Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Tallahassee, Florida, on September 23, 1963, and continued in employment until May 5, 1979. (The suggestion by Petitioner that he had 24 to 27 days of leave accrued upon the last day of his employment is not utilized in determining the official termination date of employment. Beyond May 5, 1979, Petitioner was entitled to be paid for leave time, but was no longer obligated to perform as a firefighter, having been terminated effective May 5, 1979.) During his service as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Petitioner received a certificate of tenure in 1974, pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes. This provision has been referred to as the savings clause or grandfather clause and allows firefighters who were employed upon the effective date of that section to be certified without the necessity of complying with provisions of law related to certification through training and examination. Section 633.41, Florida Statutes became effective in 1969, thus Petitioner was certified by the terms and conditions of that provision. Petitioner left his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department to pursue private business and for reason of family obligations. Having terminated his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department on a voluntary basis, there was no prohibition against reapplying for employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department at some future date. That eventuality occurred when the petitioner contacted the Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department in April, 1981 to discuss the possibility of reemployment. The Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department then and now is one Edwin C. Ragans. Shortly after this discussion with Chief Ragans, and in the same month, April, 1981, Ragans hired Petitioner with the effective date of Petitioner's reemployment being July 21, 1901. The delay between April and July was caused by the petitioner's need to conclude certain business undertakings before assuming his duties as a firefighter. The State of Florida, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, had been informed of the date of original employment for the Petitioner, September 23, 1963, and the date of termination, May 5, 1979, based upon a notice of termination which was submitted by Chief Ragans in behalf of the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 1 admitted into evidence. Likewise, the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training was made aware of the reemployment of the Petitioner through the filing of a form known as Qualification of New Employee. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 2 admitted into evidence. That exhibit reflects the date of reemployment or rehiring as being July 21, 1981, and further notes that the initial employment was September 23, 1963. That form does not allude to the date of original termination of employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department which was May 5, 1979. When Petitioner returned to employment in July, 1981, Chief Ragans made mention of the "two year rule", which is a reference to Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code, (1976), dealing with the idea that firefighters who had been employed with an employing agency, such as the Tallahassee Fire Department, would not have to reapply for certification in this same fashion as the person seeking initial employment as a firefighter, if that former individual resumed full time paid employment with the employing agency within a period of two years immediately subsequent to termination of the initial employment. In this connection Ragans told the Petitioner at the point of reemploying the Petitioner in 1981, that Petitioner had two options. First, he could challenge the examination related to firefighters and gain certification or if that choice was not made it would be necessary for the Petitioner to go through a minimum standards class before recertification. At the commencement of reemployment, Petitioner was mindful of the existence of the two year provision pertaining to continuing certification for those persons who had not been away from employment as a firefighter for more than two years. Furthermore, this topic had been discussed between Petitioner and some other individuals of the fire department on one occasion. Under these circumstances, Petitioner contacted an official within the training division of the Tallahassee Fire Department and obtained books necessary to study in preparation for standing the examination for certification as a firefighter. Petitioner had commenced preparation for the examination when he happened to see Bobby Presnell a lieutenant within the Tallahassee Fire Department and president of the local firefighters union. In the course of this conversation with Presnell, Petitioner mentioned that he was going to have to be examined through a test before receiving certification. Presnell indicated that he would check into the situation and find out exactly what would be necessary to obtain certification. A couple of weeks after that conversation, Presnell called the Petitioner and told him that he had spoken with Olin Greene the then Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal in the state of Florida. Presnell reported to the Petitioner that in the course of the conversation between Greene and Presnell, Greene had stated that the Petitioner was a certified fireman. These conversations between Petitioner and Presnell occurred some time in August or September, 1981. Presnell testified that the discussion between Presnell and Greene concerned the problem which Petitioner had with the two year requirement for continuing certification without the necessity of testing or schooling. In testimony, Presnell indicated that he told Greene that the Petitioner had been reemployed and everything was "supposed to be okay, and then a month or two or three later the problem arose", meaning a certification problem. Greene, according to Presnell, stated that he would get back in contact with Presnell on this subject. Again, per the testimony of Presnell, some ten days to two weeks later, beyond the initial discussion between Greene and Presnell, Greene called Presnell and told him that as far as he, Greene, was concerned, and the Fire Marshal's office was concerned, that "They didn't have any problem with Mr. Adams' recertification or certification." Greene has no recollection of any conversation with Presnell on the subject of the certification situation related to the Petitioner. Having considered the testimony of Presnell and Greene, the Presnell testimony is accepted as factually correct. Following the occurrence wherein Presnell related remarks attributed to Greene as described before, a few days after those events, Petitioner had a discussion with District Fire Chief Raymond Love of the Tallahassee Fire Department. In this conversation Love describes a discussion which he claims to have taken place between himself and Buddy Dewar, whose actual name is Dennis Dewar, in which Dewar is reported to have said that Petitioner was certified. At that time Dewar was the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. At present he is the Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal, having been promoted to that position in April 1982. In testimony, Love's account of the Dewar conversation concerning certification of the Petitioner, was that in the course of a fireman's convention in October 1981, Dewar asked Love if he knew Jimmy Adams, and Love replied in the affirmative. Given this opening, Love then related that he was impressed with Adams as a person and in terms of his capabilities as a firefighter. Love then recounts that he began to tell Dewar that there was a problem related to the Adams certification and if there was any help that Dewar could give, it would be most appreciated. To which, according to Love, Dewar replied that "he didn't see any problem with the recertification." Dewar, per Love's comments, did not state that he considered the Petitioner to be certified at the time of that conversation, nor was the two-year requirement pertaining to the return to the employment roles, to remain in a certified position without reapplication for certification mentioned in the Dewar conversation with Love, according to Love. Dewar, in his testimony, denied that the conversation between Love and Dewar concerned the Petitioner. His recollection is that Love asked Dewar how long the retention of certification would be valid for, to which he responded two years. Having considered the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses, a decision cannot be reached on which of the witnesses Love or Dewar should be believed pertaining to the conversation which took place between them in October, 1981. Following discussion with Chief Love, and particularly on the next morning after that discussion, Petitioner talked to another fire chief within the Tallahassee Fire Department, whose name is Revel. This conversation was instituted by Revel in his inquiry of the petitioner