The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent's Florida real estate license should be subjected to disciplinary sanctions based upon the charge that the Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practice of real estate salespersons and brokers licensed pursuant to the authority of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and related rules. The Respondent, Shirlee Jeanette Pearson, is and at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate salesperson, having been issued Florida license number 0389549, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a non-active salesperson with a home address of 6124 The Oaks Lane, Pensacola, Florida 32504-7361. On or about December 4, 1989, the Respondent entered into a Listing Agreement with Alexis Reginald Harris and Margaret Harris (hereinafter "Sellers"). The Listing Agreement was executed by the Sellers and the Respondent on behalf of Old South Properties, Inc. The Agreement allowed the Respondent to represent the Sellers in the prospective sale of their property to Michael Jones. Subsequent to showing the property to Mr. Jones, the Respondent presented the Sellers with a Contract for Sale and Purchase dated December 6, 1989. The Contract reflected an earnest money deposit of $500.00 to be held by Old South Properties, Inc. The Contract was dated December 6, 1989 and included a provision whereby Mr. Jones would obtain conventional financing. On or about December 19, 1989, the Contract was amended to allow for veterans administration financing. The Contract was amended on or about January 17, 1990 to provide for a cash sale. Before agreeing to the amendments to the Contract, the Sellers demanded an additional $2,500.00 earnest money deposit. The amended Contract was initialed by the Sellers and taken by the Respondent to the prospective purchaser, Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones initialed the changes, signifying agreement to them. The Contract, as amended, reflected an earnest money deposit in the total amount of $3,000.00 to be held by Old South Properties, Inc. The Contract was thus finalized and the Sellers vacated the property around the first of February, 1990 in anticipation of the closing of sale, which was scheduled for the end of February. The Respondent was aware that the Sellers had moved from the property in expectation of the sale. On or about February 25, 1990, the Respondent told the Sellers that she had never actually received the additional $2,500.00 earnest money deposit called for by the January 17, 1990 amendments to the Contract. This was the first time that the Sellers became aware that the earnest money deposit had not been received by the Respondent. When the Respondent advised them that she had not received the earnest money deposit, as provided for in the Contract, she assured them that the closing would still occur as scheduled on February 28, 1990. On February 28, 1990, the Sellers signed the necessary documents to close the sale and left town. The Respondent told the Sellers that Mr. Jones would sign the papers later on the same day. The Sellers left the keys to the house with their daughter, who would remain in town, upon their departure. The Sellers advised the Respondent that Mr. Jones could obtain the keys from their daughter when the closing documents had all been signed. Subsequent to February 28, 1990, the Sellers' daughter called and advised them that the sale had not closed. The Sellers thereafter retained an attorney, and a civil lawsuit was filed against Old South Properties, Inc. and the Respondent. The court in that case found that the Respondent had breached her fiduciary duty to the Sellers and awarded damages accordingly. Ron Giles ("Giles") was employed as vice president and sales manager of Old South Properties, Inc. at the time the Respondent was employed there as a sales associate. Sometime in February of 1990, the Respondent went to Giles and informed him that she had acknowledged receipt of a $3,000.00 earnest money deposit on the Harris/Jones Contract, but, in fact, had only received $500.00. Giles told the Respondent to immediately contact the Sellers and advise them that the $2,500.00 earnest money deposit had not been received. The Respondent showed Giles a $2,500.00 Promissory Note that she had obtained from Mr. Jones, representing the deposit amount that she had not actually received. Giles went to James Porter, the broker for Old South Properties, Inc., and advised him of the problem with the Harris/Jones Contract. Mr. Porter is now, and was at all times material to the allegations of the Complaint, the President of and the qualifying broker for Old South Properties, Inc. Mr. Porter hired the Respondent as a sales associate for Old South Properties, Inc. sometime in August of 1989. Upon learning of the problem with the Harris/Jones transaction, Mr. Porter had a meeting with the Respondent; and the Respondent admitted to Mr. Porter that she had not informed the Sellers that she had not received the $2,500.00 additional earnest money deposit called for by the amended Contract. When the transaction failed to close, Mr. Porter made efforts to resolve the Sellers' complaint, but was unsuccessful; and the lawsuit ensued. The Sellers were awarded damages by the court, and Mr. Porter paid the Final Judgment entered against Old South Properties, Inc. and the Respondent. The Respondent then agreed to pay Mr. Porter back for the funds he expended in satisfying the judgment; however, the Respondent never actually paid Mr. Porter.