The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a consent to use sovereign submerged lands.
Findings Of Fact MBRRC filed an application for an environmental resource permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands located in the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve (BBAP). This application sought approval to construct two finger piers and to install twelve mooring pilings for the benefit of a private yacht club. The application was filed with the Department for review on October 20, 1995. The Petitioner’s property is located on Hibiscus Island, a man-made island within the BBAP, and is accessed by boat. The island is primarily used for residential purposes. Petitioner’s facility is the only commercial docking facility on the island. Petitioner owns approximately 140 feet along the waterfront with its property line extending 20 feet seaward of the upland property. It has an existing dock which is approximately 10 feet wide that runs the length of, and parallel to, the seawall along its waterfront. The proposed finger piers would extend waterward and perpendicular to the existing dock from its ends. This extension proposes to use approximately 16 feet into the sovereign submerged land at the ends and would also allow the installation of 12 mooring pilings between the piers. The ultimate purpose of the installation is to allow perpendicular docking. At all times material to this case the Department has considered the proposed construction to be a new facility subject to the requirements of Section 258.397(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 18-18.006(3), Florida Administrative Code. No existing structures at the site would qualify the applicant for the type of lease proposed. The Petitioner annually hosts numerous fishing and social events at its club facility. Participants typically “raft” vessels together in order to gain access to the shore. Historically this process has moored vessels parallel to the existing dock/seawall. This “rafting” would not necessarily be eliminated by the addition of the proposed finger piers. Petitioner seeks to expand the docking facility as requested in order to provide better ingress and egress to its property. It contends that fishing and boating in the BBAP will be enhanced by such improvements. Petitioner maintains its property is being treated differently than others; however, policies used by the Department in this instance are applicable to all areas of the BBAP. By letter dated February 6, 1996, the Department advised the Petitioner that staff would recommend denial of the application. That letter advised Petitioner of the “extreme hardship” test found in Rule 18-18.006(3), Florida Administrative Code as well as Section 258.397(3)(a), Florida Statutes. The letter noted that this standard was “at best very difficult to demonstrate” and advised Petitioner of the “public interest” requirement also set forth by rule and statute. “Self-imposed circumstances” as used in the applicable rule has been construed to include circumstances where the applicant seeks to improve existing boat access, to increase the number of docking slips, and to enhance the upland property. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board of Trustees) has determined that the construction of single-family docks meets the “extreme hardship” test because single-family docks are considered to be the lowest impact use available on sovereign submerged land. It is deemed appropriate to allow a qualified right of ingress and egress to the upland owner. The Petitioner’s proposal is not a public project or a public necessity. Petitioner currently has ingress and egress to its upland property. The Petitioner’s property is a nonconforming use in a residential area. The term “property owners in the area” has been construed to mean the BBAP. The proposed project is not unique to the applicant, and the burden to the applicant is shared by other property owners in the BBAP. The proposed project would provide additional access to an upland property owner who already has boat access to the waterway. Neither the project site nor the island on which it is located are unique as other properties of a similar nature are within the BBAP. In order to establish that a proposed project is “in the public interest,” applicants are required to demonstrate that the activity would improve either public recreation, water quality, fish hatcheries, or other matters of public interest. In this instance, Petitioner did not submit a written proposal to support the public interest requirement during the application process. Consequently, DEP has not assessed such proposal for its quantity or quality. Petitioner relies on its improved boating access to support a claim of enhancement to public recreation. As to water quality, fish hatcheries, or other matters of public interest, the proposed project would adversely affect seagrasses and other environmental resources by shading. Although the installation of mooring pilings would provide some environmental benefit, those benefits would not be quantifiable and would be offset by increased shading from the project. Other proposals submitted by Petitioner incidental to its Dade County permit application are insufficient in detail and scope to show the public interest requirement would be met. The proposed project is located in an area that is intermediate between the most sensitive and least sensitive sites, for the purpose of manatee protection. The proposed project would have an adverse environmental impact on manatee protection since it creates additional docking slips and additional boat traffic. The proposed project would result in environmental costs through the loss of resources and increased turbidity. The proposed project would provide no quantifiable economic benefit to the public, but would provide some economic cost in the loss of habitat and food source for fisheries. The proposed project would provide no social benefits different from those presently provided by the existing facility. The benefit of the proposed project is merely enhancement of the Petitioner’s current use at a cost of lost fisheries, increased danger to manatees, and increased turbidity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for authorization to lease sovereign submerged land. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31st day of March 1997. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen E. Tunstall, Esquire Stephen E. Tunstall, P.A. 2701 Southwest LeJeune Road Suite 410 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Jeffrey Brown, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Office of the General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection, Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Does a statement by an agency that its regulatory authority is limited by Section 161.58, Florida Statute, constitute a non- rule policy? Does a statement by an agency that fees levied under authority of Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, by county governments for beach driving do not constitute revenue for purposes of invoking its regulatory jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005 (Rule 18-21.005) constitute a non-rule policy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Petitioner Shirley Reynolds (Reynolds) resides and owns beachfront property overlooking the Atlantic Ocean in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Reynolds does not own to the mean high water line, and her property is not adjacent to the sovereign submerged lands held by the Trustees. Reynolds “shares riparian rights with the public.” Reynolds has owned her oceanfront home since 1981. She has observed beach driving by the general public on the beach and in the shallow water in the vicinity of her home. She enjoys the beachfront for “regular recreational, traditional recreational purposes.” Petitioner