The Issue Whether just cause exists to reprimand and suspend Respondent, Thomas Caggiano, for five days without pay from his position as a teacher with Petitioner, the School Board of Duval County (School Board),1 for the reasons set forth in the March 26, 2021, correspondence from the School Board, which contained an April 6, 2021, Amended Step III Progressive Discipline Petition.
Findings Of Fact The School Board is charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise free public schools within Duval County Public Schools. See Art. IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const.; § 1012.33(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The School Board and Mr. Caggiano executed a professional service contract, as defined in section 1012.33, Florida Statutes, and he has been employed by the School Board since 1994. The School Board has renewed this professional services contract on an annual basis. The parties’ employment relationship is governed by School Board policies, Florida laws, Department of Education rules, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Duval Teachers United and the School Board. The CBA relevant to this matter was effective from 2017 through 2020.2 Mr. Caggiano’s Employment at SHS Mr. Caggiano had been a math teacher at SHS for numerous years, including the time period relevant to the allegations of the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. He currently remains employed by the School Board, but is currently not a math teacher at SHS. During his career with the School Board, Mr. Caggiano received positive employment evaluations. Prior to the allegations at issue, the School Board had never disciplined Mr. Caggiano. During the 2019/2020 school year, Mr. Caggiano taught Algebra II. During his career at SHS, he also taught geometry, trigonometry, analytic geometry, calculus, and statistics. He also taught college-level classes for Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University during this time. As a teacher at SHS and an employee of the School Board, Mr. Caggiano received numerous and various training materials and updates concerning governing policies and procedures, electronically (via email). 2 The CBA entered into evidence, without objection, and which was unexecuted, states on its cover page that it is effective from 2017 through 2020. However, the same document, in Article XV, section C, states that it is effective from July 1, 2014, through June 30, 2017. As the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline letter references the 2017-2020 CBA, and as no party objected to the CBA that the undersigned accepted into evidence, the undersigned has treated the CBA entered into evidence as the CBA that was in effect during the allegations concerning Mr. Caggiano. Many of these materials were provided to Mr. Caggiano prior to faculty and staff training, which occurred in the weeks leading up to the start of the school year. Among the various materials provided to Mr. Caggiano (and other faculty) was a handout entitled “Ethics and Professionalism,” provided by Duval County Public Schools’ Office of Equity and Inclusion/Professional Standards. SHS also provided Mr. Caggiano (and other faculty) a link to its handbook, which contained policies, laws, and rules that govern Mr. Caggiano. The “Ethics and Professionalism” training materials contained a section on social media, and stated: Please ensure that personal social media accounts are set to private. Do not accept friend requests from students or their parents, and use discretion when inviting colleagues to your pages. Please ensure that your social media posts are respectful and do not possess profane, insensitive, or offensive language or images. As a reminder, you may not post photographs or identifying language about your students. It is a violation of FERPA. In the Acceptable Use Policy (2.1.11), it states “Employees must maintain professional boundaries between themselves and students. Employees will not solicit or engage in inappropriate communications with students verbally, in writing, or electronically regardless of the age of the student. Employees will not engage in any direct electronic communications with students, parents, supervisors, or co-workers whether by e-mail, instant messaging, or other digital media that will adversely affect the employee’s ability to perform his or her job.” Here are some best practices to follow: You are the adult, the teacher, the professional. You are not their friend. You are in violation of the Code of Ethics if you post disparaging comments about your colleagues, administration, and/or the Superintendent. Do not post material that is illegal, sexually explicit, obscene, derogatory, related to alcohol or drug use, or in violation of copyright laws. Do not access social networking sites from your school computer or during work time. Be cautious about photos posted online. Students and parents could view them! Any information posted to, or communicated through, a social networking site shall not bring disfavor, embarrassment or condemnation to the student, employee or school district. Mr. Caggiano (and other faculty) further received materials and training related to the School Board’s Non-Discrimination Policy (Board Policy 10.10), which states: Duval County Public Schools (DCPS) believes that education should be provided in an atmosphere where differences are understood and appreciated, and where all persons are treated fairly and with respect, and where all persons are free from discrimination, harassment and threats of violence or abuse. School board policy explicitly states, “No person shall, on the basis of a person’s actual or perceived identity with regard to race, color, religion, gender or gender identity, age, marital status, disability, sexual orientation, political or religious beliefs, national or ethnic origin, veteran status, or any other distinguishing physical or personality characteristics, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity on in any employment conditions or practices conducted by this School District, except as provided by law.” Previous Incident Involving Transgender Student J.N.S. J.N.S., a student at SHS, is a female transgender student and has identified as female at least since the 2018-2019 school year, her freshman year. In the summer before her sophomore year, after receiving her class assignments for the new academic year, J.N.S. sent an email to all of her new teachers, including Mr. Caggiano. The August 5, 2019, email, sent at 9:21 p.m., stated: I will be in your class during the 2019-2020 school year, and I would like to let you know that I am a Male-to-Female Transgender student who would like to go by the name [J.N.S.] as well as female pronouns in your class. I am sending this email before the actual school year starts so that there is plenty of time to change it on the roll before then if possible. Thank you very much for carrying out my request, I can’t wait to attend your class this year. That same evening, Mr. Caggiano responded to J.N.S.’s email: I will call you by any reasonable name you like, but the pronouns are not a negotiable thing for me. I will NOT refer to you with female pronouns. If this is not acceptable for you change classes. J.N.S. testified that most of her remaining teachers responded to this email in a positive fashion, agreeing to her request. J.N.S. also testified that she posted her email interaction with Mr. Caggiano on one of her social media platforms. On August 6, 2019, during the faculty pre-planning period before classes started, SHS held a mandatory training session presented by Dr. Wells as part of the Duval County Public Schools’ “All In: Ally for All” program. As part of this training, Dr. Wells presented various Duval County Public Schools policies that included the treatment of transgender students, including that transgender students had a right to be called by names that they chose. Principal Hatcher also attended this training, and stated that all students had a right to be called by their requested names, including pronouns. A sign-in sheet reflected that Mr. Caggiano attended this training session, although Mr. Caggiano testified that he did not recall attending. On August 7, 2019, J.N.S. contacted the SHS school counselor, Ms. Solliday, to request a transfer out of Mr. Caggiano’s class. After conferring with SHS Assistant Principal Motley, Ms. Solliday transferred J.N.S. to a different class with a different teacher. J.N.S. never attended Mr. Caggiano’s class, was never his student during the 2019-2020 school year, and has never been a student in Mr. Caggiano’s class. On August 12, 2019, Principal Hatcher met with Mr. Caggiano regarding his email response to J.N.S. and to counsel him regarding Duval County Public Schools’ policies for addressing students. Principal Hatcher informed Mr. Caggiano that he should use whatever name or pronoun a student asks to be called. Mr. Caggiano testified that he told Principal Hatcher he would stop using all pronouns, and refer to a student by the name requested. Although the School Board devoted a significant amount of time and effort at the final hearing to this incident involving Mr. Caggiano’s response to J.N.S.’s email request, this incident is not part of the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence that is the subject of the instant action. Dr. Hatcher counselled Mr. Caggiano on this issue. The undersigned heard testimony of various students, faculty, administrators, and even a school psychologist concerning this incident, which the undersigned finds provides background to the issues included in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence; however, this particular incident does not form the basis for the proposed discipline in the instant proceeding. Mr. Caggiano’s Use of Facebook Mr. Caggiano testified that he decided to set up a Facebook account sometime in 2008, to catch up with old friends. He testified that his daughter, Arielle, actually set up the account, and told him that his account’s settings were “private.” Thereafter, Mr. Caggiano stated that he posted and commented on posts of his Facebook “friends,” and because he believed his settings were “private,” he believed that only those “friends” could see those posts and comments. He testified that “[a]ll my posts were either political commentary, social commentary, or adult humor.” Mr. Caggiano did not accept any of his students as Facebook “friends,” but did have a few fellow SHS teachers as Facebook “friends.” He testified that he did not think anybody from SHS would be able to see his Facebook posts, aside from the fellow SHS teacher “friends.” Additionally, at some point in the past, Mr. Caggiano set up a separate Facebook account, called “AP Caggiano,” for students in an advanced placement class to post questions or comments concerning a class. Mr. Caggiano testified that he had not used that particular Facebook account in some time. Mr. Caggiano also testified that he never accessed his Facebook account at SHS or during his normal work hours. Mr. Stika, who was a forensic examiner in the Information Technologies department of Duval County Public Schools, testified that Mr. Caggiano did not use his school- issued laptop to access Facebook during the time period relevant to the instant matter. Amended Step III Progressive Discipline On May 19, 2020, the Duval County Public Schools Office of Equity and Inclusion/Professional Standards received an email concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook postings. On May 21, 2020, the Florida Times Union published a story concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook postings and comments. The May 19, 2021, email, and the May 21, 2020, newspaper article, caused an investigation into Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts and comments, conducted primarily by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson interviewed parents, students, former students, Principal Hatcher, Mr. Stika, and Mr. Caggiano, as part of this investigation. His findings form the basis for the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. As alleged in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence, the complainant provided screenshots of Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook postings. Mr. Johnson’s investigation discovered a Facebook account in the name of “Thomas Caggiano,” who was listed as a Duval County Public School teacher. Mr. Caggiano admitted that the Facebook account referenced in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence was his personal Facebook account, which his daughter initially set up. As reflected in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence, the investigation revealed Mr. Caggiano, commencing on or about January 2020, admitted to 27 various Facebook posts, reposts, or comments. The Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence specifically alleges that “some of your posts and/or comments were as follows[,]” and then lists seven specific posts, reposts, or comments from Mr. Caggiano’s personal Facebook account.3 At the final hearing, the undersigned heard testimony and considered evidence of Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, reposts, or comments, including Mr. Caggiano’s testimony, and finds that Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook account reflects the following posts and reposts—which could be considered “memes,” which can be defined as amusing or interesting pictures, videos, etc., that are 3 The School Board introduced into evidence other Facebook posts, reposts, or comments attributed to Mr. Caggiano, and questioned numerous witnesses about this “other” Facebook activity. The undersigned has only considered the allegations contained in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence in determining whether the School Board has just cause to discipline Mr. Caggiano. spread widely through the internet or social media—or comments to memes or articles, that were made, or reposted, by Mr. Caggiano. These seven posts, reposts, or comments, which are the only posts, reports, or comments alleged in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline, are: A repost from a Facebook entity called “Messenger of Liberty,” which states: “My son is taking part in a social experiment. He has to wear a Bernie 2020 t-shirt for 2 weeks and see how people react. So far he’s been spit on, punched and had a bottle thrown at him! I’m curious to see what happens when he goes outside.”; A repost from an individual and an entity called “LIFT – LONG ISLANDERS FOR TRUMP,” which states: “Crazy but TRUE, If this girl sees a penis at a party it’s a crime … [with an accompanying photograph of a young woman], but if this girl sees a penis in the woman’s bathroom … it’s tolerance [with an accompanying photograph of a girl in a bathroom]. Vote Republican and put an end to the madness.”’ A post authored by Mr. Caggiano which states: “Dumb ass liberals are now organizing protest against the killing of the Iranian general (terrorist) who was responsible for many attacks against the USA. Amazing how TRUMP derangement syndrome can cause democraps, and the main stream media, to support our enemies.”; A repost from another individual, which appears to be a “screen grab” from a Fox News segment, which states, at the top, “MAN AND WOMAN,” and which then states: “A man goes home and masturbates his typical fantasy. A woman on her knees, a woman tied up, a woman abused. A woman enjoys intercourse with her man—she fantasizes being raped by 3 men simultaneously…” The “screen grab” attributes this quote to Bernie Sanders, currently a United States Senator from Vermont, sometime in the 1970’s (the exhibit copy is unclear), and Mr. Caggiano’s handwritten notes next to this exhibit states” “Bernie said this!”; A repost from a Facebook entity called “Maine Bikers,” which states: “Meanwhile at the ‘Bikers for Bernie’ rally…[,]” and which contains a picture of two nude men on a motorcycle; What appears to be an attempted repost by Mr. Caggiano, which Facebook apparently removed with the message “False information, Checked by independent fact-checkers,” but which also contains the following comments from Mr. Caggiano: “Teach this childish nasty bitch a lesson. Have her treasonous ass removed from office and put in jail.”; and A repost, dated August 19, 2020, from Mr. Caggiano, of an article from an entity called “Lifesitenews.com,” with a headline that states, “Teen girls stage school walkout to protest boys in their bathroom who claim to be ‘girls’”; and to which Mr. Caggiano commented, “Love it! About time people stood up to this insanity.” The Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence further alleges: Resulting from our Facebook postings, your school and district leadership were both impacted as they received several complaints and/or concerns from students, parents and constituents expressing their displeasure with your conduct as a Duval county teacher and the comments displayed within your Facebook account. Many parents also contacted the school and informed the principal that they would not want their children in your class for the 2021- 2021 school year. If this administrative action had not occurred, the public consequences would cause an equity issue for other teachers by redistributing your assigned students or assignment of replacement teachers. While you are certainly entitled to your First Amendment right to free speech, your actions are in direct contradiction to the District’s mission to “Provide educational excellence in every school, in every classroom, for every student, every day.” This is without regard to a student’s ethnicity, race, religious beliefs, gender orientation, political persuasion, or any other qualifier. In addition, the Principals of Professional Conduct of the Education Profession in Florida (Florida Administrative Code 6A-10.081), requires that an individual, “Take reasonable precautions to distinguish between personal views and those of any educational institution or organization with which the individual is affiliated.” As an educator you have a duty and/or a responsibility to maintain the respect of the community and your colleagues. You posted and/or shared inappropriate, derogatory, demeaning and inflammatory material and comments referencing sexual orientation, national origin, and domestic abuse on your public social media (Facebook) account. Your conduct was unethical, lacked integrity and violated Duval County School Board policy, as such, warrants corrective discipline. The Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence alleges that Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, reposts, and comments violated section 1006.147, Florida Statutes; Florida Administrative Code Rules; rules 6A-5.053 and 6A-10.081, and Duval County School Board Policies 6.80 and 10.10. It further alleges that, pursuant to article V, section 9, of the CBA, which concerns “potential harm to the physical or mental wellbeing of a student, or students, constitutes more severe acts of misconduct which warrant circumventing progressive disciplinary steps,” and imposed discipline of a written reprimand, five consecutive working days of suspension without pay, and a requirement that Mr. Caggiano complete a course in “Culture Diversity” by a certain date.4 Additional Facts Concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook Account J.N.S. testified that at some point after her email interaction with Mr. Caggiano, she was “curious” and decided to access his Facebook account, 4 A review of the CBA in evidence shows that the provision of the CBA that addresses progressive discipline may be found in article V, section C, subsections 9 and 10. and saw numerous posts, including some of the posts that form the basis of the School Board’s proposed discipline. She stated that she was “appalled, but not surprised.” She also testified that the Florida Times Union reporter who authored the May 21, 2020, article about Mr. Caggiano reached out to her through social media concerning Mr. Caggiano. Ms. Schultz previously served as SHS Principal during the time period that Mr. Caggiano taught at SHS. She recalled seeing Mr. Caggiano’s posts that were “forwarded” to her, and she thereafter communicated directly with Mr. Caggiano. She stated that she asked Mr. Caggiano to remove his Facebook posts. In an email exchange between them, after Ms. Schultz informed Mr. Caggiano that she was able to access his Facebook account numerous times after he stated that he had changed his account settings to private, Mr. Caggiano wrote: Thank you for your email. I have had my daughter assist me in making my Facebook account settings “private,” and I have changed my account password. I am going through and removing a number of posts that were made by people that I do not know. I do not want to shut the entire account down, because I have a number of personal photos of my grandkids and me. Please confirm whether you are still able to see the Facebook “wall” for my account. I want to make sure the settings are properly adjusted so that only people whom I accept as “friends” can see what I post at this time. As you are aware, I have also received inquiries from the Duval County Public Schools Equity & Inclusion/Professional Standards supervisor …. In the emails, [he] provided me with a link to a Times- Union article by reporter Emily Bloch. [He] inquired whether I posted