The Issue The issues in this case are whether the allegations in the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Petitioner. On the evening of July 13, 2010, the Respondent was observed driving erratically by Deputy Mark Buswell, an officer of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office. After observing the Respondent driving for a distance, Deputy Buswell executed a traffic stop, at which time he smelled the odor of alcohol on the Respondent. In response to Deputy Buswell's inquiry, the Respondent denied having consumed alcohol. Deputy Buswell asked the Respondent to step out of the truck and observed that the Respondent was unsteady on his feet and swaying. Deputy Buswell then administered a series of sobriety tests to the Respondent. Based on his observations, and his training and experience as a law enforcement officer, Deputy Buswell believed that the Respondent had been driving under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Buswell arrested the Respondent for DUI, a violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes (2010).1/ After the arrest, Deputy Buswell twice asked the Respondent to submit to a breath alcohol test, and, on both occasions, the Respondent declined to take the test. The Respondent had previously been arrested for DUI.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order permanently revoking the certification of Derek C. Floyd as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2012.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent has violated Sections 491.009(2)(h) and (u), Florida Statutes, by failing to timely comply with a prior Board Order and, if so, the determination of an appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, David Pesek, is a licensed Marriage and Family Therapist in the State of Florida, and has been so licensed at all times relevant and material to this proceeding. His license number is NT 192. On September 7, 1988, the Petitioner filed an earlier Administrative Complaint against the Respondent in DPR Case No. 0055334. On February 14, 1990, the Respondent signed a stipulation providing for a stipulated disposition of DPR Case No. 0055334. The Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling approved the stipulated disposition at a meeting on April 27, 1990, and on Nay 23, 1990, a Final Order was rendered in DPR Case No. 0055334. The Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334 included the following pertinent language: Respondent shall pay an administrative fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) to the Executive Director of the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling within sixty (60) days of the filing of the Final Order herein. Respondent shall be placed on probation for one (1) year, with the condition of probation that Respondent's billing records and documents be reviewed by a consulting practitioner. The one (1) year probation shall begin to run when consulting practitioner is approved. Such consultant shall submit a written report to the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling six (6) months following the rendition of the Final Order. The consulting practitioner shall be selected by Respondent, subject to approval of the Board. Pursuant to the terms of the Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334, the deadline for paying the administrative fine was July 23, 1990. On November 27, 1990, the Department of Professional Regulation sent a letter to the Respondent reminding him that he had not complied with the Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334. By letter dated December 6, 1990, and received on December 13, 1990, the Respondent transmitted his check in the amount of one thousand dollars in payment of the fine. 2/ The fine was paid approximately four and a half months after it was due. By letter dated January 23, 1991, the Respondent advised the Chairman of the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling of the name of a consulting practitioner who was willing to perform the review and reporting functions required by the Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334. The letter of January 23, 1991, was two months after the deadline for the consultant's report. By letter dated April 1, 1991, the Respondent was advised by staff of the Department of Professional Regulation that his choice of a consulting practitioner had been approved, that the consultant's report would be due six months from the date of the letter, and that the Respondent's one-year probation period would begin as of the date of the letter. /3
