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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs WILLIE B. WARD, 03-004060PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebring, Florida Nov. 03, 2003 Number: 03-004060PL Latest Update: May 12, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Willie B. Ward, is a certified correctional officer in the State of Florida. He was issued Correctional Officer Certificate No. 193831 on October 20, 2000. Respondent was employed by the Highlands County Sheriff's Office as a correctional officer during the period March 6, 2000, through March 13, 2002. On or about April 22, 2002, Respondent was referred for a random drug test. Respondent signed the certification indicating that he provided his urine specimen to the collector; that he had not adulterated it in any manner; that each specimen bottle used was sealed in a tamper-resistant seal in his presence; and that the information provided on the Custody Control Form and on the label affixed to each specimen bottle was correct. The sample was then sent to LabCorp for analysis. It was received with the seal intact. The sample was initially screened at a screening cutoff of 15 nanograms per milliliter. The sample showed positive for cannabis. Since the sample was positive, it was sent for gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) confirmation testing for a specific marijuana metabolite. The results by LabCorp reflected a positive drug test on the initial screening and the confirmation test. On or about April 25, 2002, the electronic positive result was then sent to the National Medical Review Corporation, along with a faxed copy of the Custody Control Form. Dr. John Eustace, M.D., medical review officer (MRO) for National Medical Review Corporation, provides MRO services to the Highlands County Sheriff's Office pursuant to a contract for a drug-free workplace. Dr. Eustace received the Custody Control Form from LabCorp showing a positive drug test on Respondent for a test taken on April 22, 2002. Dr. Eustace processed the final certification of the Custody Control Form, Copy 4, certifying the drug test as positive. Dr. Eustace requested LabCorp to quantify the amount of the chemical present and document it on a Forensic Drug Analysis Report. LabCorp reported 28 nanograms of cannabinoid. It did not change the positive result; it merely quantified it. The MRO and his assistant then attempted to contact Respondent. They finally made contact with him on May 1, 2002. Respondent indicated he had tested positive a year and a half prior to this test of April 22, 2002. He also stated that he took over-the-counter pain killers, Advil or Aleve. Dr. Eustace stated these medications would not cause a false positive for marijuana. The GC/MS test rules out the possibility of a false positive. The MRO contacted the Human Resources Department of the Highlands County Sheriff's Office to report the positive drug test result after speaking with Respondent. Human Resources then contacted Respondent's supervisor, Captain Hinman, who sent a memo to Sheriff Godwin requesting an investigation. An investigation was opened; Respondent was called in and gave a statement. He had no explanation or mitigation for his positive drug test result. He admitted that he had followed all of the chain of custody procedures and that he had seen the lab technician place the seal on the container. Respondent had a prior positive drug test in April 1999 that was not prosecuted because the confirmation levels were not codified by sheriff's office policy. As a result of the investigation, Respondent was terminated from the Highlands County Sheriff's Office. The evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent tested positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, during a random drug test administered on April 22, 2002.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2001). Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie B. Binder, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Willie B. Ward 1043 Booker Street Sebring, Florida 33870 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.60893.13943.085943.13943.1395943.255
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs NICOLE LEE EMMONS, R.N., 18-001262PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Mar. 08, 2018 Number: 18-001262PL Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs LORRIE A. GERDON, 12-003043PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Sep. 14, 2012 Number: 12-003043PL Latest Update: Mar. 08, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2011)1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(d), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?

Findings Of Fact The Commission is an agency of the State of Florida responsible for the certification, and the revocation of certification, of officers and instructors in the criminal justice disciplines. Ms. Lorrie Gerdon was certified as a Correctional Officer in the State of Florida by the Commission on June 8, 2009, and issued Correctional Certification #284320. Ms. Gerdon was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections from October 17, 2008, to January 19, 2011. Although originally employed as a Correctional Officer, Ms. Gerdon took a step down in assignment to a Clerk Typist due to a back injury sometime early in 2010. It was too hard for her to continue to wear all of the equipment that Correctional Officers must wear. She is still receiving payments from workers’ compensation and is under treatment for her back injuries. Lieutenant Georgiana Hand is employed at the Apalachee Correctional Institute in Sneads, Florida, where she has worked since about 1988. It is Lt. Hand’s responsibility to supervise the Corrections Officers, listen to Disciplinary Reports, and fill in for the shift supervisors when one of them is on leave. On January 14, 2011, Lt. Hand was the Officer in Charge, fulfilling the duties of a Shift Supervisor, insuring that Officers were posted at their assigned locations. Ms. Gerdon was assigned to a non-sworn position as a Clerk Typist in the Classifications Department. As Lt. Hand was posting the shift, Ms. Gerdon stated, “Me and Jarvis will go work for you in P-Dorm.” (Officer Jarvis was a Classification Officer.) Lt. Hand thought that this was an odd comment because P-Dorm had been closed down for a couple of years. Lt. Hand asked Ms. Gerdon to repeat what she said. Ms. Gerdon again volunteered to work with Officer Jarvis in P-Dorm. Lt. Hand observed that Ms. Gerdon was “real jovial” and that her speech was slurred. Ms. Gerdon’s eyes appeared to be glassy. Ms. Gerdon’s appearance and behavior concerned Lt. Hand. Ms. Gerdon was not behaving normally and Lt. Hand thought Ms. Gerdon might be on medication or “something else.” Lt. Hand notified Assistant Warden Tommy Barfield. Shortly after, Lt. Hand was asked to report to the Warden’s Office. When Warden John Palmer received the reports about Ms. Gerdon’s