Findings Of Fact On October 10, 1979, the Respondent entered into a written swimming pool contract with Mr. and Mrs. Stellato, wherein the Respondent agreed to construct a swimming pool for them on their property in accordance with the plans and specifications attached to the contract. Among other things this swimming pool contract provided for the payment of a total purchase price of $11,225.00 to be paid in the following manner: ten percent to be paid at the signing of the contract. fifty percent to be paid upon the installation of the tank. thirty-five percent to be paid upon completion of the base decking and screen enclosure. five percent, or the balance of the purchase price, to be paid when the filter system was put in operation. Further, this contract provided that if the purchasers of the swimming pool failed to pay the purchase price in accordance with the prescribed schedule, the contractor reserved the right to suspend all work on the swimming pool, and to suspend all warranty work due after completion of the pool. During the month of February, 1980, the Respondent, acting through his duly authorized representatives, did all acts necessary to cause the filter system of the subject swimming pool to become operable, and requested that the Stellatos pay the five percent balance due under the contract. The Stellatos failed to make this final payment, claiming that there was a problem with the pool decking. In response to this complaint the Respondent personally met with the Stellatos, and agreed to cover the problem area of the decking with Chattahoochee River Rock at no cost to the Stellatos. In exchange for this agreement the Stellatos agreed to pay the balance due under the contract. Thereupon, the Respondent installed Chattahoochee River Rock over a substantial portion of the decking at his own expense. During the installation of this Chattahoochee River Rock, Mrs. Stellato contacted the Respondent by phone and demanded that he also install, at his own expense, Chattahoochee River Rock over an existing concrete patio area that had not been built by the Respondent. The Respondent refused to incur this additional expense, because it was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. Thereafter, the Stellatos again failed to pay the balance due under the contract. The subject swimming pool was inspected by an inspector for Palm Bay, and the City issued a certificate of occupancy in June of 1980. The pool was ready for a certificate of occupancy in February of 1980 except for the removal of one pile of dirt that still remained on the premises. All other aspects of the pool construction passed inspection in February of 1980 when the pool filter system was activated. Since February Of 1980, the Stellatos have had full use of the subject swimming pool. Except for alleging that some low spots remain in the pool decking, the Petitioner offered no substantial evidence of any other significant problem with the Respondent's construction. Notwithstanding the failure of the Stellatos to pay the balance of the contract price in a timely manner, the Respondent performed warranty work on the subject swimming pool after February of 1980. During the course of this warranty work the Respondent added chlorine chemicals to the pool because the Stellatos had failed to properly maintain it up to June of 1980. Another claim concerning a leaking pipe on the pool sweep did not manifest itself until April of 1981, after the expiration of the one year warranty period afforded by the Respondent to all customers. The Petitioner offered no evidence to show that the leak in this pipe was caused by the Respondent. Notwithstanding the expiration of the warranty period, and the lack of evidence to show that the leak was caused by the Respondent, he did send an employee to the job site and stopped the water leak, at no cost to the Stellatos. On several occasions when the Respondent or his employees attempted to satisfy the complaints of the Stellatos, they had to leave the job site because of the abusive language and conduct directed toward them by the Stellatos. In one instance Mr. Stellato ordered the Respondent's employees from the job site and prevented performance of any work under the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint, as amended, against John W. Thornett be dismissed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 9 day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1982.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., denied Petitioners full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services offered at its place of public accommodation, in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction Petitioners are African Americans who reside in the State of Ohio, who visited Orlando, Florida, in June 2011 and stayed at Lake Eve Resort beginning on June 21, 2011. Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., was the owner of Lake Eve Resort, located at 12388 International Drive, Orlando, Florida, at all times relevant hereto. Each Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission as follows: Jessica Austin – July 20, 2012 Denise Austin – July 21, 2012 Tracie Austin – January 18, 2013 (Amended Complaint)2/ Bonlydia Jones – July 11, 2012 James Austin – July 31, 2012 Dionne Harrington – August 1, 2012 Esther Hall – January 28, 2013 (Amended Complaint)3/ Boniris McNeal – March 27, 2013 Summer McNeal – March 27, 2013 Derek McNeal – March 27, 2013 In each Complaint, the Petitioner alleges that the most recent date of discrimination is June 22, 2011. On June 21, 2012, Petitioners Esther Hall, Summer McNeal, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, and Dionne Harrington, each filed a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) with the Commission. Each TAQ is signed by the named Petitioner, is stamped received by the Commission on June 21, 2012, and contains the specific facts alleged to be an act