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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs NOEL ANGEL RIVERA, 95-003032 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 19, 1995 Number: 95-003032 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 1996

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed violations as alleged in the amended administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case the Respondent has been licensed as a limited surety agent. On April 10, 1995, Elsa De La Cruz went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who represented himself to be Respondent approached Ms. De La Cruz and asked her if he could help her. He specifically wanted to know if she was there to bail someone out and identified himself as a bail bondsman. The male also gave Ms. De La Cruz a business card bearing Respondent's name and business location. Ms. De La Cruz left the fifth floor of the courthouse and walked to the east wing which is commonly referred to as "the jail wing." The same male was also there and again approached Ms. De La Cruz. At this time he advised her that if the bond was set at $10,000, he would need $1,000 and collateral to help her. Ms. De La Cruz left the property and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit 2. Ms. De La Cruz did not initiate any of the contact between herself and the male who represented himself as Respondent. On April 11, 1995, Maggie Porto went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who later identified himself as Respondent initiated contact with Ms. Porto and advised her that he was in business if she needed him. After a short while, Ms. Porto left the fifth floor and walked over to the east wing of the criminal center. Upon her arrival there, the same male handed Ms. Porto a business card. When Ms. Porto asked the male if he was the man identified on the card, the subject answered "yes." The business card represented Respondent's name. Later, Ms. Porto left the criminal center and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit number 3. All contact between Ms. Porto and Respondent was initiated by the Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3032 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 2, the allegation as to the time of the incident is rejected as not supported by the record or hearsay. With regard to paragraph 3, the allegation as to when the business card was delivered to Ms. De La Cruz is rejected as contrary to the weight of the record. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 Northwest 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33166 Noel A. Rivera 2200 Northwest 11th Street Miami, Florida 33172 Anthony Alvarez 350 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 201 Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Florida Laws (2) 648.44648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs LARRY LORENZO JONES, 06-000707PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 23, 2006 Number: 06-000707PL Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2007

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed surety agent, holding license number A134458. Respondent is the president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale. Mark Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has been convicted four times of driving under the influence over the past 20 years. The arrest that resulted in the fourth conviction took place on December 7, 2003. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest, Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent. Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's office and arrange for Respondent to post bond, which was $23,500. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and delivered, as security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity agreement, title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these conditions, and Respondent bailed him out of jail. At this point, the agreement between Respondent and Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it could be stored safely and without charge. Three or four days later, while out on bail, Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the new offense. At this time, the vehicle no longer served as security because the bail bond that it had secured no longer existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the return of the vehicle. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged offenses. Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February 2004, after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman began serving nights in jail. The day after his re-arrest, Mr. Blackman called Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent if he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually, Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car, but Respondent declined, at least initially. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the day after his re-arrest, Respondent removed the car from the body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer. Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead kept the car at his office or home. The record does not establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second arrest. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as collateral for a bail bond. Although released from jail during days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackman did not want his brother to have access to the car. As Mr. Blackman testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000 from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want the car parked in his crime-ridden neighborhood. Additionally, Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after his re-arrest for Respondent to give up possession of Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman. At no time, though, did Respondent try to document the change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically, Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature on a collateral release, which would document that the car no longer secured a now-nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail, but it is customary for limited surety agents to visit inmates in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a collateral release. Also, in February 2004, Respondent could have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the day. After showing the car the first time, two or three days after Mr. Blackman's second arrest, Respondent began to use the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January 2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear whether the registration and license tag expired during this period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused these offers. After being released on days, Mr. Blackman did not visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one night shortly after his release, Mr. Blackman violated one of the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re-arrested and returned to jail in March or April 2004. