Findings Of Fact At or about 5:30 a.m., July 25, 1977, Trooper Vayda, while on radar patrol on the I-95 just north of the Dade County line, observed a car proceeding south at a speed of 85 m.p.h. and gave chase with his identification lights flashing. When the suspect was overtaken by Trooper Vayda suspect swerved towards Vayda causing the latter to move two wheels off the paved surface to avoid collision. The suspect subsequently left the I-95 at the 135th Street exit and while on the ramp with no other vehicles in view Vayda fired one shot which struck suspect's vehicle on the left side just above the bumper. Suspect ran through the stop light at 135th Street and rejoined the I-95 pursued by Vayda. Suspect again exited the I-95 at 125th Street and after turning east on 125th Street Vayda fired a second shot hitting suspect's right tail light. Suspect lost control of his vehicle and struck another car. Vayda stopped his vehicle, got out and told the suspect to get out of his car. Suspect then restarted his car and started eastward with Vayda in pursuit. In the interim Vayda had, via radio, alerted the Highway Patrol office of the chase and requested assistance. With the assistance of other law enforcement officers the suspect was subsequently apprehended on Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida and found to be driving a stolen car. During the chase Vayda had no information to lead him to believe suspect was other than a speeder. As a result of firing the shots Vayda was suspended from duty for a period of eight hours by the Director of the Florida Highway Patrol. Exhibit 5, the disciplinary record of Vayda, shows that Vayda was suspended for eight hours without pay on September 7, 1977 for speeding on the Florida Turnpike on July 22, 1977. Vayda was aware of the contents of General Orders 17, 20 and 43 of the Florida Highway Patrol.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner L. H. Turner is a Highway Patrol Officer II with the Florida Highway Patrol, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, having been employed since 1977. By memorandum dated August 10, 1982, to Troop Commanders and Florida Highway Patrol Staff, the Acting Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, Roger C. Collar, gave the following instructions: Effective August 20, 1982, all off-duty employment, including self-employment, shall be reported by all uniformed personnel on a weekly basis to coincide with the weekly report of daily activity. The first reporting period will be August 20-26, 1982, and the report shall be submitted each week along with the trooper's weekly report of daily activity. The attached sample reporting form will be used until permanent forms are developed. The sample reporting form attached to the memorandum required personnel to list the starting and ending time of their "off-duty employment" on a daily basis, the number of hours worked and the Florida Highway Patrol vehicle miles. At the bottom of the form is a signature line, above which is written I certify this is an accurate report of all off-duty employment (including self- employment) worked during the reporting period. The form also requires the signature of the "immediate supervisor" after the word "reviewed." The instructions contained in this August 10, 1982 memorandum are intended to apply to all uniform members of the Florida Highway Patrol. Failure to file a weekly report of off-duty employment or the filing of an inaccurate report would subject the employee to discipline for insubordination. Article XIII of the current collective bargaining agreement between the State of Florida and the Florida Police Benevolent Association pertains to employment outside State government. The Agreement requires advance approval for out- side employment, and provides that approval will not be unreasonably withheld as long as such employment does not conflict with the employee's State employment or with the agency's procedures limiting outside employment. With regard to off-duty police employment, Article XIII provides that approval will be granted if it does not constitute a conflict of interest, does not interfere with the employee's primary duties, is within the employee's jurisdiction and scope of employment, and as long as all mileage placed on a State automobile is paid for by the employee at the statutory mileage rate. General Order Number 19, adopted by reference in Rule 15B-11.03, Florida Administrative Code, contains provisions relating to prohibited acts which may constitute a conflict of interest, including, in certain instances, the acceptance of other employment or other business or professional activity. Paragraph 15 of General Order Number 19 requires a written request and authorization before an employee may accept "part-time employment outside of this Department." The request for outside part-time employment must include a statement of the nature of duties, the approximate hours of duty contemplated and the name and address of the firm. Guidelines for part-time employment are listed. Paragraph 15(b) sets forth the procedures for approval of requests to be employed or compensated by more than one State agency or to hold employment during the normal working hours for which the employee is being compensated by the Department. Paragraph 15(c) contains guidelines for "off-duty police details." Among such guidelines is that an employee may only engage in up to twenty (20) hours per week of such off-duty police details, unless the employee is on annual leave for the week in question or receives approval for work in excess of twenty (20) hours 4 per week. There are no limitations on the hours per week which an employee may devote to employment other than "off-duty police details."