of discrimination in the provision of public accommodation by Respondent. Allegations of Discrimination On or about May 23, 2011, Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, entered into a Standard Group Contract with Lake Eve Resort (the Resort) to reserve 15 Resort rooms for five nights at a discounted group rate beginning June 21, 2011.4/ The rooms were to accommodate approximately 55 members of her extended family on the occasion of the Boss/Williams/Harris family reunion. Petitioners traveled from Ohio to Orlando via charter bus, arriving at the Resort on the evening of June 21, 2011. Erika Bell, a relative of Petitioners, drove a rental car from Ohio to Orlando. She did not arrive in Orlando until June 22, 2011. Petitioners checked in to the Resort without incident. However, one family member, John Harris, was informed that the three-bedroom suite he had reserved for his family was not available due to a mistake in reservations. He was offered two two-bedroom suites to accommodate his family. Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, dined off-property on the evening of June 21, 2011, to celebrate her wedding anniversary. Petitioner, Bonlydia Jones, left the Resort property shortly after check-in to shop for groceries. Petitioners, Dionne Harrington and Esther Hall, were very tired after the long bus trip and went to bed early on June 21, 2011. Petitioner, Denise Austin, arrived in Orlando with the family on June 21, 2011. On the morning of June 22, 2011, Ms. Jones received a call from Mr. Harris, informing her that the Resort management wanted to speak with them about his room. That morning, Ms. Jones and Mr. Harris met with two members of Resort management, Amanda Simon and Marie Silbe. Mr. Harris was informed that he needed to change rooms to a three-bedroom suite, the accommodation he had reserved, which had become available. Mr. Harris disputed that he had to change rooms and argued that he was told at check-in the prior evening he would not have to move from the two two-bedroom suites he was offered when his preferred three-bedroom suite was not available. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Harris would move his family to an available three-bedroom suite. The Resort provided an employee to assist with the move. Following the meeting with management, Ms. Jones went to the pool, along with Ms. Harrington and other members of the family. After a period of time which was not established at hearing, Mary Hall, one of Ms. Harrington’s relatives, came to the pool and informed Ms. Harrington that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Harrington left the pool and entered the lobby, where she observed police officers and members of Resort management. She approached a member of management and was informed that she and her family were being evicted from the Resort and must be off the property within an hour. Ms. Harrington left the lobby and returned to her room, where her mother, Ms. Hall was sleeping. Ms. Harrington informed Ms. Hall that the family was being evicted from the Resort and instructed Ms. Hall to pack her belongings. Ms. Jones’ cousin, Denise Strickland, came to the pool and informed her that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Jones entered the lobby where she was approached by a member of management, who introduced herself as the general manager and informed her that the family was being evicted. Ms. Jones requested a reason, but was informed by a police officer that the owners did not have to give a reason. In the lobby, Ms. Jones observed that an African- American male was stopped by police and asked whether he was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion. He was not a family member. Ms. Jones observed that no Caucasian guests were approached in the lobby by management or the police. Ms. Austin was on a trolley to lunch off-property on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from her cousin, Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland informed Ms. Austin that the family was being evicted from the Resort and she needed to return to pack her things. Ms. Austin returned to the property, where she was escorted to her room by a security guard and asked to pack her belongings. Ms. McNeal was en route to rent a car and buy groceries on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from Ms. Strickland informing her that the family was being evicted and that she needed to return to the Resort to pack her belongings. Upon her arrival at the Resort, Ms. McNeal entered the lobby. There, she was approached by Resort staff, asked whether she was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion, and informed that the Resort could not honor the reservations and the family was being evicted. Ms. McNeal observed that Caucasian guests entering the lobby were not approached by either the police or Resort management. Ms. McNeal was escorted to her room by both a police officer and a member of management and instructed to be out of the room within 30 minutes. Ms. McNeal inquired why they were being evicted, but was told by a police officer that the Resort was not required to give a reason. Erika Bell received a call from her mother, Ms. Austin, while en route to the Resort on June 22, 2011. Ms. Austin informed Ms. Bell that the family was being evicted from the Resort and asked her to call the Resort and cancel her reservation. Respondent gave no reason for evicting Petitioners from the property. Respondent refunded Petitioners’ money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: Finding that Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., committed an act of public accommodation discrimination in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011), against Petitioners Jessica Austin, Denise Austin, Tracie Austin, James Austin, Bonlydia Jones, Esther Hall, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, Summer McNeal, and Dionne Harrington; and Prohibiting any future acts of discrimination by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in connection with Petitioner’s employment by Respondent on the basis of his national origin.