Diann Bowman (Bowman) resides and owns property that extends to and adjoins the mean high water line of the Atlantic Ocean in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Bowman has observed the general public driving on the beach and in shallow waters of the Atlantic Ocean in the vicinity of her property. Bowman goes swimming in the ocean, builds sand castles by the edge of the water with her grandchildren, and walks on the beach with friends. Petitioners did not have any requests for leases or applications for action pending before the BOT, and Volusia County had not made an application to the Trustees for any activity permit or lease. Petitioner Bowman was not even aware of Reecy's e- mail, and could not articulate how she was affected by it. Although Reynolds testified at length about the impacts of beach driving and beach concessions between her home and the ocean, she failed to show how she was affected by Reecy's statements that the BOT does not regulate beach driving. In response to counsel’s question of what personal interest she has in whether or not the Trustees require authorization to use state land for motor vehicle traffic in front of her home, she responded, “[I]f and when they ever deal with it, it will certainly raise the consciousness of the human safety element.” Petitioners testified regarding the adverse impacts of beach driving on their property and their enjoyment of their property. Beach driving has an adverse impact upon the property values and upon their enjoyment of their property. Respondents The BOT is an agency of the State of Florida, consisting of the Governor and Cabinet. (Art. IV, s. 4 (f), Fla. Const.) The BOT holds the title to the State’s sovereign submerged lands acquired at statehood “for the use and benefit of the people of the state,” pursuant to Chapter 253, Florida Statutes. (§§ 253.001, 253.03, and 253.12, Fla. Stat.) Private use of such lands generally requires consent of the BOT and must not be contrary to the public interest. The BOT is required to manage and conserve state-owned lands, including sovereignty lands, by law and is granted rulemaking authority to that end. The Department functions as the staff for the BOT, and issues leases and other authorizations for private parties to use sovereign submerged lands under Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. In carrying out its duties with relationship to the BOT, the Department implements policy as determined by the BOT, to include taking some final agency actions. The Department would be the agency through which the BOT would initiate rulemaking. The Department does not have delegated authority to adopt rules for the BOT. Ken Reecy (Reecy) is a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor in the Department’s Division of State Lands. One of Reecy’s job duties is to provide responses to requests for BOT’s public records housed in the Division of State Lands of the Department. On August 5, 2003, Ross Burnaman e-mailed Eva Armstrong of the Department the following public records request: Hi Eva-I am hoping that you can assist me with this inquiry for public records. I'm looking for any Trustees authorization for the use of state lands (including uplands and submerged lands) for beach driving by the general public or commercial vendors. While I'm aware of Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, I'm of the opinion that Trustees' authorization is still required for beach driving on state lands. Most local governments that allow beach driving (e.g. Gulf County, Volusia County) charge a fee for that activity. That would appear to trigger, Rule 18-21.005(b)(2), FAC, and the requirement for a lease. As I understand it, public beach driving is allowed in parts of the following counties: Nassau, Duval, Flagler, St. Johns, Volusia, Gulf and Walton counties. Thanks in advance for you assistance. Best regards, Ross Burnaman (phone number deleted) Ms. Armstrong passed this request to Ken Reecy of the Department who replied to Mr. Burnaman with the following e-mail message: Mr. Burnaman Concerning your request as to any authorization by the Board of Trustees for beach driving and fees triggering Rule 18- 21.005(b)(2)[sic]: We are unaware of any instance in which the issue of beach driving has been brought before the Board of Trustees for authorization. Further, in discussions with staff from our legal department, it is felt that s. 161.58 sufficiently covers the issue and that authorization from the Board is not necessary. We are also of the opinion that fees counties charge for beach driving would not trigger Rule 18-21.005(b)(2)[sic]. If you have any further questions on this issue, please contact Suzanne Brantley in EIP's Office of General Counsel (phone number deleted) The e-mail above contains two potential policy statements; one concerning a statute and the other concerning a rule. The analysis of each differs slightly. The BOT was authorized at one time to regulate all the uses of state sovereignty lands, to include regulation of driving on the state's beaches, i.e., that portion of land seaward of the mean high water line (hereafter: beach.) The BOT restricted the operation of private vehicles on the beaches via rule. The Legislature of the State of Florida enacted Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, which authorized those counties which had traditionally permitted driving on the beach to regulate the operation of privately owned vehicles on the beaches in their counties. Several of the counties which had traditionally permitted driving on the beach permitted privately owned vehicles to be operated on the beach in their counties and charged a small fee to defray the costs of providing parking, life guards, and traffic direction on the beaches. The BOT attempted to intervene in those counties which charged fees for beach driving on the basis that the fees being charged were "revenue" producing. The Legislature of the State of Florida amended Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, to specifically authorize the counties to collect reasonable fees to defray their costs of regulating beach driving. The statements that are challenged have not been adopted as a rule. Reecy testified at the hearing. Reecy only intended to give Burnaman information related to his public records request. The portion of Reecy's e-mail that is being challenged was intended to explain why no records were found. Reecy responded because Burnaman had sent follow-up e-mails to Reecy’s supervisor, Armstrong, the Director of the Division of State Lands. Reecy knew that Armstrong had a practice of providing information to the public when it was requested. Reecy is not charged with implementing or interpreting Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21 and does not process applications for leases or other authorizations from the BOT. Reecy's statement that no records were found is not a policy statement and has not been alleged to be one by Petitioners. Reecy conferred with Department legal staff before issuing his statement about Section 161.58, Florida Statutes. Reecy did not state that Section 161.58 exempted counties from getting BOT authorization for beach driving, as Petitioners state in their Petition, for several reasons: first, Reecy is not the person on the BOT’s staff who makes such determinations; second, there was no factual determination pending, i.e., no request for declaratory statement or request for an exemption or authorization; and third, the statute cited and its history indicate that the Legislature has vested the exclusive authority to regulate beach driving in those counties in which it traditionally occurred to county government in those counties. James W. Stoutamire (Stoutamire) is the principal Department employee who is charged with interpreting and applying the BOT’s rules. Stoutamire was the person to whom authority had been delegated to make such policy