on the subject of whether Petitioner was studying for the examination for certification. In response Petitioner stated that he had been but that he had found out the night before that he was certified. Revel in turn told Chief Ragans of this conversation and Ragans summoned the Petitioner to his office and the conversation between Love and Petitioner on the question of certification was recounted for the benefit of Chief Ragans. Petitioner and Love indicate that in the course of the meeting with Ragans, Ragans made a phone call and having concluded that phone call, stated that Petitioner did not have any problem with certification, or something to that effect, as Love recalls Ragans comments. Petitioner's recollection of the comment after the phone call was that Chief Ragans said, "You are a certified fireman." Ragans, in his testimony, does not relate having phoned someone on the topic of certification of the Petitioner in the presence of Petitioner and Love as previously described. His recollection is to the effect that some time prior to Love having stated in the fleeting between Ragans, Love and the Petitioner, that Dewar had confirmed Petitioner's status as a certified firefighter, he, Ragans, had talked to a Mr. Schaffner, Standards Coordinator, at the State of Florida, Fire College, and Schaffner had indicated that the time which Petitioner had been out of employment as a firefighter in a Florida department, was so close to being within the two years allowed, that Petitioner would not be required to go back through the certification process. At the time this case was placed at issue Schaffner had died. Having considered Ragans comments in the context of the other proof, it is determined that Ragans was sufficiently acquainted with Schaffner's voice to identify Schaffner in the course of the telephone conversation on the topic of the Petitioners certification. It is also concluded that this was the only conversation which Ragans had with officials within the State of Florida, Office of the State Fire Marshal, during 1981. Whether this conversation between Ragans and Schaffner occurred while Petitioner and Love were in Ragans office is uncertain. Benjamin E. Mclin, inspector with the Fire Department, speaks in terms of a conversation which he had with Olin Greene in October 1981, in the course of a seminar. Mclin introduced himself to Greene and, Greene is reputed, according to Mclin, to have asked Mclin if he knew Jimmy Adams, the Petitioner, and to have asked what kind of person Adams was. Mclin reports that he replied that he thought that Petitioner was an outstanding person as well as an impressive fireman, to which Mclin says that Greene stated, "Well, I know I did the right thing." Greene has no recollection of this conversation. Having considered the comment, even if it can be attributable to Greene, it is sufficiently ambiguous that it has no value in resolving the certification issue related to the Petitioner. After the conversation with Chief Ragans and Chief Love, which took place in Ragans office, Petitioner assumed that he was certified without the necessity of standing examination to receive certification. He had received no written indication from Respondent confirming or denying this understanding and had never personally spoken to anyone in the employ of the Respondent, on this subject. Petitioner continued his duties throughout 1981, into the beginning of 1984, serving in the capacity as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department. At that point, Petitioner had been promoted to Lieutenant within the Fire Department, and in the face of that action, a grievance was filed by another firefighter employed by the Tallahassee Fire Department indicating that Petitioner was not a certified firefighter. Ragans, in response to the grievance contacted Paul R. Steckle who was employed with the Office of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as a Field Representative Supervisor. Steckle had been asked by Dewar to check the Petitioner's file to determine the period of time between the termination of initial employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department and reemployment with that employer. Having made this check Steckle believed that the period was beyond the two years and reported this finding to Dewar. In conversation with Ragans, Steckle had asked Ragans when Petitioner had been employed and Ragans had indicated that Petitioner had been rehired in April but did not report to work until July, 1981. Steckle told Ragans that if Petitioner had been hired in April, 1981, and had been granted a leave of absence, allowing Petitioner to start work in July, 1981, that the reemployment would have been within the two year limit. Ragans indicated that the City of Tallahassee had no policy of allowing a leave of absence such as inquired about by Steckle. Nonetheless, Ragans got the impression that petitioner was duly certified based upon remarks made by Steckle. On January 30, 1984, Ragans wrote Steckle verifying that Petitioner had not returned to work in April, in view of commitments which would not allow him to be actually at work until July. (Mention is made of 1979, but it is determined that Ragans is referring to 1981.) This correspondence also mentions the conversation between Ragans and Schaffner. A copy of the correspondence is Respondent's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence. On February 22, 1984, Steckle wrote to the Petitioner and advised the Petitioner that a review of the records of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training revealed that the Petitioner had been out of fire service for over two years before reemployment. This correspondence refers to May 5, 1979, as the date of termination and July 21, 1981, as the date of reemployment. It alludes to the fact that Petitioner must regain certification through provisions of Rule 4A-37.52, Florida Administrative Code, (1981) 1/ related to an equivalency examination and encloses a copy of the package related to that examination process. It requests that the examination be taken in April, 1984. Otherwise, it is indicated in the correspondence, the Petitioner would be terminated from employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department upon request from the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training to the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 14, admitted into evidence. On April 10, 1984, through correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel for the petitioner, the case is discussed and the Petitioner is requested to stand the equivalency examination and it alludes to the fact that in view of the error of the Respondent in failing to note at the time of reemployment that Petitioner had been away from fire fighting for more than two years, Petitioner is given until February 22, 1985, to undergo an equivalency examination for purposes of recertification. In lieu of this disposition, Petitioner is afforded the opportunity for a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes hearing, which he availed himself of, leading to the present Recommended Order. A copy of the April 10, 1984 correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 15 admitted into evidence. Luther Richter had been employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department and was dismissed from that employment after being arrested on a federal drug smuggling charge. He subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to the charge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in 1976 and was given a three year probation. In April of 1979 he applied to the Tallahassee Fire Department to be reemployed. Through the reemployment paperwork, Chief Ragans recommended that Richter not be accepted based upon an alleged lack of good character. In response, Dewar, the then Bureau Chief of the Fire College, wrote Ragans on May 22, 1979 stating that Richter was not eligible for employment because of his drug conviction. Another letter was sent on June 15, 1979, from Dewar to Ragans to the same effect. On July 17, 1979, Dewar requested a legal interpretation of the Richter situation from the point of view of the Respondent's duties in considering the question of Richter's certification as a firefighter in Florida. On September 10, 1979, the City of Tallahassee and Richter entered into an agreement for Richter's reinstatement as an employee with the City of Tallahassee. In the face of the action of the City of Tallahassee, the Respondent accepted Richter for purposes of certification as if he had never been dismissed. As stated in the October 16, 1979 correspondence from Olin Greene to Daniel E. A. Kleman, City Manager of the City of Tallahassee, with Richter's reinstatement as an employee of the City of Tallahassee the Respondent would ". . . have no alternative but to accept the reinstatement order and allow his certification that was in effect prior to September 1, 1975, to come back into effect." The agreement for reinstatement can be found as part of the composite exhibit number 6 of the Petitioner, admitted into evidence. The October 16, 1979 