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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs ERNEST L. HOWEY, 91-000210 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 07, 1991 Number: 91-000210 Latest Update: Jul. 01, 1992

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for the reasons set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses, their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: Respondent, Ernest L. Howey ("Howey"), was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission") on June 4, 1970 having been issued Certificate No. 763. At all times material to the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent maintained that certification. Respondent was employed as police officer with the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department from January 9, 1984 to February 8, 1989. Respondent was terminated from the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department on February 8, 1989 for conduct prejudicial to the good order of the Department. The grounds for his termination were essentially the same as those alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint in this proceeding. Prior to beginning work with the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, Respondent was employed by the Sunrise Police Department. While he was with the Sunrise Police Department, Respondent helped build that Department's shooting range and served as an assistant range officer. While serving in this capacity, Respondent held a NRA instructor's certificate and a Class "K" License from the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing. While he was employed with the Sunrise Police Department, Respondent started a private security company called Arm Security and Investigations, Inc. (the "Company"). The Company was and is licensed by the Department of State as a private security company. At all pertinent times, Respondent was the president of the Company and he and his wife were the sole shareholders. In order for the security guards employed by the Company to carry a gun while they were on duty, they were required to have a Class "G" statewide firearm license issued by the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing. To qualify for a Class "G" license, an applicant was required to meet the requirements of Section 493.306(7)(a), Florida Statutes which provides that an applicant must . . .satisfy minimum training criteria for firearms established by rule of the Department [of State], which training criteria may include, but are not limited to, sixteen hours of range and classroom training taught and administered by a firearms instructor who has been licensed by the Department. Prior to October 1, 1986, the statutory training criteria called for eight hours of classroom and range training. See, Chapter 86-193, Laws of Florida (increasing the training requirements to sixteen hours.) At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the administrative criteria implemented by the Department of State required at least six hours of classroom instruction and three hours of firing range instruction under a licensed instructor. To qualify as a firearms instructor for Class "G" license applicants, an instructor had to obtain a Class "K" license. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent possessed a Class "K" license. On or about March 17, 1987, after receiving a complaint from a former employee of Respondent's corporation, the Department of State, Division of Licensing began an investigation into charges of various violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, by Respondent and his corporation. The investigation revealed that during 1985, 1986, and 1987, Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed firearms instructor, certified on the Class "G" license applications for seven of his employees that the employees had received the requisite classroom and firing range training necessary for the license. Each of the certifications executed by Respondent contained the following statement: III certify that the above- named person has satisfactorily completed the prescribed training as set forth in Section 1C-3.27, Rules of the Department of State." In actuality, none of those employees received the training required under the applicable statutes and rules. All seven of the employees admitted that they had not received the full amount of classroom instruction shown on the license application and that they had not received firing range instruction under Respondent's supervision as reflected in the applications. Six of the employees indicated in affidavits that they had never received training on a firing range under Respondent's supervision. The seventh employee indicated that all of his training was conducted in the office of Arm Security. None of the seven employees certified by Respondent received a waiver or exemption from the prescribed training requirements. Respondent contends that he did not certify any applicant whom he did not believe was qualified. Respondent administered a written NRA test to all applicants and each of them passed. Respondent admits that many of the applicants were not trained on the firing range. However, he contends that he did train them in his office using "non-live" ammunition at reduced, close range targets. The ammunition used included a primer, a cartridge and a casing or head made out of wood with a hole in the back of it. There was no powder in the cartridge. Respondent contends that this training procedure enabled him to adequately assess the capabilities of the applicants. However, Respondent never inquired of the Department of State whether this indoor method could serve as a substitute for training on the firing range. In fact, it appears that Respondent was aware or at least strongly suspected that the applicable statute and rules required the shooting of live ammunition by the applicant on a firing range. Moreover, at least two of the applicants denied ever shooting a firearm in the presence of the Respondent. Thus, it is clear that some of the applicants did not even receive this indoor training. As a result of the Department of State's investigation, Respondent was fined $7,000 and his Class "K" Firearm Instructor License was revoked. At least part of the motivation for Respondent's certification of the seven applicants was to enable them to begin functioning immediately as armed security guards for Respondent's company. After the Department of State discovered the falsified applications, the Class "G" licenses issued to the employees were revoked. At least six of the employees filed new applications and were able to satisfactorily complete the prescribed training under a new instructor on the first attempt.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint and revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of October, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX The Petitioner has submitted a Proposed Recommended Order. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or in the Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5-9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. COPIES FURNISHED: John F. Booth, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ernest L. Howey 5016 South Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33405 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES vs VLADIMIR MAGLOIRE, D/B/A ADRENALINE FITNESS STUDIO, 19-005832 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Nov. 01, 2019 Number: 19-005832 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 2020

