The Issue Whether the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., is liable for the payment of $10,176.18, together with a penalty of 5 percent and interest accruing daily as claimed in the audit by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, for the period September 1, 1975, through August 31, 1970.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc.`s challenge to the tax audit conducted by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, covering the period September 1, 1975, through August 31, 1978. The claim of the audit is for sales tax due pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and its supporting rules found in the Florida Administrative Code. The audit document showing the Proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest may be found as the Petitioner's Exhibit A admitted into evidence. Although the audit document originally claimed tax in the amount of $29,600.37, at the commencement of the hearing the amount remaining in dispute was $15,288.75, together with a penalty of 5 percent and interest accruing until date of payment. During the hearing, a stipulation was entered into between the parties to the effect that, of the remaining disputed tax, penalty and interest, $5,112.57, together with the applicable penalty and interest was acknowledged to be owed by the Respondent. Therefore, there remains in dispute the amount of $10,176.18, with a 5 percent penalty and interest accruing until date of payment. This amount of tax, penalty and interest claimed represents the difference between the tax rate which the Petitioner has applied in this assessment process and the tax rate that the Respondent claims to be applicable. The Petitioner claims that a tax rate of 4.5 percent against total receipts, in keeping with the authority of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent counters that position by offering its own formula arrived at in view of the nature of its prices charged its customers, and that tax rate is 4.1666667 percent. The sales in question during the audit period pertain to sales of alcoholic and malt beverage in the lounges of the Respondent's licensed premises located in Dade County, Florida. The facts reveal that the sale of all alcoholic beverages in the time period at issue were made in increments of a quarter dollar ($.25). These quarter-dollar increments included the imposition of sales tax. As example: SALES PRICE TAX TOTAL $ .48 $.02 $ .50 .72 .03 .75 .96 .04 1.00 1.20 .05 1.25 1.44 .06 1.50 1.68 .07 1.75 Although the tax was computed on the sales price and this system was made known to the public by prominently displaying the price list, which list indicated that the beverage prices included tax; the Respondent did not separate the increment of the total price into categories of sales price and tax at the time of each transaction. Consequently, the books audited in the process of making the claim for assessment only demonstrated the total sales price of a given day's alcoholic beverage sales as an aggregate and did not reflect the tax as a separate item from the sales price. To this aggregate amount the Respondent applied its tax rate formula of 4.166667 by taking the amount of total receipts for the day and dividing by 1.04666667 to get gross sales. The gross sales were then subtracted from the amount of total receipts to obtain the figure for tax collected. This method was rounded off to the nearest penny on each day of computation. The Petitioner, as stated before, relies on Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a basis for its claim that the rate of tax should be 4.5 percent. That provision states: (3) Dealers in alcoholic and malt beverages are required to remit the actual tax collected to the State. In some instances, however, it may be impractical for such dealers to separately record the sales price of the beverage and the tax collected thereon. In such cases, dealers may elect to report tax on the following basis. Package stores who sell no mixed drinks should remit the tax at 4.3 percent of total receipts and dealers who sell mixed drinks or a combination of mixed drinks and packaged goods should remit the tax at the rate of 4.5 percent of total receipts. In those instances where the sales price and the tax have not been separately recorded but where it can be demonstrated that the public has been put on notice by means of price lists posted prominently throughout the establishment that the total charge includes tax, the dealer may deduct the tax from the total receipts to arrive at the appropriate tax and gross sales figures using the method shown below: Total receipts divided by the tax rate = gross sales. For example, a package store which sells no mixed drinks and whose total receipts are $2,000 would compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.043 percent = gross sales $1,917.54 tax collected 82.46 A dealer who sells drinks or a combination of drinks and package goods and whose total receipts are $2,000 would compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.045 percent = gross sales $1,913.87 tax collected 86.12 When the public has hot been put on notice through the posting of price lists that tax is included in the total charge, tax shall be computed by multiplying total receipts by the applicable rates referred to in this rule. In the mind of the Petitioner, by failing to segregate the total amounts collected into the categories of sales price and tax and then to remit the tax collected as a separate item, the Respondent is relegated to the utilization of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, in remitting its tax. Under its theory, the Petitioner has taken the total receipts recorded in the Respondent's work sheets and divided those total receipts by the formula 1.045 percent to get gross sales and then subtracted the gross sales from the amount of total receipts to get the amount of tax that should have been collected, and then made a further subtraction of the tax which the Respondent remitted, from the tax formula which the Petitioner claims to be due on the transactions to arrive at the tax presently outstanding. This amount being the figure referenced above. From that computation, the amount of penalty and interest has been claimed. (By its position the Petitioner does not seem to question the fact that the public has been put on notice by price lists posted throughout the establishment that the total charge reflected on the price lists includes tax, as referred to in the subject Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code.) According to the Respondent, the reason for the utilization of the rate of 4.1666667 percent was the fact that all beverages having a break in price increments of a quarter-dollar ($.25), it is mathematically impossible for the proper effective rate being charged on all beverages sold in the lounges to vary from their tax rate of 4.1666667 percent because each increment of increase has the same ratio of sales price to tax. The Respondent argues that to claim a rate of 4.5 percent causes the collection in excess of the amount allowed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. After considering the position of the parties, the Respondent is found to be correct in its position. The overall scheme of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, calls for the taxation of sales of tangible personal property at a rate of 4 percent, see Section 212.05, Florida Statutes. A further refinement of that theory is found in Subsection 212.12(10), Florida Statutes, which creates a bracketing system for sales representing the various fractions of a dollar in amount. This bracketing system thereby causes imposition of a sales tax greater than 4 percent in some transactions. The Petitioner is granted further authority to refine the system of taxation by those provisions of Subsections 212.17(6) and 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, which state in turn: 212.17(6) The department shall have the power to make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, or the other laws, or the constitution of this state, or the United States, for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder, and such rules and regulations shall when enforced be deemed to be reasonable and just. 212.18(2) The department shall administer and enforce the assessment and collection of the taxes, interest, and penalties imposed by this chapter. It is authorized to make and publish such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, as it may deem necessary in enforcing its provisions in order that there shall not be collected on the average more than the rate levied herein. The department is authorized to and it shall provide by rule and regulation a method for accomplishing this end. It shall prepare instructions to all persons required by this chapter to collect and remit the tax to guide such persons in the proper collection and remission of such tax and to instruct such persons in the practices that may be necessary for the purpose of enforcement of this chapter and the collection of the tax imposed hereby. The use of tokens in the collection of this tax is hereby expressly forbidden and prohibited. It can be seen that the Petitioner has the authority to promulgate the necessary rules for the accomplishment of the purpose of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, but is restricted in this task by being prohibited from making rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this chapter or other statutes within the laws of the State of Florida or the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida and it is further restricted from imposing rules or regulations which cause the tax to be collected on the average more than the rate levied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. While it is clear that the legislature intended to keep the effective rate of tax as near the 4 percent level as possible, it is also evident that the system contemplated a segregation of the amount collected in a sale as sales price, and the amount of tax applied to the sale at the point of the transaction. This is a means of accountability that helps insure that the proper remittance of tax due on each and every retail sales occurs. However, the preeminent charge to the Petitioner is the duty to collect the tax at a rate which most closely approximates the 4 percent called for, without abandoning responsibility or the close monitoring of the records of a given taxpayer. When considered in the overall context of the purpose of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the method which the Respondent used to collect and remit tax, does not violate the conditions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, nor the rules designed to enforce that chapter. The tax rate of 4.1666667 percent has been proven to be correct, in the sense of more closely approximating the 4 percent tax rate called for than the application of a tax rate of 4.5 percent. The correctness is established because the increments charged for alcoholic beverages are always in the amount of a quarter-dollar ($.25) and each increment of increase carries the same tax rate. This fact, when considered with the additional fact that the break-out of the tax in the price structure as established by the Respondent, is in keeping with the tables of the bracket system found in Subsection 212.12(10), Florida Statutes, is sufficiently convincing to demonstrate the propriety of the Respondent's position. Nonetheless, a further examination of the Petitioner's argument is indicated. The focus of the Petitioner's position is Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, and a detailed reading of this rule reveals that dealers who have properly put the public on notice that their sales prices include tax, "may" elect to remit tax by using the formula of the rate of 4.5 percent of total receipts as the tax due. The use of the word "may" in this instance creates an option on the part of the Respondent, an option which it has elected not to proceed under and by the facts of this case, the alternate method which the Respondent used in computing this tax, i.e., the rate 4.1666667 percent is efficacious. Finally, the Petitioner has advanced the argument that the formula found in Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, is unique to that rule and may not be utilized unless the prerequisite factors are shown and unless the tax rate factor 4.5 percent is part of the formula. Even though the formula as expressed in Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, may have legitimate application to some cases, it is not preemptive in its scope and it would not prohibit the Respondent in this case from using the formula and substituting the rate of tax of 4.1666667 percent for the rate of 4.5 percent in that part of the formula. In summary, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate its entitlement to the tax, penalty and interest under its claim founded on Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. (Petitioner in this cause had submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommendation in the case styled, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., Petitioner, vs. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Respondent, D.O.A.H. Case No. 70-1003R, and in doing so made reference to matters which have been considered in the present case. Therefore, to the extent that those matters are not inconsistent with this Recommended Order they have been utilized. To the extent that those proposals are inconsistent with this Recommended Order they are specifically rejected. The Respondent has also submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommended Order and to the extent that those matters are not inconsistent with this Recommended Order they have been utilized. To the extent that those proposals are inconsistent with this Recommended Order they are specifically rejected.)