determinations. Burnaman's request was not presented to Stoutamire, and Reecy did not consult with Stoutamire. Although it is a statement concerning general law, Reecy's first statement regarding Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, does not assert agency jurisdiction or exempt a specific factual predicate from agency jurisdiction. Reecy also discussed Burnaman’s reference to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005(1)(b)2. with the Department's legal staff. Reecy's references to the section mistakenly cites it as Rule 18-21.005(b)2. Regardless of Reecy's intent, his answer constitutes an interpretation of the rule as applied to the fees charged by counties for beach driving. The BOT's rules provide what types of private activities must have consent prior to their being undertaken on sovereign submerged lands. They do not contain a list of all of the many public activities that occur on Florida’s beaches, shores, and waters that do not require consent. The BOT's rules in Chapter 18-21 are not intended to prevent air or noise pollution, promote public safety, protect property values, provide peace and quiet, or protect quality of life. These are the concerns about which Petitioners testified as diminishing their peaceful enjoyment of their property rights. Beach concessions above the mean high water line do not fall within the Trustees jurisdiction or control.
Findings Of Fact By application (Exhibit 1) dated September 15, 1978, WCMI requested a permit to dredge approximately 740 cubic yards of sovereign bottom lands in Snook Bay adjacent to upland property owned by applicant. At the same time applicant requested a lease of some 0.98 acres of submerged sovereign land, containing the area to be dredged, for the purpose of constructing a marina with docking facilities over the leased property. Following receipt of all requested information from applicant, plus objections from adjacent land owners, DNR, as the state agency acting on behalf of the Trustees Internal Improvement Trust Fund (TIITF), held a public hearing in Naples, Florida on April 25, 1979. The Hearing Officer submitted a report following this hearing in which he recommended the lease be granted (Exhibit 4). After review DNR staff recommended granting the lease and before the Trustees took action, Petitioner requested this hearing. In the interim DER reviewed the application for a dredge and fill permit and, following a preliminary investigation, advised WCMI of its intent to deny the permit (Exhibit 8). At informal conferences with DER, WCMI revised its application to commence the dredging 25 feet from the existing seawall, reduce the amount of material to be dredged to 349 cubic yards and to move the floating dock sections further from the seawall. This revised application (Exhibit 10) was submitted to DER and, after review, DER on November 13, 1979 (Exhibit 11) issued its notice of intent to grant the requested permit. Petitioner then requested this hearing to contest the granting of this permit. The Isles of Capri was developed into a waterfront homesite project by bulkheading, dredging and filling a pristine mangrove area to provide the homesites now occupied by members of Petitioner. This project destroyed the ecosystem as it existed before the development. The area which is here proposed for lease and for a permit to dredge some 349 cubic yards therefrom is located in the originally disturbed area. Most of the homes on the Isles of Capri are built on waterfront lots and most homeowners have docks and boats. Fishing is generally considered good off the docks and in surrounding waters. The proposed marina is located in Snook Bay, a relatively small cul-de-sac-like area. On the dead end of Snook Bay, which is adjacent to the proposed marina, mangroves have been planted and the area designated as a park. Since these mangroves are rat infested, the park concept has not received general acceptance. However, the proposed marina will not adversely affect this park. Apart from the ecological problems that will allegedly be created by the leasing of the property and the dredging thereon, Petitioner alleges the project will interfere with other "rights" of the homeowners of the Isles of Capri. Although this Hearing Officer has considerable doubts as to the validity of these alleged rights, the facts presented relating thereto will be first considered. WCMI owns the uplands adjacent to this submerged land and this land is zoned General Retail Commercial, which includes use as a proposed marina. Use as a marina would create less additional vehicular traffic than would any of the other 12 uses considered most likely for this land. (Testimony of Barr) The proposed marina will provide wet dock space for 32 boats and dry storage for 116 boats in sheds with the boats stacked three-high. No ramps will be provided and boats will be launched and picked up by use of a forklift at the concrete seawall. Parking space for 54 vehicles will be provided. This parking space complies with local requirements, as does WCMI's proposed construction. Collier County and the area of Collier County in the vicinity of Isles of Capri is an area of rapidly increasing population. A need for some six additional marinas has been recognized by Collier County authorities. Numerous witnesses opposed the use of WCMI property as a marina because: They do not think the site is suitable for a marina, and a much smaller marina would be preferred. Installation of a marina would increase boat traffic, thereby increasing the risk of boat collisions, increase wake action which might damage seawalls, disrupt the peace and quiet now enjoyed by these residents, and increase the possibility of boats striking manatees. Property values in the vicinity of the proposed marina and elsewhere in the Isles of Capri might decline. Operation of a marina would increase the noise level, thereby disturbing occupants of residences closest to the proposed marina. Vehicular traffic would be greatly increased on the Isles of Capri once the marina commences operation. Most of these objections are beyond the jurisdiction of this tribunal. This property has been zoned for the use proposed and if this use is inappropriate, the proper recourse is with the local zoning authorities. The credible evidence submitted is that the operation of the marina would increase boat traffic in and out of Snook Bay some 20 round-trips per day and this increase will create and insignificant additional risk of collision with other boats or with the occasional manatee that is sighted. While most of this traffic will use the deeper channel that follows the seawalls and boat docks of residents, an alternate channel is available for use by boaters with local knowledge of its characteristics. Even if all traffic used the deeper channel, no serious hazard to navigation would thereby result. No credible evidence was presented that the increased boat traffic caused by the marina would increase the damage to a properly constructed seawall. Navigation of these waters is a right to be jealously guarded. If wave damage results, local authorities have jurisdiction to establish speed or wake restrictions. Furthermore, the more credible evidence presented was that at the Isles of Capri more subsidence of soil behind the seawalls is caused by tidal action than by wake action. No credible evidence was presented that the operation of the proposed marina would decrease property values. Even if this could be shown, such a use would be consistent with the usage for which this property is zoned. There are two marinas across the street from WCMI's proposed marina and no evidence was presented that the operation of these smaller marinas affected property values. The uncontradicted evidence that was submitted was that property values on the Isles of Capri have increased at a rate as great as, if not greater than, land values elsewhere in Collier County. The