The Issue Whether Respondent may be disciplined for failure to maintain the qualifications established by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002), which requires that a correctional officer have good moral character.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent, Jacqueline L. Scriven, is a state-certified correctional officer holding certificate No. 45230. She was certified by Petitioner on August 28, 1985. On March 18, 2002, Respondent and her 21-year-old daughter, Marissa Jefferson, were involved in a physical altercation. The daughter reported to the arresting officer that Respondent struck her with her fists and a claw hammer. The arresting officer reported physical evidence on Marissa Jefferson's back and shoulders consistent with an attack with a claw hammer. Marissa Jefferson also reported to the arresting officer that Respondent threatened to shoot her with a revolver that Respondent was holding, although Respondent did not point the weapon at her. Marissa Jefferson was not available to testify; she is presently incarcerated for writing bad checks in Orange County jail. She has charges pending in four other Florida counties. She has a history of police involvement for various criminal and drug-related offenses. She stole from her mother while living with her. Interestingly, while Marisa Jefferson is in jail, Respondent is the primary caretaker for Marissa Jefferson's son. Respondent was arrested and charged with aggravated battery (Section 784.045, Florida Statutes (2002)) and aggravated assault with a firearm (Section 784.021, Florida Statutes (2002)). On December 17, 2002, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to a violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2002), felony battery. Adjudication was withheld, and she was placed on probation for a period of one year. In addition, she paid $183.50 in costs and was directed to undergo anger management evaluation and training. Respondent, who is 43 years old, had been employed by Department of Corrections since 1985 and had risen to the rank of captain. She was terminated on January 9, 2003. Respondent acknowledges hitting her daughter with a hammer, but denies having ever had the pistol in her possession during the altercation. Respondent contends that she used the hammer in self-defense. The position of the blunt trauma visible on Marissa Jefferson's back and shoulders indicates that she had her back to Respondent when she was struck. Based on the hearsay nature of the evidence supporting the allegations of assault with a firearm and Respondent's candid admission of hitting her daughter with a hammer, but denying having ever had possession of the firearm during the altercation, her testimony is credible regarding both allegations. It does not appear that Respondent's striking her daughter with the claw hammer was in self-defense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Jacqueline L. Scriven, violated Subsection 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, and, as a result, failed to demonstrate good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that her certification be suspended for two years from January 10, 2003, and that she be given such other associated penalties as Petitioner deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer should be suspended or revoked pursuant to Chapter 943, Florida Statutes for alleged conduct as set forth in Amended Administrative Complaint dated April 16, 1982. This proceeding was initiated by an administrative complaint issued by the Police Standards and Training Commission on May 26, 1981, alleging certain grounds under Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, for the suspension or revocation of Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer. The case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the appointment of a Hearing Officer, and the case was thereafter set for hearing on September 15, 1981. Pursuant to a request for a continuance by the Petitioner, the hearing was continued and rescheduled for March 16, 1982. The case was again continued upon motion of Petitioner due to injuries sustained by its counsel. A prehearing conference was held on March 9, 1982 at which time the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission was substituted as the Petitioner in this proceeding, pursuant to Section 943.255, Florida Statutes. The final hearing was rescheduled for April 13, 1982. Thereafter, on March 31, 1982, L. Sanford Selvey, II, Esquire filed a Motion for Continuance based on the incapacity of Respondent's counsel, M. Howard Williams, Esquire as a result of an apparent heart attack. The motion requested that final hearing be continued until such time as Mr. Williams had recovered from his illness. The motion was granted and final hearing was cancelled by Order, dated April 7, 1982, wherein counsel for Respondent was directed to advise the Hearing Officer within thirty days as to when he anticipated medical recovery. On April 20, 1982, Petitioner filed an Amended Administrative Complaint seeking disciplinary action pursuant to subsection 943.145(3)(a), F.S. for failure to maintain qualifications for certification under subsection 943.13(4) and (7), F.S. On May 19, 1982, Petitioner filed a Motion for an Order Deeming Requests for Admissions Admitted and Amended Complaint Filed. No opposition was filed against this motion and it was granted by Order dated June 7, 1982. That Order provided that the final hearing was rescheduled for July 21, 1982, in view of the failure of counsel for Respondent to advise the Hearing Officer as to his anticipated date of medical recovery. A copy of the Order was furnished to M. Howard Williams, Esquire and L. Sanford Selvey, II, Esquire. Neither Respondent nor his counsel appeared at the final hearing on July 21, 1982. Upon inquiry by the Hearing Officer, counsel for Petitioner stated that he had previously been advised by Mr. Selvey's office that the case files of Mr. Williams had been referred by the Circuit Court to Dexter Douglas, Esquire as an inventory attorney, and that upon inquiring of Mr. Douglas' office, he was informed that two letters had been sent to Respondent informing him of the hearing date in this proceeding. Upon direction of the Hearing Officer, counsel for Petitioner again contacted Mr. Douglas' office to ascertain if any response to the letters had been made by Respondent. Counsel was advised that letters, dated June 29 and June 30, 1982, had been sent to Respondent, advising him of the date of hearing and of the need to obtain representation, but no response was received. Based upon these representations, and under all the circumstances, it was determined that adequate notice of the hearing had been provided Respondent, and Petitioner was permitted to proceed with presentation of its case as an uncontested proceeding. Petitioner presented the testimony of four witnesses and submitted four exhibits in evidence.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Earl Junior Beagles, was first employed with the Tallahassee Police Department in January, 1967. He received certification as a "grandfathered" law enforcement officer in June of 1967. In 1979, he was a sergeant in charge of the Vice and Narcotics unit of the Police Department. (Testimony of Tucker, Westfall) In November or December of 1979, Respondent obtained $200 from the Police Department informant fund upon authorization of Police Chief Melvin Tucker. At the time, Respondent told Chief Tucker that he wanted the funds to compromise a prostitute in order to obtain access to a local drug dealer. In March, 1980, one Patricia Dalton made allegations to police officials that on December 19, 1979, Respondent had coerced her into having sexual relations with him. Specifically, she told police investigators that she was a prostitute and had previously received a telephone call from someone identifying himself as "Bill", and that they arranged to meet at a local motel. At that meeting in the motel room, they arrived at an understanding that she would furnish her services for $150. She produced a small portion of cocaine, at which point Respondent placed her under arrest for drug possession and prostitution whereupon she commenced to cry, but Respondent told her that he was sure they could work things out and make a deal. Respondent turned the cocaine over to his partner, Officer Lewis Donaldson, and told him that he would take Miss Dalton home. She alleged that she departed with Respondent and that later, at his request, she registered at another hotel under a fictitious name where he coerced her into having sexual intercourse and fellatio with him. (Testimony of Tucker, Coe) Police