correspondence may also be found within that document. Those items are copies of the originals. In furtherance of Greene's perception, Richter having been reinstated by the City of Tallahassee was deemed by the Respondent never to have left employment. Richter's certification continues from September 1, 1975, the dismissal date, and his initial certification remains valid to this date as established in the correspondence of Olin Greene to Kleman dated January 9, 1980, a copy of which is found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit number 6. In essence, Respondent felt that in view of the reinstatement it could not refuse to recognize Richter's certification as if it had never lapsed between the interim period of his dismissal in 1975 and the agreement for reinstatement in 1979. In early 1984 a minimum standards training course for firefighters in Florida was taught at Indian River Community College. An unusually high failure rate was experienced by those students who took that course and this led to an investigation by the State Fire College. Through the investigation it was learned that one of the instructors in the minimum standards course had not been properly certified. To resolve this problem, all students who attended that course were required to take further training with a certified instructor. Following that additional training session, another examination was given and those persons who passed the second examination, in addition to those persons who had passed the initial examination, were certified. Those who failed the second examination were not accepted for certification. On other occasions where tenured firefighters, as recognized by Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, have gone beyond the two year time period for reemployment and continuing certification without examination, those firefighters have had to stand the examination, without exception.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application for certification as a firesafety inspector.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an applicant for certification as a firesafety inspector. In order to be certified, Petitioner was required to successfully complete the Firesafety Inspector Training Course and pass a firesafety inspector certification examination. Petitioner successfully completed his required coursework at the Florida State Fire College and Daytona State College. To pass the written examination, an applicant must achieve a score of at least 70 percent. Petitioner took the exam the first time and did not receive a passing score. After a month or so, Petitioner took a "retest." He received a score of 68 on the retest, which is below the minimum passing score of 70. By letter dated October 11, 2011, Respondent notified Petitioner that he did not receive a passing grade on the retest. The notice also informed Petitioner that because he failed both the initial and retake examinations, it would be necessary for him to repeat the Inspection Training Program before any additional testing can be allowed. The notice further informed Petitioner that if he enrolled in another training program, he would have to submit a new application. Petitioner submitted a letter which was received by the Department on September 27, 2011, in which he raised concerns about the quality of instruction he received at Florida State Fire College. Petitioner asserted that in two classes he took, the instructors had not taught the class before. He also asserted that the books used for class were not always the books used for testing, and that he believed that some of the state inspector test questions were irrelevant to how or what he would need to know in performing an actual inspection. Attached to this letter were five questions which had been marked as being answered incorrectly on the examination. Petitioner's letter and attachments were treated as a request for administrative hearing, which was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings, which resulted in this proceeding. Marshall Shoop took classes with Petitioner at the Florida State Fire College. It was also Mr. Shoop's understanding that at least one instructor had never taught the class before. Karl Thompson is the Standard Supervisor for the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. At hearing, Mr. Thompson reviewed each question offered by Petitioner and the answer Petitioner thought to be correct. Mr. Thompson concluded that Petitioner answered each of the five questions incorrectly. Mr. Thompson explained that the firesafety test is a secure document and, pursuant to a contract with a third party, persons who take the test and later review their incorrect answers are not allowed to write down the questions or copy anything from the test. The test must remain secure so that it is not compromised. The test questions and answers are not in evidence. Petitioner has been shadowing a part-time fire inspector for the City of Flagler Beach. Martin Roberts is the Fire Chief for the City of Flagler Beach. Chief Roberts would feel comfortable with Petitioner taking on the role of fire inspector despite Petitioner's grades on the fire safety inspector certification examination. While attending Daytona State College, Petitioner earned an "A" in a building construction course and a "B+" in a course in "construction codes and materials rating."
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for certification as a Firesafety Inspector, and permitting Petitioner to repeat the required coursework before retaking the Firesafety Inspector certification examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of State Fire Marshal (the Department), properly administered and graded the Firefighter Minimum Standards practical examination taken by Petitioner, Catalina Williams (hereinafter Williams).
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility for testing, monitoring and certifying firefighters. The Department conducts certification examinations at the Florida State Fire College in Ocala, Florida, and some thirty-plus other sites around the State. Those sites are located on college campuses, training facilities, fire stations, and other locales. The test at issue in this proceeding was administered at the Fire College site. Catalina Williams is an Hispanic woman who desires to become a certified firefighter. Her interest in firefighting began when she worked as a photographer covering fire-related events for a magazine and thought it would be exciting and interesting to be on “the front line.” Williams has also served as a caregiver, giving her experience in providing assistance to others, and is a certified lifeguard. In order to accomplish her goal of becoming a firefighter, Williams entered into schooling to learn the trade. Williams first attended First Coast Technological College (First Coast) in 2009. She completed the Firefighter Minimum Basic Standards Course (Firefighter I) that year. In 2010, she enrolled at the school for the summer semester to begin training in the advanced (Firefighter II) curriculum. That school term was shorter and more compressed than a regular semester. Despite her best efforts, Williams did not successfully complete the Firefighter II course. Rochford was one of her instructors during her first unsuccessful enrollment at First Coast. In 2012, Williams entered First Coast again. At that time, she was working as a paid volunteer firefighter for Volusia County. The county paid her tuition costs at First Coast when Williams entered the school for the Firefighter II course work. The second time, Williams was able to successfully complete the course material and pass her final examination. Passing the final examination was a prerequisite to taking the State certification exam. While attending First Coast, Williams took hundreds of practice exams, especially on the practical portions of the tests. She took exams as part of her classes, took exams voluntarily with someone timing her, and took exams just to practice. The State Certification Exam There are four primary segments of the State certification exam: A written examination of 100 multiple choice questions; A hose evolution involving a self- contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and personal protection equipment (PPE); A ladder/search and rescue evolution; and A skills portion, involving ropes and knots, two fire ground skills, and a short test on the emergency response guide (ERG). The ladder/search and rescue evolution is a practical portion of the exam; it is the singular portion of the test at issue in this proceeding and will be referred to as the ladder evolution. The ladder evolution portion consists of the following tasks and assignments: The candidate inspects ladders hanging on a simulated fire truck. He or she then takes a 24-foot ladder from the truck and extends it against the wall of a building up to the second floor. Once that ladder is properly hoisted, the candidate confirms that a ladder guard (another candidate acting as a spotter) has control of the ladder. The candidate then initiates radio contact and then walks quickly around the building to another