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent did not violate Section 491.009(2)(h), Florida Statutes, and dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint. Concluding that the Respondent did violate Section 491.009(2)(u), Florida Statutes, and finding him guilty of the violation charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint. Imposing a penalty consisting of: (1) an administra- tive fine in the amount of $500.00 (Five Hundred Dollars), (2) issuance of a public reprimand, and (3) a six-month period of probation, which period shall begin on the first day following the Respondent's current probation period and shall be subject to such reasonable conditions of probation as may seem appropriate to the Board. DONE AND ENTERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of January, 1992. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 1992.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came before the Director, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division), and enters this Final Order in the above styled cause pursuant to authority vested by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. LI TAT 1. On September 20, 1997, the Division issued an Administrative Action against Respondent, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 2. On April 15, 1997, an administrative hearing was held in 1 of 6 this matter in Ocala, Florida, before Administrative Law Judge Donald R. Alexander, the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to §120.569 and §120.57(1), Florida Statutes. 3. On May 12, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued his Recommended Order in this cause. IN {e) T The Division hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Findings of Fact, numbered 1 through 9, as set forth in the Recommended Order.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1997), by pleading or having been found guilty of a crime which involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate broker pursuant to license no. 0414405. The last license issued is inactive. On December 15, 1997, Respondent entered into a plea of guilty to aggravated assault and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. Both crimes are third-degree felonies under Sections 784.02(1) and 316.027(1)(a), respectively. The court adjudicated Respondent guilty and sentenced Respondent to two years of community control to be followed by two years probation. Both sentences ran concurrently. The court also imposed miscellaneous fines in the cumulative amount of $255 and ordered Respondent to pay probation costs. On January 13, 1998, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner voluntarily disclosing his plea and conviction. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. Both convictions involve a single incident which occurred on November 23, 1996, at the Draft House, 1615 Lee Road, Orlando, Florida, a bar in Orange County, Florida. Respondent touched the female owner of the bar on her buttocks. The owner's son took offense to the incident. When Respondent left the bar, the owner's son followed Respondent to Respondent's car in the parking lot. The owner's son hit Respondent in the nose with his fist. Respondent got into his car. The owner's son smashed the windshield of Respondent's car with a steel bar. Respondent left the scene to call for help. When Respondent drove away, Respondent's car struck the owner's son. Respondent did not remain at the scene because he feared for his own safety. Respondent stopped a few blocks away and called 911. The extent of injuries of the person struck by Respondent's car was not established at the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f), and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard F. Ronnick 4271 Biltmore Road Orlando, Florida 32804-2201 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues are whether, under section 440.107, Florida Statutes, Petitioner may calculate a penalty assessment for a failure to secure the payment of workers' compensation for one day as though the failure persisted over two years and whether Petitioner may calculate a penalty assessment based on double the statewide average weekly wage (AWW) when the lone uncovered employee earned $10 per hour.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was incorporated in 2008 by Ineido Soler, Sr., and his son, Ineido Soler, Jr. Since the corporation began operations, the wife of Mr. Soler, Jr., Idalmis Pedrero, has served as the office manager of this family-owned company. At all material times, Respondent has contracted with a personnel leasing company to handle employee matters, such as securing the payment of workers' compensation. Ms. Pedrero's responsibilities include informing the employee leasing company of new hires, so the company can obtain workers' compensation coverage, which typically starts the day following notification. On the afternoon of November 22, 2015, Mr. Soler, Jr., telephoned his wife and told her that he and his father had hired, at the rate of $10 per hour, a new employee, Geony Borrego Lee, who would start work the following morning. Customarily, Ms. Pedrero would immediately inform the employee leasing company. However, Ms. Pedrero was working at home because, six days earlier, she had delivered a baby by caesarian section, and she was still recuperating and tending to her newborn. A fatigued Ms. Pedrero did not notify the employee leasing company that day of the new hire. Late the next morning, Ms. Pedrero was awakened by a call from her husband, who asked her if she had faxed the necessary information to the employee leasing company. Ms. Pedrero admitted that she had not done so, but would do so right away. She faxed the information immediately, so that the employee leasing company could add Mr. Lee to the workers' compensation policy, effective the next day, November 24. Uncovered for November 23, Mr. Lee joined three other employees of Respondent and performed roofing work at a worksite. Late in the afternoon of November 23, one of Petitioner's investigators conducted a random