the items in question, on my Facebook account, as attributed by the writer of the article. I have reviewed the article. The article indicates that I am not obligated to respond to [his] inquiry. The article states that a “note from the Office of Equity and Inclusion and Professional Standards added that an inquiry ‘could take some time, as the office cannot compel anyone to meet or speak with us’,” and that I “did not directly reference a student of direct [my] posts at a student in [my] posts,” nor identify myself as a Duval County Public Schools teacher in my posts. Please confirm whether the article’s statement is accurate, as I prefer to only respond on this issue as I am obligated and as is otherwise necessary. For the record, I view Emily Bloch’s article as a well- timed political hit piece, full of inaccuracies, targeting me for my political views on issues of sexuality, to promote the latest version of the “need” for the City of Jacksonville Human Rights Ordinance (“HRO”), which was illegally passed back in 2017, and recently struck down by a Florida court. It is a transparent attempt to torpedo a good teacher’s career, to score political points. I hope the Duval County Schools will not countenance this reporter’s efforts to manufacture an issue to promote her political causes, especially where the public cannot come out to oppose the latest ordinance, because of Coronavirus. I treat all of my students with dignity and respect, and my classroom record speaks for itself. I will not lie to my students. I treat all of them with honesty and fairness. On the other hand, I make no secrets that when I am not acting in my official capacity as a Duval County Schools teacher, I do engage in robust political debate on political issues. I deny making any kind of “phobic” remarks or posts. A “phobia” is an irrational fear. Holding traditional views about the biological nature of sex (and need for sex-based privacy in bathrooms and lockers) is not a “phobia.” Disagreement with the political orthodoxy of the Left on matters of sexuality is not a “phobia.” Sharing my belief on my personal Facebook that there are only two genders that correspond with biological sex is not a “phobia.” Ms. Bloch may not like the way I make those points, and that is fine. Since I have been active on Facebook, I know I have shared various political memes on my personal Facebook wall, or commented in response to others’ postings. I do not instantly recall them all. Memes are often a good way of making pithy political statements, with a touch of humor. Sometimes “humor” is in the eye of the beholder, or is funny at the time. I’m sure I found certain memes funny or punchy at the time, and I have friends who did as well. I’m sure others may not find them funny, or may disagree with me, as is their right. I have not gone back through the last year’s worth of Facebook postings, and I am unable to verify some of Ms. Bloch’s attributed quotes. I can confirm that the account settings are now “private.” I stand by a number of statements Ms. Bloch attributes to me (or at least, I agree with the sentiments expressed, where they may have been posted by me or others). Others I do not. I will also note that at least one of the specifically quoted references in Ms. Bloch’s article was taken out of context, and she uses that out-of-context quote to suggest my remarks are “racist” or “xenophobic.” I’m neither. In fact, some of my beautiful grandchildren are “biracial” (for lack of a better term – there is only one “race”– the human race). But even having to make that note is offensive, and suggests bigotry and prejudice on the part of Ms. Bloch in leveling that charge against me. For the record, the “corona” or “covid” food reference was a political jab at President Trump’s references to the “CHINA” virus. Nothing more, nothing less. I trust that the Duval County Schools will continue to respect the rights of teachers to engage in robust political debate on Facebook, on matters of public concern (such as the political “transgenderism” movement – “Exhibit A” of which is the novel “lexicon” Ms. Bloch placed in her article, purporting to tell the public which terms are acceptable in the debate, and which are not). The First Amendment surrounds political speech with the highest level of protection, whether some people find the speech of others “offensive,” or wish to silence speakers with whom they disagree. Mr. Caggiano and his daughter, Arielle, testified that it was, and has been, Mr. Caggiano’s intention that his Facebook account settings be “private” so that only his “friends” could see them, and that after the May 21, 2020, Florida Times Union article, they both checked and saw that it was not set to private. Arielle then set Mr. Caggiano’s settings back to private. The School Board called numerous witnesses, including students and parents, who testified about accessing Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook account. None of the student witnesses (including J.N.S.) were students of Mr. Caggiano. Ms. Porak, a parent of students at SHS, testified that neither of her children had Mr. Caggiano for a teacher. The various student and teacher witnesses discussed a number of Mr. Caggiano’s Faceook posts, reposts, and comments, only some of which were contained in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. Impact of Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook Posts After the publishing of the May 21, 2020, Florida Times Union article, school officials, including Ms. Schultz and Dr. Hatcher, testified to receiving numerous complaints. The undersigned received into evidence numerous complaints from parents concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, some of which were included with Mr. Johnson’s investigative report. Some of these parents also testified at the final hearing concerning their complaints and feelings concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook activity. These parents testified that they felt Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts were inappropriate for a teacher. Assistant Principal Motley testified that a total of four students (not including J.N.S.) requested and were transferred out of Mr. Caggiano’s classes during the Spring 2020 semester. Dr. Hatcher testified that after the Duval County Public Schools removed Mr. Caggiano from SHS, it took part of the Fall 2020/2021 semester to hire a full-time replacement teacher. During that semester, several substitute teachers taught what would have been Mr. Caggiano’s math classes before SHS hired a full time teacher. Ms. Brennan testified that Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts impacted J.N.S. negatively. Ms. Brennan did not perform a psychological assessment of J.N.S.; the School Board requested that Ms. Brennan provide emotional support to J.N.S. during her preparation as a witness in this matter in March 2021—more than a year after J.N.S. testified that she read Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts. Ms. Brennan testified that J.N.S. has experienced symptoms of depression. She also testified that J.N.S.— previously an A-B student her freshman year, and who had few absences her sophomore year—had approximately 345 separate class absences from school her junior year and was retained. Mr. Caggiano’s Explanation Mr. Caggiano admitted to having authored the Facebook posts, reposts, and comments that are contained in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence and detailed in paragraph 29 above. Mr. Caggiano testified that his daughter Arielle “did everything” in setting up his Facebook account, to ensure that his settings were private so that only people he accepted as “friends” could see his posts, reposts, and comments. He further stated that, for the approximately 10 years after establishing his Facebook account, he believed his settings were private. After learning in 2019/2020 that members of the public could view his Facebook account, he again asked Arielle to ensure that it was private. Mr. Caggiano believes his Facebook account was “hacked.” He testified that he believed it to be set to private, and after learning otherwise, “fixed” it. Then, he found it was “public” again. As there was no additional testimony or evidence concerning whether Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook account was hacked, the undersigned does not credit this explanation. Mr. Caggiano testified about the seven posts, reposts, or comments that are the subject of the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence and detailed in paragraph 29 above. Mr. Caggiano did not express any regret in making any of these Facebook posts, reposts, or comments. With respect to Mr. Caggiano’s repost from a Facebook entity called “Messenger of Liberty,” which states, in part, “My son is taking part in a social experiment[,]” Mr. Caggiano testified that “it’s funny. All my posts were either political commentary, social commentary, or adult humor. And that’s funny. Okay. So for somebody to look at that and not giggle at least, you know, I don’t think you know what funny is. That’s funny.” This particular repost states that, after his son wears a “Bernie” t-shirt, “[s]o far he’s been spit on, punched and had a bottle thrown at him.” Although Mr. Caggiano testified that he believed this to be “funny,” the undersigned finds that it also could be logically read to encourage violence against a child. With respect to Mr. Caggiano’s repost from another individual, which appears to be a “screen grab” from a Fox News segment, which states, at the top, “MAN AND WOMAN,” and which then states: “A man goes home and masturbates his typical fantasy. A woman on her knees, a woman tied up, a woman abused. A woman enjoys intercourse with her man—she fantasizes being raped by 3 men simultaneously…[,]” and which attributes this quote to Bernie Sanders, sometime in the 1970’s (the exhibit copy is unclear), Mr. Caggiano testified that it was not his opinion, but that he was quoting Bernie Sanders, and that “people should know somebody who’s a sitting senator, twice presidential candidate, former mayor of New York City, has this sort of mentality.” On cross-examination, when asked if “women, teenage girls, could be offended by this post[,]” Mr. Caggiano testified, “I think everybody should be offended by this.” The undersigned finds that despite Mr. Caggiano’s belief that his post makes an important point about Bernie Sanders, the undersigned finds that it can be logically read to be patently offensive, discriminatory, and degrading to women. Mr. Caggiano’s own testimony confirms this. The undersigned finds that the remaining posts, reposts, or comments, can be fairly characterized as political memes that, depending on the viewpoint of the reader, could be characterized as crude political commentary, passionate advocacy, or humor. While these postings, which are generally consistent with a conservative ideology, might not originate from more traditionally respected sources like the National Review or the opinion page of the Wall Street Journal, they are the type of abrasive political speech that one regularly finds in social media. In particular, with respect to Mr. Caggiano’s repost of the meme entitled “Crazy but TRUE,” and the article from an entity called “Lifesitenews.com,” with a headline that states, “Teen girls stage school walkout to protest boys in their bathroom who claim to be ‘girls’”; and to which Mr. Caggiano commented, “Love it! About time people stood up to this insanity[,]” the undersigned cannot find that these reposts, or Mr. Caggiano’s comments, are related to, or in retaliation to, his email interaction with J.N.S. concerning the use of pronouns, or his subsequent counselling on the subject. Mr. Caggiano testified of his concern about men using a women’s restroom which, while counter to the policy of the Duval County Public Schools, does not on its face appear to be the type of bullying, harassing, or retaliating prohibited in applicable laws, rules, and policies. Ultimate Findings of Fact Mr. Caggiano created seven posts, reposts, and comments to posts on his personal Facebook account, which are more fully described in paragraph 29 above. Mr. Caggiano contends that he never intended to share these posts, reposts, and comments publicly, and more specifically, to the SHS community. Mr. Caggiano contends that his Facebook account was hacked, which caused all of his Facebook activity to become public. The undersigned finds that Mr. Caggiano’s explanation is not credible, as he testified that he had several SHS teachers as “friends,” and as he did not check his Facebook settings for approximately 10 years, before the Duval County Public Schools, and the SHS community, became aware of the seven posts, reposts, and comments. The undersigned finds that Mr. Caggiano posted, reposted, and commented on Facebook on his personal account, and shared them in a manner that did not ensure that they remain private. Ultimately, Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, reposts, and comments described in paragraph 29 made their way into the public sphere, and students, parents, Duval County Public Schools personnel, and the media viewed and became aware of them. The undersigned finds that two of the alleged posts, reposts, and comments—entitled “My son is taking part in an experiment,” and “MAN AND WOMAN”—warrant further findings that include violations of statutes, rules, and policies enunciated in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. The undersigned does not make such findings with respect to the remaining five posts, reposts, and comments contained in the Amended Step III Progressive discipline correspondence. Accordingly, the following ultimate findings of fact below apply only to the two posts previously mentioned. The two posts at issue concern violence and abuse of a child, as well as discriminatory and degrading views of women being abused and raped. Mr. Caggiano candidly admitted that the post concerning women was offensive. The undersigned finds that these particular posts violate some of the governing laws, rules, and policies alleged in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(1)(b), because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to exercise best professional judgment and integrity. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b). Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(1)(c), because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to maintain the respect and confidence of his colleagues, students, and parents, and failed to sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)1., because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to make reasonable effort to protect students from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the students’ mental and/or physical health and/or safety. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rules 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)5., because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he intentionally exposed students to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(b)1., because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to take reasonable precautions to distinguish between personal views and those of any educational institution or organization with which he is affiliated. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-5.056(1), which concerns “immorality,” because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his actions constituted immorality, which is “conduct that brings the individual concerned or the education profession into public disgrace or disrespect and impairs the individual’s service in the community.” Mr. Caggiano violated Duval County School Board Policy 10.10(IV)(A), because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he engaged in conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual because of his/her actual or perceived identity with regard to gender. The undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish, bya preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Caggiano violated section 1006.147(2), which prohibits bullying and harassment. The undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)6. (“Shall not intentionally violate or deny a student’s legal rights.”), or rule 6A-10.081(2)(c)1. (“Shall maintain honestly in all professional dealings.”). The undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish other alleged violations of Duval County School Board Policy, including bullying or retaliation. The School Board established, with respect to the two aforementioned Facebook posts, that Mr. Caggiano’s conduct constituted “potential harm to the physical and mental wellbeing of a student, or students[,]” and “behavior that impairs the employee’s effectiveness in performing her/his duties, professionalism, and confidence in the eyes of the students and parents/guardians[,]” and thus, under article V, section C, subsections 9 and 10 of the CBA, it was not required to follow the steps of progressive discipline, and had just cause to reprimand (Step II) and suspend without pay (Step III) Mr. Caggiano, and require him to complete a course in Culture Diversity. However, because the undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish that the remaining Facebook posts violated governing laws, statutes, rules or polices, and because the undersigned further finds that the School Board did not establish that the posts constituted bullying or retaliation, the undersigned finds that a reduction in the proposed discipline is warranted.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Derrel Q. Chatmon, Esquire Office of General Counsel City of Jacksonville Suite 480 117 West Duval Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202 For Respondent: Kelly B. Mathis, Esquire Mathis Law Firm 3577 Cardinal Point Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32257
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the School Board of Duval County enter a final order that: (1) finds that Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A- 5.056(1) and (2)(b); rule 6A-10.081(1)(b), (c), (2)(a)1., (2)(a)5., and (2)(b)1.; and Duval County School Board Policy 10.10(IV)(A) for two public Facebook posts or reposts associated with his Facebook account; (2) finds that Mr. Caggiano did not violate section 1006.147(2), rules 6A-10.081(2)(a)6. or 6A- 10.081(2)(c)1., or any remaining portions of Duval County School Board Policy 10.10(IV); (3) issues a written reprimand; (4) suspends Mr. Caggiano, without pay, for three days; and (5) requires Mr. Caggiano to complete a course in Culture Diversity. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2021. Derrel Q. Chatmon, Esquire Office of General Counsel City of Jacksonville Suite 480 117 West Duval Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Anastasios Kamoutsas, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Diana Greene, Superintendent Duval County School Board 1701 Prudential Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207-8152 Kelly B. Mathis, Esquire Mathis Law Firm 3577 Cardinal Point Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32257 Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent, Jean M. Hovey, willfully violated Subsection 106.143(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), as alleged in the Order of Probable Cause dated August 26, 2009, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Facts are made: Respondent was a candidate for Winter Springs, Florida, city commission in 2008. Respondent was a first-time candidate for public office. She evidenced her decision to enter the city commission race by qualifying on August 28, 2008, one day prior to the deadline to qualify. A component of qualifying is the candidate's assertion that they have read and understand the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. As a result of her late filing, Respondent had only five or six weeks to actively campaign. Responding to the advice of volunteer advisors, on September 4, 2009, Respondent hired Denise Ryser to manage her campaign. Ms. Ryser had previously managed a successful city commission race and was managing two other Winter Springs city commission races. Ms. Ryser was qualified to manage a city commission campaign. Ms. Ryser's initial focus was to prepare a campaign mailer. It was important that the mailer be presented to the voters as quickly as possible. Respondent provided the biographical information for the mailer; Ms. Ryser did the graphics, layout, color selection, and the "marketing" of the mailer. Several layouts/mock-ups of the mailer were prepared by Ms. Ryser and submitted to Respondent for approval. Each layout/mock-up submitted to Respondent contained the statutorily-mandated disclaimer. Subsection 106.143(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that: Any political advertisement that is paid for by a candidate and that is published, displayed, or circulated prior to, or on the day of, any election must prominently state: "Political advertisement paid for and approved by (name of candidate), (party affiliation), for (office sought)." After Respondent finally approved what she believed to be the final layout/mock-up, Ms. Ryser, on September 19, 2008, electronically forwarded a layout/mock-up to a printer in Miami. Inexplicably, the layout/mock-up forwarded by Ms. Ryser did not contain the statutorily-mandated disclaimer. This failure was attributed to a transmission error. Because Ms. Ryser perceived a need for "handouts" to be distributed by Respondent at personal appearances, Ms. Ryser, on the same day, September 19, 2008, ordered 100 additional mailers from a local printer. These mailers contained the statutorily- mandated disclaimer. When the Miami printer returned the mailers to Ms. Ryser, without further examining the mailers, she took them directly to a "mail-house" in Winter Park, Florida, to be mailed to 11,000 registered Winter Springs, Florida, voters. They were mailed on October 2, 2008. Respondent did not receive a mailer, as she was not on the mailing list. Ms. Ryser received a mailer at her home on Saturday, October 3, 2008. It was not until Sunday, October 4, 2008, that she noticed the absence of the statutorily-mandated disclaimer. Ms. Ryser immediately called Michael Ertel, Seminole County, Florida, supervisor of elections, and advised him of the error. Mr. Ertel did not testify. However, the parties stipulated that he would have testified that he advised Ms. Ryser to remail the mailer with the proper disclaimer and destroy the remaining mailers without the disclaimer. On Monday, October 6, 2008, Ms. Ryser discarded the mailers in her possession. At Ms. Ryser's direction and paid for by her, the mail-house printed the appropriate disclaimer on the remaining 3,000 mailers in its possession and mailed them to voters. On Tuesday, October 7, 2008, Respondent attended a candidates' night at Highland's in Winter Springs, and mailers were available to the public at this event. Unrefuted testimony indicates that Respondent's mailers, without the statutorily- mandated disclaimer, were available to the public at this meeting. Respondent did not learn that the mailers did not have the statutorily-mandated disclaimer until October 8, 2008, when she and her volunteer campaign advisors confronted Ms. Ryser about the error. Ms. Ryser acknowledged that the failure to include the statutorily-mandated disclaimer was her error and that Respondent was unaware of the error until October 8, 2008.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the provisions of Section 104.051(2), Florida Statutes (2002), by willfully neglecting to perform her duties as alleged in the 55-count Order of Probable Cause and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.1