roads on Isles of Capri are presently operating far below capacity and the additional traffic expected to be generated by the proposed marina will have no significant impact on these roads, nor will the construction of the marina create any vehicular safety problems. Petitioner's contention that the construction and operation of the marina will create additional pollution because of septic tank, oils and greases, and water runoff from impervious surfaces is not well-placed. It is not well-placed in the first instance because this is not the proper forum in which to air these complaints. Local health and safety ordinances regulate the installation of septic tanks, installation of fueling facilities and retention of water falling on the property. Secondly, the evidence presented here is that WCMI will comply with all regulations regarding septic tanks, no live-aboard boats will be moored at the marina other than temporarily for fuel or supplies, fuel tanks will be underground on the upland area, provided with proper protection and insulation, and the fuel will be dispensed by hose from the fueling dock by experienced personnel. WCMI will provide containment booms and retrieving material to take care of the accidental spill that might occur. Collier County Ordinance requires the first 1-inch of rainfall be retained on the property and WCMI will comply with this requirement. From the testimony of the numerous residents who testified, the primary concern of most of those who object to the proposed installation is that "their" waters will become more available to people living elsewhere and this will somehow detract from the use and enjoyment of these waters by these residents. If access to the Isles of Capri is facilitated for people living elsewhere by the installation of this marina, these waters will become more crowded, resulting in less fish per resident, and this aquatic preserve will become less private and more available to the general public. These residents purchased their homesites because of the waterfront characteristics and the quietness and solitude of the area. Facilitating access by non-residents will necessitate sharing these waters with these non-residents, thereby detracting from the enjoyment residents hoped to retain undiminished forever. The allegations of Petitioner that merit the most serious consideration in both of these applications of WCMI involves those relating to the ecosystem. Petitioner contends that the proposed dredging will adversely affect the ecosystem and this requires denial of the dredge-and-fill permit. Without the permit the lease would be useless. Petitioner also contends the granting of the lease would be contrary to the public interest. WCMI's original application was to dredge from the seawall seaward some 60 feet until the desired depth contour was reached. Also, floating concrete docks would be adjacent to the seawall for berthing sites. When an inspection of the area disclosed the bottom grasses were heaviest from the seawall out to about 30 feet, the applicant was issued the Notice of Intent to Deny by DER because of these bottom grasses and the shading that would be caused by the floating docks. WCMI then proposed to do no dredging for the first 25 feet from the seawall, except for two areas 30 feet and 36 feet wide needed to launch boats, and also to move the floating docks 25 feet from the seawall so as not to shade the grassy areas. As noted above, the site under consideration was severely disturbed by the initial dredging which destroyed the original grassbeds at this site. Some of these grasses have now returned but the coverage is sparse and patchy. From the seawall out to about 30 feet the grass is Cuban shoalweed and manatee grass. Respondent's investigations and studies revealed only these two grasses. Petitioner's biologist who performed studies similar to those done by Respondent found halophila in the deeper waters (up to five feet) extending out as far as 60 feet from the seawall. Halophila is a more ephemeral grass that grows in deeper depths than Cuban shoalweed and manatee grass and is often found in previously dredged areas. The area proposed for dredging comprises some 1200 square meters, and seagrasses cover about one-fourth of the dredge area. Sample cores taken by Petitioner's expert in October while the more luxuriant summer growth predominated showed some 1600 blades of grass per square meter, while the winter sample taken by WCMI expert showed 467 blades per meter. In the 320 square meters of seagrasses in the area a total biomass of invertebrates was found to be 17 pounds. Using generally accepted conversion rates and invertebrate reproduction cycles to convert this biomass to fish, this weight of invertebrate biomass could be converted into between 2 and 10 pounds of fish annually. Removal of the seagrasses will remove feeding grounds and hiding areas for some types of aquatic animals and also take away the type of fish that inhabit such areas. On the other hand, the piling and other docking structures that will be installed will attract sessile organisms such as oysters, barnacles, etc. which currently attach themselves to rocks and mangrove roots in the vicinity. The biomass or weight of these organisms is likely to equal or exceed those to be lost by dredging away the seagrasses. While different types of fish will be attracted to the area where the shellfish and other attaching animals congregate than will be attracted to grassy bottoms, the change is not significant from a quality or quantity of fish point of view. The area to be dredged is an area that has partially recovered from its earlier destruction and there is no reason to believe a similar recovery will not recur after the dredging here proposed is completed. No evidence was presented that a collision between a boat and a manatee has ever occurred in the waters in the vicinity of the Isles of Capri. Any conclusion that such an incident is likely to occur because of increased boat traffic when the proposed marina is in operation would be sheer speculation. Furthermore, Collier County does not contain any of those designated waters wherein special manatee protection rules are to be set up. Nor is Snook Bay one of those areas where a concentration of manatees is likely to occur.
The Issue The issue is whether appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (appellant, applicant or Nostimo), is the owner of Lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, Revised Plat of Clearwater Beach Subdivision, located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is subject to the land use requirements codified in the City of Clearwater Code of Ordinances (code or city code). By application filed on April 25, 1989 appellant sought the issuance of a conditional use permit from appellee, City of Clearwater (City or appellee). If approved, the permit would authorize the sale of beer and wine for off-premises consumption by a Pick Kwik Food Store to be constructed on the property under a lease agreement between appellant and Pick Kwik, Inc. Appellant's property is properly zoned for a retail establishment (CB or Beach Commerical), and it needs no further zoning permits from the City in order to convert the existing structures on the property to a convenience store. Indeed, appellant has already received approval for the construction and operation of the store. However, under subsection 137.024(b) of the city code, appellant is required to obtain a conditional use permit because it intends to engage in the sale of packaged beer and wine for off-premises consumption. In order to obtain such a permit the applicant must satisfy a number of criteria embodied in the code. The parties have stipulated that, with the exception of one standard, all other relevant criteria have been met. The disputed standard requires that "the use shall be compatible with the surrounding area and