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RICHARD E. PARKER vs FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 97-000809 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 18, 1997 Number: 97-000809 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 1998

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a 47-year old resident of Hollywood, Florida. He is married and has a five-year old step-daughter. His wife's father is the minister of the First Methodist Church in Hollywood. Petitioner is an active member of his father-in-law's church. In recent years, he has volunteered a significant amount of his time to perform tasks on behalf of the church. Petitioner is now, and has been since June of 1997, employed as a salesperson by Rex Yacht Sales (Rex) in Fort Lauderdale. As a salesperson for Rex, he sells new boats and he also sells used boats that are 32 feet or less in length.3 Approximately, 75 percent of the sales he makes are of used boats. Petitioner specializes in the sale of sailboats. He possesses a considerable amount of knowledge concerning sailboats as a result of the years (since he was a young child) that he has devoted to sailing. Petitioner owned, lived aboard, and captained a sailboat named the "Wave Dancer" from 1975 until the late 1980's. He acquired the "Wave Dancer" in return for his participation in an illicit drug smuggling operation. In 1975, when he was still living in his hometown of Port Washington, New York, Petitioner was approached by a childhood friend, Dan Locastro. Locastro advised Petitioner that he (Locastro) and his associates wanted to buy a sailboat to use to transport marijuana from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands to the New England coast. Locastro promised Petitioner that, if Petitioner were able locate a sailboat for them to purchase and if he thereafter successfully captained the newly purchased sailboat on its journey to and from the Virgin Islands, Petitioner could keep the sailboat. Approximately a month later, Petitioner notified Locastro that he had located a sailboat for Locastro and his associates. The sailboat was the "Wave Dancer." Locastro and his associates subsequently purchased the "Wave Dancer." They purchased the boat in the name of Richard Harrison. Following the purchase of the "Wave Dancer," Petitioner, accompanied by Locastro, sailed the boat to an island near St. Thomas. There, 500 pounds of marijuana were loaded onto the "Wave Dancer." Petitioner then sailed the boat to the New England coast, where he delivered the marijuana. Petitioner participated in this illicit smuggling operation because he wanted his own sailboat. He was neither arrested, nor charged, for having participated in this operation. As promised, Petitioner was allowed by Locastro and his associates to keep the "Wave Dancer" after the conclusion of operation. The boat was subsequently titled in Petitioner's name. For approximately 12 or 13 years, Petitioner (who was then single) lived in the Caribbean aboard the "Wave Dancer." He earned a living by taking tourists (usually one couple at a time) out in the water on his boat. In the late 1980's, Petitioner decided to return to the United States to live with and care for his parents, who, because of their advanced age, required his assistance. Before moving back to the United States, Petitioner put the "Wave Runner" up for sale. He was unsuccessful in his efforts to sell the boat. He discussed with a friend of his, Ken Fish, the possibility of Fish purchasing the boat for $50,000.00, but no sale was consummated. Petitioner was still the owner the "Wave Runner" when he flew to the United States and moved in with his parents (in their home). He left the "Wave Runner" behind in the Virgin Islands in the care of his friend Fish. Approximately nine months after he left the Virgin Islands, Petitioner received a telephone call from Fish, who indicated that he was having financial difficulty and that he wanted to use the "Wave Runner" in a "marijuana scheme." Approximately six months later, Fish again telephoned Petitioner. This time he told Petitioner that he wanted "to do a cocaine smuggling venture with [the "Wave Runner]." At first, Petitioner told Fish that he (Fish) was "out of his mind." Later during the conversation, however, Petitioner relented and agreed to allow Fish to use the "Wave Runner" in the proposed "cocaine smuggling venture." Petitioner gave his permission without receiving any promise from Fish that he (Petitioner) would receive anything in return. The "cocaine smuggling venture" was unsuccessful. The "Wave Runner" was seized by authorities in Martinique. In the spring of 1991, in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR- HIGHSMITH, Petitioner was criminally charged by the United States government for his role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. Petitioner's role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" was limited to permitting Fish to use the "Wave Runner" to transport cocaine into the United States. After his arrest in May of 1991, Petitioner agreed to, and he subsequently did, cooperate with federal authorities by participating in federal undercover drug enforcement operations under the supervision of federal agents. At times during these operations, he was required to place himself in situations where his personal safety was compromised. In or around January of 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91- 349-CR-HIGHSMITH to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine. On January 30, 1995, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of said crime and, as punishment, placed on probation for five years and fined $17,500.00. Such punishment constituted a substantial downward departure from the range provided in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge explained that he was "constrained to substantially modify the sentence in this case downward" because of the risks Petitioner had taken to assist federal authorities in their drug-fighting efforts. Although under no legal obligation to do so, Petitioner continued to provide similar assistance to federal authorities (at a substantial personal risk) after his sentencing. In September of 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department an application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. Question 13 on the application form read as follows: CRIMINAL HISTORY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the law of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. Yes No The application form instructed those applicants whose answer to Question 13 was "Yes" to "attach [their] complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or [were] pending." On the application form that he submitted to the Department, Petitioner answered "Yes" to Question 13, but he did not attach the required signed statement. He merely appended to the application form a copy of the judgment entered in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On or about October 1, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioner: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Section of General Regulation is in receipt of your application for a yacht Salesman. A review of your application has disclosed the following deficiencies: You answered Yes to question 13 which asked "Have you been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" The paragraph under question 15 further states "If your answer to question 13, 14, 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." You will need to submit a signed statement of the charges and facts, within twenty-one (21) days to this office before your application can be checked for form. Should you have any questions, please contact me. After receiving the Department's October 1, 1996, letter, Petitioner telephonically requested additional time to respond. By letter dated December 13, 1996, Petitioner's attorney, John J. Lynch, Esquire, responded on