inspection of Respondent's worksite and determined that Respondent had secured the payment of workers' compensation for the three other employees, but not for Mr. Lee. The investigator issued an SWO on the day of the inspection, November 23. The SWO contains three parts. First, the SWO orders Respondent to cease work anywhere in the state of Florida. Second, the SWO includes an Order of Penalty Assessment, which does not contain a specific penalty, but instead sets forth the formula by which Petitioner determines the amount of the penalty to assess. Tracking the statute discussed below, the formula included in the SWO is two times the premium that the employer would have paid when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll "during periods for which it has failed to secure the payment of compensation within the preceding 2-year period." Third, the SWO includes a Notice of Rights, which advises Respondent that it may request a chapter 120 hearing. On November 24, Petitioner released the SWO after Respondent had secured the payment of workers' compensation for Mr. Lee. On November 25, the investigator hand delivered to Respondent a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (Request). The Request covers November 24, 2013, through November 23, 2015, and demands records in eight categories: identification of employer, occupational licenses, payroll documents, account documents, disbursements, contracts for work, identification of subcontractors, and documentation of subcontractors' workers' compensation coverage. The Request identifies "payroll documents" as: all documents that reflect the payroll of the employer . . . including . . . time sheets, time cards, attendance records, earning records, check stubs and payroll summaries for both individual employees and aggregate records; [and] federal income tax documents and other documents reflecting the . . . remuneration paid or payable to each employee . . . . The Request adds: The employer may present for consideration in lieu of the requested records, proof of compliance with F.S. 440 by a workers' compensation policy or coverage through employee leasing for all periods of this request where such coverage existed. If the proof of compliance is verified by the Department the requested records for that time period will not be required. The Request warns: If the employer fails to provide the required business records sufficient to enable the . . . Division of Workers' Compensation to determine the employer's payroll for the period requested for the calculation of the penalty provided in section 440.107(7)(d), F.S., the imputed weekly payroll for each employee shall be the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2), F.S., multiplied by 2. The Department shall impute the employer's payroll at any time after ten, but before the expiration of twenty eight business days after receipt by the employer of [the Request]. (FAC 69L-6.028) . . . . On December 11, 2015, Respondent provided the following documents to Petitioner: itemized invoices, including for workers' compensation premiums, from the employee leasing company to Respondent and checks confirming payment, but the invoices and checks are from December 2011; an employee leasing agreement signed by Respondent on August 1, 2014, and signed by the employee leasing company on August 5, 2014; an employee leasing application for Mr. Lee dated November 23, 2015, showing his date of birth as November 20, 1996, his hourly pay as $10, and his hire date as November 23, 2015; and an employee census dated December 1, 2015, showing, for each employee, a date of hire and, if applicable, date of termination. Partially compliant with the Request, this production omitted any documentation of workers' compensation coverage prior to August 1, 2014, and any documentation of payroll except for Mr. Lee's rate of pay. On December 14, 2015, Respondent filed with Petitioner its request for a chapter 120 hearing. On December 30, 2016, Petitioner issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (Amended Assessment), which proposes to assess a penalty of $63,434.48. On the same date, Petitioner transmitted the file to DOAH. Petitioner issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on February 16, 2016, which is mentioned in, but not attached to, the Prehearing Stipulation that was filed on April 26, 2016, but the second amended assessment reportedly leaves the assessed penalty unchanged from the Amended Assessment. In determining the penalty assessment, Petitioner assigned class code 5551 from the National Council on Compensation Insurance because Mr. Lee was performing roofing work; determined that the entire two-year period covered in the Request was applicable; identified the AWW as $841.57 based on information provided by the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity for all employers subject to the Florida Reemployment Assistance Program Law, sections 443.01 et seq., Florida Statutes, for the four calendar quarters ending June 30, 2014; applied the appropriate manual rates for class code 5551 to $841.57, doubled, and divided the result by 100--all of which yielded a result of $31,717.24, which, doubled, results in a total penalty assessment of $63,434.48. There is no dispute that the classification code for Mr. Lee is code 5551, the AWW is $841.57, and the manual rates