The Issue Whether the Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice was timely filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition was not timely filed.
Findings Of Fact On December 15, 1994, the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice, together with all other "pleadings and jurisdictional papers heretofore filed in this proceeding." The pleadings and papers transmitted by FCHR show that Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on November 2, 1993, charging an unlawful employment practice by Respondent in connection with her lay off on October 29, 1992. On October 21, 1994, the FCHR concluded its investigation into the matter and issued its determination of No Cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. Notice of that determination was mailed to Petitioner and Respondent on October 21, 1994 by regular mail. The Notice of Determination of No Cause served on Petitioner included the following statement: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an admini- strative hearing within 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992). Counsel for Petitioner, George T. Paulk II, received the Notice of Determination on behalf of Petitioner and prepared the petition to be "filed" with the FCHR. On November 25, 1994, 35 days after the Notice was mailed, Counsel for Petitioner transmitted to the FCHR her Petition for Relief, requesting an administrative hearing. The petition was submitted on the form provided by the FCHR. The petition was sent by regular U.S. Mail. The Petition for Relief was filed with the FCHR on November 29, 1994, 39 days after the Notice of Determination was issued. The FCHR transmitted the pleadings to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. At the same time of the transmittal to Division of Administrative Hearings, FCHR issued a notice of the petition to Respondent advising it of the requirement to file an answer to the Petition for Relief. Respondent timely filed its answer with affirmative defenses, including the first affirmative defense that "Petitioner failed to file her petition within the time allowed by law." Respondent also filed a separate Notice to Dismiss raising the same issue. The Petition for Relief was deposited in the mail on Friday, November 25, 1994, the day after Thanksgiving which is an official state holiday. The next business day was Monday, November 28, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief in Division of Administrative Hearings' Case No. 94-6976 and FCHR Case No. 94-7490, for failure to timely file the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1995.
Findings Of Fact The Hospital Cost Containment Board has adopted a policy known as the "outlier" policy. Generally speaking, the policy is a credit available to a hospital as a result of the hospital's having experienced a higher level of outlier experience compared to total admissions in one period as compared to another period. The policy has an exception in which a hospital can receive credit in an amendment for a change in outlier experience in a previous year if it files an amendment to its budget within the first ninety days of its current fiscal year. For such amendments, the comparison is between changes in outlier experience which have occurred between two specific timeframes. The first is the change between outlier experience during all the fiscal year two years prior to the current year and the first half of the year prior to the current year. The second is the change between outlier experience in all the fiscal year two years prior to the current year and all of the year prior to the current year. If the second change is greater than the first change, the difference is the outlier credit that is allowed. For an amendment filed after the first ninety days of a hospital's current fiscal year, no credit is allowed for changes in outlier experience from the prior year because in such cases the comparison is between outlier experience which has actually occurred in the current year-to- date compared to the hospital's prior year actual outlier experience. The "outlier" policy described above has been adopted by the Hospital Cost Containment Board as a policy that it generally applies to all hospitals subject to its regulation. The "outlier" policy described above has not been promulgated as a rule in accordance with the procedures established by Section 120.54, Fla. Stat. (1987).