not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services." It is noted that appellant must secure the necessary land use permit from the City before it can obtain the alcoholic beverage license from the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The application was considered by the Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (Board) on June 13, 1989 and denied by a 5-0 vote with one member abstaining. As a basis for the denial, the Board adopted a staff report that concluded that "due to the beach area being saturated with this use (sale of alcoholic beverages), public nuisances requiring police action are taxing community services." It further concluded that the proliferation of this activity "has a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities and services, specifically police services in handling nuisances related to alcoholic beverage establishments." Members of the public who testified in opposition to the application expressed concern over increased traffic in the area, the glare of lights from a 24 hours per day establishment, and potential problems arising from customers who will consume the beer and wine during the evening hours. In addition, two letters in opposition to the application were considered by the Board. Finally, besides a presentation by applicant's attorney, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the applicant and established that Pick Wick, Inc. provides security services at its stores, if needed, and training for employees to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The subject property is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. The avenue narrows from four to two lanes just south of where the store is to be located. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street and runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. In general terms, the property is surrounded by mixed uses and include a 7-11 convenience store immediately across the street to the east, motels and rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. Maps received in evidence more definitively depict the nature of the uses surrounding Nostimo's property. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are also tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. Finally, the area is replete with apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the proposed establishment. Although there are presently no active businesses located on the subject property, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on and off premises consumption of alcohol. The applicant contends that the proposed use is compatible with both the property's former use and the present surrounding area, particularly since a 7-11 convenience store directly across the street has been in business selling beer and wine for the last twenty-five years, and there are several restaurants or motels within a block that sell alcoholic beverages. The applicant added that, in all, there are approximately fifty-three active alcoholic beverage licenses within two miles of the proposed convenience store. At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick store and a former employee of the 7-11 store across the street, who recalled that when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). Two other witnesses testified at final hearing in opposition to the application. One, who is a member of a church that lies a block from the proposed store, pointed out without contradiction that a playground sits next to the church and is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. She was concerned that if more traffic is generated by the store, it would make access to the playground more hazardous and discourage the children from using the facility. The second member of the public is concerned that the store will be incompatible with the surrounding area. This is because much of the neighboring area is made up of public areas, apartments, rental units or condominiums, and he contended an establishment selling alcoholic beverages would be inconsistent with those uses.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material hereto, Pinnacle Port Community Association (hereinafter referred to as PPCA) has been a not- for-profit corporation created under Chapter 617 Florida Statutes, and was the association, as defined in Section 718.103(2), Florida Statutes, which operated the four separate condominiums which together constitute the Pinnacle Port Resort. The Pinnacle Port Resort is located in Bay County, Florida and consists of four separate residential condominiums, identified as Phases I-A, I-B, I-C, I-D, and together these condominiums have a combined total of 408 units. Although each of the above condominiums was created by a separate recorded declaration of condominium, the declarations are, in all respects material to this proceeding and for all time periods relevant hereto, identical to the declaration for Phase I-B received into evidence as Joint Exhibit I. The Pinnacle Port Condominiums are located on a pie- shaped parcel of property which is bordered by the Gulf of Mexico on the south and there is a large lake, known as Lake Powell, located a short distance to the north of the condominium property. Immediately to the west of the condominium property, on land owned by a third party, Avondale Mills Corporation, there is a narrow channel, known as Phillips Inlet, that connects the Gulf of Mexico to Lake Powell. Because of fluctuating water levels in the channel and tidal action which regularly causes some shifting of sand around the channel, the current inlet does not provide trustworthy year round navigation for use by recreational boats between Lake Powell and the Gulf of Mexico. During 1983, several individuals owning land adjacent to Lake Powell, including Avondale Mills Corporation and certain unit owners at Pinnacle Port, decided to work together to investigate the possibility of stabilizing the inlet in order to provide a year round navigable channel between Lake Powell and the Gulf of Mexico. In March of 1984, the above land owners formed a not- for-profit corporation, known as Lake Powell Improvement Corporation, and through individual financial contributions by the members of this corporation began developing plans and conducting studies on the feasibility of stabilizing the Phillips Inlet. In May of 1984, the board of directors of Respondent adopted a resolution supporting the efforts of the Lake Powell Improvement Corporation and a non-binding straw vote of Pinnacle Port unit owners was conducted by the board of directors. The results of this vote were 232 votes in favor, 32 votes opposed, 6 votes requesting additional information and 138 unit owners did not respond. A true and correct copy of the correspondence which was sent to unit owners and representative samples of ballots returned from unit owners was received into evidence as Joint Exhibit 3. On or about August 11, 1984, at a meeting of the Respondent association, a majority of the voting interests present at the meeting for each of the four Pinnacle Port Condominiums approved a resolution "to participate in the stabilization of Phillips Inlet at the cost of no more than an average of $700.00 per unit." The resolution, which would authorize assessments in a total amount of $285,600.00, was passed by a vote of 179 votes in favor, of which 108 votes were by proxy; 81 votes against, of which 36 votes were by proxy; and 2 abstentions. The association is comprised of 408 members entitled to vote, in person or by proxy, and at least 205 members must be present, in person or by proxy, at a meeting of the association to satisfy quorum requirements. As part of the above resolution, the unit owners were advised that up to 50% of the proposed assessment would be used to obtain governmental permits required prior to beginning construction activities to stabilize the inlet and 50% of the assessments collected, plus any