unusual behavior, he had asked to talk to her so that he could observe her appearance and behaviors himself. Warden Palmer has been employed in various capacities in the corrections system for over 20 years, and based upon his training and experience is able to determine whether or not there is reasonable suspicion that someone is under the influence of a controlled substance. Warden Palmer testified that he observed that Ms. Gerdon had “glassed over” eyes and slurred speech. The Warden reasonably concluded that she was under the influence of some type of substance. Lt. Hand was present in Warden John Palmer’s office as he questioned Ms. Gerdon about what was going on. Lt. Hand recalled that Ms. Gerdon was upset and crying. Lt. Hand remembered that after Warden Palmer told Ms. Gerdon that he was going to send her for a reasonable suspicion drug test, Ms. Gerdon told the Warden that she knew she would test positive and that her son had put drugs in her coffee. Warden Palmer also testified that Ms. Gerdon had told him that she had tested herself previously and had tested positive for marijuana. She told the Warden that her son had “poisoned” her coffee with marijuana. As a result of the behavioral and physical changes noted in Ms. Gerdon, on January 14, 2011, Regional Director R. Bryant approved an order requiring Ms. Gerdon to submit to a Reasonable Suspicion Drug Test. Ms. Gerdon, in compliance with the order issued to her by her employer, the Florida Department of Corrections, reported to the Marianna Family Care Center in Marianna, Florida, on January 14, 2011, at approximately 8:45 a.m., and gave a specimen of her urine, by urinating in a sterile, previously unused specimen cup provided to her by personnel at the Marianna Family Care Center. After Ms. Gerdon urinated into the specimen cup provided to her, she delivered the cup containing her urine specimen to a Marianna Family Care Center employee who immediately capped and sealed the specimen container, assigned the specimen ID# 0288508894, and labeled it in a manner making it uniquely identifiable as Ms. Gerdon’s January 14, 2011, urine sample. Ms. April Sadousky is employed as a Medical Assistant in the Marianna Family Care Center and in the office of Dr. Rodriguez, where she is responsible for operating the laboratory and conducting drug screenings. After having Ms. Gerdon sign the chain of custody form indicating that she had provided the specimen, Ms. Sadousky placed the urine sample in a bag, sealed that bag, and placed it in the refrigerated LabCorp drawer, where it was picked up that day by LabCorp personnel. Specimen ID# 0288508894 was received in LabCorp’s accession laboratory by Ms. Catherine Hess, who took the paperwork and the specimen out of the sealed chain-of-custody bag. No one had tampered with or altered the specimen since it was initially collected, as evidenced by the intact seals and the chain-of-custody records. Ms. Phyllis Chandler is a Responsible Person and Lab Manager who works in the Occupational Testing Division of LabCorp. LabCorp holds a Florida Laboratory Permit with Certificate number 052, which was in effect in January of 2011. LabCorp is also licensed by SAMHSA, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. LabCorp participates in proficiency testing of samples with known concentrations submitted by regulatory agencies to insure accurate testing. LabCorp conducts initial testing of urine samples by immunoassay, and confirmation testing by “GC-MS” or gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. It is the regular practice of LabCorp to make reports of the results of its testing. A marijuana metabolite is produced by the body of a person who consumes marijuana either by ingestion or by smoking it. The marijuana is absorbed into the body and it is broken down by the liver, producing the marijuana metabolite, which is excreted though the kidneys, hair, or saliva. As Dr. Dash testified, the only substance other than marijuana that produces a marijuana metabolite is the prescription medication marketed under the name “Marinol” or its generic equivalent “dronabinol.” These prescription drugs have active tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in them, as does marijuana. LabCorp conducted immunoassay and confirmation testing on Specimen ID# 0288508894. As is their usual practice, records of the testing on Specimen ID# 0288508894 were made at or near the time of the tests and were made by a person with knowledge of the information that was recorded, as was testified to by Ms. Chandler, who is a custodian of these records. In initial screening, the THC cut-off was 50. Specimen ID# 0288508894 tested at 555. In confirmation testing, Specimen ID# 0288508894 tested at 171 nanograms per milliliter of marijuana metabolites. The confirmation cut-off was 15 nanograms per milliliter. All test batches at LabCorp contain blind controls that are run within the batch to assure that the testing process is accurate. The blind controls within the batch containing Specimen ID# 0288508894 were tested correctly. The drug analysis conducted by LabCorp indicated that urine Specimen ID# 0288508894 contained marijuana metabolites. A secure chain of custody was maintained from the time the urine sample was collected until the test results were produced. The Department of Corrections has contracted with Doctors Review Service to receive test results from the laboratory and to contact the specimen donor on all non-negative results to determine if there is any medical documentation that would explain the test results. Dr. Neil Dash is employed by Doctor Review Services and received the test results from Ms. Gerdon’s sample. After Doctors Review Service obtained the laboratory results on Ms. Gerdon’s sample, Ms. Gerdon called them on January 19, 2011. In response to questioning, Ms. Gerdon did not provide Doctor’s Review Service with information on prescriptions or any medical explanation for the finding reported by the laboratory that her sample contained marijuana metabolites. Dr. Dash prepared a Controlled Substance Test Results report indicating that specimen 0288508894 had tested positive for marijuana metabolites. These results were sent to the Department of Corrections. The drug test was conducted in accordance with sections 112.0455 and 440.102, Florida Statutes, and evidenced the introduction of a controlled substance into Ms. Gerdon’s body. Ms. Gerdon testified that her ex-husband abused her. Ms. Gerdon had three children, two girls and a boy. Her ex- husband would threaten the daughters to control Ms. Gerdon. He would not allow her to be around her parents, except when they came over to see her at the house. If she left the house, he would destroy something. Several walls and doors were damaged by her ex-husband. Ms. Gerdon’s son has been diagnosed as manic bipolar through the North Florida Therapy Center. Ms. Gerdon was experiencing a high level of domestic stress at the time of the incident. Ms. Gerdon