The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Kenneth Davis, made sexually harassing statements and made body contact with a female counselor so as to constitute sexual harassment and a hostile work environment, in violation of Pinellas County Sheriff Office Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: Respondent, Sheriff Everett S. Rice (Sheriff), is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida, responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within the geographic boundaries of Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, Detention Deputy Kenneth Davis (Deputy Davis), is a 23-year employee with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, having spent his entire career as a detention officer. As a result of years of training and experience, Deputy Davis is intimately familiar with the Sheriff's policy regarding sexual harassment, detention policies, operations, procedures, and the priority of security applicable to detention deputies. The evidence demonstrates that in the collective opinions of those detention deputies who worked longest with Deputy Davis, all agreed that his personality was that of one who "[was] loud and obnoxious--to pretty much everybody," "play[ed] around a lot," "never insulted anybody," and "[didn't] mean any harm." At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis held the rank of detention corporal until the Sheriff reduced his rank to Deputy and removed him from his position of detention corporal on March 10, 2003. Deputy Davis' chain-of-command consisted of Major Kirk Brunner, Detention and Correction Bureau commander; Captain Nesbitt; Lieutenant Keith George; and Sergeant Buckingham. Deputy Davis did not have authority over Lori Atwater (Ms. Atwater), the complainant in this cause. He was not in her chain-of-command nor was he one of her bosses in the sense that he could assign her tasks. At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis worked in detention barrack C, North Division. Barrack C is a two-storied structure divided into B block and C block, with each cellblock divided into an upper level and lower level. Deputy Davis had four deputies under his supervision in cellblock C. At all times pertinent to this cause, Control Deputy Salazar worked the control center at barrack C. The control deputy is stationed in a glassed enclosure with clear view of individuals desiring entrance into the waiting room of barrack C and with clear view of inmates desiring to leave the cellblock and enter the waiting room. On or about March 4, 2002, Ms. Atwater, an African- American and a long-time resident of St. Petersburg, Florida, commenced employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as an inmate-counselor. Ms. Atwater has an Associate of Science degree in Computer Technology Engineering and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems. Her inmate- counselor duties consisted of identifying inmates who had family, legal, and personal issues requiring her intervention. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employed Ms. Atwater for ten years before she began employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. While employed with DCFS, she worked in food stamps, Medicaid, protective services, adoptions, and several community recruitment programs. DCFS also has a policy against sexual harassment. The Sheriff has adopted Pinellas County Sheriff's Office General Order 3-4, which defines and prohibits sexual harassment. Pursuant to General Order 3-4, sexual harassment is defined as: All unwelcome or unwanted advances; including sexual advances or unwanted sexual attention, whether between person(s) of the opposite or same sex. This includes, but is not limited to, leering, touching, patting, brushing against, hugging, kissing, fondling, any other similar physical contact, or quid pro quo arrangements (i.e., a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in unwelcomed sexual conduct in order to protect or advance his/her job.) Unwelcome requests or demands for favors, including sexual favors. This consists of subtle or blatant expectations, pressures, or request for any type of favor, including sexual favor, including unwelcome requests for dates, whether or not the request is accompanied by an implied or stated promise of preferential treatment or negative consequences. Inappropriate third party comments or one time comments made which do not constitute a hostile work environment, language not directed at the offended member, jokes (spoken, printed or drawn) that are not directed at the offended member or joint banter of a sexual or offensive nature in which the offended member may or may not be a party. All employees of the Sheriff, including Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater, received instructions regarding the Sheriff's Sexual Harassment Policy. The evidence demonstrates that beginning in March of 2002 and continuing through the months of April and May 2002, Ms. Atwater noticed, without telling him to stop and without reporting her resulting complaint to her supervisor, that Lieutenant George would call her "Ms. Ashwood." At some unspecified time prior to March of 2002, Ms. Atwater concluded that the name "Ms. Ashwood" was offensive. Ms. Atwater based her conclusion on her interpretation and knowledge of the general reputation of a Ms. Ashwood (no first name given) within the African-American community of St. Petersburg. According to Ms. Atwater, Ms. Ashwood was known throughout the African- American community for engaging in sexual encounters with multiple partners. As a direct result of her superior, Lieutenant George, continuously calling her Ms. Ashwood, a name she considered to be sexually offensive, Ms. Atwater chose not to report her sexual harassment complaint against Lieutenant George through the proper protocol. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Atwater asked Lieutenant George what was his intended meaning by calling her Ms. Ashwood. The evidence demonstrates that Lieutenant George, having been involved in both the hiring of Ms. Atwater as well as involved in her performance evaluation, knew her name to be Ms. Atwater. Alleged statements made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria during a lunch period. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis initially enjoyed a rather cordial relationship at work during the period of March through May 2002, at least by outward appearances. Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater both attended read- off sessions; on occasions, they walked together from the read- off sessions back to barrack A; and on two separate occasions, they were seated at the same table in the compound's buffet- styled cafeteria. They did not have contact with each other beyond what was necessary in the performance of their respective duties. They did not have contact with each other outside the workplace. On some unspecified date during lunch in the compound cafeteria, Ms. Atwater chose to ask Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George kept calling her Ms. Ashwood. According to Ms. Atwater, Deputy Davis came over to the table where she sat and she allegedly initiated the following conversation: Atwater: I really don't appreciate that, him [Lieutenant George] calling me Ms. Ashwood. Davis: He's probably P-U-S-S-Y whipped and you probably remind him of her. Atwater: He just alluded to--and used the term inside whore. Atwater: What's an inside whore? Davis: That's when you sleep with someone that makes Decisions for your career. Atwater: If I ever get promoted around here it will not be because I've slept with anybody, but based on my own merits. At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied the allegations regarding the above statements attributed to him by Ms. Atwater. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis made those statements attributed to him with the intent of sexually harassing Ms. Atwater, and if the statements were, in fact, made, whether his answers were truthful responses to her question. The compound cafeteria has several long tables seating six to eight persons and several shorter tables seating four to six persons. It is significant that not a single witness, from among others who were seated at the same table with Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis in the cafeteria on that unspecified day, was called to corroborate the statements allegedly made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater. With knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy coupled with her prior knowledge of DCFS's similar sexual harassment policy, and having been highly offended by Deputy Davis' conversation, it is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job included accurate record keeping, made no attempt to record this first incident with Deputy Davis resulting from repeated incidents with Lieutenant George. Additionally, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and report to her immediate supervisor her complaint of sexual harassment by a relatively new co-worker. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity, thus proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Deputy Davis made unwelcome or unwanted sexual comments or advances and/or unwelcome unwanted sexual demands, nor created a hostile work environment as Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what was said or not said by Ms. Atwater or by Deputy Davis during the alleged conversation that took place on some unspecified date in the compound cafeteria. Alleged intentional body contact by Deputy Davis with Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria buffet serving line. Ms. Atwater further testified that on another unspecified day while she was in the cafeteria buffet serving line fixing her salad, she felt "a brazen--it felt maybe like his [Deputy Davis] radio or something-it was hard--and then he went in my ear 'boo.' It made me jumpy and I made a squealing noise-because I didn't expect anything to braze in the back on my----." Continuing, Ms. Atwater testified that Lieutenant George came in the cafeteria at that time, and she asked him "why don't you tell your friend to just cut it out?" The Sheriff did not call Lieutenant George to testify. No other witness testified to corroborate Ms. Atwater's statements. Deputy Davis denied this second allegation of intentionally making body contact with Ms. Atwater and speaking in her ear. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity and that Deputy Davis engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur on that unspecified date between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater in the buffet serving line in the compound cafeteria. It is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job required accurate and detailed daily record keeping, made no record of Deputy Davis' second alleged sexual harassment of her person. With firsthand knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy plus her ten-year experience with a similar sexual harassment policy during her employment with DCFS, Ms. Atwater chose again not to follow proper protocol. She chose not to properly report this second incident to her immediate supervisor. Her second decided refusal to report what she considered sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if Deputy Davis was guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve him from liability. Having chosen for the second consecutive occasion not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis does present a significant impediment regarding Ms. Atwater's memory, recall, and credibility. Alleged repeated harassing comments by Deputy Davis resulting from Ms. Atwater's frightened squealing. Concluding, Ms. Atwater testified that "for months" after the undated cafeteria serving line incident, "every time" she would see Deputy Davis (minimum twice a week in barrack C) he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." According to her, these statements allegedly resulted from the cafeteria serving line incident and from a subsequent work related discussion and disagreement between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater regarding the form "62" (a form used by inmates requesting to see the counselor). Ms. Atwater, when confronted with what she considered a third but continuing sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, again chose not to follow protocol and report this third incident to her supervisor. It is significant that according to Ms. Atwater, she was initially and had been continuously sexually offended by Lieutenant George calling her Ms. Ashwood. When she inquired of Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her Ms. Ashwood, she was again sexually offended by his alleged answer to her question. She turns then to Lieutenant George, who was continually sexual harassing her and (did not ask him to stop calling her Ms. Ashwood) asks his assistance (not to file a proper complaint) but to have Deputy Davis (whose answer to her question about Lieutenant George she considered sexual harassment) to "just knock it off." Regarding her third alleged sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis (Ms. Atwater with knowledge that Lieutenant George and Deputy Davis were friends and she admittedly intended to take advantage of their friendship), she went to Lieutenant George, who (1) had continuously called her Ms. Ashwood; (2) was in her chain-of-command; and (3) was also in Deputy Davis' chain-of-command (but not file a complaint against Deputy Davis) and asked if he would "talk to his friend [Deputy Davis]--I don't want to make waves over this-I don't want to make a big to do-if you could talk to him--just have him knock it off." At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied her third allegation that he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." It is significant that after months and three separate allegations of sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and make a sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis to Lieutenant George, who would have been obligated to initiate a formal investigation. She chose instead to ask a favor from one who had continuously called her the sexually harassing name of Ms. Ashwood. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis continually made the alleged sexual and harassing comments to Ms. Atwater during an unspecified number of months. The Sheriff presented no witness to corroborate Ms. Atwater's allegations on this issue. Lieutenant George was not called to testify, leaving Ms. Atwater's hearsay testimony regarding this particular issue without corroboration. For the third time, Ms. Atwater chose to not follow protocol and report her third sexual harassment incident. The fact finder acknowledges that her third decided refusal to report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a third time not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis to her immediate supervisor does present a significant obstacle in the evaluation of Ms. Atwater's credibility. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity that Deputy Davis for months engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur during unspecified months when Deputy Davis may have been in the presence of Ms. Atwater. Allegations that Deputy Davis intentionally delayed or caused delay of inmates desiring conference with Ms. Atwater. Regarding her final allegation of sexual harassment by retaliation against Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater recalled that on one occasion, Deputy Davis intentionally caused a "two-hour" delay in getting inmates on her list from their cells to the conference area where she awaited them. The purported intent of this alleged two-hour delay was to threaten or to produce a negative consequence regarding Ms. Atwater's performance of her duties. I find that Ms. Atwater's August 9, 2002, memo to her supervisor, Deputy Armsheimer, purporting to be a chronology of events that occurred on August 8, 2002, conclusively demonstrates that Deputy Davis was not the cause, directly or indirectly, for Ms. Atwater's two-hour delay in getting the two inmates she had requested. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Atwater gave her form "62" list (inmates to be pulled who had requested a conference with her) to the control deputy, Deputy Salazar, in barrack C and waited 40 minutes. Returning to the holding area and inquiring as to the whereabouts of her inmates, Deputy Davis and not Deputy Salazar informed Ms. Atwater that the top three inmates on her list were not there. Ms. Atwater asked Deputy Davis of the inmates' whereabouts, but he gave her no further explanation. Ms. Atwater thereafter called Deputy Hartfield, who is in her chain-of-command, to ask if he would look into the matter and Deputy Hartfield promised to get back to her. Ms. Atwater waited for Deputy Hartfield's return call. After waiting an unspecified period of time and not receiving Deputy Hartfield's returned message, she called Deputy Hartfield a second time and was told that he had relayed his message to control (Deputy Salazar) about one and one-half hours ago. In that message, Deputy Hartfield explained that her first requested inmate (no name given) had been moved to maximum security and her second inmate (Brandon) was written up earlier that morning by him. In her August 9, 2002, memo to Deputy Armsheimer, Ms. Atwater wrote, "the conversation concluded with me stating [to Deputy Hartfield] if I had known 1 1/2 hours ago, I would have just left out of here and could have eaten lunch." It is significant that Ms. Atwater authored her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Deputy Armsheimer, for the singular purpose of explaining the exact cause (and persons involved) of her two-hour plus wait for inmates who were not pulled for her. At the final hearing in May 2003, she contradicts her August 9, 2002, written statements by testifying that Deputy Davis caused her a "two-hour" delay in pulling her inmates. This obvious contradiction is a severe detriment upon her credibility. Ms. Atwater's memorandum to Sergeant Groff, dated October 30, 2002, was written to give a recount of her experiences with Deputy Davis during all times pertinent to this case. She began her memorandum with the statement: "[S]o for the whole story to be clear, I must tell you how we ended up here and start from the beginning." In her first sentence of the second paragraph appears the first conflict in the evidence of record. In that sentence, Ms. Atwater writes, "Shortly after starting to work here, I began to experience unpleasantness from Cpl. Kenneth Davis. His obnoxious gestures, comments and disposition could not be tolerated any longer." (This conclusion consisted of the three separate allegations against Deputy Davis made herein above.) With this opportunity to formally complain of sexual harassment in the work place, Ms. Atwater failed to include the fact that it was she who initially asked Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her the sexually offensive name of "Ms. Ashwood." Intentionally choosing to allege that Deputy Davis' answer to her question why Lieutenant George kept calling her "Ms. Ashwood" was the initial sexual harassment that created a hostile work place is contradictory to her testimony. Continuing, Ms. Atwater wrote--"I did tell him that I felt he 'played too much,' and need[ed] to stop moaning and groaning behind me." Even though she recounted moaning and groaning, she specifically omitted her alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis (Finding of Fact 12 hereinabove) when he answered her question "why Lieutenant George calls me Ms. Ashwood." This is significant in that Ms. Atwater's testimony was that Deputy Davis' alleged verbatim statements when he answered her question were so "sexually harassing" that she was "immediately" offended the moment she heard them. Yet, she omits any mention that it was Lieutenant George continuously calling her "Ms. Ashwood" that initially and repeatedly offended her. The name Ashwood she considered had such a negative sexual reputation in the community that she was immediately offended and sexually harassed when Lieutenant George first called her Ms. Ashwood and each time thereafter. She omits any mention that it was her inquiry of Deputy Davis, "why Lieutenant George [sexually harassing her] was calling her the offensive name of Ms. Ashwood" that produced the alleged response. Based upon Ms. Atwater's acknowledgement contained in her October 30, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Groff, I find that her allegations that Deputy Davis caused a delayed wait of two hours to get inmates pulled and, thus, "creat[ed] a hostile work environment" to be contrary to her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Armsheimer, admitting that had she known her inmates were not in barrack C, she would have left and had lunch "one and one-half" hours prior. Ms. Atwater further admits in writing that from May of 2002 forward, she and Deputy Davis "barely" spoke to one another. If Ms. Atwater's memory is presumed to be accurate and she and Deputy Davis discontinued speaking to one another during the March through May 2002 period, it was not logical to conclude that Deputy Davis repeatedly and continually moaned and groaned in her ear for "months" thereafter (i.e. June, July, August, and October). For the fourth time, Ms. Atwater chose not to and did not report this fourth incident to her immediate supervisor at or near the time it occurred. Her sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis was filed after her October 2002 complaint was filed against Lieutenant George. Her fourth decided refusal to immediately report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a fourth time not to report the initial alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis during the March through May period, when coupled with the contradiction between her testimony that Deputy Davis was the cause of a two-hour delay in pulling her inmates, and her memorandum wherein she acknowledges that her inmates had been written up by Sergeant Hartfield, presents a credibility obstacle. Ms. Atwater makes no further mention of Deputy Davis in her October 30, 2002, memoranda, devoting the remainder to Lieutenant George. She recounts in detail their initial friendly relationship, turning to a cold and unfriendly relationship, the keeping-your-distance treatment, their many phone conversations at work, their lunch dates away from the work place, and their private phone calls when at home, ending on October 24, 2002, with an incident of kissing and Lieutenant George rubbing his groin against her buttocks and her resisting his advances. (See Joint Exhibit J-1.) In her final paragraph, Ms. Atwater relates how, unbeknownst to Lieutenant George, she arranged for a three-way call between herself, Lieutenant George, and her uncle, a City of St. Petersburg employee. She arranged the three-way call for the purpose of securing a witness to corroborate her statements regarding the Lieutenant George sexual harassment encounter. Though her alleged initial sexual harassment was initiated by Deputy Davis and continued for months, Ms. Atwater made no similar attempt to corroborate her claims of sexual harassment against Deputy Davis. Knowing that Deputy Davis was not within her chain-of-command and not in a supervisory position over her, there was no logical reason for Ms. Atwater to fear promotions and job security. Ms. Atwater knew that filing a complaint against a lieutenant within her chain-of- command presented a greater risk than filing a complaint against Deputy Davis who was not in her chain-of-command. Her choosing not to record (or procure corroboration) the Deputy Davis incidents, when coupled with her delay of many months in reporting her compliant through proper channels because of fear of reprisal, rings hollow. It was after the Administrative Review Board had begun an investigation of Ms. Atwater's October 2002 complaint of sexual harassment against Lieutenant George that the Sheriff initiated an investigation of Deputy Davis. Only after her egregious October 24, 2002, incident involving Lieutenant George did she file a subsequent and separate sexual harassment compliant against Deputy Davis. In the absence of corroboration, Ms. Atwater's testimony of a single incident of intentional touching and her testimony of alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis and his unequivocal denial presents a "she said-he said" dilemma. Neither party's testimony is inherently more credible than the other party's testimony. Contrary to the opinion of Major Brunner, who sat on the Administrative Review Board, that when the Administrative Review Board questioned Deputy Davis regarding those allegations, Deputy Davis was "in denial." This assumption and by implication presumed guilt, thereby lending credibility to Ms. Atwater's allegations, is a conclusion not based on fact and is contrary to the evidence adduced during the de novo proceeding. Ms. Atwater's testimony of incidents having occurred over a four-month or more period and the lack of time or specific dates coupled with the contradictions between her testimony during the final hearing and her August 9, 2002, memorandum to her supervisor, creates an unfathomable chasm in the evaluation of her credibility. The Inspection Bureau of the Administrative Inspection Division investigated Ms. Atwater's complaint and submitted their investigative results to the Administrative Review Board, made up of various employees with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Petitioner, Deputy Davis, had violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4: violation of provisions of the law or rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' conduct was a violation of the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Rules 3-1.1 (level five violation) and 5.16, relating to sexual harassment and discrimination as defined in the Sheriff's General Order 3-4. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' available range of discipline was calculated in conformance with the matrix contained within General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office that allocates a point scale to various violations. The matrix provides that a level five offense, which includes sexual harassment, results in a 50- point assessment. Deputy Davis scored a total of 50 cumulative points with a discipline range of five-day suspension up to and including termination. Demotion is also authorized under the applicable General Order. After considering the evidence and available sanctions, the Sheriff notified Deputy Davis on March 10, 2003, that he was imposing a ten-day suspension without pay and demoting him from the rank of corporal to the rank of detention deputy. After weighing all the evidence, including the Sheriff's evidentiary presentation of Ms. Atwater's testimony of verbal comments made and intentional body conduct allegedly engaged in by Deputy Davis, this fact finder finds the uncorroborated hearsay evidence insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations that Deputy Davis made sexually harassing verbal comments to Ms. Atwater, and that he made intentional sexually harassing body contact with her, so as to create a hostile work environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a final order finding that: Petitioner did not commit the verbal and physical conduct alleged in the charging document and that there was no violation of the rules, regulations, and policies of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as alleged. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's demotion from his previous rank of detention corporal to the rank of detention deputy was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office be restored with full detention corporal's pay and benefits. Petitioner be restored to the rank of detention corporal2 and given full duties and responsibilities as previously held. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2003.