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., be relieved from further responsibility to pay the amount of tax, $10,176.18 and the 5 percent penalty and interest accruing on that amount of tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Martha J. Cook, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 422, Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Watson, Esquire c/o Spieth, Bell, McCurdy & Newell 1190 Union Commerce Building Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Mark J. Wolff, Esquire and Howard E. Roskin, Esquire First Federal Building, 30th Floor One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) should grant Petitioner's request for a refund of the $1,433.40 in sales tax Petitioner paid in connection with his purchase of a mobile home from Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: In October 2002, Petitioner purchased a lot in a mobile home park in Davie, Florida (Petitioner's Property). There was a "worn out" mobile home on the property that Petitioner had "demolished and removed." On May 30, 2003, Petitioner entered into a Purchase Agreement with Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc., wherein he agreed to purchase, for $23,890.00, a 2003 Homes of Merit mobile home that was not yet built (Purchased Mobile Home). The Purchase Agreement provided that the Purchased Mobile Home was to be "drop shipped" directly from the manufacturer's facility to Petitioner's Property, where it would be "met by [Petitioner]." The Purchase Agreement further provided, in pertinent part, as follows with respect the passing of title of the Purchased Mobile Home: Title to said equipment shall remain in the Seller until the agreed purchase price therefor is paid in full . . . ; thereupon title to the within described unit passes to the buyer as of the date of . . . full cash payment . . . . Petitioner paid the full purchase price of the Purchased Mobile Home upon execution of the Purchase Agreement, but no sales tax was collected from him at that time. On July 13, 2003, the Purchased Mobile Home was delivered to Petitioner's Property, where it has remained. Thereafter, Larry Douglas, Sr., of Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes sent the following letter, dated September 11, 2003, to Petitioner: You have recently purchased a new Homes of Merit manufactured home from Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc. You have not provided us with proof that you are exempt [from] sales tax. Therefore, you owe Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc., the amount of $1,433.40 for the sales tax on your home. Your home will not be registered in your name until the balance is paid in full. On or about September 15, 2003, Petitioner filed with the Broward County Property Appraiser an "application for the issuance an 'RP' License Plate to identify [the Purchased Mobile Home] as real property." In his application, Petitioner represented that the Purchased Mobile Home had been "permanently affixed on January 1 of the current year, [was] now permanently affixed, and it [was his] intention that [it] remain permanently affixed," to Petitioner's Property. At no time prior to the filing of the application had the Purchased Mobile Home been classified as real property. The Broward County Property Appraiser, on September 15, 2003, issued a certificate stating that the Purchased Mobile Home was "included in an assessment for ad valorem taxation of [Petitioner's Property]." On September 18, 2003, Petitioner reluctantly paid the $1,433.40 that Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes claimed was due "for the sales tax on [the Purchased Mobile Home]." On September 19, 2003, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issued a certificate of title for the Purchased Mobile Home in Petitioner's name. In March 2006, Petitioner applied to DOR for a refund of the $1,433.40 he had paid to Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes in sales tax for the Purchased Mobile Home. On July 27, 2006, DOR issued its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's refund request. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2007.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be assessed sales and use tax for the audit period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, per the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated July 3, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Wales is a Florida S corporation. Its principal place of business is located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Wales' federal employee identification number is 59- 1703273. Wales' Florida sales and tax number is 16-03-095273- 26/1. By letter dated June 6, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Notice of Intent). The Notice of Intent identified the audit number as A0205310975. On July 10, 2002, the Department's auditor assigned to perform the audit conducted an initial interview with Wales. The auditor discussed, among other things, the audit and sample methods that would be employed during the audit. On August 13, 2002, the auditor began examining Wales' books and records at Wales' business location. Wales was cooperative during the audit. Wales provided all available books and records for the audit. The sole shareholders of Wales are Stewart Levy and Diane Levy. Wales leased its business location from Element Two Enterprises, Inc., ( Element Two) a related entity. Stewart Levy and Diane Levy are also the sole officers of Element Two, president and secretary, respectively. Element Two is the record owner of the improved real property located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, (realty). The address for the realty is also the address for Wales' place of business. Element Two mortgaged the realty leased by Wales. Wales paid monthly monetary consideration to Element Two in lease payments, which directly correlated to the amount of the monthly mortgage payments. Ad valorem taxes and property insurance were included in the monthly mortgage payments. Wales paid the ad valorem taxes and property insurance on the leased property. The lease payments to Element Two by Wales included the amount of the ad valorem taxes, property insurance, and common areas of maintenance. Wales did not pay sales tax on any of the lease payments to Element Two. Element Two did not charge or remit sales tax to the Department on the lease payments by Wales. Element Two was not registered with the Department as a dealer. Only dealers that are registered can remit sales tax on lease payments. Consequently, Element Two could not remit sales tax on the lease payments by Wales. Wales did not utilize all of the property it leased. Wales sub-leased a portion of the leased property to an unrelated entity. A prior sales and use tax audit was conducted of the sub-lessee, which included the period May 1997 through December 1998. The Department examined the sublease audit to determine whether Wales owed additional sales tax. The Department's examination of that audit revealed that the sales and use tax on the rent paid by the sub-lessee for the period May 1997 through September 1998 was assessed and paid by the sub-lessee. For the period May 1997 through December 1998, Wales had neither charged or collected sales tax nor remitted sales tax to the Department on the sub-lessee's payments. No sales tax was charged or paid on the sublease payments for the period October 1998 through December 1998. From January 1999 through April 2002, Wales charged, collected, and remitted sales tax on the sublease payments. The Department credited Wales for sales tax already paid on the subleased portion for the period May 1997 through September 1998 and January 1999 through April 2002. On its general ledger, Wales posted the lease payments to Element Two as rent payments. Element Two posted the lease payments to its general ledger as rent income. On its federal income tax returns, Wales reported the lease payments to Element Two as rent expense. Element Two reported the lease payments on its federal income tax returns as rent income. On November 29, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes for audit number A0205310975. Wales requested and the Department agreed to hold an audit conference to discuss the audit findings. Wales claimed that rent payments made were not subject to sales tax because both Wales and Element Two signed the mortgage and promissory note on the realty leased by Wales. However, only Element Two was reflected as the borrower on the loan and only Element Two was the signatory on the mortgage even though both Wales and Element Two signed the promissory note. On January 10, 2003, Wales executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment or to File a Claim for Refund (Consent). The Consent extended the statute of limitations for the period of time in which an assessment may be issued or a claim for refund may be filed to December 31, 2003. On July 3, 2003, the Department issued, by certified mail, the Notice and an Addendum to Proposed Assessment for audit number A0205310975. The Notice provided, among other things, for the assessment of sales and use tax in the amount of $17,481.73; penalty in the amount of $8,741.10; interest in the amount of $5,756.03, with additional daily interest being computed at the rate of $3.54 per day from July 3, 2003; and a total