testified that she had numerous medical problems and was on the following prescriptions at the time of the January 14, 2011, incident: Seroquel, Buspar, Cymbalta, Zoloft, Triazadone, Synthroid, Hydrocodone, Topomax, Fioricet, Nexium, Peridium, Macrodanton, Flomax, Cipro, Indocin, Skelaxin, Zofran, Medrol, Klonopin, Rstrace, Levothroxine, Atarax, Ativan, Reglan, Effexor, and Prozac. Ms. Gerdon testified that she took these medications for anxiety and depression, and that she has a thyroid disease, a kidney disease, and suffers from cluster migraine headaches. She testified that now she is down to only three or four of these medications since she is no longer in an abusive relationship. The drug Fioricet is a prescription medication that contains butalbital, often prescribed to treat migraine headaches. Butalbital is a barbiturate. Ms. Gerdon testified that she takes the Fioricet every day for migraine headaches. Ms. Gerdon testified that prior to the incident of January 14, 2011, with the help of her parents, who own the house, Ms. Gerdon was repairing walls and doors that had been destroyed by her abusive husband. Ms. Gerdon testified that her mother was making coffee and noticed that something was wrong with the coffee: . . . when my mother had noticed that there was something weird about it, she called me and I said, I’m not quite sure what that is, I said, I believe that that is marijuana, and I actually went down and I did get a test, I got a home test. It tested me for marijuana, it tested me for barbiturate and I flipped out. Ms. Gerdon testified that she had not noticed anything before, because “90 percent of the time” she did not even turn on the lights when she scooped out her coffee. Ms. Gerdon testified that she went over her list of medications and was confused about why she tested positive for marijuana. None of the drugs that Ms. Gerdon testified she was taking at the time of the incident would have resulted in a positive test for marijuana metabolites. Ms. Gerdon has been tested almost every other month since the January 14, 2011, incident, and she has not had any test that was positive for marijuana. She testified that she also has not tested positive for barbiturates, although it is not clear why her use of Fioricet would not result in a positive test. Ms. Gerdon was under the influence of marijuana on the morning of January 14, 2011, as evidenced by her physical symptoms, her statement that she knew she would test positive for marijuana, and her drug test results. As both Dr. Dash and Ms. Chandler testified in response to Ms. Gerdon’s questions, it would be possible for persons to ingest marijuana without knowing that they were doing so. It was not clear why LabCorp’s testing of the January 14, 2011, urine sample would not have tested positive for barbiturates as a result of the Fioricet. Dr. Dash testified that if a person was taking Fioricet it would show up in the drug testing if the test was screening for barbiturates and the amount taken exceeded the cut-off set at the laboratory. He did not know what cut-off amount was set by the laboratory. Ms. Gerdon’s ex-husband was incarcerated shortly after their divorce was final. Her son is also now incarcerated. Stress on Ms. Gerdon was reduced after she divorced her husband. Ms. Gerdon is no longer taking many of the medications she was taking earlier. Ms. Gerdon unlawfully injected, ingested, inhaled, or otherwise introduced marijuana into her body. Ms. Gerdon has failed to maintain good moral character. The position of Correctional Officer is one of great public trust. No evidence of any prior disciplinary history was introduced for Ms. Gerdon.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Lorrie Gerdon in violation of section 943.1395(7), as defined in Florida Administrative Law Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d). It is further recommended that Respondent's certification as a Corrections Officer be suspended for a period of two years, followed by probation for a period of two years. As condition of probation, it is recommended that the Commission require random or scheduled drug testing and substance abuse counseling, as provided for in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.005(7)(c). DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2012.

Florida Laws (12) 112.0455120.569120.57440.102741.28893.03893.101893.13943.12943.13943.1395944.474
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CHARLOTTE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs LORI LORENZ, 17-001541TTS (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port Charlotte, Florida Mar. 14, 2017 Number: 17-001541TTS Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2019

The Issue Whether there was just cause to terminate Respondent’s annual employment contract during the term of the contract.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the duly authorized entity responsible for the operation, control, and supervision of all public schools (grades kindergarten through 12) in Charlotte County, Florida, and for otherwise providing public education to school-aged children in the county. Art. IX, § (4)b, Fla. Const.; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. (2016). During all times relevant hereto, Petitioner employed Respondent as a classroom teacher working pursuant to an annual contract. Between the years 1986 through 2000, Respondent worked as an educator for the School District of Hillsborough County, Florida. During the late 1990s, Respondent had multiple surgeries on her lungs and jaw. Respondent was prescribed various pain medications following her surgeries, and unfortunately she became addicted to the medication. Around 1998, Respondent’s addiction to pain medication caused her to engage in criminal activity (i.e. attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud), which resulted in her arrest. Respondent, at the time of her arrest in 1998, was employed as a teacher by the Hillsborough County School District. As a result of her arrest, Respondent resigned from employment with the Hillsborough County School District. Additionally, the Florida Department of Education (DOE) was notified of Respondent’s arrest and as a result thereof suspended Respondent’s teaching certificate for two months, imposed a two-year probationary period, and required Respondent to submit to substance abuse treatment. Respondent left the teaching profession in 1998 and did not return to the profession until 2014, when she became employed by Petitioner. When Respondent returned to the profession in 2014, she still needed to complete the two years of probation imposed against her teaching certificate by DOE. As part of her probation, Respondent was required to submit to two years of random drug testing. For the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years, Respondent passed each of her randomly imposed drug tests and has subsequently been released from probation by DOE. Respondent has suffered from