Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a prehearing stipulation executed by the parties on July 22, 1982, the facts in this case are essentially not in dispute. The prehearing stipulation establishes the following facts concerning the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint: Respondent Novoa is a certified air conditioning contractor having been issued license number CAC010132 and CAC010132. Respondent's address is 30 S. W. 67th Court, Miami, Florida 33144. At all times material hereto, Respondent was associated with and was the qualifying licensee for Baker Service Company, Inc., d/b/a Dade Air Conditioning and Appliance Service, 11651 N.W. 7th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33168. Respondent's responsibilities in said company were to pull permits and supervise installation of air conditioning systems in return for a salary of $100.00 per week. Petitioner has no evidence that Respondent did not fulfill that particular function for the company he qualified. However, Petitioner asserted and Respondent admitted that the company was also involved in soliciting service contracts for which it maintained a fleet of trucks and personnel to sell and solicit said contracts and to perform the obligations requested under the contracts. Petitioner asserted and Respondent admitted that it was not his function in the company to take any part in the business concerned with the service contracts. The Respondent completed a "Certification Change of Status Application" on or about December 14, 1978, and submitted it to the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. The Respondent signed an affidavit which is part of the application, certifying as true and accurate his answers on the application. Respondent asserted that the Certification Change of Status Application was prepared for his signature by personnel within Baker Service Company, Inc., who represented to him the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner has no information contrary to Respondent's assertion. The Certification Change of Status Application contained false information in that it listed only Frank Baker as President of the company without listing the company's Secretary, Frank Baker III, and Albert Crooke, Vice President of the company. Respondent alleged and Petitioner has no evidence to the contrary, that he did not know of the involvement of Frank Baker III and Albert Crooke as officers of the corporation and only inadvertently filed false information with the Department. Baker Service Company, Inc. entered into many service contracts with certain named parties who are listed in and made a part of the Administrative Complaint by the attachment of Exhibit A thereto, all of whom had service contracts similar to Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Baker Service Company, Inc. was to provide air conditioning and other major appliance service pursuant to said contracts and did not perform its obligations thereunder, even though the company was paid and received funds to perform such service. The Respondent admitted that he did not take any active part in supervising the operation of Baker Service Company, Inc., with regard to their maintenance and service contract business and therefore used his registration to evade the contracting license law in violation of Section 489.129(1)(f) Florida Statutes. However, Petitioner admitted that this violation is of a technical nature. Respondent admitted that he obtained his registration by the filing of a false application, but asserted that he was not aware of its misrepresentation at the time of filing. Petitioner admitted it had no information with which to prove the Respondent knew the application was false when filed. Respondent admitted that his qualification of Baker Service Company, Inc., the execution of the numerous service contracts, and abandonment of the same by Baker Service Company, Inc., constitutes violations of Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10 , Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Section 10-22G, by failing to fulfill contractual obligations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Construction Industry Licensing Board finding that the Respondent Novoa committed technical violations of Sections 489.129(1)(f) and (k), Florida Statutes, and imposing a $500.00 administrative fine and a private reprimand. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 E. Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Rodolfo Sorondo, Jr., Esquire Suite 1101 Peninsula Federal Building Miami, Florida 33131 James Linnan, Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION/CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Petitioner, vs. DPR Case No. 0012267 DOAH Case No. 81-2477 JOSE E. NOVOA 30 SW 67th Court Miami, Florida 33144 C & S Air, Inc. CA C010132 Post Office Box 43-2094 Miami, Florida 33144 Baker Service Company CA CA10132(deleted) Respondent. /
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the following acts on Ellenton Shoney's construction project: Aiding and abetting a person engaged in the unregistered and uncertified practice of contracting. Obtaining a permit for construction in which he took no part. Using his license to illegally associate with an unlicensed contractor.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent, Samuel E. Whitener, was licensed as a certified general contractor in Florida, and held license number CG C024909. His qualifying status is that of an individual, and the business address is 13502 Greenleaf Drive, Tampa, Florida 33612. On December 9, 1987, the Respondent contracted with Restaurant Management Services, Inc., a Georgia corporation, to manage a construction project known as Shoney's in Ellenton, Florida. Respondent was awarded the contract once it was determined that he had submitted the lowest bid for the job. This contract was the written restatement of an oral agreement entered into by the parties on December 4, 1987. Pursuant to the contract terms, Respondent was to substantially complete the partially completed project within four weeks from the restart of the job. His management fee of $4,000.00 was to be paid upon completion of his contract. The reason the job had to be restarted was that Stop Work Order number 1055 had been issued by the Manatee County Building Official on December 3, 1987 because a properly qualified Florida licensed contractor was not on the permit documents previously submitted to the county. At the time the stop work order was issued, the project was seventy- five percent complete. All of the subcontractors were in place, and the project manager retained by the owner was still with the project. The Shoney's restaurant being built at this location was based upon a design and plans created by the architect Steven Cooper. This was a "cookie cutter" project in that the project manager and a majority of the subcontractors had built Shoney's restaurants from the same plans at various locations throughout Florida and the Southeast. The project manager and the subcontractors went from location to location, and built the restaurants wherever the owner, Restaurant Management Services, Inc., scheduled such construction. In keeping with the corporate plan to locate these restaurants in certain locales by certain target dates, the subcontractors and the project manager were paid by the corporation instead of the contractor. When Respondent entered into the contract with Restaurant Management Services, Inc., he was aware that the funds for supplies and services on the project were to be managed by the owner. Respondent likened the contract to those traditionally made with school boards and hospitals. In Florida, these particular entities hire a contractor, but they like to maintain control of the funds themselves. However, as part of the cost management of the project, the contract specifically required that Respondent, Samuel E. Whitener, approve all related costs prior to payment by the owner. He also had authority to determine the value of the subcontractor's work on the site. It was agreed that Respondent would visit the jobsite twice weekly, and he would be on call during normal working hours. He would meet with building officials when needed. Values of work or code interpretation would be his sole responsibility, and the job superintendent had to be qualified and approved by Respondent Whitener. If he were unable to work with the job superintendent provided, a replacement would be made by Respondent. During the time period between December 4, 1987 and the completion of the project, the Respondent took responsibility for the work performed at the site and fulfilled his obligations of contract. As agreed, he was paid upon completion of the job. The Respondent was not paid $4,000 by Fred Pringle to obtain the permit. He was paid $4,000 to manage the remaining twenty-five percent of the project, which he did. After his personal interview of the project manager, and upon review of his work during the project, the Respondent decided to allow the same project manager to continue with his work on this project. No conflicts occurred on the job involving Respondent's authority or the quality of construction undertaken by the subcontractors or the project manager. Testimony from one subcontractor at hearing revealed that Respondent exercised his authority as the general contractor to reject some clay materials brought to the site that he determined were unacceptable for its intended use.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found not guilty of having violated Sections 489.129(1)(e), (f) and (m), as alleged in Counts I, II and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint filed August 14, 1990, and modified without objection on December 14, 1990. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-5657 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. See HO number 1. Accepted. Accepted. See HO number 4. Reject the first sentence. Contrary to fact. See HO number 2. Accept the rest of the paragraph. Reject the first sentence. Contrary to fact. See HO number 3, number 11 and number 12. Accept second sentence. See HO number 8. Reject the rest. Contrary to fact. See HO number 5 - number 15. Accept the first sentence. Reject the second sentence. Contrary to fact. See HO number 10, number 11, number 13 - number 15. Reject the third sentence. Contrary to fact. See HO number 7. Reject the fourth sentence. Contrary to fact. See HO number 10. Accept the last sentence. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. See HO number 1. Accepted. See HO number 2, number 5, number 8, number 9, number 10. Accepted. See HO number 11 - number 15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO number 11 and number 12. Accepted. Accept that Respondent was unaware of an entity known as Quality Construction. See HO number 8. The rest of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Jurand, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Brian A. Burden, Esquire Post Office Box 2893 Tampa, Florida 33601 Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 111 East Coastline Drive, Room 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Jack McCray, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent, Casselberry ALF, Inc., d/b/a Eastbrooke Gardens, violated Section 400.28(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 58A-5.0182, Florida Administrative Code, as cited in the four AHCA Administrative Complaints, based on four consecutive AHCA surveys of Respondent's assisted living facility (ALF), alleging failure to provide care and services appropriate to the needs of its residents. Whether the facts alleged constitute Class I or Class II deficiencies. Whether, if found guilty, a civil penalty in any amount or the imposition of a moratorium is warranted pursuant to the cited statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration. Petitioner is responsible for licensing and regulating adult living facilities pursuant to Section 400.401 et seq., Florida Statutes, and Chapter 58A-5, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent is Casselberry ALF, Inc., d/b/a Eastbrooke Gardens, an assisted living facility located at 201 North Sunset Drive, Casselberry, Florida, which is licensed and regulated pursuant to Section 400.401 et seq., Florida Statutes, and Chapter 58A-5, Florida Administrative Code. On June 1, 2001, Petitioner's employee, Vilma Pellot, whose duties include surveying ALFs for compliance with licensure statutes and rules, conducted a survey of Respondent's facility based on an abuse complaint received by Petitioner. That same day, Pellot discussed her findings with the facility administrator, and later prepared AHCA form 3020. In her report, Pellot found that the facility was not in compliance with Rule 58A-5.0182, Florida Administrative Code, which states, in pertinent part: Resident Care Standards. An assisted living facility shall provide care and services appropriate to the needs of residents accepted for admission to the facility. Pellot determined that the standard was not met because "the facility failed to take proactive measures to prevent patient to patient abuse and to minimize potential for falls resulting in injuries." The deficiency was classified as a Class II deficiency and a prospective $2,500 fine was imposed. At hearing, Petitioner did not produce the records that Pellot reviewed, nor did it present the testimony of any of the people with whom Pellot spoke. Other than Pellot's direct observations of the residents' bruises and dressings, the only other direct evidence offered by Petitioner regarding the June 1, 2001 survey was the AHCA form 3020, which Petitioner acknowledged was not being entered for proof of the facts stated therein. Pellot did not print or send the AHCA form 3020 to the facility and she does not know if the facility received the form 3020 when she made a subsequent visit to the facility. On July 16, 2001, Pellot conducted a follow-up visit to Petitioner's facility. She again observed residents with bruises or dressings and reviewed their records. She also observed two residents sleeping in the wrong beds. In addition, Pellot determined that based on an interview and incident reports review, the facility failed to submit to Petitioner a preliminary report of all adverse incidents within one business day after occurrence. Pellot discussed her findings with the new administrator and concluded that there was still patient wandering, resulting in injury, and patient-to-patient abuse. Following her visit, Pellot drafted another AHCA form 3020, finding a continued violation of Rule 58A-5.0182, Florida Administrative Code. The continued deficiencies of June 1, 2001, were upgraded to Class I and a prospective fine of $5,000 imposed. In addition, a Class III deficiency was found for the failure to report adverse incidents within one day. At hearing Petitioner did not introduce the records that Pellot reviewed on her second visit, nor did it present the testimony of any of the people with whom Pellot spoke. Other than Pellot's direct observations of the residents' bruises and dressings and her observation that two residents were in the wrong beds, the only other direct evidence offered by Petitioner regarding the July 17, 2001 survey was the AHCA form 3020, which contained hearsay statements. In regard to the Class III deficiency for failure to report adverse incidents within one day, there was no testimony or records presented by Petitioner to support the allegation set forth in the AHCA form 3020, dated July 16, 2001. Petitioner acknowledged, in its Order of Immediate Moratorium, that an incident report had been submitted regarding a kicking incident involving Resident number 6. Other incidents noted in the AHCA form 3020 did not require incident reports because they did not meet the definition of "major incident" as defined by rule. Following the surveys on June 1, 2001, and July 17, 2001, Petitioner made an administrative determination that "conditions in the facility present an immediate or direct threat to the health, safety or welfare of the residents . . ." and issued an Order of Immediate Moratorium against Respondent's ALF. Respondent was not permitted to admit any new residents until the moratorium was lifted. On August 8, 2001, another follow-up survey to the ALF was made, and Pellot observed bruises on residents and one resident wandering into another resident's room. Another AHCA form 3020 was prepared finding a continued violation of the rule. The continued deficiencies of June 16, 2001, were classified as Class I and a prospective fine of $5,000 imposed. In addition, a Class III extended congregate care (ECC) deficiency was found for the alleged violation of not admitting a resident who required ECC services, total help with activities of daily living (ADL), or discharging her. At hearing, Petitioner did not produce the records reviewed by Pellot, nor did it present any of the people with whom she allegedly spoke. Other than Pellot's direct observations of the residents' bruises and dressings and her observation of a resident wandering into another resident's room, the only other direct evidence offered by Petitioner regarding the August 8, 2001 survey was the AHCA form 3020, which contained hearsay statements. On August 17, 2001, another follow-up survey of the ALF was conducted, and bruises on residents were observed and a band-aid was seen on one resident. Another AHCA form 3020 was prepared, finding a continued violation of the rules. The continued deficiencies were classified as Class I and a prospective fine of $5,000 imposed. In addition, the Class III ECC deficiency previously determined in the August 8, 2001 survey was found to have been corrected. At hearing, Petitioner did not produce the records reviewed by Pellot, nor did it present any of the people with whom she spoke. Other than Pellot's direct observations of the residents' bruises and dressings, the only other direct evidence offered by Petitioner regarding the August 17, 2001 survey was the AHCA form 3020, which contained hearsay statements. Pellot returned to the facility on September 27, 2001, for a monitoring visit and on September 28, 2001, for a follow- up survey. At that time she concluded that the alleged deficiencies had been corrected and recommended that the moratorium be lifted. Petitioner recognizes that ALF residents do fall. The rule does not require that a facility be "fall free." There is no rule or regulation concerning falls, and there are no guidelines set forth in AHCA complaint investigation guidelines. Lois Bosworth, a certified gerontological nurse, is Director of Operations for Homestead Health Management Group which operates Respondent's ALF. Homestead Health Management Group operates nine ALFs in Florida, all of which have ECC licenses. ECC stands for Extended Congregate Care which is a higher level of care than a standard ALF license. All of Respondent's ALF residents are memory impaired to some extent. Most are in their 60s or older, some have early Alzheimer's, others have dementia for other reasons. Because they suffer from dementia, the residents' physical abilities are declining. Some are not ambulatory and use wheelchairs, some are able to use walkers to some degree, most can still feed themselves. In the evening, ALF residents with dementia have to be cued over and over to perform the activities of daily living (ADLs) more often than in the daytime because while they're up during the day, they become very tired and their processes decline. Some residents have the same levels all day, but over the course of weeks, to months, to years, they will decline, needing more hands-on personal services as their disease progresses. ECC has established criteria and retention criteria which Respondent is required to follow. With the dementia clients, it is gauged on their ability to transfer with minimal assistance. They may need help becoming steady because sitting for any length of time makes them unsteady or off balance when they