assessment in the amount $31,978.86. On September 1, 2003, the Notice became a Final Assessment for audit number A0205310975. Wales contested the Final Assessment and requested a hearing. Wales is not contesting that part of the audit which found that Wales failed to pay sales tax on certain fixed assets purchased for use in its business. At hearing, Wales contended that its federal income tax returns could be amended to reflect the payments to Element Two as mortgage payments instead of rent payments, which would, in turn, change the Department's audit to reflect the payments as mortgage not rent. To address this contention, the Department presented the testimony of an expert witness in the area of rental consideration and sales tax audits. The Department's expert testified that the consideration for rental or use of property is the payment between/to one who owns the real property and/from one who uses the property; and concluded that consideration, as rental, was provided to Wales by Element Two based on the Department's taxing statute, Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, and its rules and regulation, Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.070. The expert opined that the mortgage payments were consideration for a lease or license to use the real property and that, therefore, the monthly lease payment, which equaled the monthly mortgage payment, paid by Wales to Element Two was consideration for the lease or license to use the realty. The expert's testimony is found to be credible. The evidence presented shows that the mathematical computations performed by the Department in its audit are correct. Further, the evidence shows that the mathematical computations as to tax, penalty, and interest assessed are correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's assessment of sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation be sustained and that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation for the period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, consistent herewith. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Schnitzer GSS Advisory Services, Inc. 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners owe the taxes, interest, and penalties assessed by the Department of Revenue based upon Petitioners’ alleged rental of their real property to a related corporation from June 2000 through August 2003.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: In July 1997, Petitioners acquired the real property located at 640 North Semoran Boulevard in Orlando, Florida (hereafter “the Property”). The Property was acquired in Petitioners’ individual capacities, and they financed the purchase of the Property through a loan secured by a mortgage on the Property. The documents relating to the 1997 loan and mortgage were not introduced at the hearing. At the time the Property was acquired, Petitioner Paul Solano was engaged in the practice of accounting through a sole proprietorship known as P. Solano and Associates. Mr. Solano has been practicing accounting in Florida since 1969 and he is familiar with Florida's sales tax laws. The Property was treated as an asset of Mr. Solano’s sole proprietorship even though he was not using it as his place of business at the time. For example, depreciation expense related to the Property was itemized on Petitioners’ tax returns as a business expense. The mortgage payments made by Petitioners were also treated as business expenses of the sole proprietorship. In October 1999, Mr. Solano incorporated his accounting practice into an entity known as Solano & Associates Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter “the Corporation”). The sole business of the Corporation is providing accounting services. At the time of its formation, the Corporation was owned in equal 20 percent shares by Mr. Solano, his wife (Petitioner Diane Solano), their two daughters, and their son-in-law. There has been no change in the ownership of the Corporation since its inception. Mr. Solano is the president of the Corporation. The other owners/family members are also officers in the Corporation. Once the Corporation was formed, the depreciation expense related to the Property was included on the Corporation's tax returns, not Petitioners' tax return. At the time the Property was purchased, it was zoned for residential use. Between 1997 and 1999, Petitioners took the necessary steps to get the Property rezoned for commercial use so that the Corporation could conduct its accounting practice from that location. In November 1999, after the property had been rezoned, the Corporation and its owners applied for a loan from First Union National Bank (First Union) to obtain the funds necessary to renovate the existing building on the Property. Although unclear from the documentation in the record, Petitioners both testified that the 1999 loan was effectively a refinancing of the 1997 loan. The Corporation was not able to obtain a loan in its own name because it had only been in existence for a short period of time. The owners of the Corporation were not able to obtain a loan at a favorable interest rate, primarily because of the lack of credit history of Petitioners’ daughters and son-in- law. As a result, the loan was obtained by Petitioners in their individual capacities. Petitioners gave a mortgage on the Property as collateral for the 1999 loan. The mortgage document, entitled “Mortgage and Absolute Assignment of Leases” (hereafter "the 1999 mortgage"), was signed by Petitioners in their individual capacities on November 18, 1999; the Corporation was not identified in the 1999 mortgage in any way. The 1999 mortgage includes boiler-plate language referring to Petitioners’ obligation to maintain and enforce any leases on the Property and requiring the assignment of rents from any such leases to First Union. That language cannot be construed to mean that a lease actually existed at the time; in fact, the Property was still undergoing renovations at the time. The Corporation began doing business from the Property in February 2000 after the renovation work was complete and a certificate of occupancy was issued. The 1999 loan was refinanced in May 2000 with First Union. The loan amount was increased from $145,000 to $200,000 and the term of the loan was extended through a document entitled “Mortgage and Loan Modification and Extension Agreement” (hereafter "the 2000 mortgage"). The 2000 mortgage refers to the Corporation as the borrower and refers to Petitioners as the guarantors. Petitioners signed the 2000 mortgage in their individual capacities (to bind themselves as guarantors) as well as their capacities as corporate officers (to bind the Corporation as borrower). The related promissory note, dated May 5, 2000, also refers to the Corporation as the borrower, and it is signed by Petitioners in their capacity as officers of the Corporation. As part of the documentation for the refinancing in 2000, Petitioners executed an “Affidavit of Business Use” in which they attested they were the owners of the Property and that the loan proceeds would be “utilized exclusively for business or commercial purposes and not for personal use.” Petitioners also executed a “Mortgagors" Affidavit” in which they attested that they were in sole possession of the Property and that no other persons have claims or rights to possession of the property “except Solano & Associates Enterprises by virtue of a written lease which does not have an option to purposes or right of first refusal.” The monthly mortgage payment for the refinanced loan was $2,044.91. That amount was due on the fifth day of each month beginning on June 5, 2000, and it was automatically deducted from the Corporation’s bank account with First Union. In addition to making the mortgage payment for the Property, the Corporation paid the ad valorem taxes, insurance, and related expenses. The amount of those payments is not quantified in the record. Petitioners formally deeded the Property to the Corporation in October 2003. Mrs. Solano testified that the failure to do so earlier was simply an “oversight.” When the Property was formally deeded to the Corporation, Petitioners did not report any income or loss on the transaction for tax purposes. Any equity that had accumulated in the Property was simply “given” to the Corporation. The First Union mortgages were satisfied in October 2003 as part of a refinancing done by the Corporation with SunTrust bank after it became the owner of the Property.1 At that point, the Corporation had been in existence long enough to establish a credit history and obtain financing in its own name. The record does not include any documentation related to the 2003 refinancing transaction. Despite the representation in the “Mortgagors’ Affidavit” quoted above, there has never been any written or oral lease between Petitioners and the Corporation with respect to the use of the Property. Petitioners have always considered the Property to be a business asset, initially an asset of Mr. Solano’s sole proprietorship and then an asset of the Corporation. Petitioners never collected any sales tax from the Corporation on the mortgage payments made by the Corporation. Petitioners did not consider those payments to be rental payments. In late-June or early-July 2003, the Department sent a letter to Petitioners stating that the Property “appears to be