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Thomas P. Crapps, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice Of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed May 29, 2013 9:27 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this Ay day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this QQ day of May, 2013. tes Vorecvcte Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Ficense AE NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jdc Copies furnished: A. Edward Quinton, III, Esquire Adams, Quinton and Paretti, P.A. Brickell Bayview Center 80 Southwest 8" Street, Suite 2150 Miami, Florida 33130 equinton@adamsquinton.com John C. deMoulpied, Esquire Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbau, Perlman & Nagelberg LLP 200 West Madison Street Chicago, Illinois 60606 john.demoulpied@pbfkn.com James R. Vogler, Esquire Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbau, Perlman & Nagelberg LLP 200 West Madison Street Chicago, Illinois 60606 Jim.vogler@bfkn.com Thomas P. Crapps Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS LOKEY OLDSMOBILE, INC. d/b/a LOKEY VOLKSWAGEN, Petitioner, Case No.: 13-0007 vs. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., Respondent. / NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE COMES NOW Petitioner, LOKEY OLDSMOBILE, INC. d/b/a LOKEY VOLKSWAGEN, by and through its undersigned counsel and hereby files this Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice regarding its pending Petition Protesting Charge-back of Incentive Payments, pursuant to settlement of this matter. I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on the parties as reflected on the attached Service List, this 13" day of May, 2013. s/ A, Edward Quinton, III (Florida Bar No. 464074) ADAMS, QUINTON & PARETTI, P.A. Attorneys for Petitioner 80 SW 8™ Street, Suite 2150 Miami, Florida 33130 PH: (305) 358-2727 Email: equinton@adamsquinton.com Filed May 13, 2013 3:24 PM Division of Administrative Hearings SERVICE LIST Jennifer Clark Office of the Hearing Officer Florida Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Bldg. - Room A-308 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 jenniferclark@flhsmv.gov James R. Vogler, Esquire John C. deMoulpied, Esquire Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP 200 West Madison Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 jim.vogler@bfkn.com john.demoulpied@bfkn.com STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS LOKEY OLDSMOBILE, INC., d/b/a LOKEY VOLKSWAGEN, Petitioner, vs. Case No. 13-0007 VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., Respondent. ~~~ rere rere re rere rr ORDER CLOSING FILE AND RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION This cause having come before the undersigned on Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, filed May 13, 2013, and the undersigned being fully advised, it is, therefore, ORDERED that: 1. The final hearing scheduled for June 18 through 21, 2013, is canceled. 2. The file of the Division of Administrative Hearings is closed. Jurisdiction is relinquished to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. DONE AND ORDERED this 21st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. va bay THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Mail Stop 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 A. Edward Quinton, III, Esquire Adams, Quinton and Paretti, P.A. Brickell Bayview Center 80 Southwest 8th Street, Suite 2150 Miami, Florida 33130 equinton@adamsquinton.com John C. deMoulpied, Esquire Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum, and Nagelberg LLP 200 West Madison Street Chicago, Illinois 60606 john.demoulpied@bfkn.com James R. Vogler, Esquire Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum, Perlman & Nagelberg, LLP Suite 3900 200 West Madison Street Chicago, Illinois 60606 jim.vogler@bfkn.com
The Issue Whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment as a teacher based on his conviction of the crime of vehicular homicide.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was hired as a teacher by Miami-Dade County Public Schools in February 2000. On August 13, 1999, Respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Monroe County, Florida. The accident resulted in criminal charges filed against Respondent in December 2000 for vehicular homicide (Section 782.071, Fla. Stat. [sic]). On or about May 2002, Respondent pled no contest and was adjudicated guilty of the offense of vehicular homicide by the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, Florida. Respondent was placed on probation for five years, ordered to pay $50.00 court costs per month for his suspension [sic], and ordered to perform 500 hours of community service work. On March 15, 2006, Petitioner took action to suspend and initiate dismissal proceedings against Respondent due to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4C-1.021 defines vehicular homicide (Section 782.071, F.S. [sic]) as a crime involving moral turpitude.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 2007.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Pursuant to section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, Petitioner is charged with the responsibility of investigating complaints and taking disciplinary action against persons holding certificates as law enforcement officers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a law enforcement officer, having been issued certificate number 248318 on April 28, 2005. Upon receiving his certification, Respondent accepted a position as a trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol. Events of April 18, 2008 At approximately 9:30 p.m. on April 18, 2008, Ms. Diana Agudelo was driving alone on Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County. Respondent, who was on solo patrol in his marked Florida Highway Patrol cruiser, initiated a traffic stop of Ms. Agudelo for exceeding the speed limit. Respondent exited his cruiser, approached the driver's window of Ms. Agudelo's vehicle, and began to engage her in conversation. While he did so, Respondent stared——with, in Ms. Agudelo's words, a "perverted" expression on his face——at her breasts and directed the beam of his flashlight at the same part of her anatomy. Eventually, Respondent requested, and received, Ms. Agudelo's driver's license, at which point he