Findings Of Fact THE PARTIES Petitioner is created by Section 106.24, Florida Statutes, and has the authority conferred upon it by the Florida Election Code. Respondent was elected as the Broward County SOE in November 2000. She was sworn into office in January 2001. Respondent was serving as the Broward County SOE for the 2002 Primary. Respondent was suspended from office by Governor Jeb Bush in November 2003. At the time of the final hearing in this proceeding, Respondent was not working, had little equity in any asset, and owed money to her attorneys and to various credit card companies. She was borrowing money from relatives to meet monthly expenses. BCSOE OFFICE At the time of the 2002 Primary, the Broward County SOE Office (BCSOE Office) had a main office in the Broward County Governmental Center (BCGC), six regional offices, and a facility referred to as the Voting Equipment Center (VEC). Respondent had her main office in the BCGC. The VEC was essentially a warehouse at which voting equipment and supplies were stored. The six regional offices were spread throughout Broward County. At the time of the 2002 Primary, there were more that 60 full- time employees of the BCSOE Office.3 Walter Foeman served as Respondent’s Deputy SOE for the 2002 Primary. Respondent replaced the employee who had served as the Deputy SOE for Respondent’s predecessor in office. Pat Nesbit served as chief of the Poll Worker’s Department. Ms. Nesbit had the responsibility of recruiting and training poll workers. Ms. Nesbit was a veteran employee of the BCSOE Office of approximately 12 years.4 Mr. Foeman was Ms. Nesbit’s direct supervisor. Barbara Adams was the chief financial officer for the BCSOE Office. Carol Hill was a director in the BCSOE office. Petitioner attempted to establish that Respondent’s management style and her hiring practices created dissension among the employees of the BCSOE Office so that it became a matter of us (the employees from Respondent’s predecessor in office) versus them (the new employees hired by Respondent). That attitude did exist to a degree within the office and was exacerbated by staff turnover, including supervisors who had served Respondent’s predecessor in office. However, Petitioner did not prove that the negative attitude within the office was a contributing factor to the 23 precincts opening late or the 32 precincts that failed to comply with Governor Bush’s Executive Order. As will be demonstrated below, Respondent’s management style of totally relying on staff contributed to the problems with the 2002 Primary that are at issue in this proceeding. PRE-ELECTION PLANNING The 2002 Primary represented a considerable challenge for Respondent, who was relatively inexperienced. As a result of legislative and congressional redistricting, the number of precincts in Broward County went from 619 for the 2000 election to 809 for the 2002 election. For the 2002 election there were approximately 500 polling places throughout the county.5 New touch-screen voting equipment was utilized for the first time in the primary election, which required training of staff and poll workers. That training was conducted. These voting machines replaced the infamous punch card ballots that had been used in the 2000 Presidential election. For the first time provisional ballots were utilized. A provisional ballot would be issued to an individual when his or her name could not be located in the precinct register. The provisional ballot would be counted only if it was subsequently verified that the voter was in the proper precinct. While the use of provisional ballots required training for poll workers, there was no evidence that the use of provisional ballots delayed the opening of any precincts or contributed to any precinct’s failure to comply with Governor Bush’s Executive Order. Each county is divided geographically into voting precincts. Each precinct has its own poll workers, including a precinct clerk and a deputy precinct clerk. For the 2002 Primary (809 precincts and approximately 500 polling places), Respondent’s staff determined that a total of 4,941 precinct poll workers were needed to conduct the election. Poll worker recruitment and training is an essential part of conducting an election. Ms. Nesbit and her department recruited experienced poll workers using a computer data base of poll workers who had worked prior elections and recruited new poll workers at community functions and from business, educational, and governmental entities. There was insufficient evidence to establish that there were too few poll workers recruited or that the poll workers were inadequately trained. The poll workers were provided appropriate checklists and appropriate instructions as to how and when to report for duty. To prepare for the 2002 Primary, weekly staff meetings were held to assess the BCSOE Office’s readiness for the election. On the Friday before the Tuesday election, Respondent met with all the managers in the office. Based on the reports that were provided, Respondent reasonably concluded that the office was ready for the election. The VEC is responsible for putting together a box of supplies that is referred to as the “gray box.” Included in the gray box are various signs, ballots, envelopes, and other supplies that are needed by the poll workers. The VEC is also responsible for placing additional voting materials into what is referred to as the precinct’s “blue bag”. The blue bag contains materials that are essential to the opening of the poll. Among other items, the blue bag contains the poll register (which is a list of the precinct’s eligible voters), the precinct’s Personal Electronic Ballots (which are necessary to activate the precinct’s voting machines), and a checklist (which the precinct clerks are to follow to make sure that the election is properly conducted). The precinct clerk is in charge of the precinct’s polling place the day of the election, but his or her official duties begin the day before election day. The VEC is responsible for arranging delivery of the voting equipment and the gray box to each precinct at its polling place prior to election day. A trucking company was hired for this purpose for the September 2002 primary election. The precinct clerk is responsible for visiting the polling place the day prior to the election to verify that the equipment and the gray box have been delivered. In the gray box is a white form that the precinct clerk is responsible for taking to the regional office when the clerk picks up the blue bag. The precinct clerk uses the form to verify that the correct number of voting machines and all required materials in the gray box have been delivered to the precinct’s polling place. The precinct clerk also verifies that he or she will be able to open the facility on election day. The VEC is responsible for delivering all blue bags to the appropriate regional site. The precinct clerk is responsible for going to the appropriate regional site to pick up the blue bag the day before the election. The precinct clerk must empty the contents of the blue bag while at the regional center and, using a checklist, verify in front of a regional office staff person that all items that are required to be in the blue bag have been included. If all items are present, the precinct clerk and a regional center staff worker sign the checklist and the precinct clerk keeps the bag until it is time to open the polls the next morning. Any item missing from the blue bag should be secured before the precinct clerk leaves the regional office or arrangements should be made to deliver the missing item(s) to the polling place the next morning in time for the precinct clerk to open the precinct for voting by 7:00 a.m. Pick up of the blue bags for the 2002 Primary was to be between 1:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. for one regional center and between 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. at the other regional centers on the day before the election. The precinct clerk is responsible for opening and closing the poll and for overseeing the vote while the poll is open. The assistant precinct clerk performs the clerk’s duties if the clerk is absent or unable to perform his or her duties. The assistant clerk also answers the phone, deals with the public, and generally assists in the conduct of the election. CANCELLATIONS BY PRECINCT CLERKS On Friday, September 6, 2002, Ms. Nesbit learned that some individuals who had agreed to serve as precinct clerks had subsequently declined to serve. Ms. Nesbit made reasonable efforts to replace the precinct clerks who she knew had cancelled as of that Friday. On the day before the 2002 Primary, Ms. Nesbit and her staff spent the day talking to various poll workers about various problems. Ms. Nesbit heard during the day from more than one precinct clerk that there were long waiting lines at the regional centers (up to two hours) and that some precinct clerks had become frustrated and had left without picking up the precinct’s blue bag from the precinct’s regional site. Ms. Nesbit received no communication from any regional site that blue bags were not being picked up by precinct clerks and she did not know that those blue bags were being returned to the VEC until approximately 9:00 p.m. that evening when Damian Robinson, an employee of the BCSOE Office’s outreach department, told her that approximately 50 blue bags had been returned to the VEC because the blue bag had not been picked up at the regional site by a precinct clerk. Mr. Robinson also told her that a fax had been sent to her with a list of the precincts whose blue bag had not been picked up and a list of the precincts whose blue bag was incomplete when it was picked up. Ms. Nesbit had been working all day in an area that was not close to the fax machine and was unaware that the fax had been sent. Ms. Nesbit retrieved the fax, which was not introduced as an exhibit. Ms. Nesbit testified that there were 30 to 35 precincts listed on the fax, but she did not remember the number of precincts on each list. By midnight, there were approximately 15 blue bags at the VEC that had not been picked up. The total number of incomplete bags that had been picked up was not established and it was not established what was missing from each bag. If an essential item, such as a poll register, was missing from a blue bag, the precinct clerk could not open the precinct’s polling place for voting until someone from the BCSOE Office delivered the missing item to the precinct’s polling place. Ms. Nesbit saw Mr. Foeman and Ms. Adams shortly after she saw Mr. Robinson and read the fax. Ms. Nesbit gave the information she had received to Mr. Foeman and Ms. Adams. Ms. Nesbit proposed to Ms. Adams and Mr. Foeman that sufficient staff of the BCSOE Office be called that night and be ordered to appear at the VEC the following morning at 5:00 a.m. for the purpose of delivering each undelivered bag and missing material to the appropriate precinct. Ms. Nesbit contemplated that poll workers (other than the missing precinct clerk) would be present at the polling place and that one of those workers could substitute as the precinct clerk. Ms. Adams informed Ms. Nesbit that they were not going to call BCSOE Office employees at that time of night. As she and Mr. Foeman turned and left Ms. Nesbit, Ms. Adams said to Mr. Foeman: “We’ll take care of this.” Ms. Nesbit received no further instructions from any of her supervisors that night. Respondent returned to her home at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the day before the 2002 Primary. When she left, she knew that some precinct clerks had cancelled, but she relied totally on Ms. Nesbit and four employees under Ms. Nesbit’s supervision, to resolve the problem. Shortly after Respondent returned home, Mr. Riley informed her by telephone that approximately 15 blue bags had been returned to the VEC and that a news reporter had contacted him about the matter. Respondent’s reaction was to try to contact a fellow SOE for advice. After several calls, Respondent spoke with Gertrude Walker, an experienced SOE from St. Lucie County, Florida. After Respondent told her about the undelivered blue bags, Ms. Walker told Respondent that she had a serious problem and that she should immediately make arrangements to have staff available to deliver the blue bags to the appropriate precinct and to make sure the precinct opened on time. The telephone call between Respondent and Ms. Walker occurred around midnight on the eve of the election. Ms. Walker specifically advised Respondent to wake staff up and have them ready for action the next morning. Respondent knew about the problems with the undelivered bags for almost three hours before she talked to Ms. Walker. Why Respondent felt the need to verify with another SOE that the undelivered blue bags constituted a serious problem was not clear. Why she did not follow Ms. Walker’s advice was also not clear.6 Instead, Respondent tried to contact Mr. Foeman at his office and at his home. When she could not reach him, she left a voice message ordering him to make sure that all precincts opened on time. There was no evidence that Respondent talked to Ms. Adams or Ms. Nesbit that evening. Ms. Adams called Linda Levinson, the BCSOE Office Assistant Director of Finance and Administration, at 4:00 a.m. the morning of the 2002 Primary and ordered her to report to the VEC immediately. Ms. Adams was Ms. Levinson’s direct supervisor. As will be discussed below, Ms. Levinson helped deliver blue bags to precincts that morning. POLLS MUST OPEN AT 7:00 A.M. Section 100.011(1), Florida Statutes, regulates the opening and closing times for polls as follows: The polls shall be open at the voting places at 7:00 a.m. on the day of the election, and shall be kept open until 7:00 p.m., of the same day, and the time shall be regulated by the customary time in standard use in the county seat of the locality. Respondent knew that polls had to be open at 7:00 a.m. on the day of the election. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER On September 10, 2002, Governor Bush entered the following Executive Order Number 02-248: WHEREAS, today, September 10, 2002, is the regularly-scheduled date for the conduct of primary elections throughout the state; and WHEREAS, the Secretary of State has reported to me that there have been substantial delays in the opening of certain polling places in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties; and WHEREAS, today’s election is the first time that many election officials will have had an opportunity to implement the major technological and procedural changes mandated by the recent wholesale revision of our state’s election code; and WHEREAS, under this unique combination of circumstances, there is a possibility that certain residents of our state could be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to vote and that certain election officials will be unable to conduct an orderly election; and WHEREAS, in light of the above-described conditions and in an abundance of caution, the Secretary of State has requested that I order that polling places throughout the state remain open for an additional two hours beyond their regularly-scheduled closing times; and WHEREAS, the Secretary of State has made the request after consultation with the Attorney General of Florida, the President of the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections, and the chairmen of the Florida Republican and Democratic parties; NOW, THEREFORE, I JEB BUSH, as Governor of Florida, by virtue of the authority vested in me by Article IV, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution, by the Florida Elections Emergency Act, and by all other applicable laws, do hereby promulgate the following Executive Order, to take immediate effect: I hereby declare that, based on the above- described conditions, a state of emergency exists. In order to ensure maximum citizen participation in the electoral process and to protect the integrity of the electoral process, for today’s election all polling places in the state shall remain open for two hours beyond their regularly scheduled closing times. FACTS DEEMED ADMITTED7 A total of 24 precincts in Broward County failed to open by 7:00 a.m. on September 10, 2002. In the list that follows, the precinct number is followed by the time that morning that precinct actually opened with the exception of precinct 5K, whose opening time was unknown. The following list contains 23 precincts, with each listed in the order in which it appears as a separate count in the Petitioner’s Order of Probable Cause. In addition to the precincts listed below, Precinct 13D opened five minutes late. Precinct 13D is not included in the following list because no count in Petitioner’s Order of Probable Cause was based on the failure of that precinct to open at 7:00 a.m. Precinct 50C (8:00 a.m.) Precinct 10D (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 11D (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 5E (7:20 a.m.) Precinct 7E (8:45 a.m.) Precinct 3F (8:30 a.m.) Precinct 5K (unknown) Precinct 15K (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 9M (9:15 a.m.) Precinct 31N (7:55 a.m.) Precinct 38N (7:55 a.m.) Precinct 10R (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 18V (10:00 a.m.) Precinct 23V (8:00 a.m.) Precinct 11W (10:00 a.m.) Precinct 21X (7:15 a.m.) Precinct 22X (9:00 a.m.) Precinct 23X (7:10 a.m.) Precinct 32X (12:20 p.m.) Precinct 37X (8:30 a.m.) Precinct 62X (11:00 a.m.) Precinct 63X (8:30 a.m.) Precinct 65X (11:00 a.m.) The following 32 Broward County precincts failed to comply with Executive Order Number 02-248 by failing to remain open for two hours beyond their regularly scheduled closing time of 7:00 p.m. on September 10, 2002: 13A, 17A, 19C, 22C, 24C, 21E, 1G, 3G, 6G, 11J, 19J, 24J, 15L, 16L, 27M, 38M, 40N, 51Q, 36R, 75R, 1T, 12T, 7U, 34V, 35V, 36V, 44V, 8W, 12Y, 14Y, 7Z, and 23J. These precincts are listed in the order they appear in Counts 24-55 of the Order of Probable Cause. In addition to the foregoing, the following facts were deemed admitted based on Respondent’s failure to respond to Petitioner’s First Request for Admissions: Thirteen precincts opened late due to a lack of election supplies and the remainder opened late due to a lack of personnel. Because of delays in opening the polls in Broward and one other county on September 10, 2002, Governor Bush issued Executive Order Number 02-248 requiring all polling places in the State of Florida to remain open for an additional two hours beyond their regularly-scheduled closing time or until 9:00 p.m. The Broward County SOE Office received Governor Bush’s Executive Order at 3:41 p.m. Miriam Oliphant instructed her staff not to say anything about the Executive Order until she gave further instructions. Respondent, upon receiving the Executive Order at 3:41 p.m., assigned Rick Riley, an independent contractor hired by the SOE’s Office, the task of writing a press release to the person in charge of each precinct. Mr. Riley made the final revisions to the press release at 4:49 p.m. after Walter Foeman completed his last review. It took from 3:41 p.m. until approximately 6:15 p.m. for Miriam Oliphant’s staff and volunteers to begin notifying the [809] precincts.