subject to sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212.031, Florida Statutes.” The letter was sent as part of the Department’s “Corporation Rent Project” through which the Department compares records in various databases to identify commercial properties whose owner of record is different from the business operating at that location. Included with the letter was a questionnaire soliciting information from Petitioners regarding the Property and its use. The questionnaire was completed by Mr. Solano and returned to the Department in a timely manner. Mr. Solano marked a box on the questionnaire indicating that the Property is “[o]ccupied by a corporation in which a corporate officer is the property owner,” and he identified the Corporation as the entity occupying the Property. In response to the question as to “which of the following considerations are received by you,” Mr. Solano marked the following boxes: “The corporation remits payment for the mortgage loan”; “I do not receive rental income, but the related entity pays the mortgage payments”; and “No consideration is received from this related entity.” In response to the questions regarding the “monthly gross rental income of the property” and the “amount of real estate taxes . . . paid on the property by the lessee” for 2000 through 2003, Mr. Solano answered $0 for all periods. Terry Milligan, a tax specialist with the Department, determined based upon Mr. Solano’s responses on the questionnaire that the Corporation’s use of the Property was subject to the sales tax on rentals. Mr. Milligan advised Petitioners of that determination by letter dated July 29, 2003. The letter requested that Petitioners provide “a detailed month by month breakdown of rent (or mortgage payment) amounts, any other consideration, and property taxes that you received from the tenant (or tenant paid on your behalf) for the last thirty-six (36) months).” (Emphasis in original). Petitioners responded to Mr. Milligan’s request through a letter dated August 11, 2003. The letter explained that the reason that the title to the Property appeared under Petitioners’ name rather than the Corporation's name is “due to credit history.” More specifically, the letter stated that “[i]t was decided by the Board members, my wife and our [] children, to put it under our name since we have a long history of good credit.” Included with the letter was a bank statement showing the monthly mortgage payment of $2,044.91 and a notice of the proposed property tax assessment from Orange County for the Property, which was addressed to the Corporation. In addition to providing the requested documentation to Mr. Milligan, one of Petitioners’ daughters, Joylynn Aviles, spoke with Mr. Milligan to explain the circumstances relating to the financing and use of the Property. Ms. Aviles is the Secretary of the Corporation. Ms. Aviles also spoke with Mr. Milligan’s supervisor and an individual in the Department’s legal division. When it became apparent that the matter could not be resolved informally, Ms. Aviles requested that Mr. Milligan issue a final assessment so that Petitioners could bring a formal protest. In response, the Department issued the NOFA on September 11, 2003. The NOFA was preceded by a spreadsheet dated September 3, 2003, which showed how Mr. Milligan calculated the tax, penalties, and interest amounts set forth in the NOFA. As described in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet and his testimony at the hearing, the tax was computed based upon the monthly mortgage payments of $2044.91 made by the Corporation from June 2000 to August 2003. The June 2000 start-date for the assessment corresponds to the 36-month period referred to in Mr. Milligan’s July 29, 2003, letter; it also happens to correspond to the date that Corporation began making the mortgage payments. The August 2003 end-date for the assessment was used because it was the month preceding the date of the NOFA. The Department has not sought to expand the assessment to include the period between August 2003 and October 2003 when the Property was formally deeded to the Corporation. The NOFA does not include any assessment for the property taxes, insurance or other expenses paid by the Corporation on the Property. The Department has not sought to expand the assessment to include those amounts. The sales tax rate in effect in Orange County during the assessment period was six percent from June 2000 through December 2002, and it was 6.5 percent from January 2003 through August 2003. The 0.5 percent increase resulted from the imposition of a county surtax of some kind. The NOFA calculated a total tax due of $4,784.91. As shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet, that amount was calculated by multiplying the monthly mortgage payment by the tax rate in effect at the time of the payment and then totaling those monthly amounts. The NOFA calculated $465.79 in interest due on the unpaid tax through September 13, 2003. As shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet, that amount was calculated at the applicable statutory rates. Interest continues to accrue at 53 cents per day. The NOFA calculated a penalty due of $2,233.97. That amount was calculated based upon the applicable statutory rate as shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet and explained in the NOFA. In total, the NOFA imposed an assessment of $7,566.43. That amount includes the taxes, interest, and penalties described above. The NOFA informed Petitioners of the procedure by which they could protest the Department's assessment. On November 10, 2003, the Department received Petitioners' timely protest of the assessment. This proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order rescinding the Notice of Final Assessment issued to Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March 2004.
Findings Of Fact Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc., Petitioner, operates, as a concessionaire, duty-free stores at Miami International Airport. The premises are owned by the Dade County Aviation Department and the stores are leased to Petitioner pursuant to the terms of a lease and concession agreement dated 19 July 1977, effective 1 August 1977 and continuing until 30 September 1987. (Exhibit 1 to Deposition) Pursuant to this agreement Petitioner occupies six stores and additional warehouse space at the Terminal Building and the International Satellite Facility. Article II in Exhibit 1 entitled Rental Charges and Payments provides for rental payments for each store and space occupied based upon a fixed fee of $X per square foot per year with the dollar per square foot cost varying with the space occupied. In addition to this minimal rental fee, Section 2.03 of this agreement provides: County Profit Participation: As additional consideration for the rights and privileges granted Concessionaire herein, Concessionaire shall pay the County a portion of its profits. As a convenience and in order to eliminate requirements for detailed auditing of expenditures, assets and liabilities and in order to provide an even flow of annual revenues for budgeting and bond financing purposes, said portion of the profits of the Concessionaire shall be calculated as the amount by which sixteen percent of the monthly gross revenues, as defined in Arti- cle 2.07, exceeds the sum of monthly rental payments required by Articles 2.01 and 2.04. Concessionaire shall pay such portion of its profits to County by the twentieth (20th) day of the month following the month in which the gross revenues were received or accrued. For the period October 1, 1982 through September 30, 1987, the percent of monthly gross revenues to be paid by Concessionaire as a portion of its profits shall be eighteen percent, payable and calculated in the same manner as above. The lessor provides air conditioning, garbage and sewage disposal facilities, security, and many other services to the lessee in addition to the space leased. From October 1976 through September 1977 Petitioner paid $40,499.66 in additional sales tax over the guaranteed minimum amount; for the year ending September 1978 this additional sales tax was $66,284.85; for the year year ending September 1979 this additional sales tax was $93,837.15; and for the year ending September 1980 this additional sales tax was $137,521.87. (Exhibit 2 to the Deposition) As the owner of the facility Dade County has the option of operating the various facilities and services available to the public or having these operated by a concessionaire. Dade County has opted for the manner it believed more profitable to the county and in the case of the duty free stores this has resulted in leasing the space to a concessionaire. The hotel at the airport is operated by the Aviation Department under a management contract. It is Petitioner's and Dade County's position that a sales tax should not be paid on the county profit participation charges because, if the Aviation Department operated the stores there would be no sales tax on any rental income and the County operates the facilities at the airport so as to maximize profits to the county. Therefore by requiring the concessionaire to pay sales tax, this reduces the profit available to share with the County.
Findings Of Fact At the time and place scheduled for final hearing, nobody appeared on behalf of petitioner and no evidence was adduced.
