The Issue The Petitioner and Respondent have agreed by stipulation that the following four issues of law are to be determined by the Hearing Officer: Whether Red Lobster must pay four percent sales tax on ad valorem taxes paid directly to a governmental taxing unit on leases in which it is set forth that Red Lobster, the Lessee, will, in addition to the rental payments, be obligated to pay the ad valorem taxes. Whether certain waitress uniforms and denominators purchased from vendors outside the State of Florida by Red Lobster and shipped to Red Lobster Headquarters within the State of Florida for storage purposes and subsequently transshipped for use in Red Lobster locations outside the State of Florida are subject to Florida sales or use tax. Whether those automobiles purchased by Red Lobster's parent company, General Mills, Inc., outside the State of Florida and on which a sales tax was paid in the state in which purchased and then leased to Red Lobster for use in the State of Florida for periods in excess of twelve months are subject to a Florida sales or use tax on the rental payments. Whether Red Lobster is obligated to pay an amount of sales tax determined by the Bracket System as set forth in Florida Statutes or is obligated to pay all sales tax actually collected so long as the sales tax collected equals or exceeds 4 percent of gross sales.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Department of Revenue assessed certain sales and use tax against Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc., for a three-year period commencing February 1, 1971 through January 31, 1974. The Petitioner filed a petition for hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, contesting the imposition of said sales and use taxes by Respondent. Each of the issues will be treated separately. ISSUE I Whether Petitioner must pay 4 percent sales tax on ad valorem taxes paid directly to a governmental unit on leases in which it is set forth that Red Lobster, the Lessee, will, in addition to the rental payments, be obligated to pay the ad valorem taxes. Two kinds of leases are involved here. One type (Exhibit "A") provides the payment of "all real estate taxes" shall be "as additional rent" and a second type (Exhibit "B") provides that "The lessee shall be responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes" without labeling such payments as additional rental. In both types of leases, the ad valorem tax payments on the leased real estate are the obligation of Red Lobster, Lessee. The Petitioner, Lessee, paid the sales tax on the amount it considered "rent" paid but did not pay the sales tax on the monies paid the Lessor for the payment of the ad valorem taxes on the leased property. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: that all the monies paid by Petitioner as Lessee, including the amount paid for the payment of ad valorem taxes, constitute consideration for the lease and thus constitute rent for purposes of Chapter 212. Petitioners contend: that these payments for ad valorem taxes are not "total rent charges for such real property" under Section 212.031(c); that to require that sales and use tax be paid on ad valorem tax payments is double taxation; that the imposition of a sales and use tax on an existing ad valorem tax constitutes a pyramiding of taxation contrary to Section 212.031(2)(b). Petitioner further contends that the rule 12A-1.70(3) exceeds the statutory authority of Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, inasmuch as the statute states a tax is levied on the "rent charged" whereas the rule states that the tax shall be paid "on all considerations." The lease between the parties marked for identification as Exhibit "A" provides in pertinent part on page 1, Section 2, Demise of Premises: "In consideration of the rents and covenants herein stipulated to be paid and performed by Lessee, Lessor hereby demises and lets to Lessee . . . the parcel of land . . . together with all buildings, structures and other improvements constructed thereon . . ." On page 5, in Section 9, Taxes and Other Charges: "(a) Lessee also agrees . . . to pay and discharge as auditional rent, punctually as and when the same shall become due and payable without penalty, all real estate taxes, personal property taxes, business and occupation taxes, occupational license taxes . . . and all other governmental taxes which at any time during the term of the lease shall become due " Clearly, the payment of taxes was understood by both parties as being part of the rent in Exhibit "A" contracts. The lease between the parties marked for identification as Exhibit "B" does not specifically provide that the payment of taxes is part of the rent. However, it speaks to the issue on page 1 providing: "That for and in consideration of the covenants and agreements herein contained and in consideration of the rents herein reserved to be paid by lessee to lessors, the parties hereto do hereby mutually covenant and agree . . . ." to do certain things and includes the specific requirement on page 3: "9. The lessee shall be responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes, both city and county, assessed against the demised premises and shall pay the same before the taxes become delinquent." It is apparent that the payment of real estate taxes is a part of the "total rent charges for such real property" in Exhibit "B" contracts. Designation by the Lessor as to the method of distributing the gross sum of rent does not relieve the Lessee from his payments to the Lessor or change the fact that it is for rent due and for the "return . . . which the tenant makes to the landlord for the use of the demised premises." 52 CJS, Section 462, p. 344. Thus, there is no pyramiding or double taxation. Inasmuch as the payment of ad valorem taxes is a part of the rental agreement between the parties, sales tax would be due on the amount paid by Lessee for ad valorem taxes regardless of whether the Lessee or the Lessor performed the transmittal duties of paying the taxes. The acceptance by the Lessee of the onerous duties of timely paying the numerous taxes, charges, assessments and other impositions is a valuable consideration and a part of the rent charge itself. The statute supports the assessment of Respondent. The contention that the rule is invalid is not well taken inasmuch as the rule is presumed valid for the purpose of this hearing. Thus, the Hearing Officer determines that the Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America must pay the 4 percent sales tax on the ad valorem taxes paid directly to a governmental taxing unit. ISSUE II Whether the waitresses' uniforms and denominators (a counting device) purchased from vendors outside the State of Florida by Petitioner and shipped to Petitioner's headquarters in Florida for storage purposes and thereafter shipped for use in Red Lobster Inn locations outside the State of Florida are subject to Florida sales or use tax. The Respondent Department of Revenue sought to impose a use tax upon the uniforms and denominators which were purchased outside the state, sent in and then sent out again. The Petitioner Red Lobster Inns does not contest the assessment of sales or use tax on the uniforms and denominators that were used and consumed in this state. However, it contests the assessment on the items that were bought outside the state, sent in to Florida and then sent out of state in the same condition. Red Lobster uses uniforms both within and without the state and also denominators both inside and outside the state. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: that the sales and use tax is properly applied inasmuch as the uniforms and denominators came to rest in the State of Florida, were delivered and stored and therefore became part of the mass property in the state. It contends that they were used in that a right of ownership was exercised. The Petitioner Red Lobster Inns contends: that the tax is not due on the items that were brought in and transshipped out again; that the goods never actually came to rest because the storage time was very short and was in fact part of the shipment process; that the uniforms and denominators were reshipped without having been used or consumed in this state. Section 212.05, Sales, storage, use tax.-- provides: "It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a tangible privilege who engages in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state, or who rents or furnishes any of the things or services taxable under this chapter, or who stores for use or consumption in this state any item or article of tangible personal property as defined herein and who leases or rents such property within the state . . . . * * * (2) At the rate of 4 percent of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed or stored for use or consumption in this state." Section 212.06(6), Sales, storage, use tax; collectible from dealers; dealers defined; dealers to collect from purchasers; legislative intent as to scope of tax, provides: "(6) It is however, the intention of this chapter to levy a tax on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage to be used or consumed in this state of tangible personal property after it has come to rest in this state and has become a part of the mass property of this state." The Petitioner was correct in paying the tax on the waitresses' uniforms and the denominators that were used and consumed in this state. Those uniforms and denominators that were temporarily stored in this state and sent outside the state in the same condition were not a part of the mass property of this state, had not come to rest in this state nor became a part of the mass property of this state. They were not used or consumed in this state. The use and consumption of the uniforms and denominators were subsequent to their shipment outside of the state and therefore no use tax is due on those items reshipped to other states. ISSUE III Whether those automobiles purchased by Red Lobster's parent company, General Mills, Inc., outside the State of Florida and on which a sales tax was paid in the state in which purchased and then leased to Red Lobster for use in the State of Florida for periods in excess of twelve months are subject to Florida sales or use tax on the rental payments. The Petitioner contends: that it is entitled to the exemption in Rule 12A-1.07(13)(b) because the purchase of the automobiles was made out of state and sales tax was paid out of state. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: the exemption of the rule applies only when the sales tax was paid to the State of Florida. Section 212.21(2), Declaration of legislative intent.-- provides in pertinent part: "(2) It is hereby declared to be the specific legislative intent to tax each and every sale, admission, use, storage, consumption or rental levied and set forth in this chapter, except as to such sale, admission, use, storage, consumption or rental, as shall be specifically exempted therefrom by this chapter, subject to the conditions appertaining to such exemption." Section 212.07(9), Sales, storage, use tax; tax added to purchase price; dealer not to absorb liability of purchasers who cannot prove payment of the tax; penalties; general exemptions:-- provides in part: "(9) Any person who has . . . leased tangible personal property, . . . and cannot prove that the tax levied by this chapter has been paid to his vendor or lessor shall be directly liable to the state for any tax, interest, or penalty due on any such taxable transactions." Rule 12A-1.07(13)(b) provides: "When the term of a lease or rental to one lessee or rentee is for a period of 12 or more months, the lessor-owner may pay the tax on the acquisition of the vehicle. In such cases, the rental to the initial lessee and the renewals thereof to the same lessee are not subject to the rental tax. Rentals of the same vehicle to subsequent lessees by the owner are taxable." Clearly, it appears from the foregoing that the rule made pursuant to the authority of the legislature does in fact state that the tax may be paid "on the acquisition of the vehicle" and that the lessee is then not subject to the rental tax. The rule is presumed to be valid. Thus, in answer to the question in Issue III, the answer is that the rental cars are not subject to the Florida sales or use tax on the rental payments having been specifically exempted. ISSUE IV Whether Red Lobster is obligated to pay an amount of sales tax determined by the Bracket System set forth in Florida Statutes or is obligated to pay all sales tax actually collected so long as the sales tax collected equals or exceeds 4 percent of gross sales. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: that the Petitioner must collect and pay the tax according to the Bracket Method provided in the statutes. The Petitioner contends: that it does not have to be governed by the Bracket Method as long as Petitioner pays 4 percent of its gross sales to the State of Florida and that the Bracket System is merely a convenience method. Section 212.12(1), Dealer's credit for collecting tax; penalties for noncompliance; powers of Department of Revenue in dealing with delinquents; brackets applicable to taxable transactions; records required, providing for the Bracket System.