Petitioner's behalf to the Department's October 1, 1996, letter. Lynch's letter, which was received by the Department on December 17, 1996, read as follows: I represent the Applicant, Richard E. Parker. In response to concerns raised by Richard Parker's application's disclosure of charges and crimes and the results thereof, please consider the following as part of the application process: The subject matter was limited to involvement in a conspiracy to import controlled substances. Mr. Parker voluntarily entered a guilty plea in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida, in an action entitled, "United States v. Richard Parker" Criminal No. 91-349-CR- Highsmith. Upon being aware of potential liability, he cooperated fully with the U.S. Government. During a four-year period, he provided extensive assistance to the U.S. Government in ongoing investigations and provided training and resources to special agents. Mr. Parker's participation as a Government agent put him at considerable risk. His case remains under court seal to protect information which may be used by the Government in future criminal prosecutions. I cannot provide a complete transcript of the court proceedings without jeopardizing Mr. Parker's safety. To appreciate Mr. Parker's significant assistance to the U.S. Government, a portion of the Honorable Judge Highsmith's sentencing comments has been enclosed. Pages 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the sentencing memorandum specify the efforts made by Mr. Parker, and recognized by the Court to rectify his prior conduct. (Note: All individuals, other than Mr. Parker, have been redacted to preserve a measure of safety since the matter remains under court seal). In recognition of [his] assistance, Mr. Parker was placed on probation for five years and fined on January 30, 1995. The fine was paid and probation has commenced. I trust this supplemental response answers concerns regarding this unfortunate episode in Mr. Parker's life. As his attorney asserted in the foregoing letter, as of the date of the letter, Petitioner had paid the $17,500.00 fine imposed in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On January 17, 1997, the Department issued its Notice of Intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure. On February 12, 1997, Petitioner requested a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the matter. On August 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH requesting that "his period of probation [be reduced] from a term of 60 months to a term of 32 months thereby terminating his probation on September 30, 1997." In support of his motion, he stated the following: On January 30, 1995, Richard Parker was sentenced by this Court to five years probation for his participation in a cocaine conspiracy. The Court imposed this lenient sentence because of the extraordinary cooperation Richard Parker had rendered (a transcript of the sentencing is attached hereto as Exhibit A). As part of his cooperation Parker had gone to Columbia in a sailboat, at great personal risk and with no protection from law enforcement, and developed a case involving significant arrests, convictions, and seizure of cocaine. Since sentencing Parker has remarried and complied with all terms of probation. Parker had promised the agents and the Court that his cooperation would continue regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. True to his word, following sentencing, at the request of the DEA, Richard Parker traveled alone to Columbia and negotiated the location in the Caribbean Sea for an air drop of 300 kilos of cocaine. Parker then captained a sailboat and traveled to Dominica and Barbados, St. Kitts and the British Virgin Islands with DEA agents on board and participated in the recovery of the 300 kilos of cocaine as it was dropped from a plane in 50 kilogram packages. Parker received no payment for this cooperation. Parker rendered substantial assistance to the Government after sentencing because of his moral commitment to cooperation as a form of restitution, because of his sense of obligation and gratitude, and because he had given his word to the Government and this Court. It is now over 2 1/2 years since Parker was sentenced. Parker has complied fully with all conditions of probation. Parker has committed himself to building a productive law-abiding life. The Count may well recall that Parker's marriage ended during his cooperation and sentence. Parker has recently married again becoming the father of a four-year old in the process. Parker has spent his life working on and sailing boats. Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a license to be a yacht salesman. The issuance of these licenses in Florida is regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). The DBPR has denied Parker's request for a license citing Parker's conviction as irrefutable proof of moral turpitude as a basis for denial. Parker has petitioned for review and a hearing before an administrative law judge is scheduled for October 14, 1997. Undersigned counsel has been advised that the hearing scheduled for October 14, 1997, will be the final hearing regarding Parker's petition for a license to sell boats in the State of Florida. Regarding this issue, undersigned counsel has become aware of an administrative decision where an application for a license as a yacht and ship salesman was granted by DBPR to an applicant who had been convicted of a drug felony, sentenced to probation and had been terminated from probation. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes v. Orr, Docket No. YS95025 (Final Order No. BPR-95-03991, 7/20/95). It is respectfully submitted that evidence of successful completion of probation by Parker prior to the time of final hearing on October 14, 1997, will either result in the DBPR rescinding their denial of Parker's application or a reversal of DBPR's denial by the administrative law judge. Assistant United States Attorney John Schlessinger has conferred with the United States Probation Officer Anthony Gagliardi regarding this motion and has authorized undersigned counsel to state that the United States has no objection to a reduction of probation from 60 months to 36 months. Richard Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a yacht salesman license so that he can support himself and his family. Richard Parker, through his cooperation, has rebutted any presumption of moral turpitude that attached to his conviction and has affirmatively and courageously demonstrated good moral character; Richard Parker has honored and will continue to honor his pledge to the United States and to this Honorable Court never to break the law again. . . . The Final Order in the Orr case, which was referenced in Petitioner's Motion to Modify Probation, contained the following "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law":

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1997.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57326.004326.00690.405 Florida Administrative Code (3) 61B-60.00261B-60.00361B-60.004
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs JILL SOUSA BARKER, 99-002478 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 02, 1999 Number: 99-002478 Latest Update: Dec. 16, 1999