The Issue The issues in this cause concern whether disciplinary action should be taken against the Respondent's license to practice medicine, based upon alleged violations of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the disputed issue concerns whether his license to practice medicine was revoked, suspended or otherwise acted against by the licensing authority of another state.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is and at all times material hereto, has been licensed as a physician in the State of Florida. He holds licensed number ME0028248 issued by the State of Florida, Board of Medical Examiners. Respondent is also licensed in the State of New York as a medical doctor. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the medical practice standards contained in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes and related rules. Pertinent provisions of that chapter and Chapter 455, Florida statutes authorize the Petitioner to make investigations of physician's licenses in the State of Florida and, if probable cause exists to indicate that a physician has engaged in conduct proscribed by Chapter 458, to commence formal proceedings seeking disciplinary action against such physicians. The New York State Department of Education and its Board of Regents is the licensing authority for medical doctors for the State of New York, (Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is evidence.) On August 14, 1986, the Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, on behalf of the State Education Department and its Board of Regents entered an order wherein the Respondent'S license to practice medicine in the State of New York was suspended for one year. That suspension was stayed and the Respondent's license to practice medicine was placed in probationary status with the probation being subject to certain conditions. See Petitioner's Exhibit 3 in evidence. In that order, the Respondent, had been found guilty of professional misconduct by being convicted of committing crimes under the state law of New, York. Specifically, he was convicted of four counts of violations of Public Health Law 12.B(2), by being registered as a medicaid provider and leasing space for the practice of medicine at a dental office, a "shared health facility", the rental fee for which was calculated and paid as a percentage of the defendant's earnings for medical services rendered on the premises. The Respondent was also found guilty of falsely representing that he was certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine when in fact he was not so certified, and by the willful making and filing of a false report, which also constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of the law of the State of New York, specifically 8NYCRR 29.1(b)(6), (1984), cited in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 in evidence.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Board of Medical Examiners suspending the Respondent's license for one full year or until such time as the Respondent appears before the Board of Medicine and demonstrates that he is capable of practicing medicine with care, skill and safety to patients including a demonstration that his license to practice medicine in New York is reinstated and is unrestricted, whichever time period is less. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan King, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Vijay Sakhuja, M.D. 120 Secor Drive Port Washington, New York 11050 Vijay Sakhuja, M.D. 90-10 Sutphin Boulevard Jamaica, New York 11435 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Kenneth Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 ================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA VIJAY SAKHUJA, M.D., NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. vs. CASE NO. 89-2296 DOAH CASE NO. 88-4658 DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Appellee. / Opinion filed October 10, 1990. Appeal from an Order of the Department of Professional Regulation Walter D. Forehand, of Myers & Forehand, Tallahassee, for appellant. Lisa S. Nelson, Department of Professional Regulation, for appellee. WENTWORTH, J. Appellant seeks review of an administrative order by which appellee Department of Professional Regulation, through its Board of Medicine, suspended appellant's medical license. The duration of this suspension exceeds the penalty which the hearing officer had recommended. Although we find no error with regard to appellant's other contentions, we do find that the Board did not fully and adequately delineate the basis for increasing the recommended penalty. We therefore reverse the order appealed. Appellant was licensed to practice medicine in both Florida and New York, and the current proceeding ensued after disciplinary action was taken by the licensing authority in New York for violations which had occurred in that state. The New York licensing authority acted upon appellant's conviction for violating a public health law which prohibits calculating medical office rental fees on a percentage of earnings, and upon appellant's false reporting and false representation of a medical certification. The proceeding in Florida was based upon this New York action, as appellant was charged with violating section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which specifies that disciplinary action may be taken in this state when a license has been "acted against" by the licensing authority of another jurisdiction. After an administrative hearing on this charge the hearing officer recommended that appellant's Florida license be suspended for one year or until such time as he satisfies certain conditions including the reinstatement of his New York license. The Board of Medicine adopted the hearing officer's recommended findings, but increased the penalty so as to suspend appellant's license in Florida for one year and until such time as the various other conditions are