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that respondent dismiss petitioner's request for a formal administrative proceeding. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Thomas Herndon, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Vicki Weber, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Kevin J. O'Donnell, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Louise J. Allen, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. 150 W. Flagler Street, Suite 2200 Miami, FL 33130
The Issue The issues are: Whether Latin America Sales made unreported sales which became subject to sales tax because they went unreported? Are purchases of inventory by Latin America Sales from overseas vendors subject to state use tax while temporarily warehoused in Miami and before export? Are purchases of inventory of Latin America Sales subject to state use tax because of its failure to register as a dealer, although its purchases would be exempt had it registered?
Findings Of Fact The Assessments The Department of Revenue assessed sales and use tax against Latin America Sales International for the period February 1, 1985 to June 30, 1987, in the amount of $114,682.88, a penalty of $28,670.72, and interest of $19,704.39, for a total of $163,057.99. It also assessed sales and use tax against the taxpayer for the period July 1, 1987 to January 31, 1988, in the amount of $72,374.71, a penalty of $18,093.68, and interest of $4,655.37, for a total of $95,123.76. These taxes were assessed for three reasons, failure to pay sales tax, failure to pay use tax and failure to pay tax due on rentals of space used to store sewing machine inventory in Florida. Sales Tax Latin America Sales International, Inc., is a Florida Corporation organized in 1975 by Cuban immigrants Ricardo and Elsie Miranda. It was formed to avail itself of a benefit created by the Internal Revenue Code for companies which qualified as western hemisphere trading corporations. Under 26 U.S.C. Section 921, a substantial tax reduction was available to United States corporations which made at least 95% of their sales to buyers outside of the United States, and within the western hemisphere. Mr. and Mrs. Miranda and a Mr. Ricardo Gomez had been operating a business known as Richards Sewing Machines Company, which sold industrial sewing machines both domestically and in Central American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and in Jamaica. They bought the industrial sewing machines in Taiwan and Italy. To take advantage of the deduction available to a western hemisphere trading corporation, Mr. and Mrs. Miranda incorporated Latin America Sales International, Inc. (Latin America). On its federal corporate income tax returns which were prepared by its certified public accountant, Eugene Drascher, Latin America obtained a deduction for its activities as a western hemisphere trading corporation for its fiscal years ending October 31, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980. Ultimately, this federal deduction was phased out. Richards Sewing Machines had been registered properly with the Florida Department of Revenue as a dealer and a payor of sales and use taxes, but no similar registration was filed for Latin America when it was formed. Mr. Drascher advised Mr. and Mrs. Miranda that the sales by Latin America would be made outside the United States, and consequently Florida was not entitled to collect sales tax from the foreign buyer, and that Latin America was only involved in importing and exporting industrial sewing machine inventory for resale, so the corporation was not responsible to pay use tax to the State of Florida on those sewing machines in its inventory. In essence, the CPA advised Mr. and Mrs. Miranda that there were no reports concerning sales and use tax to be filed and no reportable sales or use tax due from Latin America. This advice about reports was erroneous, and the failure of Latin America to register as a dealer has serious financial consequences with respect to liability for use tax. To allow persons claiming to engage in tax exempt sales to file no returns or to avoid registration entirely would provide a means of tax evasion which could be easily abused. All vendors must register and file tax returns so the Department of Revenue will be aware the vendor is in business and so the Department can audit to verify claims that sales are made in a way which is tax exempt. Some accomodations are made for tax exempt export sales; for instance, vendors may apply to file their returns semi-annually or annually rather than monthly. After the tax deduction available to western hemisphere trading corporations was phased out, Mr. and Mrs. Miranda continued to use Latin America to make foreign sales because the corporation had made a name for itself in the export market. In essence, Latin America had built up good will with its foreign customers. Latin America continued to engage only in export sales; it made no domestic sales within the United States or the State of Florida, except sales to other exporters. On those few occasions, Latin America obtained an appropriate resale certificate from the buyer/exporter. Latin America never filed any returns with the Florida Department of Revenue with respect to its inventory purchased from overseas vendors in Taiwan or Italy. Even if exempt, these purchases should have been reported as property held for export on schedule B of an annual sales tax return, under a dealer registration number Latin America should have obtained. (Tr. 118) Latin America received shipments of containers of sewing machines at the Miami free port, but because rent there was so expensive, Latin America transferred the inventory to a warehouse in Miami, after a customs broker paid the applicable federal customs duties on behalf of Latin America. Latin America never registered as an exporter with the State of Florida. Latin America never filed any returns with respect to gross sales made of its inventory stored in Miami which it exported to customers in the Caribbean or Central America. These sales should have been reported to the Department of Revenue under a dealer registration number as exempt sales. (Tr. 118) Richards Sewing Machines Company, which handled domestic sales and which was appropriately registered with the Department of Revenue, made proper and timely filings of all Florida Department of Revenue sales tax returns, Forms DR-15. The Department of Revenue initially audited the sales tax payments of Richards Sewing Machines, and the results of that audit are not at issue here directly. The Mirandas maintained their invoices in alphabetical order by vendor, so that invoices for Richards Sewing Machines and Latin America were physically located in the same file cabinet, although it would be obvious to the Mirandas from the face of the invoice whether the sale was one made by Richards Sewing Machine (a domestic sale), or Latin America (an export sale).1 Similarly, a single journal was used by Ms. Miranda to record the dollar amount of sales by both corporations. Each entry contained the purchaser, the sale date, the invoice number, the total amount of the sale, and if tax were collected on that sale, the amount of tax. Mrs. Miranda then used that journal to file on Form DR-15 with the Department of Revenue the gross amount of sales, taxable sales, and remit the tax collected by Richards Sewing Machines. No such filings were made by Latin America because the Mirandas had been advised by their accountant that no sales tax was due on export sales and none had been collected. Actually, returns showing that all sales were exempt should have been filed. See, Finding 7, above. In performing the audit of Richards Sewing Machines, the Department's auditors used that corporation's United States Corporate Income Tax Return, IRS Form 1120, for the applicable years, and compared the gross sales reported on those forms to the federal government with the amount of gross sales Richards Sewing Machines had reported monthly to the State of Florida on its Florida Sales and Use Tax Form, Form DR-15. The gross sales shown on the federal returns, Form 1120, for Richards Sewing Machines were 7.49 million dollars over the three years of the audit (1984, 1985 and 1986). Over the same period, Richards Sewing Machines had shown gross sales on Florida Department of Revenue Forms DR-15 of 7.46 million dollars. There was a $33,000 discrepancy, amounting to less than 1/2 of one percent. The Department's auditor never found any evidence that any sales made by Latin America failed to have attached a resale certificate, or a bill of lading showing that the machinery or parts sold were shipped outside the United States (Tr. 45, 110-11, 126, 129-30). The actual invoices, resale certificates and bills of lading have been destroyed. After the completion of the audit on Richards Sewing Machines, the auditor told Mrs. Miranda there was no further need to keep those records, and relying on that advice, Mrs. Miranda disposed of the records (Tr. 84-5). The Department never contested that this advice was given to Mrs. Miranda. Due to the commingling of the invoices and the sales journal for Richards Sewing Machines and Latin America, the auditor for the Florida Department of Revenue decided to audit Latin America, and received authorization to do so. The auditor believed that the total sales tax owed by these two separate legal entities had been combined and reported together on one Florida Department of Revenue Form DR-15, but separate Federal Income Tax Returns, Form 1120, had been filed for each of the two companies. She believed that the total gross sales for both companies on the federal tax returns should have equalled the amount shown on the DR-15s filed with Florida by Richards Sewing Machines. The auditor then determined that a percentage of sales should be computed for each year in order to prorate the sales reported on the DR-15s for each company, Richards Sewing Machines and Latin America. The