[8] The following problems occurred at various precincts: 19 precincts could not run a zero tape 1 precinct had incorrect time precinct had incorrect date precinct locations were unable to select [political] parties 2 precincts did not have an ADA voting unit 4 precincts did not have a cellular phone 6 precincts did not have registers 23 precinct clerks did not pick up supplies 2 precincts did not receive communication package or activation card BLUE BAG DELIVERY The scene at the VEC was chaotic on the morning of the election with no one, including Respondent, taking charge or attempting to organize the bag delivery in a rational manner. Respondent testified that she panicked that morning because she was very angry with her staff, who she believed had let her down. Shortly before 6:00 a.m., Respondent ordered Mr. Foeman to get the blue bags and other materials delivered without giving further instructions and without devising a rational plan for such delivery. Ms. Levinson delivered three blue bags and opened three precincts in the Pembroke Pines area that morning. She was not instructed where to go and got lost. Ms. Levinson opened her last precinct around noon on the day of the election. Mr. Riley was recruited to deliver blue bags. He could not testify to how many he delivered, where he delivered them, or when he delivered them. He could not testify that the precincts to which he delivered opened by 7:00 a.m. Respondent delivered blue bags that morning. She was in a van with her driver, Mike Lindsay (a representative of the Department of State, Division of Elections), Respondent’s attorney, and Jimmy Davis (an employee of BCSOE Office outreach program). Respondent’s group did not deliver the last blue bag until shortly after noon on the day of the election. There was no evidence as to whether the other three blue bags were delivered in time for the precincts to open at 7:00 a.m. Respondent’s group had difficulty locating at least one precinct. Respondent could not testify whether her group had a map or accurate driving directions to each precinct. Michelle Feinberg was a precinct clerk for a precinct in Plantation for the 2002 Primary. When Ms. Feinberg picked up her precinct’s blue bag from the regional center the day before the election she inventoried the bag and discovered that it lacked essential voting material (including the precinct register). Staff at the regional center told her that the missing material would be delivered to her precinct in time for her to timely open the poll. That voting material was not delivered to the precinct on the morning of the election in time for the precinct to open by 7:00 a.m. The poll opened approximately 30 minutes late because the voting materials were not delivered on time. There was insufficient evidence to identify the other employees who delivered blue bags and other materials to the various precincts. Respondent knew shortly after 9:00 p.m. on September 9, 2002, that approximately 15 blue bags had not been picked up by the precinct clerk. She knew that the precinct could not open without the blue bag. She also should have suspected that each precinct clerk who failed to pick up the precinct’s blue bag would likely not show up for duty the next day. Respondent knew that she was mandated by statute to open all precincts for voting at 7:00 a.m. the next day. After learning of the problem with the blue bags, Respondent failed to take reasonable action either the evening before the election or the morning of the election to ensure that each blue bag and other required voting material would be delivered to the appropriate precinct. Likewise, she failed to take reasonable action either the evening before the election or the morning of the election to ensure that the precincts whose clerk had not picked up the precinct’s blue bag the day prior to the election would be staffed with a precinct clerk. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE EXECUTIVE ORDER The BCSOE Office received Governor Bush’s Executive Order 02-248 at 3:41 p.m. on the day of the election. Respondent immediately instructed Mr. Riley to prepare a memorandum to the poll workers pertaining to the extended hours for the polls and basic instructions on how to close the polls. Respondent further instructed her staff not to call precincts until they had the memorandum. Mr. Riley made the last revision of the memorandum at 4:49 p.m. It was not until 6:04 p.m. that Respondent gave the memorandum to Ms. Nesbit and instructed her and assigned staff to read the memorandum to each precinct clerk. The following is the memorandum (Memorandum): Due to delays in the opening of certain polls, voting for the September 10, 2002, primary election has been extended by Governor Jeb Bush, for all polling locations throughout the State of Florida (pursuant to Executive Order 02-248), for an additional two hours beyond their regularly-scheduled closing time, from 7 pm till 9 pm. After 7 pm the following voting procedures will be in effect. When the Personal Electronic Ballots (PEB) is [sic] inserted, the herein below listed questions will appear: Close menu options, follow the sequence below. Close terminal Lock terminal Press no For each voter after 7 pm, and until 9 pm the poll worker that is activating the ballot shall press the box designated for no, and the ballot page will appear. Please due (sic) not press the close terminal until 9 pm. All terminals should be closed using the green master Personal Electronic Ballot (PEB) at 9 pm. Carol Hill and her staff were responsible for copying the Memorandum and for dividing the precincts into call lists. Each participating staff member was given a copy of the Memorandum and a list of precincts with telephone numbers to call. It took approximately ten minutes for Carol Hill’s staff to copy the memorandum and to make the calling assignments. Errors were made while making the calling assignments. Some of the precincts were on the calling lists more than once while other precincts were omitted. As a result, some precincts received two calls from staff while others received none. After approving the contents of the Memorandum, Respondent had no further involvement with advising the 809 precincts that the Governor had extended the voting day by two hours. Respondent did not participate in the actual calling of the precincts or in making the call assignments. Respondent testified that she did not know that some polls had closed at 7:00 p.m. until the next day. There was no rational explanation for the time that elapsed from the time the BCSOE Office received the Executive Order (3:41 p.m.) until the time staff began contacting poll workers (6:15 p.m.). Respondent knew that she was responsible for ensuring that all precincts complied with the Executive Order. Respondent abdicated that responsibility to her staff without providing any oversight. Petitioner established that some of the 32 precincts that failed to comply with the Executive Order did so because the precinct clerk was not notified of the Executive Order, despite having an operable telephone.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order that finds Respondent guilty of two violations of Section 104.051(2), Florida Statutes, and imposes against her an administrative fine in the total amount of $2,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Lydia Miller, ran for election to the Hillsborough County Commission, District 4, in 1992. It was her first campaign for election to public office. She declared her candidacy in September, 1991, and appointed her husband as her campaign treasurer and herself as deputy campaign treasurer. She ran as a Republican and had several Republican opponents in the primary. She did not have the backing of the Republican Party and had difficulty attracting financial support, especially at first. Of necessity, she ran a "grass roots" campaign and spent countless hours going door-to-door in her district asking for support and, when possible, making public appearances. She also tried to capitalize on the "grass roots" nature of her campaign. Trying to emulate a campaign technique that worked for Governor Lawton Chiles, she pledged that she would not accept financial contributions in excess of $100 (versus the $500 statutory maximum) and would not accept financial contributions (or endorsements) from "special interests." To substantiate the strength of her "grass roots" campaign, the Respondent saw value in her campaign treasurer's reports showing as large a number of relatively small contributions from individuals. In all, the Respondent raised less than $14,000. Yet, she was able to survive the first primary, win the second primary, and beat her Democrat opponent in the general election. Cash Not Deposited or Reported The Respondent admitted that she accepted a $20 cash contribution from Irene Herring and put it in her campaign's petty cash without reporting it in her campaign treasurer's reports. Herring made two other cash contributions to the Respondent's campaign- -one in the amount of $20 and another in the amount of $30. Neither contribution was reported. Both contributions were given to Susie Farmer, a campaign worker. Similarly, David Gill contributed between $50 and $100 cash to the Respondent's campaign, but the contribution was not reported. This contribution also was given to Susie Farmer. The Respondent denied specific knowledge of the two other cash contributions from Herring and the cash contribution from Gill. The only evidence which could support a finding that the Respondent knew of them was testimony of Larry Sweat, an aide the Respondent hired after her election but fired three months later. From an evaluation of the testimony of the Respondent and Sweat, taking into account all of the relevant evidence as well as their demeanor and overall credibility, and it is found that Sweat's testimony was not sufficient to overcome the Respondenet's denials by a preponderance of the evidence. By her own admission, however, it would not have been unusual for the Respondent to use small cash contributions (or allow and approve their use) to replenish her campaign's petty cash without reporting them in her campaign treasurer's reports. It certainly is possible that the other two cash contributions from Herring and the cash contribution from Gill were handled in that manner. The Respondent was aware that all contributions had to be deposited in her campaign account and reported in her campaign treasurer's report. Yet, for reasons not fully explained in her testimony, the Respondent also thought that it was permissible to use small cash contributions to replenish her campaign's petty cash. It is possible that the Respondent misread or misunderstood the election campaign financing laws dealing with petty cash and the reporting of expenditures from petty cash. See Conclusions of Law 79 through 81, below. The Respondent certainly was not handling the small cash contributions that way to "beef up" her campaign treasurer's reports. Cash Deposited and Reported But Donor Allegedly Unknown The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports show the following cash contributions: $100 from Phillip Preston on August 17, 1992 $ 90 from Robert Preston on August 17, 1992 $100 from Kelley Preston on August 22, 1992 Robert, Kelley, and Phillip are the minor children of Allen and Rosina Preston, aged 16, 4, and 2. It is possible but improbable that Robert donated $100 of his own cash to the Respondent's campaign; it is all but impossible that Kelley or Phillip did. The Prestons were supporters of the Respondent and contributors to her campaign. The Respondent's Sun City Center campaign headquarters was in office space donated by Allen Preston. The offices of Preston's business also was in the same building. Allen Preston often visited the campaign headquarters and helped with the campaign, in addition to his financial contributions. Yet, Preston denied donating $290 cash in the names of his children. Preston does not think his wife would have done so without telling him, but his wife did not testify. The Respondent denies any specific knowledge concerning the $290 in cash contributions attributed to the Preston children. But it would not have been unusual for Susie Farmer or other campaign workers to leave cash contributions with "Post-It" notes attached to identify the donors. The campaign treasurer's reports normally would be prepared using the information on the "Post-It" notes. Especially in the days leading up to the three elections, the campaign headquarters became hectic and confused, and it is possible that incorrect information inadvertently was placed on the "Post-It" notes for these cash contributions. When the Respondent saw cash contributions from the Preston children in preparing or reviewing reports, she would not have questioned the accuracy of the information. She would have assumed that the Prestons had made the donations in the names of their children. She did not think there was anything wrong with adults making campaign contributions in the names of their minor children. She denies intentionally misreporting the contributions in order to hide contributions from Allen and Rosina Preston, or their businesses, or artificially to "beef up" the number of small contributions reflected in her campaign treasurer's reports. The evidence was not sufficient to overcome the Respondenet's denials by a preponderance of the evidence. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also show a $25 cash contribution from Evelyn Ackerman on October 14, 1992. The parties stipulated in their Joint Prehearing Stipulation that Ackerman is an elderly woman on a fixed income and that Ackerman denies making the contribution. But the Respondent has a specific recollection that Ackerman offered the contribution, that the Respondent tried to decline in view of Ackerman's meager financial means, and that Ackerman insisted. It is found that the Respondent's testimony outweighs the statements from Ackerman, who has been know to hallucinate and whose memory may not be trustworthy. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also showed a $100 cash contribution from Henry Farmer on October 18, 1992. Henry Farmer denies making the contribution and does not believe that his wife, Susie, would have donated $100 cash in his name without telling him. Susie did not testify, but she was an enthusiastic supporter, campaign worker and fund-raiser for the Respondent's campaign, and it certainly is possible that she donated the cash in her husband's name without his knowing it. Regardless of the actual source of the cash, the Respondent testified to her recollection of seeing a $100 cash contribution with a "Post-It" notes attached indicating that it was from Henry Farmer. She indicated that she had no reason to think it was not a contribution from Susie's husband, and it would not have been unreasonable for the Respondent to believe, without question, that the information on the "Post-It" note was accurate. The evidence was not sufficient to overcome the Respondent's testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent knew her campaign treasurer's report of the $100 cash contribution from Henry Farmer was not accurate. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also showed a $100 cash contribution from Marie Schrag on October 18, 1992. Neither she nor her husband made the contributions. The Respondent did not testify to any specific recollection about the Schrag contribution. But Schrag was Allen Preston's bookkeeper and worked in the same building of Preston's where the Respondent's Sun City Center campaign headquarters was. Although she was not an active campaign worker for the Respondent, she did type one letter for the campaign, and her husband stuffed envelopes for the campaign on at least one occasion. In addition, she had been friends with Susie Farmer, one of the Respondent's most successful fund-raiser, for over 20 years. If the Respondent saw a $100 cash contribution with a "Post-It" notes attached indicating that it was from Marie Schrag, she would have had no reason not to believe, without question, that the information on the "Post-It" note was accurate. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent knew her campaign treasurer's report of the $100 cash contribution from Marie Schrag was not accurate. Alleged Business Contributions Allegedly Falsely Reported From Individuals The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a June 1, 1992, contribution in the amount of $25 from "Phil Boggs, Occupation (if over $100), Boggs Jewelry," when the check was written on the account of Boggs Jewelry, and signed by Phil R. Boggs. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Boggs contribution was reported. When the Respondent pledged not to take financial contributions or endorsements from "special interests," she did not intend to indicate that she would not accept financial support from any businesses or corporations. (In her mind, "special interests" meant political action committees, not any and all businesses and corporations.) The Respondent does not know Phil Boggs, and Boggs Jewelry had no business before the County Commission during the Respondent's term. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Boggs contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Boggs contribution or make it look like it was coming from Boggs, individually, instead of the business, Boggs Jewelry. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 2, 1992, in the amount of $25 from "Charles Hostetter, Occupation (if over $100), Fisher Beauty Salon," when the check was written on the account of Fisher's Beauty Salon, and signed by Charles Hostetter. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Hostetter contribution was reported. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Hostetter contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Hostetter contribution or make it look like it was coming from Hostetter, individually, instead of the business, Fisher's Beauty Salon. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 22, 1992, in the amount of $25 from "Charles Bingham, Occupation (if over $100), c/o Floral Decor Florist," when the check was written on the account of Floral Decor Florist, and signed by Charles Bingham. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Bingham contribution was reported. Bingham is a personal friend of the Respondent and personally gave the check to the Respondent. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Bingham contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Bingham contribution or make it look like it was coming from Bingham, individually, instead of the business, Floral Decor Florist. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 24, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "John Williams Coppes Kitchen, Occupation (if over $100), Owner," when the check was written on the account of Williams Kitchens & Baths, Inc. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the John Williams contribution was reported. The Respondent knows Williams's business as "John Williams Coppes Kitchens," the name on the business's signage. (Coppes is the name of the brand Williams sells.) The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the John Williams contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the John Williams contribution or make it look like it was coming from Williams, individually, instead of the business, whether known as Williams Kitchens & Baths, Inc., or as John Williams Coppes Kitchens. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on August 16, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "Ann Williams, Guys & Dolls," when the check was written on the account of Guys 'N Dolls of Brandon, Inc., and signed by Ann Williams. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Ann Williams contribution was reported. Ann Williams is the Respondent's regular hairdresser and personally gave the check to the Respondent at the beauty parlor. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Ann Williams contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Ann Williams contribution or make it look like it was coming from Ann Williams, individually, instead of the business, Guys 'N Dolls of Brandon, Inc. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on September 12, 1992, in the amount of $50 from "Martha Simmons, Tropical Fish Farms," when the check was written on the account of Gerald Simmons Tropical Fish Farm, and signed by Martha Simmons. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Simmons contribution was reported. The Simmonses were neighbors of the Farmers. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Simmons contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Simmons contribution or make it look like it was coming from Martha Simmons, individually, instead of the business, Gerald Simmons Tropical Fish Farm. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on September 23, 1992, in the amount of $50 from Tommy Brock, when the check was written on the account of Brock Farms, and signed by Tommy Brock. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Tommy Brock contribution was reported. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Brock contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Brock contribution or make it look like it was coming from Tommy Brock, individually, instead of the business, Brock Farms. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 15, 1992, in the amount of $100 from William Stearns, when the check was written on the account of F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc., and signed by William Stearns. If the Respondent had carefully compared check to the report, she probably should have known that the Stearns contribution was not reported properly. The check arrived in the mail, and there was no reason to think it was not from the F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc. Nonetheless, the Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Stearns contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Stearns contribution or make it look like it was coming from Williams Stearns, individually, instead of the business, F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc. It just as easily could have been a mistake or oversight. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 15, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "William Bishop, c/o L.L. Corporation," when the check was written on the account of Leslie Land Corporation, signed by William Bishop, with the "memo": "William L. Bishop." If she had carefully compared check to the report, the Respondent probably should have known that the Leslie Land Corporation contribution was not reported properly. However, the "memo" on the check indicated "William L. Bishop," and the report gave Bishop's address as "c/o L. L. Corporation." It was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Leslie Land Corporation contribution or make it look like it was coming from William Bishop, individually, instead of the business, Leslie Land Corporation. It is just as possible that the intention was to include all of the information on the check for full disclosure and that the initials "L. L." were used instead of the full name of the Leslie Land Corporation by mistake or oversight, or to compress all of the information into the limited space allotted on the report form. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 22, 1992, in the amount of $100 from the "Bill Kincaid Company," when the check was written on the account of the Kincaid Company, and signed by William F. Kincaid. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Kincaid contribution was reported. All the report did was provide the additional information of Kincaid's first name, along with the company name. It was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Kincaid contribution or make it look like it was coming from Kincaid, individually, instead of from the Kincaid Company. The Respondent also reasonably did not perceive the Kincaid contribution to have come from a "special interest." The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 29, 1992, in the amount of $50 from Kenneth Wetherington, when the check was written on the account of the Morgan and Wetherington Chiropractic, and signed by Kenneth Wetherington. The Respondent did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Wetherington contribution was reported. She thought that a chiropractor in partnership with other chiropractors acted in his own behalf when making a political contribution, even when writing a partnership check. Although the Respondent probably incorrectly reported this contribution, the Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Wetherington contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Wetherington contribution or make it look like it was not coming from the partnership of Morgan and Wetherington Chiropractic. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 28, 1992, in the amount of $100 from Paul Rozeman, when the check was written on the account of the McCaw Communications of Florida, Inc., and signed by someone other than Rozeman. (The signature was illegible, and it could not be identified through testimony.) However, the check was delivered by Rozeman, who worked in McCaw's local office, and who introduced himself to the Respondent. Although McCaw Communications is a large corporation, the Respondent was not familiar with it and was willing to assume that the contribution was from Rozeman's company and to decided err on the side of using his name. Obviously, her assumption was incorrect, and the report was in error. In any event, the Respondent probably should have known that the contribution was not reported properly. (See Finding of Fact 36, above.) But the evidence did not prove that the Respondent was lying, and that she actually perceived McCaw Communications to be a "special interest," and intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the contribution and make it look like it was coming from Rozeman, individually, instead of from McCaw Communications. In all, the Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports that were admitted in evidence listed 216 separate contributions. ($3,052 in cash and check contributions and $1615.80 of in-kind contributions would have been listed in earlier reports that were not admitted in evidence.) Of the 216 separate contributions, 31 (aside from the ones discussed in paragraphs 15 through 43, above) unambiguously and properly listed the contributions as coming from corporations, businesses or organizations. Contributions Allegedly Over $100 And Falsely Reported As Several $100 Contributions On or about October 5, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $500 check on the account of, and signed by Allen Preston, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being a $100 contribution from each of the five family members: Allen; his wife, Rosina; and their three children, Robert, Kelley, and Phillip. On or about September 3, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $300 check on the account of Aquarius Water Refinery, Inc., and signed by Joe Gaskill, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being a $100 contribution from him, another $100 contribution from his wife, and another $100 contribution from his company, Aquarius Water Refinery, Inc. On or about September 3, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $200 check on the account of Care Animal Hospital, Inc., and signed by Richard Kane, a veterinarian and the corporation's president, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being one $100 contribution from him and another $100 contribution from his corporation. The Respondent did not specifically request that the Preston, Gaskill and Kane contributions be considered and reported as being several contributions of $100. Preston, Gaskill and Kane all were aware of the Respondent's campaign pledge to limit contributions to $100, and it was their desire and intention not to cause the Respondent to violate the pledge. The Respondent did not think it was improper or illegal or inaccurate to reports the Preston, Gaskill and Kane contributions as requested. It appears that the Petitioner has issued an advisory opinion that contributions in excess of the statutory maximum by check drawn on a joint account only can be divided into smaller contributions from more than one account holder if all of the donors sign the check. (The Petitioner's investigator testified to the existence of such an advisory opinion, but none was admitted in evidence at the hearing. The Petitioner attached to its proposed recommended order a copy of what purports to be its advisory opinion on the subject, designated DE 93-10, but technically the advisory opinion still is not in evidence in this case.) But there is no evidence that the advisory opinion was furnished to the Respondent or that she was aware of it. If the Respondent were aware of the advisory opinion, she should at least have been on notice to inquire whether it was permissible to report the contributions as she did. But it still would not have been clearly impermissible. Allegedly False Termination Report And Improper Disposition of Surplus Funds The deadline for submission of the Respondent's termination campaign treasurer's report was 90 days after the general election, or Monday, February 1, 1993. As the deadline approached, the Respondent reasonably thought she needed two things in order to file the termination report: first, the January, 1993, bank statement on the campaign account; and, second, the resolution of a dispute she had with the phone company (GTE of Florida, Inc., or GTE) about charges on bills she received after having the campaign headquarters phone disconnected. On the weekend before the termination report was due, the Respondent attempted to obtain the bank statement but was told that it just had been put in the mail and could not be regenerated by the bank's computer at that time. The bank personnel advised the Respondent to wait until the statement arrived in the mail. Without the bank statement, the Respondent reasonably could not prepare the termination report before the deadline. She asked officials at the local elections supervisor's office for advice and was told to write a note explaining the reasons why she could not meet the deadline. She wrote a note dated February 1, 1993, stating that she "could not report on the closing of my campaign account until I received the final Banking Statement." It is found that the note was truthful and that she did not have the January, 1993, bank statement at the time she wrote it. Testimony from Larry Sweat to the effect that the Respondent came into her office that day and gave him the bank statement to hide in a drawer is rejected as false or mistaken. The Respondent did not receive the bank statement in the mail until later that week. It is possible, as testified by Sweat, that he and the Respondent had a discussion to the effect that it was to the Respondent's advantage that her termination report would not be available for public scrutiny on the deadline, along with the reports of other candidates (assuming they were filed on time). But it is as likely, or more likely, that Sweat thought of the fortuitous side- benefit of filing late. In any event, it is found that the Respondent did not intentionally file late in order to reap the perceived side-benefit that might have been discussed. It is possible that, when the January, 1993, bank statement was received in the mail, the Respondent brought it into the office and gave it to Sweat to keep in his desk drawer until she was in a position to prepare the termination report. (The dispute with the telephone company still was not resolved.) But it is found that, contrary to Sweat's testimony, the Respondent did not give the bank statement to Sweat to "hide" in his desk drawer. On February 18, 1993, the Respondent filed the termination report. It showed a January 6, 1993, check on the campaign account (check number 1070) in the amount of $88.45, made out to cash. The check memo stated, "petty cash reimbursement," but the report clarified that the cash actually was paid to the Respondent and two others for the purchase of party goods for the celebration of the Respondent's victory in the general election. The February 18, 1993, termination report also showed that a February 16, 1993, check for $48.95 to GTE of Florida (check number 1072) "on account, balance due in dispute" was written on the campaign account on the day of the report. The report also showed a zero balance in the account. Check number 1072 never was presented to the bank, and its whereabouts is not known. The Petitioner contends that check number 1072 and the disputed telephone bill were fabrications to cover the improper disbursement of $48.95 of surplus to the Respondent. But the check just as easily could have been lost or, for some reason, simply not presented to the bank for payment. Besides, as reflected in the following Findings of Fact, the evidence was clear both that there was in fact a dispute regarding the GTE bill and that the $48.95 was not disbursed to the Respondent in February, 1993. The Petitioner presented the GTE telephone records for the Respondent's campaign office telephone account in an apparent attempt to prove that, as of November 10, 1992, there was only a $1.02 balance on the account and that GTE was not pursuing collection of the $1.02. But, while only a $1.02 balance appeared on the campaign telephone account as of November 10, 1992, approximately $154.68 was transferred at that time from the campaign telephone account to the Respondent's personal home telephone account. It was the transferred charges that the Respondent was disputing. For reasons not apparent from the record, on or about December 10, 1992, GTE reduced the balance transferred to the Respondent's home phone bill to $131.37. Apparently, GTE further reduced the transferred balance to $84.09 on December 19, 1992; again, no explanation for the further reduction is apparent. The $84.09 charge remained on the GTE records at least until an entry on one of the records indicating that GTE wrote it off as uncollectible on or about February 12, 1993. Although the records include the notation dated February 12, 1993, indicating that GTE was writing off the $84.09 charge as being uncollectible, the Petitioner did not call a witness from GTE to explain the GTE records, and the records presented at the hearing do not go beyond the February 12, 1993, entry. It is not clear from the records that GTE stopped soliciting payment of the charge at that time. On May 12, 1993, the Respondent filed an amended termination report showing a March 30, 1993, disbursement to the Respondent in the amount of $36.95 for reimbursement for partial payment of the campaign's GTE bill. It also attached a copy of the March 31, 1993, bank statement on the campaign account showing a beginning balance as of March 1, 1993, in the amount of $36.95 and one withdrawal/debit in the same amount during the month, for a zero balance at the end of the month. The Respondent testified that she paid the $84.09 charge in June, 1993. Unfortunately, the Respondent's testimony was not corroborated by any records. But the GTE records presented by the Petitioner did not go beyond February 12, 1993, and without testimony from a witness from GTE, they were insufficient to disprove the Respondent's contention that she paid the charge in June, 1993. If the June, 1993, payment date is correct, the amended termination report filed on or about May 12, 1993, would indicate that the Respondent disbursed the $36.95 balance of the campaign account (representing the $48.95 she thought she had paid to GTE on or about February 16, 1993, less a $12 bank service charge for February, 1993) to herself on or about March 30, 1993, believing that there still was a disputed $84.09 charge to GTE, and that she held the money pending resolution of the disputed charge. When she paid the GTE charge, she considered the March 30, 1993, disbursement to herself to be reimbursement for her payment of the GTE charge. The Respondent knew or should have known that it was improper to disburse surplus from the campaign account to herself, except to reimburse her own contributions to her campaign. But, according to the Respondent's testimony, she did not consider the $36.95 payment to herself to be "surplus" since she considered there to be an outstanding disputed liability to GTE.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent, Lydia Miller. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6612 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. First sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is conclusion of law. 2.-3. Last two sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last two sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (Rather, she complied with the donors' instructions as to the source of the donations and how to report them.) First sentence, rejected as argument. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent willfully filed false reports. As to Ackerman, rejected as not proven that the report was inaccurate. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven that he admitted his wife did not make the contribution. (He said it was possible that she made it but he does not think she did.) Second sentence, rejected as not proven as to Ackerman but otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Third sentence, rejected as not proven that she said Suzie Farmer was responsible; the Respondent admitted to handling the Ackerman contribution and testified that said that someone, quite possibly Farmer, attached an explanatory "Post-It" note to the other cash contributions. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Third, fifth and last sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent willfully made false reports. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. First, sixth penultimate and ultimate sentences, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is rejected as not proven. (A review shows that she usually followed Barr's advice although not in each and every case.) Penultimate sentence, rejected as not proven as to petty cash. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Third sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Penultimate and ultimate sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First and last sentences, ejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First, sixth, seventh and eighth sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven as to petty cash. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. Third paragraph, fourth sentence (that the small size of the individual alleged "masked" cash donations makes the allegation "absurd"), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The point of the Petitioner's argument that a single fairly large cash contribution--which could have been in addition to reported contributions--could have been "masked" by fabricating many small cash contribution.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. Second paragraph, first sentence (that the dispute concerned check #1072), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Third paragraph, first sentence, rejected in part (omission of January, 1993, bank statement as a cause of initial delay) as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and in part (the Respondent's first campaign and the amounts involved) as irrelevant on the issue whether she willfully violated the law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: David R. Westcott, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Elections The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ralph C. Stoddard, Esquire Hampton, Stoddard, Griffin & Runnells 915 Oakfield Drive, Suite F Brandon, Florida 33511 Carlos Alvarez, Chairman Florida Elections Commission Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Based upon the foregoing and in consideration of Pitts' failure to timely respond to Requests for Admissions, the following Findings of Fact are made in this matter: On or about December 12, 2007, J2J filed a form entitled, "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committees and Electioneering Communication Organizations" with the Florida Division of Elections (the "Division"). The form designated Pitts as the chairman and treasurer of J2J. The Division then sent Pitts a letter dated December 14, 2007, providing directions concerning the filing of a Committee Campaign Treasurer's Report ("Report") by J2J in accordance with the campaign financing requirements set forth in chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2007). Pitts received the letter from the Division. By letter dated April 13, 2009, the Division notified Pitts that J2J had failed to file the Report which had been due on April 10, 2009. Pitts received the letter from the Division concerning the overdue Report. The Division sent a follow-up letter to Pitts dated April 27, 2009, concerning the delinquent Report. Pitts received the letter from the Division. As of the date of its Motion for Summary Final Order, the Division had not received the Report from Pitts. J2J is in violation of the campaign financing requirements for political committees in Florida. The Division deems Pitts' failure to file the Report for J2J to be a willful violation of the Florida campaign financing laws.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner, James P. Appleman, "willfully" violated Subsections 106.021(3), 106.07(5), and Section 106.1405, Florida Statutes, as alleged by Respondent, Florida Elections Commission, in its Order of Probable Cause; and whether or not Petitioner, James P. Appleman, "knowingly and willfully" violated Subsections 106.19(1)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes, as alleged by Respondent, Florida Elections Commission, in its Order of Probable Cause.