first stand up. Retention criteria is also based on how much cuing a resident needs in feeding themselves. With Alzheimer's patients, it is typical that feeding is one of the last of the physical needs that they can do themselves. When residents are no longer able to ambulate or feed themselves, they are more prone to physical ailments that require nursing home care. If there is a question concerning appropriate placement, Respondent will have the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) CARES team become involved. The CARES team consists of nurses that make the official determination of the appropriate level of care required for a resident. Many times it is necessary to involve the CARES team because the family is reluctant to have their loved one transferred from the ALF to a nursing home. In a facility such as Respondent's where there are many residents with dementia, it is not unusual for the residents to get into confrontations with one another. Often they will shout at each other before they touch each other. Alzheimer residents will sit next to each other touching each other, shoulder to shoulder, knee to knee. They'll even hold hands walking down the hallway. There are other times they need to have the comfort of someone touching them. But they have periods of time when they don't want people touching them at all and for no apparent reason. Of the residents identified in the June 6, 2001 survey, Resident number 1 was ambulatory. She would wander at night time up until midnight before she would settle down and go to sleep. This is typical Alzheimer's type activity. She was a lady who had very large bags under her eyes constituting soft tissue which can continue to bleed from a bruising into both eyes. Such an injury is typical of people with glasses, or people who get hit over the bridge of the nose, making it quite common to have two black eyes with one injury. A small bruise over the eye one day may be extremely massive the next because there will be continued leaking of blood under the skin and the tissues that cause the bruise. This resident was allegedly struck by another resident who was not known to be aggressive, but did not recognize people all the time. One of the defenses that Alzheimer's people have, if they can't process the thought and recognize someone, is to make someone the bad person because they don't remember what happened. Often they will respond verbally ordering the person to go away, even though the person may be a roommate. In the earlier stages of Alzheimer's, a person may recognize that he or she is forgetting things and have a tendency on some occasions to be more resistant, not necessarily aggressive. The resident who allegedly struck Resident number 1 was not known to be aggressive to other residents, even after this alleged incident. The alleged incident could not have been foreseen. Resident number 2 in the June 1, 2001 survey was receiving therapy for her falls. There was a recommendation that a different wheelchair with a seat which slightly tilts back be tried. After the June 1, 2001 survey, this resident was placed in a nursing home which could use restraints in a wheelchair. Resident number 5 in the June 1, 2001 survey would sit on the side of the bed to put her slippers on. She would pitch forward because she was short and the bed was too tall for her to sit on. Her mattress was placed on the floor to alleviate the problem which was resolved. Resident number 5 had a tendency to bruise easily. It was determined that she had a bleeding disorder, so that even a slight bump would cause her skin to bruise. She continued to have skin tears and bruising following June 1, 2001, which required her to go to the emergency room. When she returned her skin tear had not healed and she had very massive bruising from use of an IV in the emergency room. The patient eventually went back to the hospital and did not return to the facility. Resident number 4 in the June 1, 2001 survey was the resident who allegedly had an altercation with Resident number 1. She had no other problems such as this. Resident number 4 apparently alleged that Resident number 1 came into her room and grabbed her arm. Then she hit that resident for coming into her room, to defend herself. This is the only event that occurred with this resident. A person with dementia is usually not credible. It is not uncommon for people with dementia to blame something that happened to them on someone else. Due to memory impairment, they do not want people to think that something is wrong with them, so they blame someone else for something that happened to them. The material available, publications and educational offerings for Alzheimer's encourage allowances for wandering for Alzheimer's clients, because it is part of the disease process and part of their need. They are not able to sit quietly; in fact, the literature states that it's important that they be permitted to wander. At Respondent's ALF wandering is allowed throughout the facility, which is open. Respondent is barrier- free to permit the wandering, allowing a resident to pace up and down the hallways or common areas. The option to participate in activities is always the right of the resident. Alzheimer's clients can't always make that decision, and so they're encouraged to participate in activities to keep them distracted to a degree. They cannot be forced to participate if they choose to continue to walk up and down the halls. Respondent tries various techniques to deter wandering into the wrong room, from posting photographs on residents' doors to decorating rooms with personal items. Respondent tries hard to keep the residents in common areas when they wander and tries to keep doors to residents' rooms closed. But wandering is still a problem with Alzheimer's residents. There are no publications on how to prevent falls. Falls can be minimized in number and by the severity of injuries. The facility needs to be able to provide what the resident needs; if that means they need to go barefoot, then they should be allowed to go barefoot without neglect being alleged. While Respondent cannot prevent falls, it tries to minimize them by providing appropriate care and services to meet the residents' needs within the standards set by the state. Respondent has a procedure in place to minimize falls. Fall assessments were done by the therapy department. When someone had a first fall, therapy would do a screening and assessment to see if they had a need for therapy services to increase their functionality of ambulating. The administrative staff would also review the circumstances of the fall to see if it was preventable or non-preventable. The resident would be evaluated to determine if there was a medical condition that had arisen that was contributing to the fall. There would be a general assessment of the different environmental issues as well as clinical issues. The resident would be watched for any possible decline. Resident number 3 in the June 1, 2001 survey is a tall gentleman who walks around with a stuffed dog. He is friendly and takes direction easily. He is not aggressive, and he does not have a tendency to walk into other peoples' rooms. Other than the two residents seen napping in other residents' beds, the incidents cited in the July 16, 2001 survey, which led to the issuance of a repeat citation and a moratorium, consisted of the actions of one resident identified in that survey as Resident number 6. Resident number 6 was a 48-year-old lady who was brought to Respondent by DCF through an emergency placement under a court order to place her in an ALF for supervision of her care needs. She was a younger resident than normal for the facility because she had a diagnosis of Huntington's Chorea, which is a type of dementia which does not progress as quickly as Alzheimer's but strikes adults earlier in life. Respondent has an agreement with DCF which provides for emergency placements for persons who do not need to go into nursing homes, for those with memory impairment, including after-hour placement, and weekend placement. Respondent does not require that DCF bring with them a medical assessment. Regulations allow Respondent to have one completed within 30 days following the emergency placement. Resident number 6 was at a table and another resident reached for her purse. Resident number 6 picked up a cup of coffee that was sitting on the table and threw the coffee on the other resident's lap. The other resident involved was not injured because the coffee served was not hot coffee. Resident number 6 came to the facility in early June 2001. The coffee incident occurred on June 30th and was the first indication that there might be a problem. Respondent did not interpret the action of Resident number 6 to mean that Resident number 6 was going to hurt anyone. Resident number 6 did not come with a history of hurting anyone, and there was no documentation that she had tried to hurt anyone in the past. She calmed down after the incident and didn't seem to be a problem. Resident number 6 was quite settled in and was doing well. This was a DCF placement to see how she did and whether or not she would be able to return home or go to a different living arrangement. On July 11, 2001, the survey indicated that Resident number 6 had an altercation with Resident number 1 over a cigarette lighter and pushed him down and kicked him, requiring him to be admitted to the hospital with a fractured hip. On July 14, 2001, Resident number 6 allegedly grabbed the arm of Resident number 3 who was in her room and created a skin tear to Resident number 3 as she was pulling her down the hall to the nursing station. During the July 16, 2001 survey, Respondent was directed to remove Resident number 6 immediately from the facility. DCF declined to help. Respondent placed Resident number 6 on one-to-one supervision until the next day when DCF refused to remove her. Respondent could not Baker Act Resident number 6 to a mental facility because she did not meet the criteria. Respondent was finally able