The Issue The issues in this case are whether, as Petitioner has charged, Respondent offered for sale training in a program of physical exercise, or the right or privilege to use equipment in furtherance of a program of physical exercise, at an unregistered business location, in violation of section 501.015(1), Florida Statutes; and, if so, whether a penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible, among other things, for administering the laws regulating health studios. For purposes of circumscribing the Department’s jurisdiction, the term health studio “means any person who is engaged in the sale of services for instruction, training, or assistance in a program of physical exercise or in the sale of services for the right or privilege to use equipment or facilities in furtherance of a program of physical exercise.” § 501.0125(1), Fla. Stat. Magloire is a person who meets the definition of a “health studio” subject to the Department’s regulatory jurisdiction. During the period from, roughly, December 2018 until December 2019, Magloire operated a gym under the name “Adrenaline Fitness,” which was located at 3700 Northwest 124th Avenue, Coral Springs, Florida (the “Gym”). There is no dispute that Magloire allowed persons to use equipment or facilities at the Gym for the purpose of physical exercise. It is also undisputed that Magloire never registered the Gym with the Department, which would have been required if the Gym were a “business location.” See § 501.015, Fla. Stat. A health studio constitutes a “business location” if “studio services” are performed onsite. The term studio services “means privileges or rights offered for sale or provided by a health studio.” § 501.0125(2), Fla. Stat. Magloire maintains that the Gym was a “private facility” where services were not “offered for sale” to the public, but rather were made available as a convenience to his personal friends and acquaintances. The relevant distinction here, however, is not between private and public facilities, per se, but between commercial and noncommercial gyms. A homeowner who installs exercise equipment in his garage for personal use and invites a few friends over for a workout once in a while does not thereby turn his home into a “business location.” Magloire’s Gym did not involve this kind of obviously personal, noncommercial use. Magloire testified that many of the persons who worked out at the Gym did not pay him with money for the privilege, although a few did, occasionally, tender cash; the undersigned accepts this as true. Magloire admitted, however, that he received other valuable consideration from guests, such as services, in exchange for his letting them use the Gym’s equipment and facilities. The undersigned determines as a matter of ultimate fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the Gym constituted a “business location” where “studio services” were “offered for sale.” Magloire, therefore, was required to register the Gym with the Department pursuant to section 501.015(1), which he failed to do, in violation of the law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order imposing a fine of $1,000 against Magloire for providing studio services at an unregistered business location in violation of section 501.015(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Genevieve Hal1, Esquire Amanda B. McKibben, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Vladimir Magloire Adrenaline Fitness Studio 10370 Northwest 40th Place Coral Springs, Florida 33065 (eServed) Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57501.0125501.015501.016570.971 Florida Administrative Code (1) 5J-4.015 DOAH Case (1) 19-5832
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RONALD A. GRIMALDI vs FLORIDA STATE BOXING COMMISSION, 00-001600RX (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 12, 2000 Number: 00-001600RX Latest Update: May 14, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Rules 61K1-1.0011(3)(c) and 61K1- 1.0011(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code, and a portion of Form BPR-08-451 (currently Form BPR-0009451), which is incorporated therein by reference, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, formerly known as the Florida State Athletic Commission, licensed Petitioner as a manager of participants in boxing matches effective September 5, 1997. On or about September 17, 1997, Petitioner and Intervenor entered into a contract for Petitioner to be Intervenor's manager and for Intervenor to render services for Petitioner in professional boxing contests. Petitioner did not file a copy of this contract with Respondent within seven days of its execution. Petitioner and Intervenor had a disagreement after several fights regarding their respective rights and duties under the contract. On or about April 26, 1999, Intervenor filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for Marion County, Florida, Case No. 99-781-CA-D. Among other things, Intervenor requested the court to declare the September 17, 1997, contract to be null and void for two reasons: (a) because Petitioner had not filed it with Respondent within seven days of its execution as required by Rule 61K1-1.011(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code; and (b) because the contract did not contain all provisions specifically set forth in Respondent's Form BPR- 0009451, entitled Letter of Agreement Between Participant and Manager, as required by Rule 61K1-1.0011(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner filed a counter-claim in Marion County Circuit Court Case No. 99-78-CA-D, bringing Respondent in as a party. Petitioner's counter-claim alleged that there was no legislative authority for an administrative rule to declare a contract between a manager and a boxer void. As of December 6, 2000, the civil suit was in abeyance pending issuance of the final order in the instant case. On April 5, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Petitioner. Said notice alleged that Petitioner as a manager had entered into a contract with Intervenor, a licensed boxer, and that Petitioner had not filed the contract with Respondent. The Notice to Show Cause referenced Rules 61K1-1.011(3)(c) and 61K1-1.011(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner filed this rule challenge proceeding on April 11, 2000. Petitioner seeks a determination that Rules 61K1-1.011(3)(c) and 61K1-1.011(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code, including a portion of Form BPR-0009451, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority to the extent they purport to automatically void a contract if the manager is not licensed when the contract is executed or if the manager fails to file a copy of the contract with Respondent within seven days of the execution date. Rules 61K1-1.0011(3), Florida Administrative Code, states as follows in pertinent part: (3) Contracts Between Manager and Participant. * * * (c) All contracts shall be in writing and shall be filed with the commission within 7 calendar days of execution . . . . * * * (g) All contracts entered into in Florida between a manager and a participant, and all such contracts entered into outside of Florida involving participants and managers licensed by or subsequently licensed by the commission, shall expressly contain all provisions specifically as worded in Form BPR-0009451, entitled Letter of Agreement Between Participant and Manager, incorporated herein by reference and effective May, 1990, and if they do not, shall be deemed to contain such provisions. The specific language in Form BPR-0009451 that Petitioner objects to is: This contract is automatically void if manager is not licensed on the date this contract is signed or fails to file with the Florida State Athletic Commission, a copy of this contract within 7 calendar days of its execution.