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, documentary evidence, record of proceedings, and the facts agreed to by the parties in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: In 2000, Petitioner was reelected to the office of State Attorney, Fourteenth Judicial Circuit. Prior to his reelection in 2000, Petitioner had been elected to the same office in 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. Petitioner, on February 1, 1999, signed a Statement of Candidate indicating that he had received, read, and understood Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. During the 2000 campaign, Petitioner made the following purchases using his personal funds in the form of cash, check or charge upon his personal credit card: a. Purchase 1: 7/12/99 Down payment/purchase of vehicle- $525.00 b. Purchase 2: 7/12/99 Purchase of vehicle/tax and title-$602.85 c. Purchase 3: 1/07/00 Bay Pointe Properties-$100.35 d. Purchase 4: 1/13/00 Delchamps Liquors-$58.50 e. Purchase 5: 1/22/00 Delchamps Liquors-$135.10 f. Purchase 6: 1/22/00 Cafe? Thirty A-$144.11 g. Purchase 7: 1/30/00 Pineapple Willy's-$17.45 h. Purchase 8: 5/05/00 Skirt/Jones of New York-$104.00- blouse/Jones of New York-$63.00 i. Purchase 9: 5/09/00 Tie/Dillards-$30.00-tie/Dillards- $40.00-misc. Big & Tall/Dillards- $8.75 j. Purchase 10: 5/23/00 Blazer/Polo Store-$199.99-short sleeve shirt/Polo Store-$39.99- short sleeve shirt/Polo Store- $39.99-short sleeve shirt/Polo Store-$39.99-shorts/Polo Store- $29.99 k. Purchase 11: 5/05/00 Casual bottoms/Brooks Brothers- $34.90-casual bottoms/Brooks Brothers-$34.90 casual bottoms/Brooks Brothers-$34.90 l. Purchase 12: 5/05/00 Shorts/Geoffrey Beene-$24.99- shorts/Geoffrey Beene-$24.99 m. Purchase 13: 5/05/00 Sport coat/Dillards-$195.00 n. Purchase 14: Telephone expense-$23.49 o. Purchase 15: 8/11/00 Tie down/Wal-Mart-$19.96-security chain/Wal-Mart-$19.26 p. Purchase 16: 8/11/00 Trailer hitch ball-$16.99 q. Purchase 17: 8/12/00 Event admission-$60.00 r. Purchase 18: 8/23/00 Liquor purchase/Delchamps-$37.41 s. Purchase 19: 8/30/00 Gas purchase/Shop a Snack-$20.00 t. Purchase 20: 8/30/00 Event admission-$40.00 u. Purchase 21: 8/30/00 Event admission/DEC-$15.00 v. Purchase 22: 8/26/00 Sign charge-$20.64 w. Purchase 23: 8/30/00 Auto insurance charge-$100.00 x. Purchase 24: 9/02/00 Gas purchase/Happy Stores-$34.00 y. Purchase 25: 9/02/00 Campaign staff/meal/food-$140.00 z. Purchase 26: 9/04/00 Ice purchase/Winn Dixie-$6.36 aa. Purchase 27: 9/05/00 Gas purchase/Swifty Store-$25.00 bb. Purchase 28: 9/06/00 Meal purchase/ St. Andrews Seafood House-$27.52 cc. Purchase 29: 9/08/00 Posthole digger-$42.90 dd. Purchase 30: 9/08/00 Lunch for sign crew-$20.14 None of these purchases were individually listed on Petitioner's Campaign Treasurer's Reports. Petitioner was reimbursed for each of the above- referenced expenditures by a check written on the campaign account, which was listed as an expenditure on Petitioner's Campaign Treasurer's Reports filed with the Division of Elections as follows: Date Name and Address of Person Receiving Reimbursement Purpose Amount 07-17-99 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 02-11-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 Reimb. Cmpgn. Vehicle Expenses Reimb. Cmpgn. Expenses $1,127.85 $830.81 06-10-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 08-07-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 Reimb. Cmpgn. Expenses Reimburse vehicle & Phone exp. $1,000.00 $400.00 08-30-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 09-08-00 Appleman, Jim PO Box 28116 Panama City, FL 32411 Reimbursement/ Campaign Expense Reimbursement Camp. Expense $670.51 $295.92 On July 18, 2000, a campaign check for $140.99 was written to Winn Dixie. This check was reported on Petitioner's Campaign Treasurer's Report with the purpose listed as being "Campaign Social Supplies." The Winn Dixie purchase included the following items: A cat pan liner. 4 cans of cat food. A box of dryer sheets. A package of kitty litter. f. A jug of laundry detergent. The total cost of these items was $33.88. Petitioner signed all of his Campaign Treasurer's Reports, certifying as to their accuracy. The July 18, 2000, purchases at Winn Dixie were made by Mrs. Appleman, Petitioner's wife, and were a result of an inadvertent error. Immediately realizing that she had purchased personal items with campaign funds, she brought the matter to Petitioner's attention. Petitioner took possession of the Winn Dixie cash register receipt for the purchases; on the receipt he circled the inappropriate purchases with a pen, noted the total amount of inappropriate purchases on the receipt adding his initials, submitted the cash register receipt to his campaign treasurer, and several days later wrote a check reimbursing the campaign for the inappropriate purchases. During the campaign, Petitioner made 30 purchases listed in paragraph 3, supra, with personal funds, i.e., cash, personal check, or personal credit card, for which he provided receipts, and sought and received reimbursement from campaign funds by campaign check. These 30 purchases were not individually reported as expenditures on Campaign Treasurer's Reports during the reporting periods during which the purchases were made, but were reported as reimbursements as reflected in paragraph 4, supra. No evidence was presented that suggested that Purchases 3-7, Purchase 14, Purchases 17-22, or Purchases 24-30 listed in paragraph 3, supra, were not for campaign-related purposes. During the April 1 through June 30, 2000, campaign reporting period, Petitioner purchased 16 items of clothing (listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchases 8-13) for which he received reimbursement from campaign funds by campaign check. Petitioner and his wife testified that these items of clothing were used exclusively for campaign functions and purposes. Admittedly, each of the items of clothing could be used for non- campaign functions and purposes. However, the Campaign Treasurer's Reports reflect that in excess of $1,100 of "campaign shirts" were purchased during the campaign, supporting Petitioner's contention that he, his wife and campaign workers were all attired, while campaigning, in a color-coordinated "uniform of the day": red shirts, and tan/khaki trousers or walking shorts. This is further supported by photographs admitted into evidence. I find credible and accept the testimony of Petitioner and his wife that the items of clothing in the questioned purchases were used exclusively for campaign functions and purposes and not to "defray normal living expenses." During the August 12 through August 31, 2000, campaign reporting period, Petitioner purchased the following items for which he received reimbursement from campaign funds by campaign check: trailer hitch ball, trailer security chain, and sign tie-downs (listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchases 15 and 16). These three items were clearly used for campaign purposes and not to "defray normal living expenses." On August 30, 2001, Petitioner received a campaign check from the campaign treasurer reimbursing him for several campaign expenses he had paid. Among these campaign expenses, Petitioner sought reimbursement for $100 for "auto insurance" (listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchase 23). From the onset of his campaign, Petitioner had consistently either paid his automobile liability insurer, United Services Automobile Association, directly with a campaign check or sought reimbursement for payments he personally made for liability insurance on his personal vehicle or the "campaign Jeep" for automobile liability insurance cost attributable to the use of the motor vehicles in the campaign. Automobile liability insurance expense is a legitimate campaign expense and can reasonably be considered an actual transportation expense exempt from the statutory prohibition against payments made to "defray normal living expenses." On July 12, 1999, Petitioner purchased a 1997 Jeep to be used as a campaign vehicle (the down payment, tax and tag are listed in paragraph 3, supra, as Purchases 1 and 2); thereafter, loan payments to Tyndall Federal Credit Union and automobile liability insurance payments to United Services Automobile Association for the campaign vehicle were paid by the campaign treasury. On December 7, 1999, the 1997 Jeep was sold/traded to a third party for a 1999 Honda which was not used as a campaign vehicle. The Tyndall Federal Credit Union lien was transferred to the 1999 Honda. After December 7, 1999, the 1999 Honda was driven by Petitioner's adult stepdaughter. At the time of the transfer of the vehicles, Petitioner and his wife agreed that she would reimburse the campaign $800 which was determined to be the value lost by the campaign when the 1997 Jeep was traded. Petitioner later determined that he should reimburse the campaign an additional $525, the amount of the down payment paid when the 1997 Jeep was purchased in July 1999. On June 2, 2000, Petitioner's wife tendered a personal check drawn on her personal account to the campaign account for $800, which was reported under an entry date of June 5, 2000, on the Campaign Treasurer's Report for the period ending June 30, 2000, as a "REF" made by Petitioner. On March 14, 2001, Petitioner tendered a personal check to the campaign account for $617. This included $525 for the 1999 Jeep down payment reimbursement and an automobile liability insurance refund. Prior to the June 5, 2000, "REF" entry on the Campaign Treasurer's Report, there had been no report reflecting the sale of the campaign vehicle. The sale of the 1999 Jeep should have been reported on the Campaign Treasurer's Report for the period ending December 31, 1999; it was not. Petitioner certified that he had examined the subject Campaign Treasurer's Report and that it was "true, correct and complete" when, in fact, it was not as it did not reflect the sale of the campaign vehicle or the failure of Petitioner to pay the campaign treasury either $800 or $1,325, the amount Petitioner ultimately determined the campaign treasury should have been reimbursed as reflected by his late reimbursements.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, James P. Appleman, violated Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, on one occasion and Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, on one occasion and assess a civil penalty of $1,000 for the violation of Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, and a civil penalty of $2,400 for violation of Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes; and dismissing the remaining alleged violations of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, against him as asserted in the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: David F. Chester, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello and Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether the Respondents willfully violated Subsections 106.071(1), 106.143(4)(b), and 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, (2003)1 as charged in Counts 5 through 12 of the Florida Elections Commission's Order of Probable Cause.
Findings Of Fact Respondents are Douglas Guetzloe (Guetzloe), an Orlando-based political consultant, and Guetzloe Communications Group Inc., d/b/a, Advantage Consultants, a Florida Corporation (GCG). Guetzloe is president and principal of the firm. Douglas M. Guetzloe has been a political consultant since 1984. GCG has, also, been in existence since 1984. Approximately ten to 20 percent of GCG's business is political consulting. Guetzloe and his wife own 100 percent of the stock in the company. Guetzloe works with all of the clients, and Guetzloe makes 100 percent of the decisions for the business. On or about May 28, 2004, the Commission entered an Order of Probable Cause, in two cases, charging Respondents with four counts of violating Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, for failing to include a proper disclaimer on an independent expenditure; three counts of violating Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, for failing to file independent expenditure reports; four violations of Subsection 106.143(4)(b), Florida Statutes, for failure to include a proper disclaimer on a political advertisement; and one count of violating Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for deliberately failing to report or falsely reporting information required by Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. Respondents denied the allegations and requested a formal hearing. Respondents were denied a formal hearing, but were granted an informal hearing. On December 3, 2004, after an informal hearing, the Commission entered a Final Order finding that Respondents committed the violations alleged in the twelve counts listed in the Order of Probable Cause and imposed a civil penalty of $12,000. Guetzloe appealed the Final Order to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. In its opinion in Guetzloe et. al. v. Florida Elections Commission, 927 So. 2d 942, (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) rev. den. Florida Elections Commission v. Guetzloe, 939 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2006), the Fifth District Court of Appeal found the following facts: In 2003, Guetzloe and GCG paid for political advertisements directed against Darlene Yordan ("Yordan"), a candidate for city commissioner in Daytona Beach. Each of the advertisements contained the words, "Paid political advertisement," and one contained the words, "Pd. Pol. Adv. Paid for personally by Doug Guetzloe, Chairman of Ax the Tax. Ax the Tax is an issues-only political committee and does not make political endorsements." Guetzloe, also, bought air time for two radio advertisements, which urged people to vote against Yordon. Both advertisements provided that they were paid for by "Douglas Guetzloe, Chairman of Ax the Tax," and one stated that Guetzloe had approved the advertisement. Guetzloe failed to provide a written statement informing the radio stations that advertisements had not been approved by any candidate. He also mailed a flyer that supported a number of candidates for public office, including the City Commission, which contained the words "Paid political advertisement, paid for by Doug Guetzloe, independent of any candidate or campaign." Guetzloe did not file an expenditure report with the Daytona Beach City Clerk, but did file a memorandum with the Clerk that listed expenditures of $4,476.80 for radio advertisements, printing, postage, and telephone calls. However, the actual expenditures totaled $9,790.84. Yordan filed multiple complaints claiming that Guetzloe and GCG violated numerous campaign finance laws. Following an investigation, the Commission found probable cause to conclude that Guetzloe and GCG violated section 106.071(1), Florida Statutes (2003) by failing to include disclaimer/disclosure language in the advertisements. Guetzloe requested a formal hearing, but the Commission denied the request after finding that he had failed to identify the facts in dispute. Instead, the Commission set an informal hearing and subsequently entered a final order finding that Guetzloe and GCG violated: Section 106.071(1) by failing to include the proper disclaimer on political advertisements paid for by independent expenditures; Section 106.071(1) by failing to timely file periodic reports of independent expenditures of $100 or more, on three separate occasions; Section 106.143(4)(b) by making independent expenditures for political advertisements submitted to radio stations for distribution and by failing to provide the station with a written statement that no candidate approved of the advertisements; and Section 106.19(1)(c) by writing a memorandum to the clerk reporting expenditures totaling $4,476.80 and by failing to file any report of the actual expenditures of $9,790.84. Id. at 943-944. In its opinion in Guetzloe, supra, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the holding of Petitioner in its Final Order as to the disclaimer language required in Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes. It held that the holdings of the Florida Supreme Court in Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1998) and the U.S. Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) applied to this case. Doe struck the language in the prior version of Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, that required advertisements to display the name and address of the person who paid for the advertisements, save for the words "Paid political advertisement." It held that any provision, which required further identification of the person placing the advertisement was an unconstitutional infringement on free speech. Guetzloe, supra, at 944-45. The Fifth District declined to extend the holding in Doe to include the provisions of Subsection 106.143(4)(b), Florida Statutes. Guetzloe, supra at 945. This resulted in the dismissal of Counts 1 through 4 of the Orders of Probable Cause, which related to the required disclaimer language contained in the last sentence of paragraph one of the statute. When this matter was referred to DOAH, it proceeded on Counts 5 through 12 of the Orders of Probable Cause, specifically on the issue of "willfulness." Guetzloe is a very experienced political consultant. He has run for public office three times. In 1986, Guetzloe was a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives. In 1990, Guetzloe was a candidate for the Florida Senate from District 14. When Guetzloe qualified as a candidate for the Florida Senate in 1986 and 1990, he received a copy of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. Guetzloe is also chairman and treasurer of Ax the Tax, a Florida-registered political committee. Ax the Tax first registered as a local political committee in 1982. It registered again in 1986 and it has been, more or less, active ever since. Guetzloe is the only officer of Ax the Tax, and Guetzloe makes 100 percent of the decisions for Ax the Tax. Guetzloe did not recall what was required to become a political committee at the time he re-registered Ax the Tax as a political committee in 1986. Guetzloe testified he probably checked with the Orange County Supervisor of Elections (SOE), where he filed his paperwork. Guetzloe re-registered Ax the Tax in 2002 with the Orange County SOE. He did not recall receiving any resource materials at that time. He does not recall whether he received a copy of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, or whether he received a copy of the Handbook for Committees, although he may have last received the Candidate Handbook in 2002. Guetzloe received the Department of State Handbook for Committees (Handbook) through the years in connection with Ax the Tax. The Handbook contained information concerning independent expenditures. Guetzloe testified that when he received updates to the handbooks, from time to time, he possibly reviewed them. Guetzloe has never read through the statutes to familiarize himself with the requirements imposed upon candidates for public office or on committees. Guetzloe is aware that the election laws have changed dramatically through the years. Guetzloe has generally kept up with changes in the law relating to political disclaimers through notices sent by the Division of Elections. However, unless there was a notice specifically outlining changes, Guetzloe generally assumed that the law that had been in effect is still in effect. Guetzloe relies on receiving notice in the mail from the Division of Elections to determine if there were any changes to the election laws. Unless he receives such a notice, Guetzloe presumes that there are no changes. Guetzloe does not take affirmative steps on his own to determine if and how Florida's election laws may change from year to year. Over the years, Guetzloe did not contact any of the County SOE's, or local filing officers, to ask if there had been changes in the law, nor did he review the statutes for changes. However, if a question arose that he wanted answered, the Supervisor or the local filing officers would be Guetzloe's point of reference. He availed himself of those resources many times over the years. Guetzloe was involved in the 2003 City of Daytona Beach City Commission race. He made independent expenditures in excess of $100 in a Daytona Beach City Commission race in which Darlene Yordan was a candidate for re-election. Expenditures were paid for by withdrawing funds from GCG's bank account. Other than the City Clerk's Office, Guetzloe did not consult with anyone about these expenditures prior to making them. The decision of where and when to make expenditures was his alone. Guetzloe and GCG did not file an independent expenditure report with the Daytona Beach City Clerk, but did file a memorandum with the Clerk on October 24, 2003, that listed expenditures of $4,476.80. The actual expenditures totaled $9,780.84. Respondents were required to file independent expenditure reports, on forms available from the Division of Elections, with the Daytona Beach City Clerk on October 17, 31, 2003, and a final report was due on February 2, 2004. No report was filed. Guetzloe did not recall how he learned about independent expenditures in Florida. He does not recall whether he knew what an independent expenditure was before he became involved in the 2003 City of Daytona Beach, City Commission election. Guetzloe could not recall, specifically, what was allowed under the statute, only that he had to file a report, if more that $100 was spent for an independent expenditure. He believes he learned this information from the City Clerk's Office. Respondent sent a Fax Memo, on GCG letterhead, to the City Clerk of Daytona Beach, dated October 24, 2003, which stated in pertinent part: To: City Clerk of Daytona Beach From: Doug Guetzloe President Date: October 24, 2003 Subject: Independent expenditures for Daytona Beach Mayor and City Commission Please be advised that in accordance with Section 106.071 Florida Statutes that The Guetzloe Communications Group, Inc., d/b/a Advantage Consultants, 3101 Maguire Blvd., Suite 161, Orlando, Florida 32803 has made an independent expenditure