migraine headaches for several years and would often miss work due to migraine-related symptoms. Although Respondent missed several days of work during the 2016-2017 school year as a result of migraine headaches, her absences did not rise to the level to where it became necessary for her school principal to speak with her regarding the issue. On the morning of January 3, 2017, which was a teacher planning day, Respondent awoke with a migraine headache. Teachers are expected to report to work by 6:35 a.m. on teacher planning days. Respondent and Lisa Pellegrino were colleagues and friends. On January 3, 2017, at 7:16 a.m., 7:20 a.m., and at 10:29 a.m., respectively, Respondent called Ms. Pellegrino, who was at work. Respondent’s calls were not answered by Ms. Pellegrino because at the time, Ms. Pellegrino did not have her phone in her possession. At 9:01 a.m., on January 3, 2017, Respondent sent a text message to Ms. Deb Capo, who is the school’s secretary. The text message states: “Woke up with a headache . . . will be in ASAP.” At 10:36 a.m., Ms. Capo responded to the text message asking: “Are you here yet. Lou needs to see you.” Respondent replied and stated, “Not yet . . . I’ll be there by noon. All ok?” Ms. Capo then replied, “Yes. See you then.” At approximately 10:50 a.m., Ms. Pellegrino retrieved her cellphone and noticed that she had missed three calls from Respondent. Fearing a possible emergency, Ms. Pellegrino immediately called Respondent. Ms. Pellegrino testified during the final hearing as follows: I just called her because I wanted to see what was going on. I figured I had three missed calls; maybe there was an emergency. And when I spoke with her, she informed me that she had a really bad migraine, she didn’t think she was going to be able to make it, or she was trying to get pain pills because she couldn’t get her Imitrex prescription for a couple of days, and she was having a hard time getting to work to get her grades completed by the end of the day. And she asked me for pain pills or if I had any, and I said no.[1/] Within an hour or so of speaking with Respondent, Ms. Pellegrino and a few of her colleagues were preparing to leave for lunch when the question was asked, “did Lori [Respondent] come in yet?” One of the teachers in the lunch group was Amy Haggarty, who is the chairperson of the school’s math department and was aware of Respondent’s history of addiction to pain medication. Ms. Pellegrino, in response to the question about Respondent’s whereabouts, mentioned to Ms. Haggarty that she had just gotten off the phone with Respondent and that it was a weird conversation because Respondent said, according to Ms. Pellegrino, “that she has a bad migraine headache and she can’t fill her pain medication,” and asked her [Ms. Pellegrino] “if she had any pain medication.” Ms. Haggarty, because she knew of Respondent’s history with addiction to pain medication, became alarmed by Ms. Pellegrino’s statement and she immediately arranged to meet with the school principal, Mr. Long, to discuss what she had been told about Respondent. During her meeting with Mr. Long, Ms. Haggarty informed him of what she had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long, upon concluding his meeting with Ms. Haggarty, then met with Ms. Pellegrino. Upon questioning by Mr. Long, Ms. Pellegrino confirmed that she had spoken with Respondent that morning and that Respondent asked her for pain medication. Mr. Long then contacted the school board’s office of human resources to report what he had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long was advised by a representative from the office of human resources that Dave Carter would report to the school on the morning of January 4, 2017, to “possibly place Ms. Lorenz on administrative leave.” Dave Carter is a “human resources investigator” for the Charlotte County School Board and he reports to, among others, Mr. Chuck Breiner, assistant superintendent for the school board. According to Mr. Carter, his job responsibilities include conducting “personnel investigations based on allegations of misconduct or violations of school district policies, rules, or the Department of Education code of ethics.” During his testimony, Mr. Carter explained that when Mr. Breiner, or others as appropriate, believes that reasonable suspicion exists to subject an employee to drug testing, he [Mr. Carter] will go to the employee’s worksite, perform “an on- scene concurrence evaluation” of the employee, and, if necessary, transport the employee to the drug testing facility. Mr. Carter testified that an on-scene concurrence evaluation consists of him “interview[ing] the principal, call[ing] the employee down, [and] mak[ing] a physical observation of [the employee].” Mr. Carter testified that upon completion of the concurrence evaluation, if he believes that reasonable suspicion does not exist for drug testing, he will contact Mr. Breiner who will then make the final determination of whether the employee should be subjected to drug testing. Respondent arrived at the school around 6:15 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017. Soon after arriving at the school, Respondent saw Mr. Long who informed Respondent that he needed to meet with her during the “second hour” of the day, which is her planning period. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that Respondent taught her first-period class before meeting with Mr. Long and Mr. Carter at 8:10 a.m. There is no evidence indicating that Mr. Long took any steps to observe Respondent’s “performance, appearance, or behavior” in preparation for his January 4, 2017, meeting with Respondent and Mr. Carter, or that Mr. Long reasonably believed that Respondent was under the influence of drugs such that she should be prevented from teaching her class.2/ At about 8:00 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017, Mr. Carter reported to Port Charlotte High School for the purpose of interviewing Respondent as part of an investigation into an unrelated matter. When Mr. Carter checked in at the school, he met with Mr. Long who informed him of the allegations concerning Respondent’s solicitation of pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter immediately contacted Mr. Breiner and informed him of the allegations against Respondent. Mr. Breiner, when he spoke with Mr. Carter, was not aware of Respondent’s history of drug addiction and, consequently, this was not a factor that he considered when ordering that Respondent be drug-tested. Mr. Breiner, based on the information that Respondent allegedly solicited pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino, as reported by Mr. Long, and the fact that Respondent, like a number of other employees, had multiple absences from work, directed Mr. Carter to terminate the investigation into the unrelated matter and to proceed with taking Respondent to an authorized facility for reasonable suspicion drug testing. At no time prior to directing Mr. Carter to subject Respondent to drug testing did Mr. Breiner instruct Mr. Carter to personally interview Ms. Pellegrino regarding her conversation with Respondent. Additionally, at no time prior to Respondent’s drug test did Mr. Carter even attempt to question Ms. Pellegrino about her conversation with Respondent and the circumstances related thereto. It was only after Respondent had been drug tested that Mr. Carter interviewed Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter, after receiving direction from Mr. Breiner, and with the assistance of Debbie Anderson, who works as a personnel analyst in Respondent’s department of human resources, met with Respondent and explained that she was required to submit to drug testing pursuant to the school board’s drug-free workplace policy. Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Petitioner uses a form titled “Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Checklist” (checklist), when evaluating employees for suspicion of violating Petitioner’s Drug and Alcohol Free Work Environment Policy. The checklist provides as follows: Manager/Supervisor: This form is to be used to substantiate and document the objective facts and circumstances leading to a reasonable suspicion determination. After careful observations of the employee’s performance, appearance or behavior, please check all the observed indicators that raised the suspicion that the employee may have engaged in conduct which violates the Drug- and Alcohol-Free Work Environment Policy. Incident or reason for suspicion Apparent drug or alcohol intoxication Nausea or vomiting Abnormal or erratic behavior Evidence of possession, dispensation, or use of a prohibited substance Industrial accident requiring medical attention Physical altercation or assault Odors and/or Appearance Odor of alcohol (on breath or person) Distinctive, pungent aroma on clothing Excessive sweating or skin clamminess very flushed very pale Jerky eye movements Unfocused, blank stare Dilated or constricted pupils Dry mouth, frequent swallowing or wetting lips Bloodshot or watery eyes Behavior and Speech Slurred or incoherent speech Breathing difficulty or irregularity Loss of physical control, dizzy or fainting Unsteady walk, poor coordination Euphoric, fidgety, agitated or nervous affect Shaking hands/body, tremors, twitches Extreme fatigue or sleeping on the job Lackadaisical, apathetic attitude Irritable, moody, belligerent or aggressive demeanor Nausea or vomiting Suspicion of others; paranoia; accuses others Physical and/or verbal abusiveness Rambling, loud, fast, silly or repetitious speech Talkative, cursing, other inappropriate speech Diminished (or lack of) concentration Delayed or faulty decision making Impulsive, unsafe risk-taking Inappropriate response to instructions Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed a checklist. None of the indicators listed above were checked by either Mr. Carter of Ms. Anderson as it pertains to their evaluation of Respondent. There is, however, an “indicator” appearing on the respective forms that is different in substance when comparing the form completed by Mr. Carter with the one completed by Ms. Anderson. On the form completed by Mr. Carter, there is a marked indicator that reads “Colleague disclosed that employee solicited ‘pain medication’ (controlled substance) during a teacher work day.” By comparison, the form completed by Ms. Anderson notes a different indicator which states “Employee discloses that he or she has consumed alcohol, used or ingested a controlled substance during or immediately prior to duty.” Neither party offered an explanation regarding the differences between the forms. Nevertheless, both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson attached a narrative to the checklist regarding the circumstances surrounding Ms. Pellegrino’s statement about Respondent allegedly soliciting Ms. Pellegrino for pain medication. Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed their respective checklist on January 11, 2017, which coincidentally, was the same date that Respondent’s lab results from her drug test were received by Petitioner.3/ The evidence does not explain why both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson waited several days to complete their respective checklists. Mr. Carter testified that when he performed his concurrence evaluation of Respondent on January 4, 2017, the only indicator present for subjecting Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing was the statement of Ms. Pellegrino indicating that Respondent solicited pain medication from her on January 3, 2017. Ms. Anderson did not testify at the final hearing. Mr. Breiner, who made the ultimate decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing on January 4, 2017, testified that two factors drove his determination: the first being Ms. Pellegrino’s statement, and the second being Respondent’s history of absenteeism from work during the 2016- 2017 school year.4/ On cross-examination, however, Mr. Breiner admitted that in Respondent’s notice of termination he made no reference to absenteeism being a factor in his decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing. Morphine and Imitrex Respondent admits that on January 3, 2017, she took morphine in order to get relief from her migraine headache. Respondent testified that she typically takes Imitrex to treat her migraines, but when that drug is ineffective she takes morphine for relief of her symptoms. According to Petitioner, she has been taking Imitrex since about 2007 and she suffers no side effects from the medication. Respondent testified that she typically takes morphine about once or twice a year “when the Imitrex [is not] working” and that the effects of the morphine last “[a]nywhere from four to six hours, sometimes eight, but nothing after that.” Petitioner did not rebut Respondent’s statement and offered no evidence regarding the effects of morphine and the period of time after ingestion that a person is typically under the influence of the drug. According to medical records from Peace River Medical Center, Respondent was discharged from the hospital on August 23, 2007, following treatment for: 1. “[c]hest pain, myocardial infarction protocol; 2. [p]leuritic pneumonia; [and] [m]igraine.” At the time of release from the hospital, Respondent was “discharged home with Morphine 60 mg p.r.n.” According to Respondent’s unrefuted testimony, the morphine pill that she took on January 3, 2017, was part of the batch of pills that she received when discharged from the hospital in 2007. Petitioner, when first interviewed by Respondent on January 13, 2017, denied soliciting pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Charlotte County School Board enter a final order finding that there was no just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment during the term of her 2016-2017 annual contract with the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2017.