are 18.03 as of July 1, 2013, 18.62 as of January 1, 2014, and 17.48 as of January 1, 2015. Because Petitioner determined that Respondent had failed to provide sufficient evidence of its payroll, Petitioner calculated the penalty assessment by using the AWW of $841.57, doubled, instead of Mr. Lee's actual rate of $10 per hour. Petitioner's calculations are mathematically correct. For the 5.27 weeks of 2013, the penalty assessment is $3198.58 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 18.03 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 5.27. For the 52 weeks of 2014, the penalty assessment is $32,593.67 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 18.62 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 52. For the 46.44 weeks of 2015, the penalty assessment is $27,326.48 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 17.48 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 46.44. Adding these sums yields a total penalty assessment of $63,118.73, which approximates Petitioner's penalty assessment calculation of $63,434.48. (Mistranscription of difficult-to- read manual rates or a different rule for handling partial weeks may account for the small difference.) Respondent challenges two factors in the imputation formula: the two-year period of noncompliance for Mr. Lee instead of one day's noncompliance and the AWW, doubled, instead of Mr. Lee's $10 per hour rate of pay. Underscoring the differences between the two-year period of noncompliance and double the AWW and the actual period of noncompliance and Mr. Lee's real pay rate, at the start of the two-year period, Mr. Lee was three days past his 16th birthday and residing in Cuba, and Mr. Lee continues to earn $10 per hour as of the date of the hearing. The impact of Petitioner's use of the two-year period of noncompliance and double the AWW is significant. If the calculation were based on a single day, rather than two years, the assessed penalty would be less than the statutory minimum of $1000, which is described below, even if double the AWW were used. One day is 0.14 weeks, so the penalty assessment would be $82.38 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 17.48 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 0.14. If the calculation were based on the entire two years, rather than a single day, the assessed penalty would be about one-quarter of the proposed assessed penalty, if Mr. Lee's actual weekly rate of pay were used instead of double the AWW. Substituting $400 for twice the AWW in the calculations set forth in paragraph 15 above, the penalty would be $760.14 for 2013, $7746.92 for 2014, and $6494.17 for 2015 for a total of $15,001.23. Explaining why Petitioner treated one day of noncompliance as two years of noncompliance, one of Petitioner's witnesses referred to Mr. Lee as a "placeholder" because the real focus of the imputation formula is the employer. The same witness characterized the imputation formula as a "legal fiction," implying that the formula obviously and, in this case, dramatically departs from the much-smaller penalty that would result from calculating exactly how much premium that Respondent avoided by not covering the modestly paid Mr. Lee on his first day of work. Regardless of how Petitioner characterizes the imputation formula, the statutory mandate, as discussed below, is to determine the "periods" during which Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance within the two-year period covered by the Request. The focus is necessarily on the employee found by the investigator to be uncovered and any other uncovered employees. Petitioner must calculate a penalty based on how long the employee found by the investigator on his inspection has been uncovered, determining how many other employees, if any, in the preceding two years have been uncovered, and calculating a penalty based on how long they were uncovered. There is evidence of one or two gaps in coverage during the relevant two years, but Petitioner has failed to prove such gaps by clear and convincing evidence. One of Petitioner's witnesses testified to a gap of one month "probably" from late January to late February 2015. This witness relied on Petitioner Exhibit 2, but it is completely illegible. Ms. Pedrero testified that Respondent had workers' compensation coverage since 2011, except for a gap, which she thought had occurred prior to August 2014, which is the start date of the current policy. This conflicting evidence does not establish by clear and convincing evidence any gap, and, even if a gap had been proved, no evidence establishes the number of uncovered employees, if any, during such a gap, nor would such a gap justify enlarging the period of noncompliance for Mr. Lee. Ms. Pedrero testified that her mother-in-law, Teresa Marquez cleaned the office and warehouse on an occasional basis, last having worked sometime in 2015. Respondent never secured workers' compensation coverage for Ms. Marquez, but she did no roofing work and appears to have been a casual worker, so her periods of employment during the two-year period covered by the Request would not constitute additional periods for which Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence only a single day of noncompliance, November 23, concerning one employee, Mr. Lee, within the relevant two-year period for the purpose of calculating the penalty assessment. Likewise, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence a rate of pay of only $10 per hour for the purpose of calculating the penalty assessment. At no time has Respondent provided payroll records of all its employees for November 23, 2015. Respondent Exhibit E covers payroll for Respondent's employees for a two-week period commencing shortly after November 23, 2015. But the evidence establishes that Mr. Lee's rate of pay was $80 for the day, which, as discussed below, rebuts the statutory presumption of double the AWW.