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Leneve Plaisime (“Plaisime”), whose country of origin is Haiti, was employed as a busboy and room service attendant at the Marriott Key Largo Bay Resort (“Marriott”)1 from 1995 to 1997. On September 13, 1997, upon returning to work after a vacation of several weeks, Plaisime was fired by a manager named Eric Sykas who said to him: “There is no job for you because the owner says he’s not interested in Haitians.”2 This statement was overheard by a co-worker of Plaisime’s named Fito Jean, who testified at the final hearing, corroborating Plaisime’s account.3 In around the middle of October 1997 (approximately one month after his discharge), Plaisime found a new job at Tak Security Corporation (“Tak”). Evidence introduced by Plaisime shows that he earned $7,862.52 at Marriott in 1997, which reflects an average monthly wage of about $925. Had he worked the entire year at Marriott, Plaisime would have earned a total of approximately $11,100. In contrast, working for Tak in 1998 Plaisime earned $11,396 (or approximately $950 per month)——a 2.7% increase in his annual income. There is no evidence showing what Plaisime’s likely income would have been in 1998 had he remained in the employ of Marriott. Ultimate Factual Determinations Marriott discharged Plaisime because of his national origin. Thus, Marriott committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The actual economic loss that Plaisime suffered as a result of Marriott’s unlawful discrimination against him was one month’s pay, or $925.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order declaring that Marriott discharged Plaisime on the basis of his national origin, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes; prohibiting Marriott from committing further such violations; and awarding Plaisime $925 to relieve the effects of the unlawful discrimination that Marriott perpetrated against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (appellant, applicant or Nostimo), is the owner of Lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, Revised Plat of Clearwater Beach Subdivision, located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is subject to the land use requirements codified in the City of Clearwater Code of Ordinances (code or city code). By application filed on April 25, 1989 appellant sought the issuance of a conditional use permit from appellee, City of Clearwater (City or appellee). If approved, the permit would authorize the sale of beer and wine for off-premises consumption by a Pick Kwik Food Store to be constructed on the property under a lease agreement between appellant and Pick Kwik, Inc. Appellant's property is properly zoned for a retail establishment (CB or Beach Commerical), and it needs no further zoning permits from the City in order to convert the existing structures on the property to a convenience store. Indeed, appellant has already received approval for the construction and operation of the store. However, under subsection 137.024(b) of the city code, appellant is required to obtain a conditional use permit because it intends to engage in the sale of packaged beer and wine for off-premises consumption. In order to obtain such a permit the applicant must satisfy a number of criteria embodied in the code. The parties have stipulated that, with the exception of one standard, all other relevant criteria have been met. The disputed standard requires that "the use shall be compatible with the surrounding area and not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services." It is noted that appellant must secure the necessary land use permit from the City before it can obtain the alcoholic beverage license from the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The application was considered by the Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (Board) on June 13, 1989 and denied by a 5-0 vote with one member abstaining. As a basis for the denial, the Board adopted a staff report that concluded that "due to the beach area being saturated with this use (sale of alcoholic beverages), public nuisances requiring police action are taxing community services." It further concluded that the proliferation of this activity "has a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities and services, specifically police services in handling nuisances related to alcoholic beverage establishments." Members of the public who testified in opposition to the application expressed concern over increased traffic in the area, the glare of lights from a 24 hours per day establishment, and potential problems arising from customers who will consume the beer and wine during the evening hours. In addition, two letters in opposition to the application were considered by the Board. Finally, besides a presentation by applicant's attorney, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the applicant and established that Pick Wick, Inc. provides security services at its stores, if needed, and training for employees to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The subject property is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. The avenue narrows from four to two lanes just south of where the store is to be located. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street and runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. In general terms, the property is surrounded by mixed uses and include a 7-11 convenience store immediately across the street to the east, motels and rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. Maps received in evidence more definitively depict the nature of the uses surrounding Nostimo's property. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are also tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. Finally, the area is replete with apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the proposed establishment. Although there are presently no active businesses located on the subject property, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on and off premises consumption of alcohol. The applicant contends that the proposed use is compatible with both the property's former use and the present surrounding area, particularly since a 7-11 convenience store directly across the street has been in business selling beer and wine for the last twenty-five years, and there are several restaurants or motels within a block that sell alcoholic beverages. The applicant added that, in all, there are approximately fifty-three active alcoholic beverage licenses within two miles of the proposed convenience store. At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick store and a former employee of the 7-11 store across the street, who recalled that when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). Two other witnesses testified at final hearing in opposition to the application. One, who is a member of a church that lies a block from the proposed store, pointed out without contradiction that a playground sits next to the church and is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. She was concerned that if more traffic is generated by the store, it would make access to the playground more hazardous and discourage the children from using the facility. The second member of the public is concerned that the store will be incompatible with the surrounding area. This is because much of the neighboring area is made up of public areas, apartments, rental units or condominiums, and he contended an establishment selling alcoholic beverages would be inconsistent with those uses.
The Issue The administrative complaint filed on September 17, 1987 alleges that in a residential pool contracting job Respondent Martin ". . . exhibited financial mismanagement, misconduct, or diversion, in violation of 489.129(1)(h), (m) . . . [and] failed to perform in a reasonably timely manner, and/or abandoned said job, in violation of 489.129(1)(m), (k)." The issue is whether Martin committed those violations, and if so, what disciplinary action is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Kenneth Martin was licensed in the State of Florida as a registered commercial pool contractor, holding license number RP 0021608. His license is currently in inactive status. Martin was President of Adair Pools, Inc., the corporation under which he conducted his pool construction business. In early July 1986, Adair Pools contracted to build a residential pool for Paul and Cynthia Pajak at 8304 Helena Drive in Orange County, Florida. The pool was to be kidney-shaped, approximately 14 feet by 30 feet, with a waterfall and a detached spa. The contract amount of $11,571.00 expressly excluded the deck, electrical work and screening, although the written contract included a sheet describing the specifications for the excluded work, recommended contractors, and estimated costs. This sheet and the pool contract itself clearly indicated that these items were not the responsibility of the pool company and were not included in the contract price. Work commenced in July, shortly after the contract was signed. Although the contract did not specify a completion date, Martin concedes that the pool should have taken no more than four to eight weeks to complete. The Pajaks had planned a Labor Day party and were told by Adair's employees there would be no problem getting their pool finished for the party. The pool was not finished by Labor Day. After the pool was dug, shot with concrete and tiled, someone determined that the spa was supposed to have been raised. In attempting to raise the spa and to change the water jets, the workers cracked the shell of the spa and had to replace it. Until the problems with the spa, the Pajaks felt that the construction progress was reasonable and smooth. At this point, sometime around Labor Day, the problems began. Adair delayed in paying Shotcrete Pools, the subcontractor for the concrete shell, because Adair felt it was Shotcrete's fault that the spa was cracked. Shotcrete notified the Pajaks that a lien would be placed on the property if they were not paid. The notice to owner is dated November 3, 1986. Eventually Adair paid Shotcrete and its other subcontractors for the Pajak work and no lien was filed. The evidence does not reflect a clear sequence of events, but between Labor Day and February or March 1987, little progress was made to finish the pool. Martin's supervisor left and Martin's brother took over. The Pajaks kept calling Martin and were always assured that the job would be completed. Martin admits that the company at this time was in serious financial trouble because it was not being paid for a large commercial job that it had undertaken. On December 10, 1986, Mrs. Pajak's brother-in-law, an attorney, sent Martin a demand letter, giving a 10-day deadline for completion of the work. Martin and his brother met with the attorney and assured him the job would be finished. In spite of the problems, the Pajaks continued working with Martin and paid the full contract price, less the $100.00 that was to be paid when the pool was filled. On March 5, 1987, Martin informed the Pajaks that they should have the deck poured so that Adair could finish the pool. The Pajaks were not satisfied that the pool was ready for the deck as there were leaks in the waterfall, debris was all over the yard and the spa tile work looked messy. In Martin's opinion those items were his company's responsibility, but were part of the finishing to be done after the deck was poured and the pool was lined with marblelite. On March 21, 1987, the Pajaks contracted with another pool company for $4450.00 to finish their