funding or allocation. The 2003 Application Process On or about April 8, 2003, Riverside, Provincetown, and others submitted applications for MMRB and SAIL financing in the 2003 Universal Application cycle. Riverside requested $3,205,000 in tax-exempt MMRB funding and $1.6 million in SAIL funding to help finance its proposed development, a 34-unit development in Pinellas County, Florida. In its application, Riverside committed to lease all or most of these units to house families earning 60 percent or less of the area median income (AMI). However, depending on which Florida Housing funding source(s) Riverside’s application was deemed eligible to receive, it would commit to lease at least 17 percent of the units to families earning 50 percent or less of AMI, or would commit to lease only a total of 85 percent of the units to families earning 60 percent or less of AMI. Provincetown requested $4.5 million in tax-exempt MMRB funding and $2.0 million in SAIL funding to help finance its proposed development, a 50-unit development in Gadsden County, Florida. In its application, Provincetown committed to lease all or most of the units to families earning 60 percent or less of AMI. However, depending on which Florida Housing program(s) Provincetown’s application was deemed eligible to receive, it would commit to lease at least 11 percent of the units to families earning 50 percent or less of AMI, or would commit to lease only a total of 85 percent of the units to families earning 60 percent or less of AMI. Florida Housing evaluated all applications and notified applicants of their preliminary scores on or before May 12, 2003. Applicants were then given an opportunity to file NOPSEs on or before May 20, 2003. After considering all NOPSEs, Florida Housing notified applicants by overnight mail on or about June 9, 2003, of any resulting changes in the scoring of their applications. Applicants were then allowed to submit, on or before June 19, 2003, cure materials to correct any alleged deficiencies in their applications previously identified by Florida Housing. Applicants were also allowed to file NOADs on competing applications on or before June 27, 2003. After considering the submitted NOADs, Florida Housing issued notice to Provincetown, Riverside, and others of their adjusted scores on or about July 21, 2003. Commitment to Affordability Period Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006, entitled "Development Requirements," lists certain minimum requirements that a development shall meet or that an applicant shall be able to certify that such requirements shall be met. One of these requirements is "The Applicant shall have no present plan to convert the Development to any use other than the use as affordable residential rental property." Part III.E.3 of the Application provides a line for an applicant to commit to an "affordability period" for its application. This subsection of the application form reads in its entirety: 3. Affordability Period for MMRB, SAIL, HOME, and HC Application: Applicant irrevocably commits to set aside units in the proposed Development for a total of years. Both Provincetown and Riverside filled in the number "50" on the blank line in this subsection of their respective applications. An applicant’s score on its application is determined in part by the length of its affordability period commitment. An applicant who commits to an affordability period commitment of 50 or more years received 5 points; 45 to 49 years, 4 points; 40 to 44 years, 3 points; 35 to 39 years, 2 points; 31 to 34 years, 1 point; and 30 years or less, 0 points. Scoring of Provincetown and Riverside Applications In its preliminary scoring of the Provincetown and Riverside applications, Florida Housing awarded each applicant the full 5 points on Part III.E.3 of his or her application for the 50-year affordability period commitment. Also, in the preliminary scoring of the Provincetown and Riverside applications, Florida Housing did not find any threshold failure regarding an alleged present plan to convert the development to a use other than affordable residential rental property. In its preliminary scoring of the Provincetown application, Florida Housing identified an alleged threshold failure related to the validity of the contract for purchase of the site of the proposed development. A subsequent cure submitted by Provincetown regarding the contract for purchase of the site has resolved this issue, and Florida Housing no longer takes the position that the Provincetown application fails threshold for any reason related to site control. In its preliminary scoring of the Riverside application, Florida Housing identified a threshold failure related to documentation of the status of site plan approval, or plat approval, for the proposed development. A subsequent cure submitted by Riverside regarding the status of site plan approval has resolved this issue, and Florida Housing no longer takes the position that the Riverside application fails threshold for any reason related to site plan approval, or plat approval. During the scoring process, Florida Housing received NOPSEs on both the Provincetown and Riverside applications, which asserted that these applicants were proposing transactions that were not financially feasible and would not pass subsequent credit underwriting requirements. The NOPSEs also alleged that the Riverside and Provincetown applications were for townhouses designed with an intent to eventually convert to home ownership in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(6). According to that rule, the applicant shall have no present plan to convert the development to any use other than the use as affordable residential rental property. After reviewing these NOPSEs, but before issuing revised NOPSE scores, Florida Housing determined that it was inappropriate to apply subsequent credit underwriting requirements during the scoring of these applications, and therefore, disagreed with the allegations of the NOPSEs on those grounds. Accordingly, Florida Housing's scoring summaries for Riverside and Provincetown issued, after receipt of the NOPSEs, raised no issues concerning financial feasibility, and it was not placed at issue in this proceeding. Following the filing of NOPSEs, Florida Housing released NOPSE scores for all applicants, including Riverside and Provincetown. The NOPSE scores are reflected on a NOPSE Scoring Summary dated June 9, 2003. For both Provincetown and Riverside, the NOPSE Scoring Summary contained the following statement regarding alleged threshold failure, identifying two separate reasons for the alleged threshold failure: The proposed Development does not satisfy the minimum Development requirements stated in Rule 67-21.006, F.A.C. The Development is not a multifamily residential rental property comprised of buildings or structures each containing four or more dwelling units. Further, the Applicant has a present plan to convert the Development to a use other than as an affordable residential rental property. The first threshold failure noted in the preceding paragraph relates to Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(2), which requires that there be four or more residential units per building for projects financed with MMRB. A subsequent cure regarding the design of the proposed developments has resolved this issue, and Florida Housing no longer contends that these applications, as cured, exhibit a threshold failure related to the number of residential units per building. The second threshold failure noted in the NOPSE Scoring Summary and quoted in paragraph 30 above, relates to Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(6), which requires that applicants "shall have no present plan to convert the Development to any use other than the use as affordable residential rental property." In response to the NOPSE Scoring Summaries, both Provincetown and Riverside submitted cures to their respective applications. In the cures, Provincetown and Riverside presented their explanations of how they believed their applications, as submitted, demonstrated a 50-year affordability period commitment and included these applicants’ contentions that they had no present plan to convert the developments to a use other than affordable residential rental property. For Provincetown, an issue had also been raised by a NOPSE concerning whether the Provincetown application was entitled to certain "tie-breaker" points for the distance from the proposed development to a public transportation stop. The points awardable to Provincetown for tie-breaker purposes are not in dispute, and Provincetown, if its application is otherwise deemed to meet threshold requirements, would be entitled to 5.0 of a possible 7.5 tie-breaker points. If Riverside's application were deemed to meet threshold requirements and if the 5 points for the affordability period commitment were restored, Riverside would have been within the funding range for applicants within the 2003 Universal Application cycle at the time the Board took final action on the ranking of applications on October 9, 2003. If Provincetown's application were deemed to meet threshold requirements and if the five points for the affordability period commitment were restored, Provincetown would have been within the funding range for applicants within the 2003 Universal Application cycle at the time the Board took final action on the ranking of applications on October 9, 2003. The Sciarrino Letter and Cures After reviewing the NOPSEs filed against the Provincetown and Riverside applications, Florida Housing received a letter dated June 2, 2003 (Sciarrino letter or letter), from Michael Sciarrino, president of the CED Companies, addressed to Orlando Cabrera, executive director of Florida Housing, with a copy to Kerey Carpenter, deputy development officer of Florida Housing. Michael Sciarrino is a manager of the sole general partner (CED Capital Holdings 2003 Y, LLC., a Florida limited liability company) of Provincetown. Mr. Sciarrino is also a Class B limited partner of the sole member of the general partner (CED Capital Holdings XVI, LTD., a Florida limited partnership). Michael Sciarrino is a manager of the sole general partner (CED Capital Holdings 2003 K, LLC., a Florida limited liability company) of Riverside. Mr. Sciarrino is also a Class B limited partner of the sole member of the general partner (CED Capital Holdings 2003 XVI, LTD., a Florida limited partnership). As manager of the sole general partner of Provincetown and Riverside, Mr. Sciarrino had supervisory authority and editorial control over the processing and preparation of the Provincetown and Riverside applications. The Sciarrino letter was drafted, in part, to respond to the allegations of the NOPSEs filed against Provincetown and Riverside applications and specifically addressed those issues pertaining to Provincetown and Riverside applications. Also, while the letter does not mention Petitioners by name, the description and location of the properties, as detailed in the letter, clearly refer to these applicants. The Sciarrino letter evinces a present plan on the part of Petitioners to convert the proposed developments to a use other than that of affordable residential rental housing. First, the letter describes in detail the economic motivations for the subsequent sale of the units of the proposed development within the 50-year extended affordability period stating that the "residual value potential" of such an arrangement "is the single biggest economic reason for our desire to develop these communities." Next, the letter describes in detail the means by which Petitioners would be relieved of the commitment to a 50-year affordability period as stated in their applications, that is, by seeking a waiver from Board after the 15-year period of tax credit recapture exposure had expired. Third, the letter plainly states that Petitioners had intended to request such relief from the 50-year affordability period in the future. Petitioners' present plan to convert the proposed developments for sale to homeowners during the 50-year extended affordability period is further evident by the fact that the concept of such a conversion existed prior to and at the time the applications were filed. Moreover, the Provincetown and Riverside developments were specially selected to test the concept. On or about June 19, 2003, Petitioners filed cures with Florida Housing addressing the issues raised in the NOPSEs. While the cures presented argument in favor of their respective applications and reiterated Petitioners' commitment to the 50-year extended affordability period for each proposed development, they did not deny that it was their intention to seek relief from this period in the future. Following review of the Sciarrino letter and the cures submitted by Petitioners, Florida Housing rejected both the Provincetown and Riverside applications for failing to meet the mandatory development requirement set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(6). The applications also had five points deducted from their scores on the grounds that, under the circumstances, their commitment to an affordability period could not be determined.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order that upholds the scoring of the applications of Riverside Village Partners, LTD., and Provincetown Village Partners, LTD.; that rejects the applications of Riverside Village Partners, LTD., and Provincetown Village Partners, LTD.; and that denies the relief requested in the Petitions. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Fifth Floor Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 Orlando J. Cabrera, Executive Director Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wellington H. Meffert, II, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether certain provisions of the 1993 Florida Utility Accommodation Manual which have been adopted by Respondent, the FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, as rules by reference in Rule 14-46.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The specific provisions of the 1993 Florida Utility Accommodation Manual which are at issue include the definitions of "utility" and "utility facilities" (page 4), the "no monetary gain" provision (page 7), and the "joint use" provision (page 12). In addition, Petitioners raised an issue as to whether Respondent, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION violated Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, by failing to adopt by rule certain agency requests for information from Petitioner regarding costs associated with the installation and maintenance of utility poles.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, WITHLACOOCHEE RIVER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (WITHLACOOCHEE), is a cooperatively-owned utility operating in the State of Florida. Respondent, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (FDOT), is the agency of the State of Florida vested with jurisdiction over the regulation of the use of state rights-of-way along, across, or on any public roads or publicly owned rail corridors. WITHLACOOCHEE owns utility poles which are located in state rights-of- way FDOT has promulgated rules for the regulation of the usage of the state rights-of-way by utilities, including cooperatively-owned utilities such as WITHLACOOCHEE. WITHLACOOCHEE holds valid permits issued by FDOT which authorize and regulate the placement of its utility poles on state rights-of way. FDOT does not receive from WITHLACOOCHEE any fees or other compensation for the placement of its utility poles on state rights-of-way. Intervenor, TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P. (TIME WARNER), is in the business of providing cable television service throughout the State of Florida, and has placed and maintains cable television lines within the state rights-of way. Cable television lines are structures similar to telephone, telegraph and other lines transmitting communications. Intervenor, TIME WARNER, (including its predecessors), and WITHLACOOCHEE have been joint users of the state rights-of-way in Pasco, Hernando, and Citrus Counties since before 1982. Intervenor, TIME WARNER, including its predecessors, and WITHLACOOCHEE have entered into pole sharing agreements regarding the placement and maintenance of TIME WARNER's cable television lines on WITHLACOOCHEE's utility poles. On or about November of 1994, the pole sharing agreements between TIME WARNER and WITHLACOOCHEE terminated. Prior to the termination of the pole sharing agreements, on April 13, 1994, TIME WARNER filed a petition with FDOT requesting that FDOT address and resolve the dispute with WITHLACOOCHEE. The TIME WARNER petition was the first such petition ever filed with FDOT. By order dated June 14, 1995, FDOT denied WITHLACOOCHEE's Motion to Dismiss the TIME WARNER petition. In an effort to collect information regarding the petition, FDOT by letter dated July 6, 1994, and subsequently by Show Cause Order entered June 14, 1995, requested pole cost information from WITHLACOOCHEE. On June 30, 1995, WITHLACOOCHEE responded to the Show Cause Order, contesting the authority of FDOT to request such information. FDOT has not promulgated rules with respect to the request of costs associated with installation and maintenance of utility poles or other such information from a utility. STANDING OF INTERVENOR FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION On September 22, 1995, FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION (FLORIDA POWER), filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene in these proceedings alleging that it is a utility in the State of Florida, that it owns poles in the state rights-of- way, that it has entered into pole sharing agreements with cable television companies which set rates that the cable television companies will pay to FLORIDA POWER to attach their cables to FLORIDA POWER's poles. These allegations were not disputed. Respondent FDOT and Intervenor TIME WARNER contend that FLORIDA POWER lacks standing because under 47 U.S.C. s. 224, the Federal Communications Commission, and not FDOT, has authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for attachments by cable television systems, and therefore the substantial interests of FLORIDA POWER are not affected in this proceeding. FLORIDA POWER's substantial interests are affected by a determination of FDOT's definition of "utility" and "utility facilities", and by a determination of the extent to which FDOT has jurisdiction over the regulation of the use of the state rights-of-way by utilities. FLORIDA POWER has a substantial interest in the determination of the application of federal and state statutes in this regard, and should not be foreclosed from presenting its position in these proceedings. CHALLENGE TO ADOPTED RULES WITHLACOOCHEE challenges three provisions contained in the 1993 Florida Utility Accommodation Manual (Manual). FDOT has adopted the Manual as a rule by reference in Rule 14-46.001(3), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, WITHLACOOCHEE challenges the Manual's definition of "utility" and "utility facilities", (page 4), the "no monetary gain" provision, (page 7), and the "joint use" provision, (page 12). The Manual provides guidelines for the issuance of utility permits on public roads maintained by FDOT. A version of the Manual has been in existence since at least 1964. The 1993 edition of the Manual contains, on page 5, a statement of intent which provides in pertinent part: This Manual is established to regulate the location, manner, installation and adjustment of utility facilities along, across, under or on any right-of-way under the jurisdiction of the FDOT. This Manual also is used for issuing permits for such work which is in the interest of safety, protection, utilization and future development of the highways with due consideration given to public serves afforded by adequate and economical