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has been the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on gender or handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensed Registered Nurse. He was hired by Respondent on April 4, 1997, in its medical facility at Gulf Coast Correctional facility. In 2000, Petitioner's supervisor was Pamela Spears, R.N. At some point, Nurse Spears became friends with Chris Miles, a Licensed Practical Nurse, who worked on Petitioner's shift. Nurse Spears would sometimes talk with this L.P.N. in her office. Somehow, Petitioner felt his authority as the shift nurse was undermined by this relationship. It was not clear from the record what the basis of Petitioner's belief was, but his belief seemed to be related to the fact that Petitioner had to wait to speak with Nurse Spears. On May 5, 2000, Petitioner complained to Nurse Miles that he felt she was being treated with favoritism by Nurse Spears. Apparently, the discussion caused an uproar at the shift change and there was some agreement to swap shifts among the nurses to allow things to cool off. Around May 10, 2000, Nurse Odom filed sexual harassment charges against Petitioner for alleged comments and jokes of a sexual nature ("spanking the monkey", "choking the chicken", cross-dressing inuendos, use of handcuffs during sex, going to naked bars). In addition Nurse Miles filed a hostile work environment complaint against Petitioner because he allegedly threatened to spread rumors about her. Nurse Miles’ complaint did not involve sexual harassment. Nurse Nowak filed a sexual harassment complaint against Petitioner, but withdrew her complaint, indicating that she did not have a complaint with Petitioner and that she felt pressure to file her complaint. Nurse Spears did not file any complaint against Petitioner. Petitioner testified these nurses had been pressured into filing their complaints. However, he had no independent personal knowledge of such pressure and other than hearsay, offered no evidence of such pressure. Respondent, also did not offer any evidence demonstrating that such behavior was sexually harassing, as opposed to simply vengeful and petty behavior by a supervisor. On August 15, 2001, Dr. Gilo in front of co-workers and staff, called Petitioner, who is obese, a “fat lazy bum.” Petitioner filed a hostile work environment complaint against Dr. Gilo and an incident report was filed. The evidence demonstrated that Dr. Gilo was known for demeaning or belittling everyone and having a harsh manner. The comment was not related to any of the earlier complaints of the nurses, but to Dr. Gilo's irritation towards Petitioner for calling him at home. There was no evidence that demonstrated this comment constituted discrimination or harassment based on Petitioner's obesity. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner's obesity was a handicap or viewed as a handicap by his employer. Respondent pursuant to its policy on sexual harassment complaints investigated the complaints. Several witness/co- worker statements were taken during the investigation that indicated Mr. Clardy, along with other employees, had made some statements or jokes of a sexual nature. The investigation took a considerable period of time. Again the record was not clear as to what caused the length of the investigation or whether the length of the investigation was unusual. However, on February 8, 2002, as a result of the investigation, Petitioner received a written reprimand for unspecified sexual jokes or comments. Petitioner filed a grievance regarding the reprimand. The grievance was denied in both Step 1 and Step 2 of the grievance process. There was no evidence that demonstrated either the undertaking of this investigation or the investigation itself constituted sexual harassment. However, on June 10, 2002, Petitioner filed a sexual harassment complaint against Respondent, the complaining nurses and Dr. Gilo for gender and disability discrimination. As with the nurses' complaints, the Respondent, pursuant to its policy, investigated Petitioner's complaints.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order affirming its decision that Petitioner is not eligible for services. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald J. Clardy 115 Sioux Trail Crawfordville, Florida 32327 Joshua E. Laws, Esquire Florida Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination or sexual harassment against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a payroll, accounts-payable clerk for Respondent's furniture store from May 23, 2001 until May 20, 2002. Respondent operates a furniture store located at 6886 North 9th Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32504-7358. Five months after commencing her employment with Respondent, Petitioner began to look for a new job. Petitioner believes that Mr. Alan Reese, Respondent's office manager and Petitioner's direct supervisor, began to follow her home in August 2001. Petitioner believes that, after ceasing to follow her when she confronted him about it, Mr. Reese began to follow her home again two months later. Petitioner accused Mr. Reese of following her home on numerous occasions, peeking into her windows, and sitting in his car and watching her while she tended to her garden. Petitioner was permitted to come to work late during October 2001, on occasion, when she was looking for a new place to live. Petitioner did not get along with Serita Coefield, her fellow accounting clerk at the furniture store. They often had disputes over the handling of invoices. In May of 2002, Petitioner met with Barbara Hoard, the Escambia County/Pensacola Human Resource Coordinator, to discuss the alleged harassment by Mr. Reese. Ms. Hoard told her to inform her employer in writing of her concerns and explained the availability of filing a complaint with the FCHR or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On May 15, 2002, Petitioner delivered a memo to Mr. Reese in which she accused him of following her home, touching her improperly in the workplace, and asking her questions about her personal life. She also sent, by certified mail, a copy of the memo to Elmer Githens, Respondent's president. After receiving the memo, Mr. Githens conferred with Mr. Reese, then issued a memo to Petitioner on May 17, 2002, in which he set forth her work schedule for the dates of April 29 through May 16, 2002. Petitioner's regular work hours were supposed to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with an hour for lunch. The May 17 memo, which was based upon Petitioner's actual time cards, showed that her start time at work ranged from 8:18 a.m. to 11:38 a.m. and her end time ranged from 4:01 p.m. to 6:12 p.m. Petitioner clocked in for a full eight- hour workday on only four of fourteen days during the time period reflected in the memo. Later in the day on May 17, 2002, Mr. Githens issued a second memo to Petitioner in which he noted that Petitioner had yelled at him when he gave her the first memo, and accused Serita Coefield of "being out to get her." The memo further stated that Petitioner "has alienated every one [she] works with due to [her] attitude." The memo continued with a discussion of Petitioner's work hours which were to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with at least a 30-minute lunch break every day. Petitioner was informed that this was her final warning about her tardiness and her inability to get along with her co-workers. The memo concluded with the words "[t]he next time you will be dismissed." On Monday, May 20, 2002, Petitioner's next workday, Petitioner clocked in at 10:37 a.m. She was given a memo that day dismissing her for "willful misconduct after receiving ample warnings that termination of your employment was imminent if you continued present behavior of coming to work late, not putting lunch on your time card, clocking out after 5pm without permission and causing disturbances with fellow employees for no reason." Petitioner claims that, on the day she was fired, she arrived at Respondent's parking lot at 8:00 a.m., but sat in her car because she was having a "panic attack" due to her belief that Mr. Reese was continuing to stalk her. Both Petitioner and Mr. Reese live east of Respondent and travel, at least part of the way, in the same direction and on the same roads to go home after work. Mr. Reese denies knowing the location of Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese has never been to Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese admits he drove home in the same direction as Petitioner on numerous occasions since she drove along one of the routes he routinely took home. No one witnessed the alleged stalking of Petitioner by Mr. Reese. Petitioner claims to have contacted the police by telephone, but never filed a police report concerning the alleged stalking by Mr. Reese.
Recommendation is, Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause, within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (1999), to terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for alleged sexual harassment of a co-worker. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a maintenance worker at Yulee Primary School in Yulee, Florida (the "school") for approximately 18 years. Petitioner has employed Ms. Joyce Sullivan as a food service worker for approximately three years. Respondent and Ms. Sullivan are co-workers. Respondent has no supervisory authority over Ms. Sullivan, has no authority to discipline Ms. Sullivan, and has no authority to affect the conditions of employment for Ms. Sullivan. The material facts in this case transpired over approximately ten minutes during work hours on April 6, 2000. Respondent approached Ms. Sullivan in the back kitchen of the school cafeteria shortly after breakfast and asked to speak to her privately. Ms. Sullivan agreed, and the two moved to the adjacent serving area near the checkout counter in the cafeteria. Respondent asked Ms. Sullivan to pose for pictures that would be nude, semi-nude, or partially clothed and that Respondent would enter into a contest on the internet. Respondent explained that the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan because the pictures would be taken from the neck down and that Ms. Sullivan could wear a bikini, a thong, or a bra. Ms. Sullivan asked Respondent what he was talking about. Respondent assured Ms. Sullivan that she would not be identified because the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan's face. Ms. Sullivan told Respondent that he was crazy. The entire conversation lasted approximately three minutes. Ms. Sullivan left Respondent and walked to the cash register to "ring up" the school principal who purchased some food. Ms. Sullivan went to an office in the back of the cafeteria with Ms. Sullivan's assistant manager. Respondent went to the back room and told Ms. Sullivan that he would show her some pictures on his computer. Respondent exited the room through the back door of the room to retrieve a laptop computer. Ms. Sullivan and her assistant manager went outside the back room and discussed the situation. Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed. After four or five minutes, Respondent returned to the back room and placed the laptop on the desk in front of Ms. Sullivan. The assistant manager was in the same room at another desk engaged in a telephone conversation. It took about 1.5 minutes for Respondent to turn on the laptop and display some pictures. The pictures included pictures of partially clad women and topless women. The situation terminated after 1.5 minutes when the assistant manager ended her telephone conversation, a child asked Ms. Sullivan to "ring up" some papers, and Ms. Sullivan's manager approached the room. Respondent changed the computer screen to a picture of his daughter and began talking to Ms. Sullivan's manager. Respondent left the school with the computer. Ms. Sullivan reported the incident to her manager, but Ms. Sullivan did not file a complaint for sexual harassment or state to her manager that she had been sexually harassed. Ms. Sullivan's manager relayed the information to Respondent's supervisor who discussed the matter with Respondent. Respondent admitted to the facts and expressed regret. Respondent's manager relayed the information to the Superintendent. The Superintendent investigated the matter and determined that Respondent had engaged in sexual harassment. The Superintendent based his determination on the definition of sexual harassment in the Board's Official Rule 3.54I.C. Rule 3.54I.C., in relevant part, states that sexual harassment consists of: . . . unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: . . . such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work . . . environment. Respondent's request for Ms. Sullivan to pose for sexually revealing pictures was either an unwelcomed sexual advance, request for sexual favor, or other inappropriate oral or written conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with Ms. Sullivan's work performance or created an offensive work environment. The Superintendent testified during cross-examination that he would not have determined that Respondent engaged in sexual harassment if Ms. Sullivan had not said no to Respondent's request. A preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Ms. Sullivan expressly said "no" when asked pose or view pictures. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed and that the entire episode was unwelcomed and offensive within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent has no previous discipline history. Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and its employees prescribes progressive discipline procedures for this case. Except in unusual circumstances, employment can be terminated only after an oral warning for a first offense, a reprimand for a second offense, a written warning for a third offense, and suspension for a fourth offense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of sexual harassment and suspending Respondent from employment for the time of the current suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. John L. Ruiz, Superintendent Nassau County School Board 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32304 Brent P. Abner, Esquire Suite F 4741 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Martha F. Dekle, Esquire 806 G Street Post Office Box 1644 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
The Issue Did Respondent, Jennifer Abadie, R.R.T., violate sections 468.365(1)(q), 468.365(1)(x), 456.072(1)(v), or 456.063(1), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ by committing sexual misconduct?
Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 468, Florida Statutes, charge the Board with regulating the practice of respiratory care in Florida. Ms. Abadie is a licensed registered respiratory therapist in Florida. Ms. Abadie worked for Comprehensive Healthcare of Clearwater (Comprehensive) from October 24, 2017, through February 4, 2018, at its Pinellas County, Florida, location. Comprehensive is a residential rehabilitation and nursing facility. Ms. Abadies’s 89-year-old father was a patient at Comprehensive from before she started working there until his death. He suffered from dementia. Ms. Abadie visited her father frequently, before and after her shifts and when she was not working. G.B. was a severely ill patient at Comprehensive trying to recover from multiple strokes. G.B. was only 56 years old. However, he had extensive medical conditions. They included hypertension, congestive heart failure, fibromyalgia, diabetes, blindness and end-stage renal (kidney) disease. G.B. received dialysis three times a week for his kidney disorder. He took dozens of medications daily. G.B. also had a tracheostomy. A tracheostomy is a tube that goes into the trachea to help people with impaired breathing breathe. The heavy treatment load weighed on G.B. psychologically and caused him anxiety and depression. Ms. Abadie provided respiratory therapy services to G.B. G.B. recognized Ms. Abadie from an earlier time when she worked at Florida Hospital where he had been a patient. He reminded her of that time and established a friendship with her. Over time, the friendship grew closer. As a result of their friendship and Ms. Abadie's compassion for G.B., Ms. Abadie and G.B. spoke regularly. When Ms. Abadie visited her father, she usually checked on G.B. He and Ms. Abadie talked about the range of subjects that acquaintances talk about including families, children, marital status, holiday plans, and day-to-day lives. They spoke regularly by telephone as well as in person. Although they spoke regularly, Ms. Abadie and G.B. did not always speak at length. Sometimes she just waved and poked her head in to say hello. At G.B.'s request, Ms. Abadie brought him items from outside the facility, such as toiletries and a blanket. G.B. grew very fond of Ms. Abadie and wanted her as his girlfriend and eventually his wife. Ms. Abadie did not encourage or reciprocate these feelings or intentions. Lisa Isabelle was G.B.'s only other visitor. G.B. was a friend of her husband. She had known G.B. for most of their lives. Ms. Isabelle rented G.B. a residence on her property. Ms. Isabelle described her relationship with G.B. as "love-hate." Ms. Isabelle held a durable power of attorney for G.B. His family lived out of town and decided it would be good for somebody local to hold the power of attorney. On Sunday, February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie came to Comprehensive to visit her father. She wanted to watch the Eagles play in the Super Bowl with him. Their family is from Philadelphia. Ms. Abadie stopped at G.B.'s room first. Charity Forest, L.P.N., was on-duty that day. G.B. was one of her patients. Towards the end of the first of her two shifts, Ms. Forest noticed that the curtain by G.B.’s bed was pulled halfway around his bed, which was unusual. The door was open. Ms. Forest entered G.B.’s room and looked around the curtain. She saw G.B. and Ms. Abadie sitting on the bed, on top of the covers. The head of the bed was raised about 45 degrees to provide a backrest. G.B. was wearing long pajama pants but not wearing a shirt. Ms. Abadie was wearing jean shorts, a T-shirt, and Keds®. Ms. Abadie was resting her feet on her iPad® so she would not dirty the covers. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were not touching each other. They were talking, watching television, and looking at pictures on Ms. Abadie's telephone. The room was a two-bed room. There was a patient in the other bed. Ms. Forest thought that the two sitting on the bed was inappropriate and left in search of her supervisor. Ms. Forest could not locate her supervisor. But she met another L.P.N., Ruth Schneck. Ms. Forest told Ms. Schneck what she had observed. Ms. Schneck went to G.B.'s room. The door was open. Ms. Schneck briefly entered the room. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Ms. Schneck left immediately, closing the door behind her. She joined the search for the supervisor. Neither Ms. Schneck nor Ms. Forest could locate the supervisor. While looking for the supervisor, Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck encountered Sean Flynn, L.P.N. They told him what they had seen. Mr. Flynn was a licensed practical nurse and a case manager at Comprehensive. He had come to the facility briefly that day in order to take care of some paperwork. After talking to Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck, Mr. Flynn went to G.B.’s room and opened the door. Ms. Abadie and G.B. were sitting on the edge of the bed facing the door. Mr. Flynn asked them if anything was going on. They said no. Mr. Flynn left the room and called Nicole Lawlor, Comprehensive's Chief Executive Officer. Ms. Lawlor told Mr. Flynn to return to G.B.'s room, instruct Ms. Abadie to leave, and tell her that she would be suspended pending an investigation. He returned to G.B.'s room with Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Mr. Flynn asked Ms. Abadie to step outside. She did. G.B. soon followed in his wheelchair. Mr. Flynn told Ms. Abadie that she was suspended and had to leave. G.B. overheard this and became very upset and aggressive. He insisted that Ms. Abadie was his girlfriend and that he wanted her to stay. Ms. Abadie asked to visit her father before she left. Mr. Flynn agreed. Ms. Abadie visited her father for a couple of hours. Ms. Abadie also called Ms. Isabelle to tell her that Mr. Flynn asked her to leave and that G.B. was very upset. After Ms. Abadie's departure, G.B. became increasingly upset and loud. His behavior escalated to slamming doors and throwing objects. Comprehensive employees decided G.B. was a danger to himself and others and had him involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act at Mease Dunedin Hospital. On her way home, Ms. Abadie received a telephone call offering her full-time employment at Lakeland Regional Hospital. February 4, 2018, at 6:08 p.m., Ms. Abadie submitted her resignation from Comprehensive in an e-mail to Ms. Lawlor. Ms. Abadie's only patient/caregiver relationship with G.B. was through her employment with Comprehensive. As of 6:08 p.m. on February 4, 2018, G.B. was not a patient of Ms. Abadie. She no longer had a professional relationship with him. Ms. Lawlor suspended Ms. Abadie on February 4, 2018. She based her decision on the information that Ms. Forest, Ms. Schneck, and Mr. Flynn told her, not all of which is persuasively established or found as fact in this proceeding. Still, Ms. Lawlor's memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie reveals that the nature of G.B.'s relationship with Ms. Abadie and the events of February 4, 2018, were not sexual. Ms. Lawlor's Employee Memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie does not identify a state or institution rule violated in the part of the form calling for one. She wrote "Flagrant violation of code of conduct." The description in the "Nature of Infraction" section of the form reads, "Employee was found cuddling in bed with a resident during her time off." There is no mention of sex, breasts, genitalia, or sexual language. None of the varying and sometimes inconsistent accounts of the day mention touching or exposure of breasts, buttocks, or genitalia. None of the accounts describes or even alludes to sex acts or statements about sex. The only kiss reported is a kiss on the cheek that G.B. reportedly forced upon Ms. Abadie as she was leaving. The deposition testimony of the Board's "expert," offers many statements showing that what the Board complains of might be called "inappropriate" or a "boundary violation" but does not amount to sexual misconduct. He testified about the strain a patient expressing romantic feelings toward a therapist puts on the professional relationship. He says the professional should tell the patient that the statements are inappropriate. The witness says that if the patient starts expressing the romantic feelings by touching the therapist, the therapist must tell the patient that his behavior is inappropriate and begin recording the events for the therapist's protection so that "no inappropriate allegations are made later." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 3). Asked his opinion about allegations that Ms. Abadie was laying on G.B.'s bed, the witness says the behavior "crossed a professional boundary" and that he was not aware of the "behavior being appropriate in any situation." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 16). The witness acknowledged that a hug is not inherently sexual. (Jt. Ex. 3, pp. 24 & 30). In addition, the training and experience of the witness do not qualify him as someone whose opinion should be entitled to significant weight. Among other things, he has never written about, lectured about, or testified to an opinion about sexual misconduct. Had the deposition not been offered without objection, whether the testimony would have been admissible is a fair question. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. After February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie attempted to continue her friendship with G.B. by telephone calls and visits. However, Comprehensive refused for several weeks, against G.B.'s wishes, to allow Ms. Abadie to visit G.B. and would only permit Ms. Abadie brief, supervised visits with her father. G.B. was very upset by Comprehensive's prohibition of visits from Ms. Abadie. He began refusing food and treatment, including medications and dialysis. G.B.'s condition deteriorated to the point that he was admitted to hospice care. At that point, on February 24, 2018, Comprehensive contacted Ms. Abadie and gave her permission to visit G.B and lifted restrictions on visiting her father. A February 27, 2018, e-mail from Shelly Wise, Director of Nursing, confirmed this and admitted that the Agency for Health Care Administration had advised that G.B.'s right as a resident to visitors trumped Comprehensive's concerns. Ms. Abadie resumed visiting her friend, G.B. On May 21, 2018, G.B. passed away. G.B. was a lonely, mortally ill man. He initiated a friendship with Ms. Abadie that she reciprocated. Ultimately, he developed unfounded feelings about her being his girlfriend and them having a future together. The clear and convincing evidence does not prove that the relationship was more than a friendship or that it was sexual in any way.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Mary A. Iglehart, Esquire Christina Arzillo Shideler, Esquire Florida Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Kennan George Dandar, Esquire Dandar & Dandar, P.A. Post Office Box 24597 Tampa, Florida 33623