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman re-address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had written on Tracy. The next thing, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent for the sale of the vehicle, on the same date, to Respondent for $35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of attorney, but it did not apply to the car, so Respondent would not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's sister returned with a proper power of attorney, and Respondent released the car to her. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it should have. Respondent had driven the vehicle 7,000 to 10,000 miles during the six months that he had possessed the car, but entirely after the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tickets, as well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in the car when it was delivered to Respondent--all of which charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman. After repeated demands, Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's fair market value by as much as $3000. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car for $33,000 to a person other than Respondent.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III, finding Respondent guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in Count II, and imposing a six-month suspension and a $5000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg S. Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Michael A. Levin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael A. Levin Global Commerce Center 1900 North Commerce Parkway Weston, Florida 33326 Larry Lorenzo Jones 1310 Sistrunk Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57648.442648.45648.49648.52648.571
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. BONNIE LOUISE SPONHEIM, 81-001711 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001711 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 1982

Findings Of Fact James L. Sponheim is licensed as a Limited Surety Agent to represent Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc., and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. His office is located in Dade City, Florida. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, petitioner's Exhibit 2) Respondent Bonnie L. Sponheim is qualified, but not currently licensed, as a bail bond runner. She was previously licensed as a runner, but her license was cancelled on April 3, 1980. Thereafter, she has served as a secretary in her husband's Dade City office. (Testimony of B. Sponheim, Petitioner's Exhibit l) On August 6, 1980, Stephen W. Sissitka, of Zephyrhills, Florida, made application to the Cotton Belt Insurance Company for appearance bonds B6A095951- 52 to effect his release from the custody of the Pasco County Sheriff's office. The application contained provisions as to events which would constitute a breach of the obligations under the bond, including the applicant's change from one address to another without notifying the Cotton Belt Insurance Company or its agent in writing prior to any such move. On the reverse of the application, Glenna Lilly and Spurgeon Phillips executed an indemnity agreement whereby they agreed to bind themselves to produce Sissitka in court at the required time. The application further identified Glenna Lilly as Sissitka's mother. Phillips executed a separate indemnity agreement on August 30, 1980. He is the father- in-law of Sissitka and resides in Dade City. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, S. Sissitka, Respondent's Exhibits 1,2) On August 6, 1980, Mr. Sponheim, as agent for Cotton Belt Insurance Company, issued the requested bonds in the total amount `of $2,500.00. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 4) Although Sissitka had listed his address as Zephyrhills, Florida, he was living at the home of his father-in-law Spurgeon Phillips, in Dade City at the time he was released on bond. However, he was having difficulties with his wife and did not remain in Dade City on a continuous basis. On several occasions, he went over night to his mother's house in Zephyrhills, and another time he visited his wife's mother for several days in Pasco County. He did not tell Mr. Sponheim about the latter visit, nor did Phillips know where he was. In fact, he stayed only sporadically with Phillips during the period August to October, 1980, and sometimes would be gone for a week or two. Phillips complained to Mr. Sponheim about his inability to keep up with Sissitka's whereabouts, and wanted to have him returned to custody. As a result, Mr. Sponheim and Phillips had a meeting with Sissitka on October 7, 1980, at which time Mr. Sponheim reminded Sissitka of his obligations to report any changes of address or employment and imposed the requirement that Sissitka "check in" with Sponheim's office once a week. Sissitka was also told to stay at Phillips' house in the future. Sissitka agreed to follow the conditions imposed and keep Mr. Sponheim and Phillips notified of his whereabouts. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, B. Sponheim, Phillips, Harrelson, S. Sissitka, M. Sissitka, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Stipulation) On October 15, 1980, Mrs. Sponheim discovered Sissitka was no longer employed at a restaurant in Dade City. Mr. Sponheim was out of the state at the time. Mrs. Sponheim was under the impression that Sissitka was living at Zephyrhills, and so she drove out to Phillips' house to talk to his wife in an attempt to ascertain his current situation. When she knocked on the door, Sissitka answered and told her that he had been living there. Mrs. Sponheim told him that they needed to talk. She waited in her car while he put on a shirt and some shoes, and joined her in the car. They then drove to Mr. Sponheim's office. On the way, she asked him about his job and where he was living, but Sissitka indicated that it was none of her business, that Mr. Sponheim had no control over him, and that as long as he showed up in court that was all that mattered. He asked her if he was going to jail, and she told him that was between him and Mr. Sponheim. When they arrived at the office they discussed the conditions of the bond and the arrangements which had been made at the previous meeting with Phillips and Mr. Sponheim on October 7. Sissitka told her that he was tired of being harrassed not only by her husband, but by Phillips, and that everyone was giving him a hard time, and he wanted it stopped. Mrs. Sponheim inferred from this statement that Sissitka wished to terminate the bond relationship and told him that if he wanted to "end it" he was free to go to the jail and surrender himself at any time. At that point, Sissitka said "fine, let's go" but Mrs. Sponheim told him that they needed to talk to Mr. Sponheim about it first. She went into the adjoining private office, telephoned her husband and informed him of the situation. He told her that Sissitka could either go ahead and surrender himself, or otherwise they would have to wait until he returned to the city to settle the matter. He further told her that if Sissitka wanted to turn himself in that she should make sure to get the surrender documents to the jail so that he couldn't walk out again. Mr. Sponheim made a practice of pre-signing the appropriate surrender forms for each person he bonded out at the time the bond was written; therefore, a signed surrender form had been previously prepared for Sissitka. The Pasco County Sheriff's Department requires that the surrender document be filed with that office prior to permitting an individual to surrender himself. Otherwise, the individual would be free to leave the jail because the bond would still be valid. After talking to her husband, Mrs. Sponheim informed Sissitka of the conversation and he asked to use the phone to call his mother. After he completed the call, he said "o.k. let's go." Mrs. Sponheim then filled in the date on the "off bond" form and they walked across the street to the jail. Sissitka went up to the jail door and said "here I am again" and opened the metal door and went on in. Mrs. Sponheim handed the surrender forms to the official at the booking office and said that she was coming off the bond. She then returned to her office and later that day Sissitka called her and inquired about the possibility of being bonded out again because he did not have enough money to post a cash bond. Mrs. Sponheim told him that her husband was not there and he asked if she could bond him out. She replied that she didn't have a license, but gave him the name of another bondsman. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, B. Sponheim, Kelly, Brown, Shytle, Petitioner's Exhibits 5,6)

Florida Laws (3) 648.25648.30648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs CLARENCE LUTHER CEPHAS, SR., 03-000798PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida Mar. 05, 2003 Number: 03-000798PL Latest Update: Nov. 02, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent violated provision of the Florida Insurance Code by employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business. Whether Respondent violated the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code by failing to report a change of address to Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in this matter, Respondent Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., was licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. Pursuant to Florida law, Petitioner has jurisdiction over the bail bond licensure and appointments of Respondent. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on March 28, 1975, in case number 75-239 CF, of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on October 22, 1975, in case number 75-2390 CF, of violation of drug abuse law, a felony. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 4 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violations. On or about March 7, 1980, the State of Florida Office of Executive Clemency restored the civil rights of Pamela Jean Coleman, relative to Coleman's criminal convictions in Palm Beach County, Florida, in 1975. Records of the FDLE show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, plead nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, and convicted of retail theft in Polk County, Florida, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, in case number CF91-1923, pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and convicted of petit theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed against Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in the County of Polk and State of Florida, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business contrary to Section 648.44, Florida Statutes. Further, the records of said court show that on or about January 31, 2002, Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, was tried, found guilty and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Said conviction is presently on appeal before the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. Respondent knew or should have known the foregoing information. Documents under Seal from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, pertaining to Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., Bailbonds, Ltd., Inc., show that Pamela Jean Coleman filed original documents on behalf of Respondent's corporation and corresponded with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, on behalf of the said corporation. She was listed as both the registered agent of the corporation and also a vice-president and director of the said corporation as set forth on a document filed over the signature of Respondent. Other filed documentation show Pamela Jean Coleman as the president, secretary, and as director of said corporation. These documents are accurate and valid. The original license application form, Florida Insurance Temporary License Application, under Section 11, Screening Question Information, contains the following language: "If you were adjudged