utility installations as authorized under Section 337.403, Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-46.001. Adherence shall be required under the circumstances set forth in this Manual. Where actual field conditions vary from those outlined in this Manual, disputes may arise as to what accommodation criteria is appropriate under the actual conditions. Such disputes which cannot be resolved at the local or District level by mutual agreement shall be referred to the State Utility Administrator or designee for final resolution. While this Manual governs matters concerning future location, manner and methods for the installa- tion or adjustments and maintenance of utilities on FDOT right-of-way, it does not alter current regulations pertaining to authority for their installation nor does it determine financial responsibilities for placement or adjustment thereof. The Manual is prepared with the consultation and cooperation of the Florida Utilities Coordinating Committee (Committee). The Committee is a voluntary private organization comprised of representatives from various utilities, including cooperatively owned utilities, that coordinates and communicates with FDOT on issues impacting both the utility industries and FDOT. The Committee meets with representatives of FDOT on a regular basis to develop policy recommendations on such issues. The Committee worked with representatives of FDOT in developing the 1993 edition of the Manual. Members of the Committee had knowledge of the provisions of the 1993 edition of the Manual prior to adoption of the Manual as a rule by FDOT. Definition of "Utility" and "Utility Facilities" In 1993 the Manual was amended to include "television transmission signals" within the definitions of "utility" and "utility facilities" on page 4 of the Manual. Specifically, the Manual provides: Utility - All privately, publicly or cooperatively owned lines, facilities and systems for producing, transmitting or distributing communications, power, electric- ity, light, heat, gas, oil, crude products, water, steam, waste and storm water not connected with highway drainage, and other similar commodities, including television transmission signals, publicly owned fire and police signal systems and street lighting systems, which directly or indirectly serve the public or any part thereof. The term "Utility" shall also mean the UAO, inclusive of wholly owned or controlled subsidiary. Utility Facilities - All privately, or publicly or cooperatively owned lines, facilities and systems for producing, trans- mitting or distributing communications, power, electricity, light, heat, gas, oil, crude products, water, steam, waste, storm water not connected with highway drainage and other similar commodities, including television transmission signals, fire and police signal system and street lighting systems, which directly or indirectly serve the Public or any part thereof. The 1993 amendment to the Manual to include television transmission signals within the definitions of "utility" and "utility facilities" was adopted at the request of the Committee. Television transmission signals are transmitted by structures similar to other utilities and utility facilities as defined in the Manual. Joint Use Provisions The accommodations standards set forth in the Manual, (page 12), provide for the basic requirements governing location of utility installations on state rights-of way. These requirements include a general requirement that for installation of overhead utilities, one side of the right-of-way is reserved for communication lines, and one side for power lines. The basis for this requirement is that the greater number of structures placed in the right-of-way increases the risk of accidents to the traveling public. It is in the interest of safety for the traveling public for FDOT to minimize the number of structures placed in the state rights-of way. In Florida, between 1990 and 1993, vehicle collisions with utility poles resulted in 297 deaths. Under conditions found in Florida, the density of poles or other structures in the right-of-way is the factor most closely identified with the number of such vehicle accidents. Since at least 1964, FDOT has required that in cases where more than one utility agency or owner (UAO) proposes an aerial installation on the same side of a highway, a joint use arrangement must be agreed to by the UAOs. This provision is also contained in the 1993 Manual, and specifically provides: For the installation of overhead utilities, one side of the right-of-way is usually reserved for communication lines and the other side is reserved for power lines. In situations where underground and overhead utilities occupy the same side of the roadway, the overhead facility should be placed on the outside of the underground facility to provide the maximum clear roadside recovery area possible. In cases where more than one UAO proposes an aerial installation on the same side of the highway, a joint-use arrangement must be agreed to by the UAOS. Only single pole lines shall be permitted on each side of FDOT's right-of-way. Any exception must be amply justified and approved by the State Utility Administrator or designee. In cases where the UAOS cannot agree, the dispute shall be referred to the State Utility Administrator or designee whose determination shall be final. This does not prohibit a single UAO from occupying both sides of the right-of-way when there are no objections from other UAOS if proper justification is provided to the FDOT, and there is only one pole line on each side of the right-of-way. As indicated above, in cases where the UAOs cannot agree, the Manual provides that the State Utility Administrator or his designee shall resolve the dispute. Until this dispute arose between WITHLACOOCHEE and TIME WARNER, FDOT had not been petitioned to resolve a joint use dispute between a power company and cable television company. No Monetary Gain Provision Contained in the provisions of the Manual setting forth the requirements for making application to use the state right-of-way, there is a prohibition against use of the state right-of-way for profit. Specifically, the Manual on page 5 provides: No individual, firm, company or governmental agency may be permitted to use the FDOT right-of-way for monetary gain except where provided for by the Public Service Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or Federal Communications Commission. This provision was adopted in response to complaints received by FDOT that utilities were making a profit from use of the state rights-of-way. Specifically, FDOT had been informed that a company was constructing surplus conduits in the state rights-of-way for the purpose of leasing the use of the conduit to other utilities. Conduit, like poles, is used for communications distribution systems. The provision was drafted by Richard Larry Noles, an FDOT employee. The provision was provided to the Committee prior to adoption, and was accepted by the Committee with the addition of the provision to allow for monetary gain where provided for by the Public Service Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or Federal Communications Commission. Cooperatively-owned utilities, including WITHLACOOCHEE, are not exempted from the no monetary gain provision. The intent of the no monetary gain provision is to provide equal access to all users of the state rights-of-way, and to prevent subsidization of one utility at the expense of the customers of another utility. It is not the purpose of the no monetary gain provision to determine the rates charged to customers of a utility.
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination, as defined by the Florida Fair Housing Act, Chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes, against Petitioner, on the basis of her age and/or handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 73-year-old woman on a fixed income. She suffers from congestive heart failure, for which she takes medication. She has been treated one time for an allergic reaction to pesticides, but an on-going allergy to pesticides was not proven. She lives alone in a mortgaged home in the County of Volusia. Respondent James A. Whittaker has been the Housing Manager for Respondent County of Volusia Community Service Group (Group) only since 1998. Respondent Group is part of the Community Services Department of the Volusia County government. The Group receives grants, lets construction bids/contracts, and provides low-cost funding to pay for maintenance/repair/improvement work on the homes of low-income homeowners in Volusia County. There is no age factor involved in the Group's determination of a homeowner's eligibility. Eligibility is determined based almost entirely upon income. The vehicle for Volusia County's maintaining/ repairing/improving low-income homes is called a "rehabilitation loan." The normal sequence of events for a homeowner is to: apply for eligibility; be determined eligible by the Group; be placed on a waiting list; rise to the top of the waiting list; sign a Rehabilitation Loan Agreement; and participate in a home inspection/pre-bid conference in the home. After this, the Group bids out a contract and accepts a bidder. Then, the successful bidder repairs the home and is paid by the Group. Homeowners over 62 years of age are not required to pay back any of the money; younger homeowners are required to repay 50 percent. Effective in the autumn of 2000, the Group, on behalf of the County, began to require, as part of the Rehabilitation Loan Agreement, that each homeowner execute permission for a timed lien on the home which would protect 50 percent of the Group's investment if, within a specified time period after the work is completed, the homeowner rents, sells, or vacates the real property which has been improved at public expense. The time period for each lien is based on the amount of the loan. Larger loans result in longer lien periods. There is a similar provision for a lien if the homeowner dies within a specified period and the new client is less than 62 years of age. In the case of death of a homeowner, accommodations with regard to the lien can be made for familial heirs less than 62 years of age who inherit from homeowners over 62 years of age. (R-1) In 1994, Petitioner sought housing assistance/a rehabilitation loan from the Group. She filled out the necessary application paperwork and was determined to be eligible for assistance. Her name was placed on a waiting list ranked solely by the date she was deemed eligible. At that time, the immediacy of her repair needs was not part of her ranking or that of any other applicant. She was told the Group would get to her in approximately two years. Before Petitioner's name moved to the top of the waiting list so that her repair/maintenance problem could be assessed, and possibly addressed, by the Group, her name was either removed from the list inadvertently or because she did not respond to periodic notification(s) that she must affirmatively state whether she still wished to remain on the list or not. Mr. Whittaker did not work in any capacity that would have permitted him to remove her name prior to 1998. There is no proof that Mr. Whittaker or his predecessor(s) did any affirmative act at any time to remove her name, let alone removed her name for a discriminatory reason. Between 1994 and 2000, Petitioner was required to sign up several times to get back on the list. She found this confusing and unfair. She has complained about this to many people. By 2000, the hole in Petitioner's floor, which she had originally approached the Group to fix, had become substantially larger than it was when she first applied. She maintains that this was because the hole had gone unattended from 1994 to 2000. She blames the Group for the interim deterioration of her house. (P-2, P-3) Petitioner also has had roofing problems. She maintains that the Group's delay in addressing her roofing problems has caused minor roofing damage to increase to substantial water damage inside the home. She testified that the original problem was exacerbated when an inspector stepped through a room ceiling weakened by rain coming through the roof into the attic. It was proven that she currently has a bad leak in her dining room, and considerable damage to the ceiling and dry wall, but it was not proven when or how this problem began. Petitioner has a particular kind of roofing shingle that she wants replaced and warranted, and she does not want to accept any substitutes. (P-2, P-3) Sometime in 2000, in response to Petitioner's complaints, Ms. Herrin, the Housing Coordinator in Mr. Whittaker's office, went to Petitioner's home to determine what Petitioner's situation was, because none of her papers could be located. Ms. Herrin assisted Petitioner in making out and submitting new application papers. Petitioner was declared eligible and placed on an emergency repairs waiting list. In response to Petitioner's complaints, a County Inspector came to her house. Upon this inspector's recommendation, the Group paid for someone to do a temporary repair to Petitioner's floor. This inspector may have been the person who stepped through Petitioner's ceiling, but Petitioner's testimony is not clear in this regard. The floor repair was admittedly only a temporary one, and Petitioner does not like it. She is concerned about people and animals crawling under her house and losing her insurance as a result. On February 24, 2000, the Group sent Petitioner a letter, over the signature of a staff assistant, stating that Petitioner's name was being removed from the emergency waiting list because the inspection had determined that no emergency existed, and that Petitioner would be retained on the regular rehabilitation list and receive assistance when her name reached the top of that list. (P-4) In response to Petitioner's continued complaints, on March 24, 2000, Mr. Whittaker reported to the SHIP Analyst at the Florida Housing Finance Corporation that the Group had stabilized Petitioner's bedroom wall and caulked the areas around her window. An inspector had explained to Petitioner the work that had been done and needed to be done and that the present temporary repairs would be sufficient until she became eligible for a substantial rehabilitation loan. (P-1) Petitioner has not refuted this information. The materials forwarded by the Commission to the Division show that Petitioner prepared her discrimination charge, based on age and disability, on August 21, 2001, stating that the last discrimination had occurred on "July 31, 2001 and continuing." The charge bears no signature of Petitioner and no date stamp by the Commission. However, these pleadings show that Petitioner objected to the designation of her problems as "non-emergency," and further show that she does not want to sign the lien agreement required of all participating homeowners. At hearing, Petitioner pointed out that a lien was not required when she first applied in 1994 and, indeed, was not required prior to the autumn of 2000, but whether the contract to repair/improve Petitioner's home, described below, was bid before or after she filed her charge of discrimination, is not clear on the record. At some point in time after autumn 2000, Petitioner was offered a rehabilitation loan to make major repairs and improvements to her home. Petitioner objected to some of the terms and conditions of the loan, including but not limited to the lien requirements, and refused to sign the County of Volusia Rehabilitation Agreement. (R-1) Assuming that she would eventually sign the agreement, the Group went ahead and bid out the work for the rehabilitation of Petitioner's home. Charles Coleman, the building contractor who was awarded the bid, required that Petitioner move out of the house while the contracting work was being done. This is such a common requirement by contractors that the Group has pre-printed Temporary Relocation Notices, which staff merely fill out to specify dates for the respective participant-homeowners to be in and out of their houses and which instruct them to pack up any breakables and valuables for that interim period. The form letter is applied to all applicants by the Group, regardless of which contractor makes the request. The Group, like the contractors, fear liability if a homeowner is hurt or any damage is done to his or her possessions during construction. Also, a construction crew cannot proceed in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner with laymen, including the homeowner, present on a project. Petitioner refused to temporarily vacate her house while the contractor did the rehabilitation work. Ms. Herrin met with Petitioner five times to explain the health considerations of Petitioner remaining in the house during construction, but this is not sufficient, in light of the remainder of the evidence, to support a finding that anyone associated with the Group or the County perceived Petitioner to be "handicapped," as defined by the applicable statutes. Petitioner maintained to the Group, and further maintained at hearing, that plaster dust would not bother her. Despite the obvious danger of construction to someone with congestive heart failure and pesticide allergies, Petitioner continued to insist upon remaining in her home for the duration of the construction. She also testified that her doctor believed it more stressful for her to "run back and forth" than to stay in the house during the construction. Petitioner did not establish that her doctor was aware of the lengths to which the Group was willing to go to make other living arrangements for her, which are detailed below; but based upon Petitioner's testimony, the undersigned is forced to conclude that Petitioner has not established that her medical condition(s) substantially limit one or more of her major life activities. Contractor Coleman refused to do the work if Petitioner remained in the house during construction, so on November 20, 2001, Mr. Whittaker wrote a letter (R-3) to Petitioner explaining that Mr. Coleman would need Petitioner to be out of her home for only nine days and that his crew would move all her furniture into a storage box and keep it on her property while the work was being done. He pointed out that all her home's electricity and water would be shut off during the nine days of construction. He stated that Petitioner could move back into her house after the primary work was finished. This letter's explanation comports with the rather lengthy list of repairs on which the contractor had bid, which, in addition to fixing Petitioner's roof and floor, included some plumbing and replacement of major kitchen appliances. (P-5, R-3) While it is possible that repair costs could run so high that the Group would not replace Petitioner's stove and refrigerator, apparently that determination would have had to wait until construction was underway. In other words, Petitioner wanted a new stove and refrigerator but might not have gotten them due to the existing funding scheme. However, it is clear that the Group and Mr. Coleman agreed to make sure that Petitioner got the best warranty possible on the type of shingle she was requesting; that her wishes with regard to her interior doors were met; and that her other requests were honored wherever they did not offend either the legal requirements for construction contracts or building permits/codes. (P-5, R-3) Mr. Whittaker's November 20, 2001, letter also advised Petitioner that the second lowest bid was $5,000 more than Mr. Coleman's bid; that the third lowest bid was $6,000 more than Mr. Coleman's bid; and that the second and third lowest bidders would require Petitioner to be out of her house for 60 days, or neither of them would do the job. Petitioner has not refuted any of this information. (R-3) At hearing, it was shown that Petitioner has a grown son residing in Volusia County, with the potential to house her during construction. It was not shown that he would be able to house Petitioner during construction. However, in his November 20, 2001, letter, Mr. Whittaker offered to find Petitioner a place to stay for the nine days' duration of construction. (R-3) After Petitioner repeatedly refused to leave her home for the nine days of construction, Mr. Coleman withdrew his bid on the project. Prior to filing her discrimination complaint on or about August 21, 2001, Petitioner complained a lot about delays and paperwork, but she never stated or wrote to anyone with the County or Group that she felt she had been discriminated against. In hearing, when first asked why she thought she had been turned down for a rehabilitation loan, she replied, "I don't know," but later she stated it was because of her age and heart condition. When first examined about Mr. Whittaker's involvement in this case, Petitioner stated that she had never met or talked to Mr. Whittaker, but later in the hearing, she insisted that at some undesignated time, Mr. Whittaker screamed at her over the phone that he would never fix her house or allow his inspectors to enter it because she had written Governor Bush about him. Mr. Whittaker credibly denied making such a statement, and his letters in evidence demonstrate his efforts to work with Petitioner, not against her. Even if Mr. Whittaker had made the statement of which he is accused, such a reason as "retaliation for calling the Governor" would not be probative of discrimination on the basis of age or handicap. On January 28, 2002, Mr. Whittaker wrote Petitioner offering to rebid the job if she would cooperate by leaving the house just during primary construction. The letter requested that Petitioner let him know what her intentions were by February 12, 2002, or he would close her file. (R-4) On February 13, 2002, Mr. Whittaker answered a letter from Petitioner's attorney, informing him that in order for Petitioner to participate in the rehabilitation program, she would have to agree to vacate her premises until the contractor had completed a substantial portion of the work and that he, Mr. Whittaker, could not rebid the project until Petitioner complied. (P-7, R-5) On March 20, 2002, the Commission returned a Determination of No Probable Cause against Petitioner. On April 9, 2002, Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief. On April 12, 2002, the Director of the County of Volusia Community Services Department wrote a final time to Petitioner stating that because she refused to relocate temporarily from her home for just nine days, the contractor had relinquished the bid, and accordingly the Director was closing her file. (R-6)