-- clearly states in pertinent part: "(10) . . . Notwithstanding the rate of taxes imposed upon the privilege of sales, admissions and rentals, and communication services, the following brackets shall be applicable to all 4 percent taxable transactions: On single sales of less than 10 cents no tax shall be added. On single sales in amounts from 10 cents to 25 cents, both inclusive, 1 cent shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 26 cents to 50 cents, both inclusive, 2 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 51 cents to 75 cents, both inclusive, 3 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 76 cents to $1, both inclusive, 4 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts of more than $1, 4 percent shall be charged upon each dollar of price, plus the above bracket charges upon any fractional part of a dollar." It is self-evident that the foregoing statute does in fact require the Bracket Method to be used inasmuch as it dictates that is shall be applicable to all 4 percent taxable transactions. The tax is increased when the Bracket Method is used. In summary, the findings of the Hearing Officer are: On Issue I, Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America must pay ad valorem tax on the full amount of the consideration as set forth in its various leases. On Issue II, the waitresses' uniforms and denominators which were reshipped in the same condition outside the state were not subject to Florida sales and use tax. On Issue III, the automobiles on which a sales tax was paid to the state in which they were purchased and then leased to Red Lobster for use in this state for periods in excess of twelve months are not subject to the Florida sales and use tax on rental payments. On Issue IV, Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America is obligated to pay an amount of sales tax determined by the Bracket System as set forth in Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Affirm the position of the Respondent Department of Revenue on Issue I. Affirm the position of the Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America on Issue II. Affirm the position of the Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America on Issue III. Affirm the position of the Respondent Department of Revenue on Issue IV. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrell Griffin, Esquire 515 Pan American Building 250 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles E. DeMarco, Esquire Staff Attorney Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc. Post Office Box 13330 Orlando, Florida 32801 Caroline C. Mueller, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Revenue’s (Department) January 27, 2020, Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner B Century 21, Inc. (B Century 21) is incorrect.
Findings Of Fact Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida’s sales and use tax laws, pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. B Century 21 is a Florida S-Corporation that operates two liquor stores (Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor), as well as a bar (Overtime Sports Bar), in Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Altheeb is the sole owner of B Century 21 and testified that he is solely responsible for the operation of it, including the two liquor stores and bar. With respect to the operation of B Century 21, Mr. Altheeb testified, “I do all the paperwork, all the books, all the taxes. I do all the orders.” Matters Deemed Admitted and Conclusively Established2 B Century 21 received correspondence from the Department, dated August 20, 2019. That correspondence, from Ms. Pitre, stated, in part, “I will be conducting an examination of your books and records as authorized under Section 213.34, Florida Statutes.” B Century 21 received the Department’s form DR840, Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, dated August 20, 2019, including the Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist. The form DR-840 indicated that the Department intended to audit B Century 21 for a tax compliance audit for the period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019. The Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist listed a number of categories of documents the Department intended to review as part of this audit. B Century 21 (through its accountant, power of attorney, and qualified representative, Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s October 30, 2019, correspondence, which referenced the “Audit Scope and Audit Commencement,” and an attached Records Request list. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received an email, dated October 30, 2019, from Ms. Pitre. That email references an attached Audit Commencement Letter. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received an email, dated November 12, 2019, from Ms. Pitre, which inquired of “the status of the records requested during the meeting with you and Mr. Altheeb on October 29, 2019.” B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, form DR-1215, dated December 16, 2019. The form DR-1215 reflects a total amount of tax of $170,232.93, a penalty of $42,558.24, and interest through December 16, 2019, of $25,461.86, for a total deficiency of $238,253.04. The form DR-1215 also reflects that if B Century 2 See Order Granting Motion Declaring Matters Admitted and Setting Discovery Deadline. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b). 21 did not agree with these audit changes, or only agreed with a portion, that it had until January 15, 2020, to request a conference or submit a written request for an extension. Further, the form DR-1215 attached a Notice of Taxpayer Rights, which included additional detail on the options available to B Century 21. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received correspondence from Ms. Pitre, dated December 16, 2019, which stated that as of the date of the correspondence, the Department had not received the information previously requested on October 13, 2019, which it needed to complete the audit. The correspondence stated that B Century 21 had 30 days to review the audit changes, provided contact information to B Century 21 if it wished to discuss the findings in the form DR-1215, and noted that if the Department did not hear from B Century 21 within 30 days, it would send the audit file to the Department’s headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s Notice of Proposed Assessment, form DR-831, dated January 27, 2020. The form DR- 831 reflects a total amount of tax of $170,232.93, a penalty of $42,558.24, and interest through January 27, 2020, of $27,224.82, for a total deficiency of $240,016.00. For the time period between August 20, 2019, and January 7, 2021, B Century 21 did not provide the Department with: (a) any sales records; (b) any purchase records; or (c) any federal tax returns. For the time period between August 20, 2019, and January 7, 2021, B Century 21 did not provide any records to the Department for examination in conducting the audit. Additional Facts In 2011, for the purpose of enforcing the collection of sales tax on retail sales, the Florida Legislature enacted section 212.133, Florida Statutes, which requires every wholesale seller (wholesaler) of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products (ABT) to annually file information reports of its product sales to any retailer in Florida. See § 212.133(1)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat. Once a year, ABT wholesalers report to the State of Florida their name, beverage license or tobacco permit number, along with each Florida retailer with which they do business, the Florida retailer’s name, retailer’s beverage license or tobacco permit number, retailer’s address, the general items sold, and sales per month. See § 212.133(3), Fla. Stat. The information collected captures the 12-month period between July 1 and June 30, and is due annually, on July 1, for the preceding 12-month period. Id. ABT wholesalers file these reports electronically through the Department’s efiling website and secure file transfer protocol established through the Department’s efiling provider. § 212.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Baker explained this statutory process further: [W]e annually, every year in the month of May, my unit reaches out to the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulations. We compel them to give us a list of all of the active wholesalers who were licensed to sell to retailers in the state of Florida for the prior fiscal year. Once we receive that list, we then mail a notification to all those wholesalers and state the statute and the requirements and give them a user name and a password that will allow them to then log into that portal and submit their retail—their wholesale—or their wholesale sales to retailers in the state of Florida for the prior fiscal year. Those reports are due on July 1st of each year, but they are not considered late until September 30th of that year. So that gives the wholesaler population a couple of months to compile all of their sales for the prior year, fill out their reports and submit them to the Florida Department of Revenue by the end of September. Additionally, each month, and for each retail location, B Century 21 reports gross monthly sales to the Department, and remits sales tax, utilizing the Department’s form DR-15. Ms. Baker further described the process the Department utilizes in identifying an “audit lead,” utilizing the data that ABT wholesales provide: Specifically for ABT, we have a very, actually, kind of simple comparison that we do. . . . [A]s a taxpayer, as a retailer in the state of Florida, you may purchase from multiple wholesalers. So, part of our job is we compile all of the purchases that each beverage license or tobacco license has purchased, and once we compile all the purchases for the fiscal year, then to say, you know, what were the purchases for the fiscal year versus what were the reported sales for the fiscal year. And, again, a pretty simple comparison we really look to see, did you purchase, or . . . did you report enough sales to cover the amount of purchases that we know you made as a – as a retailer. And if the sales amount does not exceed the purchase amount, then we’ll create a lead on it. The Department’s efiling provider exports the ABT wholesalers’ information to SunVisn, the Department’s database. The Department’s analysts review the ABT wholesalers’ reported data, and taxpayer information, to identify audit leads. The Department then assigns these audit leads to its service centers to conduct an audit. A tax audit period is 36 months. In conducting ABT audits, the Department has 24 months of reported data (i.e., the first 24 months of the audit period) for review. This is because the timing of section 212.133(3) requires ABT wholesalers to report annually on July 1, for the preceding 12- month period of July 1 through June 30. For the ABT reporting data examination period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2018 (a period of 24 months), B Century 21’s gross sales for its two liquor stores was as follows: Liquor Store Reported Gross Sales Al’s Liquor $1,051,128.56 Arlington Liquor $902,195.49 For the same 24-month time period of July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2018, B Century 21’s wholesalers reported the following ABT inventory purchases to the State, as required under section 212.133: Liquor Store ABT Inventory Purchases Al’s Liquor $1,250,055.79 Arlington Liquor $1,174,877.98 As the ABT wholesalers’ reported ABT inventory purchases by B Century 21’s retail outlets were higher than B Century 21’s reported sales, the Department issued an audit lead, which led to the audit that is at issue in this proceeding. The Audit For the 36-month audit period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019 (audit period), B Century 21’s reported gross sales for each of its locations was: Location Reported Gross Sales Al’s Liquor $1,557,569.74 Arlington Liquor $1,434,551.65 Overtime Sports Bar $968,476.08 On August 20, 2019, Ms. Pitre mailed to B Century 21 (and received by Mr. Altheeb), a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records for the audit period. Included with the Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records was correspondence informing B Century 21 of the audit and requesting records. On August 26, 2019, Ms. Pitre received a telephone call from Mr. Altheeb. Ms. Pitre’s case activity notes for this call state: Received a call from Baligh Altheeb and he said he will be hiring Brett Isaac as his POA [power of attorney]. I informed him to complete the POA form and to give it to Mr. Isaac for signature and send to me. He knows about ABT Data assessments and asked that I note on the case activity that he contacted me regarding the audit. He was worried that his liquor license will be suspended if he does not respond right away. I informed him that once I receive the POA, I will contact Mr. Isaac and discuss the audit. On October 18, 2019, the Department received B Century 21’s executed power of attorney (POA) form naming Mr. Isaac as its POA for the audit. The executed POA form reflects that the Department’s notices and written communications should be sent solely to Mr. Isaac, and not B Century 21. The executed POA form further reflects that “[r]eceipt by either the representative or the taxpayer will be considered receipt by both.” On October 29, 2019, Ms. Pitre met with Mr. Altheeb and Mr. Isaac at Mr. Isaac’s office, for a pre-audit interview. Ms. Pitre’s case activity notes for this meeting state: Met with the taxpayer contact person, POA Brett Isaac and owner Baligh Thaleeb [sic], at the POA’s location to conduct the pre-audit interview. Discussed the scope of the audit, records needed to conduct the audit, availability of electronic records, business organization, nature of the business, internal controls, and