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order determining that Respondent has failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation for one employee for one day within the two-year period covered by the Request and imposing an administrative penalty of $1000. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan Anthony Martin, Esquire Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Daniel R. Vega, Esquire Robert Paul Washington, Esquire Taylor Espino Vega & Touron, P.A. 2555 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, Suite 220 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in Administrative Complaint, as amended? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since April 30, 1982, certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer. He holds certificate number 08-82-002- 01. Respondent is now, and has been since early 1982, employed by the Florida Highway Patrol (hereinafter referred to as the "FHP"). He currently holds the rank of sergeant, a rank he has held since 1986, with the exception of a brief period of time in 1990 when he served as a lieutenant. As a sergeant, Respondent is responsible, on a regular basis, for the direct supervision of eight troopers. There are occasions, however, when as many as 40 troopers are under his supervision. During the time that he has been with the FHP, Respondent has received numerous commendations and his overall work performance has been rated as either satisfactory or above. Only twice during the period of his employment has he been disciplined- - in 1983, for the negligent operation of his FHP vehicle, for which he received a written reprimand, and, more recently, for the incidents which gave rise to the issuance of the instant Amended Administrative Complaint. These incidents all occurred during the time Respondent held the rank of lieutenant. Respondent was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and assigned to the investigative section of the FHP's Troop "E" in Miami on or about February 1, 1990. His duties included working out of uniform (in civilian clothes) investigating driver's license fraud. Among the other investigative lieutenants assigned to Troop "E" with whom Respondent worked were Lieutenants Jimmy Hobbie, Paul Sharpe and Kenneth Glass. Respondent shared an office with Lieutenant Hobbie. They each had their own desk. Lieutenants Sharpe and Glass occupied other nearby offices. Respondent enjoyed a congenial, professional relationship with his fellow investigative lieutenants. At no time did he ever have an exchange of angry or threatening words with them. On at least three separate occasions between February 19, 1990 and April 15, 1990, while in his office and in the presence of Lieutenants Hobbie and Sharpe, with whom, at the time, he was engaged in casual, light conversation injected with attempts at humor, Respondent removed his .38 caliber FHP-issued service revolver from his holster, placed it near the side of his head, pulled the hammer partially back, and, without firing any shots, returned the revolver to his holster. On none of these occasions did Respondent intend to harm or threaten anyone. He was simply trying to be funny. Neither Hobbie nor Sharpe, however, were amused by Respondent's careless and potentially dangerous display of his firearm. 1/ To the contrary, they were troubled by Respondent's actions, but they did not express their concerns to Respondent. On March 30, 1990, Respondent displayed a firearm in arresting an individual named Mark Barken for driver's license fraud. Prior to locating and arresting Barken, Respondent had been told by Barken's brother that Barken was a heroin addict and that Barken had recently threatened the brother with a shotgun and told the brother that he was going to kill him and his wife. Based upon the information he had been provided by the brother, Respondent considered Barken to be an unstable, dangerous and violent individual. Therefore, when he received a tip that Barken was at a drug treatment and rehabilitation facility in Perrine, he asked Lieutenant Hobbie to accompany him to the facility to assist in arresting Barken. Hobbie agreed to provide such backup support. Respondent and Lieutenant Hobbie drove to Perrine and waited together outside the facility for Barken to leave. After a while, Respondent left the surveillance area for brief moment. When he returned, Hobbie advised him that Barken, or at least someone who looked like Barken, had just left the facility. Respondent thereupon got into his FHP vehicle and drove off in the direction Hobbie had told him Barken was headed. Hobbie remained behind in the surveillance area. Shortly thereafter Respondent spotted Barken, who was with a companion. As Respondent approached the two, they ran across the street into a parking lot. Respondent followed them. As he pulled into the lot, he identified himself as a law enforcement officer 2/ and ordered Barken and his companion to stop, turn around and face him with their hands up. The pair stopped, but they did not comply with Respondent's other directives, even after these directives had been given several times. Believing that it would be prudent to do so, Respondent took a shotgun with him as he exited the vehicle and initially held it in a port-arms position in an effort to gain control of the situation. Ultimately, Respondent did gain control of the situation. When Lieutenant Hobbie arrived on the scene, Barken and his companion were laying face down on the pavement and Respondent was pointing a shotgun in their direction. 