to get Resident number 6 to agree to a voluntary psychiatric placement. Resident number 4, a 98-year-old female, identified in the August 8, 2001 survey, apparently had been found on the floor of her room in April with no injuries. She appeared to fall because she was trying to dress herself and the blanket got wrapped up in her legs. In June, she fell into the soda machine with no injuries. And then on July 18th and 20th she fell in the evening. Evening is when some Alzheimer's residents have what is called "sundown syndrome," simply meaning that as the sun sets, they have become so tired they've exhausted all their physical resources and will have a decline. Resident number 4 was receiving physical therapy to keep her ambulating at the highest level possible. She reached her highest potential in therapy because she couldn't remember safety factors that she was taught. The purpose of physical therapy was to help Resident number 4 in her ability to ambulate and minimize her falls. The only way to actually prevent her from falling was to restrain her, which is not permitted at an ALF. On August 1st, Resident number 4 aparently stood up from a bench that was in the hallway and literally ran down the hallway, running to the point that a therapist and the nursing assistant could not catch her. Resident number 4 only stopped because she fell forward and hit her nose on the floor. She was in a dementia state, and did not reach her hands out to catch herself. There was no way anyone could have prevented such an accident, especially since Resident number 4 did not take off running all the time and she was under direct supervision when this happened. Resident number 3 in the August 8, 2001 survey, apparently fell in the TV room and the corner of her chin hit the table. While the injury did cause a massive bruise on her chest, there was no way of knowing the fall would occur since the resident did not have a history of falls. Resident number 6 identified in the August 8, 2001 survey, was non-verbal. During the survey she followed the staff and held hands with a staffer. She is a person who was always reaching for someone. She had a habit of patting another resident on the head, but she was not aggressive. She merely liked to touch, kiss, hold hands, or hug people. Respondent tried to keep her hands busy by giving her something to hold but that did not stop her need to touch people. During the surveyor's tour of the facility on August 8, 2001, a resident mistakenly walked up to a room and asked if it was hers. She was redirected before she entered the room. The resident who claimed to be missing glasses and spools of thread has a mild dementia. She was wearing glasses and the facility supplied her with spools of thread when she ran out. Resident number 2, in the August 17, 2001 survey, was totally ambulatory and did not have a history of falling. She was steady but very confused. She was walking to dinner in the dining room in an open area, no barriers, and apparently when she made a step, she stepped on the shoe of her other foot and fell down, striking her head on the piano. She had a tendency when she sat down to constantly shake her leg or cross her legs back and forth. She was in continuous motion, which is not unusual with Alzheimer's type of dementia. Apparently when she first came back from the hospital, she was able to stand up, help herself to bed with some assistance. Through the night she was having more difficulty and returned to the emergency room where they discovered that she in fact had a fractured hip from the fall. Resident number 1, in the August 17, 2001 survey, was approximately 97 years old, very frail and very thin. He had a recent diagnosis of cancer that was a progressive non-Hodgkins type lymphoma. He had good days and he had bad days, as far as his physical health, which is typical of the disease process. He also had confusion from memory impairment disorder that may or may not have been Alzheimer's. There were days when Resident number 1 could walk using a cane, on other days he could walk with a walker, and there were days when he was so tired he used a wheelchair. With his demented state he wasn't always sure which appliance to use for the day and had to be reminded. Resident number 1 was a smoker, so he would go out on the patio frequently. Sometimes he would reach for things and, being frail, would fall. He was in end stage with his cancerous process and one of his goals was to stay out of a nursing home. Resident number 1 did have a series of falls which created skin tears because his skin was very thin, but nothing that was more of a serious nature than that, and he was adamant that he stay at the ALF. He was able to be maintained at Respondent's ALF and did not have any fractures while he was there. Toward the end of his life, he determined that he did not want to be involved with the hospice group that came to visit. He did eventually go to a different level of care. Resident number 3, identified in the August 17, 2001 survey, fell in the shower when she was being assisted in May of 2001. She apparently fell and hit the back of her head on a shower stall, but she was receiving assistance at the time. This was an unusual occurrence, Resident number 3 was not a resident who fell frequently or had a great history of falls. On August 12 the survey notes that she had redness under both her eyes and a cut or scratch on her nose. This was another resident who had very large bags under her eyes and rubbed her eyes frequently. There was no documentation that this resident had received an injury or a fall that would create this redness around her eyes or the yellowish, purplish hematomas. There was no indication that this resident had had a fall and she was not prone to falls. Resident number 6, identified in the August 17, 2001 survey, was a resident who was required to wear shoes because it is considered inappropriate for our elders to walk around barefoot. She would take her shoes off frequently. When she did wear them, she had a difficult time picking her feet up high enough to walk without someone with her. Resident number 6 apparently tripped with no apparent injuries, but later that day her right hand showed bruising and swelling. There was no indication as to the cause of the swelling and an X-ray indicated no fracture. Resident number 6 apparently tripped again while walking, tried to catch herself and held onto a chair; she had a skin tear on her shin. Resident number 6 although ambulatory, would often catch herself from falling. Resident number 4, identified in the August 17, 2001 survey, scratched his arm because he has dry skin. It began bleeding and an aide administered a bandage. There was no need for documentation. The facts alleged in the four surveys at issue do not indicate any conditions or occurrences relating to the operation and maintenance of this facility, or the personal care of the residents which directly threatened the physical or emotional health, safety or security of the facility residents. At no time during any of her surveys that are at issue in this proceeding did Pellot find Respondent's ALF to be short-staffed. The facts alleged in the four surveys at issue do not indicate any conditions or occurrences relating to the operation and maintenance of the facility or the personal care of the residents which would have been an imminent danger to the residents or guests of the facility, or a substantial probability that death or serious physical or emotional harm could result therefrom. Respondent was providing appropriate care for the needs of the residents that were identified in the statements of deficiencies at issue in this proceeding. None of the patients who were involved in these incidents cited in the four surveys had the mental capacity to form a willful intent to harm someone. Nor could the patient's actions be interpreted, under the facts, to be anything more than defensive reactions or touching incidents of persons with mental impairments. The relevant facts showed that Respondent took appropriate steps to address wandering problems and protect residents in its facility. The events surrounding Resident number 6, in the July 16 survey were an anomaly and could not have been foreseen by the staff at the facility. Respondent had a right to rely on the assertion by DCF that Resident number 6 was appropriate for placement in an ALF. The incident with the coffee was not significant enough to precipitate the resident's removal from the facility. When it became apparent that the resident was aggressive at times, Respondent took appropriate steps to have her placed elsewhere. In addition, this isolated incident was not similar to those for which Respondent was cited in the first survey of June 1, 2001. This was a problem created by a particular patient and not incidents of falls or wandering. As such, it should not have triggered a repeat offense nor a moratorium. The evidence produced by Petitioner was primarily hearsay in nature without corroboration. Respondent presented none of the patients, staff or other witness to the incidents referred to, and none of the records referred to or relied on by the surveyor were produced. Under these circumstances, Petitioner failed to meet its burden to produce clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed the violations alleged in Petitioner's form 3020s, the Administrative Complaints, or the Order of Immediate Moratorium. Respondent's witness was credible and its explanation surrounding each incident was plausible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order determining that: The deficiencies in the AHCA form 3020s are unfounded and must be withdrawn; The Administrative Complaints be dismissed against Respondent; and The Order of Immediate Moratorium be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2002. Michael P. Sasso, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Mirror Lake Drive, North Suite 310-G St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discharging Petitioner because of his age.