guilty or convicted of a felony crime and your civil rights were lost, provide evidence that your civil rights have been restored." There is no evidence in the record that Coleman provided that information to Petitioner at the time the original application was filed or at any time subsequent to that period, and Coleman signed the application. Respondent gave a statement, under oath, before Luis Rivera, Special Investigator for Petitioner's predecessor (Department of Insurance), on November 27, 2000, wherein he stated: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She had a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an office of the corporation. Respondent had a business address-of-record with Petitioner of B & B Bail Bonds, 580 North Broadway Avenue, Bartow, Florida 33830-3918, when in fact his business address was 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710. Respondent did not notify Petitioner of a change of address for his corporation as required by law. In November 2000 during an interview, Luis Rivera and another Special Investigator from his office advised Respondent that Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance) considered him to be in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, notwithstanding any restoration of civil rights granted to Pamela Jean Coleman. Luis Rivera visited the home office of Respondent, on March 7 and 21, 2000, at 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710, and knew of no other office location for that agent after that date. Constance Castro, a Special Investigator with the Tampa Office, Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, during September 2001, made an undercover visit to the bail bond office of Respondent, and pretended to be in need of a bail bond for a fictitious relative. She dealt directly with Pamela Jean Coleman who proceeded from the home living area of the house where Respondent was also located, to the office area of the home where Coleman conducted bail bond business with Castro. Special Agent Michael Kreis, Drug Enforcement Agency, in early 2001, had business with Cephas Bail Bonds. He went to the office thereof where he observed Pamela Jean Coleman sitting behind the desk. Coleman told him that she had posted bond the night before for the people he was asking about, and was very familiar with the street names of the people that were being sought. Coleman helped to arrange what was supposed to be a meeting between her and one of the suspects using the ruse that she needed the suspect to sign some bail bond paperwork. Kreis observed Respondent in the office but Coleman seemed to be in charge. Kreis observed her on the phone and dealing with people who came into the Cephas' bail bond office, and noted that by her actions and conduct, she was acting as a bail bond agent. On or about June 19, 2001, Noel Elizabeth "Nikki" Collier was working as a paralegal in her husband's law office when Pamela Jean Coleman visited their office with paperwork for one of their mutual clients to fill out. Coleman left her business card which read "Pamela J. Coleman, President, Clarence L. Cephas, Sr. Bail Bonds." Coleman was dressed in a black outfit with a badge attached to her belt. Coleman told her that if the mutual client did not sign the paperwork then the bail bonds would be revoked. When in the law office, Coleman identified herself as an agent for Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8 was indeed a sworn statement made by him during a visit to Petitioner (then Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, at its offices in Tampa, Florida, in November 2000, and that he was indeed warned by Petitioner's personnel that he was in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes. He was subsequently warned by the filing of an Administrative Complaint in June 2001, an Amended Administrative Complaint in December 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint in March 2003. Respondent acknowledged that Pamela Jean Coleman was indeed listed as an officer and as a registered agent as well as the filer of various corporation documents, regarding his corporation and on file with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, and that he did sign the paperwork indicating that she was a corporate officer. Respondent further acknowledged that Coleman did participate in his bail bond business and that he did make payments to her as an employee, which included filing of a W-2 Form indicating said payments. During the pendency of this action, the State of Florida, by and through Jerry Hill, State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Respondent for criminal violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes (2003), in the case styled State of Florida v Clarence Luther Cephas, Florida Tenth Circuit Court, Case Number CF02-00598A-XX (the "criminal case"). The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit conducted a jury trial in the criminal case. On December 17, 2003, the jury rendered a verdict of "not guilty," and the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit rendered a judgment of not guilty in the criminal case. The allegations contained in the criminal case were identical to the allegation contained in Count one of Petitioner's Second Amended Administrative Complaint. During the approximate period of time March 1997 to at least December 2001, Respondent did employ and/or did otherwise allow Pamela Jean Coleman to participate in the bail bond business. Respondent did fail to notify the Department of Financial Services of a change of address as required by law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.30, 348.44(8)(b), 648.45(2)(e) and (j), and 648.45(3)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes; Finding Respondent guilty of failing to report a change of address; and Revoking the bail bond agent license and eligibility for licensure of Respondent pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Franklin, Esquire The Franklin & Carmichael Law Firm, P.A. 301 East Main Street Post Office Box 50 Bartow, Florida 33806 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (15) 120.569120.57624.303648.30648.34648.355648.421648.44648.45775.082775.083775.08490.20290.80390.902
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. TIMOTHY MICHAEL PALETTI, 79-002442 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002442 Latest Update: Oct. 13, 1980