Florida Laws (15) 120.52120.536120.54120.56120.595120.68548.003548.006548.011548.017548.05548.071548.075775.082775.083 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61K1-1.011
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs IRVING WEISSBROD, 95-002880 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 07, 1995 Number: 95-002880 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 1996

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Irving Weissbrod (Weissbrod) held a Class "K" Firearms Instructor Licence Number K87-00026 /1 , which allowed him to provide classroom and range instruction to applicants for a Class "G" license. Weissbrod has been teaching the firearms qualification course since 1987. Weissbrod was required by Rule 1C-3.128, Florida Administrative Code, to use the Department of State, Division of Licensing's Firearms Instructor's Training Manual (Training Manual) in teaching the course for a Class "G" license. In early March, 1995, Richard Thomas Railton (Railton), an investigator for the Respondent, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department), was given the assignment to attend a Class "G" training course which was being given by Weissbrod through his business, Florida Firearms Corp. The purpose of the assignment was to determine whether the training being given met the minimum hours required by statute. Railton called Weissbrod to arrange for the class. Weissbrod told Railton that the cost of the course was $144.00. Railton obtained the money from the Department and converted the funds to a money order payable to Florida Firearms for $144.00. Railton identified himself to Weissbrod as Richard Thomas. On March 14, 1995, Railton went to Florida Firearms, where the class was to be conducted. He arrived around 6:45 p.m. There were two other students in the class, Paul Stephenson and an unidentified male. When Railton arrived at the class, he advised Weissbrod that he had extensive experience with firearms, that he had been a policeman for seven or eight years, and that he was currently a private investigator. Stephenson advised Weissbrod that he had been a private investigator for about ten years and that he had a lot of firearm training. The third student had no training in firearms. The Training Manual requires that an instructor provide 13 hours of instruction on the legal aspects of the use of firearms; fours hours of instruction on operational firearms safety; three hours of firearms mechanical training; and eight hours of firearms range qualification. The class started at 7:05 p.m. During the first fifteen minutes of class, Weissbrod processed the students' paperwork, collected fees, and gave receipts. When Railton paid his fees, Weissbrod charged him only $134.00 because Railton did not need to have a photograph taken for his license application. Weissbrod told the class that he taught an accelerated class and that he could teach the required information in less time than the state requirement of 28 hours. From 7:20 to 7:40 p.m., Weissbrod explained the definitions of misdemeanors and felonies and discussed firearm violations in the two categories. He also discussed the meaning of reasonable and deadly force. From 7:40 to 8:10 p.m., Weissbrod passed out copies of an examination and reviewed the questions and answers with the students. While they were reviewing the examination, Weissbrod remarked, "I'll be out of here real early tonight." At 8:10 p.m. Weissbrod passed out an examination for the students to complete. By 8:35, the students had completed the examination. Both Railton and Stephenson passed the written test. Weissbrod told them to meet at Big Al's Gun Range the next evening at 7:30 p.m. for range qualification. Weissbrod told one student that they would be finished with the range qualification by 8:00 p.m. On March 15, 1995, Railton and Stephenson met Weissbrod at the firing range at 7:30 p.m. The third student did not participate in the range qualifications on that evening. Railton and Stephenson fired their guns and their targets were scored. Both men passed the range qualifications. Weissbrod issued certifications to Railton and Stephenson, stating that they had received 28 hours of training. Weissbrod admitted that Railton and Stephenson received less than the 28 hours required by Section 493.6115(8), Florida Statutes; however, he submits that it was an isolated incident, and no evidence was presented to the contrary. Notwithstanding, his violations were flagrant and, whether isolated or not, were knowingly committed. On March 22, 1995, the Department issued an Emergency Suspension Order, alleging that Weissbrod committed fraud, deceit, negligence or misconduct in the practice of regulated activities under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, based on essentially the same facts that are alleged in Counts I through VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint. On April 13, 1995, an Order was issued vacating the Emergency Suspension Order. Thus, Weissbrod had been effectively suspended by the Department from March 22, 1995 to April 13, 1995, a period of 22 days.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order finding that Irving Weissbrod violated Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes as set forth in Counts I through VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint and imposing an administrative fine of $300 for each Count (a total of $1800) and suspending his license for one month. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1996.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57493.6115493.6118
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING vs CELESTINA M. GANGEMI, 00-003816PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Davie, Florida Sep. 13, 2000 Number: 00-003816PL Latest Update: Apr. 06, 2001