the time line of the audit. Discussed sampling for purchases and POA signed sampling agreement. Made appointment to review records on November 12, 2019. Toured one of the location [sic] to observe business operations, Overtime Sports Bar. On October 30, 2019, Ms. Pitre emailed Mr. Isaac a copy of the Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, which included a “Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist,” which requested specific taxpayer records. After receiving no response from Mr. Isaac, Ms. Pitre, on November 12, 2019, emailed Mr. Isaac concerning “the status of the records requested during the meeting with you and Mr. Altheeb on October 29, 2019.” Section 212.12(5)(b) provides that when a taxpayer fails to provide records “so that no audit or examination has been made of the books and records of” the taxpayer: [I]t shall be the duty of the department to make an assessment from an estimate based upon the best information then available to it for the taxable period of retail sales of such dealer … or of the sales or cost price of all services the sale or use of which is taxable under this chapter, together with interest, plus penalty, if such have accrued, as the case may be. Then the department shall proceed to collect such taxes, interest, and penalty on the basis of such assessment which shall be considered prima facie correct, and the burden to show the contrary shall rest upon the [taxpayer]. Section 212.12(6)(b) further provides: [I]f a dealer does not have adequate records of his or her retail sales or purchases, the department may, upon the basis of a test or sampling of the dealer’s available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by such dealer for a representative period, determine the proportion that taxable retail sales bear to total retail sales or the proportion that taxable purchases bear to total purchases. Mr. Collier testified that, in the absence of adequate records, the Department “estimates using best available information, and for this industry … ABT sales are a higher percentage of their taxable sales.” Because B Century 21 did not provide adequate records to Ms. Pitre, she estimated the total taxable sales for the audit period. For each liquor store that B Century 21 operated, she multiplied its total ABT purchases by average markups to calculate total ABT sales. To derive these average markups, Mr. Collier explained that the Department receives data from wholesalers, and then: [W]e take that purchase information, apply average markup to the different ABT product categories, which include cigarettes, other tobacco, beer, wine, and liquor; and then that gets us to total ABT sales number. And then we derive what we call a percentage of ABT sales, percentage of that number represents. And in this particular model, 95.66 percent represents what we believe in a liquor store industry, that this type of business, that 95.66 percent of their sales are ABT products. We derive the markups, and the percentage of ABT sales from a number of liquor store audits that the Department had performed on liquor stores that provided records. The Department utilized markup data from other ABT audits. The Department applied the following markups to these ABT categories: 6.5 percent for cigarettes; 47.5 percent for other tobacco products; 17.33 percent for beer; 29.84 percent for wine; and 24.5 percent for liquor. Applying the Department’s markup for liquor stores to the wholesalers’ reported ABT data and percentage of taxable sales, Ms. Pitre estimated taxable sales for the ABT reporting data examination period and calculated the under-reported sales error ratio as follows: Location Estimated Taxable Sales Error Ratio Al’s Liquor $1,597.544.01 1.519837 Arlington Liquor $1,516,259.34 1.680633 The Department then divided B Century 21’s estimated taxable sales for the examination period, for each liquor store, by its self-reported tax sales in its DR-15s to arrive at the under-reported rate. The Department then multiplied the under-reported rate by the reported taxable monthly sales in the DR-15s to arrive at the estimated taxable sales for the 36-month audit period. The result of this calculation was: Location Estimated Taxable Sales Al’s Liquor $2,367,252.11 Arlington Liquor $2,410,954.82 The Department then multiplied the estimated taxable sales by an effective estimated tax rate which, after giving credit for B Century 21’s remitted sales tax, resulted in tax due for the Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor for the audit period, as follows: Location Sales Tax Owed Al’s Liquor $58,367.01 Arlington Liquor $70,068.44 For Overtime Sports Bar, the Department could not use ABT wholesalers’ data to estimate an assessment because the Department does not have audit data averages for bars and lounges. The Department used the “Tax Due Method” in estimating under-reported taxes and calculating under- reported taxable sales. Mr. Collier explained: The Department does not have average markup and percentage of sales for a bar. Though, you know, obviously, we all know that a bar, their main product that they sell and in most cases is ABT products. So, therefore, typically, an auditor would need to get information about that specific location. Bars can vary so much in their type of business that they do, they can be like nightclubs, or they can be like bar and grill that serves a lot of food. So there’s a lot of variances there for that particular type of industry, so we haven’t really come up with average markups, average percentage of sales for bars, per se. It’s a case-by- case situation, and in this case, the auditor decided that the fair, reasonable way to estimate the bar location would be to just average the error ratios that were derived from the Al’s Liquor and the other liquor store location and apply it to the taxable sales reported for the bar. And I think that’s a very fair and reasonable estimate based on what we all know in a bar situation; their markups are significantly higher. And of course, there can be plenty of other non-ABT taxable sales occurring in a bar setting, such as prepared food, you know, just your regular cokes and drinks. So it’s certainly a fair way to estimate in this particular audit and I believe only benefits the taxpayer. The undersigned credits the Department’s methodology for estimating an assessment for Overtime Sports Bar. Further, Mr. Altheeb testified that Overtime Sports Bar operates as both a sports bar and a liquor/package store, and stated: Most of it—it’s a liquor store. I don’t know if you know the area, it’s a liquor store on the Westside. So most of it—the sport bar doesn’t really do too much business in the Westside, mostly the liquor stores. People coming in and buy package, you know, buy bottles and leave. So, most of the business is the drive-through window. The Department’s decision to average the error ratios for the other two liquor stores to derive the additional tax due average for Overtime Sports Bar is reasonable, particularly in light of Mr. Altheeb’s testimony that Overtime Sports Bar operates primarily as a liquor (package) store. The Department calculated the additional tax due average error ratio for Overtime Sports Bar by averaging the error ratios of Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor, and then multiplied it by B Century 21’s reported gross sales to arrive at the additional tax due for Overtime Sports Bar of $41,797.49. Ms. Pitre testified that she determined that, for the audit period, B Century 21 owed additional sales tax of $170,232.93. In addition, the Department imposed a penalty and accrued interest. On December 16, 2019, Ms. Pitre sent correspondence, the preliminary assessment, and a copy of the audit work papers to B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac), informing B Century 21 that it had 30 days to contact the Department’s tax audit supervisor to request an audit conference or submit a written request for an extension. After receiving no response from B Century 21, Ms. Pitre forwarded the audit workpapers to the Department’s headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida, to process the Notice of Proposed Assessment. B Century 21’s Position As mentioned previously, and after initially meeting with the Department, B Century 21 failed to provide requested financial records or respond to any of the numerous letters and notices received from the Department, despite being given adequate opportunity to do so. And, after filing its Amended Petition, it failed to timely respond to discovery requests from the Department which, inter alia, resulted in numerous matters being conclusively established. Mr. Isaac served as the POA for B Century 21 during the audit, and also appeared in this proceeding as a qualified representative. However, Mr. Isaac did not appear at the final hearing, did not testify as a witness at the final hearing, and does not appear to have done anything for B Century 21 in this proceeding, other than filing the Petition and Amended Petition. After Mr. Heekin appeared in this matter, and well after the time to respond to discovery, B Century 21 provided 127 pages of documents to the Department. These documents consist of: 18 pages of summaries of daily sales that Mr. Altheeb prepared for the hearing; 41 pages of sales and use tax returns from B Century 21 locations, covering 25 months (DR-15s); 2 pages of Harbortouch’s 2016 1099K, reporting credit card sales; 43 pages of unsigned federal tax returns from 2016, 2017, and 2018, prepared by Mr. Isaac; and 17 pages of B Century 21’s untimely responses to the Department’s discovery requests. Florida Administrative Code Rule 12-3.0012(3) defines “adequate records” to include: (3) “Adequate records” means books, accounts, and other records sufficient to permit a reliable determination of a tax deficiency or overpayment. Incomplete records can be determined to be inadequate. To be sufficient to make a reliable determination, adequate records, including supporting documentation, must be: Accurate, that is, the records must be free from material error; Inclusive, that is, the records must capture transactions that are needed to determine a tax deficiency or overpayment; Authentic, that is, the records must be worthy of acceptance as based on fact; and Systematic, that is, the records must organize transactions in an orderly manner. The nature of the taxpayer’s business, the nature of the industry, materiality, third-party confirmations and other corroborating evidence such as related supporting documentation, and the audit methods that are suitable for use in the audit, will be used to establish that the taxpayer has adequate records. The undersigned finds that the summaries of daily sales are not adequate records because Mr. Altheeb prepared them for use at the final hearing, rather than in the regular course of business. The undersigned finds that the DR-15s provided by Mr. Altheeb, covering 25 months, are not adequate records because they are incomplete and are not inclusive. The audit period encompassed 36 months, for B Century 21’s three retail locations; however, Mr. Altheeb only provided 25 months of DR-15s. The 2016, 2017, and 2018 federal tax returns that B Century 21 provided are not adequate records because they are not authentic. Mr. Altheeb was unable to verify if these tax returns were correct, and they were unsigned. B Century 21 did not provide any evidence that it had filed any of these federal tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service. Ms. Pitre reviewed the 127 pages of documents that B Century 21 provided and testified that the summaries of daily sales did not provide the “source documents” for verification. The unsigned federal tax returns reflect that B Century 21 reported a cost-of-goods-sold (COGS) of $518,606.00 for 2016; $1,246,839.00 for 2017; and $796,968.00 for 2018. Additionally, the unsigned federal tax returns reflect that B Century 21 reported a beginning inventory (BI) for 2016 of $95,847.00, and a year-end inventory (EI) for 2016 of $200,556.00, EI for 2017 of $280,235.00, and EI for 2018 of $295,628.00. When comparing the unsigned federal tax returns with the ABT wholesalers’ data, the federal tax returns reflect, for 2016, total inventory purchases of $623,315.00 (which is derived from $518,606.00 (COGS) + $200,556.00 (EI) - $95,847.00 (BI)). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,174,997.34 – a discrepancy of more than $500,000.00. For 2017, the federal tax returns reflect total inventory purchases of $1,326,518.00 (which is derived from $1,246,839.00 (COGS) + $280,235.00 (EI) for 2017 - $200,556.00 (EI) for 2016). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,422,854.79 – a discrepancy of over $96,000.00. And for 2018, the unsigned federal tax returns reflect total inventory purchases of $812,361.00 (which is derived from $796,968.00 (COGS) + $295,628.00 (EI) for 2018 - $280,235.00 (BI) for 2017). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2018 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,335,814.00 – a discrepancy of over $500,000.00. Mr. Altheeb testified that Arlington Liquor and Overtime Sports Bar opened in 2016 – after B Century 21 began ownership and operation of Al’s Liquor. He stated that he did not purchase inventory for the openings of the newer locations, but instead transferred excess inventory from Al’s Liquor, which resulted in lower total inventory purchases for 2016. Mr. Altheeb also testified that B Century 21’s three locations experienced spoiled inventory. However, B Century 21 should include spoiled inventory in COGS reported in its federal tax returns, and further, B Century 21 provided no additional evidence of the cost of spoilage for the audit period. The undersigned finds that the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 through 2018 reflects similar amounts for inventory purchases between 2016 through 2018. The undersigned credits the Department’s reliance on the ABT wholesalers’ data, which reflect fairly consistent purchases for each year. The undersigned does not find the unsigned federal tax returns that B Century 21 provided to be persuasive evidence that the Department’s assessment was incorrect. Mr. Altheeb testified that he believed Mr. Isaac, who B Century 21 designated as POA for the audit, and who appears as a qualified representative in this proceeding, was actively handling the audit. Mr. Altheeb stated that the audit, and the final hearing, “kind of came out of nowhere” and that once he learned of it, he retained Mr. Heekin and provided “everything” to him. However, it is conclusively established that the Department provided correspondence and notice to B Century 21 through its designated POA, and that B Century 21 failed to respond to record requests in a timely manner. Mr. Isaac neither testified nor appeared at the final hearing to corroborate Mr. Altheeb’s claims that Mr. Isaac did not keep Mr. Altheeb or B Century 21 apprised of the status of the audit, including the failure to provide requested records or to communicate with the Department. B Century 21 also attempted to challenge the Department’s use of markup data from other ABT audits, in an attempt to argue that the markups were inflated and not representative of B Century 21’s markups. However, and as previously found, B Century 21’s failure to timely provide records—or respond in any meaningful way to the audit—undermines this attempt. The undersigned credits the Department’s methodology in using the best information available to it for the audit period in calculating the assessment. Although it became apparent during the final hearing that Mr. Altheeb did not treat the audit of B Century 21 with appropriate seriousness, and deflected blame to Mr. Isaac, and that his approach resulted in a legally appropriate and sustainable audit and assessment based on the Department’s best information available, the undersigned does not find that B Century 21, Mr. Isaac, or Mr. Heekin knew that the allegations of the Amended Petition were not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense, or would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts. The undersigned finds that the Department made its assessment based on the best information then available, and is thus prima facie correct, pursuant to section 212.12(5)(b). The undersigned further finds that B Century 21 did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Department’s assessment is incorrect, pursuant to section 212.12(5)(b).
Conclusions For Petitioner: Robert Andrew Heekin, Esquire The Law Office of Rob Heekin, Jr., P.A. 2223 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 For Respondent: Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Franklin David Sandrea-Rivero, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Department enter a final order sustaining the January 27, 2020, Notice of Proposed Assessment to B Century 21, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Robert Andrew Heekin, Esquire The Law Office of Rob Heekin, Jr., P.A. 2223 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Franklin David Sandrea-Rivero, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brett J. Isaac 2151 University Boulevard South Jacksonville, Florida 32216 James A Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be assessed sales and use tax for the audit period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, per the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated July 3, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Wales is a Florida S corporation. Its principal place of business is located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Wales' federal employee identification number is 59- 1703273. Wales' Florida sales and tax number is 16-03-095273- 26/1. By letter dated June 6, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Notice of Intent). The Notice of Intent identified the audit number as A0205310975. On July 10, 2002, the Department's auditor assigned to perform the audit conducted an initial interview with Wales. The auditor discussed, among other things, the audit and sample methods that would be employed during the audit. On August 13, 2002, the auditor began examining Wales' books and records at Wales' business location. Wales was cooperative during the audit. Wales provided all available books and records for the audit. The sole shareholders of Wales are Stewart Levy and Diane Levy. Wales leased its business location from Element Two Enterprises, Inc., ( Element Two) a related entity. Stewart Levy and Diane Levy are also the sole officers of Element Two, president and secretary, respectively. Element Two is the record owner of the improved real property located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, (realty). The address for the realty is also the address for Wales' place of business. Element Two mortgaged the realty leased by Wales. Wales paid monthly monetary consideration to Element Two in lease payments, which directly correlated to the amount of the monthly mortgage payments. Ad valorem taxes and property insurance were included in the monthly mortgage payments. Wales paid the ad valorem taxes and property insurance on the leased property. The lease payments to Element Two by Wales included the amount of the ad valorem taxes, property insurance, and common areas of maintenance. Wales did not pay sales tax on any of the lease payments to Element Two. Element Two did not charge or remit sales tax to the Department on the lease payments by Wales. Element Two was not registered with the Department as a dealer. Only dealers that are registered can remit sales tax on lease payments. Consequently, Element Two could not remit sales tax on the lease payments by Wales. Wales did not utilize all of the property it leased. Wales sub-leased a portion of the leased property to an unrelated entity. A prior sales and use tax audit was conducted of the sub-lessee, which included the period May 1997 through December 1998. The Department examined the sublease audit to determine whether Wales owed additional sales tax. The Department's examination of that audit revealed that the sales and use tax on the rent paid by the sub-lessee for the period May 1997 through September 1998 was assessed and paid by the sub-lessee. For the period May 1997 through December 1998, Wales had neither charged or collected sales tax nor remitted sales tax to the Department on the sub-lessee's payments. No sales tax was charged or paid on the sublease payments for the period October 1998 through December 1998. From January 1999 through April 2002, Wales charged, collected, and remitted sales tax on the sublease payments. The Department credited Wales for sales tax already paid on the subleased portion for the period May 1997 through September 1998 and January 1999 through April 2002. On its general ledger, Wales posted the lease payments to Element Two as rent payments. Element Two posted the lease payments to its general ledger as rent income. On its federal income tax returns, Wales reported the lease payments to Element Two as rent expense. Element Two reported the lease payments on its federal income tax returns as rent income. On November 29, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes for audit number A0205310975. Wales requested and the Department agreed to hold an audit conference to discuss the audit findings. Wales claimed that rent payments made were not subject to sales tax because both Wales and Element Two signed the mortgage and promissory note on the realty leased by Wales. However, only Element Two was reflected as the borrower on the loan and only Element Two was the signatory on the mortgage even though both Wales and Element Two signed the promissory note. On January 10, 2003, Wales executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment or to File a Claim for Refund (Consent). The Consent extended the statute of limitations for the period of time in which an assessment may be issued or a claim for refund may be filed to December 31, 2003. On July 3, 2003, the Department issued, by certified mail, the Notice and an Addendum to Proposed Assessment for audit number A0205310975. The Notice provided, among other things, for the assessment of sales and use tax in the amount of $17,481.73; penalty in the amount of $8,741.10; interest in the amount of $5,756.03, with additional daily interest being computed at the rate of $3.54 per day from July 3, 2003; and a total assessment in the amount $31,978.86. On September 1, 2003, the Notice became a Final Assessment for audit number A0205310975. Wales contested the Final Assessment and requested a hearing. Wales is not contesting that part of the audit which found that Wales failed to pay sales tax on certain fixed assets purchased for use in its business. At hearing, Wales contended that its federal income tax returns could be amended to reflect the payments to Element Two as mortgage payments instead of rent payments, which would, in turn, change the Department's audit to reflect the payments as mortgage not rent. To address this contention, the Department presented the testimony of an expert witness in the area of rental consideration and sales tax audits. The Department's expert testified that the consideration for rental or use of property is the payment between/to one who owns the real property and/from one who uses the property; and concluded that consideration, as rental, was provided to Wales by Element Two based on the Department's taxing statute, Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, and its rules and regulation, Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.070. The expert opined that the mortgage payments were consideration for a lease or license to use the real property and that, therefore, the monthly lease payment, which equaled the monthly mortgage payment, paid by Wales to Element Two was consideration for the lease or license to use the realty. The expert's testimony is found to be credible. The evidence presented shows that the mathematical computations performed by the Department in its audit are correct. Further, the evidence shows that the mathematical computations as to tax, penalty, and interest assessed are correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's assessment of sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation be sustained and that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation for the period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, consistent herewith. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Schnitzer GSS Advisory Services, Inc. 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners owe the taxes, interest, and penalties assessed by the Department of Revenue based upon Petitioners’ alleged rental of their real property to a related corporation from June 2000 through August 2003.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: In July 1997, Petitioners acquired the real property located at 640 North Semoran Boulevard in Orlando, Florida (hereafter “the Property”). The Property was acquired in Petitioners’ individual capacities, and they financed the purchase of the Property through a loan secured by a mortgage on the Property. The documents relating to the 1997 loan and mortgage were not introduced at the hearing. At the time the Property was acquired, Petitioner Paul Solano was engaged in the practice of accounting through a sole proprietorship known as P. Solano and Associates. Mr. Solano has been practicing accounting in Florida since 1969 and he is familiar with Florida's sales tax laws. The Property was treated as an asset of Mr. Solano’s sole proprietorship even though he was not using it as his place of business at the time. For example, depreciation expense related to the Property was itemized on Petitioners’ tax returns as a business expense. The mortgage payments made by Petitioners were also treated as business expenses of the sole proprietorship. In October 1999, Mr. Solano incorporated his accounting practice into an entity known as Solano & Associates Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter “the Corporation”). The sole business of the Corporation is providing accounting services. At the time of its formation, the Corporation was owned in equal 20 percent shares by Mr. Solano, his wife (Petitioner Diane Solano), their two daughters, and their son-in-law. There has been no change in the ownership of the Corporation since its inception. Mr. Solano is the president of the Corporation. The other owners/family members are also officers in the Corporation. Once the Corporation was formed, the depreciation expense related to the Property was included on the Corporation's tax returns, not Petitioners' tax return. At the time the Property was purchased, it was zoned for residential use. Between 1997 and 1999, Petitioners took the necessary steps to get the Property rezoned for commercial use so that the Corporation could conduct its accounting practice from that location. In November 1999, after the property had been rezoned, the Corporation and its owners applied for a loan from First Union National Bank (First Union) to obtain the funds necessary to renovate the existing building on the Property. Although