ladder that is already in place. He/she must ascend the ladder to the second floor, test the floor inside the building to make sure it is safe, and enter the building through a window. Upon entry the candidate must find a “victim” (a 125-pound mannequin) on the lower floor, secure the victim in an approved manner, and then exit the building with the mannequin. Upon exit, the candidate must safely deposit the victim on the ground and provide notice by way of radio contact that he/she and the victim are outside the building. The radio transmission is something along the lines of: “PAR 2 [Personnel Accountability Reporting, two people]. Firefighter No. “X” and victim have safely exited the building.” The entire ladder evolution sequence must be done within four minutes and 30 seconds although, as will be discussed below, there are differences of opinion as to when the timed portion of the evolution ends. It is necessary for candidates taking the test to pass each of the four sections. Failure of any one portion would result in failure overall. Should a candidate fail the examination, they must reschedule their retest within six months of the failed test. All retest examinations are administered at the Fire College. On test day, there may be dozens of applicants taking the test at the same time. The procedure dictates that candidates arrive at the test facility in time to process paperwork prior to the 7:30 a.m., test commencement. Candidates must first provide identification to an instructor and be assigned a candidate number. They then fill out paperwork, including a waiver should any injuries occur during testing. Candidates will have their gear inspected to make sure it is in compliance with State standards. Prior to commencement of testing, one of the instructors or examiners will read a document called the “Minimum Standards Pre-Exam Orientation” (the Orientation) to the candidates. During the reading of the Orientation, which may take 45 minutes to an hour or more, candidates are allowed and encouraged to ask questions. Unless a question is asked, the Orientation will be read verbatim, word for word, with no additional comment. After the Orientation is read, candidates are walked through the facility so they can familiarize themselves with the test site. Once the test commences, candidates are not allowed to ask any questions. Williams’ Test Experience In October 2012, after successful completion of the Firefighter II course at First Coast, Williams applied for and was approved to take the State certification examination. The exam was conducted at First Coast on the school’s training grounds. The test was conducted by certified employees of the Department. Williams did not pass the examination. One of her shortcomings in that test was a failure in the ladder evolution. Her timed completion of that evolution was in excess of the required time of four minutes and 30 seconds. Williams had been confident she would pass the certification exam because it was similar to the final exam she had passed at First Coast during her schooling. She believes she failed because she was too nervous when she took the exam when it was administered as the actual State certification test. After failing the exam, Williams then applied for a retest which would be held at the Fire College on February 7, 2013. That re-test is the focus of the instant proceeding. On the morning of the retest, Williams arrived well in advance of the 7:30 a.m., start time. As she inspected her gear in anticipation of the start of the exam, she found that the SCBA regulator she was supposed to use did not properly fit the face mask on her helmet. There were extra regulators behind one of the tables being used to process applicants for that day’s test. Examiner Harper was sitting at that table and was providing paperwork to applicants who had already signed in at the first processing station. Williams went to Harper’s table and was allowed to obtain a new regulator. Inasmuch as she was already at Harper’s table getting her replacement regulator before going to the first processing station, Williams went ahead and filled out the paperwork Harper was providing to candidates at his processing station. That is, she filled out the paperwork before actually checking in at the first station. Williams then went to the first check-in table which was manned by Examiner Rochford. She provided her identification to Rochford and was assigned candidate number 37. Rochford then told Williams to go to Harper’s table to fill out the paperwork at that station. Williams told Rochford she had already done so and walked away. (At that point, Williams remembers Rochford yelling at her, asking whether she understood his order and telling her in a harsh manner to obey him. Rochford does not remember talking to Williams at all. Neither version of this alleged confrontation is persuasive. Inasmuch as the conversation was not verified one way or another by a third person -- although there were probably a number of other people around, it will not be considered to have happened for purposes of this Recommended Order.) The Orientation was then read to the candidates. The various portions of the test were addressed in the Orientation. The ladder evolution contained the following language, which Rochford read verbatim to the candidates without anything added or deleted: “Time starts when you touch anything. Time ends when the candidate and victim fully exit the building.” There is no evidence that any of the candidates asked a question concerning this part of the Orientation. Rochford’s timing policy regarding the ladder evolution differs from what he read to the candidates. He takes the position that time stops when the candidate exits the building with the victim, places the victim on the ground in an appropriate manner, and issues a verbal statement into the radio indicating that the firefighter and victim are out of the building. By his own admission, Rochford could not speak to how other examiners handle this timing issue. Harper, who was Williams’ assigned examiner on the test, also seemed to require candidates to lay the victim down and make radio contact before stopping the time. Neither Rochford nor Harper satisfactorily explained why their timing policy was different from what was stated in the orientation. The testimony concerning the correct way of timing the evolution was, at best, confusing. The following statements from the record provide contradictory and disparate opinions by various examiners: Rochford: “As soon as they lay the mannequin on the ground [and] announce they have exited the building . . . the time stops.” Tr. p. 45, lines 9-18 “The mannequin’s feet have got to be outside the plane from the door opening. That’s when the time stops.” Id. Lines 23- 25. “Until they talk on the radio is – - when they finish talking on the radio is when the time would stop.” Tr. p. 255, lines 7-9. Johnson: “At that point, they’ll use one of the prescribed methods for rescue to take the victim and themselves past the threshold out to the fresh air. At that point, the time stops.” Tr. p. 111, lines 11-14 “I read [the Orientation] word for word.” Tr. p. 114, line 23 “On the ladder rescue evolution . . . we [examiners] all stop when they pass the threshold.” Harper: “Then they’re told to lay the victim down, make radio contact you’re out of the building. Time stops.” Tr. p. 138, lines 7-8 “After they make radio contact.” Tr. p. 147, line 3 “[Orientation] says time starts when they touch anything, time ends when the candidate and the victim fully exit the building.” Tr. P. 148, lines 15-17 Hackett: “It stops when the victim comes out of the building.” Tr. p. 222, lines 7-8 [If the victim was thrown out of the building by the firefighter] “I think they would stop the clock.” Id., lines 9-11 “It is part of the timed part that they have to designate that they’re out of the building safely and lay down the victim.” Tr. pp. 222, line 24 through 223, line 1 Question to Hackett: “If [Williams] is coming out and she dropped the victim and picked up -- and presumably picked it up or whatever and then radioed, would that add time?” Answer: “No.” Tr. p. 246, lines 5- 10 Williams was timed by Harper when she took the ladder evolution portion of the exam. According to Harper’s (deposition) testimony, he subscribes to the version of timing that requires the victim to be laid down on the ground and the firefighter to make radio contact. Using that version of timing, Williams received a time of four minutes and 35 seconds for the entire ladder evolution portion of the test. In March, the Department mailed out notices to all the candidates that had tested on February 7. Notices of failure were sent by registered mail, return receipt requested. Williams’ letter was returned to the Department as unclaimed. Williams at some point in time found out from Chief McElroy, head of the Fire Academy, that she had purportedly failed the exam. She began calling examiner Harper in March seeking to find out what portion of the exam she had not successfully completed. She had at least two telephone conversations with Harper in March 2013. On April 4, 2013, the