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Jerome D. Mitchell, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2002. Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Randell H. Rowe, Esquire County of Volusia 123 West Indiana Avenue Deland, Florida 32720-4613 James L. Whittaker, Housing Manager County of Volusia Community Service Group 123 West Indiana Avenue, Room 203 Deland, Florida 32720-4611 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are (1) whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation's (Florida Housing) intended decision to award low- income housing tax credits for an affordable housing development in medium-size counties to Grove Manor Phase I, LTD (Grove Manor), JIC Grand Palms, LLC (Grand Palms), Madison Palms, Ltd. (Madison Palms), and RST The Pines, LP (The Pines), was contrary to solicitation specifications, and if so, whether that determination was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition; and (2) whether Florida Housing's determination that Brownsville Manor, LP (Brownsville), achieved the maximum available score of 28 points was contrary to solicitation specifications, and if so, whether that determination was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504. One of its responsibilities is to award low-income housing tax credits, which developers use to finance the construction of affordable housing. Tax credits are made available to states annually by the United States Treasury Department and are then awarded pursuant to a competitive cycle that starts with Florida Housing's issuance of an RFA. On September 3, 2015, Florida Housing issued an RFA in which it expected to award up to an estimated $10,763,426.00 of tax credits for affordable housing developments in medium counties. The RFA also requested proposals for housing developments in small counties, but that portion of the RFA is not at issue. All applicants in this proceeding proposed developments in medium counties. They include Redding (Seminole County), HTG (Hernando County), Brownsville (Escambia), Grove Manor (Polk County), Grand Palms (Manatee County), Madison Palms (Brevard County), and The Pines (Volusia County). Florida Housing retained the right to "waive Minor Irregularities in an otherwise valid Application" filed pursuant to the RFA. Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.008. A "minor irregularity" is defined as "a variation or condition of the Application pursuant to this rule chapter that does not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants, and does not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public." Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.002(6). These rules are particularly relevant in this case, as during the scoring process Florida Housing waived minor irregularities for several applicants. Florida Housing's Executive Director appointed a review committee comprised of Florida Housing staff to evaluate the applications for eligibility and scoring. Ninety-eight applications were received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked pursuant to the terms of the RFA, administrative rules, and applicable federal regulations. Applications are considered for funding only if they are deemed "eligible," based on whether the application complies with various content requirements. Of the 98 applications filed in response to the RFA, 88 were found to be eligible, and ten were found ineligible. All applicants in this case were preliminarily deemed to have eligible applications and received a maximum score of 28 points. The RFA specifies a sorting order for funding eligible applicants. Recognizing that there would be more applications than available credits, Florida Housing established an order for funding for applicants with tied scores using a sequence of five tie breakers, with the last being a lottery number assigned by the luck of the draw. Applications with lower lottery numbers (closer to zero) are selected before those with higher lottery numbers. On January 29, 2016, Florida Housing posted a notice informing the participants that it intended to award funding to eight developments in medium counties, including those of Grove Manor, Grand Palms, Madison Palms, and The Pines. While the applications of HTG, Brownsville, and Redding were deemed to be eligible, they were not entitled to a preliminary award of funding because of their lottery number ranking. The randomly assigned lottery numbers of those applicants are as follows: HTG (14), Brownsville (16), and Redding (17). HTG and Redding timely filed formal written protests. HTG's protest is directed only at Grove Manor's application. Because Grove Manor agreed that its score should be adjusted downward, HTG is the next applicant in the funding range and should be awarded tax credits, assuming it successfully emerges from the credit underwriting process. No party has challenged the scoring of HTG's application. Redding's protest is directed at the applications of The Pines, Madison Palms, Grand Palms, and Grove Manor, who were selected for funding. Redding also contends that Brownsville, which has a lower lottery number, should have been deemed ineligible or assigned a lower score so that it would no longer be in the funding range. In an unusual twist of events that occurred after the posting of the notice on January 29, 2016, Madison Palms and Grove Manor agreed that they are either ineligible or out of the funding range. Therefore, assuming that adequate funds are available, in order for Redding to be awarded credits, it must establish that at least one of its remaining targets (Grand Palms, Brownsville, and The Pines) is ineligible or should be assigned fewer points. No party has challenged the scoring of Redding's application. Under the RFA, applicants are awarded points in three categories: general development experience, local government contributions, and proximity to services. Depending on whether family or elderly units are being proposed, to obtain proximity to service points, an applicant may select among several types of community services, including transit, a grocery store, a medical facility, a pharmacy, or a public school. Redding has challenged the number of proximity points awarded to The Pines for proximity to a medical facility and public school, Grand Palms for proximity to a pharmacy, and Brownsville for proximity to a public bus transfer stop. Based on Florida Housing's preliminary review of the applications, all three achieved a total proximity score of 18 points. The RFA requires that an applicant submit a Surveyor Certification Form with its application. The form identifies a Development Location Point (DLP), which is representative of where the development is located and must be on or within 100 feet of an existing residential building or a building to be constructed. The DLP is represented by a latitude and longitude coordinate. The distance from the DLP to the selected service is how the proximity points are awarded. The services on which an applicant intends to rely must also be identified on the form, along with the location of the service, as well as the latitude and longitude coordinates for each service. The RFA requires that the coordinates "represent a point that is on the doorway threshold of an exterior entrance that provides direct public access to the building where the service is located." Jt. Ex. 1, p. 25. Redding contends that the coordinates for certain services selected by The Pines, Grand Palms, and Brownsville are not on the "doorway threshold of an exterior entrance that provides direct public access to the building where the service is located." Accordingly, it argues that the number of proximity points awarded to each applicant must be lowered. The Pines selected a public school that has no doors allowing direct public access to the facility. Instead, the school is a series of buildings and classrooms connected by sidewalks and covered breezeways, making a primary "doorway threshold" problematic. The office is interior to the school. Given this unusual configuration, The Pines placed the coordinates at a student drop-off area in front of the school, where students then walk under the covered breezeways to their classrooms, and members of the public walk to offices and/or classrooms. Even if Redding's desired point for the coordinates was used, there would be no difference in the awarded proximity points, as the change in distance would be minimal. The coordinates for The Pines' medical facility are approximately 90 feet from the door that provides direct public access. This was due to an error by the surveyor, who used the back of the facility, rather than the front doorway threshold. Even if the front door had been used for the threshold, The Pines would still be entitled to the same amount of proximity points, as the change in distance would be minimal and not change the scoring. The slight error in the form is a waivable minor irregularity. Brownsville selected a public bus transfer stop for its transit service. Due more than likely to a digital error in one of the satellites used to pinpoint the spot, the coordinates were approximately 150 feet from the canopy where passengers load and unload. Even if the correct point had been used, it would not change the amount of proximity points awarded to Brownsville. The slight error in the form is a waivable minor irregularity. Finally, Grand Palms selected a pharmacy for one of its services. During the process of locating the doorway threshold at the pharmacy, a traverse point was established 70 feet east of the doorway threshold. This was necessary because of an overhang above the doorway threshold. A measurement was then made from the traverse point to the doorway threshold. By mistake, the coordinates on the form represented the location of the traverse point, instead of the doorway threshold of the pharmacy. However, this 70-foot error did not affect the distance from the pharmacy to the DLP or the points awarded to Grand Palms for proximity to a pharmacy. The slight error in the form is a waivable minor irregularity. Florida Housing determined that the coordinates used by The Pines, Brownsville, and Grand Palms yielded the same proximity point score had they been located at the "doorway threshold" and/or "embark/disembark location" as defined in the RFA. Because there is no language in the RFA that provides direction on how to treat these types of minor errors, or mandates that Florida Housing treat them as a non-waivable item, Florida Housing considers them to be a minor irregularity that can be waived. In sum, the deviations were immaterial, no competitive advantage was realized by the applicants, and they were entitled to the proximity points awarded during the preliminary review. Redding also contends that Brownsville is ineligible for funding because it failed to comply with a material requirement in the RFA. In its application, Brownsville stated that it intends to place an 87-unit development on a "scattered site" consisting of two parcels (Site I and Site II) with an intervening roadway (North X Street) between them. The RFA defines a development which consists of a scattered site "to mean a single point on the site with the most units that is located within 100 feet of a residential building existing or to be constructed as part of the required Development." Jt. Ex. 1, p. 25. Stated another way, if multiple parcels are used for the development, the DLP must be located on the site which contains the majority of the residential units. Florida Housing considers this to be a material, non-waivable requirement of the RFA. In Brownsville's Surveyor Certification Form, the DLP is located on Site I, a 1.49-acre parcel that is zoned Commercial and lies west of Site II. In making its preliminary decision to award funding to Brownsville, Florida Housing relied upon the validity of the DLP as of the application deadline and assumed that Site I would have the majority of the units. It had no way to verify the accuracy of that information during the initial scoring process. The RFA requires an applicant to attach to its application a form entitled, "Local Government Verification that Development is Consistent with Zoning and Land Use Regulations." Brownsville's verification form was signed by Horace L. Jones, Director of Development Services for Escambia County, who confirmed that the intended use of the property was consistent with local zoning regulations. The verification forms do not include any information regarding the number of units on each parcel of the site. Florida Housing defers to the local government in determining whether local zoning requirements will be met. Mr. Jones later testified by deposition that Escambia County zoning regulations allow only "25 dwelling units per acre" on Site I. Therefore, on a 1.49-acre parcel, the maximum number of units allowed is 36, or less than a majority of the 87 units. Because Brownsville did not comply with a material requirement of the RFA for a scattered site, Florida Housing now considers the DLP for proximity purposes to be invalid. Had it concluded otherwise, Brownsville would be given a competitive advantage over the other applicants. Brownsville contends, however, that during the County site review process, it will utilize a procedure by which the County can consider the two parcels as a "Single Unified Development" and "cluster" the dwelling units. Although the County has a process to allow the transfer of density from one parcel to another, Brownsville had not started this process as of October 15, 2015, the due date for all applications and the cutoff date for any changes. Also, this process would entail a public hearing before the Board of County Commissioners (Board), and there is no guarantee that the Board would approve the density transfer. In fact, Mr. Jones testified that he was not sure if the density transfer was even a viable option. Therefore, the application of Brownsville contains a material deviation from the RFA and is not eligible for funding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order rescinding the preliminary award to Grove Manor Phase I, Ltd. and Madison Palms, Ltd.; determining that Brownsville Manor, LP, is ineligible for funding; and designating HTG Hammock Ridge, LLC, and Redding Development Partners, LLC, as the recipients of tax credits being made available for developments in RFA 1015-106. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Kate Fleming, Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. Post Office Box 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Betty C. Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 340 1725 Capital Circle Northeast Tallahassee, Florida 32308-1591 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1706 (eServed) Douglas P. Manson, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson, P.A. 1101 West Swann Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606-2637 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) properly dismissed this matter for lack of jurisdiction.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, as a first-time home buyer, applied for and was pre-approved by Cendant Mortgage Corporation d/b/a/ Century 21 Mortgage for a mortgage loan. The loan, in the amount of $28,687.00, was to be insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). In February 2003, Respondent agreed to sell Petitioner his home. They agreed that Petitioner would pay Respondent $29,000.00 for the house. Respondent subsequently stated in writing that he agreed to sell his house to Petitioner for that amount. On March 5, 2003, Petitioner signed a form entitled No Brokerage Relationship Disclosure. The form made it clear that Century 21 Prime Property Resources, Inc., a local real estate agency, and its associates did not have a brokerage relationship with Petitioner. There is no evidence that the professional services of a licensed real estate agent was involved at all in this case. However, the local Century 21 real estate office gratuitously sent a few documents on Petitioner's behalf by facsimile transmission to Century 21 Mortgage in New Jersey. Respondent did not use the sales facilities or services of Century 21 for any purpose. On March 7, 2003, Cheryl Barnes, a certified appraiser, completed an appraisal of the property. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or FHA required the appraisal in order for Petitioner to receive the loan insured by FHA. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent was required to pay for the appraisal. In a letter dated March 10, 2003, Century 21 Mortgage advised Petitioner that the closing date was scheduled for April 16, 2003. The letter enclosed additional forms that Petitioner needed to complete in order to close the loan. The Housing Department, Division of Planning and Development, in Sumter County, Florida, sent Petitioner a letter dated March 19, 2003. The letter advised Petitioner that she was eligible for an award of Supplemental Household Income Protection funds to cover the down payment and closing costs on the loan. Subsequently, Respondent refused to sign any papers related to the sale of the house. The loan could not be closed without Respondent's cooperation. Petitioner had placed $250 in an escrow account with Century 21 Mortgage. The mortgage broker refunded all of the money in the escrow account to Petitioner after Respondent refused to sign any more paperwork. Finally, there is no evidence of the following: (a) that Respondent owned more than three single-family houses at any one time; (b) that Respondent sold more than one single- family home within any 24-month period; (c) that Respondent had an interest in the proceeds from the sale or rental of more than three single-family houses at any one time; and (d) the sale of the subject house did not involve the posting, mailing, or publication of any written notice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan M. Parker 3840 East County Road 478 Apartment D-30 Webster, Florida 33597 Paul Moore 2396 County Road 608 Bushnell, Florida 33513