3/ Following Hobbie's arrival, Respondent placed the shotgun back in his vehicle and Barken and his companion were taken into custody. On or sometime between April 16, 1990, and April 20, 1990, while seated at his desk in the office he shared with Lieutenant Hobbie, Respondent jokingly pointed his revolver out the open doorway of the office and in the direction of a reception area. As he did so, he commented to Hobbie, who was in the office with him, "Wonder what he would do if he would, you know, look up and see me pointing this gun at him." From where he was situated, Hobbie was unable to see the person to whom Respondent was referring. After making this comment, Respondent put the gun back in his holster. At around lunchtime, on or sometime between April 16, 1990, and April 20, 1990, Respondent walked into Lieutenant Sharpe's office and the two began to engage in a friendly conversation. Their discussion centered upon their plans for lunch. During the conversation, Respondent was standing immediately in front of the desk at which Sharpe was seated. At some point in their discussion, Respondent decided that he needed to tuck his shirt in his pants. Before loosening his pants, he unholstered his service revolver and laid the revolver on Sharpe's desk. As Respondent placed the revolver on the desk, he carelessly pointed the barrel of the gun in Sharpe's direction and pulled the hammer partially back. Sharpe reacted by quickly changing his position to avoid being in the line of fire in the event the revolver discharged. Respondent saw Sharpe's reaction. He immediately removed the revolver from the desk and placed it back in his holster without bothering to tuck in his shirt. Although concerned about this incident, Lieutenant Sharpe did not discuss his concerns with Respondent; 4/ however, he did report the incident shortly after it had occurred to Randy Snow, who was his, as well as Respondent's, immediate supervisor. 5/ On April 25, 1990, Respondent and Lieutenants Hobbie, Sharpe and Glass were standing in close proximity to one another in the secretarial area of Troop "E" headquarters and engaged in informal and friendly conversation when Respondent, in response to a remark make by Hobbie and in an effort to be humorous, removed his service revolver from his holster, pointed it at Hobbie's head and pulled the hammer partially back. Hobbie turned his head to the side and ducked. Glass threw his hands up and exclaimed, "That's loaded," in response to which Respondent stated, "I know it is." Respondent then put the revolver back in his holster. At the time of this April 25, 1990, incident, an internal investigation of Respondent's conduct was already underway. During the course of the investigation, Respondent, who had not yet completed his probationary period as a lieutenant, was returned to the rank of sergeant and placed on "administrative duty." Following the conclusion of the investigation, Respondent was dismissed by the FHP on the ground that he was unfit for duty. The FHP subsequently determined that it did not have just cause to dismiss Respondent for fitness deficiencies. Accordingly, pursuant to a settlement agreement with Respondent, it rescinded Respondent's dismissal and instead suspended Respondent for ten days without pay for the improper display of a weapon. In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement, Respondent successfully participated in the FHP's Employee Assistance Program. He also took a firearms retraining course, which he also successfully completed. Since Respondent's return to work, his overall work performance has been rated as exceeding performance standards and he has received a letter of commendation from his supervisor. There have not been any reoccurrences of the improper conduct for which he was suspended. Apparently, he has mended his ways. He is today considered to be an effective, hard working and honest law enforcement officer who is an asset to the FHP.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Respondent guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character," in violation of Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, by virtue of his having engaged in the conduct described in Findings of Fact 10, 18, 19 and 21 of this Recommended Order, and (2) issuing him a written reprimand and placing him on probation for a period of two years, during which time he shall be required to undergo firearms training and meet any other terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of April, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1993.