methodology used was that the total sales reported on the Federal Forms 1120 filed by Richard Sewing Machines and Latin America for each of their fiscal years was prorated to a calendar year, to derive a monthly average gross sales for each entity. (Richards and Latin America had different fiscal years). The average was then multiplied by the applicable number of months in each calendar year to arrive at the annual sales total for each company. The estimated sales for each company were then divided by the total sales for both companies to obtain the percentage of sales for each company. Latin America's percentage was then applied to the gross sales report of the monthly DR-15s to determine its estimated gross sales for each month. (Department Exhibit 1, Audit Report, Page 9.) The monthly average of gross sales derived from Latin America's IRS Form 1120, was compared with its estimated monthly gross sales reported on the DR-15. For each month Latin America reported higher gross sales based on its IRS form, the difference was treated as unreported Florida sales and taxed at 5%. There is no logical reason for the Department to have engaged in its proration calculations. There is no credible evidence that any sales by Latin America to its export customers were subject to sales tax in Florida. Mrs. Miranda had prepared a list for the auditor which separated all invoices to demonstrate that all sales by Latin America were export sales. Appropriate bills of lading or certificates of resale for sales by Latin America were in the files. There is no reasonable basis to accept the Department's contention that State Form DR-15s filed by Richards Sewing Machines reflect combined sales figures for both Latin America and Richards Sewing Machines. The Department makes its argument because using the sales journal kept by Mrs. Miranda, the amount of sales tax due according to the journal is the same amount recorded on the DR-15s, but Richards Sewing Machines reported $33,000 more in sales to the federal government. From that the Department's witnesses somehow infer that the DR-15s reflected sales from both companies. The more reasonable inference here, however, is that the figures in the sales journal and DR-15 forms match because all sales by Latin America were foreign sales on which no tax was due, no tax was collected, and no tax was carried on the sales journal. When the amount of sales tax collected was computed from the sales journal, and reported by Mrs. Miranda on the State DR-15, that figure dealt solely with sales by Richards Sewing Machines. To the extent there is any discrepancy in the total sales Richards Sewing Machines reported to the State of Florida and to the Federal Government on Federal Form 1120, that discrepancy is due to a bookkeeping error. A small amount of additional tax was due on sales by Richards Sewing Machines in the years 1984 to 1986 ($33,000 times 5% or about $1,500). The evidence does not support an inference that taxable sales from both corporations were combined in the sales journal kept by Mrs. Miranda, and were then reported as a lump sum figure on the DR-15 filed by Richards Sewing Machines. The Department argues that its proration process did not tax Latin America for sales which were reported, because the Department agreed to recognize proper bills of lading or certificates of resale from customers of Latin America as justification for not collecting sales tax. It does, however, believe that tax should be assessed against Latin America for unreported sales, i.e., on the gross sales derived from its IRS Form 1120. Because the evidence is persuasive that Latin America made no sales which were taxable in Florida, the Department's argument is rejected as lacking a factual basis. All sales by Latin America were to exporters who gave a resale certificate to Latin America, or to foreign purchasers who provided an appropriate bill of lading showing that the material was exported from the State of Florida. It is true, however, that Latin America was required to file information returns reporting all of its sales, both gross and exempt. Its report would have shown all sales were exempt, and no tax was due. The mere failure to have filed the report does not make those export sales taxable. Use Tax Use tax is due for two reasons. Latin America made purchases of sewing machines and equipment from foreign manufacturers in Taiwan and Italy. It imported those machines and parts into the United States to an airport free zone. The machines and parts then cleared customs and were moved to a warehouse in Miami at 2303 Northwest 2nd Avenue, which interrupted the export process. Secondly, the failure of Latin America to have registered as a dealer has an important affect on its liability for use tax. Because it was never registered as a dealer during the audit period, it was impossible for Latin America to execute and deliver a certificate of resale to its Taiwanese and Italian suppliers of the industrial sewing machines it received and warehoused in Miami. Latin America introduced no proof that it was already contractually obligated to sell its inventory overseas at the time it was delivered to the free zone, or when it was removed from the free zone. Therefore, when Latin America removed the industrial sewing machines or parts from the airport free zone and stored them in its warehouse at 2303 Northwest 2nd Avenue in Miami, it engaged in a taxable event. The bills of lading showing eventual export of its inventory are insufficient to avoid the use tax, for "tax will apply if the property is diverted in transit to the purchaser," Rule 12A-1.064(1)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Under use tax law, removing those sewing machines from the stream of international commerce subjected them to use tax, even though Latin America may have harbored a subjective intent of ultimately reselling them to foreign purchasers in the Caribbean and Central America. Moreover, by failing to file as a dealer, Latin America also failed to report its purchases from its Taiwanese and Italian suppliers as exempt sales for which use tax was not due on schedule B of an annual return. It should have filed as a dealer engaged in resale. That failure to file a return is not the reason use tax is due, however. Latin America may be assessed use tax because it was not a registered dealer, took possessions of the sewing machines in Florida, and was unable to give a valid dealer's certificate of resale to its Taiwanese and Italian suppliers because it had never registered as a dealer. The tax is due at the rate of 5% on purchases made from its suppliers beginning February 1, 1985 to January 31, 1988, plus interest. See audit report, page 16- 17, Schedule B. Penalty There is no reason to assess any penalty on the use tax due in this case. The tax payer's failure to register as a dealer or to file information returns was based on the advice of a CPA, and that advice was facially reasonable. The Department is not required to impose a penalty if the applicable penalty, here 25% of the tax due, "would be too severe or unjust." Rule 12A-1.056(9)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Had Latin America registered as a dealer and given its suppliers a certificate of resale, no tax at all may have been due. There is no indication of some intent to evade a tax. Rather, laxness of the tax payer has rendered a transaction otherwise tax free fully taxable. Payment of the tax and interest is penalty enough. Commercial Rental Latin America offered no evidence with respect to the assessment the Department made for taxes due on commercial rentals. The amount involved is small, for the period November 1985 through June 1987, the tax due is $184.16.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing use tax on inventory imported into Florida, plus interest and for tax due on commercial rentals, with interest. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-0136 Rulings on proposals by Latin America: Discussed in Findings 4, 22 and 25. There is no credible evidence that Latin America ever actually sold sewing machines to Richards Sewing Machines for resale in the domestic market. There was, however, no legal impediment to doing so. Covered in paragraph 7, 8 and 11. Covered in Findings 17-19. Covered in Finding 10. The proposed findings based on materials which may have been produced in response to the Department's first request for production of documents have no bearing on this case, for they were not introduced into evidence at the final hearing. The testimony that all sales by Latin America were for export or to other exporters has been accepted. Rulings on proposals by the Department: Covered in Finding 1. Covered in Finding 2. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Finding 17, although both corporations did file their own Form 1120s. The methodology is described in Finding 18. The methodology is described in Finding 18. Rejected because State Form DR-15 did not reflect combined sales figures. See, Findings 19 and 20. Rejected. See, Finding 21, although it is true that Latin America was not registered as a dealer, see, Finding 7. Adopted in Finding 25. Adopted in Finding 25. Adopted in Finding 27. Adopted in Findings 9 and 10. Adopted in Findings 9, 24 and 25. Adopted in Finding 24. Copies furnished: Mark R. Vogel, Esquire 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami Center, Suite 880 Miami, FL 33131 Matt Goldman, Esquire 1001 South Bayshore Drive Suite 1712 Miami, FL 33131 Linda Miklowitz, Esquire Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire Mark T. Aliff, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 William D. Moore, General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 J. Thomas Herndon, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent properly conducted a sales and use tax audit of Petitioner's books and records; and, if so, whether Petitioner is liable for tax and interest on its purchases of materials used for improvements to real property.