The Issue The issue is whether the actions of Florida Housing concerning the review and scoring of the responses to Request for Applications 2019-102 (“RFA”), titled “Community Development Block Grant--Disaster Recovery (‘CDBG- DR’) to be Used in Conjunction with Tax-Exempt MMRB and Non- Competitive Housing Credits in Counties Deemed Hurricane Recovery Priorities,” were contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the RFA specifications.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: THE PARTIES Berkeley is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $6,500,000 in CDBG Development funding; $2,500,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; and $844,699 in non-competitive housing credits. The Berkeley Application, assigned number 2020-017D, was preliminarily deemed ineligible for consideration for funding. Brisas is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $5,000,000 in CDBG Development funding and $1,674,839 in non-competitive housing credits. The Brisas Application, assigned number 2020-056D, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Northside is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $7,300,000 in CDBG Development funding; $1,588,014 in non-competitive housing credits; and $24,000,000 in Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds (“MMRB”). The Northside Application, assigned number 2020-024D, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Beacon Place is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $6,925,500 in CDBG Development funding; $4,320,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $1,764,203 in non-competitive housing credits; and $24,000,000 in MMRB. The Beacon Place Application, assigned number 2020-045DB, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Bella Vista is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $8,000,000 in CDBG Development funding; $1,450,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $609,629 in non-competitive housing credits; and $13,000,000 in MMRB. The Bella Vista Application, assigned number 2020-038DB, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Solaris is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,420,000 in CDBG Development funding; $4,500,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; and $937,232 in non-competitive housing credits. The Solaris Application, assigned number 2020-039D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Metro Grande is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,175,000 in CDBG Development funding and $1,041,930 in non-competitive housing credits. The Metro Grande Application, assigned number 2020-041D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Sierra Bay is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,650,000 in CDBG Development funding; $3,300,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $1,074,173 in non-competitive housing credits; and $16,000,000 in MMRB. The Sierra Bay Application, assigned number 2020-040DB, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Bembridge is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $7,800,000 in CDBG Development funding; $564,122 in non-competitive housing credits; and $10,100,000 in MMRB. The Bembridge Application, assigned number 2020-046DB, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. East Pointe is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $4,680,000 in CDBG Development funding and $690,979 in non-competitive housing credits. The East Pointe Application, assigned number 2020-053D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Florida Housing is a public corporation organized pursuant to Chapter 420, Part V, Florida Statutes, and, for purposes of these consolidated cases, is an agency of the State of Florida. Florida Housing is tasked with distributing a portion of the CDBG-DR funding allocated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), pursuant to the State of Florida Action Plan for Disaster Recovery. THE COMPETITIVE APPLICATION PROCESS AND RFA 2019-102 Florida Housing is authorized to allocate low-income housing tax credits and other named funding by section 420.507(48). Florida Housing has adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60 to govern the competitive solicitation process. Rule 67-60.009(1) provides that parties wishing to protest any aspect of a Florida Housing competitive solicitation must do so pursuant to section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Funding is made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a request for applications. Rule 67-60.009(4) provides that a request for application is considered a “request for proposal” for purposes of section 120.57(3)(f). The RFA was issued on July 30, 2019, with responses due on August 27, 2019. The RFA was modified four times and the application deadline was extended to September 24, 2019. No challenges were made to the terms and specifications of the RFA. Section Five of the RFA included a list of 48 “eligibility items” that an applicant was required to satisfy to be eligible for funding and considered for funding selection. Applications that met the eligibility standards would then be awarded points for satisfying RFA criteria, with the highest scoring applications being selected for funding. No total point items are in dispute. Proximity Point items are contested as to the Beacon Place, East Pointe, and Bembridge Applications. Applicants could select whether they would be evaluated as Priority I, II, or III applications. All of the parties to these consolidated cases identified themselves as Priority I applications. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award an estimated $76,000,000 of CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding to areas impacted by Hurricane Irma, and in areas that experienced a population influx because of migration from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands due to Hurricane Irma. Florida Housing will award up to $66,000,000 for CDBG Development funding and an additional $10,000,000 for CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding. Applicants were not required to request CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding. Forty-four applications were submitted in response to the RFA. A Review Committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (the “Board”). The Review Committee found 34 applications eligible for funding. The Review Committee found 8 applications ineligible, including that of Berkeley. Two applications were withdrawn. The Review Committee developed charts listing its eligibility and funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. On December 13, 2019, the Board met and accepted the recommendations of the Review Committee. The Board preliminarily awarded funding to 12 applications, including those of Sierra Bay, Solaris, Metro Grande, East Pointe, and Bembridge. Petitioners Berkeley, Brisas, Northside, Beacon Place, and Bella Vista timely filed Notices of Protest and Petitions for Formal Administrative Hearing. THE BERKELEY APPLICATION As an eligibility item, the RFA required applicants to identify an Authorized Principal Representative. According to the RFA, the Authorized Principal Representative: must be a natural person Principal of the Applicant listed on the Principal Disclosure Form; must have signature authority to bind the Applicant entity; (c) must sign the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form submitted in this Application; (d) must sign the Site Control Certification form submitted in this Application; and (e) if funded, will be the recipient of all future documentation that requires a signature. As an eligibility item, the RFA required applicants to submit an Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment form executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. As an eligibility item, the RFA also required applicants to submit a Site Control Certification form executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. In section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A of the RFA, the applicant is directed to enter the contact information of its Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley entered the name, organization, and contact information for Jennie D. Lagmay as its Authorized Principal Representative, in response to section 3.e.(1). The name of Jennie D. Lagmay was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form required by the RFA. The Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment form and the Site Control Certification form were executed by Jonathan L. Wolf, not Jennie D. Lagmay, the designated Authorized Principal Representative. On both forms, Mr. Wolf is identified as “Manager of Berkeley Landing GP, LLC; General Partner of Berkeley Landing, Ltd.” Jonathan L. Wolf is listed on the Principal Disclosure Form. Aside from section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A, Jennie D. Lagmay’s name is not found in the Berkeley Application. Florida Housing determined that the Berkeley Application was ineligible for an award of funding for three reasons: 1) the Authorized Principal Representative listed was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form; 2) the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form was not signed by the Authorized Principal Representative; and 3) the Site Control Certification was not signed by the Authorized Principal Representative. Two other applications for this RFA were found ineligible for identical reasons: Thornton Place, Application No. 2020-020D; and Berkshire Square, Application No. 2020-034D. In these, as in the Berkeley Application, Jennie D. Lagmay was named as the Authorized Principal Representative in section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A, but Jonathan L. Wolf executed the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form and the Site Control Certification form as the Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley concedes it made an error in placing the name of Ms. Lagmay in section 3.e.(1), but argues that this constituted a minor irregularity that should have been waived by Florida Housing. Berkeley contends that the entirety of its Application makes plain that Jonathan D. Wolf is in fact its Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley argues that Florida Housing should waive the minor irregularity and determine that the Berkeley Application is eligible for funding. Berkeley points out that only two members of the Review Committee, Rachel Grice and Heather Strickland, scored the portions of the Berkeley Application that led to the ineligibility recommendation. Ms. Grice determined that the Authorized Principal Representative listed in the Berkeley Application was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form. Ms. Strickland determined that neither the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form nor the Site Control Certification form was executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. Neither Ms. Grice nor Ms. Strickland conducted a minor irregularity analysis for the Berkeley Application. Rule 67-60.008, titled “Right to Waive Minor Irregularities,” provides as follows: Minor irregularities are those irregularities in an Application, such as computation, typographical, or other errors, that do not result in the omission of any material information; do not create any uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the competitive solicitation have been met; do not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants; and do not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public. Minor irregularities may be waived or corrected by the Corporation. Berkeley contends that because a minor irregularity analysis was not conducted by the Review Committee members, the Board was deprived of a necessary explanation for the preliminary recommendations of Ms. Grice and Ms. Strickland. Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Allocations, agreed that the Review Committee members did not perform a minor irregularity analysis but testified that none was required given the nature of the discrepancy in the Berkeley Application. Ms. Button performed a minor irregularity analysis as Florida Housing’s corporate representative in this proceeding and concluded that the error could not be waived or corrected without providing an unfair competitive advantage to Berkeley. Ms. Button testified that the fact that the person identified as the Authorized Principal Representative was not the same person who signed the certification forms could not be considered a minor irregularity because the application demonstrated conflicting and contradictory information, creating uncertainty as to the applicant’s intentions. She stated that Florida Housing is required to limit its inquiry to the four corners of the application. Ms. Button stated that Florida Housing cannot take it upon itself to decide what the applicant intended when the information provided in the application is contradictory. Berkeley points to the fact that the Application Certification and Acknowledgement form, signed by Mr. Wolf, includes the following language: “The undersigned is authorized to bind the Applicant entity to this certification and warranty of truthfulness and completeness of the Application.” Berkeley argues that it should have been clear to Florida Housing that Mr. Wolf is the person authorized to bind the company and that the inclusion of Ms. Lagmay’s name in section 3.e.(1) was in the nature of a typographical error. Florida Housing points out that the Application Certification and Acknowledgement form also includes the following language below the signature line: “NOTE: Provide this form as Attachment 1 to the RFA. The Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form must be signed by the Authorized Principal Representative stated in Exhibit A.” Florida Housing notes that the Site Control Certification form includes similar language: “This form must be signed by the Authorized Principal Representative stated in Exhibit A.” Berkeley contends that Florida Housing was well aware that Jonathan L. Wolf has been the named Authorized Principal Representative on multiple applications filed under the umbrella of Wendover Housing Partners, the general developer behind Berkeley. In at least one of those previous applications, Ms. Lagmay, an employee of Wendover Housing Partners, was identified as the “contact person.” Ms. Button responded that Review Committee members are specifically prohibited from using personal knowledge of a general development entity in a specific application submitted by a single purpose entity. She further testified that if Florida Housing employees were to use their personal knowledge of an experienced developer to waive errors in a specific application, applicants who had not previously submitted applications would be at a competitive disadvantage. Ms. Button testified that Berkeley was established as a single purpose entity in accordance with the RFA’s requirements. She testified that she has known general developers to structure these single purpose entities in different ways, depending on the requirements of an RFA. An applicant might designate an employee, such as Ms. Lagmay, as a principal to give her experience as a developer. Again, Ms. Button emphasized that Florida Housing is not in a position to decide what the applicant “really meant” when there is a discrepancy in the information provided. Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing has determined in prior RFAs that an applicant was ineligible because the person identified as the Authorized Principal Representative was not the same person who signed the certification forms. Florida Housing rightly concluded that there are only two possible ways to interpret the Berkeley Application. If Ms. Lagmay was the Authorized Principal Representative, then the application is nonresponsive because she was not listed on the Principal Disclosure form and she did not sign the required certification forms. If Ms. Lagmay was not the Authorized Principal Representative, the application is nonresponsive because no Authorized Principal Representative was identified. There is no way to tell from the four corners of the application which of these alternatives is the correct one. Florida Housing cannot step in and cure the defect in the application by making its own educated guess as to the intended identity of the Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of ineligibility was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA, or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE SIERRA BAY APPLICATION The parties stipulated to the facts regarding the Sierra Bay Application, which are incorporated into this Recommended Order. Florida Housing deemed the Sierra Bay Application eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, preliminarily selected Sierra Bay for funding. In order to demonstrate site control, the RFA required execution of the Site Control Certification form. Site control documentation had to be included in the application. One way to demonstrate site control was to include an “eligible contract.” The RFA required that certain conditions be met in order to be considered an “eligible contract.” One of those requirements was that the contract “must specifically state that the buyer’s remedy for default on the part of the seller includes or is specific performance.” Sierra Bay acknowledged that the site control documentation included within its application did not meet the “eligible contract” requirement because it failed to include language regarding specific performance as a remedy for the seller’s default. Sierra Bay agreed that the omission of the specific performance language was not a minor irregularity and that Sierra Bay’s Application is ineligible for funding under the terms of the RFA. THE SOLARIS APPLICATION The RFA specified that a Local Government, Public Housing Authority, Land Authority, or Community Land Trust must hold 100 percent ownership in the land of any qualifying Priority I application. The RFA defined “Community Land Trust” as: A 501(c)(3) which acquires or develops parcels of land for the primary purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity through conveyance of the structural improvement subject to a long term ground lease which retains a preemptive option to purchase any such structural improvement at a price determined by a formula designed to ensure the improvement remains affordable in perpetuity. The RFA provided that if a Community Land Trust is the Land Owner, the Community Land Trust must provide the following documentation as Attachment 2 to the application to demonstrate that it qualifies as a Community Land Trust: The Community Land Trust must provide its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws demonstrating it has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier and that a purpose of the Community Land Trust is to provide or preserve affordable housing; and The Community Land Trust must provide a list that meets one of the following criteria to demonstrate experience of the Community Land Trust with owning property: (i) at least two parcels of land that the Community Land Trust currently owns; or (ii) one parcel of land that the Community Land Trust owns, consisting of a number of units that equals or exceeds at least 25 percent of the units in the proposed Development. The RFA required that the proposed development must be affordable in perpetuity. For purposes of the RFA, “perpetuity” means 99 years or more. Solaris identified Residential Options of Florida, Inc. (“Residential Options”), as the Community Land Trust owner in its Priority 1 Application. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application included the Articles of Incorporation of Residential Options (“Original Articles”), filed with the Division of Corporations on July 30, 2014. The purpose of the corporation as stated in the Original Articles was as follows: Said corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, including for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of any future federal tax code. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application also included Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Residential Options (“Amended Articles”), filed with the Division of Corporations on September 20, 2019. The Amended Articles retained the boilerplate statement of purpose of the Original Articles, but added the following paragraph: This shall include the purpose of empowering individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities to successfully obtain and maintain affordable and inclusive housing of their choice and to provide affordable housing and preserve the affordability of housing for low- income or moderate income people, including people with disabilities, in perpetuity. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application also included the Articles of Incorporation of ROOF Housing Trust, Inc. (“ROOF Housing Trust”) filed with the Division of Corporations on July 17, 2017. The purpose of the corporation as stated in these Articles includes the following: “to acquire land to be held in perpetuity for the primary purpose of providing affordable housing for people with developmental disabilities.” Finally, Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application included Articles of Merger, which were filed with the Division of Corporations on September 10, 2019. The Articles of Merger indicated that the Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust had merged, with Residential Options standing as the surviving corporation. The petitioners contesting the Solaris Application raise several issues. The first issue is whether the RFA requires only that the entity named as the Community Land Trust have been in existence in some form as of June 28, 2018, or whether the entity had to exist as a Community Land Trust as of that date. The Community Land Trust named in the Solaris Application, Residential Options, existed prior to June 28, 2018, but not as a Community Land Trust. The second issue is whether the June 28, 2018, date applies only to the existence of the Community Land Trust or whether the RFA requires that the Community Land Trust have been in existence and have had a stated purpose to provide or preserve affordable housing and have met the ownership experience criteria as of June 28, 2018. It is questionable whether Solaris would be eligible for funding if the RFA required the latter, because Residential Options did not have a stated purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing prior to its merger with ROOF Housing Trust, at least no such purpose as could be gleaned from the four corners of the Solaris Application. The third issue is whether the RFA’s definition of “Community Land Trust” requires the qualifying entity to have existing ground leases at the time of the application. Florida Housing and Solaris concede that Residential Options did not have operative ground leases at the time Solaris submitted its application. Hurricane Irma struck Puerto Rico and Florida in September 2017. Ms. Button testified that in creating this RFA, Florida Housing wanted to weed out opportunistic community land trusts created only for the purpose of obtaining this funding. Florida Housing initially proposed an RFA requirement that the community land trust have existed as of September 2017, but discovered through workshops with interested parties that the early date would exclude legitimate Community Land Trusts that had been established in response to the storm. Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing’s intent was to make this RFA as inclusive as practicable. Florida Housing therefore selected June 28, 2018, as a date that would exclude opportunists without penalizing the genuine responders to the natural disaster. Both Florida Housing and Solaris point to the text of the RFA requirement to demonstrate that the date of June 28, 2018, should be read to apply only to whether the Community Land Trust existed as of that date. Solaris argues that the RFA states three independent criteria for eligibility: 1) that the Community Land Trust “has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier”; 2) that a purpose of the Community Land Trust is1 to provide or preserve affordable housing; and 3) the Community Land Trust must demonstrate its property ownership experience, one means of doing which is to name at least two parcels of land that the Community Land Trust currently owns. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the first criterion by providing its Articles of Incorporation showing it has existed since July 30, 2014. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the second criterion by providing its Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, which stated the purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the third criterion by identifying two properties in Immokalee, Independence Place, and Liberty Place as parcels that it currently owns. Florida Housing thus reached the conclusion that Residential Options met the definition of a Community Land Trust in the RFA as of June 28, 2018. Florida Housing argues that, according to the definition in the RFA, a Community Land Trust must be a 501(c)(3) corporation, which Residential Options clearly is. It must acquire or develop parcels of land, which it has done. Finally, it must have the “primary purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity through conveyance of the structural improvement subject to a long term ground lease.” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing’s interpretation of the RFA’s Community Land Trust definition was that if Residential Options had the primary purpose of providing affordable housing in perpetuity through the use of long term ground leases, the definition has been met even if Residential Options had not actually entered into any ground leases at the 1 Both Florida Housing and Solaris emphasize that the second criterion is stated in the present tense, which suggests that it does not intend a backward look to June 28, 2018. time it submitted its application. This is not the only way to read the RFA’s definition, but it is not an unreasonable reading, particularly in light of Florida Housing’s stated intent to make the RFA as inclusive as possible in terms of the participation of legitimate community land trusts. Sheryl Soukup, the Executive Director of Residential Options, testified via deposition. Ms. Soukup testified that in 2017, Residential Options realized there was a need for housing for people with disabilities and decided to become a nonprofit housing developer of properties that would be kept affordable in perpetuity. To that end, ROOF Housing Trust was created to act as the community land trust for the properties developed by Residential Options. The two companies had identical Boards of Directors and Ms. Soukup served as Executive Director of both entities. In its application to the IRS for 501(c)(3) status, ROOF Housing Trust included the following: The organization does not own any property yet. ROOF Housing Trust intends to own vacant land, single family homes, and multi-family units. Some of the units will be provided as rental units. ROOF Housing Trust will sell some of the houses for homeownership, while retaining the land on which they are located. The land will be leased to homeowners at a nominal fee to make the purchase price affordable, using the community land trust model. Ground leases and warranty deeds not been developed yet [sic], but will be based on the sample documents provided by the Florida Community Land Trust Institute.[2] Ms. Soukup described ROOF Housing Trust as “a vehicle by which Residential Options of Florida could act as a community land trust…. [I]t was always the intention of Residential Options of Florida to develop and put into 2 The ROOF Housing Trust 501(c)(3) application was not a part of the Solaris Application. It was included as an exhibit to Ms. Soukup’s deposition. a community land trust property so that it would remain affordable in perpetuity for use by people of intellectual and development [sic] disabilities.” Residential Options acquired the aforementioned Independence Place and Liberty Place properties but never conveyed ownership to ROOF Housing Trust. Residential Options acted as a de facto community land trust. No ground leases have yet been entered into because the properties are at present rented directly by Residential Options to persons with developmental disabilities. Ms. Soukup testified that at the time ROOF Housing Trust was created, the Board of Residential Options was undecided whether to create a separate entity to act as a community land trust or to incorporate that function into the existing entity. The decision to incorporate ROOF Housing Trust was based on the Board’s intuition that a separate corporation would “allow us the most flexibility in the future.” In any event, Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust were functionally the same entity. Ms. Soukup testified that plans to merge the two companies emerged from a situation in which Collier County refused to allow Residential Options to convey its two properties to ROOF Housing Trust. The Board that controlled both companies decided that there was no point in maintaining separate legal entities if ROOF Housing Trust could not perform its main function. As noted above, Articles of Merger were filed on September 10, 2019. Northside points to minutes from Residential Options’s Board meetings in August and September 2019, as indicating that the Board itself did not believe that Residential Options was a community land trust prior to the merger with ROOF Housing Trust. Northside contends that the September 2019 merger was initiated and completed mainly because Residential Options had been approached about serving as the Community Land Trust for the applications of Solaris and Sierra Bay in this RFA. Northside points to the “frenzied activity” by Residential Options to create an entity meeting the definition of Community Land Trust in the days just before the September 24, 2019, application deadline. Northside argues that Residential Options is the very kind of opportunistic community land trust that the June 28, 2018, date of creation was intended to weed out. Northside’s argument is not persuasive of itself, but it does point the way to an ultimate finding as to the Solaris Application. Both Florida Housing and Solaris gave great emphasis to Ms. Soukup’s testimony to refute the suggestion that Residential Options acted opportunistically. Ms. Soukup was a credible witness. Her explanation of the process by which Residential Options first created then merged with ROOF Housing Trust dispelled any suggestion that Residential Options was a community land trust created solely to cash in on this RFA. The problem is that Ms. Soukup’s explanation was not before the Review Committee when it evaluated the Solaris Application. The only information about Residential Options that the Review Committee possessed was Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application. The dates of the merger documents and Amended Articles certainly give some credence to the suspicions voiced by Northside. However, the undersigned is less persuaded by the implications as to the intentions of Residential Options than by the contradictions between Florida Housing’s statements of intent and its reading of the RFA in relation to the Solaris Application. The decision to find the Solaris Application eligible for funding founders on the first issue stated above: whether the RFA requires only that the Community Land Trust have been in existence in some form as of June 28, 2018, or whether it had to exist as a Community Land Trust as of that date. Ms. Button testified that the June 28, 2018, date was settled upon as a way of including community land trusts created in the wake of Hurricane Irma, while excluding those created to cash in on this RFA. During cross- examination by counsel for Northside, Ms. Button broadened her statement to say that Florida Housing’s intention was to exclude entities that had not been involved in affordable housing at all prior to June 28, 2018. Nonetheless, the RFA language is limited to Community Land Trusts. The RFA states: “The Community Land Trust must provide its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws demonstrating that it has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier…” The Solaris Application shows that Residential Options existed prior to June 28, 2018, but not as a Community Land Trust. Residential Options did not become a Community Land Trust until it completed its merger with ROOF Housing Trust and filed the Amended Articles on September 20, 2019. Ms. Button’s statement of intent is accepted as consistent with the plain language of the RFA: the date of June 28, 2018, excludes Community Land Trusts created subsequently. It is inconsistent for Florida Housing to also read the RFA language to say that the qualifying entity need not have existed as a Community Land Trust prior to June 28, 2018. It would be arbitrary for Florida Housing to set a date for the creation of Community Land Trusts then turn around and find that the date does not apply to this particular Community Land Trust. Ms. Soukup’s testimony was that Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust were effectively a single entity and that Residential Options was in fact operating as a community land trust prior to the September 10, 2019, merger. However, Ms. Soukup’s explanation was not before the Review Committee, which was limited to one means of ascertaining whether an entity was a Community Land Trust prior to June 28, 2018: the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. Residential Options’s Original Articles included no language demonstrating that it was a Community Land Trust prior to the September 10, 2019, merger with ROOF Housing Trust and the filing of the Amended Articles on September 20, 2019.3 As set forth in the discussion of the Berkley Application above, Florida Housing is required to limit its inquiry to the four corners of an application. It was contrary to the provisions of the RFA for Florida Housing to find that Residential Options’s mere existence as a legal entity prior to June 28, 2018, satisfied the requirement that the Community Land Trust must demonstrate that it existed prior to June 28, 2018. Ms. Button’s own testimony demonstrated that Florida Housing intended to exclude Community Land Trusts created after June 28, 2018. ROOF Housing Trust existed as a Community Land Trust in 2017, but ROOF Housing Trust was not the Community Land Trust named in the Solaris Application. Ms. Soukup’s explanation of the circumstances showed that Residential Options was well intentioned in its actions, but her explanation was not a part of the Solaris Application that was before Florida Housing’s Review Committee. THE METRO GRANDE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Metro Grande Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, the Metro Grande Application was preliminarily selected for funding. Petitioner Brisas contends that the Metro Grande Application should have been found ineligible for failure to include mandatory site control documentation. Metro Grande submitted a Priority I application that was not seeking Land Acquisition Program funding. The site control requirements for such applicants are as follows: 3 This finding also disposes of Solaris’s arguments regarding the legal effect of corporate mergers. The RFA provided one simple way of demonstrating whether an entity was a Community Land Trust as of June 28, 2018. Florida Housing’s Review Committee could not be expected to delve into the complexities of corporate mergers to answer this uncomplicated question. The Local Government, Public Housing Authority, Land Authority, or Community Land Trust must already own the land as the sole grantee and, if funded, the land must be affordable into Perpetuity.[4] Applicants must demonstrate site control as of Application Deadline by providing the properly executed Site Control Certification form (Form Rev. 08-18). Attached to the form must be the following documents: A Deed or Certificate of Title. The deed or certificate of title (in the event the property was acquired through foreclosure) must be recorded in the applicable county and show the Land Owner as the sole Grantee. There are no restrictions on when the land was acquired; and A lease between the Land Owner and the Applicant entity. The lease must have an unexpired term of at least 50 years after the Application Deadline. Metro Grande did not include a deed or certificate of title in its application. In fact, no deed or certificate of title for the Metro Grande site exists. Miami-Dade County owns the Metro Grande site. Miami-Dade County acquired ownership of the Metro Grande site by eminent domain. The eminent domain process culminated in the entry of four Final Judgments for individual parcels which collectively compose the Metro Grande site. The Final Judgments were not attached to Metro Grande’s Application. There was no requirement in the RFA that Metro Grande include these Final Judgments in its application. The Final Judgments were produced during discovery in this proceeding. In its application, Metro Grande included a Land Owner Certification and Acknowledgement Form executed by Maurice L. Kemp, as the Deputy Mayor of Miami-Dade County, stating that the county holds or will hold 100 percent ownership of the land where Metro Grande’s proposed 4 The RFA defined “Perpetuity” as “at least 99 years from the loan closing.” development is located. Additionally, in its application, Metro Grande stated that Miami-Dade County owned the property. The RFA expressly states that Florida Housing “will not review the site control documentation that is submitted with the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process unless there is a reason to believe that the form has been improperly executed, nor will it in any case evaluate the validity or enforceability of any such documentation.” Florida Housing reserves the right to rescind an award to any applicant whose site control documents are shown to be insufficient during the credit underwriting process. Thus, the fact that no deed or certificate of title was included with Metro Grande’s site control documents was not considered by Florida Housing during the scoring process. Ms. Button testified that while this was an error in the application, it should be waived as a minor irregularity. The purpose of the documentation requirements was to demonstrate ownership and control of the applicant’s proposed site. There was no question or ambiguity as to the fact that Miami- Dade County owned the Metro Grande site. Florida Housing was not required to resort to information extraneous to the Metro Grande Application to confirm ownership of the site. The Land Owner Certification and Acknowledgement form, executed by the Deputy Mayor as the Authorized Land Owner Representative, confirmed ownership of the parcels. Metro Grande’s failure