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, recommended that the Respondent be found guilty of having violated Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, by being guilty of culpable negligence, that the Respondent's real estate license be suspended for a period of three (3) years, and that the Respondent be required to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-4932 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-28. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Director DPR-Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack L. McRay, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Janine B. Myrick, Esq. Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Ms. Shirlee Jeanette Pearson 6125 The Oaks Lane Pensacola, FL 32504-7361
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, a black married couple, executed a contract for the sale of real estate with Respondent Florida West Coast Homes, Inc., on April 15, 1985 which included their purchase of the land and a dwelling to be constructed thereon at Lot 5, Charro Lane, Country Trails Subdivision, Hillsborough County, Florida. The full purchase price of the land and dwelling was $79,850.00. Respondent Locke was President and General Manager of Florida West Coast Homes, Inc., at all times material hereto. He owned 50 percent of the stock of the corporation. Locke signed Petitioners' real estate sales contract on behalf of Florida West Coast Homes, Inc. Respondent Blanke acted as real estate salesman with Florida West Coast Realty in the transaction between Florida West Coast Homes, Inc., as builder and seller, and the Petitioners, as buyers. His broker, Frances Johnson, was employed by Locke. Blanke witnessed the sales contract. A deposit totaling $2000 was paid by Petitioners, who also paid a $1500 cash advance to Florida West Coast Homes, Inc., during construction of their home. These funds have never been refunded to Petitioners, nor has their home been completed. They have never closed on, or received a deed to, the property in question. Construction on Petitioners' home was begun in August, 1985 by Florida West Coast Homes, Inc., after approval for their V.A. financing was received. Approximately two weeks prior to commencement of construction on Petitioners' home, Florida West Coast Homes, Inc., began construction of a dwelling on the lot immediately adjacent to Petitioners' lot. This neighboring lot and dwelling is owned by Respondent Blanke. In September, 1985 construction of Blanke's house and Petitioners' were both at the same stage of completion. Subsequently, however, Blanke's house was completed in February, 1986, but Petitioners' house was not completed prior to Florida West Coast Homes' filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on February 27, 1986. Petitioners' house has not been completed to date. Reasons given to Petitioners for the delay in construction of their home included changes in subcontractors, and the need to complete other homes under construction before Florida West Coast Homes could complete their home. In reality, Florida West Coast Homes was in serious financial difficulty from November, 1985 until its filing for bankruptcy. Subcontractors and suppliers were refusing to do business with the company, and Locke was sued repeatedly in December, 1985 and January, 1986 for amounts owed by Florida West Coast Homes, Inc. Petitioners' contract for sale of real estate states that the estimated date of their home's completion would be November 15, 1985. However, when it became apparent that this completion date would not be met, Locke repeatedly informed them of new completion dates, including December 1, December 31 and January 31. All construction on Petitioners' house stopped after October, 1985 with the house forty or fifty percent complete. In late September or early October, 1985 Petitioners' went to see how construction was progressing on their home. They found that "KKK" had been painted on a tree in their yard. Two weeks later they found that the street in front of their house had been painted with the phrase, "KKK, No Nigers" (sic). Petitioners contacted Florida West Coast Homes about these incidents and requested that the tree be cut down and the street paint removed. They were advised by Locke that he would cut down the tree, but it would cost them $200 to $300, and further that there was nothing he could do about the street painting. In late March, 1986, Petitioners received two harassing telephone calls in which the callers said, "Niggers, take your money and run." This was after Florida West Coast Homes, Inc., had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and also after a newspaper article had appeared in the Tampa Tribune which detailed the incomplete progress of construction on their home, and the racial slurs which had been painted on their tree and on the street. There is no evidence that any of the Respondents were responsible for, directed, or personally engaged in activities which resulted in these racial slurs and harassing telephone calls. Petitioners testified that they believe they were unlawfully discriminated against due to their race because