investigators verified the fact that Miss Dalton had been transported in a taxicab to the motel where she had allegedly met Respondent on December 19, 1979, and also that she had registered under a fictitious name at the second motel on that date. As part of the investigation, Miss Dalton was equipped with a "body wire" to enable the investigators to monitor a conversation that she had with Respondent at the Greyhound Bus Station in Tallahassee. Although the investigators observed Miss Dalton enter the bus station, they did not personally see Respondent from their monitoring location nearby. However, they were able to recognize his voice from the tape recording made of the conversation. Respondent made admissions during the conversation which gave credence to Dalton's contentions that he had had prior sexual relations with her and had not pursued criminal charges against her. A transcript of the conversation shows that he made the following statements to her: "No, you're unarrested, no charges, forget it, it's over. Call it washed clean." and "For God's sake, don't mention my deal about dropping those God-damn charges". Police records reflect that Respondent never initiated charges against Patricia Dalton and that he returned the entire amount of $200 which he had obtained from the informant fund. (Testimony of Coe, Runo, Petitioner's Exhibit 2) As a result of the investigation, Respondent was indicted for sexual battery, extortion, and bribery in the Leon County Circuit Court on April 23, 1980. On that date, Chief Tucker advised Respondent of the Dalton complaint, but Respondent denied all of her allegations of misconduct. Respondent was then suspended from his employment with the Police force pending disposition of the criminal charges. (Testimony of Tucker, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4) On October 17, 1980, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of unlawful compensation (Section 838.016, F.S.) which is a third degree felony, and one count of simple assault which is a misdemeanor. Adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence was withheld and he was placed on probation for a period of two years. In the opinion of Chief Tucker and Lieutenant Thomas R. Coe, Jr. of the Tallahassee Police Department, Respondent's actions in connection with the Dalton incident did not meet the required standards of moral character required for certification as a law enforcement officer. After the indictment, Respondent was discharged from his employment with the Department. (Testimony of Tucker, Coe, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Although hearsay testimony was received from a police investigator concerning another incident of sexual misconduct involving another alleged prostitute in 1977, insufficient competent evidence was received upon which to base findings of fact. (Testimony of Runo)
Recommendation That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order revoking the certification of Respondent as a law enforcement officer. DONE and ENTERED this 30 day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur C. Wallberg, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Room 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Earl Junior Beagles Star Route, Box 506B Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Sheriff Don R. Moreland Chairman Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Marion County Sheriff's Department P. O. Box 1987 Ocala, Florida 32670 M. Howard Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 382 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William S. Westfall, Jr., Bureau Chief Bureau of Standards Division of Criminal Justice Standards & Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer and was issued certificate number 13-84-002-01 on July 14, 1984. On September 1, 1988, Respondent was employed as an investigator with the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit working in the misdemeanor division. While on duty and driving his employment car on the evening of September 1, 1988, Respondent was in the area of Lee Street and 20th Street in Orlando, Florida. He was in the area attempting to locate a witness as part of a criminal investigation he was conducting. He had previously made the acquaintance of a person named Ruby Burk. He would on occasion drive past her house and stop and they would talk and once previously had engaged in a sex act. On the night of September 1, 1988, he went to Burk's house, talked with her and then left on a futile attempt to locate a witness. He then returned to Burk's residence, picked her up and proceeded to a dark secluded area on an unpaved street which borders an elementary school. Shortly thereafter, while on routine patrol, an Orange County Deputy Sheriff observed Respondent sitting behind the wheel of the state vehicle in a complete state of undress. When she shined her bright lights into the vehicle, the Deputy observed the head of a black female pop up from the direction of the Petitioner's lap. The Deputy recognized Burk and observed that she was fully clothed. The Deputy permitted Respondent to put his pants on before he exited his vehicle. Respondent and Burk were engaging in fellatio in the front seat of the state vehicle. At the time of the incident, Respondent was having marital problems which caused him to be despondent. In mitigation, Respondent demonstrated that he had been a certified law enforcement officer for over four years at the time of this incident and has had no prior disciplinary problems. He has performed his job in private security and as an investigator in an exemplarily capacity. In September 1988, Respondent was discharged by the State Attorney, but was given a favorable recommendation He is presently employed as a Child Protective Investigator with HRS. He is respected by his peers and in his community. The violation of the law and rules by the Respondent was an isolated incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of the following offense: Failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1989). It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's certification be suspended for a period of six months, followed by a probationary period of one year, subject to the successful completion of such career development training and counseling as the Commission may impose. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (in part), 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 (in part), 17, 18, 19 (in part), 21. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence or irrelevant: Paragraphs 7 (that Burk had been convicted of engaging in prostitution on Westmoreland Street), 11, 16 (in part), 19 (in part), 20, 22. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (in part), 6, 7. Rejected as irrelevant or as argument: Paragraphs 5, 8 and 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa L. Whitehurst, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Leon B. Cheek, Esquire 101 Sunnytown Road Suite 306 Casselberry, FL 32707 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent used excessive or unnecessary force on Stephen Cody Kester on July 15, 2000, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Victor Bosch, is a certified Law Enforcement Officer in the State of Florida. He was issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 170035 on February 26, 1997. He was also issued Auxiliary Law Enforcement Certificate Number 163915 on June 27, 1996, and Correctional Officer Certificate Number 160836 on March 27, 1996. On June 15, 2000, Respondent was employed by the Charlotte County Sheriff's Department as a Deputy First Class. On July 15, 2000, Stephen Cody Kester, a seventeen- year-old juvenile, was in attendance at a teen dance conducted by the Charlotte County Parks and Recreation Department at the Tringali Center located in Englewood, Charlotte County, Florida. During teen dances at the Tringali Center, it is common practice for teenagers to step outside of the center, with permission of the adult sponsors, to use wireless phones due to the volume of music, if they stand near the Deputy on security duty by the front door. Rules regulating the dances conducted at the Tringali Center are not written or posted in any manner, but left to the discretion of individual counselors. However, teenagers who leave the premises during a dance, without permission, are not permitted to return to the dance. Kester had asked and was given permission to go outside of the center to use his wireless telephone. Upon leaving the center, Kester informed Respondent that he had permission to use his wireless phone. Kester stepped several feet away from Respondent, and