remaining funds collected previously for permitting purposes, would be used later for construction of the stabilized inlet if the governmental permits were granted. Based on the August 1984 resolution, the association has assessed as a common expense approximately $142,000.00 from unit owners and has contributed approximately $110,792.00 of these funds to the Lake Powell Improvement Corporation. In addition, the association is currently holding approximately $14,823.00 as interest on the funds collected for the Phillips Inlet projects. The Respondent has no written or formal agreement with Lake Powell Improvement Corporation. The funds were contributed to that corporation with the understanding that they would be used to conduct environmental and engineering studies and take other similar steps to obtain governmental permits which are necessary as a prerequisite to constructing the stabilized inlet. Respondent alleges that all of the funds spent have either been paid to Lake Powell Improvement Corporation or to third parties performing professional services for that corporation and that these funds have in fact been used to conduct environmental studies and to take other steps to obtain the necessary governmental permits. The Petitioner and the Intervenors do not dispute this statement in this proceeding. If the necessary governmental permits can be obtained, Lake Powell Improvement Corporation intends to dredge a new channel adjacent to the existing channel at Phillips Inlet and located on property owned exclusively by Avondale Mills Inc. The exact location of the proposed channel on the Avondale Mills property has not yet been determined. The Respondent expects the channel to be located approximately as shown on the maps included in the joint-application filed with the various agencies which have jurisdiction to issue the necessary permits. A true and correct copy of this joint application was received into evidence as Joint Exhibit 2. In order to complete the proposed channel, it will be essential that permits be obtained from the Florida, Department of Natural Resources and the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Although Lake Powell Improvement Corporation filed a joint application with both the above agencies in October of 1985, the permits have neither been granted nor denied. At the time of the August 1984 resolution, and continuing to the present, the property upon which the stabilized --inlet is proposed to be constructed was not a common element for -any of the Pinnacle Port Condominiums and the Respondent-Association does not have any contractual or property interest, existing or contingent, in this property. Although no agreement has previously been entered into between the members of Lake Powell Improvement Corporation concerning the future maintenance of the proposed channel, it is contemplated that an agreement will be entered into prior to the actual construction of the channel. The Respondent further contemplates contributing up to one third of the cost of maintenance, contingent upon unit owner approval, through further assessments against the unit owners. If the governmental permits applied for are granted and the inlet is constructed and maintained to a depth and width as proposed in the permit applications, the Pinnacle Port unit owners and their guests with boats, either docked at the Respondent's pier or launched at the boat ramp in Lake Powell, will have convenient access to the Gulf of Mexico. There are no existing boat ramps, piers, or docks located along the Gulf of Mexico or Pinnacle Port property. The Pinnacle Port condominiums have a rental program which advertises and rents owner's units on both a short and long term basis for owners who so desire. At the present time, 240 units participate in this rental program and an unknown number of additional owners occasionally rent their units independently. Based on the evidence produced at the hearing and the testimony of Randall Clark Chandler, the following finding of fact is made: Although it is reasonable to expect that the planned stabilization of Phillips Inlet would provide recreational benefit to some unit owners and might help to make the units at the resort more marketable, factors affecting the relative costs and benefits of the project (such as, whether necessary governmental permits are granted; the amount of future assessments which will be imposed against units to pay for construction and maintenance costs of the inlet; the possible imposition of restrictions or restrictive convenants on the use of the inlet or the adjoining lands; the effect of the inlet on water quality; and future market conditions are speculative at this time and make it impossible to quantify the value of the stabilization project or even to conclude that the project will clearly or substantially benefit unit owners.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) Respondent immediately cease and desist any further collection of assessments based on the August, 1984 resolution at issue herein and immediately obtain and refund to unit owners, on a pro rata basis, any monies in its possession which were previously collected under this assessment; (2) Respondent refund, on a pro rata basis, all interest on the funds previously collected for the Phillips Inlet project and; (3) Respondent, in the future, strictly comply with the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes and any future violations of the statutes at issue here shall be considered as a basis for aggravating civil penalties should administrative action be necessary in the future. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Coats, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 James Rearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John C. Courtney, Esq. Deputy General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1927 Michael Reichman, Esq. Post Office Box 4 Monticello, FL 32344 Marshall Conrad, Esq. Post Office Box 39 Tallahassee, FL 32302 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1.-3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-3. 4. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 5.-21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4-19. 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-19. 20. Rejected as not comporting to the substantial competent evidence in the record. The Intervenors submitted a "Recommended Order" which adopted the Findings of Fact submitted by the Respondent in its Proposed Findings of Fact.
Findings Of Fact The Resource Recovery Facility The purpose of the proposed resource recovery facility (RRF), a solid waste-fired electrical power plant, is to dispose of solid waste and recover energy. This "waste to energy" facility will initially dispose of up to 2,352 tons of refuse each day, and generate up to 62.5 megawatts of electrical power. The ultimate capacity of the facility is 3,300 tons of refuse each day, and a generating capacity of 96.1 megawatts. The proposed RRF complex will include a gatehouse and weigh station, refuse receiving and handling building, turbine generator building, administrative building and two landfills for the disposal of ash residue and non- processable solid waste. The site development plans for the project contemplate that solid waste will be delivered by truck to the enclosed refuse and receiving building. All waste will be stored and processed inside the main facility. The Site The site for the proposed RRF is a predominantly undeveloped 248-acre parcel of land situated at the southeast intersection of US 441 (State Road 7) and State Road (SR) 84, an unincorporated area of Broward County. The site is bounded on the north by the right-of- way for I-595, the northerly part of its east boundary by the proposed Ann Kolb Park, the southerly part of its east boundary and the south by the South Fork of the New River Canal (New River Canal), and the west by US 