to include a deed or certificate of title, therefore, created no confusion as to who owned the property or whether Miami-Dade County had the authority to lease the property to the applicant. There was no evidence presented that the failure to include a deed or certificate of title resulted in the omission of any material information or provided a competitive advantage over other applicants. Brisas contends that the RFA was clear as to the documents that must be included to satisfy the site control requirements. Metro Grande failed to provide those documents or even an explanation why those documents were not provided. Florida Housing ignored the fact that no deed or certificate of title was provided, instead relying on information found elsewhere in the application. It is found that Metro Grande failed to comply with an eligibility item of the RFA, but that Florida Housing was correct to waive that failure as a minor irregularity that provided Metro Grande no competitive advantage, created no uncertainty as to whether the requirements of the RFA were met, and did not adversely affect the interests of Florida Housing or the public. Brisas has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE BEACON PLACE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Beacon Place Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Beacon Place was not preliminarily selected for funding. The RFA provides that an application may earn proximity points based on the distance between its Development Location Point and the selected Transit or Community Service. Proximity points are used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference. Beacon Place is a Large County Application that is not eligible for the “Public Housing Authority Proximity Point Boost.” As such, the Beacon Place Application was required to achieve a minimum Transit Point score of 2 to be eligible for funding. Beacon Place must also achieve a total Proximity Point score of 10.5 in order to be eligible for funding. Beacon Place must achieve a total Proximity Point score of 12.5 or more in order to receive the RFA’s Proximity Funding Preference. Based on the information in its Application, Beacon Place received a Total Proximity Point score of 18 and was deemed eligible for funding and for the Proximity Point Funding Preference. The Beacon Place Application listed a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as its Transit Service. Applying the Transit Service Scoring Charts in Exhibit C of the RFA, Florida Housing awarded Beacon Place 6 Proximity Points for its Transit Service. The Beacon Place Application listed a Grocery Store, a Pharmacy, and a Public School in its Community Services Chart in order to obtain Proximity Points for Community Services. Using the Community Services Scoring Charts in Exhibit C of the RFA, Florida Housing awarded Beacon Place 4 Proximity Points for each service listed, for a total of 12 Proximity Points for Community Services. Beacon Place has stipulated, however, that the Public School listed in its application does not meet the definition of “Public School” in the RFA and Beacon Place should not receive the 4 Proximity Points for listing a public school. The RFA defines a “Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop” as: [a] fixed location at which passengers may access public transportation via bus. The Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop must service at least one bus that travels at some point during the route in either a lane or corridor that is exclusively used by buses, and the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop must service at least one route that has scheduled stops at the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop at least every 20 minutes during the times of 7am to 9am and also during the times of 4pm to 6pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, on a year- round basis. Additionally, it must have been in existence and available for use by the general public as of the Application Deadline. The Beacon Place Application included Metrobus Route 38 (“Route 38”) as a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop. Route 38 has scheduled stops at the location identified in the Beacon Place Application at the following times during the period of 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. Monday through Friday: 7:01, 7:36, 7:56, 8:11, 8:26, 8:41, and 8:56. Brisas and Northside contend that Route 38 does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop because there is a gap of more than 20 minutes between the 7:01 a.m. bus and the 7:36 a.m. bus. Applicants are not required to include bus schedules in the application. Florida Housing does not attempt to determine whether an identified stop meets the RFA definitions during the scoring process. During discovery in this litigation, Florida Housing changed its position and now agrees that Route 38 does not satisfy the definition. Nonetheless, the standard of review set forth in section 120.57(3) is applicable to Florida Housing’s initial eligibility determination, not its revised position. All parties stipulated that Route 38 meets the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as to scheduled stops during the hours of 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. Monday through Friday. If the bus stop listed by Beacon Place does not also meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as to scheduled stops during the hours of 7 a.m. to 9 a.m., Beacon Place would not be entitled to any Transit Service Proximity Points and would be ineligible for funding. Beacon Place cannot contest the fact that there is a 35 minute gap between the 7:01 and the 7:36 buses. Beacon Place has attempted to salvage its situation by comparing the language used in the RFA definition of a Public Bus Stop with that used in the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop. The RFA defines Public Bus Stop in relevant part as [a] fixed location at which passengers may access one or two routes of public transportation via buses. The Public Bus Stop must service at least one bus route with scheduled stops at least hourly during the times of 7am to 9am and also during the times of 4pm and 6pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, on a year round basis…. Florida Housing has interpreted the “hourly” requirement of the Public Bus Stop definition to mean that a bus must stop at least once between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., and at least once between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. Beacon Place suggests that Florida Housing should interpret the “every 20 minutes” requirement for a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop similarly, so that a bus must stop at least once between 7:00 a.m. and 7:20 a.m., once between 7:20 a.m. and 7:40 a.m., and once between 7:40 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. Florida Housing has rejected this interpretation, however, noting that the language in the two definitions is explicitly different. Ms. Button testified that if Florida Housing had intended these two distinct definitions to be interpreted similarly, it could easily have worded them differently. It could have required a Public Bus Stop to have stops “at least every 60 minutes,” rather than “hourly.” It could have required a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop to have “three stops per hour” rather than “every 20 minutes.” Ms. Button observed that the purpose of the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop definition is to award points for serving the potential residents with frequent and regular stops. The idea was to be sure residents had access to the bus during the hours when most people are going to and from work. Florida Housing’s interpretation of “every 20 minutes” is consonant with the plain language of the phrase and reasonably serves the purpose of the definition. Florida Housing also rejected the idea that the failure of the identified stop to meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop in the RFA should be waived as a minor irregularity. Ms. Button testified that allowing one applicant to get points for a stop that did not meet the definition would give it a competitive advantage over other applicants, including some potential applicants who did not apply because they could not satisfy the terms of the definition. Because the bus stop listed by Beacon Place does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop, Beacon Place is not entitled to any Transit Service Proximity Points and is thus ineligible for funding. Brisas and Northside have demonstrated that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility for Beacon Place was contrary to the specifications of the RFA. Florida Housing’s original recommendation would have been contrary to the terms of the RFA. THE EAST POINTE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the East Pointe Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, East Pointe was preliminarily selected for funding. Bella Vista challenged Florida Housing’s action alleging that the Medical Facility selected by East Pointe did not meet the definition found in the RFA. East Pointe proposed a Development in Lee County, a Medium County according to the terms of the RFA. Applicants from Medium Counties are not required to attain a minimum number of Transit Service Points to be considered eligible for funding. However, such applicants must achieve at least 7 total Proximity Points to be eligible for funding and at least 9 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. The East Pointe Application identified three Public Bus Stops and was awarded 5.5 Proximity Points based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart in Exhibit C to the RFA. However, East Pointe has stipulated that Public Bus Stop 1 listed in its application does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Stop because it does not have the required scheduled stops. Based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart, East Pointe should receive a total of 3.0 Proximity Points for Transit Services for Public Bus Stops 2 and 3. East Pointe listed a Grocery Store, a Medical Facility, and a Public School in its Community Services Chart. Based on the Community Services Scoring Charts in Exhibit C to the RFA, East Pointe received 1 Proximity Point for its Grocery Store, 4 Proximity Points for its Medical Facility, and 3 Proximity Points for its Public School, for a total of 8 Proximity Points for Community Services. East Pointe listed Lee Memorial Health System at 3511 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, Ft. Myers, Florida, as its Medical Facility. The RFA defines “Medical Facility” as follows: A medically licensed facility that (i) employs or has under contractual obligation at least one physician licensed under Chapter 458 or 459, F.S. available to treat patients by walk-in or by appointment; and (ii) provides general medical treatment to any physically sick or injured person. Facilities that specialize in treating specific classes of medical conditions or specific classes of patients, including emergency rooms affiliated with specialty or Class II hospitals and clinics affiliated with specialty or Class II hospitals, will not be accepted. Additionally, it must have been in existence and available for use by the general public as of the Application Deadline. If East Pointe’s selected Medical Facility does not meet the definition of “Medical Facility” in the RFA, East Pointe will lose 4 Proximity Points, reducing its total Proximity Points to 7. The East Pointe Application would still be eligible but would not receive the Proximity Funding Preference and, therefore, would fall out of the funding range of the RFA. Bella Vista alleged that East Pointe should not have received Proximity Points for a Medical Facility because the Lee Community Healthcare location specified in its application “only serves adults and therefore only treats a specific group of patients.” Lee Community HealthCare operates nine locations in Lee County, including the “Dunbar” location that East Pointe named in its application. Lee Community Healthcare’s own promotional materials label the Dunbar location as “adults only.” Robert Johns, Executive Director for Lee Community Healthcare, testified by deposition. Mr. Johns testified that as of the RFA application date of September 24, 2019, the Dunbar office provided services primarily to adults 19 years of age or over, by walk-in or by appointment. A parent who walked into the Dunbar office with a sick or injured child could obtain treatment for that child. A parent seeking medical services for his or her child by appointment would be referred to a Lee Community HealthCare office that provided pediatric services. Mr. Johns testified that the Dunbar office would provide general medical treatment to any physically sick or injured person who presented at the facility, including children. Children would not be seen by appointment at the Dunbar facility, but they would be treated on a walk-in basis. The RFA requires a Medical Facility to treat patients “by walk-in or by appointment.” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing reads this requirement in the disjunctive. A Medical Facility is not required to see any and all patients by walk-in and to see any and all patients by appointment. Florida Housing finds it sufficient for the Medical Facility to see some or all patients by walk-in or by appointment. Ms. Button opined that the Dunbar office met the definition of a Medical Facility because it treated adults by walk-in or appointment and treated children on a walk-in basis. Florida Housing’s reading is consistent with the literal language of the RFA definition. While it would obviously be preferable for the Dunbar facility to see pediatric patients by appointment, the fact that it sees them on a walk-in basis satisfies the letter of the RFA provision. Bella Vista has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE BEMBRIDGE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Bembridge Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Bembridge was preliminarily selected for funding. Bembridge proposed a development in Collier County, a Medium County in RFA terms. As an applicant from a Medium County, Bembridge was required to achieve at least 7 total Proximity Points to be eligible for funding and at least 9 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. Medium County applicants are allowed, but not required, to claim both Transit Service points and Community Service points. As to Community Services, the RFA provides that an applicant may receive a “maximum 4 Points for each service, up to 3 services.” The RFA goes on to state: Applicants may provide the location information and distances for three of the following four Community Services on which to base the Application’s Community Services Score.[5] The Community Service Scoring Charts, which reflect the methodology for calculating the points awarded based on the distances, are outlined in Exhibit C. In its Application, Bembridge listed four, not three, Community Services. Bembridge was one of six Applicants that mistakenly submitted four Community Services instead of three. The Review Committee scorer reviewing Community Services in the applications stated on her scoring sheet: “After removing points for the service with the least amount of points, all still met the eligibility requirement.” 5 The four listed Community Services were Grocery Store, Public School, Medical Facility, and Pharmacy. Florida Housing interpreted the RFA as not specifically prohibiting an applicant from listing four Community Services, but as providing that the applicant could receive points for no more than three of them. As to the six applicants who submitted four Community Services, Florida Housing awarded points only for the three Community Services that were nearest the proposed development.6 Bembridge received 3 Proximity points for its Grocery Store, 3.5 Proximity Points for its Pharmacy, and 4 Proximity Points for its Public School, for a total of 10.5 Proximity Points for Community Services. Thus, as originally scored, Bembridge met the Proximity Funding Preference. Florida Housing did not score the Medical Facility listed by Bembridge, which was the farthest Community Service from the proposed development. Ms. Button testified that this fourth Community Service was treated as surplus information, and because it did not conflict with any other information in the application or cause uncertainty about any other information, it was simply not considered. Ms. Button likened this situation to prior RFAs in which applicants included pharmacies as Community Services even though they were not eligible in proposed family developments. Florida Housing disregarded the information as to pharmacies as surplus information. It did not consider disqualifying the applicants for providing extraneous information. Ms. Button also made it clear that if one of the three Community Services nearest the proposed development was found ineligible for some reason, the fourth Community Service submitted by the applicant would not be considered. The fourth Community Service was in all instances to be disregarded as surplusage in evaluating the application. 6 When queried as to whether the fourth Community Service was removed because it was worth the fewest points, as the reviewer’s notes stated, or because it was farthest away from the proposed development, Ms. Button replied that the distinction made no difference because the service that is farthest away is invariably the one that receives the fewest points. Florida Housing did not consider disqualifying Bembridge and the other five Applicants that mistakenly listed an extra Community Service in their applications. Ms. Button stated, “They provided in all of them, Bembridge and the others that were listed in this, they did provide three Community Services. And so I don’t think it is reasonable to throw out those applications for providing a fourth that we would just not consider nor give benefit to for those point values.” Bella Vista contends that Florida Housing should have rejected the Bembridge application rather than award points for the three nearest Community Services. Ms. Button testified that this was not a reasonable approach if only because there was nothing in the RFA stating that an application would be rejected if it identified more Community Services than were required. Ms. Button also noted that this was one of the first RFAs to allow applicants to select among four Community Services. She believed the novelty of this three-out-of-four selection process led to six applications incorrectly listing four Community Services. She implied that the Community Services language would have to be tweaked in future RFAs to prevent a recurrence of this situation, but she did not believe it fair to disqualify these six applicants for their harmless error. The Review Committee scorer did not perform a minor irregularity analysis relating to the fourth Community Service provided by Bembridge and the other applicants. Ms. Button opined that the addition of an extra Community Service amounts to no more than a minor irregularity because it provided no competitive advantage to the applicant and created no uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the RFA have been met. The RFA allows up to six proximity points for Transit Services. It specifically provides: Up to three Public Bus Stops may be selected with a maximum of 2 points awarded for each one. Each Public Bus Stop must meet the definition of Public Bus Stop as defined in Exhibit B, using at least one unique bus route. Up to two of the selected Public Bus Stops may be Sister Stops that serves the same route, as defined in Exhibit B. The RFA defines “Sister Stop” as: two bus stops that (i) individually, each meet the definition of Public Bus Stop, (ii) are separated by a street or intersection from each other, (iii) are within 0.2 miles of each other, (iv) serve at least one of the same bus routes, and (v) the buses travel in different directions. The Bembridge Application listed two Public Bus Stops, the definition of which is set forth at Finding of Fact 107 above. Based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart, Bembridge received a total of 1.0 Proximity Point for Transit Services for its two Public Bus Stops. Numerous questions were asked at the hearing about whether Bembridge’s identified bus stops were “Sister Stops” as defined in the RFA, and the evidence on that point was not definitive. However, whether they are Sister Stops is irrelevant because each stop identified by Bembridge independently met the definition of “Public Bus Stop” in the RFA and was therefore eligible for Transit Proximity Points. Bella Vista has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order as to RFA 2019-102 finding that: The Berkeley Application is ineligible for funding; The Sierra Bay Application is ineligible for funding; The Solaris Application is ineligible for funding; The Metro Grande Application is eligible for funding; The Beacon Place Application is ineligible for funding; The East Pointe Application is eligible for funding and entitled to the Proximity Funding Preference; and The Bembridge Application is eligible for funding. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Craig D. Varn, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. Suite 820 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Amy Wells Brennan, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. Suite 300 109 North Brush Street Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Anthony L. Bajoczky, Jr., Esquire Ausley & McMullen, P.A. Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 3-231 1400 Village Square Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen, P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP Suite 750 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether certain proposed rules of Respondent, which require applicants in Respondent's Universal Application funding cycle to designate their own applications as either "Priority I" or "Priority II" applications that may be submitted by any "Pool of Related Applicants" and which give preference to Priority I applications over Priority II applications in selection for funding, constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.1