out from under the overhang at the Tringali Center, but within clear sight of Respondent. Respondent became upset that Kester moved away from him. He also refused to accept Kester's statement that he had permission to be outside in order to use his wireless phone and then return to the dance. When Kester tried to re-enter the center, Respondent placed Kester in an arm lock, told him he could not re-enter the premises, and forced him to leave the area. Kester was not a threat to Respondent, nor was he placed under arrest. As a result of the arm lock placed on Kester, he was taken to an emergency room by his mother and subsequently diagnosed with an acute strain, left shoulder. At the time of the incident in question, Kester suffered from a brain tumor that was life threatening, and any sudden movement or trauma to the head could have resulted in dire consequences. The Tringali Center had no hard and fast rules concerning leaving the building to use a wireless phone. As long as the individual stayed in the area of the overhang and the deputy outside was informed that permission had been granted, then it was acceptable for the teenager to return to the dance. The amount of force used by Respondent to restrain Kester was excessive and unnecessary. Respondent's explanation that the arm lock technique he used was acceptable practice in the law enforcement community and that the level of force used was not harmful to Kester is not credible, nor persuasive. Prior to this incident, Respondent was employed in law enforcement for seven years and had no prior disciplinary incidents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent's certification be suspended for six months and successful completion of such training or retraining deemed appropriate by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Victor Bosch 3394 South Sumter Boulevard North Port, Florida 34287 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit: failure to accommodate Petitioner's handicap and termination of Petitioner, on the basis of handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an adult African-American male. After retiring from the United States Army with an excellent reputation, Petitioner was hired by Respondent Department of Corrections. When Respondent hired Petitioner it was aware he had a 10 percent physical impairment, as assigned by the Veterans' Administration (VA). Petitioner completed 512 hours of training and was certified as a Correctional Officer, pursuant to the Florida Statutes. At all times material, he was a "vested" State career service employee. Petitioner sustained an on-the-job injury on February 11, 2003, while employed by Respondent. Apparently, Petitioner was adequately performing his job duties up through the date of his injury. Respondent Employer provided workers' compensation and medical benefits as required by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. These benefits were monitored by the State Risk Management Office within the Department of Insurance. The Employer instructed Petitioner not to return to work until he was medically released to return to work. Petitioner's injury was a torn medial meniscus (knee joint injury). He underwent collagen injections and lengthy physical therapy, but no surgery. His treating physician was Dr. Aguero. On July 21, 2003, Petitioner underwent a Functional Capacity Evaluation by a physical therapist. The report of this evaluation was typed up two days later and showed, in pertinent part, that: Mr. Brown demonstrated the capacity to sustain work tasks in the light strength category of physical demands. His . . . previous job was corrections officer. That job is estimated to be in the medium strength category. Known job duties of concern or particular relevance include: ability to move rapidly and to perform take- down and restraint procedures. Risk Management employees urged the treating physician to release Petitioner to return to work. On July 30, 2003, Dr. Aguero released Petitioner to return to work on light duty, with restrictions on standing, walking, and lifting. Presumably, Dr. Aguero believed Petitioner would be reassigned by the employer to appropriate light duty work until he reached maximum medical improvement from his knee injury. The Employer Department of Corrections, in fact, did assign Petitioner to "alternate duty" work when he returned to the correctional institution on or about July 30, 2003. Petitioner worked in the mail room for approximately three weeks thereafter. As of July 30, 2003, in addition to his 10 percent rating of permanent partial disability from the VA, Petitioner had gained a great deal of weight due to inactivity during the post-knee injury period. He also suffered from arthritis. On or about August 18, 2003, Dr. Aguero filled out a Workers' Compensation Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI) Form, designating that Petitioner had improved from his on-the-job injury as much as could be reasonably medically expected. As of that date, Dr. Aguero assigned him an additional two percent permanent partial disability rating, due to his on-the-job accident. The two percent rating carried continued work restrictions. Dr. Aguero provided the results of Petitioner's July 21, 2003, Functional Capacity Test score to the Employer (see Finding of Fact 6) attached to his MMI rating. Dr. Aguero's employment restrictions for Petitioner, post-MMI, as stated on the official MMI Form, say "See FCE," meaning that Dr. Aguero had adopted, as his restrictions on Petitioner, the functional abilities described in the July 21, 2003, Functional Capacity Evaluation Report. This meant that Petitioner was found by the physical therapist testing him to be unable to do these tasks on July 21, 2003, and the medical physician was saying for July 30, 2003, that Petitioner had achieved all the improvement he was going to achieve from the knee injury and he should not be required to do these activities on the job because he could not do them and trying to do them could be harmful to him. These restrictions included no extended periods of standing/walking, no balancing, and no significant lifting. Also, Petitioner was listed as being unable to lift 50 pounds, routinely. Essential Function A-4 of the Essential Functions of a Correctional Officer, which the Department of Corrections has adopted as its minimum standards for employment as a Correctional Officer, requires that a Correctional Officer be able to: Sit, walk, and stand for prolonged periods of time; stoop, squat, kneel, bend, run, and lift approximately 50 pounds on a routine basis. Within a day of receiving the MMI package, Petitioner's highest superior, the Warden, sent Petitioner home. Petitioner was subsequently provided a Predetermination Conference and a dismissal letter. Petitioner claimed to have begged to stay on in alternate duty positions, but neither he nor any of his local supervisors reported these requests for light duty or other accommodation of his permanent condition to the Employer's Americans With Disabilities Act Coordinator, Martie Taylor. It was not necessary under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, for Petitioner to do more than ask his supervisors for an accommodation, but Ms. Taylor testified that even if Petitioner's supervisors had properly relayed his requests for accommodation to her, she knew of no way the Employer could have accommodated Petitioner's lifting restrictions. Petitioner related that supervisors made comments to him that they needed a fully functional "soldier in the field" and that his obesity and inability to run and subdue prisoners rendered him not fully functional as a correctional officer. Petitioner believes that his large size is an asset in commanding and subduing inmates but that Respondent is prejudiced against his size. Petitioner testified that he knew of insulin-dependent diabetics and of other obese correctional officers who did very well at regular employment with the Employer and that he knew of other correctional officers whom the Employer had permitted to stay employed at light duty longer than he had been allowed to stay on light duty. However, Petitioner had no knowledge of whether these employees had reached MMI or of which essential requirements of the job of Correctional Officer they were able, or unable, to perform while they were on light duty. In fact, the Department of Correction's Procedure 208.10, covering "Career service employee's right to alternate duty assignments," reads, in pertinent part: SPECIFIC PROCEDURES COORDINATION OF ALTERNATE DUTY: . . . * * * (c) The department does not have specific alternate duty positions. The employee will remain in her/his current position while performing alternate duties. * * * Certified Officers: Individuals employed in a certified officer's position must be prepared and able at all times to perform the essential functions of his/her position. If approved for alternate duty, an employee in a certified officer's position will be temporarily assigned to non-certified officer duties for the period of time during which the employee is determined by the Division of Risk Management to have a temporary partial disability. * * * (8) MAXIMUM MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT (c) When maximum medical improvement has been determined by the treating physical and information has been provided to the Division of Risk Management, the employee will be reassigned the duties and responsibilities of her/his regular position unless the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the position. In no way will the employee be allowed to continue to perform alternate duties once the maximum medical improvement has been determined by the Division of Risk Management. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner pursued his employment rights before the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC). PERC's Final Order (January 8, 2004) on this matter determined as a factual finding that Petitioner could not perform the essential duties of a correctional officer and accepted the hearing officer's findings of fact. Brown v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 FCSR 9 (2004). More specifically, the PERC hearing officer found that "Brown received maximum medical improvement on July 30, 2003, with a two percent impairment," and that "the doctor indicated on the evaluation that Brown has work restrictions and he cannot perform the standing and walking requirements of a correctional officer." At hearing, Brown indicated that he cannot perform the duties of a correctional officer . . . . He also stated that he cannot run . . . . In sum, the Agency demonstrated that it is undisputed that Brown cannot perform the essential duties of a correctional officer." Since there were no appeals, the findings of fact of the PERC hearing officer between the same two parties are res judicata; are presumed correct, and are binding herein as a matter of law. Some findings also constituted admissions of Petitioner. Loss of employment has been very hard on Petitioner and his family. On September 11, 2003, Petitioner applied for a disabled person license plate, reciting that he was so ambulatory disabled that he could not walk 200 feet without stopping to rest, and that he is severely limited in his walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition. His treating physician signed this application, attesting to Petitioner's listed conditions. Petitioner's Answers to Respondent's Requests for Admission in the instant case concedes that he can perform jobs other than those of a correctional officer. Petitioner's testimony at hearing was to the effect that he still cannot perform all the duties of a correctional officer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and the Charge of Discrimination herein, and awarding no attorney's fees or costs to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Horace Brown, Jr. 2012 Bradley Avenue Valdosta, Georgia 31602 Mark Simpson, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes, demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she should not be disqualified from employment in a position involving direct contact with children or developmentally disabled persons and, thus, whether the intended action to deny an exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact The Agency Action Petitioner seeks an exemption from disqualification to allow her to serve as a direct care service provider for One Mainstream, a direct services provider for developmentally disabled clients. APD is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust, and charged with serving and protecting children or adults with developmental disabilities. Vulnerable populations served by APD include individuals with developmental and intellectual disabilities, autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, and Down’s syndrome. Some of APD’s clients are incapable of expressing their needs, or unable to express whether something is wrong. As part of the application process for employment as a direct services provider with One Mainstream, Petitioner was subject to a routine pre-employment background screening pursuant to section 435.04. The screening revealed the existence of two disqualifying criminal incidents (resulting in three charged offenses) in Petitioner’s past. The offenses were described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations as follows: In April 1998, Petitioner committed her first disqualifying offense, Domestic Violence Battery, a first degree misdemeanor. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Subsequently, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the offense and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner was approximately thirty-four years old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to pay various court costs/fines. In January 2002, Petitioner contemporaneously committed her second and third disqualifying offenses, two counts of Domestic Violence Battery, first degree misdemeanors. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Petitioner contends there was no physical violence involved in these offenses. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses and was adjudicated guilty. Petitioner was approximately thirty-seven and nine months old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to serve thirty days in the county jail and pay various court costs/fines. As a result of the background screening results, Respondent determined that Petitioner was disqualified from further employment in a position of special trust with children or the developmentally disabled. On February 16, 2015, Petitioner filed her Request for Exemption. All such requests are made to the Department of Children and Families, which conducts the initial background investigation. The file was assigned to Beatriz Blanco, DCF’s central region background screening coordinator. By July 10, 2015, the request for exemption had been assigned to Respondent. Daniella Jones, APD’s state office exemption background screening coordinator, requested additional information regarding Petitioner’s drug counseling and anger management courses. The record is not clear as to which items contained in Respondent’s Exemption Review file, if any, were submitted in response to Ms. Jones’ request. Among the items submitted by Petitioner in support of her Request for Exemption were a completed employment history record; information related to her having obtained a certified nursing assistant license; and six letters of recommendation. The Exemption Review file also included Petitioner’s written explanation of the disqualifying offenses and subsequent non- disqualifying incident1/; and copies of law enforcement, prosecution, and court documents related to the disqualifying offenses, a subsequent non-disqualifying incident, and three prior non-disqualifying incidents. Petitioner responded to the best of her ability to each request for information. Among the factors identified by Mr. Lewis as bases for the recommendation of denial of the exemption by staff was the perception that Petitioner’s answers to questions about her past conduct were “immature,” that she did not take responsibility for some of the past incidents, and that she did not show sufficient remorse for those incidents. The exemption request was ultimately provided by APD staff to the director of APD, who entered the notice of denial on August 27, 2015. Petitioner’s Background Petitioner grew up in a tough neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York. Her parents were hard drinkers, and she was raised in an environment in which the use of alcohol was accepted. By the time she was 17 years of age, Petitioner was a drinker and a “brawler.” Over the years, Petitioner’s issues with alcohol led her into drunken choices that resulted in the brushes with law enforcement and the criminal justice system described herein. Petitioner readily acknowledged that she had been an alcoholic during the times when she committed the disqualifying offenses. The Disqualifying Offenses 1998 Disqualifying Offense On or about April 18, 1998, Petitioner was told by a friend that her husband was staying with a girlfriend at an apartment in a nearby town. Petitioner “had some drinks” and went to the apartment to confront her husband. She burst in on the husband and his girlfriend unannounced and became embroiled in a brawl. The police were called. By the time the police officer arrived, Petitioner was gone. The police report,2/ which was based on the statements of the husband and his girlfriend, indicated that Petitioner threw a conch shell at the husband, striking him in the head, whereupon she left the apartment, returning to throw a boot at the husband which missed and broke a clock. Since Petitioner was not on the scene, and based on Petitioner’s testimony described herein, an inference is drawn that the husband and girlfriend painted as exculpatory a picture as possible, omitting anything that could cast any blame on the husband for the incident. Petitioner testified that the altercation was not nearly as one-sided as portrayed in the hearsay police report, with the husband holding her down and choking her at one point. She denied throwing the conch shell, but admitted throwing the boot and breaking the clock. Although the evidence suggests that Petitioner may indeed have thrown the shell, the evidence also supports that the husband was more than a passive victim. Petitioner was arrested for “domestic violence (simple).” She pled nolo contendere to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was ordered to pay $620 in court costs. 