the house next door, which was at the same stage of construction as theirs at one time and which was owned by Respondent Blanke, a white male who was employed by Florida West Coast Realty and who indirectly reported to Respondent Locke, was completed while theirs was not. In addition, Petitioners' phone calls to Florida West Coast Homes were not returned by Locke during December, 1985 and January, 1986. Blanke's employment was terminated by Locke in August, 1985, shortly after the execution of Petitioners' sales contract. There is no evidence that the termination and the execution of this sales contract were in any way related. Blanke did return to work for Locke part-time for two weeks in October, 1985, but decided not to continue this employment. Thus, during the substantial portion of all times material hereto, there was no employment relationship between Respondents Locke and Blanke. Blanke had received conventional financing for his home construction prior to commencement of construction in August, 1985. He closed on the property and received a deed at that time. Although construction on his home was completed when Florida West Coast Homes filed for bankruptcy, his property had liens totaling approximately $10,000. Locke testified that he did not return Petitioners phone calls in December 1985 and January, 1986 because his company was in severe financial trouble, and he did not have any answers for the creditors and home buyers who were calling him. He had eight homes under construction at the time, and only Blanke's home was completed prior to bankruptcy. Of the seven homes which were not completed, six were being purchased by white families and only Petitioners' by a black family. There is no competent substantial evidence that Respondents ever told Petitioners to take their money and get out of the deal, or in any way sought to force Petitioners out of their contract for sale.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing Petitioners complaint under the Fair Housing Ordinance of Hillsborough County. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Kerry H. Brown, Esquire 3202 Henderson Blvd. Suite 204 Tampa, Fl 33609 Richard P. Condon, Esquire 214 Bullard Parkway Temple Terrace, Fl 33617 Fred Locke 143 Bunting Lane Land O'Lakes, Fl 33539 Bryon Blanke 4804 Charro Lane Plant City, Fl 33566 Amelia G. Brown, Esquire P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Fl 33601 Robert W. Saunders, Director Equal Opportunity Office P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Fl 33601
Findings Of Fact George A. Heyen is a duly registered real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission, and was so registered and has been so registered continuously since October 1, 1972, as evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit number 1. While serving in the capacity as a real estate salesman, the Respondent entered into a listing agreement with one Thomas S. Bowers and Brenda L. Bowers, his wife. This agreement was drawn on December 11, 1973 and is Petitioner's Exhibit number 4. On February 6, 1974, a purchase and sell agreement was drawn up by the Respondent and entered into between Maria A. Hindes and the Bowers. This purchase and sell agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 3. This contract of February 6, 1974 was submitted to Molton, Allen and Williams, Mortgage Brokers, 5111 66th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. The contract, as drawn, was rejected as being unacceptable for mortgage financing, because it failed, to contain the mandatory FHA clause. When the Respondent discovered that the February 6, 1974 contract had been rejected, a second contract of February 8, 1974 was prepared. A copy of this contract is Petitioner's Exhibit number 5. The form of the contract, drawn on February 8, 1974, was one provided by Molton, Allen and Williams. When, the Respondent received that form he prepared it and forged the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. The explanation for forging the signatures as stated in the course of the hearing, was to the effect that it was a matter of expediency. The expediency referred to the fact that the parties were anxious to have a closing and to have the transaction completed, particularly the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. Therefore, in the name of expediency the signatures were forged. Testimony was also given that pointed out the Bowers were very hard to contact in and around the month of February, 1974, and some testimony was given to the effect that the Bowers made frequent trips to Ohio, but it was not clear whether these trips would have been made in the first part of February, 1974. The Bowers discovered that their name had been forged when they went to a closing on April 11, 1974. They refused to close the loan at that time. On April 24, 1974, a new sales contract was followed by a closing which was held on April 26, 1974 and a copy of the closing statement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 6. The Respondent has received no fees or commissions for his services in the transaction and there have been no further complaints about the transaction. Prior to this incident, the Respondent, George A. Heyen, was not shown to have had any disciplinary involvement with the Florida Real Estate Commission and has demonstrated that he has been a trustworthy individual in his business dealings as a real estate salesman.