Findings Of Fact The Findings of Fact contained in the Recommended Order are hereby adopted as the findings of the Division.

Conclusions The State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division) hereby enters this Final Order for the above styled matter. On January 4, 2001, the Division received a Recommended Order from the Honorable Susan B. Kirkland, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Recommended Order is attached to this Final Order and incorporated by reference herein. This Final Order is being executed by the Secretary of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation because Dr. Paul F. Kirsch, Director of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering testified at the formal hearing which was consolidated with the rule challenge styled Daniel G. Hennessey, Fred G. Warren and Celestina M. Gangemi vs. Division, DOAH Case Nos. 99-5254RX, 00-2821RX and 00-3809RX.

Appeal For This Case Unless expressly waived, any party substantially affected by this final order may seek judicial review by filing an original Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the appropnate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days rendition of this order, in accordance with Rule 9.110, Fla. R. App. P., and section 120.68, Florida Statutes. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Thereby certify that this Notice has been provided by facsimile transmission to Cynthia S. Tunnicliff and Martha J Edenfield, Attorneys for Respondent, by U.S. Certified Mail at Post Office Box 10095, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 and David S. Romanik, Attorney for Respondent, by U.S. Certified Mail to Post Office Box 310, Hallandale, Florida 33008-0310 this 4 day of, pk 2001. Mary Polomo, Division Clerk Copies furnished to: Bureau of Operations Licensing Section Bureau of Investigations Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Assistant General Counsel General Manager, Calder Chief Inspector, Calder Stewards, Calder Director of Security, Calder Racing Form, Calder

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AMERICAN AMATEUR MIXED MARTIAL ARTS, INC., A/K/A UNITED STATES AMATEUR MIXED MARTIAL ARTS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, STATE BOXING COMMISSION, 13-002780F (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 23, 2013 Number: 13-002780F Latest Update: Dec. 20, 2013