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The licensee At all times material hereto, Respondent, Jill Sousa Barker, was licensed by Petitioner, Department of Insurance (Department), as a general lines agent. Such licensure dates to May 10, 1993, and, but for the pending action, Respondent has suffered no other complaint or disciplinary action. The violations On February 11, 1997, an Information was filed in the Circuit Court, Twentieth Judicial Circuit, Lee County, Florida, Case No. 97-0058CF, charging Respondent with two counts of trafficking in cocaine (28 grams or more), contrary to Section 893.135(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and one count of sale or delivery of cocaine, contrary to Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Information alleged that: Count 1 [Respondent] did unlawfully and knowingly sell, manufacture, or deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, on or about November 7, 1996 Count 2 [Respondent] did unlawfully and knowingly have in her actual or constructive possession, a controlled substance, to-wit: 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, on or about January 8, 1997 Count 3 [Respondent] did unlawfully sell or deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine, on or about December 18, 1996 The offenses alleged in Counts 1 and 2 constituted the commission of a felony of the first degree, and the offense alleged in Count 3 constituted the commission of a felony of the second degree. On September 3, 1997, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to Count 3, as charged, and a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser included offense (Counts 1 and 2) of sale and delivery of cocaine (contrary to Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes), a second degree felony.1 The court entered an order withholding adjudication of guilt on each count, placed Respondent on probation for a period of four years under the supervision of the Department of Corrections (with early termination after two years if in compliance with all terms and conditions imposed), and assessed a fine and costs totaling $561. Respondent successfully completed her probation within one year, and was granted early termination by the court on June 15, 1998. At no time did Respondent inform the Department in writing of having pled nolo contendere to the aforesaid felonies.2 Aggravating and mitigating factors Here, the seriousness of Respondent's criminal acts cannot be gainsaid, nor may they be casually dismissed (as counsel suggests in Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order at page 2) as "part of a sting operation and as such . . . a 'victimless' act." Rather, Respondent acted as a middleman on three occasions, purchased cocaine (up to one ounce) for a dealer (a "person involved in the regular purchase and sale of . . . cocaine") who she believed was otherwise unable to acquire the product, and for which service she was paid a fee ($300 to $500 for the one ounce transaction). That the cocaine was not sold or further distributed, since the dealer was (unbeknownst to Respondent) operating under cover as an informant for the police department, does not render the crime less offensive. Notwithstanding, Respondent has suffered and paid a criminal penalty for her conduct and has demonstrated, based on objective evidence of right conduct, that she is truly remorseful for her actions and that she is worthy of holding a position of trust and confidence. Consequently, although suspension may be mandatory for a violation of Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes, as discussed infra, it will serve no useful purpose. Therefore, any suspension should be de minimus. In reaching the foregoing conclusion, it is observed that, while serious, the isolated events which gave rise to the criminal charges filed against Respondent do not fairly reflect her character. Rather, history reveals that Respondent, age 34 at the time of hearing (date of birth September 17, 1964), has been gainfully employed (at various times, in various capacities) in the insurance industry since age 18, and that she suffered a brief, abusive marriage in the late 1980s, which resulted in the birth of a son, Trent. When Trent was 10 months of age, Respondent left her abusive husband, and moved (from Miami, Florida) to North Carolina to reside with her sister. There, Respondent successfully gained licensure as a property and casualty agent, as well as a life and health agent, and was employed by State Farm. Respondent was then, and continues to be, the primary support for herself and her son, and she enjoys little or no assistance from her former husband. Respondent remained in North Carolina approximately two years, and then returned to Miami, Florida, where she was employed by the Simons and Rose Insurance Agency. Following Hurricane Andrew (August 24, 1992), and the loss of all her possessions, she moved to Fort Meyers, Florida, to reside with her brother. There, Respondent successfully completed the 240-hour course and examination to qualify for licensure in Florida, and on May 10, 1993, was licensed as a general lines agent. Following licensure, Respondent was employed by AAA Insurance for two and one-half years, and thereafter by Tim Shaw Insurance Group, Inc. Respondent was, and continues to be, a model employee, a heavy producer, and is highly regarded among those who know of her. Apart from her continued employment, and support and participation in her son's activities (school, karate, hockey, baseball, and Cub Scouts), Respondent has, since the incidents in question, also committed to regular attendance at Lighthouse Baptist Church. There she has also taught vacation bible school, and has sat as a member of the building committee, as well as the finance committee. Moreover, Respondent has continued to attend night school at Edison Community College, and expects to receive an associate degree (A.S.) in computer programming on December 10, 1999. In all, Respondent has evidenced admirable traits, including resilience, tenacity, and character, which should not be overlooked or ignored because of the isolated incident in question. Given those traits, as well as her evident remorse, there is no reason to believe Respondent would engage in any further misconduct. Moreover, Respondent is painfully aware that, absent licensure, she would lose the means to support her family, and would most likely lose her home and the opportunity to complete her college program.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which finds the Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Subsections 626.611(14) and 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and guilty of violating the provisions of Subsection 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint. All charges that Respondent's conduct also violated the provisions of Subsections 626.611(1), (7), or (13), and 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, should be dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED that, as a penalty for such violations, Respondent's license be suspended for one day, followed by a one-year term of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1999.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.60626.611626.621893.13893.135
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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 2011 vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 12-001122RU (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 27, 2012 Number: 12-001122RU Latest Update: Feb. 04, 2013