441. The uses surrounding the site are mixed. Located east of the site, and south of the proposed Ann Kolb Park, is a large fossil fuel electric generation facility owned by Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L). To the south, across the New River Canal, is a mixed residential- commercial area of single family residences, duplex residences, and marine-oriented businesses (marinas and fish wholesalers). To the west of US 441 is a mixture of light, medium, and heavy industry, including industrial office space, auto salvage facilities and prestressed concrete pouring yards. North of the right-of-way for I- 595, and SR 84, is a mixture of strip commercial and residential usage. Although the site itself is predominantly unoccupied pasture land, some of its lands have been developed. The southern portion of the site, abutting the New River Canal, is occupied by a marine engineering firm which operates dry dockage and related facilities (heavy industrial use). The other uses currently existing on the site are for a nursery and the sale of prefabricated sheds. Bisecting the site is a parcel of land presently being developed by the City of Fort Lauderdale (City) for a sludge composting facility. Broward County proposes to locate the RRF south of the City's facility, and the landfills north of the City's facility. Consistency of the site with local land use plans and zoning ordinances Broward County has adopted a Comprehensive Plan, pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, which establishes guidelines and policies to promote orderly and balanced economic, social, physical, environmental and fiscal development of the area. Pertinent to this proceeding are the Broward County Land Use Plan-map and the Unincorporated Area Land Use Plan (the land use plan element of the comprehensive plan) and Broward County's zoning ordinances. The proposed site is designated industrial under the Broward County Land Use Plan-map and the Unincorporated Area Land Use Plan. The proposed RRF, with attendant land fill, is a utility for solid waste disposal and, as such, an allowable use under the industrial designation of both plans. Prior to rezoning, various portions of the site were zoned A-I Limited Agricultural, B-3 General Business, M-3 General Industrial, and M-4 Limited Heavy Industrial. Permitted uses ranged from cattle and stock grazing (A-1) to asphalt paving plants, junk yards and the storage of poisonous gas (M-4). On March 16, 1984, the Board of County Commissioners of Broward County approved the rezoning of the site to a Special Use Planned Unit Development District (PUD), and approved the RRF conceptual site plan. The proposed RRF, and attendant landfill, constitute a Planned Special Complex under Broward County's PUD zoning ordinances and, as such, are permitted nonresidential uses. The Department of Community Affairs, the Department of Environmental Regulation, and the South Florida Water Management District concur that the proposed RRF appears to be consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances. The Public Service Commission did not participate in this land use portion of the power plant siting process. South Broward Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc. (SBC) was the only party to contest the consistency of the proposed RRF with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances. SBC asserted that the proposed RRF violates: (1) the coastal zone protection element of the Broward County Comprehensive Plan, because the environmental impact assessment required by that element of the plan was inadequate or not done, (2) the urban wilderness inventory guidelines of the Broward County Comprehensive Plan, because the environmental effects of the proposed RRF on the area proposed to be designated as an urban wilderness area (proposed Ann Kolb Park) would outweigh the benefits of the project, and (3) Section 13 of Ordinance numbers 84- 6(2) and 84-7(2), which approved the rezoning for the site, because the impact assessment required by the Ordinances had not been prepared. While the coastal zone protection element and urban wilderness inventory guidelines of the Broward County comprehensive plan were germane to Broward County's decision to rezone the site and approve the development, they are not pertinent to this land use hearing. Broward County's decision is final, and these proceedings do not provide a forum to collaterally attack it. The relevance of SBC's assertions aside, the evidence presented established that the proposed RRF did not violate the coastal zone protection element, the urban wilderness inventory guidelines, or any other element of the Broward County Comprehensive Plan. SBC's assertion that the proposed RRF will violate Section 13 of the rezoning ordinances is ill- founded. Section 13 provides: PRIOR TO LANDFILL DEVELOPMENT, AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT SHALL BE PREPARED BY THE RESOURCE RECOVERY OFFICE OF BROWARD COUNTY TO ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL HYDROLOGICAL IMPACTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LANDFILL ON ANN KOLB PARK. DATA AND INFORMATION UTILIZED TO OBTAIN FDER PERMITS WILL BE USED TO CONDUCT THIS ASSESSMENT. IN THE EVENT POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS ARE IDENTIFIED, A MANAGEMENT PLAN SHALL BE DEVELOPED TO OFFER RECOMMENDATIONS AND MITIGATIVE ACTIONS TO INSURE THE INTEGRITY OF ANN KOLB PARK. (Emphasis supplied) The evidence is clear that an impact assessment is only required before development commences. Consequently, the proposed RRF does not violate the rezoning ordinances. Notice of the land use hearing was published in the Fort Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, a daily newspaper, on July 4, 1985, and also in the Florida Administrative Weekly on June 28, 1985.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Country Club Village MHP, Inc. (CCV Park), discriminated against Petitioner, Miguel A. Cotrich (Mr. Cotrich), based on his national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act), and, if so, the relief to which Mr. Cotrich is entitled.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Cotrich is a Hispanic male,8/ who resided in CCV Park for approximately 29 months. Mr. Cotrich did not own the mobile home or the lot (number 56) on which it was placed; thus, he owed monthly rent to CCV Park and to the owner of the mobile home. Mr. Cotrich moved out of CCV Park in late May or early June 2011.9/ Rocio Harris, an Hispanic woman, who spoke Spanish, was CCV Park's manager during the majority of the time that Mr. Cotrich resided in CCV Park. Ms. Harris was well thought of and did her best as manager, but she did not collect monthly rent payments or enforce park rules uniformly. On June 5, 2009, Mr. Cotrich and Anna Maria Cotrich, his wife, executed a $10,000.00 Promissory Note (Note) to buy the mobile home located at lot 56 in CCV Park. The Note was between the Cotriches and Maria Gonzalez. The Note called for a $1,400.00 down payment and monthly installments of $500.00 beginning on July 1, 2009. Mr. Cotrich created a ledger to record the monthly Note payments he made on the mobile home (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). This ledger reflects he paid the $1,400.00 down payment and a $500.00 payment on January 3, 2009, five months before the Note was executed. Likewise, it also reflects five $500.00 payments for the trailer before the Note was executed. Simply by adding up the figures on Mr. Cotrich's ledger, the total comes to $10,600.00. This is $600.00 in over-payments. Mr. Cotrich did not disclose this overpayment during his testimony. Mr. Cotrich did not possess the title to the mobile home, nor did he produce any credible evidence that he was entitled to it. Mr. Cotrich's testimony contradicts the executed Note and his own written record of the amounts of payments. Neither Mr. Cotrich's testimony