Department re-sent the failure letter to Williams, again by certified mail. This time, the letter was claimed by Williams and she became officially aware that she had not passed the exam. The basis given for Williams’ failure was that she did not complete the ladder evolution within the prescribed time parameters. She was timed at four minutes and 35 seconds, just five seconds beyond the allowable limit. It is her contention that she exited the building with the victim within the four minute/30 second time frame. The basis for her belief is that she has done the test so many times that she knows when she is behind schedule. During the test she did not stumble, drop any equipment, or have any other problem that would have added to her time. So, she concludes, she must have completed the evolution timely. Her personal feelings on the matter, without further corroboration or support, are not persuasive. Harper did not testify at final hearing. The transcript of his deposition taken in this case was admitted into evidence. In that transcript, Harper talks about his policy regarding timing of the evolution. His policy is the same as Rochford’s and is discussed above. He does not specifically say if he employed that policy when timing Williams during her test on February 7, 2013. He does not explain the difference between the Orientation statement about timing and his personal policy. The most persuasive evidence at final hearing established that it would have taken ten to 15 seconds after exiting the building to lay the victim down and make radio contact. The radio contact itself would have taken about four seconds. If Harper had stopped his timing when Williams and the victim broke the threshold of the building, her time would have likely been less than four minutes and 30 seconds. If he used his personal timing policy, then the time of four minutes/35 seconds was probably accurate. Harper deducted points from Williams’ score because of other minor mistakes. The totality of those points would not have caused Williams to fail the test. It was the ladder evolution time that caused the failure. In fact, Williams successfully completed all portions of the re-test except for the timing issue in the ladder evolution portion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of State Fire Marshal, rescinding the failing score on the State Firefighter Certification Examination for Catalina Williams and certifying her as a Firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Seth D. Corneal, Esquire The Corneal Law Firm 904 Anastasia Boulevard St. Augustine, Florida 32080 Michael Davidson, Esquire Department of Financial Services Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has violated various provisions governing public lodging establishments and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a public lodging establishment known as First Street Apartments at 220 South First Street in Immokalee. The license to operate this establishment, which is number 21-00721-H, expired December 1, 1997. However, Petitioner has allowed Respondent to continue to operate under this license until the resolution of pending proceedings against the license. First Street Apartments comprise 84 residential units in buildings not greater than three stories. At the time of the inspection, about 60 units were occupied. The buildings were constructed in 1963, and Respondent acquired the property in 1984. The controlling owner of Respondent was formerly a professional football player, and he formed Respondent to acquire First Street Apartments while still playing football. He has since retired, and he assumed direct responsibility for managing the property in 1994. First Street Apartments generate a net cash flow of $25,000 to $35,000 annually. Respondent has no formal policy setting the frequency of inspections of apartment units. However, the weekend prior to the hearing, Respondent's owner and his family moved into one of the apartments. Petitioner’s inspector conducted inspections of First Street Apartments on July 30 and August 19, 1997. The July inspection resulted in the issuance of a warning for 38 violations. The inspector allowed Respondent 30 days to correct these violations. The findings below describe the conditions at First Street Apartments on August 19, when Petitioner’s inspector and a local fire inspector returned to the site for the reinspection. As to the first alleged violation, apartments 30, 32, 40, and 79 lacked smoke detectors. As to the second alleged violation, apartment 31 had a smoke detector, but it was inoperative. As to the third alleged violation, an undetermined number of apartments had hasps affixed to the outside doors, so as to permit them to be latched. Most if not all of these hasps were affixed to the screen door. Most but not all of these hasps were unlocked. There is no evidence that any hasps were locked with occupants inside. The evidence suggests that tenants used the hasps to secure the contents of their premises while they were gone. However, the evidence does not establish that all of these hasps were attached to the doors and doorframe so securely as to present more than a momentary impediment to someone from the inside or outside trying to force the hasp open without unlocking it. The doorframes appear to have secured so many hasps that the wood is pitted and incapable of securing the hasp against much force. The clear appearance of numerous screwholes in the doors and doorframes supports Respondent’s contention that its representatives have frequently removed the hasps, only to find them reaffixed a short time later. As to the fourth alleged violation, one of the apartments had uninsulated wiring, unprotected by conduit, running from the ceiling to a water heater. This uninsulated wiring ran within eight feet of the floor. The proximity of this exposed wiring to the water in the water heater rendered this violation especially hazardous. However, Petitioner failed to prove its allegation of a broken electrical socket with a hot plate plugged into it. As to the fifth alleged violation, occupants of apartments 31, 32, and 33 used extension cords for other than intermittent purposes, such as cleaning, maintenance, or other temporary activities. These more ongoing, permanent uses included cooking and playing radios and televisions. As to the sixth alleged violation, there was no public lighting in the alley between the north building and a fenced area to the next property. However, Respondent or Lee County has since added more exterior lighting, and the record does not permit a finding as to the effect of the former condition. As to the seventh alleged violation, Respondent conceded that Respondent did not provide heat at the time of the inspections. As to the eighth alleged violation, the original design of the guardrail along the balcony contains openings greater than four inches. To remedy this hazardous situation, Respondent or a prior owner placed chain-link fence behind the guardrail, so as to reduce the openings to the size of the openings in the chain- link fence. The chain-link fence may have been missing on the west side of the building, but this fact does not emerge clearly from the record. There is some evidence that the chain-link fence elsewhere had loosened from the guardrail, but the evidence fails to establish the extent to which any separation had occurred and the extent to which such separation presented a hazard to persons falling between the openings in the guardrails and then between the guardrails and the chain-link fence. Respondent has since repaired the guardrails, in any event. As to the ninth alleged violation, apartments 30 and 32 had broken windows, torn screens, and a broken faucet in the kitchen sink repaired with duct tape; apartments 30 and 31 had leaky ceilings with structural damage and falling plaster; walls were pulling away from the ceiling; the south building had exposed interior beams; exterior areas had structural damage with worn concrete revealing the metal foundation; the exterior wall of the southeast end of the building had a 15-foot crack; and the concrete pillar supporting the second-floor landing on the northeast side of the building was worn and cracked. As to the tenth alleged violation, apartment 32 had a rotten shower wall and leaky toilet, and apartment 31 had an inoperative shower. As to the eleventh alleged violation, there were roaches and flies around the premises, but there is no evidence of "noxious small animals or parasitic insects, such as lice, fleas, worms, rats, or mice." As the administrative law judge advised at the hearing, he took official notice of this dictionary definition of "vermin" taken from a Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary present in the courthouse at which the hearing took place. As to the twelfth alleged violation, there was a car seat under a stairwell and about a dozen five-gallon plastic pails. However, the tenants stored these items, on a temporary basis, for their work. They remove car seats to increase the passenger-carrying capacity of their motor vehicles, and they use the pails while picking fruits and vegetables. As to