Recommendation It is recommended that the registration of the registrant, George A. Heyen, be suspended for a period not to exceed 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 George A. Heyen c/o Gregoire-Gibbons, Inc. 6439 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
The Issue Should Respondent have his Florida Real Estate Broker's License disciplined by Petitioner for violating provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to discipline its licensees for violations of Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and associated rules. Those actions are brought through administrative complaints. Petitioner regulates Respondent's real estate practice in Florida. Respondent practices in accordance with a Florida Real Estate Broker's license, No. 0605307. At times relevant to this inquiry Respondent has not acted as an independent broker. Rather, Respondent has conducted real estate business as a broker-salesperson with McAfee Enterprise, Inc. t/a Re-Max On Park Avenue, located at 2233 Park Avenue, Suite 500, Orange Park, Florida, 32702-5567. Within the relevant time period Respondent's supervising broker at the Re- Max firm was Ann McIvey. On February 28, 1995, Respondent, as listing agent for Re-Max On Park Avenue, entered into an exclusive right of sale listing agreement with Marguerite A. Barr to sell Ms. Barr's real estate located at 6720 S. Long Meadow Circle in Jacksonville, Florida. By the terms of the listing agreement Ms. Barr agreed to pay Re-Max on Park Avenue: . . . 5 ½% of the total purchase price whether a buyer is secured by the REALTOR, the SELLER, or by any other person, or if the Property is afterwards sold within 6 months from the termination of this agreement or any extension thereof, to any person to whom the Property has been shown during the term of this Agreement. The listing agreement entered into between Respondent in behalf of Re-Max On Park Avenue and Ms. Barr also stated that: . . . in the event this Agreement is cancelled by SELLER before its expiration, or SELLER otherwise prevents performance hereunder, the SELLER agrees to pay REALTOR on demand, as liquidated damages, the brokerage fee due REALTOR as though Property had been sold, or the amount of broker's expenses, the same being bonafide, fair and reasonable as a result of an arm's length negotiation. Separate and apart from the terms set forth in the listing agreement, Ms. Barr requested, before she signed the contract, that Respondent inform her concerning her opportunity to cancel the contract at any time. Respondent answered that the contract could be cancelled by Ms. Barr before the home was sold, in which case Ms. Barr would be responsible for paying the advertising cost by Re-Max on Park Avenue. Ms. Barr was amenable to that arrangement. On May 8, 1995, Ms. Barr called to inform Respondent that she was terminating the contract to sell her home. This was followed by correspondence dated May 9, 1995, addressed to Re-Max On Park Avenue, attention to Respondent, notifying Re-Max On Park Avenue that the contract to sell the home was being cancelled. In response to the cancellation Respondent wrote the following letter to Ms. Barr: Mrs. Marguerite A. Barr 1364 Lamboll Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32205-7140 Dear Meg: As you requested I have withdrawn your property located at 6720 Longmeadow Circle South from active listing for sale in the MLS and in my files. I hope you will be happy with your new arrangement and I wish you and your daughter the best. According to our contract, you agreed to reimburse me for expenses I incurred in marketing your property the event you decided to cancel prior to the expiration of said contract. A list of expenses follows: Two insertions in Homes & Land Magazine $249.21 500 Flyers to Realtors (250 twice) @ $.06 each 30.00 Total $279.21 Please forward a check in that amount to me at my office. Please remember that in the terms of our contract if anyone who has seen the property during my active term of the contract purchases the property you will still be obligated to pay the agreed upon commission to my firm. Regards, W. Wane Wier Broker-Salesman Per the request in the correspondence from Respondent to Ms. Barr, Ms. Barr contacted the Respondent and arranged to pay $50.00 a month to reimburse the costs described by the Respondent. Ms. Barr wrote three checks to the Respondent in his name, Wane Wier, without reference to Re-Max On Park Avenue. Respondent put those checks in his personal checking account. Respondent had originally taken money from his personal account to advertise the Barr property. On or about August 31, 1995, Ms. Barr sold her home on S. Long Meadow Circle to Jane Richardson. Respondent learned of the sale. Believing that the sale was a transaction that entitled Re-Max On Park Avenue to collect the 5 ½% real estate fee in accordance with the listing agreement, Respondent spoke to his supervising broker, Ms. McIvey, to ascertain the proper course for collecting the commission. Ms. McIvey advised Respondent that he should contact his attorney to see if the commission that was allegedly due Ms. McIvey and Respondent could be obtained by Respondent's counsel. Respondent took the advice of his supervising broker and