nor his ledger is credible. Mr. Cotrich allegedly paid Ms. Harris the monthly Note payments because he did not trust Ms. Gonzalez. Mr. Cotrich did not receive a receipt from Ms. Harris or Ms. Gonzalez for any payments made on the Note. His claim that he was working away from the mobile home and could not get to the office during its office hours to obtain such a receipt is not credible. Further, Mr. Cotrich's testimony that he paid someone other than the Note lender without obtaining a receipt from that recipient is not credible. In January 2011, Debra Hunter became CCV Park's manager following Ms. Harris' death. Ms. Hunter started collecting the rent payments on time and enforcing CCV Park rules. Her actions caused tension among those who were delinquent with their rent and/or not abiding by other park rules. Mr. Cotrich was always in arrears for his lot rent payment while Ms. Hunter was the manager. At some point Mr. Cotrich had one or two dogs (at least one of which was a pit bull dog) in his rented mobile home. CCV Park rules allow for one small (under 20 pounds) dog. Apparently Ms. Harris knew of the dogs, but did not charge Mr. Cotrich for having them. However, beginning in January 2011, when Ms. Hunter became the manager and was aware of the dogs, Mr. Cotrich was charged $16.00 monthly for having the two dogs ($8.00 per pet, per month). Charles Stevens, one of CCV Park's owners, credibly testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Cotrich about the pit bull dog(s). In that conversation, Mr. Stevens advised Mr. Cotrich that mean dogs (including pit bull dogs) were not (and are not) allowed in CCV Park. This was because there were children present, and there were insurance concerns. Mr. Stevens felt he was unable to make Mr. Cotrich understand the need to remove the dog(s). At some point, Mr. Cotrich approached Ms. Hunter and told her he wanted to sell or rent his trailer to his brother, who is Puerto Rican. Ms. Hunter objected to that proposal on the grounds that Mr. Cotrich owed past-due rent. Mr. Cotrich became loud and apparently yelled that Ms. Hunter did not want Puerto Ricans in CCV Park. Ms. Hunter's position to deny Mr. Cotrich's proposed tenant was based on the outstanding balance that Mr. Cotrich had with CCV Park. Following this verbal confrontation, Mr. Cotrich claimed he felt harassed by CCV Park management. Although Mr. Cotrich produced his medical records for hospitalization dates of January 8, January 10, and March 30, 2011,10/ there is nothing therein to substantiate that CCV Park or its management caused his physical circumstances. Mr. Cotrich, upon being discharged from the last hospitalization, went to a rehabilitation/nursing home facility. Mr. Cotrich testified he was not evicted from CCV Park, but he voluntarily left CCV Park in May 2011, because he felt his health was in jeopardy. Mrs. Cotrich completed her move out of CCV Park sometime in June 2011. CCV Park issued monthly receipts for payments it received. For the 29-month period that Mr. Cotrich claimed to reside at CCV Park, only 13 dated receipts were produced. (There were a total of 20 pages of receipts, but some were duplicative.) The receipts offered and accepted in evidence began in July 2009. All but one receipt had a monetary figure in the section "REMINDER OF OUTSTANDING CHARGES" at the bottom of each receipt. Ms. Hunter and Mr. Stevens both testified that CCV Park is 70 percent Hispanic. Mr. Stevens knows the rental market in Kissimmee, and he understands the Hispanic population has a very real presence in Kissimmee. CCV Park is a multi-cultural mobile home park. Since becoming the manager (while Mr. Cotrich lived there and after), Ms. Hunter has increased rental collections, enforced the park rules, and made CCV Park a nice place to live. CCV Park has instituted several after-school programs and activities that have apparently helped raise the children's grade-point averages in school. Mr. Cotrich presented Jess Jusino, his son-in-law, and Ernest Cotrich, his son and care-giver, as witnesses. The undersigned evaluated the testimony presented by these two witnesses and found it to be unpersuasive. Mr. Cotrich did not substantiate his claim of discrimination based on his national origin. The testimony and evidence demonstrate that Mr. Cotrich left CCV Park on his own volition and that he failed to pay rent in a timely manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Miguel A. Cotrich. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, K. S. Ravines Corporation, has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property. The Applicant, K. S. Ravines Corporation, is the owner of real property located in Middleburg, Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's property, known as the "The Ravines," is being developed as a 435-acre residential and golf course development. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied upon by Silver Sands. On or about June 1, 1990, the Applicant entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement agreeing to purchase The Ravines. Subsequent to the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Applicant pursued a due diligence effort. In particular, the Applicant contacted Clay County to confirm that The Ravines had been zoned as a Planned Unit Developed as represented by the seller of The Ravines. The Applicant also sought to confirm that the property possessed the development capabilities associated with the zoning. In response to the Applicant's inquiries, Keith I. Hadden, then Director of Development for Clay County, informed the Applicant of the following in a letter dated August 7, 1990: The property commonly known as The Ravines, as shown on that certain map of J. M. Ard & Associates, Inc., dated May 30, 1990, (Job No. 3751B), together with a parcel commonly referred to as the McCumber Contracting Parcel as shown on said map, and the access road from County Road 218 to the main property of The Ravines commonly known as Ravines Road (all hereinafter "The Ravines") is currently zoned "PUD" Planned Unit Development. . . . Mr. Hadden also confirmed that The Ravines was approved for development of 261 single family lots, 49 condominiums, 107 hotel units, and 60 patio homes; a total of 477 units. Silver Sands' Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Mr. Hadden's representations as Clay County Director of Planning, the Applicant purchased The Ravines for $10,709,423.00. At the time of the purchase the golf course was valued at $6,900,000.00. The Applicant purchased 168 single-family lots (44 developed and 124 undeveloped) and 60 undeveloped patio home lots. The undeveloped lots and the existing developed single- family lots purchased by the Applicant were valued at $3,943,000.00. The Applicant also spent $495,115.00 to make capital improvements to The Ravines after it purchased The Ravines. Rights that will be Destroyed. In January 1992 Clay County adopted a comprehensive plan pursuant to Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The Ravines was designated with a land use designation in the plan of "Rural Residential." The "Rural Residential" land use classification of the Clay County Comprehensive Plan allows development of one residential unit per one acre of land. As a result, The Ravines may be developed at a total of 435 units instead of the 477 units that Clay County informed the Applicant The Ravines could be developed for in the August 7, 1990, letter from Mr. Hadden. As a result of the "Rural Residential" land use classification, the total developable lots at The Ravines would be reduced from 228 lots to 186 lots, or a reduction of 42 lots. This reduction represents a reduction of 18.4% of the total lots purchased by the Applicant. It is possible that this reduction could result in an 18.4% loss of the $3,943,000.00 paid for the lots, or approximately $496,000.00. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