returned to his patrol cruiser while Ms. Agudelo waited in her vehicle. A short time later, Respondent walked back to Ms. Agudelo's vehicle and requested that she accompany him to his patrol cruiser. Ms. Agudelo complied with the request and followed Respondent to his vehicle. At that point, Respondent sat down in the driver's seat of his patrol car and asked Ms. Agudelo to get inside the vehicle with him. Ms. Agudelo declined the invitation. While Ms. Agudelo stood near the window of the patrol vehicle, Respondent continued to engage her in conversation. As he did, Respondent continued to stare at (and direct the beam of his flashlight on) Ms. Agudelo's breasts. A short time thereafter, Respondent decided to escort Ms. Agudelo back to her vehicle. While walking behind Ms. Agudelo, Respondent intentionally, and without justification, touched Ms. Agudelo's buttocks without her consent. Understandably intimidated, Ms. Agudelo made no comment in response to the unwanted contact. Once she reached her vehicle, Ms. Agudelo sat down in the driver's seat and closed the door. As Respondent leaned through the driver's window and continued to converse with Ms. Agudelo, he intentionally touched her breasts with his hand. Ms. Agudelo did not consent to the contact. Eventually, Respondent moved away from the window and advised Ms. Agudelo that she was free to leave. Respondent did not issue Ms. Agudelo a speeding ticket or a written warning. Correctly believing that Respondent's behavior constituted sexual harassment, Ms. Agudelo contacted law enforcement shortly after the incident. An investigation ensued, during which Ms. Agudelo identified Respondent from a photographic lineup.1 Events of July 28, 2006 During the evening of July 28, 2006, Erin Weigel, a 21-year-old female, was driving alone in her vehicle on Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County. After she missed her intended turn, Ms. Weigel decided to exit the interstate and ask for directions. While stopped at a red light near the interstate, Ms. Weigel noticed a marked Florida Highway Patrol vehicle——occupied solely by Respondent——at rest in an adjacent lane. After Ms. Weigel gained Respondent's attention, she advised him that she was lost and in need of assistance. Respondent instructed Ms. Weigel to follow his vehicle, at which point he led her to a poorly lit, deserted parking lot. Inconveniently, Respondent parked in such a manner that Ms. Weigel would have been unable to re-enter the roadway unless Respondent moved his patrol vehicle. Respondent exited his patrol car, approached the driver's side window of Ms. Weigel's vehicle, and began to engage her in conversation. Almost immediately, Respondent made an unsolicited inquiry regarding Ms. Weigel's relationship status. Specifically, Respondent asked, "Do you have a boyfriend," to which Ms. Weigel replied that she did. Upon being informed that she had a boyfriend, Respondent asked Ms. Weigel to produce her driver's license. Although Ms. Weigel was confused by the request, she decided to comply and reached for her purse, which was located on the passenger's seat. As she did so, Respondent aimed the beam of his flashlight down Ms. Weigel's shirt (she was wearing a v-neck tank top) and remarked, "You know what I want to see." Ms. Weigel responded by stating, "Excuse me," at which point Respondent announced, "I want to see your breasts." In response to the inappropriate and unwelcome demand, Ms. Weigel informed Respondent that she wanted to leave. At that point or shortly thereafter, Respondent informed Ms. Weigel that he thought she was pretty, he wanted to take her on a date, and that he would let her leave once she gave him her cell phone number. Although Ms. Weigel did not want to give Respondent her phone number and had no wish to date him, she relented in the hope that Respondent would keep his word and allow her to drive away. After he received Ms. Weigel's phone number, Respondent did not immediately allow her to leave. Instead, Respondent told Ms. Weigel that she seemed "a little intoxicated," notwithstanding the fact that she was not impaired and had consumed no alcoholic beverages that evening. Although Respondent asked Ms. Weigel to exit her vehicle, she held her ground and refused to comply. Eventually, Respondent ended the encounter and allowed Ms. Weigel to drive away. Ms. Weigel subsequently reported the incident to the Florida Highway Patrol. During the investigation that ensued,2 Ms. Weigel identified Respondent in a photographic lineup as the trooper involved in the July 28, 2006, incident.3 Other Allegations As a licensed law enforcement officer with the Florida Highway Patrol, Respondent was granted access to Driver and Vehicle Information Database ("DAVID"), which is maintained by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. DAVID is a secure database that contains confidential information regarding motorists, which includes addresses, photographs, driving records, and vehicle descriptions. Each time an authorized person accesses DAVID, the user is required to acknowledge that the system is being utilized for legitimate law enforcement or criminal justice purposes. Pursuant to the Prehearing Stipulation in this matter, it is undisputed that Respondent accessed DAVID on multiple occasions for "personal reasons" and without a legitimate law enforcement purpose.4 However, neither the Prehearing Stipulation nor the evidence presented during the final hearing established what particular benefit Respondent derived——if any—— from his unauthorized use of DAVID. Ultimate Findings The undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent committed a battery upon Ms. Agudelo by touching her breasts and buttocks, and therefore failed to maintain good moral character. The undersigned also finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent's behavior toward Ms. Argudelo and Ms. Weigel constitutes misuse of his position as a law enforcement officer, and thus Respondent failed to maintain good moral character. The undersigned further determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence failed to establish that Respondent's accessing of the DAVID system for personal reasons constituted misuse of his position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, in violation of section 943.13, Florida Statutes, and revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2011.