contacted Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire, who was practicing at 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5, Orange Park, Florida 32073. In conversation Respondent explained to Mr. Santoro, that he believed that Ms. Barr owned the real estate commission. Respondent asked Mr. Santoro to write a letter to Ms. Barr to solicit the commission. Respondent feels confident that he told Mr. Santoro that Mr. Santoro should advise Ms. Barr to pay the commission to Re-Max On Park Avenue, given that was the normal course of events in seeking payment for commissions. To assist Mr. Santoro, Respondent left a written memorandum which among other things stated: . . . I feel that Ms. Barr has violated our listing agreement and should pay me and my company the full commission due under the terms of that agreement. Please take any steps necessary to have Ms. Barr honor our agreement, and advise me what I should do. On January 12, 1996, Mr. Santoro wrote Ms. Barr requesting payment of the commissions in the amount $3,397.50 related to the claimed balance due, after crediting Ms. Barr with $150.00 paid for advertising costs. This correspondence stated: Please be advised that you must forward a cashier's check in the amount of $3,397.50 made payable to W. Wane Wier, Re-Max On Park Avenue, within ten (10) days of receipt of this letter, which I have forwarded by certified mail as well as regular U.S. Mail. I have been instructed to proceed with appropriate action should you fail to make the payment as stated above Please Govern Yourself Accordingly. Respondent did not see the January 12, 1996, letter before it was sent to Ms. Barr. He did receive a copy of the correspondence. Respondent has no recollection of noticing that the correspondence said that the $3,397.50 should be made payable to W. Wane Weir, Re-Max On Park Avenue. In any event, Respondent did not take any action to correct the letter to reflect that the payment should be made to Re-Max On Park Avenue only. Prior to the charges set forth in the present Administrative Complaint Respondent has not been the subject of accusations about his conduct as a realtor.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes, dismissing the complaint for alleged violations of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, imposing a $1,000.00 fine consistent with Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-24.001, Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5 Orange Park, FL 32072 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Linda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional; Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been married for nine and a half years and has a six year old daughter. He lives with his family in Key Haven. Petitioner has been arrested on three occasions. In 1970, while repossessing a stereo set he had sold, he got into a scuffle with the buyer, who filed charges, which never came to anything. In 1973, or 1974, be was a part owner of a duplex which burned down. An insurance company drew a check in favor of petitioner and three other payees. Petitioner was arrested after he bad assigned his interest in the check to somebody who then forged the endorsements of the other payees, but nothing came of these charges, either. On September 14, 1977, however, a complaint was filed in Hennepin County, Minnesota, alleging that petitioner was guilty of feloniously keeping and permitting a place of prostitution. On November 16, 1977, after pleading guilty, petitioner was convicted in Minnesota of permitting a place of prostitution; on January 5, 1978, imposition of sentence was stayed and petitioner was placed on probation on condition that he pay a $5,000.00 fine and that he "[h]ave no direct or indirect involvement whatsoever in the sauna . . . business." Respondent's exhibit No. 1. Petitioner's conviction grew out of his ownership of a business that employed young women to model lingerie for men who paid approximately ten dollars per half hour to see the show. Petitioner had owned half of this business for six weeks when the police raided; two employees were arrested for and subsequently convicted of prostitution. Since his conviction for permitting a place of prostitution, petitioner has been charged with no crime. In November of 1977 petitioner moved to Key West. Since his arrival, petitioner has represented certain Minnesota companies, established three retail stores, acted as property manager for Old Town Key West Development, Ltd., and become a distributor for Key West Fragrances and Cosmetics, which expects gross receipts of approximately six million dollars this year. As property manager for Old Town Key West Development, Ltd., from February through November, 1978, petitioner arranged for the leasing and upkeep of several buildings, and collected rent from some 65 tenants, totalling up to $15,000.00 monthly. This involved handling large amounts of cash. Christopher C. Belland and Edwin O. Swift, who hired petitioner as property manager, for Old Town Key West Development, Ltd., testified that petitioner was honest, truthful and of good character. As a distributor for Key West Fragrances and Cosmetics, petitioner has been privy to certain proprietary information. Raymond A. Charles, who is a vice-president for marketing of Key West Aloe, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary, testified