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a Florida limited liability partnership engaged in the development of affordable housing2 in this state. Petitioner regularly submits applications for public financing of affordable housing developments; and in 2008, submitted 46 such applications to Respondent. Petitioner possesses the requisite skill, experience and credit-worthiness to successfully produce affordable housing. Petitioner and its predecessor entities have successfully completed the construction of over 90 affordable housing developments and in excess of 22,000 affordable housing units in Florida from funds distributed by Florida Housing. Respondent is a public corporation created by Section 420.504, Florida Statutes (1980), to administer the governmental function of financing or refinancing affordable housing and related facilities in Florida. Its statutory authority and mandates appear in Part V of Chapter 420, Florida Statutes (2008), at Sections 420.501 through 420.55, Florida Statutes (2008). Respondent has a board of nine individuals who govern its operations. Intervenors, Eastwind Development, LLC; Housing Trust Group, LLC; The Gatehouse Group, LLC; American Realty Development, LLC; and Landmark Development Corporation are each Florida limited liability corporations engaged in the business of providing affordable housing. Eastwind and Housing Trust Group are relatively small developers as compared to Petitioner; e.g., Housing Trust Group has approximately ten employees and has developed about 12 projects in Florida and one in Georgia. Gatehouse, American Realty and Landmark are also smaller developers than Petitioner. By way of example, those entities submitted nine, six and seven applications, respectively, in the 2008 application cycle. The Proposed Rule Florida Housing has proposed several new or revised definitions, instructions, exhibit forms, and application sections to its existing rules concerning application by developers for state funding to construct affordable housing. The proposed rules create a priority ranking system for use by Florida Housing when reviewing competing applications for funding. The rule language itself does not, per se, create the new priority ranking system. Rather, the amended rules incorporate by reference the "2009 Universal Application Instructions: Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds (MMRB) Program-HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME) Rental Program- Housing Credit Program." It is in the Instructions that language appears regarding the priority system. A sampling of the new priority language can be found in the Application Instructions, March 19, 2009, Draft, page 5, which states in part: During the ranking process, as outlined in the Ranking and Selection Criteria section of the Application Instructions, preference will be given to Priority I Applications. And at Page 93, the proposed Instructions also state: [U]nless otherwise provided, when applying the SAUL Cycles for the Special Set-Asides and each Geographic Set-Aside, Priority I Applications will be considered for funding first and if funds remain after funding all eligible Priority I Applications in each set-aside that can be funded, the Priority II Applications in that set-aside will be considered for funding. The priority system itself will be more fully discussed herein. Historical Application Context Prior to the implementation of what is now called the Universal Cycle (discussed more fully below), Florida Housing implemented various approaches and processes to equitably allocate funds to developers of affordable housing. The allocation process has historically evolved over the years based on changing needs in the State, input from developers, and other relevant factors. Prior to 2002, the process used by Florida Housing was called the "Combined Cycle." The significance of the Combined Cycle was that it attempted to allocate funds by using a single competitive application process for all applicants at one time. In other words, all applications for potential funding under various programs were "combined" into one application and allocation process. Under that process, applications were prepared by applicants requesting funds from the various programs and competing for those funds, much like a competitive bidding process. Unlike the application forms now being used, the prior applications required detailed and voluminous information concerning each proposed project. The Combined Cycle applications had to be complete and accurate when submitted with no chance to edit, correct, or provide additional explanation. With this limitation in mind, applicants spent a good deal of time making certain the initial application was complete and correct. An unintended result of the rigid Combined Cycle process was that good quality applications were sometimes eliminated from funding consideration due to something as minor as a spelling or typographical error. Applicants during this time period became very adept at filling out the application forms.3 The applications were generally of high quality and applicants generally demonstrated their ability to move forward with development. The Combined Cycle process was ultimately supplanted by the Universal Cycle in 2002, and that process is currently in place. The Universal Cycle will be described more fully below. Available Funding It is the duty and responsibility of Florida Housing to interact with entities interested in developing affordable housing in this state. Florida Housing allocates resources to fund affordable housing, most of which comes from three programs referred to as: "HOME," the federally funded multi-family mortgage revenue bond program; "SAIL," the State Apartment Incentive Loan; and the federal low income housing tax credit program (referred to herein as the "tax credit"). The government, in its effort to protect financially marginalized citizens from excessive housing costs, provides the aforementioned funds to developers to build affordable housing. A discussion of the various funding sources is in order to better understand the process. Tax Credits: Low income housing tax credits come in two varieties: competitively awarded "9%" tax credits, and non- competitively awarded "4%" tax credits. The "9%" and "4%" designations relate to the approximate percentage of a development's eligible cost basis that is awarded in annual tax credits. For the nine percent tax credits, each state receives an allocation of tax credits every year from the federal government using a population-based formula. Tax credits are a dollar for dollar offset on federal income tax liability. When Florida Housing awards tax credits to an applicant, the applicant gets the credit amount every year for ten years. The developer may sell its future stream of tax credits to a syndicator, who, in turn, sells them to investors (which are often Fortune 500 companies that have profits that the investor seeks to shelter from federal income taxes). As an example, if an award of $1 million in tax credits every year for ten years is sold for 85 cents on the dollar, it generates $8.5 million in equity to the developer to help finance construction of its proposed project. Unlike the proceeds from issuance of bonds where there is debt that has to be paid back over time, the $8.5 million the developer gets from that award is cash equity, so there is no debt associated with it. Tax credits are a very rich subsidy and, consequentially, are the most sought after funding source that Florida Housing distributes. The four percent tax credits are "non-competitive" tax credits that get paired with tax exempt mortgage revenue bonds. As long as more than half of the total development cost of an affordable rental development is financed through the issuance of tax exempt bonds, the developer is eligible for an award of four percent tax credits. As with the nine percent credits, four percent credits are awarded every year for ten years, and the developers then syndicate these credits. The tax credit program was created in 1986 by the federal government and every year since then, Florida Housing has received an allocation of tax credits. HOME Funds: Florida Housing also receives a portion of the state's tax exempt bond allocation, some of which it issues to finance the construction of affordable multi-family rental housing. The tax exempt bond proceeds are loaned to developers to finance the construction of a development. The cash flow generated from rental income pays back those bonds over time. SAIL Funds: Funds are also available through a portion of documentary stamp tax revenues collected on real estate transactions in Florida. For state fiscal year 2009- 2010, the Legislature did not appropriate any money for SAIL due to the state's current budget crisis. As a result, the challenged rule provisions in the instant case will not apply to the SAIL program in the 2009 application cycle. All of these resources are allocated to finance the construction or substantial rehabilitation of affordable housing. A portion of the units are then set aside for residents earning a certain percentage of area median income ("AMI"); generally, the units are targeted to tenants earning 60 percent of AMI or below. The Universal Cycle The process used by Florida Housing to review and approve the Universal Cycle applications operates generally as follows: Applicants submit applications by a specified date. Respondent reviews all applications to determine if certain threshold requirements are met. A score is assigned to each application. A list of all applications, along with their score, is published by Respondent on its website. The applicants are then given a specific period of time to alert Respondent of any errors they believe Respondent made in its initial review of the application. Applicants also have an opportunity to cure any errors within their applications (although there are certain mandatory items which cannot be cured). After the cure period, Respondent issues a "final" score for each application. Applicants are then given an opportunity to contest their final score by way of an informal or formal administrative hearing. After the appeal period, Respondent issues the final rankings which determine which of the applicants will be selected to receive funding from one of the programs. The selected applicants are then invited to the credit underwriting process wherein third party financial consultants (selected by Respondent, but paid for by the individual applicants) determine whether the project proposed in the application is financially sound. The scoring of applications first addresses whether certain threshold requirements, such as the applicant's experience, appropriate zoning, sufficient infrastructure in the area, and minimum set-asides (more later on this issue), are being met and whether there is a basic plan for financing the project. Florida Housing then looks at such features as programs for tenants, amenities of the development as a whole and of the individual units, local government contributions to the project, and local government ordinances and planning efforts that support affordable housing in general. The initial scoring of applications very frequently results in perfect scores (66) for many applicants. Because there are so many applications with perfect scores, Florida Housing has built a tiebreaker system into its review process. Tiebreakers include such things as leveraging, i.e., the amount of corporate (applicant) resources available per set-aside unit. Proximity is another tiebreaker which takes into account how close the proposed project is to such things as public transportation, schools, grocery stores and medical facilities. Proximity points are also awarded for being geographically separated from other similar developments that have been financed within the past three years. The number of units allocated for the most extremely low income individuals has also been used as a tiebreaker. For the upcoming (2009) Universal Cycle, a tiebreaker has been established which addresses the timeliness of submission of evidence of the developer's ability to proceed. Lastly, Respondent assigns a randomly selected "lottery number" to each application. The applications are all identified and inserted into a computer software program which randomly assigns a number from one through a high number commensurate with the number of applications at issue. The lottery number is a final tiebreaker of sorts and applications are finally ranked--all other things being equal--in lottery number order. Final rankings are used to determine which applications are preliminarily selected for funding. Some applications are selected to meet certain targeting goals that address housing needs of particular demographic groups (such as farm workers, commercial fishery workers, the homeless, or the elderly). There are also goals addressing specific geographic needs (such as the Florida Keys or inner city areas). These are referred to as "special set aside" or targeting goals. After the set-aside goals are addressed, Respondent then uses the final rankings to achieve a distribution of affordable housing units among counties with small, medium or large populations. Within the county size groups, Respondent uses a formula called SAUL (an acronym for Set-Aside Unit Limitation) to evenly distribute the units.4 This formula helps prevent any one large county, for example, from getting all the large county units, even if all the applications for that county receive perfect scores and prevail on all tiebreakers. The SAUL process is described with examples in the Universal Application Instructions at pages 94 through 100. The process is further described as follows: When an Application is selected for tentative funding, the total number of set- aside units committed to in that Application will be credited toward meeting the SAUL for the county in which the proposed Development is located. The total number of set-aside units for each Application will be computed by multiplying the total number of units within the proposed Development by the highest Total Set-Aside Percentage the Applicant committed to as stated in the last row of the set-aside breakdown chart for the program(s) applied for in the Set-Aside Commitment section of the Application. Results that are not a whole number will be rounded up to the next whole number. Id. at 95. The tentatively approved applications would, therefore, be used to address the SAUL for their targeted county. As an example, if there were 20 applications from large counties, the top seven were all from Broward County and Florida Housing had established a SAUL for Broward County of 200 units, then as Florida Housing was going through the ranking, it would fund up to 200 units in Broward County and only then select the next highest ranked application from a different county. Sometimes Florida Housing finds that it receives a lot of applications from just a few counties in the medium county grouping. If the only medium county applications Florida Housing receives are from Hernando and Pasco counties, for example, then those are the only medium counties it can fund. If Florida Housing receives applications from a wide array of counties, then the SAUL mechanism tries to get funding to as many counties as it can before the funding runs out. The purpose of the complex application review process in the Universal Cycle is to equitably and reasonably distribute affordable housing throughout the state. The Rule Amendment Process Respondent often finds it necessary to tweak its Universal Cycle review rules to address needed changes, to prevent perceived abuses of the process, or to make the distribution of funds more equitable. Amendments to the rules are generally made on an annual basis. Proposed amendments to the Universal Cycle application review rules are the basis for the instant rule challenge. Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-21.003 and 67-48.004 adopt, by reference, Respondent's Universal Cycle Application Instructions, application form, and exhibits forms. Those items contain changes to the Universal Cycle review process. A description of the process for making those proposed changes, which are euphemistically referred to as Priority I-Priority II or "PI-PII" by the parties, will follow. The amendment process for the instant rule changes commenced in the early fall of 2008.5 The first public meeting on the changes was held August 8, 2008; it was followed by four rule-development workshops: September 25, 2008, in Tallahassee; October 30, 2008, in Orlando; December 11, 2008, in Bonita Springs; and February 17, 2009, in Tallahassee. The public meeting and workshops resulted in a number of comments, both written and oral, from developers. The written comments, including emails, letters, and other documents, were posted on Respondent's website for review by all interested persons. One of the primary concerns raised by some developers during the rule development period had to do with the increase in the number of applications being filed in recent years. The perception by many who submitted comments was that the increased number of applications was due to some larger developers "gaming" the system. That is, some developers believed that larger developers were filing numerous applications simply for the purpose of acquiring more favorable lottery numbers in the tiebreaker phase of review. Indeed, in the 2008 Universal Cycle, roughly 85 percent of the tax credits allocated by Florida Housing were determined by the lottery number assigned to the application, so the importance of the lottery number is apparent. There were also some comments offered during the rulemaking process as to another effect of the large number of applications by some developers, the "barricade" application concept. These concerns addressed a belief by some developers that applications were being filed which were not financially feasible. The perception was that the applicant filing a barricade application did not intend to actually build the project; rather, the applications were filed to use up the SAUL for a specific county so that funds would then go to other counties and other projects. The evidence presented on this concept was not persuasive, although the witnesses seemed very sincere about their concerns. The concern about possibly insincere applications was somewhat borne out by the fact that in 2007, only about 24 of 187 applications submitted passed the threshold review. During the period given to developers to cure their deficient applications (those that did not pass threshold review), about one third of the applications were not cured. That is, they were simply withdrawn from the review process. There has been a marked increase in the number of applications filed during recent years. In 2006, there were 104 applications filed; in 2007, there were 187; and in 2008, there were 282 applications filed. Over the period of those three years, there had also been an increase in the funds available for distribution by Florida Housing, a fact which may explain why there were more applications being filed. Conversely, Florida Housing had begun approving larger funding amounts per project, thus somewhat negating the impact of the increase in available funds. So while there was indeed more money to distribute, the money was not going to more projects; each individual project was just getting more money than before. Rationale for the Rule Amendments Based upon the increased number of applications submitted during the Universal Cycle in recent years (and in response to the concerns stated by many developers), Florida Housing determined it best to limit the number of applications from any one developer (including any single purpose entities created by a developer). The method employed by Respondent to effectuate this goal was to initiate a priority system. The priority system proposed by Respondent allowed each related- party applicant to designate up to three of its applications as Priority I; the remainder of that applicant's applications would be deemed Priority II. An applicant could designate three additional applications as Priority I, if those applications were submitted as a joint venture with a qualified not-for- profit organization. The purpose of this caveat to the rule was to encourage the involvement of not-for-profit applicants. The purpose of the rule was also to generate as many "quality" applications by as many different applicants as possible. Florida Housing believes that if each developer is forced to internally prioritize its applications, only the best applications will be filed. Some developers, Petitioner included, indicate that all of their applications will be exceptional and prioritization would not change that fact. There was no competent evidence presented to suggest that applications filed in the 2008 Universal Cycle were of an inferior nature.6 In the 2008 Universal Cycle, a small number of developers (including Petitioner), who submitted the largest number of applications received the largest percentage of allocated funds. In fact, over 40 percent of the tax credit allocation went to two large developers. Likewise, 40 percent of the SAIL funds went to a single developer. This resulted in a concentration of Florida Housing's development portfolio in a smaller group of developers. Florida Housing views that concentration as a "disastrous" situation in the current financial market. Set-asides are an important component of the application review and approval process. Every three years a study is performed on each county within the state to determine how many renter households within the county are earning 60 percent or less of the AMI and paying more than 40 percent of their annual income for rent. These are referred to as "cost- burden" households. The cost-burden households are broken down into the following groups: families, the elderly, farmworkers and commercial fishermen. The study also assesses needs for persons who are homeless. Funds are also allocated by way of geographic targeting.7 Counties are divided into three groups: small, medium, and large (based on population). Each of the three groups must receive at least ten percent of the funds, but the need is determined and then adjusted up to ten percent if it is actually less than that. Once the percentages are established, funds are allocated in accordance with the stated percentages. The example given by Florida Housing was that if large counties were deemed to have 66 percent of the need, medium counties 30 percent, and small counties four percent, then the small county percentage would be moved up to ten percent (the smallest allowed amount) and the large county would be reduced to 60 percent. There are also some set-asides for the preservation of existing affordable housing complexes. And there is a small set-aside for rural development as well. Each set-aside group essentially has its own separate funding from its share of the funds distributed by Florida Housing. An area of state critical concern, the Florida Keys, is given the highest priority during review. Then the various groups (families, the elderly, farmworkers, commercial fishermen and homeless) are considered. Then, after each of these, the geographic set-asides are considered. For 2009, there are no SAIL funds available, so the families-elderly-farmworker/fisherman-homeless categories are not a concern. Instead, the area of critical concern, the preservation projects and geographic targeting are addressed as relevant set-asides. Under the PI-PII system, PI applications are given consideration in advance of PII applications. That is, all PI applications are funded before a PII application is considered. The only significant exception to that rule is that certain preservation set-asides may be funded from PII, even if PI applications are not filed. There may be other situations that could result in a PII being funded prior to a PI, but no such scenario was elucidated at final hearing. Anecdotal evidence suggests that not-for-profit developers have shied away from the Universal Cycle due to a perception that the increase in applications has turned the system into an "odds game" in which it is not feasible for them to participate. The ability of established for-profit developers to increase their number of Priority I applications by partnering with not-for-profits is a goal of the rule to address this problem. Florida Housing believes the increased involvement by not-for-profits will be beneficial to the affordable housing program. The priority system will also likely have an impact on several key factors relating to the equitable distribution of affordable housing around the state. By having to concentrate its efforts on three (or six) key applications, a developer is more likely to make those designated applications complete and thorough at the outset of the process. This will allow for faster commencement of projects by some applicants as more due diligence is performed prior to the completion of the review process. Applicants will also be more likely to file their PI applications in the strongest markets, i.e., where the projects are most needed. This will help Florida Housing more quickly and efficiently approve additional units in its most critical areas of concern.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact At times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, a female born in October 1953, received housing assistance from a federally funded assistance program referred to as the Section 8 Choice Voucher program (the Section 8 program). The Section 8 program relevant to this proceeding is administered by Respondent and has eligibility criteria that a participant must meet. A participant receives a voucher from the Section 8 program that pays part, but not all, of the participant’s rent. Petitioner has also received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at all times relevant to this proceeding. Respondent knew that Petitioner received SSI, but it had no information as to why she qualified to receive SSI. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner’s landlord was named Rupert Phipps. On May 27, 2007, Mr. Phipps issued to Petitioner a notice styled “Three-day Notice for Non- payment of Rent pursuant to Florida Statutes" (Notice). After stating the amount owed and the address of the rented premises, the Notice demanded “. . . payment of the rent or possession of the Premises within three days (excluding Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays). ” Petitioner was evicted from her apartment. The date of the eviction was not established. After being advised by Mr. Phipps that Petitioner had failed to pay her rent, Ms. Smith mailed to Petitioner a certified letter dated July 6, 2007, stating that she would be terminated from the Section 8 program effective August 6, 2007. The stated reason for the termination was Petitioner’s failure to pay rent to the landlord, which is considered a serious violation of the lease and, therefore, a violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982,511(4)(c), which prohibits a participant in the Section 8 program from committing any serious or repeated violation of the lease with the participant’s landlord. Ms. Smith’s letter also contained the following statement: . . . If you wish to appeal this decision, you have the right to an informal hearing. The request must be submitted to this agency in writing within 10 days from the date of this letter. Your request should be directed to Alex Morales, Executive Director. The ten-day period for the appeal is part of Respondent’s written policies and is consistent with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.554(a), that require an agency such as Respondent to have a written appeals process. Respondent has consistently treated the failure of a participant to pay his or her share of the rent as a serious violation of a lease. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent’s appeal process because she had successfully appealed a prior notice of termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Ms. Smith’s letter was received by Petitioner on July 7, 2007. At some undetermined time between July 7 and July 19, 2007, Ms. Tennie called Ms. Smith and told Ms. Smith that she was sick. Ms. Smith told Ms. Tennie that she would have to follow the instructions set forth in the letter and respond in writing if she wanted an informal appeal. On July 19, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to the attention of Ms. Smith and Mr. Morales: Would you give me Mae Tennie another hearing because I got the letter to [sic] late and I was in the hospital due to an anurism [sic] stroke at the brain their [sic] was blood on my head and I’m still rehabilitating the after affects [sic] of this serious condition. In the case of my Section 8 voucher being terminated I plead for another hearing due to the terms [sic] of my hospitalization. Respondent received Petitioner’s letter on July 23, 2007. Petitioner’s written request for an appeal was after the ten-day deadline for filing the request. By letter signed by Mr. Morales and dated July 25, 2007, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request contained in her letter dated July 19 as follows: I am in receipt of your letter requesting a hearing. Please be advised that your request for a hearing cannot be granted because your request was not made within the required 10 day period. For this reason, your case will remain closed. No further action was taken by either party to this proceeding until December 2007, when Petitioner sought the services of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. On December 20, 2007, Mr. Lewis, as counsel for Petitioner, sent the following letter to Mr. Morales: This office represents Ms. Mae Tennie regarding her participation in the Section 8 program administered through the Hialeah Housing Authority (“HHA”). Ms. Tennie has been a participant of Section 8 through HHA for the past 25 years. On July 6, 2007, HHA served Ms. Tennie with notice of its intent to terminate her Section 8 assistance on the basis that she violated one of her obligations under the program. The notice informed Ms. Tennie of her right to appeal the decision and to attend an informal hearing. The written request was to be submitted to HHA within 10 days of the date of the letter. Ms. Tennie faxed her written request for an appeal on July 19, 2007. A copy of Ms. Tennie’s letter is attached as “Attachment A.” In her request, she notified HHA that she was unable to submit her request within the time required because she [had] been, and still was, recovering from a brain aneurism.[2] On or about July 31, 2007, HHA notified Ms. Tennie that her request was denied because it was submitted too late. Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie with an informal hearing to appeal the termination. Ms. Tennie is an elderly woman in failing health. In June 2007, Ms. Tennie was hospitalized twice at Jackson South Community Hospital as a result of suffering an “intracranial hemorrhage.”[3] I have attached copies of supporting medical documentation as “Attachment B.” As a result of this very serious medical condition, Ms. Tennie’s cognitive abilities were significantly diminished. Ms. Tennie was bed-bound and only able to communicate under great strain. The Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits [sic] any agency or landlord receiving federal funds to deny equal access for individuals with disabilities to housing or other program benefits and services. To ensure individuals with disabilities have equal access to those services and benefits, an agency or landlord is required to provide reasonable accommodations to that person’s disability. One form of reasonable accommodations is the modification of a program rule or policy. The right to a hearing to appeal the termination of Section 8 assistance is a benefit that Ms. Tennie, as a participant, was entitled to. Ms. Tennie made clear in her letter to HHA that she was unable to comply with HHA’s time requirement because of her disabling medical condition. Ms. Tennie also asked that the policy be modified to accommodate her disability. HHA should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Tennie’s disability by simply modifying the time period by adding 3 extra days for her to submit her request for a hearing. By failing to do so, HHA effectively denied Ms. Tennie equal access to federal benefit under the Section 8 program, that of having a hearing to appeal her termination. Ms. Tennie is therefore renewing her request to HHA for reasonable accommodations to her disability by modifying the time limit to request a hearing. For the above reasons, Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie a hearing to challenge her termination from Section 8. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or additional information at ... . [telephone number omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] By letter dated December 26, 2007, Respondent denied the request set forth in Mr. Lewis’s letter. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the complaint with HUD that culminated in this proceeding as described in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Ms. Tennie was hospitalized June 7, 2007, and discharged June 14, 2007. Mr. Lewis attached to his letter a discharge summary from Jackson Memorial Hospital, which contained the following diagnoses on discharge: Intracranial hemorrhage with intraventricular extension secondary to uncontrolled hypertension. Diabetes. The discharge summary reflects that Petitioner had fallen the Saturday before admission and had hit her head on a doorknob. The discharge summary reflects that on discharge she was awake, alert, and oriented times three. She had fluent speech and she was able to ambulate without difficulty. She was instructed to make an appointment with her primary care doctor in one week and to follow up in the Jackson Memorial’s Stroke Clinic in 4 to 8 weeks. Petitioner was discharged to home in a stable condition. Petitioner scheduled an appointment with Milton R. Bengoa, M.D., and on June 18, 2007, she kept that appointment. No finding is made as to Petitioner’s physical status as determined by Dr. Bengoa because nearly all of his notes of that meeting are illegible. In response to questions from her attorney, Petitioner testified as follows beginning at page 27, line 12: Q. And Ms. Tennie, can you please describe what your current health conditions are? A. Right now it’s not very good, because after I had the aneurism I have been having problems walking and problems breathing and I have seizures that I never had before until I had the aneurism and I take all kinds of medicines. And I just found out last week I have a brain mass and they don’t know if it is cancer or what, because the blood that was left in my head was still there so I have excruciating headaches. Q. And could you please explain what your health condition was at or about the time you suffered the stroke or shortly after you had suffered the stroke? A. Well, shortly after I suffered the stroke I had to try and walk all over again, because my memory where I had the stroke at, the neurologist said that it was so deep in my brain that they couldn’t do surgery and that it was going to mess my motor skills up. So I had to learn how to swallow. I forgot how to swallow meat and stuff, so I started eating soft food. I had problems breathing, so when I come [sic] home I had a breathing machine – oxygen machine there. My daughter had to help me try to walk all over again. Q. And so I take it you had someone helping you? A. Yes. My daughter. I moved home with my daughter, because they wanted to put me out at Purdue, it is a nursing facility, but she wanted me to come home with her, so that is what I did. I went home with my daughter and I stayed there for six months. Then I found the place down the street, close to her, which was a two bedroom. Q. Now, prior to suffering the stroke, how was your – can you describe what your health condition was. A. Before I had the stroke, I was sick too. I have congestive heart failure, so I kept going back and forth into the hospital because of my breathing. When the water built up around my heart it had [sic] me to where I can’t breathe. So I have to go in and let them pull the water off. And I was sick before I had the stroke. Petitioner also testified that she could not timely request a hearing and blamed that inability on her general medical condition. Petitioner’s testimony as to her medical condition shortly after the hospitalization is unconvincing because it contradicts the description of her medical condition as described by her treating physician in the discharge notes. The evidence established that Petitioner received Ms. Smith's letter dated July 6, 2007, and understood its contents. Petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to establish that her medical condition caused her failure to timely request an informal hearing to appeal of the termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Petitioner failed to establish that she required an extension of the expired deadline to request an informal hearing as a “reasonable accommodation” of her condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not liable for the acts of discrimination alleged in the subject Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 2009.