the thirteenth alleged violation, there was no concrete pad under one of the two dumpsters. As to the fourteenth alleged violation, a dumpster lid remained open for the entire 1.5-hour inspection. As to the fifteenth alleged violation, a broken sewer line had leaked a pool of gray water, and a sewer cap was missing from the sewer line as it left a residential unit. In sum, Petitioner proved the following violations, with critical violations marked with an asterisk: 1*, 2*, 4* (unprotected wiring, but no broken socket), 5*, 7*, 9, 10 (except for water leaking from under the sinks) 13, 14, and 15*. By Ordinance No. 92-72, the Collier County Commission adopted National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code 101, Life Safety Code, effective October 21, 1992. NFPA 5-2.2.4.6(c) provides: "Open guards shall have intermediate rails or an ornamental pattern such that a sphere 4 in. (10.1 cm) in diameter cannot pass through any opening." NFPA 19-3.4.4.1 provides: Approved single station or multiple station smoke detectors continuously powered from the building electrical system shall be installed in accordance with 7-6.2.9 in every living unit within the apartment building regardless of the number of stories or number of apartments. When activated, the detector shall initiate an alarm that is audible in the sleeping rooms of that unit. This individual unit detector shall be in addition to any sprinkler system or other detection system that may be installed in the building. Section 5-402.14, 1995 Food Code, as adopted by the Food and Drug Administration, Public Health Service, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Food Code), provides: "Sewage shall be conveyed to the point of disposal through an approved sanitary sewage system or other system, including use of sewage transport vehicles, waste retention tanks, pumps, pipes, hoses, and connections that are constructed, maintained, and operated according to law." Section 5-501.11, Food Code, provides: "If located within the food establishment, a storage area for refuse, recyclables, and returnables shall meet the requirements specified under Parts 6-1 and 6-2." Section 5-501.12, Food Code, provides: "An outdoor storage surface for refuse, recyclables, and returnables shall be constructed of nonabsorbent material such as concrete or asphalt and shall be smooth, durable and sloped to drain." Section 5-501.113(B), Food Code, provides: "Cardboard or other packaging material that does not contain food residues and that is awaiting regularly scheduled delivery to a recycling or disposal site may be stored outside without being in a covered receptacle if it is stored so that it does not create a rodent harborage problem." Section 5-501.114(B), Food Code, provides: "Equipment and receptacles for refuse, recyclables, and returnables shall be kept covered . . . [w]ith tight-fitting lids or doors if kept outside the food establishment."
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Hotels and Restaurants enter a final order imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $2750 and requiring Respondent's controlling owner to undergo additional education. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel R. Biggins Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 D. Nathan Hoskins Peck & Peck First Union Building, Suite 103 5801 Pelican Bay Boulevard Naples, Florida 34108 Dorothy W. Joyce, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurant Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a firesafety inspector should be denied based on Petitioner's criminal convictions, in the 1980s, on drug related charges.
Findings Of Fact The Denial of Petitioner's Application. On May 23, 2008, Petitioner Joseph Edgerton ("Edgerton") submitted an application to the Department of Financial Services (the "Department" or "DFS") seeking approval to sit for the state certification examination that must be passed to become licensed as a Firesafety Inspector. The next month, DFS verbally notified Edgerton that he would not be permitted to take the certification examination because of his criminal record, which includes two felony convictions, from the 1980s, for drug-related offenses. The Department took the position that each of the crimes of which Edgerton was convicted involved moral turpitude. Edgerton did not dispute the convictions, but he did object to the characterization of his criminal conduct as base and depraved, and he pressed the Department for a formal decision, in writing, on his application. By letter dated March 5, 2009, the Department denied Edgerton's application, "based upon the following factual allegations:"1 On May 22, 1980, you pled [guilty to] and were adjudicated guilty . . . [of] felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell, . . . a crime of moral turpitude, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida . . . . On April 29, 1988, you pled [guilty to] and were adjudicated guilty [of] felony conspiracy to distribute cocaine, . . . a crime of moral turpitude, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, . . . were committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons for a term of forty-two (42) months, and upon release were placed on supervised release for a term of thirty-six (36) months. The foregoing allegations of historical fact concerning Edgerton's convictions are true and undisputed. (In contrast, the Department's characterization of the offenses as crimes involving moral turpitude is sharply contested, but that particular dispute is not outcome determinative and need not be decided, for reasons that follow.) The Circumstances Surrounding the Criminal Incidents. Edgerton's state court conviction followed his arrest in late 1979, when he was discovered in an airport to be in possession of five ounces of cocaine. Edgerton testified that the cocaine was for personal use, and that he did not intend to sell or distribute the drug. While Edgerton's testimony in this regard was credible as far as it went, the fact that he pleaded guilty, in 1980, to the charge of possession with intent to sell gives rise to a conflict in the evidence regarding his criminal intent. Even assuming the worst, however, what matters more at present is that Edgerton genuinely accepts responsibility for, and is remorseful about, his very old criminal misconduct, which he readily acknowledges was "stupid" and "wrong." Edgerton further insists (and the undersigned finds that) he "is a different person now," at age 50, than the "kid" who "partied too much" 30 years ago. With regard to the federal conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, Edgerton testified that his role consisted of lending money to another person for use in a narcotics transaction. Edgerton denies having handled, carried, or delivered any drugs, and the undersigned accepts his testimony on this point, which was not contradicted by conflicting evidence. Consistent with his statements concerning the other matter, Edgerton accepts responsibility for this crime while maintaining, credibly, that he is "not the same guy" who committed it and declaring that he "wouldn't do it again." The History of the Applicant Since the Incident. Edgerton committed the subject crimes a long time ago—— nearly 30 years in the case of the trafficking charge and approximately 22 years in reference to the conspiracy charge. Edgerton thus has had ample time fully to restore his reputation and usefulness to society as a law abiding citizen following his felony convictions. There is persuasive evidence that he has done just that. In 1993, Edgerton became licensed by the Florida Department of Health as a paramedic. His license, numbered PMD 13086, was active as of the final hearing in this case. In October 1995, Edgerton received a Certificate of Compliance from the State Fire Marshal authorizing him to work as a firefighter in this state. As of the final hearing in this case, Edgerton continued to be a state-certified firefighter. For more than 15 years, Edgerton has worked without adverse incident as a first responder in the emergency medical and fire rescue fields. He has done so under the constant regulatory supervision of two separate state agencies. These facts demonstrate persuasively (and the undersigned finds) that Edgerton——who has not, as far as the evidence shows, harmed or endangered actual persons served in the past decade-and-a-half—— is, at this time, an honest man whom the public can safely trust, and who will not present a danger in the future, should he become licensed as a Firesafety Inspector. The Restoration of Edgerton's Civil Rights. By Executive Order dated July 2, 1987, the Governor and Cabinet, exercising the governor's constitutional authority to grant clemency, restored all of Edgerton's civil rights, with the exception of the specific authority to possess or own firearms, which were lost by reason of any prior felony convictions. By Executive Order dated September 1, 1993, the Governor and Cabinet restored all of Edgerton's civil rights, with the exception of the specific authority to possess or own firearms, which were lost by reason of his felony conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Ultimate Factual Determinations. The undersigned has determined, based on the greater weight of the evidence, including the circumstances surrounding Edgerton's prior convictions and the persuasive evidence of his full and complete rehabilitation, that Edgerton currently conforms his behavior to societal norms, possesses good moral character, and is otherwise morally fit to serve as a Firesafety Inspector. Edgerton meets all of the requirements for certification as a Firesafety Inspector except one: a passing score on the state certification examination, which DCF has not yet permitted him to take.