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's temporary directive, which requires probation officers to request and obtain supervisor approval on a case-by-case basis before incurring travel expenses for certain field visits, meets the definition of a "rule" in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (2011),1/ which should have been promulgated as such.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency with "supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of the inmates, buildings, grounds, and property, and all other matters pertaining to [specified correctional facilities and programs] for the imprisonment, correction, and rehabilitation of adult offenders[.]" § 945.025(1), Fla. Stat. (setting forth Respondent's jurisdiction). By far, Respondent's resources, including personnel, are primarily devoted to Respondent's responsibilities over correctional facilities and programs. There are approximately 17,000 certified officers on the correctional institution side. Respondent also is the state agency responsible for supervising offenders who are granted conditional release from incarceration or who are granted parole by the Parole Commission (chapter 947, Florida Statutes), as well as the state agency responsible for supervising probationers placed on probation (or in community control, known commonly as house arrest) by a court (chapter 948, Florida Statutes). Collectively, persons who have been conditionally released, parolees, and probationers will be referred to as "offenders." A relatively small percentage of Respondent's resources, including personnel, are devoted to the supervision of offenders. There are approximately 2,100 certified parole and probation officers providing community supervision. Organizationally, Respondent's supervisory functions fall under the umbrella of Community Corrections. The supervision of offenders statewide is divided into a northern and southern region, each covering ten of the state's 20 judicial circuits. Each region is headed by a regional director, who oversees the supervision of offenders within the region's ten judicial circuits. Each of the 20 judicial circuits has a circuit administrator. Each circuit also used to have a deputy circuit administrator, but that position was eliminated in 2009. Reporting to the circuit administrators are probation supervisors, who supervise and coordinate the activities of individual probation officers and probation officer specialists. Offenders are assigned to certified probation officers and probation officer specialists, who directly carry out the supervisory functions. See § 948.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (an offender on probation or community control is to be supervised by an officer meeting the qualifications in section 943.13, Fla. Stat.). A probation officer specialist is a probation officer with a certain level of experience to whom the offenders with the most serious criminal records are assigned. Unless otherwise specified, the term probation officer will be used, in the broad sense, to include both probation officers and the more experienced probation officer specialists. In carrying out its community supervisory functions, Respondent's goals are all of the following: to ensure compliance with the conditions of supervision imposed by the court or by the Parole Commission; to ensure public safety; to foster rehabilitation of the offender; and to reduce or eliminate future victimization. Probationers may be placed on probation, in lieu of incarceration, or as part of a split sentence that includes incarceration followed by probation. §§ 948.011 and 948.012. The starting place for supervision of a probationer is the court's order of supervision, which specifies the terms and conditions of probation. Respondent is charged with preparing a form order of supervision for the courts to use. § 948.01(1)(b). The form order prepared by Respondent and used by the courts reflects the standard conditions of probation which may be imposed by the courts, enumerated in section 948.03. The form order also provides options for the court to exercise its authority and discretion to impose special terms and conditions. See, e.g., §§ 948.031 through 948.039. The standard conditions of probation that may be imposed by a court in its order of supervision are broadly worded and general in nature and include the following: Report to the probation and parole supervisors as directed. Permit such supervisors to visit him in his or her home or elsewhere. Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as possible. Remain within a specified place. Live without violating the law. The statutes and standard terms of probation do not dictate or specify how, precisely, Respondent is to carry out its supervisory function in monitoring offenders to serve the goal of ensuring compliance with these terms. The concept of "supervision" is not quantified, such as by specifying how often an offender must report to his or her probation officer or whether and how often probation officers may or will visit an offender in his or her home or elsewhere. A court's order of supervision could theoretically provide a condition specifying that a probationer must go to his or her probation officer's office twice a month or five times a month. However, the one sample order of supervision entered in evidence in this case did not impose any such terms quantifying the number of office visits or other visits that the unidentified probationer had to make with his or her probation officer. With respect to "supervision," section 948.12 provides a distinction for violent offenders who are on probation following incarceration by providing that these offenders "shall be provided intensive supervision by experienced probation officers." However, just as the statutes do not purport to specify or quantify what is meant by "supervision," there is no statutory specification for what is meant by "intensive supervision." Respondent has had, apparently as far back as 2002, internal procedures in place to provide detailed processes for probation officers to follow in carrying out their duty to supervise offenders assigned to them. These procedures are published in a 41-page document called Procedure 302.303, which Respondent considers a "restricted access" document for internal use only. One subject addressed in Procedure 302.303 is an offender classification system. The current classification system was designed in-house and then validated by the Florida State University School of Criminology. The system considers a number of variables and is used by Respondent as a way to group offenders in an effort to ensure that supervision is provided at a level commensurate with the danger or risk the offender represents to the community. This offender classification system, which is not promulgated as a rule, is not the subject of Petitioner's challenge. Procedure 302.303 also addresses the subject of contacts expected to be made by a probation officer with individual offenders assigned to the officer. In general terms, Procedure 302.303 specifies minimum contacts, by type and frequency, that probation officers are expected to make, or try to make, for each of their assigned offenders. The types of contacts include office visits, meaning the offender comes into the probation officer's office for a meeting; other kinds of visits, scheduled or unscheduled, when the probation officer travels outside the office to visit or attempt to visit the offender in his home, in his place of employment, or another place; and field visits with third parties, when the probation officer travels outside the office to visit or attempt to visit the offender's employer, treatment providers, family, neighbors, or other third persons who might have information about the offender. Different minimum contact requirements, by type and frequency, are provided for each of the different offender risk classification categories in Procedure 302.303. The minimum contact standards are performance standards that apply to probation officers; without the minimum contact requirements, some probation officers might do less than the minimum. These minimum contact standards, which have not been promulgated as a rule, are also not the subject of Petitioner's challenge. Instead, Petitioner's challenge is directed to a recent temporary directive by Respondent that suspended some aspects of the (unpromulgated) minimum contact standards in Procedure 302.303. In lieu of these minimum contact standards, Respondent's directive provides that probation officers need to request and receive permission of their supervisors on a case-by- case basis to incur travel expenses for certain field visits. As a related part of the directive, supervisors are given discretion to approve travel expenses for any field visit if there is reason to believe there may be a violation of a condition of supervision or if there is reason to believe that there is a threat to public safety. The challenged directives were first communicated verbally on February 29, 2012, in a telephone conference call between