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, American Amateur Mixed Martial Arts, (AAMMA or Petitioner) is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact AAMMA is a not-for-profit corporation, incorporated under the laws of Florida. It has no full-time employees and utilizes volunteers to conduct its business. Evidence in the record as to AAMMA’s net worth throughout its existence and at the time the case was initiated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, State Boxing Commission (Department), demonstrated that AAMMA sustains itself through personal donations from members and fees from a variety of registrations. Evidence further demonstrated that the association was very small with few members and registrations. In fact, AAMMA uses a home gym located on property owned by founders and members Larry and Alice Downs to operate a mixed martial arts/boxing and training school. Mr. Downs’ plumbing business and the Downs’ residence are also located on this property. There was no evidence of the value of the home gym. Additionally, there was no evidence that demonstrated that AAMMA has any ownership interest in the home gym owned by the Downs’ or in any training equipment associated with that gym. More importantly, there was no substantially credible evidence that demonstrated AAMMA was not a separate entity from any of the Downs’ interests or that any of the Downs’ finances should be included in the net worth of AAMMA. On the other hand, the testimony, while not specific, was sufficient to infer that AAMMA’s net worth is well below the $2,000,000.00 threshold for a business to be considered a small business for purposes of section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Moreover, as indicated earlier, AAMMA has no full-time employees. Based on these facts, AAMMA is a small business as defined under section 57.111. The underlying action in this case was initiated by the Department when it filed an Amended Administrative Complaint against AAMMA in DOAH Case No. 12-0142.2/ Additionally, after a lengthy multi-day hearing during which both sides vigorously litigated their side of the case and after both parties filed Proposed Recommended Orders in the matter, AAMMA was the prevailing party in DOAH Case No. 12-0142. In case 12-0142, the Amended Administrative Complaint was based on evidence that was obtained through investigation by the Department both before and after the filing of the Administrative Complaints in the related DOAH Case No. 11-5102.3/ The amended complaint in case 12-0142 alleged in Count I that Respondent allowed minors under the age of 18 to engage in mixed martial arts (MMA) matches on January 28, 2011; February 26, 2011; May 6, 2011; July 16, 2011; and August 3, 2011, in violation of sections 548.006(4), and 548.071(1), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61K1- 1.0031(1)(c), by failing to enforce the ISKA Overview as Respondent’s minimum health and safety standards and engaging in unprofessional conduct. The ISKA Overview contained age limits for participants in amateur MMA matches. The evidence in the underlying case demonstrated that AAMMA allowed athletes under the age of 18 years to participate in MMA matches on the dates alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. Clearly, such evidence constitutes a reasonable basis in fact for which the Department may proceed with an administrative action. The Department alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent was aware of, and allowed, amateur fighters to compete outside the appropriate weight class on July 16, 2011, in violation of sections 548.006(4) and 548.071(1) Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61K1-1.0031(1)(c), by failing to enforce the health and safety standards in Respondent’s Rules and ISKA Overview Guidelines, specifically regarding weight classes, as well as, engaging in unprofessional or unethical conduct. Again, the evidence presented in DOAH Case No. 12-0142 showed that Robert Birge, a heavyweight, and Travis Grooms, a super heavyweight, competed against each other at the July 16, 2011, event with a weight difference of 61 pounds. Again, there was a reasonable basis in fact for the Department to proceed with an administrative action. The Department alleged in Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent misled American Legion Post #75 into signing a letter that incorrectly stated the American Legion was the sole sponsor of Respondent’s May 6, 2011, amateur event, thereby violating section 548.071(4), by engaging in unprofessional or unethical conduct. The Department’s evidence showed that Alice Downs, Larry Downs, Jr., and his secretary had access to AAMMA’s letterhead. While the evidence eventually showed that the event held on May 6, 2011, was not sponsored by AAMMA or the American Legion, the Department’s evidence clearly established that the letter to the Department attempting to exempt the May 6, 2011, event from regulation was on AAMMA’s letterhead. From these facts, it was reasonable for the Department to conclude that the letter came from AAMMA at the time it initiated the underlying action and was an attempt to mislead the American Legion into signing the letter in order to gain an exemption under the statutes for the May 6 event. Given these facts, there was a reasonable basis for the Department to proceed with an administrative action. In conjunction with the factual basis of the underlying administrative action, the Department’s legal position in that action was based on its authority to regulate amateur sanctioning organizations and the rules the boxing commission had promulgated under the authority granted to it in chapter 548, Florida Statutes. Ultimately, AAMMA prevailed because the rules of the boxing commission were so vague that they could not be enforced against AAMMA based on the law governing enforcement of such rules. However, the Department, at the initiation of the underlying proceeding and throughout this process, had reasonable legal arguments which it posited to support its interpretation that the ISKA Overview contained the health and safety standards AAMMA was required to follow and that the Department was required to enforce. The fact that the Department did not prevail in its legal position does not support a finding that its position did not have a reasonable legal basis. Given these facts, the Department had a reasonable basis in law to proceed with an administrative action against AAMMA. Finally, the undersigned has reviewed the affidavit as to Attorney’s Fees and Costs filed on September 23, 2013, and the corrections thereto, and finds the fees and costs contained therein to be reasonable. However, since the Department was substantially justified in initiating the underlying proceeding in this action, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees or costs in this matter.

Florida Laws (10) 120.54120.57120.68455.225548.003548.006548.07157.01157.10557.111
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