Findings Of Fact During the audit period, Petitioner was a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 7820 Professional Place, Suite 2, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner's Florida sales tax number was 39-00-154675-58, and Petitioner's federal employer identification number was 59-3089046. After the audit period, the Florida Department of State administratively dissolved Petitioner for failure to file statutorily required annual reports and filing fees. Petitioner engaged in the business of providing engineering services and fabricating control panels. Petitioner fabricated control panels in a shop Petitioner maintained on its business premises. Petitioner sold some of the control panels in over-the- counter sales. Petitioner properly collected and remitted sales tax on the control panels that Petitioner sold over-the-counter. Petitioner used other control panels in the performance of real property contracts by installing the panels as improvements to real property (contested panels). Petitioner was the ultimate consumer of the materials that Petitioner purchased and used to fabricate the contested panels. At the time that Petitioner installed the contested panels into real property, the contested panels became improvements to the real property. Petitioner failed to pay sales tax at the time Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate the contested panels. Petitioner provided vendors with Petitioner's resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax, when Petitioner purchased the materials used to fabricate the contested panels. None of the purchase transactions for materials used to fabricate the contested panels were tax exempt. The audit is procedurally correct. The amount of the assessment is accurate. On October 23, 2000, Respondent issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (form DR-840), for audit number A0027213470, for the period of October 1, 1995, through September 30, 2000. During an opening interview, the parties discussed the audit procedures and sampling method to be employed and the records to be examined. Based upon the opening interview, Respondent prepared an Audit Agreement and presented it to an officer and owner of the taxpayer. Respondent began the audit of Petitioner's books and records on January 22, 2001. On March 9, 2001, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (original Notice of Intent). At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted an audit conference with Petitioner. At the audit conference, Petitioner provided documentation that the assessed transactions involved improvements to real property. At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted a second audit conference with Petitioner's former legal counsel. Petitioner authorized its former legal counsel to act on its behalf during the audit. At the second audit conference, the parties discussed audit procedures and sampling methods, Florida use tax, fabricated items, and fabrication costs. Respondent revised the audit findings based upon additional information from Petitioner that the assessed transactions involved fabricated items of tangible personal property that became improvements to real property. Respondent assessed use tax on the materials used to fabricate control panels in those instances where Petitioner failed to document that Petitioner paid sales tax at the time of the purchase. Respondent also assessed use tax on fabrication costs including the direct labor and the overhead costs associated with the fabrication process, for the period of October 1, 1995, through June 30, 1999. Respondent eliminated use tax assessed on cleaning services in the original Notice of Intent because the amount of tax was de minimis. On August 29, 2001, Respondent issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Revised Notice of Intent). On September 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until January 25, 2002. On October 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a second Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until April 25, 2002. On February 6, 2002, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment for additional sales and use tax, in the amount of $21,822.27; interest through February 6, 2002, in the amount of $10,774.64; penalty in the amount of $10,831.12; and additional interest that accrues at $6.97 per diem. Petitioner exhausted the informal remedies available from Respondent. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed a formal written protest that, in substantial part, objected to the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit. Respondent issued a Notice of Decision sustaining the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest. Respondent correctly determined that the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit were appropriate and consistent with Respondent's statutes and regulations. Respondent concluded that the assessment was correct based upon the best available information and that Petitioner failed to provide any documentation to refute the audit findings. Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration that did not provide any additional facts, arguments, or records to support its position. On May 16, 2003, Respondent issued a Notice of Reconsideration sustaining the assessment of tax and interest in full, but compromising all penalties based upon reasonable cause.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for relief and sustaining Respondent's assessment of taxes and interest in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael E. Ferguson Control Design Engineering, Inc. 809 East Bloomingdale Avenue, PMB 433 Brandon, Florida 33511 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Petitioner owes unpaid sales and use tax for the period extending from May 1, 1986, through April 30, 1991, and, if so, the amount owed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Jay P. Weiss is a Florida-licensed motor vehicle dealer, and he has been licensed in Florida for 27 years. Mr. Weiss does business as Jay P. Weiss, Inc. ("Weiss"), and Weiss is, and was during the times material to this proceeding, in the business of selling cars for resale. Weiss purchases motor vehicles at auction, from banks, from leasing companies, or from other dealers; reconditions the vehicles; and sells the majority of the vehicles to other dealers for resale. During the times material to this proceeding, Weiss purchased an average of 400 to 500 vehicles each year. During the times material to this proceeding, the locations from which Weiss conducted business consisted of an office and an adjacent shop in which vehicles were reconditioned. The locations did not include a showroom or a retail car lot, and Weiss did not advertise that vehicles were offered for retail sale on the premises. Nonetheless, people often walked into the office and inquired if Weiss sold cars at retail. Occasionally, Weiss sold cars to customers at retail. Motor vehicle purchases and sales were recorded on "title jackets," which contained information regarding each vehicle purchased and sold by Weiss, including the identification of the vehicle; the date of purchase, the purchase price and the identity of the person from whom the vehicle was purchased; the date of sale, the sales price, and the identity of the person to whom the vehicle was sold; and relevant title information. Duplicate information for each vehicle was included in "police books" maintained at Weiss's offices. Mr. Weiss was in Weiss's office about nine hours per week, including weekends. Throughout the week, he traveled to various auctions throughout the state, although he routinely called his office several times each day. In addition to Mr. Weiss and the employees who worked in the shop, Weiss employed a bookkeeper that was responsible for managing the office and handling all of the accounts and records for the business, including preparation of the Florida Sales and Use Tax Return Form DR-15. The bookkeeper also provided information to Weiss's accountants from which Weiss's U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, Form 1120S, was prepared. During the times material to this proceeding, three successive bookkeepers were employed by Weiss, two of whom were employed approximately three years each. Section 212.12(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), grants to the Department of Revenue the authority to audit the books and records of any dealer subject to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, Tax on Sales, Use, and Other Transactions, to determine if the dealer overpaid or underpaid Florida sales and use taxes. Pursuant to this authority, the Department conducted an audit of the books and records of Weiss, for the period extending from May 1, 1986, through April 30, 1991. The Department initially concluded that Weiss owed $115.442.57 additional tax due on sales for the audit period and $10,706.94 additional tax due on purchases for the audit period, plus delinquent penalties and interest through December 6, 1991. Weiss provided additional documentation, and these amounts were revised downward in a Notice of Intent to Make Sales & Use Tax Changes dated January 13, 1993, to reflect $79,065.07 additional tax due on sales for the audit period and $10,706.94 additional tax due on purchases for the audit period, plus delinquent penalties and interest through January 13, 1993. The schedules and work papers from which the revised assessments were derived were attached to the January 13, 1993, notice. In conducting the audit of Weiss's books and records, the Department's auditor examined books and records made available to her at Weiss's business location and at the office of Weiss's accountant on August 1, 7, and 28, 1991; September 6, 1991; January 29 and 30, 1992; and February 5, 1992. Mr. Weiss never met the Department's auditor, although he did talk with her on the telephone. He has no personal knowledge of the records requested by the auditor or whether all of the requested records were provided. According to the affidavit of the accountant