Jenny Nimer, assistant secretary of Community Corrections, and the Community Corrections regional directors, and then reduced to writing in the following memorandum dated March 2, 2012, on the subject of "Reduced Travel" (Reduced Travel Memo) from Assistant Secretary Nimer to Community Corrections regional directors and circuit administrators: On 2/29/12 directives were provided for adjustments to be made on some non-critical supervision activities. As these directives are temporary and related to "restricted" policy areas they were given verbally; existing written policy will not be changed. Our goal is to reduce the travel budget by focusing on mission critical activities without compromising public safety. Travel related to core operational duties will continue; however all travel will be reviewed for efficiency. NO adjustments have been made to travel that involves investigation of known or suspected violations, violation proceedings/subpoenas, investigations or instruction of offenders in correctional facilities. Adjustments are focused on reduction of department established minimum contact standards and administrative duties. There is an urgent need to reduce travel costs for the remainder of the fiscal year; however public safety is the utmost priority and supervisors maintain the discretion to approve any travel that is needed to accomplish officer safety and protection of the community. For the months that adjustments are in place (March, April, May and June) officers will annotate electronic field notes for offenders requiring field contacts during the month, as follows: CN--"Contact Standards Adjusted". Alternative methods to verify (and re-verify) residence and employment during this period, including making telephone calls to the landlord and employer or instructing the offender to provide bills and paychecks to show proof of residence and employment will be utilized. Contact codes for purposes of electronic case notes for residence and employment verification will be HV, EN, or EV and text should indicate the alternative method utilized for verification. Planned Compliance Initiatives will continue; partnerships established with local law enforcement remain essential to enhance surveillance and contacts made in the community. These contacts should always be documented in case notes. Circuit Administrators are directed to reach out to judiciary, state attorney and law enforcement to ensure that they are aware of the limited scope of this reduction and that contacts required to ensure offender supervision and/or threats to public safety will not be compromised. Thank you for your cooperation during this difficult time. The Reduced Travel Memo was distributed to probation officers as the means by which Respondent communicated to its probation officers that they would not be expected to comply with all of the minimum contact requirements set forth in Procedure 302.303 between March 1, 2012, through the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 2012. The expectation was, at the time of the challenged statement, that this cost-saving measure was temporary and that the (unpromulgated) minimum contact requirements in Procedure 302.303 would resume as of the new fiscal year beginning July 1, 2012. As of the final hearing on June 6, 2012, Respondent's expectation was unchanged. The announced temporary replacement of minimum contact requirements based on risk category with a procedure for supervisor review and approval of field contacts remained just that--temporary--and the expectation was that the minimum contact standards set forth in Procedure 302.303 would resume for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2012. Petitioner hinted at, but offered no evidence to prove the notion that Respondent did not really intend to resume the minimum contact standards in the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2012.4/ The Reduced Travel Memo and a March 2, 2012, letter from Secretary Kenneth S. Tucker (Tucker Letter), represent the challenged agency statements in that these two documents memorialize the temporary directive.5/ As explained in the Tucker Letter: Due to a 79 million dollar deficit, the Department has had to make temporary modifications to field contact requirements in order to reduce travel expenditures by probation officers. . . . Our probation officers will continue to make field contacts with sex offenders and community control offenders in order to closely monitor sex offender conditions and/or house arrest requirements. Probation officers will continue to monitor other supervised offenders' compliance with conditions of supervision and probationers will still be required to meet monthly with their probation officer at the office. In addition, probation officers will make field contacts in the community as necessary to investigate non-compliance or possible violations. Probation officers will also continue to participate with law enforcement in Planned Compliance Initiative (PCI's) in the community. Probation officers will use this opportunity to spend more time with offenders in the office or on the telephone, assisting with job referrals or other resources and services needed. Community Corrections undertook an analysis of its budget in an effort to identify expenditures where cost savings might be realized to help reduce the budget deficit. The three significant budget categories of expenditures were salaries, leases, and expenses. There had been a hiring freeze in place for some time already, and so an effort was made to not cut personnel to save salary costs. There also had been a concerted effort to reduce lease costs by consolidating offices to eliminate some leases. The viable short-term option to cut costs for the remainder of the fiscal year was in the expense category, which was predominately travel reimbursement. It was determined that, over the year, Community Corrections was averaging between $250,000 and $300,000 per month in travel reimbursement. Some travel reimbursement had already been reduced before the temporary directive challenged here. For example, Community Corrections personnel, including probation officers, might travel to participate in training programs. However, training had already been greatly limited. Some travel reimbursement could not be reduced, such as reimbursing probation officers for necessary travel for court appearances. In these instances, efforts were made to use state cars and to encourage carpooling, if possible. Community Corrections assessed the number of field contacts and attempted contacts that were being made by probation officers to comply with Respondent's minimum contact standards and the travel reimbursement associated with them (i.e., the contacts). Respondent estimated that its temporary directive, challenged here, would reduce travel costs by $150,000 per month for each of the four months in which the directives would be in place. In total, Respondent expected to save $600,000. Respondent's actual experience following issuance of the Reduced Travel Memo and Tucker Letter shows that Respondent's estimates were on target. In February 2012--the last month before the temporary suspension of some of the minimum contact standards--travel reimbursement totaled $277,000. After switching to a procedure of case-by-case probation officer request and supervisor review to approve field visits, travel reimbursement was down to $99,000 in March 2012, a savings of $187,000, compared to February. In April 2012, travel reimbursement dropped to $80,000. The evidence established that the discretion afforded probation supervisors in the Reduced Travel Memo is true discretion vested in supervisors to review requests and act on a case-by-case basis to approve field visits. That discretion has been exercised on numerous occasions to authorize a field contact. There was no evidence of any probation officer having submitted a request to make a field visit to investigate a possible violation of a probation condition