that petitioner is honest and trustworthy. Petitioner pays the rent for his stores on time, and enjoys a good reputation in the Key West business community. In January or February of 1978, Minnesota requested Florida to supervise petitioner on probation. After an investigation by an employee of Florida's Department of Corrections, Florida agreed. Petitioner's first application to respondent for registration was denied on the ground that he was on probation at the time. The present proceedings began with petitioner's second application to respondent for registration as a real estate salesman. Neither application is in evidence. In early March of 1979, the probation officer who supervised petitioner at that time recommended early termination of probation. This unusual request was renewed in April or May of 1979, by William N. O'Neil, another probation officer who had succeeded to petitioner's supervision. Minnesota granted early termination of probation on May 15, 1979. Joint exhibit No. 1. Mr. O'Neil, petitioner's former probation officer, testified that petitioner was honest, truthful and trustworthy. Petitioner was licensed as a real estate salesperson in Minnesota from October 9, 1975, to June 30, 1978, and, as of August 9, 1979, was still eligible to renew his Minnesota license "by becoming affiliated with a broker and paying the renewal fee," petitioner's exhibit No. 2, notwithstanding his conviction for permitting a place of prostitution. No complaints have been lodged against petitioner as a real estate salesperson. He was not very active as a real estate salesperson in Minnesota but did make occasional sales.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED That respondent grant petitioner's application for registration as a real estate salesman. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of November, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Halpern, Esquire 410 Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 Mark A. Grimes, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent's real estate sales- person's license for alleged conduct evidencing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. In particular, Petitioner carries out its duties in compliance with Chapters 20, 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated under authority set forth in those statutes. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent was, and is now, a licensed Florida Real Estate salesperson. Her license number is 0591902. That license was issued in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent worked as a licensed real estate salesperson for Ideal Real Estate Central Florida, Inc., t/a Coldwell Banker Ideal Real Estate in Orange City, Florida (Ideal). The broker for that firm was John S. Chinelli. On April 13, 1993, Respondent listed an exclusive right of sale for property owned by Jason and Kelly Foster at 2853 Sweet Springs Avenue, Deltona, Florida. That listing contemplated that Ideal would earn a real estate commission of 7 percent of the gross purchase price. The listing price in the exclusive right of sale was $69,900. In arriving at the sales price, Mr. Foster relied upon Respondent's advice. That advice included a consideration of the price received for the sale of comparable homes. The establishment of comparable prices as a means to arrive at the listing price for the Foster property involved the use of the Coldwell Banker buyer/seller presentation booklet, as well as a marketing analysis. The price $69,900 was chosen to attract those buyers who were looking for homes that cost less than $70,000. That choice was designed to garner more interest in the home. While the Foster home was being advertised, it was available through the multiple listing pool. Respondent showed the house two times between April 13, 1993, and May 14, 1993. This did not involve a showing to any prospective buyers. Other brokers or salespersons showed the house twice to prospective buyers, but no offers were generated from those showings. Subsequently, Respondent suggested to Mr. Foster that the Foster residence might be appropriate for her use. Respondent offered to buy the Foster property for $65,000. On May 14, 1993, Respondent and Mr. Foster entered into a contract for sale and purchase of the Foster residence. The purchase price was $65,000. Respondent deposited $500 into the escrow account managed by Ideal in furtherance of her interest in the property. The earnest money deposit was placed with Mr. Chinelli pending the closing of the sale. The contract called for Respondent to assume an existing mortgage of $63,556. The contract identified that the Respondent was a licensed real estate agent in Florida, but the purchase was not being made through Ideal. Under this contract, the real estate commission that had been contemplated initially would not be paid to Ideal and Respondent. When Respondent entered into a contract to buy the Foster property, she did not tell Mr. Foster that she would no longer be representing him as a real estate salesperson. The contract between Respondent and Mr. Foster called for a closing date on or before June 30, 1993. In entering into the agreement for Respondent to purchase the home, Respondent told Mr. Foster that she intended to personally occupy that property. Respondent never told Mr. Foster that she entered into the contract