satisfied. The order increasing the recommended penalty recites that: Rule 21M-20.001(1)(b), F.A.C., provides for discipline for action taken in another jurisdiction to be the discipline which would have been imposed if the substantive violation had occurred in Florida. Although this explanation identifies a permissible basis for the Board's action, and it does not appear that the hearing officer considered the applicability of the cited rule, the order does not specify the asserted substantive Florida violation had appellant's conduct occurred in this state. While appellant's conduct in New York, as indicated by the substantive violations in that state, might be such as would also constitute substantive violations in Florida, the Board's failure to delineate a particular substantive Florida violation does not fully satisfy the Board's obligation, as mandated by section 120.57(1)(b)10, Florida Statutes, to provide a particularize statement of the reason for increasing the recommended penalty. Appellee concedes that the Board's order is deficient, but contends that it should be afforded the opportunity to enter a more thorough and explicit order on remand. Because the order now being appealed reflects a legally permissible basis for the challenged action, on remand the Board may address the matter with greater particularity should it again decide to increase the recommended penalty. See Van Ore v. Board of Medical Examiners, 489 So.2d 883 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); see also, Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded. MINER and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Lawrence A. Hall is licensed by the Florida State Board of Dentistry and the Hearing Officer has jurisdiction over the Respondent and the offenses alleged. During the time periods alleged Respondent smoked marijuana in the office after office hours in company with employees including a 16-year-old employee. During the time periods alleged Respondent wrote numerous prescriptions in the names of employees for controlled substances or drugs to be used for his personal use or for the use of his wife or friends. These drugs consisted of Eskatrol, Dexadrine, Dexamyl, Percodan, and Quaalude and were taken by Hall during office hours while he was performing work on dental patients. Some of these drugs made Respondent nervous and irritable and adversely affected his practice of dentistry. During the period between March, 1974 and July, 1975 Hall habitually used controlled substances add drugs. On many occasions he would be late getting to the office for morning appointments and late returning from lunch for afternoon appointments. Occasionally he would fail to come to the office at all and scheduled appointments would have to be cancelled - usually after the patient had appeared for the appointment. Hall wrote prescriptions for his wife and for his employees for controlled substances and drugs for uses not related to the practice of dentistry. These drugs consisted of amphetamines, Quaalude, and Percodan, and were often picked up from the pharmacy by one of his office employees not named in the prescription. Hall knew that his federal narcotics license did not authorize him to write prescriptions for drugs not intended for use in the practice of dentistry. Amphetamines are listed as Class II controlled substances in Chapter 893 F.S. On one occasion, while treating a small child, Hall became exasperated, threw a syringe across the room, then ran out of the office to jog around the adjacent shopping center for about 15 minutes to regain his composure. On another occasion a patient reacted adversely to an anesthetic and was thereafter properly treated by Hall to restore her breathing to normal. The dental procedure for which the anesthetic was given was then performed satisfactorily. The patient involved remained a patient of Hall until she moved to a location too far away to continue to use Hall as her dentist. She was satisfied with the dental treatment received from Hall. Hall sought help in his personal and drug related problems from his minister. No evidence was presented that Hall performed unsatisfactory dental work. To the contrary, all evidence presented in this regard was to the effect that Hall's dental work was above average. At the time of the hearing and for some months prior thereto Hall was not taking drugs.
Findings Of Fact Based on all the evidence, the following facts are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Glenn C. Mingledorff, was certified as a law enforcement officer by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, having been issued Certificate No. 02-25390 on June 13, 1980. When the events herein occurred, Mingledorff was employed as a uniformed highway patrolman with the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP). He resigned from the FHP effective October 26, 1984 and is no longer in the law enforcement profession. Shortly after midnight on February 5, 1983, respondent was on duty in Palm Beach County. When the following events occurred he was transporting two DWI arrestees to a local Palm Beach County jail. While driving north on I-95, he observed a vehicle with three occupants swerve into the lane in front of him. After tailing the vehicle a short distance, and noticing that it was "swerving" on occasion, Mingledorff stopped the vehicle. The driver was Nancy Lynn Pearson, a young female whose speech was slurred, and who smelled of alcohol. She was arrested for suspected driving under the influence of alcohol. Mingledorff drove her to a nearby "Batmobile" where she was given a breathalyzer test and asked to perform certain coordination tests. While these tests were being performed, Mingledorff transported the two male arrestees to a local jail. Pearson "blew" a .14 on the breathalyzer machine, which was above the .10 legal limits, and did not "adequately" perform the coordination tests. When Mingledorff returned to the Batmobile