2002 Disqualifying Offense On or about January 23, 2002, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with her boyfriend, in which her sister was involved. Petitioner was, according to the police report, “intoxicated and [ ] belligerent.” Petitioner had earlier received an inheritance from her mother, which she used to buy a house in Tampa, Florida. Her boyfriend moved in with her. The money soon ran out. Nonetheless, the boyfriend would not get a job, would not contribute to expenses, and would not move out. Petitioner and the boyfriend got into an altercation when she tried to evict him, during which Petitioner hit him with a frozen porterhouse steak. Petitioner indicated that she selected that as her weapon of choice, since he was eating all of her steaks but not paying for them. Petitioner was unclear as to the involvement of her sister, Geraldine Dreviak née Schubert, who also lived in Petitioner’s house, but denied that her sister was injured during the fracas. Petitioner introduced a letter from Ms. Dreviak in which Ms. Dreviak confirmed the boyfriend’s indolence, described her participation in requests that he leave, and substantiated Petitioner’s testimony that Ms. Dreviak was not injured. No objection was raised as to the authenticity of the letter, though it was noted that the letter was hearsay. The letter was admitted, and is used in this proceeding “for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence.” § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Thus, the evidence supports a finding that Ms. Dreviak suffered no physical injury in the altercation between Petitioner and her boyfriend. As a result of the altercation, Petitioner was arrested for “simple battery.” She pled guilty to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Petitioner was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with credit for time served, and assessed $678 in court costs and liens. Petitioner completed or was lawfully released from all nonmonetary sanctions imposed by the courts, and all fees and costs related to the two disqualifying offenses were paid. Other Non-Disqualifying Offenses Properly Considered Offense In September 2002, Petitioner was arrested in New York with several other persons for Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree, a misdemeanor. The controlled substance was cocaine. Petitioner contended she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. She testified that she just wanted to be done with the incident, and failed to appreciate the effect it would have in her later life. Petitioner was sentenced to time served and her license was suspended for six months. The incident was not only a singular and isolated event of its kind, but was Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement. Improperly Considered Offenses As set forth in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations, Petitioner was involved in the following non-disqualifying offenses: In September 1983, Petitioner committed the offense of Disorderly Conduct. Petitioner was convicted for this offense and adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately nineteen years and five months old at the time of this offense. In October 1988, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property. Petitioner contends she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately twenty-four years and six months old at the time of this offense. In December 1994, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Mischief with Reckless Property Damage. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately thirty years and eight months old at the time of this offense. Respondent considered it to be significant that Petitioner was unable to provide information regarding non- disqualifying incidents3/ despite the fact that she had no control over New York City’s records retention policy. Mr. Lewis noted that it would have been to the benefit of Petitioner to have provided records of those non-disqualifying offenses since, without those records, Respondent could not fully review that information. In denying the exemption, Respondent considered the information in totality, including the non-disqualifying offenses committed from 1983 through 1994. Petitioner’s failure to provide a “detailed explanation” of those offenses was a factor in Respondent’s decision. Section 435.07(3)(b) plainly provides that: The agency may consider as part of its deliberations of the employee’s rehabilitation the fact that the employee has, subsequent to the conviction for the disqualifying offense for which the exemption is being sought, been arrested for or convicted of another crime, even if that crime is not a disqualifying offense. (emphasis added). Considering evidence of non-disqualifying crimes committed prior to the disqualifying offenses exceeded the powers and duties granted by the Legislature. Thus, Respondent’s consideration of non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the conviction for the disqualifying offenses was error. Evidence of Rehabilitation Petitioner’s last disqualifying offense occurred on January 23, 2002. Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement of any kind occurred in September 2002. Petitioner has no arrests or involvement with law enforcement of any kind since then. At some point, the passage of time itself is evidence of rehabilitation. While by no means dispositive, the passage of almost 14 years since the last disqualifying offense is substantial evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Petitioner showed contrition and remorse for the disqualifying offenses. Petitioner has been married since 2008 to a man that she describes as supportive. Thus, the stresses of the abusive relationships that led to her disqualifying offenses have been alleviated. Petitioner initially provided letters from six persons who were acquainted with Petitioner, two of whom testified at the final hearing. The letters were sincere, left the impression that they were written by persons with knowledge of Petitioner’s present character, and were consistent with and corroborated by the testimony of witnesses at the hearing. When Petitioner filed her Request for Administrative Hearing, she provided letters of support from four additional persons who knew Petitioner, one of whom testified at the final hearing. As with the previous letters, the letters were sincere, and fully consistent with the witness testimony taken during the hearing. Petitioner has been licensed as a certified nursing assistant, though the date of her licensure was not specified. She has not been able to practice under her license due to the issues that are the subject of this proceeding. Petitioner testified convincingly that she has turned her life around, and is not the same person that she was when she was a drinker. Petitioner’s Work History The Employment History Record form that is part of the Request for Exemption requests “employment history for the last three years.” Petitioner provided an employment history that indicated employment from May 11, 2011, to the date of the filing of the Request for Exemption. During that period, Petitioner was employed to perform custodial duties at the First Baptist Church of Weeki Wachee Acres, and worked as a cook for functions held at the church. Her work ethic and performance was, and is, exemplary. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner has attended to the needs of Billy Bowling on a volunteer basis for the past five or six years. Mr. Bowling, who is 49 years of age, is significantly developmentally disabled. At the hearing, he displayed obvious affection for Petitioner. Mr. Bowling’s mother, Patsy Bowling Anderson, testified that, at one time, the family employed a licensed direct service provider who was unacceptably rude, and upset Mr. Bowling. Since then, Petitioner is the only person outside of her family that Mrs. Anderson allows to care for Mr. Bowling. Mrs. Anderson testified that she had complete trust that Petitioner would do nothing that would result in harm to her son. Her testimony was substantiated by that of Major Anderson. The testimony of the Bowling/Anderson family was credible and compelling, and is accepted as convincing evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. In addition to her care for Billy Bowling, Major Anderson and Mrs. Anderson testified that Petitioner, on her own time and without compensation, provides care and assistance to elderly neighbors, and to children at their church, all without incident. Their testimony is credited, and is accepted as further evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Additional Clear and Convincing Evidence of Rehabilitation Mr. Lewis testified that when disqualifying offenses involve violence, Respondent looks for evidence of anger management counseling. The information provided to the APD director suggested that Petitioner had undergone no anger management courses that would mitigate the possibility of a recurrence of the incidents that occurred in 1998 and 2002. The lack of such evidence was, in this case, a significant factor in the recommendation of denial to the director. Although the evidence of counseling in the Exemption Review file was spotty, the evidence adduced at hearing from Petitioner and Mrs. Anderson was convincing that Petitioner is an active, and successful, participant in Alcoholics Anonymous. Petitioner acts as a sponsor for others and on occasion, has taken it on herself to conduct meetings when group leaders have failed to appear. She has been sober for more than ten years. Since both of Petitioner’s disqualifying offenses were largely fueled by alcohol, ongoing participation in Alcoholics Anonymous is a more appropriate and effective means of rehabilitation than a class in “anger management.” Petitioner has been fortunate to find herself in what, by all accounts, is an embracing and supportive community. The individuals testifying on her behalf expressed their firm conviction that Petitioner had turned her life around, with Mrs. Anderson, who has known Petitioner for 14 years, characterizing the change as “remarkable.” None of the witnesses could identify any reason to suggest that Petitioner would not be able to provide capable and safe services to children and developmentally disabled persons. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner meets the objective criteria for an exemption from disqualification established in section 435.07(1). When the decision was made to deny the exemption, it appears that APD staff provided the director with information as to non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the disqualifying offenses. It is not known how, or whether, that impermissible information may have colored the director’s decision. Nonetheless, an evaluation of Petitioner’s suitability for an exemption should be made without consideration of those earlier events. The credible testimony and evidence in this case established, clearly and convincingly, that Petitioner has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses, and that she currently presents no danger to the vulnerable population served by Respondent if she is allowed to be employed as a direct service provider. The concerns expressed by Respondent in formulating its intended action, without the benefit of the hearing testimony, particularly those regarding her lack of “anger management” classes and her lack of remorse for her actions, were effectively refuted by the credible testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities approving Petitioner, Catherine Schubert Rivera’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character as required by chapter 943, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.011, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of certifying correctional officers and taking disciplinary action against them for failing to maintain good moral character as required by section 943.13(7). § 943.1395, Fla. Stat. (2009).2/ Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by Petitioner on July 8, 2009, and holds Correctional Certificate Number 284876. In February through May, 2010, the time frame relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Miami-Dade Correctional Institute ("Miami-Dade CI"). Incident Giving Rise to this Proceeding On or about July 29, 2010, Captain Eric Parrish, a midnight shift supervisor at Miami-Dade CI, convened a meeting of several employees under his supervision. Among those present at the meeting were Respondent and Officer Demetrices Demeritte. The purpose of the meeting was to address rumors regarding alleged sexual activity among staff members while present or on duty at Miami-Dade CI.3/ Ultimately, these rumors were determined to be unsubstantiated. However, at the meeting, Demeritte informed Parrish that Respondent had exposed his penis to her while they both were on duty at Miami-Dade CI. Respondent verbally admitted at the meeting that he did show Demeritte his penis, but stated that she had wanted to see it. Parrish ordered everyone in attendance at the meeting to complete an incident report after the close of the meeting.4/ Consistent with Petitioner's standard practice regarding the completion of incident reports, Parrish requested that the reports be submitted by the end of the shift.5/ This gave the employees approximately four hours to complete their reports. Ultimately, Parrish collected completed incident reports from all in attendance at the meeting, including Respondent. In his incident report, Respondent stated that he and Demeritte had engaged in discussions regarding sexual matters on more than one occasion. Respondent acknowledged that he exposed his penis to Demeritte on one occasion when they had discussed its size, and that upon seeing it, Demeritte took off in her post vehicle. The next day she asked him not to do that again because he was not "her man." Respondent stated that he apologized to Demeritte and considered the matter resolved between them as friends. Based on the information provided in the incident reports, Parrish recommended that Respondent and others be reviewed for disciplinary action. On or about December 6, 2011, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging that he had failed to maintain good moral character, as required by section 943.17, by having engaged in acts that constitute indecent exposure pursuant to section 800.03. Violation of section 800.03 is a misdemeanor of the first degree. § 800.03, Fla. Stat. (2009). There is no evidence in the record that Respondent was arrested or prosecuted for, convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a violation of section 800.03. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing At hearing, Demeritte testified that while she and Respondent were on duty inspecting the fence line or refueling vehicles or at other posts, Respondent exposed his penis to her on four separate occasions. In doing so, he would tell her to "look" and would watch her while exposing himself. Demeritte testified that on one of these occasions, he stroked his penis. Demeritte testified that she was uncomfortable and offended by Respondent's actions, that she considered his actions vulgar, and that on each occasion, she drove away. After she finally confronted Respondent, he apologized and never exposed himself to her again. The undersigned finds Demeritte's testimony credible and persuasive. Demeritte reported the incidents to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, not until the July 29, 2010, meeting did she report the incidents to Petitioner. Demeritte claimed that she did not report the incidents due to a "breach of confidentiality." No specific explanation was provided regarding what the breach of confidentiality entailed or why it deterred Demeritte from reporting the incidents before July 29, 2010. At the hearing, Respondent recanted his statement in his July 29, 2010, incident report that he had exposed his penis to Demeritte on one occasion. Respondent testified that the statements in his report were "sarcastic" and that he