to purchase his home with the intent to sell the home to another person. Originally that was not her intention. Respondent held to the view that in the event that her purchase of the home was not concluded, Respondent would still represent Mr. Foster in his desire to sell the home. This is taken to mean that she would be representing Mr. Foster as a real estate salesperson. Sometime around June 20, 1993, Kai and Denise M. Hansen, husband and wife, contacted Ideal to show the Hansens property in the Deltona area. Respondent assisted the Hansens in this pursuit, acting as a real estate salesperson. There was no written agreement between Respondent or her firm signed with the Hansens to represent them in their attempt to purchase a home. Respondent showed the Hansens 8 to 12 homes in the Deltona area. The Hansens were not interested in purchasing those homes. At that point, Respondent suggested that the Hansens look at the home that she was purchasing from Mr. Foster. Respondent told the Hansens that Respondent was buying the Foster house from the Fosters who were moving out of town and that Respondent was helping the Fosters "out of a bind." Respondent told the Hansens that the home might be "too big for her anyway." Respondent told the Hansens that if she could help the Hansens out she would sell the Foster home to the Hansens if the Hansens liked that property. If a suitable home had been found through a real estate listing, other than the Foster residence, a commission would have been paid from the seller of the hypothetical house to the broker for Ideal. In that circumstance, the Hansens would not be responsible for paying a commission to the Respondent or Ideal. The properties other than the Foster property which Respondent was showing the Hansens were shown by Respondent as a sub-agent for the sellers. Respondent showed the Hansens the Foster residence during the week of June 20, 1993. On June 24, 1993, Respondent entered into a contract with the Hansens for sale and purchase of the Foster property. An addendum to that contract indicated that "this contract is contingent upon seller obtaining clear Title on 2853 Sweet Springs, Deltona, FL." The Hansens paid a $1,000 earnest money deposit toward the purchase of the Foster property. That deposit was placed in the escrow account for Ideal. That deposit was to be held until the closing date scheduled for July 16, 1993. Again, it was not contemplated that a real estate commission would be paid to Respondent and Ideal. The price arrived at between Respondent and the Hansens to purchase the Foster property was $72,500. Initially, Respondent had offered to sell the property for $73,000. The Hansens counter-offered to pay $72,000 leading to the final purchase price of $72,500. The contract between the Respondent and the Hansens called for an assumption of a mortgage in the amount of 63,500. Although Respondent had advised the Hansens that the property was being purchased from the current occupants, the Fosters, Respondent did not advise the Hansens of the price the Respondent was paying the Fosters to purchase that property. Respondent never advised the Fosters that the Hansens had sought to purchase the Foster home and that Respondent had entered into a contract with the Hansens for the Hansens to purchase that property. On June 29, 1993, the closing occurred between Respondent and the Fosters and a warranty deed was prepared noting the change in ownership. At the closing Respondent told the Fosters that she still intended to occupy the home. On July 16, 1993, the closing occurred between the Respondent and the Hansens and a warranty deed was drawn conveying the property from the Respondent to the Hansens. As established by Mark A. Carper, a real estate appraiser, the value of the Foster property on April 13, 1993 was between $65,000 and $72,500. In anticipation of moving into the Foster home, Respondent had made arrangements to move out of the residence where she had been living by giving notice that she intended to move.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the administrative complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 William A. Parsons, Esquire Woerner & Parsons 2001 South Ridgewood Avenue South Daytona, Florida 32119 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Prestige Realty, Inc. and Anthony C. Cappello were at all times here relevant registered with the FREC as alleged. Mrs. Cappello, wife of Respondent, is a salesperson with Prestige Realty, Inc. Prestige Realty, Inc. is an Electronics Realty Associates (ERA) franchisee and actively promotes the ERA Homeowners warranty Plan which will, for a fee, warrant to pay for repairs to structure and equipment within the first year of purchase all costs over the minimum for which the policy is written. While showing prospective purchasers William and Dora Keys various properties, Mrs. Cappello told them about the ERA Buyers Protection Plan (BPP) and the Keys expressed an interest in having same, particularly if the seller would pay for it. Mrs.. Cappello has worked with the Keys for several months showing them various properties for sale. Thomas Hanrahan listed his home for sale with B & M Real Estate as listing agent at a price of $52,000 on 31 January 1977. On April 28, 1977 Mrs. Cappello obtained an offer from William and Dora Keys to purchase Hanrahan's house