Florida Laws (5) 1001.321012.335120.569120.57120.68
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OSCAR JONES vs COASTAL MARITIMES SERVICES, 02-002787 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jul. 16, 2002 Number: 02-002787 Latest Update: Apr. 30, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in its employment decisions in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2001).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Oscar Jones (Petitioner), is a black male. He began working for Respondent in July 1997, as a longshoreman working on "chicken boats." In that position, Petitioner loaded boxes of frozen chicken into the holds of refrigerated ships. Respondent, Coastal Maritime Services, LLC (Respondent), is engaged in the business of stevedoring and seaport terminal operations, including loading and unloading ships, and receiving cargo. On May 28, 1998, Respondent injured himself when a very heavy box of frozen chicken fell on his ankle. Other than first aid at the worksite, Petitioner declined further medical treatment that day. He was given a medical form authorizing treatment at the medical clinic which provided medical services to injured employees who might be covered under Respondent's workers' compensation insurance. The next day, on May 29, 1998, Petitioner sought medical treatment for his injury at the medical facility which handled Respondent's workers' compensation injuries. As part of that treatment, Petitioner was asked to take a drug test and Petitioner consented. Although no formal written drug test policy was in effect by Respondent at the time of Petitioner's injury, the general policy and practice was that a work-related injury would subject an employee to a voluntary drug test. Petitioner's drug test came back positive for marijuana. As a result of the positive drug test result, Respondent's insurance carrier controverted Petitioner's workers' compensation claim. There was no evidence that Respondent's management had any responsibility or involvement in the carrier's decision to controvert Petitioner's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. During the 12-month time period of January 1998 through December 1998, Petitioner was not the only employee of Respondent required to take a drug test after a work place injury. In fact, in June 1998 (the same time period as Petitioner's test) seven white employees were required to take a drug test and three black employees were required to take a drug test. For the entire 1998 calendar year, 51 total drug tests were administered, with 31 of those tests administered to non- black employees (for example, white or Hispanic) and only 21 of those tests administered to black employees. Similarly, for the entire 1998 calendar year, a total of 18 employees were not administered drug tests, either because medical attention was refused or because of the severity of the injury. Of those 18 employees, 11 were non-black employees and seven were black employees. Employees who were not required to take a drug test either were those who refused medical attention or who were severely injured and had to seek treatment from hospital emergency rooms where drug tests were not given. Clearly, race played no factor in who was required to take a drug test or who received a drug test. Petitioner did cite the names of two white employees, Jay Chavers and Andy Wiley, who allegedly were treated more favorably than Petitioner, in that those two employees did not take a drug test. However, those two employees were not "similarly situated" to Petitioner. First, the injuries of both Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley were much more serious in nature than the contusion (bruise) that Petitioner had suffered and both were taken to emergency rooms for their injuries where drug tests were not routinely administered. Specifically, Mr. Chavers had fallen from a high distance and suffered numerous broken bones, thus, rendering him incapable of giving consent to a drug test at the hospital. As to Mr. Wiley, his injuries were not subject to workers' compensation coverage, unlike Petitioner's. Thus, given the nature of the injuries of Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley, those two individuals were not sufficiently "similarly situated" to Petitioner to enable him to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Petitioner's positive drug test result had no other impact on his employment with Respondent, apart from the controversion of his workers' compensation benefits. Indeed, Respondent attempted to get Petitioner to return to work. Shortly thereafter, in early June 1998, Petitioner contacted the chief financial officer of Respondent, Kathleen Wiley, who in 1998 was Respondent's office manager. Petitioner expressed concern to Ms. Wiley about his workers' compensation benefits and his employment status with Respondent. Ms. Wiley informed Petitioner that he was still considered to be employed with Respondent and that he needed to contact Ben Brown for a light duty assignment. Petitioner was expressly informed that light duty work was available that would meet his medical restrictions imposed after his injury. Petitioner never followed-up with Mr. Brown about light duty work. Almost immediately thereafter in June 1998, Respondent hired Bud Underwood as its new safety manager. Mr. Underwood's responsibilities were to oversee workers' compensation cases and follow up on accidents and injured employees. Ms. Wiley informed Mr. Underwood to follow up on the situation of Petitioner to get him to return for a light duty assignment. In late June or early July 1998, Mr. Underwood contacted Petitioner as directed and offered him light duty work within his medical restrictions. Petitioner informed Mr. Underwood in very obscene terms that he was not going to accept any light duty assignments. Petitioner never appeared for any light duty assignments after that conversation. Based upon Petitioner's response to that telephonic offer of light duty employment, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter around July 9, 1998, informing him that based upon his refusal of light duty work, he had been deemed to have abandoned his employment, and thus was no longer employed by Respondent due to self-termination. Thereafter, in September 1998, Petitioner contacted Respondent by telephone seeking employment. However, by that time, opportunities for longshoremen, such as Mr. Jones were extremely limited, as the "chicken boat" operation had all but shut down for financial reasons, and no positions were available at the time. Thus, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter dated September 2, 1998, informing him that no positions were available, but encouraging him to reapply. Despite the invitation to Petitioner that he should reapply, Petitioner never submitted any subsequent inquiry for employment. Respondent's "chicken boat" operation had shut down completely by February 1999. Petitioner later applied for unemployment compensation benefits, but those benefits were denied on the ground that Petitioner had abandoned his employment by refusing the light duty work that was offered to him. In fact, in an evidentiary hearing held in his unemployment compensation matter, the Unemployment Appeals Referee found as a fact that Petitioner admitted that he had refused the light duty work offered to him. Petitioner's appeal of that adverse decision was, likewise, denied by the Unemployment Appeals Commission. Petitioner's race played no role in Respondent's determination that Petitioner had abandoned his employment or in Respondent's determination that no position existed for Petitioner in September 1998. Similarly, race played no role in the insurance carrier's decisions regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation benefits. In fact, Petitioner voluntarily settled his workers' compensation claim disputes in a settlement agreement signed by him and his attorney dated March 22, 1999. Petitioner had a family to support and needed the money. Pursuant to that settlement agreement, Petitioner agreed to accept $4,500 in full, final and complete settlement, release and discharge of any and all claims against the employer arising out of Petitioner's alleged accident, injury, and disability in issue, including, but not limited to claims for temporary total, temporary partial, permanent total, and/or permanent partial disability compensation, and past and future medical benefits. Petitioner verified that the settlement was adequate and was not entered into under duress. Rather, Petitioner of his own accord thought that the settlement was in his best interest. The Department of Labor approved the settlement. Petitioner has made no credible showing that there was any relationship between his race and the adverse employment actions of which he has complained.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Reed Corbin, Esquire Richard L. Ruth, Jr., Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 121 West Forsyth Street Suite 1000 Post Office Box 41566 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Oscar Jones 1817 East 27th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.01760.10760.11
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs ERIC M. PATZ, M.D., 00-000671 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 08, 2000 Number: 00-000671 Latest Update: Sep. 15, 2000

The Issue This is a proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to suspend the license of a medical doctor on the basis of allegations set forth in an Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint charges that the medical doctor is in violation of Section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, "by being unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, chemicals, or any other type of material or as a result of any mental or physical condition."