unclear from the documentation in the record, Petitioners both testified that the 1999 loan was effectively a refinancing of the 1997 loan. The Corporation was not able to obtain a loan in its own name because it had only been in existence for a short period of time. The owners of the Corporation were not able to obtain a loan at a favorable interest rate, primarily because of the lack of credit history of Petitioners’ daughters and son-in- law. As a result, the loan was obtained by Petitioners in their individual capacities. Petitioners gave a mortgage on the Property as collateral for the 1999 loan. The mortgage document, entitled “Mortgage and Absolute Assignment of Leases” (hereafter "the 1999 mortgage"), was signed by Petitioners in their individual capacities on November 18, 1999; the Corporation was not identified in the 1999 mortgage in any way. The 1999 mortgage includes boiler-plate language referring to Petitioners’ obligation to maintain and enforce any leases on the Property and requiring the assignment of rents from any such leases to First Union. That language cannot be construed to mean that a lease actually existed at the time; in fact, the Property was still undergoing renovations at the time. The Corporation began doing business from the Property in February 2000 after the renovation work was complete and a certificate of occupancy was issued. The 1999 loan was refinanced in May 2000 with First Union. The loan amount was increased from $145,000 to $200,000 and the term of the loan was extended through a document entitled “Mortgage and Loan Modification and Extension Agreement” (hereafter "the 2000 mortgage"). The 2000 mortgage refers to the Corporation as the borrower and refers to Petitioners as the guarantors. Petitioners signed the 2000 mortgage in their individual capacities (to bind themselves as guarantors) as well as their capacities as corporate officers (to bind the Corporation as borrower). The related promissory note, dated May 5, 2000, also refers to the Corporation as the borrower, and it is signed by Petitioners in their capacity as officers of the Corporation. As part of the documentation for the refinancing in 2000, Petitioners executed an “Affidavit of Business Use” in which they attested they were the owners of the Property and that the loan proceeds would be “utilized exclusively for business or commercial purposes and not for personal use.” Petitioners also executed a “Mortgagors" Affidavit” in which they attested that they were in sole possession of the Property and that no other persons have claims or rights to possession of the property “except Solano & Associates Enterprises by virtue of a written lease which does not have an option to purposes or right of first refusal.” The monthly mortgage payment for the refinanced loan was $2,044.91. That amount was due on the fifth day of each month beginning on June 5, 2000, and it was automatically deducted from the Corporation’s bank account with First Union. In addition to making the mortgage payment for the Property, the Corporation paid the ad valorem taxes, insurance, and related expenses. The amount of those payments is not quantified in the record. Petitioners formally deeded the Property to the Corporation in October 2003. Mrs. Solano testified that the failure to do so earlier was simply an “oversight.” When the Property was formally deeded to the Corporation, Petitioners did not report any income or loss on the transaction for tax purposes. Any equity that had accumulated in the Property was simply “given” to the Corporation. The First Union mortgages were satisfied in October 2003 as part of a refinancing done by the Corporation with SunTrust bank after it became the owner of the Property.1 At that point, the Corporation had been in existence long enough to establish a credit history and obtain financing in its own name. The record does not include any documentation related to the 2003 refinancing transaction. Despite the representation in the “Mortgagors’ Affidavit” quoted above, there has never been any written or oral lease between Petitioners and the Corporation with respect to the use of the Property. Petitioners have always considered the Property to be a business asset, initially an asset of Mr. Solano’s sole proprietorship and then an asset of the Corporation. Petitioners never collected any sales tax from the Corporation on the mortgage payments made by the Corporation. Petitioners did not consider those payments to be rental payments. In late-June or early-July 2003, the Department sent a letter to Petitioners stating that the Property “appears to be subject to sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212.031, Florida Statutes.” The letter was sent as part of the Department’s “Corporation Rent Project” through which the Department compares records in various databases to identify commercial properties whose owner of record is different from the business operating at that location. Included with the letter was a questionnaire soliciting information from Petitioners regarding the Property and its use. The questionnaire was completed by Mr. Solano and returned to the Department in a timely manner. Mr. Solano marked a box on the questionnaire indicating that the Property is “[o]ccupied by a corporation in which a corporate officer is the property owner,” and he identified the Corporation as the entity occupying the Property. In response to the question as to “which of the following considerations are received by you,” Mr. Solano marked the following boxes: “The corporation remits payment for the mortgage loan”; “I do not receive rental income, but the related entity pays the mortgage payments”; and “No consideration is received from this related entity.” In response to the questions regarding the “monthly gross rental income of the property” and the “amount of real estate taxes . . . paid on the property by the lessee” for 2000 through 2003, Mr. Solano answered $0 for all periods. Terry Milligan, a tax specialist with the Department, determined based upon Mr. Solano’s responses on the questionnaire that the Corporation’s use of the Property was subject to the sales tax on rentals. Mr. Milligan advised Petitioners of that determination by letter dated July 29, 2003. The letter requested that Petitioners provide “a detailed month by month breakdown of rent (or mortgage payment) amounts, any other consideration, and property taxes that you received from the tenant (or tenant paid on your behalf) for the last thirty-six (36) months).” (Emphasis in original). Petitioners responded to Mr. Milligan’s request through a letter dated August 11, 2003. The letter explained that the reason that the title to the Property appeared under Petitioners’ name rather than the Corporation's name is “due to credit history.” More specifically, the letter stated that “[i]t was decided by the Board members, my wife and our [] children, to put it under our name since we have a long history of good credit.” Included with the letter was a bank statement showing the monthly mortgage payment of $2,044.91 and a notice of the proposed property tax assessment from Orange County for the Property, which was addressed to the Corporation. In addition to providing the requested documentation to Mr. Milligan, one of Petitioners’ daughters, Joylynn Aviles, spoke with Mr. Milligan to explain the circumstances relating to the financing and use of the Property. Ms. Aviles is the Secretary of the Corporation. Ms. Aviles also spoke with Mr. Milligan’s supervisor and an individual in the Department’s legal division. When it became apparent that the matter could not be resolved informally, Ms. Aviles requested that Mr. Milligan issue a final assessment so that Petitioners could bring a formal protest. In response, the Department issued the NOFA on September 11, 2003. The NOFA was preceded by a spreadsheet dated September 3, 2003, which showed how Mr. Milligan calculated the tax, penalties, and interest amounts set forth in the NOFA. As described in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet and his testimony at the hearing, the tax was computed based upon the monthly mortgage payments of $2044.91 made by the Corporation from June 2000 to August 2003. The June 2000 start-date for the assessment corresponds to the 36-month period referred to in Mr. Milligan’s July 29, 2003, letter; it also happens to correspond to the date that Corporation began making the mortgage payments. The August 2003 end-date for the assessment was used because it was the month preceding the date of the NOFA. The Department has not sought to expand the assessment to include the period between August 2003 and October 2003 when the Property was formally deeded to the Corporation. The NOFA does not include any assessment for the property taxes, insurance or other expenses paid by the Corporation on the Property. The Department has not sought to expand the assessment to include those amounts. The sales tax rate in effect in Orange County during the assessment period was six percent from June 2000 through December 2002, and it was 6.5 percent from January 2003 through August 2003. The 0.5 percent increase resulted from the imposition of a county surtax of some kind. The NOFA calculated a total tax due of $4,784.91. As shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet, that amount was calculated by multiplying the monthly mortgage payment by the tax rate in effect at the time of the payment and then totaling those monthly amounts. The NOFA calculated $465.79 in interest due on the unpaid tax through September 13, 2003. As shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet, that amount was calculated at the applicable statutory rates. Interest continues to accrue at 53 cents per day. The NOFA calculated a penalty due of $2,233.97. That amount was calculated based upon the applicable statutory rate as shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet and explained in the NOFA. In total, the NOFA imposed an assessment of $7,566.43. That amount includes the taxes, interest, and penalties described above. The NOFA informed Petitioners of the procedure by which they could protest the Department's assessment. On November 10, 2003, the Department received Petitioners' timely protest of the assessment. This proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order rescinding the Notice of Final Assessment issued to Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March 2004.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner owes sales tax of $15,230.15 plus interest from October 15, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a sole proprietorship organized in this state and doing business at 851 Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for administering the state sales tax in accordance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.1 In 1992, other businesses located at Petitioner's address reported to Respondent that they paid rent to Petitioner. However, Petitioner did not collect and remit sales tax on the rental income and was not registered as a dealer. On February 3, 1992, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Audit Petitioner's books and records ("Notice of Intent to Audit") for the tax period February 1, 1987, through January 31, 1992. The Notice of Intent to Audit included a detailed list of the books and records needed for Respondent to conduct a detailed audit. The Notice also requested that Petitioner provide Respondent with a date on which it would be convenient to begin the audit. On February 11, 1992, Respondent had not heard from Petitioner. The auditor contacted Petitioner to schedule a date on which the audit could begin. At that time, Petitioner stated that he would not provide the auditor with any books and records. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1990 through 1992 because Petitioner incorrectly suspected that Respondent maintained a secret "blacklist." Petitioner based his suspicion, in part, on the fact that he had refused to respond to a questionnaire Respondent had mailed to taxpayers throughout the state prior to the Notice of Intent to Audit. Petitioner also based his suspicion on the erroneous assumption that Respondent's audit was part of a criminal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") into Petitioner's federal taxes for 1987 and 1988. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1987 through 1989 because those records were in the possession of the IRS. Petitioner maintained that the proposed audit was illegal. Respondent sent Petitioner copies of its statutory authority to audit Petitioner and made numerous attempts to arrange a mutually convenient time to begin the audit. Respondent did not commence the audit until March 10, 1993. On March 10, 1993, the auditor and audit group supervisor met with Petitioner and Mr. Eugene Nail, Petitioner's paralegal. Petitioner stated that he did not have the books and records Respondent needed to conduct a detailed audit because the IRS had confiscated them in connection with the pending criminal case. Respondent conducted the audit using the information Petitioner made available to the auditor. Petitioner made available: sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992 grouped together by calendar month; sales and use tax return booklets; resale and exemption certificates; and commercial lease agreements. No journals and ledgers were available. Respondent determined Petitioner's tax deficiency by sampling the available information. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the auditor used a six month sample period. The auditor explained to Petitioner that she would use Petitioner's invoices during the sample period to determine tax- exempt sales. She compared the invoices to resale certificates and calculated an error ratio based on discrepancies between the sales invoices and the resale certificates. Respondent determined the actual deficiency in sales tax during the six month sample period based on actual invoices that did not have a resale certificate and for which no sales tax was remitted. Respondent estimated the additional deficiency in sales tax by applying the error ratio to the balance of the audit period. Respondent examined only those invoices provided by Petitioner and previous sales tax returns filed by Petitioner. On April 9, 1993, the auditor conducted a meeting with Petitioner and discussed the audit procedures, results, applicable law, and abatement rules. On June 15, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $45,469.05 ("Notice of Intent"). The Notice of Intent included a copy of all audit exhibits and workpapers. On August 30, 1993, Petitioner provided additional invoices to Respondent in a meeting with the auditor and audit group supervisor. On October 15, 1993, the auditor adjusted certain items in the audit file, reduced the proposed assessment, and issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $37,417.45 ("Revised Notice of Intent"). Petitioner requested additional time to provide more information, including additional resale certificates. However, Petitioner failed to provide the additional information. By letter dated December 9, 1993, the audit group supervisor notified Petitioner that she was closing the case and sending it to the Tallahassee office as a contested case. On December 23, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner assessing Petitioner for $37,417.45 in tax, penalty, and interest through October 15, 1993. On February 21, 1994, Respondent received Petitioner's written protest dated February 10, 1994. Respondent revised the audit figures again. On January 20, 1995, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision reducing the assessment against Petitioner to $15,230.15. The Notice of Decision assessed Petitioner for taxes of $8,900.55, penalties of $2,225.14, and interest of $4,104.46 through October 15, 1993. Interest accrues at the per diem rate of $2.93 until paid. On March 16, 1995, Petitioner timely appealed the Notice of Decision by filing a Petition for Formal Hearing with Respondent. Inadequate Records Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records within the meaning of Sections 212.12(6), 212.13(2), 212.35, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.093(2) and (5).2 Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records for the five year audit period prescribed in Section 213.34(2). Petitioner failed to maintain general ledgers and journals for the five year audit period. The only records Petitioner maintained were sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Petitioner was unable to produce adequate records for 1987 through 1989. Petitioner asserted that the IRS had those records and that Petitioner could not obtain the records required by Florida law. The federal tax case has been pending against Petitioner since 1990.3 During those seven years, Petitioner was unable to obtain copies of any records in the possession of the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1987 and 1988 were maintained on computer floppy disks. Petitioner asserts that the floppy disks were lost. Petitioner asserts that his attorney kept the books and records for 1989 in an out-of-state location to avoid producing those records for the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1990 though 1992 are in the possession of Petitioner's accountants. Petitioner did not produce those records during the audit or at the administrative hearing. Petitioner could have requested the journals and ledgers for 1989 through 1991 from his attorney and accountants, respectively, but chose not to do so. Petitioner made available to Respondent only sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Without the general ledgers and cash journals to cross- reference the sales invoices, Respondent could not corroborate the financial records available for audit. Respondent was required by applicable law to conduct the audit by sampling Petitioner's available records. Exempt Sales: Resale Certificates Certain exempt sales claimed by Petitioner during the six month sample period were not supported by resale certificates. Respondent disallowed the exempt sales that were not supported by resale certificates and allowed the invoices that were supported by resale certificates. For the six month sample period, Respondent assessed an actual sales tax deficiency for those sales that did not have a corresponding resale certificate.4 Respondent prepared audit schedules for the six month sample period that listed the invoices with a sales tax deficiency due to the lack of a resale certificate. Based on the audit schedules, Respondent determined an error ratio and applied the error ratio over the five year audit period to determine the estimated tax deficiency.5 Respondent conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted audit procedures and with applicable state law. Disallowed exempt sales were listed individually by invoice, name of vendor, and the date and amount of the sale. Disallowed exempt sales were listed for each of the six months in the sample period. Additional Taxable Sales Sales invoices for the six month sample period showed that Petitioner collected more sales tax than he reported to Respondent on his monthly sales tax returns. Respondent treated the collected, but unremitted, sales tax as "additional taxable sales" rather than as an unremitted sales tax. Respondent assessed Petitioner for the sales tax paid on Petitioner's invoices but not remitted to Respondent by Petitioner. The deficiency existed for May and June, 1990, and for January and February, 1991. Taxable Rent Respondent reviewed lease agreements relating to property rented by Petitioner at his business address. Respondent determined that Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the rental of his property. Respondent assessed Petitioner for sales tax Petitioner failed to collect and remit on taxable rent. Petitioner does not contest that portion of the assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein UPHOLD Respondent's assessment of $15,230.15 plus interest statutorily due from October 15, 1993, until paid.RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1997.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against American Import Car Sales, Inc., is valid and correct.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency responsible for administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use taxes. Petitioner, American Import Car Sales, Inc., is a Florida S-corporation with its principle place of business and mailing address in Hollywood, Florida. Petitioner, during the period of June 1, 2007, through May 31, 2010 ("assessment period"), was in the business of selling and financing new and used motor vehicles. On June 29, 2010, the Department issued to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records (form DR-840) for sales and use tax for the assessment period. Said notice informed Petitioner that the audit would begin on or around 60 days from the date of the notice and included an attachment identifying the records and information that would be reviewed and should be available when the audit commenced. Specifically, the Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist attachment requested the following: chart of accounts, general ledgers, cash receipts journals, cash disbursement journals, federal income tax returns, county tangible property returns, Florida Sales and Use Tax returns, sales journals, sales tax exemption certificates (resale certificates), sales invoices, purchase invoices, purchase journals, lease agreements for real or tangible property, depreciation schedules, bank and financial statements, detail of fixed asset purchases, and other documents as needed. On the same date, in addition to the Notice of Intent, the Department issued to Petitioner, inter alia, an Electronic Audit Survey, and a Pre-Audit Questionnaire and Request for Information. On September 17, 2010, the auditor requested the following records to review by October 4, 2010: (1) general ledger for the assessment period; (2) federal returns for 2007, 2008, and 2009; (3) lease agreement for the business location; (4) deal folders for the assessment period; (5) all expense purchase invoices for the assessment period; (6) all purchase invoices relating to assets added to the Depreciation Schedule during the assessment period; (7) resale/exemption certificates, shipping documents, and any other exempt sales documentation to support exempt sales during the assessment period; (8) bank statements for the assessment periods; and (9) all worksheets used to prepare monthly sales tax returns for the assessment period. On October 5, 2010, the auditor met with Petitioner's President Joe Levy, Petitioner's Secretary Joanne Clements, and Petitioner's Certified Public Accountant, Steve Levy. At that time, Petitioner provided a hard copy of the 2007 and 2008 general ledger and profit and loss statements. At that time, the auditor again advised Petitioner that the Department needed the federal returns, as well as the completed electronic audit survey and pre-audit questionnaire. On October 5, 2010, the Department and Petitioner signed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment or to File a Claim for Refund (form DR-872). The consent provided that assessments or claims for refunds may be filed at any time on or before the extended statute of limitations, December 31, 2011. On October 18, 2010, Petitioner provided the Department with the completed electronic audit survey and pre-audit questionnaire. Thereafter, Petitioner provided the Department with the following books and records: (1) 2009 "deal folders;" Petitioner's general ledger in Excel format for June 1, 2007, through December 31, 2010; (3) January 2009 through May 2010 bank statements; (4) a listing of exempt sales; and (5) lease agreements with attendant invoices. On August 25, 2011, the Department issued its assessment, entitled a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (form DR-1215)("NOI"). Said notice provided that Respondent owed $2,324,298.42 in tax, $581,074.61 in penalties, and $515,117.04 in interest through August 25, 2011. The NOI addressed Petitioner's alleged failure to collect and remit tax on: (1) certain vehicle sales (audit Exhibit A01-Sales Tax Collected and Not Remitted)1/; (2) vehicle sales with no documentation regarding its exempt status (audit Exhibit A02-Disallowed Exempt Sales)2/; (3) motor vehicle sales where no discretionary tax was assessed (audit Exhibit A03- Discretionary Surtax)3/; and (4) unreported sales (audit Exhibit A04-Unreported Sales). The assessment also related to Petitioner's alleged failure to pay/accrue tax on: (1) taxable purchases (audit Exhibit B01-Taxable Purchases); (2) fixed assets (audit Exhibit B02-Fixed Assets); and (3) commercial rent (Exhibit B03-Commercial Realty). At hearing, Petitioner stipulated that the only component of the NOI remaining at issue pertains to audit Exhibit A04-Unreported Sales, as Petitioner has conceded A01, A02, A03, and all fee schedules. An understanding of audit Exhibit A04, and the assessment methodology employed by the auditor, is articulated in the Department's Exhibit MM, entitled Explanation of Items, which is set forth, in pertinent part, as follows: Reason for Exhibit: The records received for the audit were inadequate. The taxpayer provided bank statements for the period of January 2009 through May 2010. This period was deemed the test period for unreported sales. A review of the bank statements for the test period revealed that sales were underreported. This exhibit was created to assess for sales tax on unreported sales. Source of Information: Sales tax returns and Bank of America bank statements for the test period of January 2009 through May 2010; The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) [sic] was acquired for the period of June 2007 through May 2010. Description of Mathematical Adjustments: The bank statements were reviewed for the period of January 2009 through May 2010. Taxable Sales on sales tax returns, sales tax on sales tax returns, taxable sales on Exhibit on [sic] Exhibit A01, sales tax Exhibit A01 and Exempt Sales on Exhibit A02 was subtracted from Bank Deposits to arrive at unreported sales. See calculations on page 53. Unreported sales for the period of January 2009 through May 2010 were scheduled into this exhibit. A rate analysis of the DMV database resulted in an effective tax rate of 6.2689. Scheduled transactions were multiplied by the effective tax rate of 6.2689 to determine the tax due on the test period. A percentage of error was calculated by dividing the tax due by the taxable sales for each test period. The percentage of error was applied to taxable sales for each month of the audit period which resulted in additional tax due. The auditor's analysis of the test period, applied to the entire assessment period, resulted in a determination that Petitioner owed $1,599,056.23 in tax for unreported sales. On August 25, 2011, the auditor met with Joe and Steve Levy to discuss and present the NOI. At that time, Joe and Steve Levy were advised that Petitioner had 30 days to provide additional documents to revise the NOI. On September 28, 2011, the Department issued correspondence to Petitioner advising that since a response to the NOI had not been received, the case was being forwarded to Tallahassee for issuance of the Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA")(form DR-831). On October 7, 2011, the Department issued the NOPA, which identified the deficiency resulting from an audit of Petitioner's books and records for the assessment period. Pursuant to the NOPA, Petitioner was assessed $2,324,298.42 in tax, $31,332.46 in penalty, and $534,284.54 in interest through October 7, 2011. The NOPA provided Petitioner with its rights to an informal written protest, an administrative hearing, or a judicial proceeding. On December 5, 2011, Petitioner filed its Informal Written Protest to the October 7, 2011, NOPA. The protest noted that the NOPA was "not correct and substantially overstated." The protest raised several issues: (1) that the calculation was primarily based upon bank statement deposits; (2) not all deposits are sales and sources of income; and (3) a substantial amount of the deposits were exempt sales and loans. The protest further requested a personal conference with a Department specialist. On January 10, 2013, Martha Gregory, a tax law specialist and technical assistance dispute resolution employee of the Department, issued correspondence to Petitioner. The documented purpose of the correspondence was to request additional information regarding Petitioner's protest of the NOPA. Among other items, Ms. Gregory requested Petitioner provide the following: [D]ocumentation and explanations regarding the source of income—vehicle sales, loan payments, etc.