The Issue Whether the involuntary transfer of Trooper Fred T. Wimberly from Troop "A" in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida to Troop "E" in Tavernier, Monroe County, Florida was a transfer for the benefit and convenience of the state.
Findings Of Fact Notice of hearing and objections to these proceedings, including the manner of the preservation of the record, were waived by the parties. This Hearing Officer and the Career Service Commission have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action. Florida Highway Patrol personnel rules and regulations General Order number 43 and Career Service Commission rules and regulations Chapter 22A-09(c) provide for Career Service hearings on involuntary transfers. Fred T. Wimberly, Petitioner in this cause, is a Career Service Employee of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of the Florida Highway Patrol. He was sent a notice of his transfer by certified mail dated January 7, 1976. By Order of the Honorable Ernest E. Mason, Judge of the Circuit Court, Escambia County, said transfer as been restrained until April 15, 1976. 5, Seventy trooper positions allocated to the Florida Highway Patrol were not filled during the last fiscal year because of insufficient funds and this information was circulated by letter from Mr. Ralph Davis, Executive Director, on May 23, 1975. Col. J. E. Beach, Director of the Florida Highway Patrol by memorandum July 23, 1975, informed all Florida Highway Patrol troops: "We feel it only fair that all troops share the burden rather than a few carry the entire load" and informed the troopers that the Department had decided that each troop run 7.4 as a vacancy ratio. Troop "A" in Pensacola, Florida was to have seven (7) vacancies and Troop "E" was to have eleven (11) vacancies. On February 1, 1976, the time of the transfer of the Petitioner, Troop "A" in Pensacola had three (3) more troopers than allowed under the readjustment total of minus 7. Troop "E" had fourteen (14) less troopers beyond those readjustment figures of minus 11. Thus, Troop "A", in West Florida, had four (4) vacancies and Troop "E" in Broward, Dade and Monroe Counties had twenty-five (25) vacancies. The memorandum withheld voluntary transfers until the required ratio should be achieved. At the time of a needed involuntary transfer the long standing policy of the Florida Highway Patrol, established to help keep employees more satisfied and to retain experienced troopers, has been to consider the following factors: The troop of least need Seniority Marriage factor Wife's employment Number of children Number of school children Other considerations (a) It was determined by the Director of the Florida Highway Patrol that a trooper was needed in Tavernier, Florida, as an increment to Troop E. This determination was based on population need and road conditions. It was determined that Troop A was the troop statewide which could best accommodate itself to losing a trooper. The list of troopers was examined insofar as seniority was concerned and it was found that approximately fourteen (14) troopers had less seniority than Petitioner and therefore each trooper was examined, consistent with established policy, as to marriage status, children living with trooper, school age children living with trooper and wife's employment. It was found that two troopers, Petitioner and Trooper Pembroke Burrows, III, were most eligible for involuntary transfer insofar as these human factors were concerned both being single men with the approximate same seniority. It was decided that Trooper Burrows remain in Troop "A" since he is the only black trooper in the area, the other eleven (11) black troopers being located in the central and southern part of the state. It therefore appeared to the director of the Florida Highway Patrol that Trooper F.T. Wimberly should be chosen to fill the vacancy in Troop "A" and he was so notified of his transfer to be effective February 1, 1976. Said transfer was restrained until after a public hearing and until the Order of the Career Service Commission or April 15, 1976. Petitioner contends: That the transfer was arbitrary and disciplinary in nature and the involuntary transfer was the result of actions in his personal life that were of no concern to the Florida Highway Patrol; that if the transfer was disciplinary it should have been so designated. That the fact of his divorce and the living arrangements he made as to room and board in the home of a woman and her two sons was under investigation by the Florida Highway Patrol prior to the involuntary transfer. That the transfer was made in total disregard to his job performance, his career status and his job seniority. Respondent contends: That the involuntary transfer was for the benefit and convenience of the state and that it followed a long established policy in transferring Petitioner to a needed area. That there were several other involuntary transfers as a result of the shortage of troopers in the state, particularly the southern part of Florida, and that there must be more involuntary transfers. That each trooper signs a statement as a part of a job application which reads "I fully