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, licensed as a physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0077594. Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance with a high potential for abuse, whose use may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. When a person ingests cocaine, the human body metabolizes some of the cocaine into a substance called benoylecgonine. Benoylecgonine is commonly referred to as cocaine metabolite or metabolite of cocaine. In the normal course of events, cocaine metabolite is found in the human body only following the ingestion of cocaine. On February 17, 1998, the Respondent submitted a urine sample for drug screening as part of the application process for employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida. The results of that test came back positive for metabolite of cocaine. While positive, the amount of cocaine metabolite recorded by the test equipment was very small, only 61 nanograms of metabolite of cocaine per milliliter. The Respondent was very surprised by the results of the urine drug screen test, and he questioned the accuracy of the test results. When he gave the urine sample on February 17, 1998, the sample was split into two separate samples. He eventually requested a test of the second sample. The second sample was tested on November 24, 1998. The second sample also tested positive, but again the measured amount of cocaine metabolite was very small, only 50.5 nanograms per milliliter. The Respondent is unable to explain why the urine specimen he gave on February 17, 1998 would test positive for metabolites of cocaine. The Respondent denies any voluntary or intentional ingestion of cocaine and is unaware of any manner in which he might have accidentally or unknowingly ingested cocaine. The Respondent believes that the test results of the urine sample he gave on February 17, 1998, are erroneous because there is no logical reason known to him for his urine to have tested positive for metabolites of cocaine, other than test error or sample contamination. Drug test results that indicate only very small amounts of cocaine metabolite in the test sample are regarded as insignificant and are treated essentially the same as negative results. For example, Jackson Memorial Hospital treats test results of less than 50 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter the same as a negative result. And the Department of Transportation treats test results of less than 150 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter the same as a negative result. When the Respondent's urine sample of February 17, 1998, was tested the first time, the materials being tested also included two control samples of known values. One of the control samples contained 150 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter. The test equipment measured that sample as 163 nanograms per milliliter; 13 nanograms high. The other control sample contained 450 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter. The test equipment measured that sample as 482 nanograms per milliliter; 32 nanograms high. On the first test of the Respondent's February 17, 1998, urine sample, the test equipment recorded a measurement of 61 nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter. That result was not adjusted to take into account the fact that the test equipment was producing high readings on the known samples. If the test results of the Respondent's urine sample were to be adjusted by the 13 nanogram error in the smallest of the control samples, the result would be 48 nanograms of cocaine metabolite in the Respondent's sample. The Respondent became licensed to practice medicine in Florida on or about March 4, 1999. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent obtained employment with an anesthesia group in Miami, Florida, known as Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc. Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc., had a contract to provide anesthesia services to patients at Coral Gables Hospital. In his capacity as an employee of Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc., the Respondent was assigned to provide anesthesia services to patients at Coral Gables Hospital on a regular basis. Dr. Manuel Torres was the CEO and owner of the Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc. Dr. Torres was the person who made the decision to offer the Respondent employment with the Anesthesia Group of Miami, Inc., and was also the person primarily responsible for supervising the Respondent's professional activities. Dr. Manuel Torres has been practicing anesthesiology for approximately 30 years. During that time he has served as Chief of Anesthesiology at several hospitals in the Miami area, including Hialeah Hospital, Golden Glades Hospital, and Coral Gables Hospital. Dr. Manual Torres has also been a professor of medicine at the University of Miami School of Medicine. While the Respondent worked at Coral Gables Hospital as a new anesthesiologist, he was closely supervised by Dr. Torres, both inside and outside of the operating room. During the course of his supervision of the Respondent, it never appeared to Dr. Torres that the Respondent was impaired in any way. On the evening of July 16, 1999, while some atypical events were taking place in the vicinity of the lobby of the Coral Gables Hospital, the Respondent was elsewhere in the hospital providing anesthesia services for two patients.3 Hospital records show that from 7:00 p.m. until about 9:20 p.m. on July 16, 1999, the Respondent was providing anesthesia services to two patients in one of the hospital operating rooms. These medical records include entries made by the Respondent as the anesthesia services were being provided to the patients in the operating room and in the recovery room, with the Respondent documenting the patient's pulse, blood pressure, respiration, and other information in the records every few minutes. Between about 9:20 p.m. and 11:07 p.m., one of the patients being attended to by the Respondent was in the recovery room. During this time, the Respondent remained in or near the recovery room to ensure that the patient fully recovered from the anesthesia before the Respondent left the hospital premises. At 11:07 p.m., the recovery room nurse went to the Respondent to ask him for orders to move the patient from the recovery room to a regular floor. The Respondent gave the requested orders. Very shortly thereafter, the Respondent left the recovery room and also left the hospital. The Respondent was picked up at the hospital by his roommate at approximately 11:30 p.m. On the evening of July 16, 1999, the Respondent was not the person in the men's restroom