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order approving Joseph Edgerton to sit for the firesafety examination, which he must pass to satisfy the last remaining requirement for his certification as a Firesafety Inspector. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2009.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this proceeding is whether the Respondent’s license as an adult living facility should be subject to an administrative fine in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for repeated class III deficiencies.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the owner/operator of San Juan Retirement Home. The home is licensed to operate a 6-bed assisted living facility in Jacksonville, Florida. On March 5, 2003, AHCA conducted a survey of Respondent's facility. During that survey, Respondent did not have a fire safety inspection report within 365 days from an earlier fire safety inspection report. Because of the lack of a timely report the facility was cited for violating Tag A209, a Class III deficiency. Tag A209 requires that all licensed facilities have an annual fire inspection conducted by the local fire marshal or authorities having jurisdiction. In this instance the Agency interprets the word annual to mean 365 days from the last inspection report. Respondent had the facility inspected by the Fire Marshal on March 12, 2003. She received the report the same day. A follow-up survey was conducted on April 15, 2003. Tag A209 was noted as corrected in a timely manner by Respondent. Since this was the first Class III deficiency regarding the timeliness of the inspection report, no penalties were imposed by Petitioner on Respondent. On April 23, 2004, AHCA again inspected Respondent's facility. During the inspection, Respondent again did not have a fire safety inspection report completed within 365 days of the earlier inspection report of March 12, 2003. Because of the lack of the report, the facility was cited for a class III deficiency under Tag A209. Respondent admitted that she twice did not have a timely fire safety inspection report completed for her facility. The evidence demonstrated that, prior to the April 2004 inspection by AHCA, Respondent had called the Fire Marshal’s office to schedule an inspection for the facility. However, the call was not made until the expiration of the March 12, 2003, fire safety inspection report. For some unknown reason the Fire Marshal’s office did not schedule the fire safety inspection until after the April 2004 inspection. However, the Fire Marshal’s failure to schedule the inspection does not excuse Respondent’s lack of a timely inspection and report since Respondent remains responsible for obtaining the inspection and report in a timely manner and did not call the Fire Marshal’s office until the expiration of the earlier report. To her credit, Respondent obtained a new fire safety inspection report on May 4 or 5, 2004, after AHCA had inspected the facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That AHCA enter a final order imposing a $500.00 administrative fine for repeatedly failing to timely conduct or obtain an annual fire safety inspection report. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3408D Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elvira C. Demdam San Juan Retirement home 6561 San Juan Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Alan Levine, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 69A- 62.001, 69A-62.003, 69A-62.006, and 69A-62.007, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Sections 120.52(8)(d), 120.52(8)(e), and 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is and, at all times material to this case, was a volunteer firefighter. The size of the volunteer firefighter population is dependent on the ability of volunteer fire departments to attract and keep volunteers. People are willing to volunteer as firefighters if the experience is rewarding, training is not excessive, and conflict is minimized. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the subject rules do not detract from the volunteer experience, impose excessive training, or create between conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Petitioner testified that a reduction in volunteer population will result in increased hazards to volunteers and a reduction in the delivery of services to citizens. This testimony is not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is no persuasive testimony that the subject rules will result in a reduction of the number of volunteer firefighters. Second, the most persuasive evidence indicates that the subject rules will reduce hazards to volunteers without impairing the delivery of services to Floridians. Some labor unions that represent career firefighters discourage their members from volunteering their services with volunteer fire departments. The competition between the unions and the volunteer fire departments is commonly referred to as the "turf-war." There is no persuasive evidence that the subject rules contribute to the tension between the two groups of firefighters. The firefighter labor unions are usually very active in the political arena. It is undisputed that the unions support legislation that benefits their members. However, the subject rules were not promulgated to eliminate or place hardships on volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters. The safety needs and concerns of firefighters have evolved over time. Technology has improved firefighting equipment to such an extent that the greatest threat to firefighters is from heart attacks and transportation accidents. Nevertheless, the fact that the subject rules focus on safety enhancement at the scene of a fire instead of firefighter health and transportation safety does not render them invalid. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003 provides as follows in pertinent part: (3) With respect to 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.134(g)(4), the two individuals located outside the immediately dangerous to life and health atmosphere may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander, pumper operator, engineer, or driver, so long as such individual is able to immediately perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at an incident. (a)1. Except as provided in subparagraphs 2., 3., and 4., no firefighter or any other person under the authority of the firefighter employer at the scene of a fire is permitted to participate in any operation involving two-in, two-out as one of the two or more persons inside the IDLH atmosphere or as one of the two or more persons outside of the IDLH atmosphere unless such firefighter or other person at the scene of a fire is certified in this state by the division as a Firefighter I or a Firefighter II, as established in subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. Such training shall consist of the training described in subsection (6) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. This requirement specifically applies to volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters but is also applicable to any other person working under the authority of the Firefighter Employer at the scene of a fire. 2.a. A volunteer firefighter who possesses the State Basic Volunteer certificate previously issued by the division is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1. The training encompassed in the basic volunteer certificate in itself may not meet “trained commensurate to duty” as defined depending upon duties or tasks assigned or undertaken in the exclusionary zone. A volunteer firefighter who provides evidence of having completed curriculum equivalent to the Florida Firefighter I course of study as provided in subsection 69A-37.055(6), F.A.C., prior to January 1, 2004, is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1., if The fire chief or other chief administrative officer of the fire department of which the firefighter is a member files with the State Fire Marshal form DFS-K4-1594, “Firefighter I Training Exemption Application,” which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, and The said form is accepted by the State Fire Marshal after confirmation of the evidence provided. Form DFS-K4-1594 may be obtained by writing the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Any volunteer exempted by sub- subparagraph a.or b. is permitted to take the Florida Firefighter I examination until December 31, 2005, upon the completion and filing with the division of form DFS-K4- 1380, “Firefighter I Training Record,” Rev. 03/00, adopted in Rule 69A-37.039, F.A.C., by a Florida certified instructor that verifies equivalent training and demonstration of competency. The above-referenced rule sets forth ways that a firefighter, trained prior to the current regulations, may keep his or her interior-firefighter status without becoming certified as a Firefighter I or Firefighter II. The rule will not disqualify all previously qualified firefighters as long as they are "trained commensurate to duty" for any type of work they are requested to perform. There is no persuasive evidence that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a) will cause a reduction in the number of volunteer firefighters due to newly created administrative hurtles. The rule, which has its basis in safety enhancement, clearly is not arbitrary or damaging to the safety of volunteers. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a)4. states as follows: 4. Volunteer firefighters having NWCG S- 130, S-190, and Standards for Survival certification by the Florida Division of Forestry are permitted to participate in wild land fire suppression without the Firefighter I certification. The above-referenced rule allows a volunteer to fight wild-land fires without earning Firefighter I certification. The rule sets forth an exception to the Firefighter I certification requirement; it does not mandate that the NWCG courses are the exclusive means to qualify as a wild-land firefighter. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)4. is not invalid or arbitrary because it requires volunteers to pass training courses that are accepted as setting national standards or because the training courses teach firefighting techniques that are applicable across the nation as well as Florida. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence to the contrary. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006 states as follows: 69A-62.006 Requirements for Recognition as a Fire Department. To be recognized as an organized fire department by the division, compliance with the following must be documented: Capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day, seven days a week; Responsibility for response in an area capable of being depicted on a map; and Staffing with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters who are employed full-time or part-time or serve as volunteers and who shall have successfully completed an approved basic firefighting course recognized by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. (2)(a) A fire department shall meet the requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 Protection, the 2003 edition, the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule, effective February, 2003, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference and which may be obtained from Insurance Services Office (ISO), 545 Washington Blvd., Jersey City, NJ 07310-1686 or at www.iso.com. If the fire department does not meet the requirements of this section, the fire department shall submit a plan of compliance which provides for meeting these requirements within 90 days of the date of submission of the plan. ISO measures the major elements of a community’s fire-suppression system and develops a numerical grade ranging from 1 to 10. Class 1 represents the best public protection rating and Class 10 indicates no recognized protection. The requirements for ISO 9 may be obtained at the ISO website located at www.iso.com, or it may be obtained by writing to the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(a) is not invalid because it requires fire departments to document their capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day/seven days a week. The requirement for full-time availability will provide significant safety enhancement for the communities being served. This is true because some voluntary fire departments in rural communities historically have provided only part-time service. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring full- time fire protection will result in the following: (a) the creation of a fire-suppression performance standard that is unauthorized by law; (b) the closing of some volunteer fire departments; (c) a reduction in services to the public; and (d) uncorrectable rule-violations; an increase in conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(c) requires that each fire department be staffed with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters. The rule is not vague because it uses the word "sufficient" to determine the number of firefighters that are required. One must read the applicable rules in their entirety and consider the needs of each community to determine adequate staffing. There is no persuasive evidence that the staffing requirement fails to establish adequate standards for determining compliance. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(2) requires fire departments to meet certain requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 protection. This requirement determines the minimum equipment that is necessary to safely fight a structure fire. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring a fire department to provide Class 9 protection will make it impossible to start a new voluntary fire department. The rule clearly is not arbitrary in setting this minimum standard. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(1) states as follows in pertinent part: 69A-62.007 Minimum Requirements for Class 9 Protection. To be considered for Class 9 protection, the following minimum facilities must be available: Organization: The fire department shall be organized on a permanent basis under applicable state or local laws. The organization shall include one person responsible for operation of the department, usually with the title of chief. The fire department must serve an area with definite boundaries. If a municipality is not served by a fire department solely operated by or for the governing body of that city, the fire department providing such service shall do so under a contract or resolution. When a fire department’s service area involves one or more jurisdictions, a contract shall be executed with each jurisdiction served. Membership: The department shall have a sufficient number of firefighters/members to assure the response of at least 4 firefighters/members that can assemble at the scene of a fire as contemplated by subsection (1) of Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., to be compliant with Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., the two-in, two-out rule. The fire chief may be one of the 4 responding firefighters/members. The above-referenced rule does require fire departments to have four "interior-qualified" firefighters at the scene of a structure fire. The requirement is necessary to comply with the longstanding "two-in, two-out" rule. However, the rule does not preclude a fire department from relying on mutual-aid from other fire departments in order to comply with the rule. The rule clearly is not vague. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(4)(a) states as follows in relevant part: (4)(a) The chief of any fire department that includes volunteer firefighters shall annually submit a Roster of Volunteer Firefighters to the State Fire Marshal utilizing form DFS-K4-1581, effective 05/04, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, no later than June 30 of each year. Form DFS-K4-1581 may be obtained by contacting the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486 or at the division’s website located at http://www.fldfs.com/SFM/. The roster shall include: The fire department name, The fire department identification number (FDID), The complete fire department address, The fire department contact person, telephone number and the fire department fax number, if any, The certification level for each firefighter reported and, if any equivalency exemption has been issued, the number of persons for whom such exemption has been issued, and The firefighter certification number, the issue date of the certification, the status of the certification, i.e., volunteer or career, and the status of each firefighter who has been issued an equivalency exemption, i.e., volunteer or career, if any. The above-referenced rule requires the chief of a fire department to submit an annual roster of volunteer firefighters. Petitioner objects to the rule because some career firefighters volunteer their off-duty hours with the local volunteer fire department. Career firefighters who also perform volunteer work may do so contrary to their union rules. Publication of the roster might keep some professional firefighters from volunteering their services. Nevertheless, there is no persuasive evidence that losing some speculative number of career/volunteer firefighters will undermine the safety of firefighters or the public. The information that the roster contains is a public record. The information is necessary so that Respondent can perform statutorily-mandated studies involving injuries to firefighters. The rule clearly is not arbitrary.