Recommendation Based on the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Respiratory Care, dismiss the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on her sex and by retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2008). As a Florida non-profit corporation, all of Respondent's activities are governed by its bylaws. Petitioner, a white female, has worked for Respondent off and on during the last five years. Most recently, Petitioner began working for Respondent on January 18, 2008, as a part-time food preparation (prep) worker and a part-time waitress in Respondent's restaurant. Petitioner accepted the job because she had recently left a full-time position with another employer due to the distance of that job from her house. As a prep worker, Petitioner earned a set hourly wage. Petitioner's responsibilities included assisting the chef in preparing meals and cleaning up the kitchen. The chef, Tony Mongone, directed Petitioner's kitchen work but he was not her supervisor. As a waitress, Petitioner earned $3.35 per hour plus tips. On Tuesdays and Fridays, Petitioner earned an average of $100 in tips per shift. Petitioner worked between five and six hours on Tuesday evenings and between five and eight hours on Friday evenings when Respondent served sit-down dinners to its members. On these occasions, Respondent's kitchen served an average of 200 dinners in a two-hour period of time. Petitioner also worked when Respondent catered for banquets and other special occasions. Petitioner worked a total of 41.66 hours in January 2008; 81.5 hours in February 2008; 45.13 hours in March 2008; and 71.17 hours in April 2008. She worked 10.32 hours for the first week in May 2008. Over the course of her 15.4 week term of employment, Petitioner averaged 16.23 hours per week. Although it varied according to the event, there were five to eight other servers or waitresses (all females) working along with Petitioner on any given night. There always were eight-to-10 workers in and around the kitchen, including the servers, the chef, one pizza maker, and the kitchen prep person. At all times relevant here, Linda Ferguson was the club manager and Petitioner's direct supervisor. Ms. Ferguson was responsible for day-to-day management of all club activities with the authority to enforce all club policies. Ms. Ferguson also was in charge of all aspects of hiring and terminating employees and managing volunteer personnel. Ms. Ferguson was in the restaurant on most Friday evenings. When Ms. Ferguson was not scheduled to work, the assistant manager, Carolyn Weeks, was on duty. On Petitioner’s first night as the kitchen prep worker, Chef Mongone was drinking from a pitcher of beer. Early in the evening, Chef Mongone made comments about her breasts, telling her they were nice and asking whether they were real. Later that evening, when the staff was cleaning the kitchen, Chef Mongone walked up behind Petitioner and touched her backside. Petitioner immediately turned on Chef Mongone, telling him assertively, "Don't ever do that again! How would you like it if someone did that to your wife?" Chef Mongone just stood there as Petitioner turned and walked away. Petitioner immediately informed Ms. Ferguson about the incident. Ms. Ferguson inquired whether Petitioner wanted her "to take care of it." Petitioner responded that she felt she "had already done so." Ms. Ferguson spoke to Chef Mongone about his drinking on the job and his inappropriate conduct. Chef Mongone responded in an insubordinate way, denying all allegations of improper conduct. Ms. Ferguson also spoke to Mike Mercante, Respondent's President at that time. Ms. Ferguson complained to Mr. Mercante about Chef Mongone's drinking and offensive conduct. In the following weeks, Chef Mongone sometimes raised his voice at Petitioner and she back at him. On days that Petitioner worked as a waitress, Chef Mongone held up Petitioner's food orders, causing delays in service that resulted in reduced tips for Petitioner. The delays in releasing Petitioner's food orders usually occurred after Petitioner and Chef Mongone exchanged angry words. On or about February 11, 2008, Petitioner was working as a waitress. When she placed her first food order, Chef Mongone began yelling at her for not putting her name and table number on the ticket. When Petitioner reached to retrieve the ticket, Chef Mongone told her not to touch it. At that point, Petitioner started yelling at Chef Mongone. Petitioner admits her response was not nice and describes herself as having "lost it." When Petitioner returned to the kitchen to get her next order, she overheard Chef Mongone telling the kitchen staff that she was stupid because she could not remember to put her name on a ticket. Once again Petitioner's temper got the best of her. Petitioner called Chef Mongone a drunk, triggering another argument with Chef Mongone. Despite the hard feelings between Chef Mongone and Petitioner, Chef Mongone made additional inappropriate remarks to Petitioner. On one occasion, Chef Mongone observed Petitioner wiping her hand on the seat of her pants. Chef Mongone then stated that he "would like to do that, too." On or about February 15, 2008, Petitioner was scheduled to work first as a prep worker and later as a waitress. While she was in the kitchen, she shared a bag of Valentine candy with the staff. When only one piece of candy was left, Petitioner asked Chef Mongone if he wanted it. Chef Mongone replied that he did not want the candy. However, when Petitioner put the candy in her mouth, Chef Mongone made some comment about the way Petitioner sucked the candy. Chef Mongone immediately stated that he did not mean for his comment to come out like it did. Nevertheless, Petitioner was offended and responded in a negative way. Sometime after February 15, 2008, Petitioner wrote a letter to the members of Respondent's Executive Board. The letter details Petitioner conflict with Chef Mongone. Petitioner gave the letter to Ms. Ferguson, who gave it to Mr. Mercante. February 15, 2008, was Petitioner's last day as a kitchen prep worker. From that time forward, Ms. Ferguson scheduled Petitioner to work only as a waitress in order to reduce the time Petitioner would have to spend in the kitchen. On February 20, 2008, Respondent's Executive Board had a meeting. At the meeting, the board members discussed Petitioner's letter. Chef Mongone attended the meeting and denied all allegations. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Executive Board directed one of its members to draft a letter of reprimand for Chef Mongone. In an internal memorandum dated February 22, 2008, Respondent's Executive Board advised Chef Mongone that he had been warned about his rule infractions and general behavior for the past recent months. According to the memorandum, Chef Mongone would receive no further warnings and any future infractions of club rules or Florida law would result in disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination of employment. Respondent does not have a written policy prohibiting sexual harassment. It does have a rule against drinking on duty. On or about May 6, 2008, Petitioner once again became upset at work because the kitchen was crowded and Chef Mongone yelled at her. Petitioner called her husband to complain that Chef Mongone had cursed at her, saying, "Bitch, get the f--- out of the kitchen.” Petitioner also alleged that Chef Mongone was holding up her food orders. When Petitioner's husband arrived at the restaurant, he met Petitioner, Chef Mongone, Ms. Weeks (Assistant Manager), and Lou Barletta (Respondent's Vice President) in the restaurant's parking lot. Petitioner's husband told Chef Mongone that Petitioner would show him respect if Chef Mongone demonstrated respect for Petitioner. The discussion in the parking lot was civil and ended with Chef Mongone and Petitioner's husband shaking hands. After the meeting, Chef Mongone made it clear that he could no longer work with Petitioner and that one of them had to go. Petitioner did not want to go back into the kitchen after the meeting. Ms. Weeks suggested that Petitioner go home until everything cooled down. Petitioner agreed and left the premises. Petitioner was scheduled to work the following Saturday. Before Petitioner reported to work, Ms. Ferguson talked to Mr. Mercante. After that conversation, Ms. Ferguson told Petitioner that she should not come back to work until Ms. Ferguson could replace Chef Mongone. Ms. Ferguson was actively looking for a new chef. After locating a replacement for Chef Mongone, Mr. Mercante would not approve the termination of Chef Mongone's employment. At the end of June 2008, Respondent did not renew Ms. Ferguson's contract. Ms. Weeks replaced Ms. Ferguson as Respondent's General Manager. Due to financial difficulties, Respondent did not hire an assistant manager when Ms. Weeks became the General Manager. Respondent also eliminated all table-busing positions, using volunteers to clear the tables. Respondent has not called anyone back to work after laying them off. Like Ms. Ferguson, Ms. Weeks had problems with Chef Mongone. She eventually hired a new chef and fired Chef Mongone due to his alcohol consumption at work. Petitioner initially drew unemployment compensation from Respondent's place of business. Except for a couple of days of work, Petitioner has been unemployed since May 6, 2008. She is still drawing unemployment compensation from her most recent employer. Petitioner acknowledges that the economy is the reason she has been unable to obtain a job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: David Glasser, Esquire Glasser & Handel 116 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Mary Nelson Morgan, Esquire Cole, Stone, Stoudemire, and Morgan P.A. 201 North Hogan Street Suite 200 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Should Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: Respondent was certified by the Commission on June 10, 1977, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 41580. The Administrative Complaint alleges that: (a) On or between January 1, 1973, and December 31, 1974, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Deborah Brice, a child under sixteen years of age, by fondling her breasts and kissing her neck; (b) On or between January l, 1976, and December 31, 1979, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Dorothy Spickard, a child under sixteen years of age, by putting her on his lap and tickling her near her vaginal area; (c) On or between January 1, 1976, and December 31, 1979, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Dawn Whitehead, a child under sixteen years of age, by digitally penetrating her vagina areas and placing her hands on his penis; and (d) On or between June 1, 1969, and December 31, 1971, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Susan Kleine, a child under sixteen years of age, by kissing her on the neck, French-kissing her, and forcing her on a bed and getting on top of her, simulating sexual intercourse. Debra Brice, Dorothy A. Spickard, Dawn Allison Steward (f/n/a Dawn Allison Whitehead), and Susan Kleine testified that Respondent touched them inappropriately during the middle 1970's while they were under the age of 18 years. Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, and Susan Kleine were around the age of 14 to 15 years at the time the inappropriate touching was alleged to have occurred. Dawn Steward was around the age of 8 to 9 years at the time the inappropriate touching was alleged to have occurred. Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, and Dawn Steward are nieces of Respondent's ex-wife, Carol, who was married to Respondent during the time that the alleged incidents were supposed to have occurred. Susan Kleine is a sister of Respondent's ex-wife, Carol. Respondent and Carol were married in 1966, and were divorced sometime around 1978-79. It was not until the latter part of 1993, approximately 20 years later, that Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine told anyone of this alleged inappropriate touching. Sometime around the latter part of 1993, Carol discussed this inappropriate touching with Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine. Sometime around the latter part of 1993, this alleged inappropriate touching was discussed in the presence of Debra Brice or Dorothy Spickard or Dawn Steward or Susan Kleine during therapy sessions involving Carol's and Respondent's child. While Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine appeared to be relatively clear on the facts concerning the alleged inappropriate touching, they were not clear on all the facts surrounding the alleged incidents. There was no evidence presented to corroborate the testimony of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, or Susan Kleine. Respondent denies any inappropriate touching of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine. Respondent admits tickling and wrestling with Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine in a playful manner but denies touching any of them in an inappropriate manner, specifically in an inappropriate sexual manner. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Respondent touched Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine in an inappropriate manner, sexually or otherwise, notwithstanding the testimony of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine to the contrary which I find lacks credibility due to the reasons set forth in Findings of Fact 5 through 9.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, accordingly, Recommended that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Thomas M. Lindsey 21367 Anderson Road Brooksville, Florida 34601 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Mojo Old City BBQ ("Mojo"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on his gender.