or where there was a public safety issue that was not approved by his or her supervisor. To the contrary, the evidence established that requests are being made and leeway is being provided to probation officers to travel, if they can articulate a reason for doing so. However, for one or two probation officers who do not accept that they must request approval and justify their travel expense on a case-by-case basis and who simply ask for block reinstatement of the minimum contact standards, without articulating any reason why field visits are needed for particular offenders, those requests have been denied. As the Reduced Travel Memo and Tucker Letter suggest, there are other tools available to probation officers besides incurring the expense of field visits, which are often equally effective to accomplish the goal. For example, a field visit to an offender's employer is certainly one way to verify employment and to verify the offender's attendance, but telephone calls may well suffice to obtain the same information at much lower costs. There are also other ways to attempt to verify residence besides a personal home visit. An offender can be required to present documentation, such as a utility bill, rental agreement, or pay stub showing the offender's address. An offender can be made to come in for office visits more frequently than once a month. A probation officer can telephone the offender frequently, and the voice mail message or background noise may give some reason to believe there is a need for a field visit. A probation officer can call family members and neighbors to check on an offender and to verify information. A probation officer can enlist the help of a local law enforcement officer to check on an offender. In short, for the period of Respondent's urgent need to reduce costs, probation officers have been asked to work a little harder and more creatively from their desks, while reserving travel expenses for field visits to the cases where they have some reason to think a field visit is needed. Petitioner presented the testimony of one probation officer specialist, Kimberly Schultz. As a specialist, this officer handles a case load disproportionately made up of sex offender probationers (for whom the temporary directives did not suspend minimum contact standards) and the next category down on the risk scale--maximum offenders. Officer Schultz testified that she believes that public safety is best served by the old minimum contact standards in (unpromulgated) Policy 302.303. Officer Schultz suggested, but failed to prove, that public safety is compromised by the temporary directive. Under the temporary directive, Officer Schultz has only requested approval once from her supervisor to make a field contact based on a suspicion she developed that the offender may be in violation of his probation requirements. That single request was approved. Officer Schultz did not identify any instance in which public safety was jeopardized because a field contact was not allowed. Instead, Officer Schultz spoke to the increased possibility that allowing more travel to make surprise visits to offenders' homes or places of employment would reveal suspicious behavior or incorrect information. Certainly, Officer Schultz has the experience to draw on to offer the view that, in a general sense, increased field visits would serve to increase the possibility of discovering probation violations or other issues with offenders. In an ideal situation with unlimited resources, a probation officer following every move an offender makes could well come to find that the offender is not "liv[ing} without violating the law," as required in a standard probation condition. However, such an ideal situation obviously does not exist. Instead, Respondent has taken action to manage its limited resources. The evidence did not show that Respondent's temporary directive has threatened public safety. Officer Schultz attempted to suggest that, in the single instance when she requested a field contact, she would have discovered sooner that the offender was not living where he said he was, if she had made the minimum field contacts under Procedure 302.303. Her testimony did not bear that out. Officer Schultz testified that an offender assigned to her in March 2012, came in for the required office visits in March and in April, and he filled out the required monthly reports giving his address, telephone number, and other contact information. When the offender came in for his May office visit, the offender was supposed to stay for a drug test, but he left. Officer Schultz tried to call the offender at the number he had provided to check to see if he had misunderstood. That is when she learned that the phone number the offender had given her "wasn't a good number." Officer Schultz requested and was given approval to incur travel to investigate and learned, then, that the offender was not living where he said he was. While Officer Schultz contends that, in the above example, a field visit to verify the offender's address would have identified the problem sooner, Officer Schultz admitted that she had not previously tried to call the offender. Indeed, she said that she never calls her offenders on their cell phones. Thus, instead of incurring travel expense for a field visit, Officer Schultz could have attempted to verify the offender's office report immediately in March through other ways, such as calling the phone number provided and learning much sooner that the offender had provided a phone number that was not good. Officer Schultz might have checked for a home phone number associated with the address the offender gave; she learned when she went there that the offender's cousin lived there, and the cousin volunteered that the offender did not live there. Officer Schultz could have required this offender, and could require all of her offenders, to come into the office multiple times per month. She could have required this offender to bring in a utility bill for his residence, whether in his name or someone else's name. Had Officer Schultz tried alternative verification means, she may have been able to contact the cousin sooner. It was evident from Officer Schultz' testimony that she has become accustomed to operating under the guidance provided in unpromulgated Procedure 302.303 and does not like being asked temporarily to work harder and more creatively from her office to find other ways to conduct surveillance and monitor offenders that do not cost Respondent as much in travel expenses as her travel in the field used to. It seemed that rather than trying to replace the field visit time with alternative investigation techniques, Officer Schultz has done little to fill the gap with constructive methods to monitor her offenders using alternative means. Indeed, when Officer Schultz was asked how she was making use of her new-found office time since she is spending less time in the field, her first response was, "I'm organizing my closed files." Officer Schultz expressed concern that a probation officer could be subject to discipline if he or she were to not follow the temporary directive. However, there was no evidence that any probation officer had refused to request supervisor review and approval for a field visit, much less that discipline resulted. Officer Shultz did not represent that she had refused to follow the temporary directive or that she intended to in the few weeks remaining in the fiscal year. Petitioner's representative testified that the temporary directive harms its 2,100 certified probation officer members, although the directive does not apply to the other approximately 17,000 certified members who serve on the correctional institution side of Respondent. Thus, the temporary directive applies to only about 12 percent of Petitioner's members. Nonetheless, Petitioner's representative asserted that its members are affected by the temporary directive because they are all members of communities with a concern for public safety.