had needed more time to complete his incident report. However, Parrish credibly testified that near the end of the shift, Respondent told him he was still working on the incident report, but that at the end of the shift, Respondent provided the completed, signed, dated report and did not ask for more time to complete the report. Respondent denied having exposed his penis to Demeritte while on duty, and testified that he previously had performed as a dancer at private functions and that she may have seen his penis under those circumstances. Respondent's testimony on these points was not credible. Consistent with his incident report, Respondent testified that he and Demeritte engaged in discussions of a sexual nature on several occasions. There is no other evidence in the record directly corroborating or refuting this claim. However, the evidence does establish that around the time of the incidents at issue in this proceeding, there was discussion of, and rumors regarding, sexual matters between officers employed on the midnight shift at Miami-Dade CI. Under these circumstances, the undersigned finds credible Respondent's account that he and Demeritte engaged in discussions of a sexual nature. The undersigned does not find credible any claim by Respondent that Demeritte wanted or asked him to expose his penis to her. However, the undersigned finds it plausible that Respondent may not have understood that Demeritte was offended by his actions, particularly if they engaged in discussions of a sexual nature, and also given that she did not tell him, until after the fourth incident, to not expose himself to her. Indeed, once she told him not to expose himself to her, his behavior ceased and he apologized. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent previously has been subject to disciplinary action by Petitioner. Findings of Ultimate Fact Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent exposed his penis to Demeritte on four separate occasions, in violation of section 800.03, and that in doing so, he failed to maintain good moral character, as required by section 943.13(7). Respondent's behavior in exposing himself to Demeritte was inappropriate and unacceptable. However, the undersigned finds that the circumstances afoot around the time of Respondent's actions——specifically, discussions and rumors of sexual matters between staff, discussions of a sexual nature between Respondent and Demeritte, and the fact that Demeritte did not tell Respondent to stop exposing himself to her until after he had done so four times——may have created an atmosphere that led Respondent, mistakenly, to believe that such behavior was not a significant departure from the accepted norm on the Miami-Dade CI midnight shift at that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order suspending Respondent's correctional officer certification for a period of six months, imposing two years' probation, and ordering Respondent to undergo counseling. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 6th day of August, 2013.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Michael D. Ely, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and licensing law enforcement officers pursuant to Florida law. As such, the Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary actions against law enforcement officers. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer holding certificate number 1119822. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was employed by the Escambia County Sheriff's Office and worked as a deputy sheriff assigned to road patrol for a designated geographic area within the county. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was romantically involved with or was residing with an individual identified in this record as Greta Fernandez or Greta Brown. By his admission, the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown began around the first of August 2002. The Respondent met Ms. Brown while he was working an off duty job at Pensacola Beach. His romantic interest in her began in earnest a short while later after he bumped into her at a club known as "Coconuts." Shortly after beginning his association with Ms. Brown, the Respondent was verbally counseled by his superior officer regarding his choice of friends. Officers are warned not to socialize with and associate themselves with undesirable persons. Concerns over the Respondent's association with Ms. Brown continued and eventually led to a written report (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) issued on September 21, 2002. According to the Respondent, an individual named Patty Clark verbally teased and tormented Ms. Brown's minor child as the student left the school bus en route home. While the child did not testify in this cause it is presumed for purposes of this record that the extent of the "teasing" included verbal comments and a hand gesture commonly referred to as "the finger." It was alleged that the child was very upset by the incident. At Ms. Brown's urging, on or about September 21, 2002, the Respondent contacted Ms. Clark by telephone and identified himself as a deputy sheriff. He further admonished Ms. Clark to cease her behavior regarding the minor child and issued a veiled comment regarding the status of Ms. Clark's driving privileges (suspended). The Respondent did not write up the incident, did not refer the matter to other law enforcement who might have jurisdiction over the matter (e.g. the Pensacola police department), or take any official action against Ms. Clark. Other than the telephone call that was intended to curb Ms. Clark's actions toward the child, the Respondent took no other official action against the alleged perpetrator. Because she did not appreciate the manner in which she had been contacted, Ms. Clark filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Sheriff's Office. That complaint led to the written counseling report noted in paragraph 6. It is not alleged that Ms. Clark's actions or comments to the minor child constituted any criminal behavior. Moreover, other than to pacify Ms. Brown and presumably her child, it is unknown why the Respondent would have used his official position as a deputy sheriff to pursue the matter. If Ms. Clark committed a crime or an actionable infraction, the Respondent's wiser course would have been to refer the matter/incident to an appropriate law enforcement authority. As it happened, the Respondent attempted to use his official position of authority to secure a benefit for himself, his girlfriend and/or her child, that is, to coerce the alleged perpetrator (Ms. Clark) and to thereby keep her from interacting with the minor again. Despite the counseling on September 21, 2002, and in contrast to his testimony in this cause on October 15, 2003 (that his relationship with Ms. Brown ended "like the second week of September of 2002"), the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown did not end in September 2002. The weight of the credible evidence supports the finding that the Respondent continued seeing Ms. Brown after the second week of September 2002 and knew or should have known that she associated with persons whose reputations were less than stellar. In fact, the Respondent admitted that he utilized resources available to him through the Sheriff's Office to run background checks on at least two of Ms. Brown's friends because he thought they were "no good." More telling, however, is the fact that the Respondent admitted receiving and delivering to Ms. Brown what he believed were narcotic pills (from Dan Faircloth). The Respondent admitted that Ms. Brown did not go to physicians or doctors on a regular basis for treatment. He also knew that Mr. Faircloth was neither a doctor nor a pharmacist. Finally, the Respondent knew that Ms. Brown continued to receive and take pills for her alleged pain. How the Respondent could have imagined it appropriate for Mr. Faircloth to supply drugs to Ms. Brown is not explained in this record. Whether or not the pills actually were a controlled substance is unknown. It is certain the Respondent believed them to be. Eventually, the Respondent admitted to his superior that he found a crack pipe in his apartment (presumably owned by Ms. Brown). When the incident of the pipe came out, the Respondent was again instructed to break off his relationship with Ms. Brown. As late as November 2002 the Respondent continued to be in contact with Ms. Brown. The Sheriff's Office was by that time so concerned regarding the Respondent's poor judgment in his selection of associates that Lt. Spears felt compelled to write a memorandum to her superior regarding various allegations. One of the incidents that