for $49,000. Keys had inherited some money, and after seeing the Hanrahan house which they liked, made an offer to purchase the property for $49,000 including the drapes and BPP. Inclusion of the BPP in the offer was suggested by Respondent Cappello and/or Mrs. Cappello. The fact that an offer had been received was communicated to the listing salesperson and the listing agent met the Cappellos to present the offer to Hanrahan. Respondent Cappello, who had accompanied his wife to present the offer, first discussed the contract conditions, including drapes and BPP, before revealing the offering price to Hanrahan and the listing broker's agent. When Respondent revealed the $240 premium for BPP Hanrahan remarked it was a "rip- off"; however, Respondent Cappello emphasized that the seller shouldn't mind paying this premium if the selling price of the home is right. After obtaining Hanrahan's agreement to the BPP "if the price is right', Respondent disclosed the offering price of $49,000. Hanrahan refused this offer and made a counter offer of $51,000, which was communicated to the buyers who re-countered with a $50,000 offer. At no time during these negotiations did Respondents advise Hanrahan that Prestige Realty would receive 25 percent of the premium the contract provided the seller would pay for the ERA BPP. Of the $240 premium paid for the BPP, $C0 was retained by Respondent, Prestige Realty, and the remaining $180 was forwarded to ERA. When the offer of $50,000 was presented to Hanrahan by Respondent Cappello, it was represented to be the buyers' final offer, that the ERA BPP was an essential element of the offer, and if not accepted by the seller they would find the buyers another house. The Keys never insisted to Cappello that the BPP be included in their offer, and both William and Dora Keys testified they would have paid $50,000 for the Hanrahan home without the BPP. Attempts by Hanrahan to share the cost of BPP with the buyers or discourage their insistence upon having this policy provided were rebuffed by Respondents. Following the closing the Keys were offered the option of taking a lower deductible on the BPP than $100, but after being advised the additional cost to them for a lower deductible, it was declined. Respondents and other ERA franchisees consider the BPP to be a good selling tool in the conduct of their business. In addition to the BPP, ERA offers a sellers protection plan which, if the seller lists his house with an ERA franchisee and agrees to pay for a BPP when the house is sold, will insure the seller from failure of certain equipment (less a deductible) during the period the house is listed before sale.
Findings Of Fact From March 4, 1976, through March 18, 1976, and from April 19, 1976, until the business closed in 1976, Lipshutz was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR. From October 29, 1975, through February 18, 1976, Gottstein was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR. From February 20, 1976, until March 31, 1976, and from April 19, 1976, until the business closed in 1976, Beck was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR. FAR was a registered corporate broker, located in Dade County, Florida. During those periods of time, Far was engaged in an enterprise whereby advanced fee listings were obtained from Florida property owners. Salesmen known as "fronters" or "qualifiers" were employed to place calls to Florida property owners whose names and phone numbers had been provided to the salesmen by FAR. The prospects were asked if they cared to list their real estate with FAR in anticipation of resale. It was explained that there would be a refundable fee to be paid by the property owners for the listing. The refund was to occur upon sale of the property. If the prospect was interested, then certain literature was mailed out to them. Other salesmen were employed as "drivers" who would make the second contact of the prospect who indicated an interest in listing his property. The driver would secure a signed listing agreement along with a check for $375.00 which constituted the refundable listing fee. There was no evidence that any of the listings obtained by FAR were ever resold. There were, however, three parcels of land in negotiation for sale when the operations of FAR were terminated in June, 1976. There was to be a division separate and apart from the "fronters" and "drivers" to do the actual selling of the property. The listings were advertised in the Fort Lauderdale area but there was no evidence to establish whether or not other advertising occurred. There was a total absence of evidence and, hence, a failure of proof as to the allegations of misrepresentations by Respondents. FREC introduced no evidence to show that Respondents represented that the property could be sold for several times the purchase price, that it would be advertised nationwide and in foreign countries or that the company had foreign buyers wanting to purchase United States property listed with the company. There was no evidence introduced to show that Respondents either made the representations or knew them to be false. There was no evidence introduced to show that Respondents knew that no bona fide effort would be made to sell the property listed. There was no evidence of any nature introduced by FREC to show that Respondents were dishonest or untruthful.