Florida Laws (18) 119.071120.52120.54120.56120.57120.68943.13944.09945.025948.001948.01948.011948.012948.03948.031948.039948.12948.20
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CHARLES T. SCOTT vs. PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, 81-002458RX (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002458RX Latest Update: Dec. 18, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at the Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. In accordance with plea arrangements, Petitioner was convicted of numerous charges of robbery, burglary, sexual battery, and false imprisonment in Circuit Courts in Dade and Broward Counties, Florida. He received numerous and various prison sentences, all of which were to run concurrently with a 99- year sentence. Assuming that Petitioner is eligible for statutory gain time for good behavior, his sentence would expire sometime prior to the year 2080. During July, 1981, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of establishing a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under Parole and Probation Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the severity of the offense committed by the Petitioner, calculate a "salient factor score" and apply various aggravating or mitigating circumstances in determining a recommended PPRD. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious III);" determined a salient factor score of nine based upon prior convictions, total time served, the existence of burglary as a present offense of conviction, the number of prior incarcerations, and the Petitioner's age of first commitment; and applied numerous aggravating circumstances based upon the nature of various of the charges that had been lodged against Petitioner. The examiner recommended a PPRD of March 4, 2092. On August 26, 1981, the Parole and Probation Commission considered the examiner's recommendation and affirmed it. Petitioner is now pursuing a review of the PPRD before the Commission. In promulgating the rules which were in effect when Petitioner'S PPRD was determined, the Parole and Probation Commission sought to isolate factors that would predict the probability of a successful parole outcome. There is no perfect predictive device on a case-by-case basis. An inmate's past behavior and statistical relationships that can be isolated provide the best predictive devices. The Commission's C utilization of a system which first classifies the offense characteristics, then applies a salient factor score and aggravating or mitigating circumstances is designed to set a presumptive parole release date based on an inmate's past behavior and based upon the statistical relationships that have been found to exist. The evidence does not establish that the guidelines adopted by the Commission in its rules which were applied to the Petitioner are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The Parole and Probation Commission has amended the rules which were followed in the setting of the Petitioner's PPRD. The Petitioner continues to be affected, however, by the rules as they existed prior to the amendments because those rules provide the basis for his PPRD.

Florida Laws (3) 120.56947.165947.172
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs MICHELLE F. MANN, 98-002918 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jul. 01, 1998 Number: 98-002918 Latest Update: May 13, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 943.1395(6), (7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(c) and 11B-20.0012(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Michelle Mann (Mann), was certified by the Petitioner, Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Department) on October 11, 1991, and was issued Correctional Probation Officer Certificate Number 122933 and Instructor Certificate Number 595-40-7895. Mann was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections as a correctional probation officer in December 1994 until her resignation in February 7, 1997. Dwight Williams, aka Dwight Moment is an inmate with the Florida Department of Corrections. In December 1994, Dwight Williams was on probation with the Florida Department of Corrections for the charge of conspiracy to traffic cocaine. Mann was assigned as Mr. Williams' probation officer on December 18, 1994. This was the first time that Mr. Williams and Mann had met. From December 1994 through December 1996, Mann was Mr. Williams' supervising probation officer. Between December 1994 and November 27, 1996, Mann initiated and engaged in a physical relationship with Mr. Williams, which included hugging, kissing, and sexual relations. During this time, Mann and Mr. Williams went to hotel rooms and had sexual relations between fifteen and twenty times.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED a Final Order be entered revoking Michelle F. Mann's Correctional Probation Certificate Number 122933 and Instructor Certificate Number 595-40-7895. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James D. Martin, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michelle Mann 1556 Northwest 5th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-20.001211B-27.001111B-27.005
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs. WILLIAM M. FLOYD, 88-004789 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004789 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 1989

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations concerned herein, Respondent, William M. Floyd has been certified as a corrections officer in Florida under certificate number C- 7585, dated May 23, 1980. He had been certified prior to that time under another Commission procedure. The Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying law enforcement and corrections officers in Florida. Throughout the majority of the year 1986, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer at the Department of Corrections' Tampa Corrections Work Release Center. When he was arrested for grand theft during 1986, he advised his boss that he intended to plead not guilty. Because of his prior eight years of good work and based on his representations, he was not discharged and was allowed to keep his employment. Approximately six months later, Respondent was hospitalized for what his doctors thought was cancer of the spine. While he was in the hospital, his attorneys convinced him that due to his poor health, it would be to his advantage to plead nolo contendere and avoid the stress of a trial and thereafter negotiated an arrangement with the state attorney that in exchange for the plea of nolo contendere, adjudication of guilt would be withheld and Respondent would be placed on two years probation. Respondent entered that plea in open court on November 10, 1986 in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County and was placed on two years probation. He was promised that at the successful completion of his term of probation, his record would be sealed from the public but not from law enforcement officials. Respondent is looking forward to that happening. After his court appearance, Respondent resigned from his position as a corrections officer with the Department of Corrections, he claims, due to his poor health. On December 4, 1986, the Department of Corrections advised the Petitioner, Commission, however, that Respondent had resigned his position due to the fact that he was placed on two years probation for grand theft. The documentation in question was not presented at the hearing, however, but the basis for Respondent's resignation is irrelevant. The seminal issue here is Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to a felony and of that there is no question. Respondent is not now employed as a corrections officer or in any law enforcement capacity. As a result, he does not need his certification. However, because of the nature of the charges against him, and what he believes is a lack of culpability on his part, (not further explained); and because he may some day again want to work as a corrections officer, he wants to keep his certification.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the certification of Respondent, WILLIAM M. FLOYD, as a corrections officer be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William M. Floyd Post Office Box 1084 Gibsonton, Florida 33534 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (4) 120.57812.014943.13943.1395
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. THEODORE RILEY, 86-001734 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001734 Latest Update: Aug. 26, 1986

Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed May 28, 1986, Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) charged that Respondent, Theodore Riley (Riley), while employed as an adjuster by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Group, (USF&G), did wrongfully obtain the sum of $400 from a workmens compensation claimant to assure that USF&G would not contest the claim (Count I). The complaint further alleged that on September 16, 1985, Riley entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging a violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes, a felony of the second degree and a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the court withheld adjudication and placed Riley on 18 months probation (Count II). The Department concluded that such conduct demonstrated, inter alia, a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance; fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit; and, a plea of nolo contendere to a felony involving moral turpitude. Section 626.611(7),(9) and (14), Florida Statutes. At hearing, Riley entered a plea of no contest to Count II of the Administrative Complaint in exchange for the Department's dismissal of Count I of the Administrative Complaint and the Department's agreement that the penalty imposed would be limited to a suspension of his eligibility for licensure for a period of two (2) years. While not conditioning his agreement to a two year suspension, Riley did request that the Department consider crediting the time he has been on probation against the two year suspension. The evidence shows that Riley was arrested and charged with the subject offense in March 1985, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere, that adjudication of guilt was withheld, and that he was placed on probation for 18 months commencing September 16, 1985. As a special condition of probation, Riley was ordered not to apply for an adjuster's license during the term of his probationary period. Consistent with the terms of his probation, Riley has not renewed his adjusters' license. The Department's records reflect that Riley's license was last due for renewal, but not renewed, on April 1, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 626.611812.014
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NWEZI A. NONYELU vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 00-001733 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Apr. 24, 2000 Number: 00-001733 Latest Update: Aug. 15, 2000

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an exemption from disqualification to work in positions of special trust.