approximately an hour and a half later, he handcuffed Pearson with her hands in the front, and placed her in the back seat of his FHP car. He then drove Pearson to the Lake Worth women's facility which was approximately twenty minutes away. During the trip to the facility, Pearson began to cry, and Mingledorff attempted to comfort her by explaining what would happen after she reached the facility. He also told her she was "sweet" and "cute," that she had a "nice shape," and suggested that they might go out sometime in the future for dinner. When the two arrived at the Lake Worth facility, it was between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. in the morning. Mingledorff parked the car approximately twenty feet from the entrance to the jail. He then let Pearson out of the car, and after she had walked a few feet, told her he had to frisk her. Although the testimony is conflicting at this point, the more credible and persuasive testimony establishes the following version of events. Mingledorff asked her to extend her handcuffed hands to the front, and then reached down to her ankles and began patting her up the front side of her legs. When he got to her crotch, he "felt around" for a few seconds. Mingledorff then went up to her breasts and squeezed them momentarily. After going to her back side, he squeezed her buttocks during the pat-down process. Pearson did not say anything while Mingledorff frisked her, nor did she say anything when she was taken into the jail. However, about a month later she saw a highway patrolman named Davis at a local speedway, who she mistook for Mingledorff, and complained to him about the frisk. Davis then told local FHP officials. Mingledorff stated that he routinely frisked all arrestees for weapons and drugs, regardless of whether they were male or female. However, through credible testimony it was shown that a "hands-on" search of a female detainee by Mingledorff was inappropriate under the circumstances and contrary to FHP policy. More specifically, it was established that a female detainee is not searched by a male trooper unless the trooper "feels there's a threat to his well-being." Here there was none. Mingledorff should have taken only her purse and any other belongings and left the responsibility of frisking the prisoner to the female attendant at the jail. On the afternoon of May 23, 1984, respondent was on duty as a highway patrolman on I-95 in Palm Beach County. He came up on a vehicle which had spun around in a near-accident and was facing on-coming traffic. The vehicle was operated by Siham Caceres, a then unmarried young female. Caceres was extremely nervous and upset from her near-accident, and was unable to drive her vehicle to the side of the road. Mingledorff directed her to sit in the right front seat of his patrol car until she was calm enough to proceed on her trip. The two sat in his car for approximately ten minutes or so. During that time, Mingledorff, who was in the driver's seat, acknowledged that he briefly reached over and touched Caceres' arm to generate her "circulation." Although he denied any other contact, it is found that Caceres' testimony is more credible and that Mingledorff then reached inside Caceres' sun dress and rubbed her breasts. He also rubbed her crotch area momentarily. Caceres did not encourage or consent to this activity. She did not receive a ticket and was allowed to leave a few minutes later. Caceres did not immediately tell anyone about the incident since she was embarrassed, and she was fearful her brothers would "get" Mingledorff if they learned what had hap- pened. She later told her fiancee, who then reported the matter to FHP officials.
The Issue Whether the petition for administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule was filed within the time Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), prescribes for instituting challenges to proposed administrative rules?
Conclusions The time limit Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) sets for filing petitions which seek determinations of invalidity under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1987), before proposed rules ever take effect, is jurisdictional Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Organized Fishermen of Florida vs. Marine Fisheries Com'n, No. 88-3821R (DOAH; Sept. 14, 1988); City of Gainesville vs. Florida Public Service Com'n., 3 FALR 2448-A (DOAH 1981). Contra, Florida Medical Center vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 88- 3970R and consolidated cases, Nos. 88-4018R and 88-4019R (DOAH; Nov. 1, 1988). If a petition challenging a proposed rule is not filed within 21 days of the notice initiating rulemaking which Section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) requires agencies to publish, those seeking invalidation are relegated to rule challenge proceedings under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987), unless they are parties to the rulemaking, and take timely stems to secure judicial review of the agency action adopting the rule. See City of Key West vs. Askew, 324 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA). Substantially affected parties who fail to file a Section 120.54 challenge in time are not without an administrative forum in which to litigate both whether the substance of a rule is authorized by statute and whether the manner of its adoption was lawful. Since the petition alleges no constitutional infirmity in the rule, nothing petitioners have pleaded here would be foreclosed from consideration in a Section 120.56 proceeding. See Department of Environmental Regulation vs. Leon County, 344 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). On appeal from an order invalidating an existing rule which had been challenged pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987), the court in Department of Administration vs. Herring, 530 So.2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), while rejecting the hearing officer's conclusions, considered the propriety of the procedures employed in rulemaking. Challenges to existing rules on grounds of inadequacy of economic impact statements are other instances in which rulemaking procedures have been tested in Section 120.56 proceedings. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Delray Hospital Corp., 373 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Even where an agency makes no claim that it has followed any of the procedures required for rulemaking, challengers must ordinarily file under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987). See State, Department of Administration vs. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The petition in the present case may be read as alleging that DER published notice of proposing a mitigation rule in June of 1987, although the Florida administrative Weekly reflects publication on May 1, 1987. But it is clear from the petition that more than a year elapsed, after publication, before the present petition (or the earlier petition dismissed July 21, 1988) was filed. This makes the petition untimely under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1987) It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The petition for administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule is dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of a petition pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987). DONE and ENTERED this 15th November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter B. Belmont, Esquire 511 31st Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33704 David A. Crowley, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399 Janet E. Bowman, Esquire P.O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James S. Alves, Esquire Thomas T. M. DeRose, Esquire P.O. Box 6526 420 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, FL 32314 Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., Esquire P.O. Drawer 810 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire P. O. Box 271 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by terminating his employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, as alleged in the Petition for Relief.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Michael Jeffries, was employed as a trainee, then as a trooper by the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) from August 5, 1991, to January 30, 2009. During that time, Petitioner received a written reprimand in 1985 for "failure to perform job duties" and was suspended for 40 days in 1997 because his drivers' license was about to be suspended. In 2004, Petitioner had symptoms of fatigue, low sex drive, and difficulty sleeping. Petitioner read an advertisement, as he remembers, in a muscle and fitness magazine, for PowerMedica, a facility that listed itself as a provider of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) that could alleviate fatigue and low sex drive. Petitioner visited the offices of PowerMedica which appeared to be a typical medical office in a multi-story office building. Petitioner has learned in retrospect that, as it appeared, in April 2004, PowerMedica held a valid State of Florida license as a medical facility, a pharmacy. He asked the receptionist for information about PowerMedica, she gave him a brochure, and he left. Petitioner next consulted his primary care physician, Carlos G. Levy, M.D. Dr. Levy was unable to recall if he saw Petitioner for specific complaints or for his annual physical. Petitioner's blood was drawn in Dr. Levy's office and sent to LabCorp for testing on April 28, 2004. Dr. Levy reviewed the results of the test with Petitioner and diagnosed him as having hypogonadism, a condition manifested by a low testosterone level of 201, or any level below 300, according to Dr. Levy, although the test results form indicated that 241 to 827 is the normal range. By either standard, Petitioner was, according to Dr. Levy, hypogonatic and his condition should have been treated to avoid more serious health problems. Dr. Levy is board certified in osteopathic family medicine. As a part of his regular practice, he treats patients with low testosterone, usually beginning with topical preparations. His patients have monthly blood tests and, if the topical testosterone is not being absorbed adequately, he uses testosterone injections. Despite having diagnosed his condition, Dr. Levy did not treat Petitioner. Rather than seeking treatment from Dr. Levy, Petitioner made a second visit to the PowerMedica office. This time Petitioner filled out a confidential medical questionnaire. On the form, he indicated that he had no decrease in sexual potency and no sleep disturbances, or any other medical conditions. He testified that he was embarrassed to put low testosterone, or his symptoms on the form that would be seen by the receptionist and others in the office, but that he did tell a gentleman in a white lab coat in a private room at PowerMedica about his condition. He also gave that gentleman a copy of his blood tests results and was advised that his records would be reviewed by a doctor. He did not believe that the gentleman or anyone else that he personally met at PowerMedica was a doctor. Approximately a week later, Petitioner received a telephone call from someone he believed to be a doctor or someone who was calling for a doctor at PowerMedica. That person said his records had been reviewed, and he could get prescriptions from, and could get them filled at, PowerMedica. On his third visit to PowerMedica, Petitioner received four prescriptions, dated June 11, 2004, all signed by a Dr. Al Almarashi, whom he had never met. The prescriptions were filled at PowerMedica. Petitioner received two anabolic steroids: Stanozolol and Nandrolone Decanoate; a human chorionic gonadotropin, Novarel, that is used to stimulate testosterone and sperm production; and Clomiphene, an