triggered an internal affairs investigation was the Respondent's disclosure to Ms. Brown that the Sheriff's Office was looking for one of her former friends. Ms. Brown tipped the person (for whom an arrest warrant had been issued) off that deputies were looking for her. Based upon the warning of her impending arrest, the suspect fled the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the suspect's arrest was delayed due to the Respondent's disclosure of the warrant information to Ms. Brown. At some point a reasonable person, and certainly a trained law enforcement officer, should have known that Ms. Brown and her associates were not appropriate persons with whom to socialize. In fact, when the Respondent elected to run a background check on Ms. Brown (presumably to check the status of her driving privileges) because he did not want her to drive his vehicle without a valid license, he should have questioned whether or not he should associate with someone he might not be able to trust. When two of her friends were arrested as a result of his checks on them, he should have clearly known to disassociate from Ms. Brown. That he remained in the relationship for as long as he did is incomprehensible. The Respondent offered no rational explanation for his behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding the Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by law and that the Respondent's certification be revoked based upon the severity of the conduct, the number of violations established by this record, and the lack of mitigating circumstances to support a lesser penalty. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9675 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Roy M. Kinsey, Jr., Esquire Kinsey, Troxel, Johnson & Walborsky, P.A. 438 East Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32502
The Issue Whether Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2016), by failing to secure payment of workers’ compensation coverage, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order for Specific Worksite Only (“SWO”) and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (“AOPA”); and, if so, whether Petitioner correctly calculated the proposed penalty assessment against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Background The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. The Department is the agency responsible for conducting random inspections of jobsites and investigating complaints concerning potential violations of workers’ compensation rules. Allstate is a corporation engaged in business in the State of Florida. Allstate was organized on May 23, 2005. Edgar A. Ezelle is the president and registered owner of Allstate. The address of record for Allstate is 8217 Firetower Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32210. In March 2017, Respondent was hired as the general contractor to renovate a hotel at a jobsite located at 3050 Reedy Creek Boulevard. When Respondent accepted the project, Prestige Handyworkers, LLC (“Prestige”), a subcontractor, was working on the jobsite. Although Prestige was hired by the previous general contractor, Respondent continued to work with Prestige. On June 15, 2017, the Department’s investigator, Kirk Glover, conducted a routine visit to the jobsite to conduct a compliance investigation. Mr. Glover observed six individuals performing construction-related work at the site. Mr. Glover conducted an interview of the individuals and took notes during the course of his interviews. Mr. Glover identified the individuals as: Luis Miguel Paz; Joseph A. Pizzuli; Roger Penley, Jr.; Georgios Rapanakis; Stavros Georgios Rapanakis; and Joseph Youngs. The six individuals were employed by subcontractor Prestige to perform work on behalf of Allstate. Luis Miguel Paz, Joseph A. Pizzuli, and Roger Penley, Jr., were engaged in painting work; Georgios Rapanakis and Stavros Georgios Rapanakis were supervising the other workers; and Joseph Youngs was engaged in cleanup of the construction site. The workers did not testify at the final hearing. Mr. Glover then contacted Allstate president, Edward Ezelle, who confirmed he was the general contractor for the jobsite and that he retained Prestige as the subcontractor for the site. Mr. Glover conducted a search of the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”), which revealed that Respondent did not have active workers’ compensation coverage for Prestige or its employees. Prestige did not have workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. The search of CCAS revealed that Mr. Ezelle had an active workers’ compensation coverage exemption, effective July 27, 2015, through July 26, 2017. Based on the results of his investigation, on June 16, 2017, Mr. Glover issued an SWO to Allstate for failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. On June 19, 2017, Mr. Glover hand-served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculations (“Records Request”). The Records Request directed Respondent to produce business records for the time period of June 16, 2015, through June 15, 2017. Respondent did not provide any business records to the Department. Mr. Ezelle testified that Allstate did not conduct business in Florida for the period of September 2016 through March 2017. While the undersigned has no reason to doubt Mr. Ezelle’s testimony that his business was not active during that time period, Respondent failed to produce records in response to the Records Request to support his testimony. Penalty Assessment To calculate the penalty assessment, the Department uses a two-year auditing period looking back from the date of the SWO, June 16, 2017, also known as the look-back period. Generally, the Department uses business records to calculate the penalty assessment. If the employer does not produce records sufficient to determine payroll for employees, the Department uses the imputed payroll to assess the penalty as required by section 440.107(7)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028. Eunika Jackson, a Department penalty auditor, was assigned to calculate the penalty assessment for Respondent. Based upon Mr. Glover’s observations at the jobsite on June 16, 2017, Ms. Jackson assigned National Council on Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”) classification code 5474 to calculate the penalty. Classification code 5474 applies to work involving painting. Ms. Jackson applied the approved manual rates for classification 5474 for each of the six individuals working on the jobsite. The application of the rates was utilized by the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L- 6.027 to determine the penalty assessment. The manual rate applied in this case was $11.05 for the period of June 16, 2015, through December 31, 2015; and $11.02 for the period of January 1, 2016, through June 15, 2017. The statewide average weekly wage, effective January 1, 2017, was used to calculate the penalty assessment. Georgios Rapanakis and Starvos Georgios Rapanakis had a workers’ compensation exemption for the period of June 16, 2015, through June 10, 2016. However, they were not covered by an exemption from June 11, 2016, through June 15, 2017. Although Mr. Ezelle has an exemption, his exemption was not in effect for a short period of July 19, 2015, through July 26, 2015. None of the other employees had an exemption. Based upon the Department’s calculation, the penalty assessment for the imputed payroll would be $153,908.20. On November 17, 2017, the Department filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment (“Motion for Leave to Amend”). The Department sought leave from the undersigned to amend the penalty assessment. The Department, as a party, is not authorized to amend a penalty without leave from the undersigned after the matter was filed with the Division. See § 120.569(2)(a) and Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.202. Despite the AOPA reflecting an issued date of July 14, 2017, the record supports a finding that the AOPA was issued November 17, 2017, the date the undersigned granted the Department’s Motion for Leave to Amend. Thus, the Department issued the AOPA for the imputed payroll 105 business days after Respondent received the Records Request.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order as follows: finding that Respondent failed to secure and maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its subcontractors; and dismissing the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Christina Pumphrey, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Edgar Ezelle Allstate Custom Contracting, Inc. 8217 Firetower Road Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