Findings Of Fact In November 1999, Petitioner was employed by Angels Unaware, Inc., as a caretaker of children or the developmentally disabled. Such a position is a position of trust. By letter dated November 29, 1999, Angels Unaware, Inc., notified Petitioner that it had received information that was disqualifying and, thus, he was ineligible for continued employment as a caretaker of children, disabled adults, or elderly persons. However, in the letter, Petitioner was advised of his right to seek an exemption from disqualification from the licensing agency. Thereafter, Petitioner requested an exemption from disqualification. At all times, pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the state agency responsible for receiving and approving or denying applications for exemptions from disqualification to work in a position of trust. After receiving Petitioner's request for exemption, Respondent conducted the required background screening of Petitioner. The background screening revealed that Petitioner had been arrested and convicted of possession and delivery of cocaine. As a result of Petitioner's conviction, Respondent denied Petitioner's request for exemption. According to the background screening report, Petitioner was convicted of possession and delivery of cocaine on April 2, 1996. The incident that resulted in the conviction occurred on or about January 20, 1995, the day Petitioner was arrested. Following his arrest, Petitioner was charged with possession and delivery of cocaine. On May 1, 1995, Petitioner pled guilty to the aforementioned felony. That same day, the court withheld adjudication and placed Petitioner on probation for one year. Pursuant to condition 7 of Petitioner's probation, he was not to use or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Notwithstanding this proscription, on or about September 24, 1995, November 14, 1995, and March 3, 1996, Petitioner violated this condition by using cocaine as evidenced by positive urinalysis and his own admission. As a result of Petitioner's repeated use of cocaine, on April 2, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of violating his probation and was adjudged guilty of possession and delivery of cocaine, the charges for which adjudication had been initially withheld on May 1, 1995. Moreover, Petitioner's one-year probation was revoked and he was placed on drug offender probation for two years. One of the special conditions of the drug offender probation was that Petitioner receive drug treatment until he successfully completed such program. On or about May 15, 1997, Petitioner again used and possessed cocaine in violation of the Order of Drug Offender Probation. Following this violation, on July 17, 1997, the court entered an Order of Modification of Probation. Pursuant to that Order, Petitioner's probation continued under the previous terms and conditions but Petitioner's cost for supervision was waived while he was receiving in-patient drug treatment. Petitioner entered a six-month in-patient drug treatment program in June 1997 and successfully completed the program on December 22, 1997. The court terminated Petitioner's probation on April 1, 1998. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that his using cocaine was a "mistake" and stated that he has been drug-free since June 1997, when he began the six-month drug treatment program. However, Petitioner presented no other witnesses or evidence of his rehabilitation during the two years since his probation was terminated.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from his disqualification from employment in positions of trust or responsibility. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Nwezi A. Nonyelu 6545 Spanish Moss Circle Tampa, Florida 33625 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.57435.04435.07
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ERNEST B. BROWN, 78-002067 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002067 Latest Update: Aug. 29, 1980

Findings Of Fact Ernest Brown is a registered real estate salesman holding a registration issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Brown received notice of the instant hearing as required by the statutes and rules. His probation officer testified she had contacted him and he had advised her that he would not attend the proceedings. Brown was placed on probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, on January 25, 1989 (see Exhibit 2). Paragraph 10 of the conditions of probation requires that Brown serve 180 days in the Pinellas County Jail on weekends from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday. Because of the appeal of his case, Brown did not begin serving this jail term until August 24, 1989. He has served 72 of the 180 days according to the records of his probation officer. Brown is currently in the custody of the State's probation department.

Recommendation The Board's counsel advised the Hearing Officer after hearing that Respondent had surrender his license. This constitutes an ex parte communication of which notice is hereby given to all parties. This fact is immaterial to consideration of the matter at hand. The Board has long taken the position, quite correctly, that surrendering of a license did not impair jurisdiction to consider violations of its statutes by a licensee while licensed. Similarly, surrender of a license cannot terminate the Hearing Officer's consideration of the matter after hearing. The instant case was duly heard and the Recommended Order prepared prior to receipt of any pleadings relative to surrender by Brown of his license. At this point, the Board may accept surrender of the license and dismiss the Administrative Complaint, in which case Brown would be considered not to have had any disciplinary action against him, or the Board may enter its final order based upon the record and this Recommended Order. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the license of Ernest Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Ernest B. Brown 2027 Thirteenth Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33172

Florida Laws (3) 475.25944.08944.17
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