on behalf of various candidates for Daytona Beach Mayor and City commission. These expenditures were made independent of the candidates and without their knowledge, consultation or approval of any candidate or candidate committee. All expenditures were made on or after October 3, 2003 and therefore will be disclosed on the next reporting period with your office. The Guetzloe Communication Group, Inc d/b/a Advantage Consultants has produced two (2) mailings that included printing and postage. In addition, radio advertising has been purchased to support and oppose candidates for Mayor and City Commission. * * * Please advise me if you need any additional information or require any additional forms to be completed. When questioned specifically about the language he used in the memo, Guetzloe opined that the language in the first paragraph of the Fax Memo was provided to him by the City Clerk's Office prior to his sending the Fax Memo to the Daytona Beach City Clerk's Office. Guetzloe did not recall why he used a specific statute number or what he relied upon to determine that he was not required to use some type of form for the statement. Guetzloe never reviewed or looked at the specific language of Section 106.071, Florida Statutes. He relied on the instructions that he stated were provided by the City Clerk's Office. As stated in his October 24, 2003, Fax Memo filed with the City Clerk, Guetzloe knew he made additional independent expenditures, which had not yet been reported. Respondent could not satisfactorily explain why he did not file additional report(s) disclosing expenditures made after submitting his October 24, 2003, Fax Memo other than the fact that he was waiting on the City Clerk's Office to tell him that he was required to do so. Jennifer L. Thomas is the City Clerk of Daytona Beach. Her responsibilities include running the City of Daytona Beach elections. More specifically, she qualifies persons running for office and is the person with whom a candidate would interact when running for public office. Thomas is also the person in the Clerk's Office that registers committees, answers questions about committees, and fields any question regarding independent expenditures from the public. Prior to January 11, 2007, Thomas had never met Guetzloe. Thomas denies having a conversation with Guetzloe during the 2003 election cycle. No one else in the clerk's Office could or would have answered an election-related question from Guetzloe during that time. Independent expenditure report forms were available through the City Clerk's Office and are also available through the Florida Division of Elections website. But for the Fax Memo, Thomas did not receive any type of expenditure or contribution report from Guetzloe during the 2003 election cycle. On or about October 2, 2003, Respondents made political expenditures for political advertisements submitted to several radio stations (four counts) for distribution and broadcast. Respondents failed to provide to radio stations or any of them, a written statement that no candidate approved of the advertisements, although the advertisements did identify Guetzloe personally as the person paying for the ad. Guetzloe claimed that he did not willfully fail to provide documents to radio stations stating that no candidate approved his radio spot advertisements. He did claim to have sent a fax memo to the stations, which contained the required language. However, this claim is not credible. Guetzloe made no efforts to read or study the Florida Election Code, specifically related to independent expenditures, campaign financing reporting or disclosure statements, at any time during the 2003 election cycle. It is a candidate's or committee's responsibility to educate themselves about the requirements of the law. Reminder cards or personal contacts from the SOE and/or the City Clerk's Office, regarding reports being due, are done as a service of the office. It is not a statutory or other legal requirement. It is Guetzloe's responsibility to prepare and submit the proper paper work as it is related to his independent expenditures. Guetzloe, also, failed to disclose information about independent expenditures he made through his company, GCG. Guetzloe failed to make any reasonable effort to comply with the election laws by submitting a proper report disclosing the expenditures or a follow up report, as required by law. The evidence is clear and convincing that Guetzloe's actions in this matter, in regard to his obligation to file independent expenditure reports properly, timely, and accurately, were "willful" as that term is defined by Section 106.37, Florida Statutes. Guetzloe showed reckless disregard in failing to comply with requirements of the law. Although, Respondent could give no credible explanation as to why he failed to provide the radio stations with a proper disclaimer statement, it is not clear and convincing that Guetzloe's failure to provide the radio statements with a written disclaimer was "willful." It appears to have been negligent. In determining the appropriate amount of civil penalty the Commission may impose, the following is considered: In case number FEC 93-66, the Commission imposed a civil penalty against Guetzloe in the amount of $3,000 for violations of Subsections 106.07(5), 106.19(1)(b), and 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's Final Order. The Commission sought to enforce its Final Order in case number FEC 93-66 in Leon County Circuit Court. On September 3, 1996, the Leon County Circuit Court entered a Final Judgment against Mr. Guetzloe in the amount of $4,478.50. The Final Judgment has not been satisfied. Respondent has indicated that he does not intend to satisfy the judgment. Guetzloe estimates his 2004 salary from Guetzloe Communications, Inc., d/b/a, Advantage Consulting to be between $100,000 and $150,000. Guetzloe estimates his 2005 and 2006 annual salary to be in the $150,000 range. Guetzloe estimates the value of his home to be $575,000, and he has approximately $175,000 equity in the property. He has a small retirement fund. Guetzloe Communications pays Guetzloe's wife a $50,000 annual salary. Therefore, Respondent is capable of paying a civil penalty. Respondents provided no mitigating circumstance for their actions. Guetzloe's failure to file complete and accurate independent expenditure reports is severe. Florida's public policy, as reflected through its elections statutory scheme, is for complete financial disclosure of all finances in Florida elections. However, Guetzloe could not provide a credible explanation why he failed to include complete information regarding expenditures listed on his Fax Memo, or why he failed to file complete, accurate, and timely reports.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that: The Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding as follows: Finding Respondents violated Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, on three occasions, for failing to file a timely periodic report of the independent expenditures of $100 or more (Counts 5, 6, and 7) and imposing a fine of $1,000 for each of the counts for a total of $3,000; Finding Respondents did not violate Subsection 106.143(4)(b), Florida Statutes, on four occasions, and dismissing Counts 8, 9, 10, and 11. 3 Finding Respondents violated Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for failing to file any report of their actual expenditures of $9,790.84 and imposing a $1,000 fine for this count. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent willfully violated Section 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2004), by certifying to the correctness of five campaign treasurer's reports (CTRs), which did not disclose payments that Respondent's media consultant made to two television stations on Respondent's behalf.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has jurisdiction to investigate and enforce Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. Respondent was an unsuccessful candidate for the Walton County Commission in 2004. Respondent was defeated in the August 31, 2004, primary election. Respondent is not an experienced politician. The 2004 campaign was his first and only attempt to run for public office. Respondent's campaign was entirely self-funded. Guy Davidson was the political consultant for Respondent's opponent. On or about August 22, 2004, Mr. Davidson filed a sworn complaint with Petitioner against Respondent. The complaint alleged that Respondent was running television ads (requiring cash in advance) although no expenditures to stations for airtime appeared on Respondent's CTRs. On March 10, 2004, Respondent signed a Statement of Candidate form as required by Section 106.023, Florida Statutes (2003). The statement indicates that Respondent had received, read, and understood the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statute (2003). On March 10, 2004, Respondent filed his Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Candidates. Respondent appointed his personal and business bookkeeper, Iris Schipper, to serve as his campaign treasurer. Respondent had confidence in Ms. Schipper, who had accounting experience, but no experience with political campaigns. On July 15, 2004, Respondent appointed himself as his deputy campaign treasurer. In the spring of 2004, Respondent hired Steven Petermann, the owner of Petermann Corporation, as his campaign media consultant for the purpose of creating, producing, distributing and disseminating political advertisements for Respondent's campaign. Mr. Petermann was in charge of all media aspects concerning Respondent's campaign. Respondent had known Mr. Petermann for years. Prior to the 2004 campaign, Respondent employed Mr. Petermann for advertising services concerning business ventures unrelated to Respondent's campaign. Mr. Petermann was experienced in providing campaign advertising for local political races. He had done so for approximately 30 campaigns. Mr. Petermann provided Respondent with advertising services which were similar to the services that Mr. Petermann provided to other political candidates. Respondent never specified to Mr. Petermann what advertising to buy or how much to spend. Respondent and Mr. Petermann had no specific payment or billing terms in mind when Mr. Petermann agreed to act as Respondent's media consultant or at anytime during the campaign. Generally, Mr. Petermann did not expect his political clients to pay him until the end of their campaigns. However, Respondent attempted to pay Mr. Petermann in full in accordance with the balance due on Petermann Corporation statements or in advance on those occasions when Respondent knew about projected campaign costs. In other words, Respondent tried to make sure that Mr. Petermann was paid in advance or promptly reimbursed for campaign expenses. In this regard, Respondent acted consistently with his prior private business relationship with Mr. Petermann. With regard to Respondent's campaign advertising budget, Respondent told Mr. Petermann to do "whatever it took to run a successful campaign." Respondent trusted Mr. Petermann's professional judgment as to how much advertising was needed and in which mediums the advertising was to run. Respondent knew Mr. Petermann was making expenditures on behalf of the campaign. Respondent was aware of each and every expenditure his campaign made to Mr. Petermann because he was very involved in his campaign finances. Mr. Petermann wrote the following checks on his business account directly to WJHG-TV and WBBM-TV for advertising time on behalf of Respondent's campaign: Date of Check Check Number Payee Television Station Amount of Petermann Expenditure for Perry 06-11-04 025246 WMBB-TV $442.00 06-14-04 025247 WJHG-TV $450.50 06-29-04 025294 WJHG-TV $450.50 06-29-04 025297 WMBB-TV $446.25 07-26-04 025405 WJHG-TV $743.75 07-26-04 025406 WMBB-TV $956.25 08-12-04 025491 WJHG-TV $743.75 08-12-04 025492 WMBB-TV $956.25 08-30-04 025548 WJHG-TV $331.50 Respondent made no expenditures from his campaign account directly to a television station. Additionally, no expenditures to television stations were listed on Respondent's CTRs. Mr. Petermann purchased all of the television airtime on behalf of Respondent's campaign. Mr. Petermann periodically sent Respondent statements for campaign services and expenses. The statements did not itemize each expenditure for television airtime. The statements did list television advertising and various other advertising purchases in general. Respondent did not list the checks that Mr. Petermann paid directly to WJHG-TV and WMBB-TY for Respondent's television airtime on any CTR during his 2004 campaign. A member of the public could not look at Respondent's CTRs and determine the following: (a) which television stations Respondent paid for campaign advertising; (b) how much Respondent paid for television advertising; and (c) how much Respondent paid for Mr. Petermann's professional services. During the course of the campaign, Respondent reported making several payments to Petermann Advertising or Petermann Corporation. Respondent listed each payment made to Mr. Petermann on his CTRs. Respondent did not break down the expenditures and itemize the components of the expenditures on his CRTs, including how much was paid to Mr. Petermann for his professional services. In a letter dated June 24, 2004, Mr. Beasley, Walton County Supervisor of Elections, advised all candidates, including Respondent, to read an enclosed memorandum from Phyllis Hampton, Chief of the Bureau of Election Records for the Department of State, Division of Elections. Mr. Beasley requested all candidates to sign an enclosed statement and return the statement to his office in the enclosed stamped and addressed envelope. Ms. Hampton's memorandum was dated June 17, 2004. It specifically referred to "2004 Campaign Finance Legislative Changes." The memorandum discussed the disclaimer that candidates were required to use on campaign advertising effective July 1, 2004. The last two paragraphs of Ms. Hampton's memorandum stated as follows: Enclosed is a copy of Chapter Law 2004- 252 (CS/SB 2346 &516). Section 5 of this law amends Section 106.143, Florida Statutes. We are also enclosing a handout that contains Section 106.143, Florida Statutes, as amended, as well as examples of political disclaimers under the new law. There are other changes in this law that affect campaign financing for candidates and a summary of those changes is enclosed. The Division of Elections of the Department of State has posted all enacted legislation that affect The Florida Election Code, Chapters 97-106, Florida Statutes, on its web site. That web site is http://election.dos.state. fl.us. If you have any questions, please feel free to call us at 850-245-6240. When Mr. Beasley received Ms. Hampton's memorandum, it included a copy of Public Law 2004-252. Mr. Beasley did not duplicate the law when he sent Ms. Hampton's memorandum to candidates in Walton County. If any candidate had requested a copy of the new law, Mr. Beasley would have obtained a copy for the candidate or referred the candidate to the Internet. Respondent received Ms. Hampton's memorandum regarding the changes in the law, but he did not read it over in detail. Instead, Respondent continued to direct his attention to campaign issues. There is no evidence that Respondent took any affirmative steps to inquire which sections of the law were amended in addition to the requirements for political disclaimers. Respondent did not go to the Department of State, Division of Elections' website to review the law or a copy of the updated candidate's handbook. All Respondent did was to send a copy of the letter to Mr. Petermann. Respondent did not give Ms. Schipper a copy of Ms. Hampton's June 17, 2004, memorandum during the campaign. Ms. Schipper received the memorandum and filed it in one of Respondent's campaign files after the campaign ended. Respondent wrote a personal check dated June 30, 2004, made payable to Peterman Corp. in the amount of $7,500. The check does not state its purpose. Mr. Petermann deposited this check in his business account on July 1, 2004. Respondent wrote the June 30, 2004, personal check to Petermann Corp. because he was in Mr. Petermann's office and wanted to make sure Mr. Petermann was paid promptly for his services and expenses on Respondent's behalf. On June 30, 2004, Respondent had not yet appointed himself as his deputy campaign treasurer and did not have a campaign check signed by Ms. Schipper. Respondent's Q2 CTR, which covered the period from April 1, 2004, to June 30, 2004, was due to be filed on July 12, 2004. The report listed no expenditure to Mr. Petermann. The report did not disclose that Mr. Petermann had spent $1,789.25 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on two television stations during the reporting period. On July 24, 2004, Respondent, as deputy campaign treasurer, wrote a check on his campaign account. The check was payable to Petermann Advertising in the amount of $10,000. The check did not state its purpose. On August 5, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a check on Respondent's campaign account. The check was payable to Respondent in the amount of $7,500. The purpose of the check was to reimburse Respondent for the amount Respondent paid to Mr. Petermann out of Respondent's personal account on June 30, 2004. On August 6, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a check on Respondent's campaign account. The check was payable to Petermann Advertising in the amount of $10,000. The check states that its purpose was advertising. Respondent's F2 CRT, which covered the period from July 24, 2004, through August 6, 2004, was due to be filed on August 13, 2004. The F2 CRT listed the following payments as expenditures: (a) a check dated July 24, 2004, to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $10,000; (b) a check dated August 5, 2004, to Petermann Advertising/mlp (Respondent's initials) for campaign advertising in the amount of $7,500; and (c) a check dated August 6, 2004, to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $10,000. The August 5, 2004, check, listed as payable to Petermann Advertising/mlp, was a reimbursement to Respondent for the personal check he wrote on June 30, 2004. Respondent's F2 CTR did not disclose that Mr. Petermann spent $1,700 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on two television stations during the reporting period. Ms. Schipper contacted someone in Mr. Beasley's office in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida, by telephone on August 13, 2004, before she filed Respondent's F2 CRT. Ms. Schipper inquired about the proper method of reporting the August 5, 2004, payment of campaign funds to reimburse Respondent for his personal check dated June 30, 2004, to Mr. Petermann. During the hearing, Ms. Schipper testified as follows: Okay. I called the -- there was a question about this particular expense because the nature of the check that I just explained because I wasn't sure. I knew I had to report it, but I wasn't sure how I should report it. So I called the supervisor of elections office and I told them what had happened, including the fact that Lee Perry was totally self-funding his campaign and that he had a paid check personally that we need to record as an expenditure on the campaign account and I told her that I had to -- to fund the campaign account and then pay it back to Lee and it was just like an in and out transaction, but I had to report it, but it was to Petermann Advertising. We had other checks to Petermann Advertising. It was all the campaign advertising. How did I need to do that. After speaking with an unidentified female in Mr. Beasley's office, Ms. Schipper was not comfortable with the answer to her inquiry. Ms. Schipper decided to list the check as payable to Petermann Advertising/mlp. Ms. Schipper did not call anyone else regarding the proper method of reporting the June 30, 2004, check, which reimbursed Respondent for reimbursing Mr. Petermann for advertising services and advertising expenses paid to television stations. On August 20, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a campaign check payable to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $15,000. Respondent's F3 CTR, covering the period from August 7, 2004, through August 26, 2004, was due to be filed on August 27, 2004. Respondent's F3 CTR listed one expenditure to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $15,000. Respondent's F3 CTR did not disclose that Mr. Petermann had spent $1,700 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on two television stations during the reporting period. On September 10, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a campaign check payable to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $11,422.23. Respondent's G1 CTR, covering the period from August 27, 2004, through September 10, 2004, was due to be filed on September 17, 2004. Respondent's G1 CTR listed a check payable to Petermann Advertising as an expenditure. The check, dated September 10, 2004, was for campaign advertising in the amount of $11,422.23. Respondent's G1 CTR did not disclose that Mr. Petermann spent $331.50 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on one television station during the reporting period. On October 19, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a campaign check payable to Petermann Advertising for the "Perry Campaign" in