anti-estrogen drug. Petitioner testified that Dr. Levy was aware that he was seeking HRT for low testosterone from another facility. Dr. Levy denied that he was ever advised that Petitioner had purchased and used Stanozolol and Nandrolone. He did not recall being told that Petitioner had purchased and used Novarel or Clomiphene. According to his medical notes, Dr. Levy did not see Petitioner again after April 2004 until September 8, 2005. Petitioner became aware that State and federal agencies were investigating PowerMedica and stopped buying their controlled substances, but he did not notify his employer of his connection to the pharmacy nor did he offer to assist with the investigation. The Broward County Sheriff's Department, in cooperation with the Food and Drug Agency (FDA), determined that Dr. Almarashi was not a Florida-licensed physician and could not lawfully write prescriptions in Florida, and that PowerMedica was selling controlled substances to people without appropriate examinations and documentation of any related medical conditions. As a result, the State suspended its license and the FDA closed PowerMedica. The Sheriff's Department obtained the PowerMedica customers' list and gave law enforcement agencies the names of any of their law enforcement officers whose names were on the list. Because his name was on the list, Petitioner was investigated by Respondent. He was notified in a letter dated January 14, 2009, that his employment was terminated for the following reasons: Section 893.13(6)(a) Florida Statutes, Possession of a controlled substance without a valid prescription, 3rd Degree Felony; Florida Highway Patrol Policy Manual, Chapter 3.03.06(A)7. Code of Conduct states: "Members will maintain a level of moral conduct in their personal and business affairs which is in keeping with the highest standards of the law enforcement profession;" Florida Highway Patrol Policy Manual, Chapter 3.03.06(a)51. Code of conduct states: "Members will not possess or use cannabis or any controlled substances except when prescribed by law and Division directives"; Florida Highway Patrol Policy chapter 5.11.05, Substance Abuse. These violations constitute the following disciplinary offenses: Possession, Sale, Transfer or Use of Drugs Off the Job, first offense; Violation of Statutory Authority, rules, Regulations or Policies, Fourth Offense; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee, first offense. Based on his own testimony, Petitioner tried to tell FHP investigators that he had a legitimate medical condition and they refused to believe him. In fact, their report disputes Dr. Levy's diagnosis by asserting that the blood test showed "low testosterone serum but not low free testosterone." The report also faults Petitioner for not being suspicious and for not holding himself to a higher standard as a law enforcement officer who would be aware of the stigma attached to the purchase and use of controlled substances, not as alleged by Petitioner that there was a "stigma" of actually having the condition. The investigators concluded Petitioner knew he was purchasing controlled substances illegally, in part, because (1) they concluded that he really did not have any related medical condition, (2) he was not treated by his primary care doctor who diagnosed what he claimed was a condition, (3) he had no valid doctor-patient relationship with PowerMedica, and (4) he did not come forward with information about his connection to PowerMedica when he became aware of a law enforcement investigation. Taken as a whole, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment because its investigators decided, correctly or incorrectly, that Petitioner knew or should have known that he unlawfully purchased and consumed Schedule III controlled substances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra Coulter, Esquire Florida Highway Patrol Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cathleen Scott, Esquire Cathleen Scott, P.A. Jupiter Gardens 250 South Central Boulevard, Suite 104-A Jupiter, Florida 33458 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At or about 5:30 a.m., July 25, 1977, Trooper Vayda, while on radar patrol on the I-95 just north of the Dade County line, observed a car proceeding south at a speed of 85 m.p.h. and gave chase with his identification lights flashing. When the suspect was overtaken by Trooper Vayda suspect swerved towards Vayda causing the latter to move two wheels off the paved surface to avoid collision. The suspect subsequently left the I-95 at the 135th Street exit and while on the ramp with no other vehicles in view Vayda fired one shot which struck suspect's vehicle on the left side just above the bumper. Suspect ran through the stop light at 135th Street and rejoined the I-95 pursued by Vayda. Suspect again exited the I-95 at 125th Street and after turning east on 125th Street Vayda fired a second shot hitting suspect's right tail light. Suspect lost control of his vehicle and struck another car. Vayda stopped his vehicle, got out and told the suspect to get out of his car. Suspect then restarted his car and started eastward with Vayda in pursuit. In the interim Vayda had, via radio, alerted the Highway Patrol office of the chase and requested assistance. With the assistance of other law enforcement officers the suspect was subsequently apprehended on Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida and found to be driving a stolen car. During the chase Vayda had no information to lead him to believe suspect was other than a speeder. As a result of firing the shots Vayda was suspended from duty for a period of eight hours by the Director of the Florida Highway Patrol. Exhibit 5, the disciplinary record of Vayda, shows that Vayda was suspended for eight hours without pay on September 7, 1977 for speeding on the Florida Turnpike on July 22, 1977. Vayda was aware of the contents of General Orders 17, 20 and 43 of the Florida Highway Patrol.