Findings Of Fact Respondent produces flexible packaging, develops technology to fill that packaging with liquids, and provides services to incorporate its flexible packaging systems into its customers' facilities. Respondent primarily produces "bag-in- box" products and manufacturing systems for customers such as Pepsi-Cola and Wendy's, as well as various customers in the milk, juice, and chemical business. Respondent operates two manufacturing facilities, one located at its headquarters in Romeville, Illinois, and another located in Union City, California. Petitioner was born on April 24, 1946. In 1996, Respondent hired Petitioner as a sales representative, and he served in that position until he was discharged on April 19, 2004. Petitioner initially was assigned to service the Upper Midwest Region and was based in Chicago, Illinois. In 1999, Respondent reassigned Petitioner to the Southeast Region. After his reassignment to the Southeast Region, Petitioner continued to live in the Chicago area for several years. However, in December 2002 or January 2003, Petitioner and Respondent mutually agreed that Petitioner would relocate to Florida. Because the move resulted from a mutual decision between Petitioner and one of Respondent's founders, Respondent paid $25,000 towards Petitioner's moving expenses. After the move, Petitioner continued to be responsible for the same geographical territory and the same customers as before the move. Joe Pranckus is Respondent's vice president of sales. At the time of Petitioner's discharge, the sales department consisted of a customer service department and four geographical sales territories: the Central, Western, Eastern and Mexico Regions. The Central and Western Regions (where Respondent's manufacturing facilities are located) each were overseen by a regional manager. The Eastern and Mexico Regions did not have regional managers. As Petitioner was located in the Eastern Region, Mr. Pranckus served as his direct supervisor. From 1999 until his dismissal, Petitioner was Respondent’s only sales representative in the Southeast. His primary responsibility was to maintain and increase Respondent’s business in that region of the country. The Rapak sales department as a whole is generally responsible for maintaining and increasing Respondent’s overall sales. This involves not only selling products and services, but also following up with customers to help them solve problems and otherwise to ensure their happiness. Because his primary responsibility was maintaining and increasing sales, Mr. Pranckus judged Petitioner almost exclusively by his year-to-date sales numbers as compared to the same period in the previous year. These numbers were calculated by Mr. Pranckus on a fiscal-year basis, from May 1st through April 30th. For the 2003-2004 fiscal year, Mr. Pranckus established a goal for Petitioner of 15 percent growth in sales. The minimum expectation was that Petitioner maintain at least the same amount of sales he had the previous year. During the 2003-2004 fiscal year, Mr. Pranckus e- mailed Petitioner his sales-versus-last-year figures on almost a monthly basis. By the end of June 2003, Petitioner had sold only 84 percent as much as he had sold through June 2002; by the end of July, only 87 percent as much as he had sold through July 2002; by the end of August, 91 percent; September, 81 percent; October, 90 percent; November, 85 percent; December, 87 percent; and by the end of March 2004 (eleven months into the fiscal year), he had sold only 88 percent as much as he had sold through the first eleven months of the 2002-2003 fiscal year. In short, as the fiscal year drew to a close, it was clear that Petitioner was going to suffer a net loss of business for the year. In late October 2003, Petitioner suffered a heart attack and underwent triple bypass surgery. Petitioner was unable to work for approximately two months while recovering from surgery. However, Petitioner returned to work in January 2004, initially working on a limited basis. Petitioner's sales numbers suffered because he lost some certain accounts owing to factors beyond his control (such as product quality and price issues). Nonetheless, Petitioner concedes that it was his job to replace his lost sales, no matter what caused his customers to switch suppliers. Mr. Pranckus typically holds one sales meeting each year for his entire staff. In February 2004, Mr. Pranckus held one of those meetings. At that meeting, Mr. Pranckus informed Petitioner that "changes would be made if [his] numbers didn't improve." In his application for unemployment compensation, Petitioner stated that Mr. Pranckus also warned him on March 10, 2004, that he needed to improve his sales numbers. Finally, Mr. Pranckus sent an e-mail to Petitioner on March 27, 2004. In that e-mail, Mr. Pranckus delivered the following written warning: Your territory is at a critical state. We can not continue along this path. Sales must be improved immediately or we will need to change. We agreed at our sales meeting to get this back on track. It is not showing up in the numbers and activity. Call me and let me know how we can help. On April 19, 2004, Mr. Pranckus discharged Petitioner because of his poor performance. His year-to-date sales figures were unacceptably low, as compared to the previous year, and Mr. Pranckus saw no evidence of plans or activity designed to improve matters. After Petitioner was discharged, he filed an application for unemployment compensation. On the application, Petitioner stated that he was discharged “for failure to achieve sales goals.” Later in that same application, in response to a request to “briefly summarize your reason for separation from this employer,” Petitioner wrote: “I did not achieve my sales goals.” Petitioner did not assert anywhere in his application for unemployment benefits that he was discharged because of his age. At the time of his discharge, Petitioner was 57 years old (almost 58). Mr. Pranckus did not know Petitioner’s exact age, but he would have guessed (based on physical appearance) that Petitioner was in his mid-50s at the time. Mr. Pranckus did not consider this to be “old.” In fact, Petitioner is not much older than Mr. Pranckus. Mr. Pranckus interviewed three individuals to fill Petitioner’s position. He ultimately selected Jim Wulff. Mr. Pranckus did not know their ages at the time of the interviews, but he would have guessed (again, by appearance) that Mr. Wulff was in his mid-50s and that the other two interviewees were in their mid- to late 40s and mid- to late 50s, respectively. In fact, Mr. Wulff was born on May 26, 1948, so he was 55 years old (nearly 56) when Mr. Pranckus hired him. Sales analysis from June 2003 showed that eight Rapak employees or representatives did not meet the 100 percent sales goal. Those listed were either Rapak non-supervising employees with direct responsibility for sales, supervising employees, or non-employee independent brokers. However, none of these employees, whether younger or older, was similarly situated to Petitioner at the time of his discharge. As an initial matter, there were four other non- supervisory employees with direct responsibility for sales: Dennis Hayes, Marvin Groom, Donald Young, and Keith Martinez. The other individuals responsible for sales were either supervisory employees or non-employee independent brokers. Because the two supervisors have management responsibilities and are responsible for their entire regions and the individuals who report to them, they are not judged primarily by whether they personally meet the 100 percent or 115 percent sales-versus- last-year objectives. Brokers, meanwhile, are not employees. Rather, they are independent contractors paid on a straight commission, so Respondent receives value from their services regardless of how much they sell. Mr. Hayes was the only other employee who performed the exact same job as Petitioner, but he reported to Regional Manager Dan Petriekis in the Central Region, not directly to Mr. Pranckus. Moreover, as of March 2004, Mr. Hayes had sold 127 percent as much as he had during the same period the previous year.1 Mr. Hayes is almost ten years older than Petitioner. Mr. Young was also responsible for sales, but he was semi-retired, serviced only one customer and received a base salary for his work. As of March 2004, however, Mr. Young had sold 115 percent as much as he had during the same period the previous year. Mr. Young is more than twelve years older than Petitioner. Finally, while Keith Martinez and Marvin Groom had some responsibility for sales, their positions were “radically different” from Petitioner’s. Whereas Petitioner could identify certain problems with Respondent’s machinery and products and would refer those problems to a service technician to assist his customers, Mr. Groom and Mr. Martinez were both originally hired as service technicians. Based on this experience, they could and did not only identify technical problems, but also performed the necessary maintenance and repair work on the spot, in addition to performing preventative maintenance. Petitioner, by contrast, has spent his entire working life as salesman. Accordingly, he was neither capable of, nor expected to, perform these additional maintenance and repair functions. As a result, Mr. Groom and Mr. Martinez received more leeway on their sales performance than Petitioner because they brought additional value to Respondent’s business that Petitioner could not offer. Nonetheless, as of March 2004, Mr. Groom was running at 100 percent versus the prior year and Mr. Martinez was running at 87 percent. Mr. Groom is roughly three years younger than Petitioner, and Mr. Martinez is 15 and one-half years younger than Petitioner. Respondent paid Petitioner $113,000 in salary and commissions during his last full calendar year of employment with Rapak. Petitioner was out of work for ten months after his dismissal. During that time, he received $8,000 in unemployment compensation from the State of Florida and $8,942.33 in severance pay from Respondent. In his new job, Petitioner projects that he will earn $100,000 in his first year but admits that he could make at least $113,000 because his compensation is once again dependent upon sales commissions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent committed no unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 2006.