Findings Of Fact Mojo is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Mojo owns and operates a restaurant at 5 Cordova Street in St. Augustine. Mojo has put in place written policies and procedures that prohibit, among other things, discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, gender, national origin, or any other categories of persons protected by state or federal anti- discrimination laws. The policies also provide a specific complaint procedure for any employee who believes that he or she is being discriminated against or harassed. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received an orientation that thoroughly explained the anti-discrimination and reporting policies. Testimony at the hearing established that Petitioner was again informed of these policies at an employee insurance meeting held in October 2013. Petitioner, a black male, was hired by Mojo on August 2, 2013, as a dishwasher. Petitioner testified that “from day one” he was called names and harassed by everyone at Mojo, employees and managers alike. He stated that an employee named Linwood Finley would yell that he didn’t want to work with a man who looked like a girl, or a “he/she.” Mr. Finley said, “I don’t want to work with a man that can't have kids.” Petitioner testified that the managers and staff would accuse him of looking between their legs. Employees would walk up to him and try to kiss him. He was told that he had to go along with these antics or find somewhere else to wash dishes. Petitioner testified that he believed he was fired for refusing to kiss other male employees. He had seen Mr. Finley and another male employee kissing behind the restaurant. He stated that two male employees had tried to kiss him and he refused their advances. Petitioner testified that he complained about the kissing to anyone who would listen. He said, “I’m not a woman, I’m a man. I got to come in here every day to the same stuff over and over. Y’all act like little kids.” Petitioner stated that when he complained, the harassment would stop for the rest of that day but would resume on the following day. Petitioner testified that there is a conspiracy against him in St. Augustine. For the last five years, he has been harassed in the same way at every place he has worked. Petitioner specifically cited Flagler College, the Columbia Restaurant, and Winn-Dixie as places where he worked and suffered name calling and harassment. Petitioner testified that he wanted to call several employees from Mojo as witnesses but that he was unable to subpoena them because Mojo refused to provide him with their addresses. Petitioner could provide no tangible evidence of having made any discovery requests on Mojo. Petitioner was terminated on November 29, 2013, pursuant to a “Disciplinary Action Form” that provided as follows: Roderick closed Wednesday night2/ in the dish pit. Again we have come to the problem with Roderick not working well with others causing a hostile work environment. This has been an ongoing issue. This issue has not resolved itself, and has been tolerated long enough. Roderick has been talked [to] about this plenty of times and written up previously for the same behavior. The documentary evidence established that Petitioner had received another Disciplinary Action Form on October 2, 2013, providing a written warning for insubordination for his hostile reaction when a manager asked him to pick up the pace in the evening. Laura Jenkins, the front-house supervisor at Mojo, was present at Mojo on the night of November 27, 2013. She testified that Petitioner had a history of getting into arguments with other kitchen employees that escalated into screaming matches during which Petitioner would commence calling the other employees “nigger.” Ms. Jenkins stated that on more than one occasion she had asked Petitioner to cease using “the ‘N’ word.” On the night of November 27, Petitioner was running behind on the dishes, so Ms. Jenkins asked another kitchen employee, Colin Griffin, to pitch in and help him. Petitioner did not want the help and argued with Mr. Griffin. Ms. Jenkins testified that Petitioner was screaming and cursing. The situation was so volatile that Ms. Jenkins felt physically threatened by Petitioner. She was afraid to discipline him that evening while she was the sole manager in the restaurant. On November 29, Ms. Jenkins met with kitchen manager Billy Ambrose and general manager Linda Prescott. They decided that Petitioner’s actions could not be tolerated anymore and that his employment would be terminated. Mr. Ambrose testified that on several occasions he sent people to help Petitioner in the dish pit and Petitioner refused their help. Petitioner would get into arguments with other employees over such things as the proper way to stack dishes. Mr. Ambrose named four different employees, including Mr. Finley, whom he sent to help Petitioner. Each one of them reported that Petitioner started an argument. Mr. Ambrose stated he went in to help Petitioner himself on one occasion and that Petitioner “kind of gave me attitude” despite the fact that Mr. Ambrose was his supervisor. Mr. Ambrose testified that Petitioner had an argument with Mr. Finley one morning that resulted in Mr. Ambrose having a cautionary talk with both employees. Mr. Ambrose sent Mr. Finley to help Petitioner in the dish pit. Petitioner stated, “Nigger, I don’t need your help.” Mr. Ambrose asked if there was a problem. Petitioner said, “No, we’re fine.” Mr. Ambrose asked Mr. Finley if everything was all right. Mr. Finley replied, “Yeah, I guess he’s just having a bad day.” Mr. Ambrose returned to his work only to find, five minutes later, that the two men were nose to nose arguing about the fact that Mr. Finley wasn’t washing dishes the way Petitioner liked. Ms. Jenkins, Mr. Ambrose, and Ms. Prescott all testified that they had never seen another employee harass Petitioner and had never heard of such a thing occurring. Petitioner never complained to any of these supervisors about discrimination or harassment of any kind. All three testified that they had never seen male employees kissing one another on the job nor seen any male employee attempt to kiss Petitioner. The three supervisors never heard any employee make comments about Petitioner’s appearing to be a girl. Ms. Jenkins testified that as a gay woman she would absolutely not allow any discrimination based on Petitioner’s gender orientation. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Mojo for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Mojo's stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s gender. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Mojo discriminated against him because of his gender in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that his dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that he made while an employee of Mojo. There was no credible evidence that Petitioner ever complained to a superior about the alleged harassment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Mojo Old City BBQ did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2015.
The Issue Whether petitioner suffered sexual harassment for which respondent is answerable, or whether, on account of her sex, respondent discriminated against her by paying her unequal wages, or whether, in terminating her employment, respondent retaliated against her on account of statutorily protected activity?