understand that I may be stationed anywhere in the State of Florida and may be transferred at the convenience of the department." That the oath taken by Trooper Wimberly states that "I will render strict obedience to my superior in the Florida Highway Patrol and observe and abide by all orders and regulations prescribed by them for the government and administration of said Patrol." That the rules, regulations and policy of the Florida Highway Patrol were followed in the involuntary transfer of Petitioner and the transfer is to a place of great need and in fact is for the benefit and convenience of the state. That had the transfer been disciplinary in nature the result would have been suspension or dismissal. The Hearing Officer finds: The Florida Highway Patrol has presented substantial evidence that there is a need for a transfer to Troop "E" and that Troop "A" is a logical troop from which to withdraw a trooper and that Petitioner is not the only trooper in the state being transferred to fill the southern Florida need. The Petitioner signed a statement upon his application for employment that he understood that he might be transferred for the benefit and convenience of the state. The Florida Highway Patrol followed the established rules, regulations and policies in the involuntary transfer of Petitioner. That there were two troopers in the area who were most eligible to suffer an involuntary transfer but the reason for the determination to transfer Petitioner rather than Trooper Burrows is a valid reason. That in the field of law enforcement and for the protection of the people in the state there is a need for the Florida Highway Patrol to transfer troopers in an expeditious manner but with due regard to the individual rights of employees. That the evidence shows the human considerations were considered before Petitioner was selected to be transferred. That a determination as to whether the personal conduct of Petitioner was conduct unbecoming a police officer is not necessary for the determination of the issue.
Findings Of Fact In November of 1960 the Petitioner, Frankie L. Mills, became employed by the Florida Highway Patrol, and he was a member of the Florida Highway Patrol Pension System (Chapter 321, Florida Statutes). On approximately December 1, 1970, the Petitioner transferred from the Florida Highway Patrol Pension System, and he became a member of the Florida Retirement System (Chapter 121, Florida Statutes). In June of 1976, the Petitioner resigned from the Florida Highway Patrol to run for Sheriff of Okaloosa County. He was elected, and began his position as Sheriff in January of 1977. In the election of 1980 the Petitioner was not re- elected as Sheriff of Okaloosa County. As a result, his term of office as Sheriff ended on January 6, 1981, and the Petitioner vacated the office of Sheriff of Okaloosa County. The Petitioner did not resign from his position as Sheriff of Okaloosa County. His termination from the office of Sheriff was occasioned by the expiration of his elected term of office as of January 6, 1981.. During the time the Petitioner served as Sheriff of Okaloosa County, until January 6, 1981, he was a special risk member of the Florida Retirement System (Chapter 121, Florida Statutes). In August of 1981, the Petitioner became employed as a deputy sheriff of Gulf County. This employment qualified him as a special risk member of the Florida Retirement System (Chapter 121, Florida Statutes). The Petitioner has been employed as a deputy sheriff in Gulf County since August, 1981, and he is so employed at present. Between January 6, 1981, and at least August 11 981, the Petitioner was not employed by an "employer" as this term is defined in Section 121.021(10), Florida Statutes, and during this time he was absent from the payroll of any such "employer." Between January 6, 1981, and August of 1981, the Petitioner was not a "state law enforcement officer" as this term is used in Section 121.021(38), Florida Statutes, and Rules 22B- 2.002(5)(e) and (g), Florida Administrative Code. Between January 6, 1981, and August of 1981, the Petitioner had a break in his continuous service under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, including Section 121.021.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter its Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Frankie L. Mills, had a break in his continuous service in the special risk category of the Florida Retirement System during the period of time he was not employed as a law enforcement officer between January and August, 1981. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 26th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Robert Scott Cox, Eq. P. O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1876 Burton M. Michaels, Esq. 2639 North Monroe street Suite 207, Building C Tallahassee, FL 32303 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings are not in consecutively numbered paragraphs, but the unnumbered paragraphs will be considered to be consecutively numbered. 1.-3. Accepted. 4. Rejected, as not a proposed factual finding, but an argument of law. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-9. Accepted.