The Issue Whether certain operating procedures or policies at Baker Correctional Institution, a prison operated by respondent, are unpromulgated rules and therefore invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1981)
Findings Of Fact and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Generally CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. $120.56, Fla.Stat. (1981). Petitioners are substantially affected by the specific policies and procedures at issue. The Department concedes that they have standing to bring and maintain this administrative rule challenge proceeding. See, 120.56, Fla.Stat. The parties' proposed findings of fact have been considered in preparing this order. To the extent the proposed findings were not consistent with the weight of credible evidence, they have been either rejected, or, when possible, modified to conform to the evidence. Additionally, proposed findings which were subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary, have been rejected. II. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Inmates will be permitted to purchase and receive legal materials, such as law books, and keep them in their personal lockers if space is available. Baker Correctional Institution Operating Procedure (I0P) #78-G-1, Section VI, and 80-G-34, Section IV, pg. 2 of 3. Conclusions of Law This policy is not an unpromulgated rule, but rather is a restatement of Rule 33-3.05(6), Florida Administrative Code, which reads, in relevant part: (6) Inmates shall be allowed to purchase legal materials (such as law books) at their own expense, limited only by the amount of space available to the inmate for the storage of such items. Inmates shall be allowed to keep legal material in their quarters subject to storage limitations. III. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: If the inmate does not send his property out of the institution within thirty (30) days after proper notification, he shall forfeit ownership of such and it will be disposed of by the institution in accordance with Department of Corrections rules and regulations 33-3.2, 33-3.06, and in accordance with the guidelines on DC Form #4, Authorization for Disposition of Mail and Property. I0P #78-G-3, Section VII p. 2 of 2, and 80-G-32, Section III B. Conclusions of Law Contrary to petitioners' contention, it has not been shown that this policy has the effect of a rule but was not promulgated as such. See, State Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) In effect, the challenged policy simply requires that impounded or unauthorized inmate property be disposed of in accordance with Department rules and DC Form #4, Authorization for Disposition of Mail and Property, an authorization which each inmate must sign as a condition of being allowed to keep personal property within a correctional institution. See, Section 3.025(7), (8), Fla. Admin. Code. DC Form #4, which is not in evidence, has not been shown to contain a Department interpretation of law or policy which is virtually self-executing, intended by its own effect to create rights, require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Stevens, supra at 296; McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). IV. Findings of Fact Petitioners allege that there is an unwritten rule at Baker Correctional Institution which requires that any and all legal material, books, and files be destroyed by the institution after 30 days. There is no written or unwritten policy at Baker Correctional Institution which imposes such a requirement. Conclusions of Law Petitioners' claim is rejected for failure to prove the existence of such a policy at Baker Correctional Institution. V. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy statement is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Any radio that is altered in any way, cabinet, case electronically and/or electrically will be confiscated and the inmate will lose possession of the radio and/or disciplinary action will be taken. I0P #78-G-15, Section VIII, pg. 2 of 3. Conclusions of Law This policy is nothing more than a logical restatement of Rule 33- 3.06(1)(b) Any item or article not originally contraband shall be deemed contraband if it is passed from one inmate to another without authorization or if it is altered from its original condition. (Emphasis added) Further, Subsection (7)(d) of this rule allows contraband to be confiscated and Rule 33-3.08, generally, authorizes disciplinary action against inmates who violate Department rules. VI. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following institutional operating procedure is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Inmates are prohibited from using typewriters for personal correspondence, filing grievances, or other personal use. Any violation of this operating procedure may constitute a basis for disciplinary action. I0P #78-G-21. This is a Department policy, never promulgated as a rule, which is uniformly applied throughout Baker Correctional Institution, is--by its own terms--virtually self-executing, and intended to require compliance and otherwise have the consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy has the effect of a rule, as defined by Section 120.52(14), Florida Statutes (1981), and is therefore an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra. The Department, in its post-hearing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, "does not deny that . . . [this policy] is an invalid rule." VII. Findings of Fact Petitioners allege that there is an unwritten policy at Baker Correctional Institution which allows only one legal size envelope, at a time, to be issued an inmate. There is no such policy. Rather the number of legal size envelopes issued to inmates depends on the availability of envelopes and the reasonableness of the requests. Within these guidelines, the exact number of envelopes issued is left to the discretion of the correctional officer involved. Conclusions of Law Since this policy has been shown to operate as no more than a guideline, subject in application to the discretion of the enforcing officer, it is not a rule within the meaning of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1981), and need not be promulgated as such. See, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Police Benevolent Association, 400 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). VIII. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Visitors or regular visitors will either be Saturday or Sunday, but not both days. I0P #78-6-7. This policy, never promulgated as a rule, is uniformly applied, virtually self-executing, and intended by its own effect to create rights or require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy is, in effect, a rule, but was not promulgated as such. It is therefore an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra; Sumner v. Department of Corrections, (DOAH 82-676R), 4 FALR 1198-A (1982), where a memorandum, issued by the Superintendent of Polk Correctional Institution, restricting prisoners' visitation rights to one weekend day, was declared invalid. IX. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: We will discontinue receiving funds for inmates from visitors. Interoffice Memo 4-1-83. This policy, never promulgated as a rule, is applied uniformly, virtually self-executing, and intended by its own effect to create rights or require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy has the effect of a rule, but was not promulgated as one. Thus it is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra; Sumner, supra. Contrary to the Department's contention, this policy is not a mere restatement of Rule 33-3.06(5) which, at least by implication, allows visitors to bring money to inmates of a correctional institution. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Only one dollar bills will be spent by visitors in the visiting park. This policy, too, is uniformly applied, virtually self-executing, and intended by its own effect to create rights or require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy, which has the effect of a rule but was not adopted as such, is therefore an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra; Sumner, supra. Further, the Department's post-hearing proposed findings of fact state at page 5: The . . . [Department] does not deny that the above written policy is an invalid rule. For these reasons, it is ORDERED: That the Department procedures or policies described in Sections VI, VIII, IX, and X, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority; and That, in all other respects, petitioners Petition to Determine the Invalidity of a Rule, filed October 11, 1983, is denied. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Randall A. Holland, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Room 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Douglas L. Adams, Joe Lewis Holland Union Correctional Institution Post Office Box 221 Raiford, Florida 32083 Liz Cloud, Chief Department of State Bureau of Administrative Code Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Curtis Head and Melvin Davis Baker Correctional Institution Post Office Box 500 Olustee, Florida 32072
The Issue Whether Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent, Florida Department of Health- Volusia (Respondent or FDOH-Volusia), as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her identification with a protected class, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a provider of health services in Volusia County, Florida. Among the programs administered by FDOH-Volusia is the Women, Infants, and Children program (WIC). WIC is a federally-funded nutrition program, which provides healthy foods, nutrition education and counseling, breastfeeding support, and referrals for health care and community services. At all times relevant to this proceeding, FDOH-Volusia operated WIC health clinics in Daytona Beach, New Smyrna Beach, Orange City, and Pierson. Petitioner began working for FDOH-Volusia in June 2010, as a nutrition program director. In her capacity as nutrition program director, Petitioner was responsible for certain management activities of WIC. The State of Florida maintains close supervision of WIC. FDOH-Volusia is required to provide an annual Nutrition Plan (the Plan) to the State. The Plan is a report of WIC operations, sites, hours of operation, various objectives, local agency plans for increasing participation, local agency disaster plan, and staffing. As nutrition program director, Petitioner is responsible for preparing the Plan, and submitting it for revisions and/or final approval by FDOH-Volusia’s administrator. Ms. Boswell became the administrator of FDOH-Volusia on or about April 1, 2016. Dr. Husband, who is African-American, became Petitioner’s direct supervisor beginning in July 2016. As Petitioner’s direct supervisor, Dr. Husband provided oversight of WIC. In 2016, FDOH-Volusia consolidated its Deland and Deltona WIC offices into the office in Orange City. Petitioner was very involved in the move and was, during the period of the move, reassigned from her primary duties in Daytona Beach to duties in Orange City. By all accounts, the move went well. On September 23, 2016, Ms. Boswell requested that Petitioner meet with her and Dr. Husband to discuss the draft Plan provided by Petitioner on September 21, 2016, and for Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband to provide comments, suggestions, and revisions to the Plan, which was due for submission to the State of Florida on September 30, 2016. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the steps necessary to get the Plan in final form for submission. At the onset of the September 23, 2016, meeting, Ms. Boswell complimented Petitioner and her staff for getting DOH-Volusia’s new Orange City location “up and going.” Petitioner responded that “it’s good to hear something positive after so much negative.” The comment was directed at Dr. Husband, who Petitioner thought had been negative towards various aspects of her job performance. Petitioner’s comment led to tensions between Petitioner and Dr. Husband. Both said, at one time or another during the meeting, words to the effect of “don’t speak to me like that.” Ms. Boswell became a little uncomfortable with the interaction between the two. During the September 23, 2016, meeting, a number of deficiencies in the draft Plan were identified, including grammatical and syntax errors, discussion that did not align with the corresponding graphs, and a lack of data to support the Plan conclusions. Dr. Husband gave guidance and feedback on the Plan. Ms. Boswell indicated that, but for Petitioner’s comment regarding Dr. Husband’s negativity, the meeting was otherwise professional. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that Dr. Husband made other negative comments to her at various times, stating that at a meeting with the director of nursing regarding WIC work schedules, Dr. Husband said “we’re not going to nitpick”; and that on another occasion during a discussion on the difficulty of recruiting and retaining staff at base salary, Dr. Husband said to Petitioner “that’s the way you designed it.” According to Petitioner, Dr. Husband made similar comments to other of her direct reports. Dr. Husband testified at the hearing that she thought -- before and after the September 23, 2016, meeting -- that Petitioner was insubordinate, disrespectful to employees and supervisors, and rude. Petitioner would take meeting notes in red ink when she perceived instances of “negativity” and “unacceptable behavior” from her direct supervisor, which she described as her “red flag system.” Petitioner argued that since she “spoke up and spoke out” during the September 23, 2016, meeting, she has been the subject of retaliation by Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband. She expressed her belief that Ms. Boswell was upset that Petitioner criticized Dr. Husband because Dr. Husband was Ms. Boswell’s direct report, i.e., that Petitioner’s criticism “was a reflection on her.” On or about October 5, 2016, Petitioner was informed that her duty station was being changed from Daytona Beach to New Smyrna Beach. Petitioner testified that she posed four questions to Dr. Husband as to the reasons for the transfer and that, in her opinion, Dr. Husband’s responses did not justify the action. Petitioner felt that as the WIC nutrition program director, she should be in Daytona Beach, the largest administrative office. Thus, Petitioner could think of no reason for the move other than retaliation for her criticism of Dr. Husband. Ms. Boswell testified credibly that the reason for Petitioner’s transfer was that New Smyrna Beach was reopening WIC services at the office. In light of how well things went with the opening of the Orange City office, she wanted Petitioner to go to New Smyrna Beach to make sure that location was up and running. She testified that the reassignment was not a punishment, rather, “that was her job” to make sure WIC was running well. Her testimony is credited. In addition to the fact that Dr. Boswell had perfectly legitimate reasons for having Petitioner cover the New Smyrna Beach office, it is clear that Petitioner suffered no adverse employment action as a result. Petitioner lives between Daytona Beach and New Smyrna Beach, and the New Smyrna Beach office is no further from her home than the Daytona Beach office. Petitioner’s pay was not changed, her title was not changed, and her benefits were not changed.1/ More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the change in duty station had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On or about October 18, 2016, Petitioner received a Documented Counseling and Performance Notification (Documented Counseling) from Dr. Husband. The Documented Counseling included a number of deficiencies in performance, and several corrective measures. The deficiencies included: that Petitioner failed to monitor and spend allocated WIC funding during the 2015-16 fiscal year; that the Plan submitted by Petitioner was rejected by the administrator for lack of detail, grammatical errors, and poor work product, and when the Plan was finally completed it was discovered that Petitioner’s staff performed the majority of the work; that the WIC participation rate (65 percent) was significantly less than the program goal (85 percent); and that Petitioner failed to support efforts to refer WIC clients to the dental hygienist at the Orange City location. The Documented Counseling also reflected that Petitioner had been disrespectful to Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband. Petitioner refused to sign the Documented Counseling to acknowledge her receipt. Petitioner provided excuses for the deficiencies noted, e.g., she used most of the allocated WIC funding; the draft Plan was mostly complete, and she had never before been required to submit a draft nine days before its final submission date; she was only required to increase WIC participation by four percent per year; it was not in the WIC scope of work to facilitate clients to get dental services, just to refer them; she objected to co-location of the dental hygienist in the WIC office and, in any event, referrals were not the responsibility of management, only staff. None of Petitioner’s explanations were convincing. Rather, the testimony of Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband that the Documented Counseling was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the Documented Counseling had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On or about December 16, 2016, Petitioner received an oral reprimand. The oral reprimand noted that Petitioner violated prior instruction and FDOH-Volusia written policy regarding absence from work and reporting such absences to her supervisor by telephone. The oral reprimand was documented. Petitioner refused to sign the oral reprimand documentation to acknowledge her receipt. Petitioner acknowledged that prior notice of absences is important so that FDOH-Volusia could make sure personnel were available to perform clinical services. Despite Petitioner’s prior knowledge that she would not be at work on November 28, 2016, she did not call her supervisor, Dr. Husband, until after 8:00 a.m. on November 28, 2016. She left an earlier voicemail with a direct report. The testimony of Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband that the oral reprimand was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the oral reprimand had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On April 12, 2017, Petitioner was required to participate in an investigatory interview to determine why she was absent from her duty station on numerous occasions between January 4, 2017, and April 10, 2017. Petitioner testified that she saw no problem in coming to work late since, if she was not scheduled for clinic duties, there was no adverse affect on staff or the clinic. Petitioner thought the investigatory interview for her failure to be at work during scheduled hours “was a bit harsh,” and felt that FDOH-Volusia was “monitoring her coming and going.” She testified that the monitoring of her “daily schedule, coming and going,” was related to the September 23, 2016, meeting. Petitioner provided information on her “tardies” to Ms. Ayers. Ms. Ayers had by then been assigned as Petitioner’s supervisor since Petitioner had, in another act of “speaking up and speaking out,” filed a formal grievance against Dr. Husband for retaliation.2/ Ms. Boswell testified convincingly that Petitioner was not authorized to unilaterally “flex” her time; that an agency cannot be run when employees alter their schedules without notice; and that Petitioner’s excessive absences from her duty station violated the Employees’ Handbook. The documentation provided by Petitioner was deemed to be insufficient to justify her absences, and did not explain why Petitioner failed to get approval from a supervisor before modifying her work schedule. Thereafter, on or about June 22, 2017, Petitioner received a written reprimand for the absences. Petitioner refused to sign the written reprimand to acknowledge her receipt. The testimony of Ms. Boswell and Ms. Ayers that the written reprimand was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the written reprimand had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. The June 22, 2017, written reprimand was the last of the retaliatory actions for the September 23, 2016, meeting alleged by Petitioner. Petitioner has alleged that the October 5, 2016, change in duty station; the October 18, 2016, Documented Counseling; the December 16, 2016, oral reprimand; the April 12, 2017, investigatory interview; and the June 22, 2017, written reprimand were all unwarranted retaliation for the statement she made during the September 23, 2016, meeting, i.e., that Dr. Husband had been negative towards her. Petitioner acknowledged that there was “some truth” in the discipline, but lots of “fluff.” To the contrary, the evidence is convincing that, if anything, FDOH-Volusia was, and remains, exceedingly lenient and accommodating to Petitioner with regard to the substantiated discipline meted out. As set forth previously, Petitioner has not been terminated or demoted, and has not suffered a pay decrease or a decrease in benefits. While her duty station was moved from Daytona Beach to New Smyrna Beach, those locations are approximately the same distance from Petitioner’s home, and she has since been moved back to Daytona Beach for “need” related reasons. Respondent in this case presented hours of compelling testimony from multiple credible witnesses regarding Petitioner’s poor management skills, poor interpersonal skills, poor leadership skills; her tense, argumentative, and disrespectful attitude; and more. The testimony was, presumably, offered to demonstrate that FDOH-Volusia had a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for the alleged adverse employment actions taken against Petitioner. The testimony and evidence was unnecessary. Not once during the course of the hearing did Petitioner allege or argue that the actions taken as described herein had anything to do with discrimination or retaliation based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Petitioner stated that the actions taken against her were the result of her having “spoken up and spoken out” against negative comments from her supervisor, Dr. Husband. There was nothing raised in Petitioner’s Employment Complaint of Discrimination, in her Petition for Relief, in her statement of position in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, in the testimony and evidence that she offered at the final hearing, or in her Proposed Recommended Order that even intimates that FDOH-Volusia committed an unlawful employment practice as established in section 760.10, Florida Statutes. As will be discussed herein, the failure to allege, argue, or prove discrimination or retaliation based on a protected class or opposition to an unlawful act constitutes a failure to meet the most basic jurisdictional element of an unlawful employment practice complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lisa J. Funchess’s Petition for Relief, FCHR No. 201701356. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2019.