the amount of $9,100. After filing Respondent's F3 CTR, Ms. Schipper realized that Mr. Petermann never received the August 20, 2004, campaign check in the amount of $15,000. Therefore, Ms. Schipper cancelled the check and filed an Amended F3 CTR on October 22, 2004. Respondent's Amended F3 CTR indicated that $15,000 was subtracted from Respondent's expenditures. The Amended F3 CTR listed the October 19, 2004, check as an expenditure. The check was payable to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $9,100. Mr. Beasley has two offices. The main office is located in Defuniak Springs, Florida. The satellite office is located in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida. Neither office has a written record of inquiries concerning the reporting of expenditures for Respondent's campaign. As a general office practice, Mr. Beasley's staff does not make notes or records of telephone conversation with candidates or other individuals who call regarding campaign issues. Ms. Schipper called Mr. Beasley's office in Santa Rose Beach, Florida, when she had a question about her duties as campaign treasurer. If she could not get an answer to her question, Ms. Schipper called Mr. Beasley's office in Defuniak Springs, Florida. Ms. Schipper's office during the 2004 campaign was in Respondent's residence, which had two telephone lines. During the hearing, Respondent presented telephone records showing seven telephone calls from the residence to Mr. Beasley's main office in Defuniak Springs, Florida, on the following dates: July 1, 2004; July 7, 2004; July 16, 2004; July 17, 2004; August 27, 2004; August 30, 2004; and September 9, 2004. The telephone records do not show any calls made to Mr. Beasley's office in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida. Ms. Schipper called Mr. Beasley's Santa Rosa Beach office to inquire about reimbursing Respondent for the June 30, 2004, personal payment to Mr. Petermann. However, there is no evidence that Ms. Schipper called either of Mr. Beasley's offices to inquire specifically about the proper method of reporting campaign expenditures, paid directly to Mr. Petermann, part of which included indirect payments or reimbursements for advertising on television stations. Mr. Beasley has no independent recollection of speaking with Ms. Schipper during the campaign. There is no evidence that anyone on Mr. Beasley's staff remembers speaking with Respondent or Ms. Schipper about campaign finance reports during the 2004 campaign. Mr. Beasley's office provided Respondent with a copy of the 2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook (published November 2003)(handbook) and Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent and Ms. Schipper referred to these resources from time to time during the campaign on an as needed basis. The handbook did not specifically require a candidate to "itemize" expenditures to media consultants. The handbook contains the following statement on the first page: Important Notice The information contained in this publication is intended as a quick reference guide only and is current upon publication. Chapter 97-106, Florida Statutes, the Constitution of the State of Florida, Division of Elections' opinions and rules, Attorney General opinions, county charters, city charters and ordinances, and other sources should be reviewed in their entirety for complete information regarding campaign financing and qualifying. In addition, the following publication produced by the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections should be reviewed for further information regarding candidates and committees: 2004 Federal Qualifying Handbook 2004 Committee and Campaign Treasurer Handbook 2004 Handbook on Filing Campaign Reports 2004 Election Cycle Calendar of Reporting Dates for Candidates, Political Committees and Committees of Continuous Existence 2004 Election Cycle Calendar of Reporting Dates for Political Party Executive Committees. All forms and publications provided by the Division of Elections are available on our web site at http://election.dos.state.fl.us. Please direct any questions to either your county supervisor or elections or the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections at (850) 245-6240. (Emphasis included) Chapter 7 of the handbook states as follows regarding the duties and responsibilities of campaign treasurers: IMPORTANT: No contribution or expenditure, including contributions or expenditures of a candidate or of the candidate's family, shall be directly or indirectly made or received in furtherance of the candidacy of any person for nomination or election to political office in the state except through the duly appointed campaign treasurer of the candidate. (Emphasis included) Chapter 10 of the handbook states as follows regarding campaign expenditures: An expenditure is a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, transfer of funds by a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer between a primary depository and a separate interest-bearing account or certificate of deposit, or gift of money or anything of value made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election. * * * A candidate shall: 1. Pay all campaign expenditures by a check drawn on the campaign account (except petty cash); (emphasis included) Chapter 14 of the handbook states as follows regarding the filling of campaign reports: Reporting Expenditures Form DS-DE 14, Itemized Expenditures is used to report all expenditures made, regardless of the amount and must contain: Full name an address of each person to whom expenditures have been made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. Name, address and office sought by each candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was made. Full name and address of each person to whom an expenditure for personal services, salary or reimbursed expenses was made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. A candidate or any other individual may be reimbursed for expenses incurred for travel, food and beverage, office supplies, and mementoes expressing gratitude to campaign supporters as provided for in section 106.021(3), F.S. * * * 5. Amount and nature of debts and obligations owed by or to the candidate, which relate to the conduct of any political campaign. (Emphasis included) On July 1, 2004, amendments to Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2004), became effective, including the addition of Section 106.07(4)(a)13., Florida Statutes (2004), which states as follows: (4)(a) Each report required by this section shall contain: * * * 13. The primary purpose of an expenditure made indirectly through a campaign treasurer for goods and services such as communications media placement or procurement services, campaign signs, insurance, and other expenditures that include multiple components as part of the expenditure. The primary purpose of an expenditure shall be that purpose, including integral and directly related components that comprises 80 percent of such expenditure. After July 1, 2004, the Department of State, Division of Elections, revised and published the 2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook (effective July 2004)(amended handbook). The preface to the amended handbook states as follows: "This publication has been amended in July of 2004 to reflect changes as provided by Chapter Law 2004-252. New language is displayed in red." The notice on the first page of the amended handbook was not revised. Chapter 7 of the amended handbook states as follows regarding the duties and responsibilities of campaign treasurers: IMPORTANT: No contribution or expenditure, including contributions or expenditures of a candidate or of the candidate's family, shall be directly or indirectly made or received in furtherance of the candidacy of any person for nomination or election to political office in the state except through the duly appointed campaign treasurer of the candidate, subject to the following exceptions: * * * Reimbursements to a candidate or any other individual for expenses incurred in connection with the campaign by a check drawn upon the campaign account and reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4), F.S. After July 1, 2004, the full name and address of each person to whom the candidate or other individual made payment for which reimbursement was made by check drawn upon the campaign account shall be reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4), F.S., together with the purpose of such payment; Expenditures made indirectly through a treasurer for goods or services, such as communications media placement or procurement services, campaign signs, insurance or other expenditures that include multiple integral components as part of the expenditure and reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4)(a)13 . . . . (Emphasis included) Chapter 10 of the amended handbook states as follows regarding campaign expenditures: An expenditure is a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, transfer of funds by a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer between a primary depository and a separate interest-bearing account or certificate of deposit, or gift of money or anything of value made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election or making an electioneering communication. An expenditure for an electioneering communication is made when the earliest of the following occurs:A person executes a contract for applicable goods or services;A person makes payment, in whole or in part, for applicable goods or services ; orThe electioneering communication is publicly disseminated. * * * A candidate or other individual may be reimbursed for expenses incurred in connection with the campaign by a check drawn on the campaign account and reported pursuant to section 106.07(4), F.S. After July 1, 2004, the full name and address of each person to whom the candidate or other individual made payment for which reimbursement was made by check drawn upon the campaign account shall be reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4), F.S., together with the purpose of such payment. * * * A candidate shall: 1. Pay all campaign expenditures by a check drawn on the campaign account (except petty cash); (Emphasis included) Chapter 14 of the amended handbook states as follows regarding the filling of campaign reports: Reporting Expenditures Form DS-DE 14, Itemized Expenditures is used to report all expenditures made, regardless of the amount and must contain: Full name an address of each person to whom expenditures have been made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. Name, address and office sought by each candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was made. Full name and address of each person to whom an expenditure for personal services, salary or reimbursed expenses was made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. A candidate or any other individual may be reimbursed for expenses incurred for travel, food and beverage, office supplies, and mementoes expressing gratitude to campaign supporters as provided for in section 106.021(3), F.S. (Emphasis included) * * * 5. Amount and nature of debts and obligations owed by or to the candidate, which relate to the conduct of any political campaign. * * * 7. The primary purposes of an expenditure made indirectly through a campaign treasurer for goods and services such as communications media placement or procurement services, campaign signs, insurance, and other expenditures that include multiple components as part of the expenditure. The primary purpose of an expenditure shall be that purpose, including integral and directly related components, that comprises 80 percent of such expenditure. (Emphasis included) For the 2004 campaign, reporting forms applicable to candidates did not provide for "itemization" of payments made by media consultants to various component providers of goods and services. In contrast, forms applicable to political parties and committees required and provided a reporting mechanism for itemizing payments made by third party consultants to the providers of the component services. Those forms did not specifically apply to individual candidates. At the time of the hearing, the Department of State, Division of Elections, was in the rulemaking process to develop standards and reporting forms for candidates to use when itemizing component parts of an expenditure made to a campaign consultant or vendor. Respondent and Ms. Schipper never called the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, to make campaign finance report inquiries. After reviewing the handbook as published in November 2003, Ms. Schipper believed she had a fair understanding of campaign reporting requirements. Ms. Schipper did not review Chapter 106.07(4), Florida Statutes (2004), or the amended handbook. Respondent also reviewed Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003), and the handbook as published in November 2003. He did not review Section 106.07(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), but primarily relied on Ms. Schipper to properly report campaign expenditures. All checks written on Respondent's campaign account were reported on Respondent's CTRs. Respondent's CTRs reflect that Respondent's total campaign account receipts equaled his total expenditures. During the hearing, the parties stipulated that Respondent had the ability to pay the maximum fine possible if it was determined that he committed the violations charged.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Section 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2004), as charged in Counts 1-5 of the Order of Probable Cause, dismiss Count 6 of the Order of Probable Cause, and impose a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of using or attempting to use his position as mayor of the City of South Pasadena for his benefit or the benefit of candidates that he supported in the 2014 city commission election, in violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact In March 2014, the Respondent was the mayor of the City of South Pasadena, having been elected the year before. City commission elections were scheduled for Tuesday, March 11. There were two contested slots. The incumbents were Max Elson and Arthur Penny. The challengers were Harris Blair and Robert Small. The Respondent supported the challengers and donated to their campaigns to unseat the incumbents, who had been voting against the Respondent's positions since his election as mayor. Of the two elections, the Respondent was more interested in unseating Penny, who regularly opposed the mayor. Pasadena Liquors is a retail business operating in the City of South Pasadena. It was operated by Jimmy Valenty, whose family trust owned the business. Although not a resident and not eligible to vote in the city commission elections, Valenty supported Elson, who was a personal friend. A few weeks before the election, Elson mentioned to Valenty that the campaign signs Valenty allowed him to place outside Pasadena Liquors kept disappearing. Elson asked if Valenty would let him use the marquee inside the front window. Valenty agreed. Elson then asked if Valenty also would let Penny use it. Valenty had no personal interest in Penny's campaign but agreed to his friend's request. Valenty arranged the letters on the marquee to read: "VOTE ELSON AND PENNY CITY COMMISSIONER." During the week before the election, the Respondent received telephone calls regarding the marquee from several constituents who were supporting Blair and Small. They did not recall the marquee being used to solicit votes for city commission elections in the past and questioned whether it was legal. The Respondent was not aware of the sign before receiving the telephone calls and told his constituents that he would look into it. On Friday, March 7, the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors to talk to Valenty and tell him about the telephone calls he had received. Valenty asked if the Respondent was there as mayor, and the Respondent said, no, he was there as a concerned customer or concerned citizen. During the discussion about the propriety and legality of the sign, Valenty asked to see the city's sign ordinance. The Respondent offered to get a copy of it for Valenty. Normally, the mayor would not be involved in enforcement of the city's sign ordinance. The city's government is run by the mayor and five commissioners, all elected positions. The city has five departments. The mayor oversees the administration department. Each commissioner oversees one of the other four departments. Code enforcement, which includes enforcement of the sign ordinance, is part of the community improvement department (CID). Code violations usually would come to the attention of the city through either a code enforcement inspection or a citizen complaint, which would be referred to code enforcement for investigation. It was the CID director's job to interpret, as necessary, the ordinances being enforced. His interpretation would stand unless the city commission overruled him. In March 2014, Commissioner Elson was in charge of and oversaw the CID. The CID's director, Neal Schwartz, reported directly to Commissioner Elson. After talking to Valenty, the Respondent went to Schwartz's office, told him about his conversation with Valenty, and asked for a copy of the sign ordinance pertaining to the Pasadena Liquors marquee. Schwartz copied the sign ordinance, which was long and convoluted, and highlighted the pertinent provisions. It was the CID director's opinion that the sign was legal, in part because the marquee was a "reader board" with changeable letters. The CID director offered to check with the county election supervisor to verify his opinion and was told that the city clerk, who directed the administration department overseen by the Respondent, was in charge of city elections. It was not clear from the evidence whether the Respondent was still present in the office of the CID director when he telephoned the county elections supervisor. It was clear that the Respondent had left the CID director's office before the CID director talked to the city clerk. When the clerk was asked, she was of the opinion that the sign was legal because it was not paid political advertising. She was prepared to tell the Respondent her opinion if he contacted her. The Respondent did not contact the city clerk for her opinion. After meeting with the CID director, the Respondent returned to Pasadena Liquors to show Valenty the sign ordinance. Valenty saw nothing in the highlighted portions of the sign ordinance that made it clear to him that the sign was illegal, but there appeared to him to be a size limitation. Valenty got a tape measure and concluded that the sign exceeded the size requirements. Valenty asked if the Respondent was requiring him to remove the signage from the marquee. The Respondent said no, it was up to Valenty to decide what to do with the sign. Valenty was planning to remove the sign the next day anyway to replace it with advertising for St. Patrick's Day, so he decided to go ahead and switch the signage on the marquee that day. At the election on March 11, the incumbents won. After information was reported to him about the Respondent's actions regarding the Pasadena Liquors marquee, Commissioner Penny swore out an Ethics Commission complaint alleging that the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors and demanded that the owner remove the "vote-for-the-incumbents" sign by falsely telling him that he was in violation of the political advertisement laws, after insisting that the CID director call the supervisor of elections and not waiting for the opinion of the city clerk as to the sign's legality. After receiving and reading the ethics complaint, the Respondent brought a copy to Valenty because his name was mentioned, and the Respondent thought he should know about it. Valenty read it and said there was nothing negative in it about him, so he was not concerned about it. The Respondent did not try to influence Valenty's reaction to the complaint, and there was no evidence that there was anything else to this encounter. A few months later, the Respondent asked the city clerk to begin the process of recognizing the lounge at Pasadena Liquors for being open for 25 years and to be sure to say that it was at his request. When the city clerk broached the subject with Valenty, he declined the honor because the timing suggested to him that the recognition was to "make up for" any hard feelings that arose from the issue regarding the business's election sign. In fact, the timing was a coincidence. The city had recognized Pasadena Liquors for the 10th anniversary of its lounge being open, and other businesses in the city were recognized similarly when they reached landmark anniversaries. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of influencing the election, and it is unlikely that they had any influence on the election. In part for these reasons, it was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of securing a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself or the unsuccessful candidates. It also was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken with corrupt intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Ethics Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A. Building B, Suite 431 2454 McMullen Booth Road Clearwater, Florida 33759-1339 (eServed)