The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a limited surety agent should be revoked or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 4-1, Florida Administrative Code, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated October 16, 1979. In this proceeding, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent for various alleged violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 4-1, Florida Administrative Code, arising out of alleged irregularities in connection with a bonding transaction in 1978. Two witnesses testified for the Petitioner and the parties stipulated to the admission of seven documentary exhibits. The Respondent testified in his own behalf at the hearing.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Timothy Michael Paletti is currently licensed as a limited surety agent to represent Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc., at Orange Lake, Florida, and was so licensed during the periods alleged in the Administrative Complaint. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Stipulation) On November 23, 1978, Respondent executed an appearance bond in the Gilchrist County Circuit Court in the sum of $10,000 as agent of the surety, Cotton Belt Insurance Company, in behalf of Rodney D. Lovett, who was charged with robbery. Respondent did not attach either an affidavit or statement, as prescribed in Rule 4-1.14, Florida Administrative Code, to the bail bond at the time it was filed in the office of the Circuit Court clerk. It was not until January 31, 1979, that Respondent filed a statement concerning collateral security for the bond under Rule 4-1.141 in lieu of the affidavit required by Rule 4-1.14, F.A.C. Lovett's wife paid a $1,000 premium for the bond and his sister-in-law, Deborah Johnson, executed a demand note for $10,000, together with a mortgage deed on a dwelling which she owned in Deland, Florida, on November 23, 1978, as collateral security for the bond. During the transaction, Respondent provided Johnson with a business card bearing his Orange Lake telephone number. (Testimony of Johnson, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-4) On January 8, 1979, a Notice of Sentencing was issued by the Gilchrist County Circuit Court Clerk in Lovett's case for January 22, 1979 at Trenton, Florida. On January 13, Respondent contacted Lovett and Johnson by telephone at their respective homes and advised them of the date of the required court appearance. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 5) During January 1979, Lovett and his wife talked to Johnson about the possibility of "leaving and not going to court." Johnson became concerned about these disclosures and attempted to reach Respondent at his Orange Lake telephone number. Numerous calls to that number on January 15th were unanswered. After unsuccessful attempts to reach Respondent through the Cotton Belt Insurance Company and at another telephone number provided by Petitioner, Respondent finally called Johnson's house on January 20, at which time Johnson and a friend, Barry S. Beatty, told Respondent about Lovett's statements concerning his intentions and requested that Respondent pick up Lovett and surrender him to court so the collateral security could be released. Respondent told Johnson that he would look into the matter. He then telephoned Lovett's attorney and the Lovett home, and was assured that everything was all right. (Testimony of Johnson, Beatty, Respondent) On January 22, 1979, Lovett failed to appear at court for sentencing and the bond was therefore declared to be forfeited. Respondent and law enforcement authorities there after made efforts to locate Lovett and he was eventually apprehended and sentenced to confinement. On July 2, 1979, the Gilchrist County Circuit Court ordered that the bond previously estreated be remitted less the cost expended by the State in apprehending the defendant in the amount of $500. The collateral security posted by Johnson is still outstanding due to a dispute over costs sought by Respondent. (Testimony of Johnson, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 6-7) Respondent testified at the hearing that he felt he had made reasonable efforts to assure that Lovett would appear in court. Although Respondent moved his office in late January 1979, his office phone was in operation and his office was open during the week of January 15-22. (Testimony of Respondent)

Recommendation That the charges against Respondent Timothy Michael Paletti be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Strom Maxwell, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Legal Division Tallahassee Florida 32301 Robert J. Costello, Esquire Bates and DeCarlis - Suite B 726 Northwest Eighth Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601

Florida Laws (2) 648.34648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs ROBERT LOUIS KRAUSE, 00-003538PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 28, 2000 Number: 00-003538PL Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs DAVID LLOYD PATTERSON, 90-000406 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jan. 22, 1990 Number: 90-000406 Latest Update: Oct. 17, 1990

Findings Of Fact Mr. Patterson is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Patterson was eligible for licensure and was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. As such, he was a full-time employee of the Crews Bonding Agency and worked the 4:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., or night shift, each night. Mr. Patterson was the only licensed bail bondsman on this shift at the Crews Bonding Agency. Ralph Bunch Collins was also a full-time employee of Crews Bonding Agency at all times material, and at all times material, Mr. Collins worked the night shift with Mr. Patterson. Mr. Collins was recognized by Mr. Patterson and his employer as an administrative assistant whose job entailed clerical duties with regard to the bonding process. Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins worked as a team. Mr. Collins is not a limited surety agent, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under Chapter 648, F.S. At all times material, Jerelyn Rodriguez, ne' Langtree, was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency. She, also, was a full-time employee of that agency and was its designated office manager. Mrs. Rodriquez worked the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily with an administrative assistant named Mrs. Cook, and together Rodriquez and Cook constituted the Crews Bonding Agency's day shift team. The 1983 version of the statute under which Mr. Patterson is charged in the Administrative Complaint read as follows: 648.441 Furnishing supplies to an unlicensed bail bondsmen prohibited: civil liability and penalty.-- No insurer, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under this chapter shall furnish to any person any blank forms, applications, stationery, or other supplies to be used in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting bail bonds until such person has received from the department a license to act as a bail bondsman and has duly qualified as such. Any insurer, licensee, or permittee who furnishes to any bail bondsman or other person not named or appointed by `the insurer represented any of the supplies mentioned in subsection (1) and accepts any basil bond business from or writes any bail `bond business for such bail bondsman, person, or agency shall be subject to civil liability to any insured of such insurer to thee same extent and in the same manner as if such bail bondsman or other person had been appointed, licensed, or authorized by the insurer, general agent, or bail bondsman to act in its or his behalf by the department. [Emphasis supplied] On March 27, 1984 a Consent Order was entered in the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled, Jack I. Etheridge and F.G.C. Bonding and Insurance Corporation v. State of Florida and State of Florida Department of Insurance, Case No. 82-10537. That Consent Order provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 4. Florida statute 648.441(1) likewise must be given a liberal and common sense application in order to preserve its constitutionality. It is the intent of the Legislature, as interpreted by this Court that said subsection is designed to prohibit licensed bail bondsmen from allowing non- licensed persons to actually conduct a (sic) legitimate and licensed activities of a licensed bail bondsman. Therefore this Court finds that it is a constitutionally permissable (sic) legislative act to prevent licensed person (sic) from providing non- licensed persons with forms and supplies of the trade that would permit the non-licensed persons to violate the law. However, this does not preclude clerical activities by non- licensed persons under the direct supervision of a licensed person to the extent that it is consistent with the general intent of said section. (Emphasis supplied) [Patterson Exhibit 1] The wife of Jack I. Etheridge, who was a plaintiff in the foregoing civil lawsuit, was an owner of the Crews Bonding Agency at all times material to the instant administrative proceeding. The foregoing Circuit Court Consent Order to which DOI was a party is the only relevant interpretation by a court of competent jurisdiction of Section 648.441 F.S. which either party hereto or the undersigned has been able to discover. DOI put on no expert evidence of agency construction of the statute either formally by rule or informally by policy. Subsequent to that Circuit Court Consent Order, the statute interpreted therein [see FOF 5, supra] was amended to add subsection (3), as follows: Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. All three statutory subsections were in effect at all times material to the administrative charges against' Mr. Patterson. During the night shift of New Year's Eve, December 31, 1988, Susan Miller a/k/a Sharon Miller, who was then the wife of James Edward Miller, contacted the Crews Bonding Agency by telephone and relayed certain necessary information to Ralph Collins as a predicate to securing a bond to get her husband out of the Duval County Jail. In turn, Mr. Collins called the jail and received basic information for making out the necessary bonding papers. Mrs. Miller arrived at the bonding agency and Mr. Collins prepared certain paperwork for her signature, that of her husband, and that of the Mr. Patterson as bail bondsman. It is the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, Jerelyn Rodriquez, and Gilbert Clark that in doing so, Mr. Collins was conforming to the standard operating procedure of the Crews Bonding Agency and the custom in the bonding trade at least as far as that trade has been practiced within Duval County, Florida, since the entry of the March 27, 1984 Consent Order. Patterson Exhibit 2 and the testimony of Correctional Officer Larry Wooten established that, provided the licensed bondsman presents the bond and personally receives the prisoner into his custody, the foregoing clerical practice and procedure has been acquiesced-in by a published policy of the Duval County Sheriff's Office and by county jail personnel, of which Mr. Wooten is one. There was unrefuted testimony that without such clerical help, a licensed bondsman could not function 24 hours a day, as is common in the trade. It is also the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, and Mrs. Rodriquez that at all times material to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins was subject to the supervision of Mr. Patterson, that Mr. Patterson had the absolute right to alter any document prepared by Mr. Collins prior to signing the Miller bond, and that Mr. Patterson ultimately could have rejected underwriting Mr. Miller's bond if, after Mr. Patterson's review, the documents Mr. Collins had prepared did not conform to the insurance law, rules, or standards to which Mr. Patterson, as a licensee, was bound to conform. The foregoing testimony is further supported by the testimony of Gilbert Clark. Mr. Clark is a licensed bail bondsman who is not now and never has been associated with the Crews Bonding Agency. He testified that Mr. Patterson could ultimately have refused to place the Miller bond even if Mr. Patterson's only dissatisfaction upon his review of the documents prepared by Mr. Collins had been the sufficiency of the collateral or premium provided by the Millers. With regard to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins prepared the Indemnity Agreement (DOI Exhibit 2e) for signature by Mr. Miller's wife, which Mr. Collins notarized with certificate, seal, and stamp. Collins prepared a Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 2f) and signed on the