who prepared Weiss's federal tax returns for 1988, 1989, and 1990, which was introduced into evidence by Weiss, the accountant became aware of inaccuracies in the bookkeeping by Weiss "because of the audit by the Florida DOR and due to the fact that all details of bookkeeping records were either lost or misplaced it was recommended to Jay P. Weiss that an outside bookkeeper be hired to recreate the books and records." Weiss followed its accountant's advice, and the Department's auditor examined, and accepted as accurate, documents entitled "Sales Reconciliation" for 1988, 1989, and 1990, which were prepared by the outside accountant hired by Weiss. These documents itemized for each month of these years the corrected income received by Weiss from taxable sales, rents, and exempt sales; corrected taxable amounts; corrected sales tax; the original amount of tax paid; and the sales tax owed or overpaid. The Department's auditor concluded that additional sales tax was due in the amount of $4,281,57, attributable to unreported rental income collected by Weiss on commercial property it owned, as reflected in Schedule A-1 of the audit papers. The auditor calculated the additional taxable amount of rental income for the years 1988 and 1989 for which no tax had been paid based on the information provided by Weiss in the sales reconciliations and identified the actual rental income for 1990 based on Weiss's records. The auditor totaled the amount of additional rental income for these three years, divided the total by 36, the number of months in the sample period, and projected this average monthly amount of additional taxable rental income for each month of the 5-year audit period. The appropriate tax rate was applied to calculate the additional sales tax owed for each month, and these amounts were totaled for the 5-year audit period. 1/ The Department's auditor concluded that additional sales tax was due on retail sales of automobiles in the amount of $20,538.31, as reflected in Schedule A-3 of the audit papers. This amount was based on a comparison of the information provided by Weiss in the Florida Sales and Use Tax Returns, Form DR-15's, that it filed with the Department for 1988 and 1989 with the corrected taxable sales included by Weiss's accountant in the sales reconciliations prepared for 1988 and 1989. The auditor first totaled the taxable sales reported on the Form DR-15's for 1988 and 1989, which was $81,736.00, and the revised taxable sales included in the sales reconciliations for 1988 and 1989, which was $131,063.00, and then calculated a weighted error ratio of approximately 1.603492, meaning that Weiss's actual taxable sales were approximately 60 percent higher than reported in the Form DR-15's submitted by Weiss to the Department. The auditor then projected the total additional taxable sales by multiplying the taxable sales reported on the Form DR-15s by .603492 to arrive at the additional taxable sales for each month of the audit period. The appropriate tax rate was applied to calculate the additional sales tax attributable to additional taxable motor vehicle sales for each month, and these amounts were totaled for the 5-year audit period. The Department's auditor concluded that additional sales tax was due on undocumented sales in the amount of $54,245.19, as reflected in Schedule A-2 of the audit papers. In reaching this conclusion, the auditor reviewed the U.S. Income Tax Returns for an S Corporation, Form 1120S's, filed by Weiss with the Internal Revenue Service for 1988, 1989, and 1990, and the Florida Sales and Use Tax Returns, Form DR-15's, filed with the Department for the same period of time. The Department routinely compares the gross sales reported on the federal income tax returns with the total sales reported to the Department on Form DR-15's to determine if there is a difference between the amounts reported. The Department considers the gross sales reported on federal income tax returns to be more reliable than the total sales reported to the Department because it is assumed that taxpayers will not over-report sales to the federal government. If the gross sales reported on the federal income tax returns are greater than the total sales reported to the Department on the Form DR-15's for the applicable period, the Department asks for documentation from the taxpayer to account for the difference. If the taxpayer is unable to provide such documentation, the Department presumes that the difference is attributable to taxable sales. In concluding that Weiss owed additional tax on undocumented sales, the auditor compared the gross sales reported by Weiss in the U.S. Income Tax Returns for an S Corporation, Form 1120S's, filed with the Internal Revenue Service for 1988, 1989, and 1990 with the revised total sales reportable on the Florida Sales and Use Tax Returns, Form DR- 15's, filed with the Department for the same years. The auditor broke down Weiss's revised total sales into revised taxable sales based on Schedule A-3 of the audit papers, revised rental income based on Schedule A-1 of the audit papers, and revised exempt sales identified in the sales reconciliations for 1988, 1989, and 1990. 2/ The total gross sales Weiss reported on the Form 1120S's for 1988, 1989, and 1990 were higher than the revised total sales reported by Weiss on the Form DR-15's for the same years. The auditor calculated the monthly difference between the gross sales and the revised total sales for 1988, 1989, and 1990, 3 and, because no documentation was provided to establish that the difference was attributable to exempt sales, the difference was attributed to taxable sales. The average monthly difference was calculated, and this amount was projected for each month of the audit period. The appropriate tax rate was applied to calculate additional sales tax owed for each month, and these amounts were totaled to determine the additional sales tax due for the 5-year audit period. Because inaccuracies in the gross sales included in the Form 1120S's filed with the Internal Revenue Service for 1988, 1989, and 1990 were discovered by Weiss's accountant as a result of the recreation of Weiss's books by the outside accountant, Weiss's accountants prepared amended Form 1120S's for those years. The amended forms were sent to Weiss for execution and filing. Mr. Weiss cannot recall whether the amended returns were filed, and the Internal Revenue Service has no record that these amended returns were filed. For this reason and because Weiss did not provide any documentation to support the revised gross sales included in the amended returns, the Department refused to consider the gross sales reported in the amended Form 1120S's. The Department's auditor concluded that additional tax in the amount of $1,334.07 was due from Weiss with respect to purchases of consumable supplies, that is, supplies that did not become a component part of a motor vehicle. This conclusion was based on the auditor's review of invoices provided by Weiss for 1990 and the auditor's determinations that, of the $6,903.86 total derived from the invoices, $4,722.07 was taxable and that Weiss had paid no tax on the purchases. The average monthly taxable amount was calculated, the appropriate tax rate was applied to determine the additional tax owed for each month, and these amounts were totaled for the 5-year audit period. The Department's auditor concluded that, based on records provided by Weiss, additional tax was owed on fixed assets in the amount of $86.34. The Department's auditor concluded that additional tax was due in the amount of $9,286.53 on amounts paid by Weiss for commercial rentals and on amounts paid by Weiss in the form of mortgage payments on property it occupied that was owned by Jay P. Weiss, individually, who was also individually obligated under the note and mortgage on the property. This determination that additional tax was due was based on documentation Weiss provided to the auditor. After the January 13, 1993, Notice of Intent to Make Sales & Use Tax Audit Changes was issued, Weiss provided additional documentation to the Department. As a result of the new information, the amount of additional tax due was revised downward in a Notice of Intent to Make Sales & Use Tax Audit Changes dated March 22, 1995, which identified $75,998.46 additional tax due on sales for the audit period and $8,382.94 additional tax due on purchases for the audit period, for a total amount due of $166,800.43, including delinquent penalties and interest accrued as of March 22, 1995. This total amount was the final sustained amount identified in the Notice of Reconsideration dated May 10, 1995, which is the subject matter of this proceeding, and the notice includes a discussion of the basis for the revisions made to the January 13, 1993, assessment. After this case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, a representative of the Department met with Weiss's accountant. The Department's representative requested that Weiss provide any additional documentation that would explain the difference between the gross sales reported on the Form 1120S's and the revised total sales reportable on the Form DR-15's or that would support any further change in the sales and use tax assessment. No further documentation was provided. The evidence presented by the Department establishes that a sales and use tax audit assessment was made against Weiss, for the audit period extending from May 1, 1986, through April 30, 1991, and establishes the factual basis for that assessment. The methodology used by the Department's auditor to calculate the assessment was proper under the circumstances, and the Department's assessment for sales and use tax for the audit period, as revised in the May 10, 1995, Notice of Reconsideration, is reasonable. Weiss did not present any persuasive evidence to the contrary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding its assessment against Jay P. Weiss, Inc., in full, including all taxes, penalties, and interest statutorily due until the date of payment of the sales and use tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 2000.