—for each deposit. For vehicle sales deposits, provide the customer name, vehicle identification number and amount; for loan payments, provide proof of an existing loan and the amount received from the borrower; and for any other deposits, provide documentation of the source of this income. A conference was held with Petitioner on February 7, 2013. At the conference, Ms. Gregory discussed the January 10, 2013, correspondence including the request for information. The Department did not receive the requested information. Following the conference, the Department provided the Petitioner an additional 105 days to provide documentation to support the protest. Again, Petitioner failed to provide the information requested. On June 14, 2013, the Department issued its Notice of Decision ("NOD"). The NOD concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that it was not liable for the tax, plus penalty and interest, on unreported sales as scheduled in audit Exhibit A04, Unreported Sales, as assessed within the compliance audit for the assessment period. Accordingly, the protested assessment was sustained. On July 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration to appeal the Notice of Decision ("POR"). The POR advanced the following issues: (1) the records examined were not the books and records of Petitioner; (2) the audit should be reduced because the auditor's methodology was incorrect; and the Petitioner should be allowed a credit for bad debts taken during the audit period. At Petitioner's request, on October 22, 2013, Petitioner and Ms. Gregory participated in a conference regarding the POR. At the conference, Petitioner requested a 30-day extension to provide documentation in support of Petitioner's POR. No additional documentation was subsequently provided by Petitioner. On April 29, 2014, the Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration ("NOR"). The NOR sustained the protested assessment. Petitioner, on June 30, 2014, filed its Petition for Chapter 120 Hearing to contest the NOR. Petitioner did not file its federal tax returns for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 until after the Department issued the NOR. Indeed, the federal returns were not filed until June 3, 2014.4/ Ms. Kruse conceded that the auditor's assessment utilized Petitioner's bank statements to determine unreported sales; however, the auditor did not make any adjustments for "unusual items that would have been on the face of the bank statements." Ms. Kruse further acknowledged that the auditor's assessment does not reference Petitioner's general ledger information. Ms. Kruse acknowledged that, for several representative months, the general ledger accurately reported the deposits for the bank statements provided. When presented with a limited comparison of the bank statement and the general ledger, Ms. Kruse further agreed that, on several occasions, deposits noted on the bank statements were probably not taxable transactions; however, the same were included as taxable sales in the auditor's analysis. Ms. Kruse credibly testified that the same appeared to be transfers of funds from one account into another; however, because the Department only possessed the bank statements from one account, and never received the requested "back up information" concerning the other account, the Department could not discern the original source of the funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Department conduct a new assessment of Petitioner's sales and use tax based on a test or sampling of Petitioner's available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by Petitioner for a representative period, giving due consideration to Petitioner's available records, including Petitioner's general ledger, to determine the proportion that taxable retail sales bear to total retail sales. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Coulter Electronics, Inc., Petitioner, is a manufacturer of machinery and instruments used primarily by medical and related professions. During fiscal years 1973 and 1974 the Department included in Coulter's apportionment formula certain inter-company sales of two of its subsidiary corporations, Coulter Diagnostics, Inc., (C.D.I.), and Blood Services, Inc., (B.S.I.). C.D.I. produces products which are used with the machinery and instruments to perform certain tests and B.S.I. produces certain materials which are used by C.D.I. to manufacture its products. Coulter is the parent corporation with C.D.I. being a 100 percent wholly-owned subsidiary and B.S.I. being an approximately 92 percent owned subsidiary. The central management group of Coulter selects and appoints management of both C.D.I. and B.S.I. with some overlap between the top management of the three corporations. During Petitioner's corporate fiscal years ending March 31, 1973, and March 31, 1974, Coulter, as the parent of an affiliated group of corporations, filed consolidated income tax returns for federal income tax purposes. Petitioner's subsidiaries also filed consolidated corporate income tax returns with the State for the fiscal years in question. As reflected on Petitioner's books, sales made to it in this State by its subsidiaries for the 1973 fiscal year total $13,875,153 and for the fiscal year ending 1974, the company sales total $13,961,516 (see Exhibit B to Petitioner's Complaint P.7). These inter- company sales were not included in either the denumerator or denominator of the Petitioner's apportionment formula in the original returns which are filed with the State of Florida. The department, pursuant to an audit by its corporate income tax bureau, included these, resulting in deficiencies of $39,436.00 for the 1973 tax year and $324.00 for the 1974 tax year. The Petitioner takes the position that the transactions in question do not constitute sales which are to be included in the sales factor of the apportionment formula, Section 214.71(3), F.S., because ownership, possession, control and right to direct the products in question at all times rested with the parent corporation and the operations of the subsidiary corporations were at all times totally under the direction and control of the parent corporation. Florida Statutes, Section 214.71(3), generally provides that: "The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer in this state during the taxable year period and the denom- inator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the taxable year or period." The Petitioner urges that its inter-company transactions do not constitute "sales" because they do not include elements traditionally associated with the legal concept of a sale such as passage of title from the vendor to the vendee in payment of a direct consideration from the vendee to the vendor. However, the statutorily defined concept of a sale is very broad in Section 220.15(1), Florida Statutes. That section provides in pertinent part that: "The term 'sales' in paragraph 214.71(3)(a) shall mean all gross receipts of the tax- payer except interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and gross receipts from the sale, exchange, maturity, redemption, or other disposition of securities; except that: (a) Rental income shall be in- cluded in the term 'sales' whenever a significant portion of the taxpayer's business consists of leasing or renting real or tangible personal property; (b) Royalty income shall be included in the term 'sales' whenever a significant portion of the taxpayer's business con- sists of dealing in or with the production, exploration, or development of minerals." (Emphasis supplied) Therein the legislature extended the term "sales" to much more than is traditionally associated with the legal concept of sales for purpose of defining the sales factor or corporate income tax apportionment formula. It thus appears that the presence or absence of title and the method of payment, necessary elements of the traditional concept of the "sale", would not necessarily prevent these inter-company transactions as reflected on the Petitioner's books, from being considered "sales" within the contemplation of the sales factor in the apportionment formula when consideration is given to the above section. Petitioner's Comptroller specifically testified that the inter-company sales formed a part of its gross receipts. None of the transactions involved here fall within any of the statutory exceptions. Evidence also reveals that the inter-company transactions reflected a percentage of profits for the various subsidiaries. Case law in this state has previously recognized that book transactions between members of an affiliated group could be considered as transactions for Florida's tax purposes even where there was no actual transfer of funds. See for example Zero Food Storage Division of American Consumer Industries, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 337 2d 765(1st DCA Florida 1976). Other state courts have also construed the "sales" factor in their apportionment formula broadly so as to include receipts by the taxpayer that clearly fall without the traditional concept of a sale. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. Phillips, 47 S.E. 2d 183 (1948). The Petitioner raises, for the first time, in its brief that the inclusion of inter-company sales in the sales factor of the apportionment formula as originally enacted related only to financial organizations. Petitioner based this argument on its contention that the original legislative enactment of the tax administration act as embodied in Chapter 71-359, Law of Florida, contained the language relating to inter-company sales as part of a subsection pertaining only to financial organization. It argues further that when the State Laws were codified in the Florida Statutes from 1971, and all succeeding years, it was placed as a separate subsection applicable to all corporations. This codification was made by the Division of Statutory Revision. That division receives its authority from Florida Statutes, Section 11.242. My consideration of the various paragraphs of Section 11.242(5), F.S., persuades me to conclude that the change which was made clearly fell within the power of the division and that the legislature has met continuously, at least on an annual basis, since 1971 when the above referenced arrangement was enacted in Section 214.71(3), F.S., by the Division of Statutory Revision, and it is that branch which should have addressed any alleged erroneous placement by the Division of Statutory Revision so as to conform to legislative intent. In any event, argument in this regard should be addressed to this legislature. For these reasons, I conclude that the inter-company sales as evidenced by the testimony constituting a part of Petitioner's gross receipts are therefore a proper item for inclusion in the sales factor of the apportionment formula, as provided in Chapter 214.71(3), Florida Statutes. As such, to the extent that the Florida sales here in question include a profit element, they are includable in the denominator and in the numerator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I hereby recommend: That the Petitioner's challenge of the Department's determination of corporation tax due pursuant to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, be denied, and that the Respondent's proposed corporate income tax deficiencies for Petitioner's corporate fiscal years ending March 31, 1973 and 1974 be sustained. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: James R. McCachren, Jr., Esquire Ervin, Varn, Jacobs & Odom, Law Offices 305 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida E. Wilson Crump, II Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent properly conducted a sales and use tax audit of Petitioner's books and records; and, if so, whether Petitioner is liable for tax and interest on its purchases of materials used for improvements to real property.