line provided for a witness to Mrs. Miller's signature but without applying his notary certificate, seal, or stamp. Collins prepared a Premium Receipt (DOI Exhibit 2g) and signed on the line acknowledging that the premium had been "received by" him in the form of a check from Mr. and Mrs. Miller. The nature of the Premium Receipt and the Collateral Receipt does not necessarily require the Millers' signatures, but Mr. Collins testified that his own signature on the Premium Receipt was meant to signify that he had witnessed signatures and that he had signed it as a notary but that he did not affix a notary certificate, seal, and stamp because he saw no reason for those formalities. Because of the requirements of Chapter 117 F.S. governing notaries public, because the document speaks for itself, and because Mr. Collins testified that he, in fact, received the premium, his testimony that he signed the Premium Receipt for the Miller transaction only as a notary or witness is not credible, particularly since the exhibit (DOI Exhibit 2g) does not bear the Millers' signatures. Mr. Collins prepared the Collateral Receipt (also DOI Exhibit 2g) and received the collateral, signifying same by his signature. (TR 40-41). However, Mr. Patterson signed on the Miller bond and went through all the bond papers, including the foregoing, with Mr. Miller after Mr. Patterson personally physically obtained Mr. Miller's release from jail. On July 7, 1989, Henry A. Robinson went to Crews Bonding Agency in an effort to bond his son, Henry Steve Robinson, out of the Duval County Jail. All of the father's negotiations were with Mrs. Rodriquez. The father did not testify. At all times material to the Robinson transaction, both Mrs. Cook and Mr. Collins had signs on their respective desks, proclaiming them to be administrative assistants, and a sign on Mr. Patterson's desk proclaimed him to be a bail bondsman. When Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins arrived at Crews Bonding Agency for the July 7, 1989 night shift, some paperwork had already been prepared by Mrs. Rodriquez and others. Mrs. Rodriquez had already reviewed all the papers prepared by someone else, and Mrs. Rodriquez had tentatively committed to underwriting the bond on Henry Steve Robinson. Mr. Patterson did not thereafter "second guess" Mrs. Rodriquez's initial work or judgment despite his absolute right to reject the bond for all the reasons aforesaid in FOF 12. Some further Robinson transaction paperwork was prepared by Mr. Collins after he came on duty. The nature of several of these documents did not require either the signature of the father, the mother, or the son or the notarizing thereof, but the evidence indicates that Mr. Collins thought some of them did. Premium Receipt 127003 (DOI Exhibit 4f, apparently one of two such receipts) and the Collateral Receipt (DOI Exhibit 4b) for this transaction were signed by Mr. Collins on the "received by" lines. He testified that he signed these only as a Crews employee, i.e., a clerk administrative assistant, and as a notary but without affixing his notarial seal. Collins testified that he signed as a witness for the father's signature on the witness line as a Crews employee for the Contingency Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 4c, TR 48-50), that he did not notarize the note initially when the senior Mr. Robinson signed it in his presence because arrangements were made for the senior Mr. Robinson's convenience to allow Mrs. Robinson to sign the following day, and that the next day, Mr. Collins just witnessed on the other side of that document. However, the documentary evidence (DOI Exhibit 4c) is clear that Mrs. Robinson (the mother) never signed the Contingency Promissory Note. Mr. Collins testified that he signed as a Crews Bonding Agency employee and then notarized with a certificate, seal, and stamp the Indemnity Agreement to the effect that it had been signed by Mr. Robinson's father and mother when in fact the mother never signed that document. (TR 52-56, DOI 4e). Due to the provisions of Chapter 117 F.S., the discrepancy between the exhibits and the testimony, and the vacillation of Mr. Collins in giving his oral testimony, it is found that contrary to Mr. Collins' oral testimony, he was confused or uninformed as to his actual function with regard to the Robinson transaction. However, Mr. Patterson reviewed all the Robinson papers and documents and signed the General Appearance Bond as surety and as attorney-in-fact and an agent of Crews Bonding Agency. Mr. Patterson also personally effectuated Henry Steve Robinson's release from jail on July 7, 1989. Henry Steve Robinson (the son) had been bonded out of the Duval County Jail by the team of Patterson and Collins of the Crews Bonding Agency on at least two occasions, and due to Mr. Robinson's confusion of dates, his testimony concerning exactly what papers he went over with Mr. Patterson or anyone else on July 7, 1989 was somewhat vague. However, he was very clear on some points: Mr. Collins never said he was a bail bondsman, it was Mr. Patterson who signed Robinson out of jail each time, and Robinson signed papers in the bonding agency office each time. Robinson believed that Mr. Patterson was the person who explained all the papers to him in Collins' presence on the date in question, but could not be sure. Mr. Collins and Mr. Patterson asserted that as of the July 11, 1990 formal hearing, Crews Bonding Agency clerical personnel are no longer permitted to sign premium and collateral receipts. This instruction was given in anticipation of amendments to Section 648.441 F.S. which were due to go into effect October 1, 1990. Although Mrs. Miller did not testify, the evidence as a whole from other witnesses supports the reasonable inference that this case arose partly because she complained to DOI when Mr. Collins and other Crews Bonding Agency employees refused to summarily reincarcerate her husband upon her oral complaints of domestic problems. No finding has been made concerning what impression of Mr. Collins was formed by Mrs. Miller or concerning the state of Mrs. Miller's mind because the evidence presented on those issues was speculative and not the type of hearsay which would explain or supplement direct and probative evidence. Neither Mr. Miller or Mr. Henry Steve Robinson appeared to have any complaints with the bonding process or participants.