The Issue The issues in this proceeding are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, and whether Petitioner’s Complaint of Employment Discrimination was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a retail store located in Panama City Beach, Florida. At the time, William Todd Collins was the store manager. Petitioner is female. Around October 2011, Petitioner was first employed with Respondent in Puerto Rico as a jewelry sales expert, Level II. In October 2012, she transferred to Respondent’s Panama City Beach store as a Level II, jewelry sales expert. Towards the beginning of August 2013, Petitioner learned that she was pregnant. Shortly thereafter, she started displaying symptoms of her pregnancy and experienced dizziness from not eating due to her pregnancy. She was terminated on October 25, 2013. During her employment with Respondent, Petitioner performed her duties well and was not disciplined by Respondent until the incident that led to her termination. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner’s pregnancy was accommodated by allowing her breaks and to sit down as needed. She was also allowed to eat snacks as needed. On October 22, 2013, the store had closed for the evening. Petitioner and other sales associates were putting merchandise away and closing down the registers throughout the store. While standing at one of the sales counters, Petitioner was feeling dizzy from not eating, picked up a Godiva chocolate bar from the store’s inventory, and began to eat it. The Department Supervisor Mindy Watson saw her eating the chocolate bar and asked Petitioner what she was doing. Petitioner responded, “what does it look like I’m doing. I’m eating a candy bar.” Thereafter, Ms. Watson told Petitioner she needed to pay $4 for the chocolate bar. A discussion about the price of the chocolate bar ensued but, contrary to Petitioner’s claim that she offered to pay for the chocolate bar, the evidence showed that she did not offer to pay for the chocolate bar. The evidence was clear that it would have been easy to open a sales register so that Petitioner could pay for the chocolate with her credit card, which she had with her. Instead, Petitioner walked away from Ms. Watson and said she was going to place the wrapper in the vault as a reminder to pay for the candy bar. When Petitioner walked away with the chocolate bar, Ms. Watson informed Human Resources Supervisor Kelly Black about Petitioner not paying for the chocolate bar. At about the same time, Ms. Black approached the area where Petitioner was and saw Customer Service Specialist Pamela Wells also approaching the same area. Ms. Black heard Ms. Wells say to Petitioner, “oh you have chocolate,” to which Petitioner responded, “yes, and I stole it.” Once all the associates were gone for the day, Ms. Watson and Ms. Black checked the vault and the Fine Jewelry trash cans, but could not find the chocolate wrapper. Ms. Black called Mr. Collins that night and reported the incident. Additionally, both Ms. Black and Ms. Watson sent an email to Mr. Collins detailing these events. The day after the incident, Mr. Collins began an investigation. During the investigation, he interviewed Ms. Watson and Ms. Black, as well as other associates who were working the evening of October 22, 2013. Mr. Collins also learned that Petitioner was seen eating a Godiva chocolate bar from the store’s inventory several weeks before the October 22, 2013, incident. With that report, Mr. Collins checked Petitioner’s associate files to see whether she had purchased any chocolate over the last three months and to determine if she had purchased the chocolate bar from October 22, 2013. There was no record of Petitioner paying for any chocolate. On October 25, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., Petitioner returned to work. She did not pay for the chocolate bar either before or during her shift, even though, contrary to her claim at hearing that she could not pay for the chocolate during work, she had the ability to do so. After she did not pay for the chocolate bar during her shift, around 3:30 p.m., Sarah Menchaca, the manager on duty, told Petitioner that Mr. Collins, the store manager, wanted to speak to her. Petitioner went into Mr. Collins’ office and was terminated due to Misuse of Property/Assets. At the time of her termination, Petitioner signed dismissal papers agreeing to a summary of the events on October 22, 2013, and the reason for her termination. The dismissal papers did not mention Petitioner’s pregnancy and dizziness as the reason she took the candy bar. However, at the same meeting, Petitioner also wrote another two-paged detailed statement where she mentioned her pregnancy, the dizziness, and the fact that she had not eaten for hours. As indicated, Petitioner was terminated on October 25, 2013, and clearly was aware she had suffered an adverse employment action on that day. Thereafter, Petitioner obtained a Technical Assistance Questionnaire from FCHR. The questionnaire makes it clear on page 1 that it is not a substitute for filing an actual complaint with FCHR in a timely manner. It states, “REMEMBER, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed within 365 days of the alleged act of discrimination”. (emphasis in original). In this case, it is clear that Petitioner’s complaint was filed with FCHR on October 27, 2014, 367 days after she was terminated by Respondent. As such, her claims are time-barred and should be dismissed as a matter of law. Even assuming that Petitioner’s complaint was timely, the better evidence establishes that Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment after a reasonable investigation determined that she took a Godiva chocolate bar from inventory and failed to pay for it. Petitioner provided no testimony or other evidence that other store personnel were allowed to take chocolate bars and not pay for them or that such individuals were not terminated for theft. Additionally, there was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against women who were pregnant or had difficult pregnancies. In fact, the evidence showed that Respondent employed pregnant women and made accommodations for such pregnancies when needed. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission of Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Merrill W. Daily, Esquire JC Penney Headquarters Mail Station 1111 6501 Legacy Drive Plano, Texas 75024 Robert L. Thirston, II, Esquire Thirston Law Firm Post Office Box 19617 Panama City Beach, Florida 32417 (eServed) Derek Benjamin Lipscombe, Esquire JC Penney Corporation 6501 Legacy Drive, MS 1108 Plano, Texas 75024 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission of Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact In 1989 Dennis Presson filed a complaint of discrimination against Walt Disney World Co., Respondent, alleging he was denied employment with Disney by reason of his handicap (epilepsy). This complaint was settled between the parties by a Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1) on June 23, 1989 at which time Respondent agreed to employ Petitioner as a Property Craftsworker Assistant and Petitioner was so employed on June 28, 1989. On October 6, 1989 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for refusing to follow a directive given by his shop foreman. (Exhibit 20.) On November 11, 1989 Petitioner was given an oral reprimand for disruptive behavior in the shop. (Exhibit 24.) On November 29, 1989 Petitioner was given an oral reprimand for excessive absences and tardiness. (Exhibit 26.) Over a period of four months Petitioner had been absent (or tardy) a total of 25.5 hours. On February 6, 1990 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for disrupting the harmonious and productive working atmosphere of the shop. (Exhibit 25.) On May 16, 1990 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for unprofessional craftsmanship for using chewing gum as a woodfiller to repair a chair. (Exhibit 22.) On July 23, 1990 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for using shop machinery in a unsafe manner. (Exhibit 23.) In August 1990 while Petitioner was working in the Furnishings Department to which he was originally assigned, the work in that department declined and, in lieu of laying off some of the workers in the Furnishings Department, three of these property craftsman assistants, including Petitioner, were temporarily assigned to the Resorts Decorating Department to work there through the first week of October 1990. (Exhibit 27.) On or about October 10, 1990 Petitioner was returned to the Furnishings Department and on October 11, 1990 was laid off due to lack of work. On November 2, 1990 the remaining six property craftworker assistants employed by Respondent in the Furnishings Department were laid off. All craftworker assistants who had been employed by Respondent for one year or more were given a right to return within 12 months if jobs became available. This is pursuant to a contract between Respondent and the employees' union. None of those property craftsworker assistants laid off at or about the time Petitioner was laid off were rehired as property craftsworker assistants during the ensuing 12 months. Petitioner contends that after he was laid off four new people were hired as property craftsworkers, a position for which he deemed himself qualified. However, the position of property craftsworker required carpentry experience which the four new hires had and Petitioner did not. Property craftsworker's assistant does not require carpentry experience to qualify for hiring in that position. During the time Petitioner was employed by Respondent no craftsworker assistant was promoted to craftsworker. Credible evidence was presented that while Petitioner was employed as a property craftsworker assistant the quality of his work was satisfactory so long as he was closely supervised by his foreman; however, when not closely supervised both the quality and quantity of his work output declined. Petitioner's testimony that he worked best when someone was not looking over his shoulder is not credible. Petitioner's testimony that he was transferred to Resorts Decorating and then transferred back to Furnishings to be laid off was totally discredited by competent evidence that, when faced with lack of work in Furnishings for property craftsworkers assistants, Disney attempted to have these employees temporarily moved other departments where their skills could be used for a short period in lieu of laying them off. When their function could no longer be justified at their temporary employment position, they were returned to the Department from which they were loaned. In the instance of Petitioner's transfer, he and two other craftsworker assistants were transferred to the Resorts Decorating Department from August 20, 1990 until the first week of October 1990. (Exhibit 27.)
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed by Dennis M. Presson against Walt Disney World be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis M. Presson 2816 4th Street Orlando, Florida 32820 Susan K. McKenna, Esquire 322 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Margaret A. Jones/Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Room 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32302 4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Building F, Room 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32302 4149