Findings Of Fact During the audit period, Petitioner was a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 7820 Professional Place, Suite 2, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner's Florida sales tax number was 39-00-154675-58, and Petitioner's federal employer identification number was 59-3089046. After the audit period, the Florida Department of State administratively dissolved Petitioner for failure to file statutorily required annual reports and filing fees. Petitioner engaged in the business of providing engineering services and fabricating control panels. Petitioner fabricated control panels in a shop Petitioner maintained on its business premises. Petitioner sold some of the control panels in over-the- counter sales. Petitioner properly collected and remitted sales tax on the control panels that Petitioner sold over-the-counter. Petitioner used other control panels in the performance of real property contracts by installing the panels as improvements to real property (contested panels). Petitioner was the ultimate consumer of the materials that Petitioner purchased and used to fabricate the contested panels. At the time that Petitioner installed the contested panels into real property, the contested panels became improvements to the real property. Petitioner failed to pay sales tax at the time Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate the contested panels. Petitioner provided vendors with Petitioner's resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax, when Petitioner purchased the materials used to fabricate the contested panels. None of the purchase transactions for materials used to fabricate the contested panels were tax exempt. The audit is procedurally correct. The amount of the assessment is accurate. On October 23, 2000, Respondent issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (form DR-840), for audit number A0027213470, for the period of October 1, 1995, through September 30, 2000. During an opening interview, the parties discussed the audit procedures and sampling method to be employed and the records to be examined. Based upon the opening interview, Respondent prepared an Audit Agreement and presented it to an officer and owner of the taxpayer. Respondent began the audit of Petitioner's books and records on January 22, 2001. On March 9, 2001, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (original Notice of Intent). At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted an audit conference with Petitioner. At the audit conference, Petitioner provided documentation that the assessed transactions involved improvements to real property. At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted a second audit conference with Petitioner's former legal counsel. Petitioner authorized its former legal counsel to act on its behalf during the audit. At the second audit conference, the parties discussed audit procedures and sampling methods, Florida use tax, fabricated items, and fabrication costs. Respondent revised the audit findings based upon additional information from Petitioner that the assessed transactions involved fabricated items of tangible personal property that became improvements to real property. Respondent assessed use tax on the materials used to fabricate control panels in those instances where Petitioner failed to document that Petitioner paid sales tax at the time of the purchase. Respondent also assessed use tax on fabrication costs including the direct labor and the overhead costs associated with the fabrication process, for the period of October 1, 1995, through June 30, 1999. Respondent eliminated use tax assessed on cleaning services in the original Notice of Intent because the amount of tax was de minimis. On August 29, 2001, Respondent issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Revised Notice of Intent). On September 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until January 25, 2002. On October 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a second Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until April 25, 2002. On February 6, 2002, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment for additional sales and use tax, in the amount of $21,822.27; interest through February 6, 2002, in the amount of $10,774.64; penalty in the amount of $10,831.12; and additional interest that accrues at $6.97 per diem. Petitioner exhausted the informal remedies available from Respondent. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed a formal written protest that, in substantial part, objected to the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit. Respondent issued a Notice of Decision sustaining the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest. Respondent correctly determined that the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit were appropriate and consistent with Respondent's statutes and regulations. Respondent concluded that the assessment was correct based upon the best available information and that Petitioner failed to provide any documentation to refute the audit findings. Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration that did not provide any additional facts, arguments, or records to support its position. On May 16, 2003, Respondent issued a Notice of Reconsideration sustaining the assessment of tax and interest in full, but compromising all penalties based upon reasonable cause.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for relief and sustaining Respondent's assessment of taxes and interest in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael E. Ferguson Control Design Engineering, Inc. 809 East Bloomingdale Avenue, PMB 433 Brandon, Florida 33511 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for certain taxes and, if so, how much.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Manatee County, Florida. Petitioner is in the printing business. Specifically, Petitioner produces, manufactures, assembles, and publishes telephone directories for mobile home parks in Florida. All of Petitioner's work in connection with these directories takes place in Florida. The directories list the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of residents of the mobile home park for which the directory is prepared. The directories also contain advertisements, which Petitioner solicits from merchants seeking to sell goods or services to the mobile home park residents. Following the production of the directories, Petitioner distributes them to the mobile home park residents, who maintain possession of the directories. However, Petitioner retains ownership of each directory, even after it is distributed. Petitioner is solely responsible for the manufacture and distribution of the directories. Petitioner owns accounts receivable reflecting monies owned it by entities for which Petitioner has performed work. Petitioner owns treasury stock. Following an audit, Respondent issued its Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes. The proposed changes assessed additional sales and use taxes of $44,151.77, intangible tax of $1297.08, and $194,75 of health care tax. The bases of proposed liability for the sales and use tax were for the publication and distribution of directories for which no sales or use tax had been collected and for the sale of advertising during the period of the service tax from July 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, for which no sales tax on advertising had been collected. The basis of proposed liability for the intangible tax was for the failure to pay intangible tax on accounts receivable and treasury stock. The basis of proposed liability for the health care tax was for the failure to pay the Hillsborough County Health Care Tax and Discretionary Sales Surtax. On February 11, 1991, Petitioner protested the proposed assessments. On April 24, 1992, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision sustaining the proposed sales and use tax and intangible tax, but eliminating the proposed health care tax. On May 12, 1992, Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration concerning the proposed sales and use tax. On November 24, 1992, Respondent issued its Notice of Reconsideration sustaining the proposed sales and use tax. On January 21, 1993, Petitioner timely filed its petition for a formal administration hearing. Subject to the accuracy of its legal position, Respondent's assessment is factually accurate. Petitioner will pay the assessed amount of sales and use tax, plus interest, if its position is not sustained following the conclusion of this proceeding, including judicial review.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered determining that, for each assessed period, Petitioner is liable for the assessed corporate intangible tax plus interest, the use tax on the cost price of the materials and other covered items plus interest, the sales tax on services on the advertising revenues, but not for any sales tax apart from the period covered by the sales tax on services. ENTERED on January 25, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 25, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: David M. Carr David Michael Carr, P.A. 600 East Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Eric J. Taylor Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Revenue issued to the Petitioners a tax warrant dated May 12, 1986, for sales and use tax alleged to be due and delinquent, interest, penalties, and filing fees in the total sum of $8,269.95. Susan R. Bayer is the owner of a parcel of property located in Hillsborough County, Florida, commonly known as 3001 East Hillsborough Avenue, having become the owner of that property on February 29, 1984. Lloyd W. Bayer owned the property in finding 2 above prior to February 29, 1984. When Susan Bayer became the owner of the property, she became the successor in interest to a lease between Brown Bayer, Inc., and Creech Produce, Inc., wherein a portion of the property was leased to Creech Produce, Inc., for use by Creech Produce, Inc., to let sellers of produce use a space to park a vehicle to sell produce out of the vehicle. This business of Creech was licensed by the City of Tampa as a parking lot. The spaces in the lot were rented on a nightly basis and rent was collected on a nightly basis. There were no terms of rentals for periods longer than a nightly basis. The persons parking vehicles in the spaces generally sold wholesale produce out of the vehicles but not all of them did so, and there was no requirement the vehicles occupying these spaces be used for any specific purpose. In 1985, Susan Bayer filed proceedings against Creech Produce, Inc., seeking to revoke the lease to Creech. One ground alleged in this complaint (Exhibit 8) was that Creech was using the property in violation of state laws and regulations in failing to collect sales taxes on the parking fees and remit same to the Department of Revenue. The court not only ruled against Bayer on the eviction proceedings but extended the lease for an additional year. The lease to Creech (Exhibit 5) provided, inter alia, that the lessee would pay 1/2 of the sanitation expense paid by the lessor and that portion of electricity used for the portion of the building used and the lights for the outside of the property." The electricity was billed to the lessor and, pursuant to this lease provision, Creech remitted its share of the bill to the lessor. This payment for electricity by Creech was included by Respondent as rent on which the sales tax was levied. Exhibit 3 clearly conveys the intent of the parties to lease the property to be used by the lessee as a parking lot for the vehicles from which produce was to be sold and that the lessee could collect the fees for the use of these parking spaces. On February 1, 1984, Bayer entered into an Agreement for Purchase and Sale (Exhibit 2) with Bobby Lee McGilvery and Adella Fisher to sell the business known as Farmer Jahn's Ice to the latter. This business consisted of two icemaking machines on the premises of 3001 East Hillsborough Avenue, storage- disposing facilities at about 60 locations in Tampa, a pickup truck, step-van, ice baggers, bags, etc. McGilvery had worked for Bayer in this business of making and selling ice cubes for 15 years and purchased the business with no money down for a total price of $125,000 to be paid at the rate of $1,275 per month at 10 percent interest until the total of $125,000 is paid. Exhibit 2 provided that a separate lease agreement for the property occupied by the business would be executed providing for payment of $500 per month. A promissory note in the amount of $125,000 payable to Bayer was executed by McGilvery and Fisher (Exhibit 3) which provided for payment of $1,725 per month with interest at 10 percent until the total of $125,000 was paid. There appears to have been a scrivener's error in the preparation of the note so far as the monthly payment is concerned. Since the sale agreement provided for the business to be paid for at $1,275 per month and a rental price of $500 per month the monthly payments should have been $1,775. The Business Lease executed February 1, 1984, (Exhibit 4) provided "consideration for this lease is the note on the sale of the business." The auditor for Respondent based his sales tax calculation solely on the Business Lease (Exhibit 4) and the promissory note and calculated the tax on a rental of $1,725 per month. McGilvery and Fisher defaulted on the payments on the note and the business was recaptured by Petitioner. Having no lien on the personal property sold to the buyers Petitioner was able to recover only a small portion of those items enumerated in Finding 9 above.