Findings Of Fact In April, of 1982, the year after her 19-year marriage to a Mr. Powell, whose surname she originally kept, came to an end, petitioner Gloria Patricia Hord, as she has been known since her remarriage in August of 1984, began work for respondent Bell Aerospace Textron, which has since become the Textron Marine Systems Division of Textron, Inc. (Textron). A defense contractor that builds landing craft air cushion vehicles and trains Navy personnel to operate them, Textron employs perhaps 130 persons in Panama City alone. Textron has a written policy against sexual harassment by or of its employees. As Textron's director of logistics at its Panama City facility, George Gust Alepakos, told the petitioner she was hired on April 3, 1982. Robert L. Ormsby and Albert Eugene "Bud" Small, the supervisor of inventory control who, as her immediate supervisor, shared an office with her when she began, had already interviewed her. Bell hired her as a clerk, general class III in labor grade N-6. The duties of general class III clerks are: Under general supervision, performs a variety of clerical work, where there is individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of important records and where decisions within the limits of policies or rules are required. Performs duties such as or similar to the following: supervises and works with a small group of clerks; sets up and maintains record systems of a widely varying nature, including secret or confidential material or information; prepares and issues reports as required; contacts other personnel as necessary in maintaining accurate records; reads reports, correspondence, publications, etc., and abstracts therefrom information pertaining to a particular subject; may perform miscellaneous duties relate dot office work, such as filing, operating various machines, etc. (sic). Respondent's Exhibit No. 23. According to Bell's job description, "demonstrated supervisory ability", is a desirable qualification for general class III clerks. In addition to processing receipts and keeping inventory logs, Patty Powell, as her co-workers then called her, typed and did other secretarial chores for Textron. She worked in a trailer which housed other offices and other workers, including Carol Bjorgan, Robert L. Ormsby, Monica Mitchell, Mike Pate, Mike Smith, Betty Brandon, and George Alepakos, to whom Mr. Small reported. Mr. Alepakos was in the adjoining office. Witnesses described Mr. Alepakos as personable, fun loving, happy go lucky, warm, friendly, outgoing, talkative, loud, sometimes grouchy, displaying a temper at times without being a screamer, dedicated, conscientious, a hard worker and a firm manager. He looked at the hearing to be in his sixties. The time Ms. Powell told him he reminded her of her grandfather, he said she had hurt his feelings. One day as Ms. Powell, then 36 years old, was typing, Mr. Alepakos stood behind her and placed his hands on her shoulders, watching her finish a memorandum. Mr. Alepakos invited Ms. Powell to lunch on several occasions. He regularly took employees in his group to lunch, both male and female, individually and in groups. Conversations at lunch were "business-related" and "very professional" at first. The third or fourth time they ate lunch together, however, Mr. Alepakos professed his love for Ms. Powell. Thereafter, when Mr. Small left the office, Mr. Alepakos would stop in. Within a week of declaring himself at lunch, he said, "I really mean it." He told her she would grow to love him, would learn to, and began leaving notes for her, typically like the one that said, "I love you," signed "George ." She "tried to laugh it off," questioning his sincerity. He was married, and she had a boyfriend. Beginning in the summer of 1982, he asked her almost daily for lunch. He telephoned to inquire, "Have I told you today that I love you?" Sometimes she went to lunch with him during this period, but more often she declined. He promised to behave if she accepted his invitations for lunch, but, in Ms. Powell's view, he welshed on these promises. She had mixed feelings about George Alepakos. She discussed with Carol Bjorgan the possibility of a relationship with him. By this time, her boyfriend Chip McDill had left her in the lurch. It would be nice to have someone older to take care of her, she mused aloud; and she felt she would be better off materially. Never once did she complain to Carol Bjorgan about Mr. Alepakos' romantic interest in her. She left him notes. One note, signed "Patty" and written on notepaper depicting two smiling bees among azalea blossoms, read, "Have a wonderful vacation, then hurry back." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One night she and Carol were drinking during "happy hour." Saying she wanted to talk to George, she telephoned his home, but hung up when his wife answered. She sometimes seemed to boast about Mr. Alepakos' taking her to lunch, asking, "Guess who I'm going to lunch with?" At Peddlers Alley one night, Mlles. Hord and Bjorgan met Mr. Alepakos for drinks. When they arrived, Ms. Hord playfully pretended to sit in Mr. Alepakos' lap, and said to Ms. Bjorgan, "We can handle it from here." In December of 1982, both Mr. Alepakos and Ms. Powell attended a party at a bar or restaurant. Mr. Alepakos "didn't think much" of her going out with the 23-year old man who escorted her to the party, danced with her, kissed her while they were on the dance floor, and, later in the evening, wrestled with her in the back seat of an automobile parked outside the establishment. He felt that "it looked bad for the company." The next morning, he called her into his office, told her she had "fallen off [her] pedestal," and that somebody had said she had behaved like a slut. Over the Christmas holidays she was in the hospital, and afterwards visited her mother in Atlanta. Mr. Alepakos called her there at the number she had given him, to ask about her health and to learn when she was coming back to work. On her return she talked things over with Mr. Small, her immediate supervisor, although she never told him about Mr. Alepakos' touching her. He advised her to decline the luncheon invitations and avoid Mr. Alepakos as much as possible. He spoke to Mr. Ormsby about the matter, at her request. In deference to Ms. Powell, who asked that nobody say anything to Mr. Alepakos, Mr. Small spoke to Mr. Ormsby "off the record." At some point, Mr. Alepakos called on Ms. Powell at the apartment she had recently moved into at Panama City Beach. She had invited him. When he arrived he found her with her daughter and stayed only about 20 minutes. Eventually Patty Powell went herself to Mr. Ormsby, and Mr. Ormsby took the matter up with Clarence L. Forrest, then the vice-president in charge of Textron's Panama City operations. Messrs. Ormsby and Forrest decided to transfer Ms. Powell to a general secretarial and word processing assignment in "the training trailer." The transfer was "lateral" in the sense that neither Ms. Powell's official job description nor her labor grade changed. In her new situation, she was involved in the production of training manuals. Bell hired two other word processing clerks to assist in this effort, Diane Ansell and April Dawn Day. Ms. Powell had recommended both Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day. She helped train them when they began. Even after they had learned the ropes, she gave them work to do which she proofread afterwards. If she was out, Ms. Ansell would assume these duties. Ms. Powell wrote out evaluations for Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day, although she never signed them. She did once sign an overtime authorization form, but Mr. Forrest sent it back for Mr. Higgins' signature and resubmission. She assumed her new duties in February of 1983, but invitations to lunch and expressions of affection continued after the transfer. One afternoon, just after Ms. Powell left the office, Mr. Alepakos said to Diane Ansell, "I love that girl," referring to Ms. Powell. After she told Mr. Ormsby that Mr. Alepakos would not leave her be, Mr. Forrest instructed Mr. Alepakos to cease and desist from any activity involving Ms. Powell unrelated to professional requirements, and directed him to communicate with her, if at all, through third parties. During the ensuing eight or nine months, Mr. Alepakos avoided Ms. Powell entirely. He "went the other way around when he saw her coming." In the fall of 1983, however, they were both at an office party at the Long Glass. She grabbed his shirt and led him into another room, where she asked him why he had been avoiding her. According to a friend and co-worker, petitioner was not "an outward flirt," except when she drank. Encouraged by the evening's events, Mr. Alepakos resumed his attentions. He telephoned several times a day, unless he was angry, and they began lunching together again. At various times, she told him she was at the point of reconciliation with her ex-husband, that she was seeing a boyfriend, and that she was gay. But she accepted a good many of his luncheon invitations, which was enough to inspire him to several proposals of marriage. In November of 1983, Ms. Powell came to work early one morning and made her way in the still dark trailer to the word processing room. Suddenly Mr. Alepakos, whom she had not seen nor expected to be there, embraced her and tried to kiss her. When the lights came on, he said, "I'm sorry", and left. During this period, Ms. Powell worked under the immediate supervision of Frank Higgins, who left civilian employment with the Navy and began with Textron in August of 1983. In early December of that year, Ms. Powell spoke to Mr. Higgins about Mr. Alepakos. After a second conversation on the subject, on February 9, 1984, Mr. Higgins stated, in a "Memo For the Record": FOR BACKGROUND, PATTY IS AN EXTREMELY QUIET, SHY PERSON WITH A RATHER "FRAGILE" QUALITY. SHE IS A DEDICATED PROFESSIONAL IN HER APPROACH TO HER JOB. SHE HAS NEVER APPEARED TO PROJECT (AVERT OR OTHERWISE) HER SEXUALITY AT WORK, DRESSES CONSERVATIVELY - AN IDEAL FEMALE WORKER IN TERMS OF NOT BEING INVOLVED TO ANY EXTENT WITH HER MALE CO- WORKERS OTHER THEN PROFESSIONALLY. SHE HAS NOT AND PROFESSES NO[T] TO WANT TO DATE ANYONE FROM WORK. GEORGE IS APPARENTLY "LEANING" ON HER AT WORK TO THE POINT SHE'S BECOMING EMOTIONALLY FRAZZLED OVER IT. HE PROFESSES TO BE IN LOVE AND "WANTS HER." GEORGE IS INSANELY JEALOUS OF HER BEING SURROUNDED BY ALL THESE MEN AND TOLD HER THAT DAVE STULTS, BOB NISSLEY AND MYSELF ARE OR MAY WANT TO BE ROMANTICALLY INVOLVED. HE CALLS HER SEVERAL TIMES SOME DAYS, SOMETIMES ASKING HER TO COME TO HIS OFFICE WHERE "COMMENTS ARE MADE" TO HER. SHE IS AFRAID NOT TO GO OVER TO HIS OFFICE - APPARENTLY FEELS GEORGE IS A POWER BROKER AND IF SHE GETS HIM MAD, HE'LL TAKE IT OUT ON TRAINING BY NOT SUPPORTING OUR NEEDS. PATTY SAYS SHE HAS TRIED EVERY CONCEIVABLE APPROACH TO TELL GEORGE SHE IS NOT INTERESTED IN HIM AND HE'S ANNOYING HER & SHE WANTS IT STOPPED. YET HE REFUSES TO LEAVE HER ALONE. I TOLD HER THAT SHE NEEDS TO THREATEN HIM WITH HARASSMENT CHARGES & BE WILLING TO FOLLOW UP ON THEM TO THE BITTER END - IF GEO. KNEW SHE WAS SERIOUS AND HIS JOB WAS IN DANGER, I HOPE HE WOULD BE PRUDENT ENOUGH TO BACK AWAY. PATTY SEEMS RELUCTANT TO PRESS CHARGES FOR FEAR THAT SHE WILL END UP BEING FIRED AND PERCEIVED AS THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. SHE FEELS CASEY WILL PROTECT GEORGE AND WOULD CONSIDER GEO. MORE IMPORTANT TO BELL THAN PATTY. IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH CASEY DATING BACK TO DECEMBER, I TOO SENSED THAT EITHER CASEY WASN'T BE[ING] OBJECTIVE OR FAIR IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF PATTY OR THAT POSSIBLY GEORGE HAD BEEN FEEDING CASEY LIES AND INNUENDO ABOUT PATTY'S POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH PERSONNEL IN TRAINING. THE APPARENT STRATEGY IS TO CAST DOUBTS ABOUT PATTY'S CHARACTER SUCH THAT IF HIS SITUATION EVER BOILED TO THE SURFACE HE COULD BLAME IT ON HER TO SAVE HIS JOB. I BELIEVE THERE IS ENOUGH INFO AVAILABLE TO HAVE GEO. REPRIMANDED OR FIRED OVER THIS. THERE ARE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE SEEN OR HEARD GEO. MAKE APPROACHES TO HER WHO I'M SURE WOULD COME FORWARD TO SUPPORT PATTY'S POSITION. SINCE THE DISCUSSION WAS OFF THE RECORD I AGREED NOT TO APPROACH CASEY YET. I OFFERED TO SPEAK WITH GEO. BUT IF HE PERCEIVES ME AS A COMPETITOR FOR PATTY, HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD MISCONSTRUE MY INTENTIONS. I DO INTEND TO SPEAK TO LENNY MORGAN "OFF THE RECORD" NEXT WEEK IN NEW ORLEANS TO GAIN SOME ADDITIONAL INSIGHT IN HANDLING THIS ISSUE. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. In a second "Memo For The Record," Mr. Higgins reported discussing the situation with Mr. Morgan, and summarized the latter's advice. * * * LENNY'S BOTTOM LINE WAS AS I SUSPECTED - DON'T LEAVE IT SIMMERING TAKE FIRM ACTION. BRING IT TO CASEY'S ATTENTION. LENNY INDICATED HE WOULD BE GLAD TO COME OVER AND BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SOLVING THIS. * * * Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Although Mr. Higgins never showed these memoranda to "Casey" Forrest, who only learned of them after the present proceedings began, he did mention the situation to Mr. Forrest, who indicated that he wondered whether there was a "problem on both sides," but agreed to speak to Mr. Alepakos. By the time Mr. Higgins left Panama City, in July of 1984, he thought the situation had been resolved. About this time, Ms. Powell told Mr. Alepakos she planned to remarry. He responded that he would be there, if it did not work out. He said he still loved her, and he did not stop asking her out, although, after she became Mrs. Hord, she consistently declined. He continued to declare his love. Mrs. Hord again complained, this time to B. L. Nissley, Textron's director of training documentation, on or about December 15, 1985. Her complaint notwithstanding, she sent Mr. Alepakos a poinsettia for Christmas. At some point, she left a note on his desk, saying "Missing you, P.H." By a memorandum dated January 29, 1985, Mr. Nissley asked Mr. Forrest for a formal investigation "to assure that this problem be resolved once and for all." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. On January 31, 1985, Mr. Forrest interviewed Mrs. Hord in Mr. Ormsby's presence. She reported the frequent invitations to lunch and a suggestion by Mr. Alepakos that they take a vacation together, but said nothing about his touching her. Messrs. Forrest and Ormsby also interviewed Mr. Alepakos. They decided it might be well for a disinterested third party to investigate, and asked Textron's Mr. Morgan to come over from New Orleans for the purpose. Mr. Morgan interviewed Mrs. Hord for two and a half hours on February 10 or 11, 1985. In answer to his questions, Mrs. Hord said that Mr. Alepakos had not asked her for sexual favors, and had not behaved vulgarly, lewdly or indecently. Nor did she advert to the early morning incident in the trailer, which Mr. Alepakos admitted at hearing, while denying any attempt to kiss her. When Mr. Morgan asked her if Mr. Alepakos had ever touched her, or tried to kiss her or to force himself on her, she answered no. Mr. Morgan asked Mrs. Hord to name others who could support her claim of harassment. She gave him only one name, Ms. Ansell's. Mr. Morgan also interviewed George Alepakos at length, and asked him to name others who could support his assertions. Mr. Alepakos gave him some five names. After interviewing these people and Ms. Ansell, Mr. Morgan returned to New Orleans and stated his conclusions in a memorandum dated February 15, 1985. Mr. Forrest wrote Mr. Alepakos a memorandum advising him that his "conduct in the matter lacked professionalism and good judgement." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. He was "warned to confine ... communications and relationships with Mrs. G. Hord to a professional/business environment." Id. This February 25, 1985, memorandum raised "the possibility of termination of [Alepakos'] employment," id. in the event "the cited harassments reoccur[ed]." Id. But the phrase "cited harassments" was a reference to the February 15, 1985, memorandum, Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, in which Mr. Morgan stated: Since the evidence indicates that the relationship was two sided, I find it difficult to describe the activity of Mr. Alepakos as one of harassment. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, p. 2. Mr. Forrest did not warn or reprimand Mrs. Hord because he felt a supervisor or manager had a different responsibility in matters of this kind than an employee under supervision. At no time, did Mr. Alepakos tell her off color stories, show her pornographic photographs, explicitly solicit sexual favors, or make obscene gestures to or from Mrs. Hord. It fell to Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley to relay the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation to Mrs. Hord. The three of them gathered in Mr. Nissley's office, and he furnished her a copy to read. She had gotten part way through when she exclaimed, "That's a lie. I never sent him flowers. I never left notes on his desk." She threw down the report, and left the office, despite Mr. Nissley's telling her to stay. She dismissed the February 15, 1985, memorandum as a "bunch of bullshit." Mr. Nissley spoke to her afterwards and told her that he would not tolerate vulgar outbursts in the future. She telephoned Mr. Morgan and complained to him about the result of the investigation. She told him she did not think the report was fair or that it reflected what had happened. She became upset and characterized the report as "bullshit." To this he replied, "Wait a minute. I'll answer any question you want to ask." But she hung up the telephone. On January 30, 1985, Mrs. Hord had asked to take a leave of absence. Her request approved, she began thirty days' leave soon after she learned the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation. Upon her return, Mr. Nissley told her about the results of her annual evaluation, and informed her she had been given a raise of $.20 per hour. The $.20 raise took effect March 16, 1985. With the raise, Mrs. Hord was paid $7.90 per hour, a dollar an hour more than Diane "Dee" Ansell was paid. And Ms. Ansell was paid more than April Dawn Day, the third word processing clerk who helped produce training materials for Navy personnel. Mrs. Hord requested a meeting with Mr. Forrest to discuss the raise, which brought her salary to the highest authorized for her position; it was the same amount as the raise the other two word processing clerks in the training program received. But, since she was paid more than they were, the raise represented a smaller percentage of increase, and she objected. On the morning of March 27, 1985, when Mrs. Hord met with Mr. Forrest, Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley were also present. She told them Bell could keep the raise. Mr. Forrest began to explain the mechanics of Bell's merit raise system, when Mrs. Hord interrupted, "It's a bunch of bullshit. You can do anything you want." As she started to leave, Mr. Forrest told her to stay, but she refused. At one point, she called her bosses "jackasses." According to Mr. Forrest's secretary, who was outside, she "had a wild look" as she slammed the door on her way out. Before they dispersed, Mr. Forrest and the others decided to terminate her employment, unless Mr. Morgan advised against it. Mr. Forrest thought her language "unbecoming a lady." He certainly would not have expected a woman to use such language, and it did not affect him in the same way as it would have, if a man had used the same language. On the other hand, he would not have expected any of Bell's Panama City employees to use language of this kind in such a setting. Mr. Forrest testified under oath that Mrs. Hord was not fired because he found her language the more offensive on account of her femininity. Apprised of the situation, Mr. Morgan consulted a New York lawyer, then told management in Panama City he had no objection to firing Mrs. Hord. Mr. Ormsby then caused a memorandum to be addressed to Mrs. Hord, notifying her that her employment was "terminated as of this date (27 March 1985), for gross disrespect, incertituded (sic), premeditated and continued disregard for all levels of Management ... so as to challenge the management of this company and to incite disrespect of other employees ...." Respondent's Exhibit No. 10.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Gloria Hord's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1987. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2, the evidence showed that she worked as an acting supervisor for Columbia Research but not, as far as the hearing officer's notes reflect, for CSC. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the evidence showed that Mr. Small interviewed her first. Mr. Alepakos, as his supervisor, could presumably have overruled Mr. Small's choice even if Mr. Small made the "basic decision" to hire. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that he placed his hands on her shoulders more than once. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10, the evidence did not reveal any sexual advances at this point, aside from declarations of love, which were not entirely unwelcome. Except for the last sentence, petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to the final sentence of No. 11 and the word "Again" in No. 13, it was not clear from the evidence that she went to Mr. Ormsby before Christmas. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Mrs. Hord did not always go "to great lengths to avoid contact with Mr. Alepakos during this time period." She not infrequently accepted his invitations to lunch. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been rejected as against the weight of the evidence. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except that Mr. Alepakos was not put on any formal probation. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact Nos. 21 and 22, the evidence showed that he resumed his attentions because of her advances. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 27, the evidence showed that he called, but not that he called frequently. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 28, he did not come by uninvited. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 31, he said she needed to see a doctor but not, in so many words, that the marriage would fail. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 34, nobody placed limits on Mr. Morgan's investigation. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 35 has been rejected as contrary to the evidence. She was not told she would be reprimanded for making good faith complaints. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, the first two sentences of No. 38, Nos. 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70 and 72 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, she lived at Panama City Beach at one point. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10 are immaterial or subordinate. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Ms. Bjorgan's testimony was that she was not sure Mrs. Hord wanted to see him that night. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been accepted, in substance, insofar as material, except for Small's suggested advice to change her manner of dress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 25, Mrs. Hord was ambivalent about Mr. Alepakos before as after the incident. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 27 is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 28 blows a single incident out of proportion. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 30 is rejected. The final sentence of respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 38 is rejected, as is No. 39 to the extent it proceeds on the assumption there was any hiatus. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 44 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that the poinsettia was flowering. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 57, the epithet was "jackasses." With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 59 and 64, Alepakos had no input, but the fact of her complaints was considered and inspired the call to Morgan. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 63 is immaterial, except that Alepakos' attentions did not cause great mental stress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 67, his overtures were romantic. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 68, he did propose marriage. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 69 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except for the final clause of the final sentence which is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 71 is immaterial or subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvin L. Peters, Esquire 36 Oak Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 William B. deMeza, Jr., Esquire Holland and Knight Post Office Box 241 Bradenton, Florida 33506 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