Recommendation DOAH Case No. 90-0406 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DOAH Case No. 90-0584 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and `Treasurer enter a Final Order granting Mr. Patterson's application for a resident license to represent Amwest Surety Insurance Company as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of October, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1990.

Florida Laws (11) 120.57120.68648.30648.441648.442648.46648.50648.52648.53775.082775.083
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs LESLEY CHARLES CORBIN, 97-002216 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida May 09, 1997 Number: 97-002216 Latest Update: Sep. 28, 1998

The Issue Did Respondent plead nolo contendere to aggravated stalking, a felony, in violation of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, so as to be subject to discipline by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Sections 648.45(1); 648.45(2)(a), (e), (j), (k); 648.45(3)(a), (c), and/or (e), and if so, what penalties may be imposed, pursuant to Sections 648.45, 648.46, 648.49, 648.50, , and/or 648.53, Florida Statutes?

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida by Petitioner Agency as a limited surety agent, License No. 265986204. At the time of formal hearing, Respondent's license was suspended, pursuant to a Second Amended Emergency Order of Suspension entered by the Agency on March 11, 1997. Certified Court documents reveal that on February 10, 1997, Lesley Charles Corbin entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to the charge of "aggravated stalking," in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in Case No. 96-9760-CF. The particulars of the charge pled to allege that Respondent "did knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass . . . [name] . . . after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to Section 784.046, to-wit: 92-1772-DV, contrary to the provisions of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes." The Court documents also reveal repetitive previous similar or related criminal charges against Respondent. Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in Sections 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996). Under the plea bargain, Count I, alleging aggravated assault pursuant to Section 784.021, Florida Statutes, was dropped, and adjudication was withheld on Respondent's nolo contendere plea to Count II. Respondent was required to enter into nine months of community control followed by one year probation with special conditions to protect the person he had stalked. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes, provides that third degree felonies may be punished by up to 5 years' imprisonment. Section 775.083(1)(c) provides for third degree felonies to be punished by up to a $5,000 fine. Section 775.084(1)(c)1.b. applies to habitual felony offenders/stalkers and is not relevant here. The foregoing establishes prima facie facts in evidence, which facts Respondent did not overcome. Ms. Sarah Burt is the Bail Bond Coordinator for Petitioner Department of Insurance. In that capacity, she is responsible for administrative coordination of all bail bond related matters for the Agency. She is knowledgeable of the practices and procedures of the Agency regarding bail bondsmen and limited surety agency licensure and discipline, pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Based on her education, training, experience, and actual knowledge, Ms. Burt related that a plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge has always resulted in the Agency denying a licensure application or revoking of an existing license. To the best of Ms. Burt's knowledge and belief, this has been the Agency's consistent procedure in all similar circumstances. She did not know of any licensee who had retained his or her licenses after the Agency became aware the licensee had pled nolo contendere to a felony.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 648.45(2)(a) and (k), and 648.45(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and revoking his license. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of December, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dick E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Cash Barlow, Esquire Post Office Box 492 Jacksonville, Florida 32201

Florida Laws (12) 120.57648.34648.45648.49648.52648.53775.082775.083775.084784.021784.046784.048
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs BLAIR FOSTER, 00-000704 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Feb. 10, 2000 Number: 00-000704 Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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