pool. Martin denies that Adair abandoned the job, but admits that it took an inordinate amount of time. The Pajaks did not allow him to finish the cleanup, the interior coating and the pool start up because they contracted with someone else. Martin did not contest that the waterfall leaked or that extensive cleanup needed to be done, but disputed that this work should be done before the deck was poured. He contended that the leaks in the waterfall would have been fixed when the finish was done. Martin estimates that between 1974 and 1986, his company completed over fourteen hundred residential pools and approximately five hundred large commercial pools. Martin has been active on various local pool construction industry boards and has no record of prior disciplinary action against his license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Kenneth Martin be found guilty of misconduct, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, not guilty of the other violations with which he is charged, and that he be required to pay an administrative fine of $500.00. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Bryant, Esquire 220 East Madison Street, Suite 530 Tampa, Florida 33602 Kenneth R. Martin 3225 North Glenn Drive Orlando, Florida 32806 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issues posed for decision herein are whether or not the certified pool contractor's license issued to Respondents Licensee, Edward G. Batter, should be revoked or suspended or the Licensee's right to practice thereunder should be withdrawn based on conduct which will be set forth hereinafter in detail as set out in the Administrative Complaint filed herein on August 23, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Edward G. Batter, d/b/a Tropicana Pools, Inc., (Respondent or Licensee) is a certified pool contractor who holds license No. CPC 012906. Respondent was first licensed on July 28, 1978, as qualifier of Tropicana Pools, Inc., which license was temporarily suspended in June, 1979, and remains in an invalid status to this date. By its Administrative Complaint, Petitioner's Executive Director took action to revoke or otherwise suspend the Respondent's rights to practice pursuant to his referenced license. As a licensed pool contractor, Respondent is subject to the Board's rules and regulations. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1.) A special meeting of the Board of Adjustment, Appeals and Examiners for general building contractors for Hillsborough County was held on Thursday, July 19, 1979, for the purpose of hearing certain allegations concerning the demise of Tropicana pools, Inc. Jerry Taylor, Petitioner's field investigator, presented the Hillsborough County Board with the results of an investigation of Respondent and presented several cases wherein funds were diverted after being collected for a specific contract to other projects or for other purposes and that projects for which funds had been collected had either been left unstarted or abandoned at the time Tropicana Pools, Inc., ceased doing business. At that meeting, the Respondent's construction activities were suspended by the Board until restitution or settlement was made and verified by affected parties. The temporary suspension by Hillsborough County became final during August of 1979. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 3.) Howard Shaw, Director of Building and Zoning for the City of Tampa, appeared and testified to substantiate the disciplinary action taken against the Respondent by Hillsborough County during the summer of 1979. On June 7, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. James R. Stanton entered into a contract with Respondent to have a pool constructed for a price of $8,182.00. Respondent was paid a 10 percent deposit to commence construction of the Stantons' pool. Respondent absconded with the deposit and never notified the Stantons that their pool would not be built nor did Respondent return their deposit. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 5.) On April 19, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Theodore Hillary entered into a contract for the construction of a swimming pool for a contract price of $8,130.00. Approximately $5,690.00 or approximately 70 percent of the contract sum was paid on June 18, 1979, and the work ceased on the Hillary project at a completion stage of approximately 40 percent. Respondent abandoned the Hillary project on approximately June 5, 1979. The Hillarys completed their pool at a price of approximately $5,000.00 over and above the contracted price. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 6.) On April 30, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Leon Tope entered into a contract for the construction of a swimming pool at their residence for the contract price of $8,050.00. On June 18, 1979, the Topes had tendered to Respondent approximately 70 percent of the contract cost while the Respondent abandoned the construction of the Topes' pool after approximately 40 percent of the work was complete. Respondent abandoned the project on June 18, 1979, and the Topes completed the construction of their pool at a price of approximately $2,000.00 by engaging the services of other contractors in the area. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, and the testimony of Jim Moran.) Jerry Taylor, Petitioner's field investigator, attended the probable cause hearing during August of 1979 in which the Hillsborough County Board of Examiners suspended the pool license of Respondent. Investigator Taylor briefed the Hillsborough County Board respecting the results of the investigation conducted by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's pool contractor's license No. CPC 012906 be REVOKED. ENTERED this 10th day of March, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Respondent practiced beyond the scope of his certified commercial pool/spa contractor’s license and proceeded on a job without obtaining applicable local building department permits and inspections, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the nature of the sanctions to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the construction industry, including pool and spa contractors and electrical contractors, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed as a commercial pool/spa contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers CPC 05661, 1457406, and 1458031. Respondent was the primary qualifying agent of Cox Building Corporation, d/b/a Cox Pools (Cox Pools). Respondent has been registered, certified, or licensed as a swimming pool contractor since 1978. Over the course of his almost 40 years as a swimming pool contractor, Respondent has replaced thousands of pool lights and pool pumps. He believed that the replacement of pool equipment, which he understood to include pool lights, was within the allowable scope of work as a swimming pool contractor. On or about September 12, 2014, Cox Pools entered into a contract with John Patronis to replace four pool light fixtures, a booster pump, and other miscellaneous services for $4,681.17 at the Subject Property. The Subject Property falls within the jurisdiction of the Bay County Building Department. Respondent did not obtain an electrical permit for replacing the pool light fixtures at Subject Property. Mr. Carnley testified that the Bay County Building Department requires that pool light replacement be performed by a licensed electrician, and with a county-issued electrical permit. The permit must be obtained by an electrical contractor or a homeowner. Bay County would not have issued a permit to Respondent, because he was not an electrical contractor. The Bay County Building Department also requires an electrical permit for the replacement of a circuit breaker in the electrical box serving a swimming pool. A pool contractor is not authorized to replace circuit breakers. No permits were obtained to replace circuit breakers at the Subject Property. On September 15, 2014, during the course of replacing the pool light fixtures, an employee of Cox Pools, Joshua Cook, was electrocuted. The precise cause of the electrocution was not established, though no plausible basis exists for it being related to anything other than the replacement of the pool lights. After a period of several days following the accident involving Mr. Cook, Respondent returned to the Subject Property to complete the job. He personally went into the pool, put the light in the fixture and screwed it in, and left. The light was thereafter wired and energized by a Cox Pool service technician. Given the circumstances, Mr. Patronis was not asked to complete payment for the services performed. Nonetheless, it is clear that, but for the accident, Mr. Patronis would have been expected to pay for the services for which he contracted. The photographic evidence in this case demonstrates that between September 15, 2014, and some indeterminate time in 2016, a circuit breaker was replaced in the electrical box serving the Subject Property’s pool. The circuit breaker that existed on September 15, 2014, was a ground-fault circuit interrupter (GFCI). By 2016, the GFCI has been replaced with an arc-fault circuit interrupter (AFCI). Had Bay County performed an inspection of the electrical box with the AFCI, it would not have passed inspection. Respondent testified that he did not change the circuit breaker, that Cox Pools keeps no inventory of circuit breakers, and that service technicians do not carry circuit breakers on the trucks. Respondent acknowledged his understanding that replacing a circuit breaker is a job for an electrical contractor. At some time “recently,” Williams Electric was called to the Subject Property, at which time Mr. Williams “swapped out a breaker or two that was an incorrect type of breaker for the application.” Mr. Patronis was not clear whether an arc breaker was replaced with a ground breaker, or vice versa. Pool lights are sealed units. The light and its power cord come as a single unit. To replace a pool light, the main circuit breaker at the swimming pool sub-panel is turned off. The wires to the existing light are disconnected (unscrewed) from the circuit breaker. A lead is tied to the end of the wire. The light fixture is removed from the pool opening, and the wire is pulled through the existing conduit from the pool side. When the old fixture and wiring unit has been removed, the lead is removed from the end of the old unit’s wire, tied to the wiring of the new light, and drawn back through the conduit to the circuit breaker box. The new light is screwed into the fixture, and then energized by connecting the wires back into the existing circuit breaker. The point of connection of the light to the circuit breaker is the “load side” of the circuit. The experts who testified in this proceeding were all competent and qualified in their fields, and had served in leadership positions with the CILB (Mr. Weller, Mr. Del Vecchio, and Mr. Lenois), the Electrical Contracting Licensing Board (Mr. Tibbs), or the Florida Swimming Pool Association (Mr. Garner and Mr. Pruette). However, despite the relative simplicity of the statutes at issue, their opinions as to the allowable scope of work under a swimming pool contractor license were at odds. Respondent acknowledged, and the evidence in this case establishes, that electrical work associated with new pool construction is a task that is within the scope of work of an electrical contractor. Initial construction involves substantial work in bringing power from the main residential panel to the new pool panel, installing a junction box and circuit breakers, installing the wiring, and performing other electrical work of significantly greater complexity than that involved in the installation of equipment into a pre-constructed electrical system, which involves only the disconnect and reconnect of wires to the load side of a circuit breaker. As discussed by Mr. Lenois, a pool contractor can contract for the entire pool, but cannot self-perform the electrical components pursuant to section 489.113. As to the replacement of existing equipment, Petitioner’s experts testified that pool light fixtures differ from other pool-related equipment, e.g., pool pumps, in that the light fixtures have direct contact with the water, whereas other components do not. Lights are changed out in a submerged condition, which makes them extremely dangerous. As stated by Mr. Weller, “the whole area of electricity around pools gets complicated, between the bonding, the grounding, and all the other stuff.” It was Mr. Weller’s opinion that, although pool contractors can contract for pool light replacement, they cannot self-perform the work. Rather, the electrical work involved in replacing pool light fixtures should be subcontracted to an electrical contractor because “you can make mistakes in plumbing, and you can make mistakes in other areas, but with electricity, it's pretty non-forgiving, especially if you're around water.” Mr. Lenois distinguished pool lights, which he characterized as accessories since all pools do not have them, from pool equipment, which includes pumps and filters, heaters, specialty filters, and salt generators, which are mounted at the pump and filter area. Respondent’s experts were uniform in their opinions that the act of disconnecting and reconnecting pool lights, as well as other pool equipment, at the load side of a breaker does not constitute electrical contracting. Mr. Pruette testified that disconnecting and connecting a pool light at a circuit breaker is not a difficult or complex task, and can be easily performed with a little training. Mr. Del Vecchio testified that the disconnection and connection of pool lights at the circuit breaker is no different than that performed by a plumber in replacing a hot water heater, or an air-conditioning contractor in replacing a piece of air-conditioning equipment. Almost all of the experts either replaced pool lights as part of their routine scope of work or knew of pool contractors who did so, a practice that appears to be commonplace. Furthermore, several of the witnesses worked in areas of the state in which county building officials did not require permits, electrical or otherwise, for the replacement of pool lights, though the evidence in that regard was generally hearsay. Mr. Lenois, who testified on Petitioner’s behalf, stated his opinion that reasonable people could differ as to the meaning of the statutory language placing the “installation, repair, or replacement of existing equipment” within the scope of work of a pool/spa contractor. The issue of the extent to which electrical work is subsumed within the statutory scope of work of a pool/spa contractor of “installation, repair, or replacement of existing equipment” has been the topic of considerable discussion in the industry. In that regard, the Florida Pool and Spa Association has filed a Petition to Initiate Rulemaking with the CILB seeking, among other things, to “clarify[] the scope of a certified pool contractor’s license to include the installation, repair, and replacement of pool equipment, up to and including the electrical connection on the demand side of the power source.” There was no evidence as to the disposition of the petition. Respondent argued that Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-16.001(9), which establishes that five percent of the written certification exam for commercial pool/spa contractors is to cover “electrical work,” is evidence that electrical work is within the scope of work for a pool contractor. Electrical work associated with pool construction includes grounding for the pool shell itself. Thus, a degree of knowledge of basic electrical work and codes would be warranted, regardless of whether equipment electrical connections are within the scope of work for a pool/spa contractor. The parties introduced a series of DBPR-approved course outlines and instructor applications for a three-hour class, sponsored by the Florida Pool and Spa Association, entitled “Basic Electricity and the NEC [National Electric Code] for Swimming Pools,” and a one-hour class, sponsored by the Florida Pool and Spa Association, entitled “Basic Electrical Requirements for Pools.” The course outline prepared by the Florida Pool and Spa Association for each of the approved courses provides, in bold font, that: Instructor is aware that electrical work does not fall within the scope of work of licensed pool/spa contractors. No instruction on how to perform electrical work will take place. Course will provide much needed understanding of the basics of electricity as well as those aspects of the NEC as they pertain to pools and spas. Instructor will also emphasize the importance of using a licensed electrical contractor to perform required work.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order finding that Respondent violated section 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count One; and sections 455.227(1)(o) and 489.129(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two, but only as that count pertains to the replacement of pool lights. It is further recommended that: Respondent be subject to a fine of $1,000 for a first violation of section 489.129(1)(o); Respondent be subject to a fine of $4,000, and that Respondent’s commercial pool/spa contractor licenses be subject to a period of probation for two years for a first violation of section 455.227(1)(o) and section 489.129(1)(c); and Respondent be required to complete an approved, live seven-hour continuing education course, in addition to any otherwise required continuing education, with an emphasis on chapter 489 and the rules enacted pursuant thereto. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2016.