of the hospital lobby and was not the person who, upon leaving the men's restroom, asked that a taxi be called.4 As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the Respondent had shared a dwelling place with an adult roommate for approximately one and a half years. During that period of time, the Respondent's roommate has never seen the Respondent using drugs, nor has he ever seen the Respondent engage in any conduct that created any suspicion of drug use. After July 16, 1999, and until his license was suspended in December of 1999, the Respondent continued to work for the Anesthesia Group of Miami under the supervision of Dr. Manuel Torres at facilities other than Coral Gables Hospital. Dr. Torres was never notified by anyone at Coral Gables Hospital about the allegations made against the Respondent on July 16, 1999, even though the hospital knew that the Respondent continued to be employed by Dr. Torres and that the Respondent was continuing to provide anesthesiology services to patients at other facilities. Shortly before the Respondent was employed by Dr. Torres, Martha Garcia, the Chief Executive Officer, at Coral Gables Hospital, had notified Dr. Torres that the hospital had decided to terminate its contract with the Anesthesia Group of Miami, and that after midnight on July 16, 1999, another anesthesia group would be providing all anesthesia services at Coral Gables Hospital. The new anesthesia group took over responsibility for all anesthesia services at Coral Gables Hospital beginning at the stroke of midnight on July 16, 1999. The Respondent had wanted to continue to work at Coral Gables Hospital after July 16, 1999. Dr. Torres did not object to the Respondent continuing to work at Coral Gables Hospital after July 16, 1999. Accordingly, Dr. Torres advised the Respondent that the he would release the Respondent from the non-compete clause in the Respondent's employment contract. Dr. Torres also advised the hospital CEO that he was releasing the Respondent from the non-compete clause. The Respondent communicated with the new anesthesia group and made arrangements to work with that group when they began providing anesthesia services at Coral Gables Hospital on July 17, 1999. The Respondent also discussed the matter with Martha Garcia. She initially told the Respondent that she had no objection to him continuing to work at Coral Gables Hospital with the new anesthesia group after July 16, 1999. At some point in time prior to July 16, 1999, Martha Garcia changed her mind. She told the new anesthesia group that she would not allow the Respondent to work at Coral Gables Hospital after July 16, 1999. She also told the Respondent that she had changed her mind. Martha Garcia and the Respondent had at least one heated conversation about her change of mind. Martha Garcia became very angry with the Respondent about the way he spoke to her during their heated conversation. She was still angry with him on July 16, 1999. Martha Garcia's animosity towards the Respondent was still evident during her testimony at the final hearing. On August 3, 1999, about two and a half weeks after the alleged incident on the night of July 16, 1999, Martha Garcia, the Chief Executive Officer of Coral Gables Hospital, called the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) and told them that a hospital security guard had discovered the Respondent "strapped off" and injecting a substance into himself.5 The PRN monitors health care practitioners who are impaired or potentially impaired by alcohol, drugs, or other mental conditions. Dr. Raymond Pomm, the Medical Director of the PRN, serves as the impaired practitioner's consultant to the Board of Medicine. In response to the information provided by Martha Garcia, the PRN contacted the Respondent on August 10, 1999. The PRN requested that the Respondent obtain an evaluation for possible impairment and provided the Respondent with several options for such an evaluation. The Respondent agreed to see Dr. Richard Seely for the evaluation. On August 20, 1999, the Respondent presented to Richard Seely, M.D., who is a board certified addiction psychiatrist, for evaluation. At that time, Dr. Seely observed Respondent to be anxious, tremulous, and in an agitated state. Additionally, Dr. Seely noticed that the Respondent's nose was running and that the Respondent frequently rubbed his nose. During Respondent's visit with Dr. Seely, Dr. Seely requested that the Respondent provide an immediate urine sample for a urine drug screen. Such a urine drug screen is a routine part of an evaluation of impairment or possible impairment. The Respondent refused to provide an immediate urine sample. The Respondent was presented with two options for submitting to an immediate urine drug screen. The Respondent could either call his attorney from Dr. Seely's office, or he could immediately provide the urine sample, which Dr. Seely agreed to hold until such time as the Respondent could speak with his attorney. The Respondent rejected these options, and he did not provide a urine sample on August 20, 1999. The Respondent also refused to sign the consent forms and refused to pay for the evaluation. The Respondent contacted his attorney to discuss whether he should sign the forms provided to him by Dr. Seely and whether he should provide the urine sample requested by Dr. Seely. Following review of the forms, the attorney advised the Respondent that he should sign the forms and that he should provide the requested urine sample. On August 24, 1999, the Respondent returned to Dr. Seely's office, signed the consent forms, and provided a urine sample. Testing of that urine sample was negative for any of the drugs tested for. However, because the Respondent had waited four days to provide the urine sample, on August 24, 2000, Dr. Seely also asked the Respondent to provide a hair sample. The Respondent contacted his attorney to ask whether he should comply with the request for a hair sample. The Respondent's attorney advised him not to provide a hair sample for testing. Consistent with that advice, the Respondent refused to provide a hair sample on August 24, 2000. Dr. Seely could not complete an evaluation of Respondent or make a recommendation to PRN without the Respondent's undergoing some form of reliable drug screening, either by immediate urine screening or by hair drug toxicology screening. Dr. Seely reported to the PRN that an evaluation of the Respondent could not be completed because the Respondent refused to cooperate with the evaluation. On October 4, 1999, Dr. Raymond Pomm, the Medical Director at PRN and a board certified addiction psychiatrist, wrote to the Respondent. Dr. Pomm's letter to the Respondent included the following: This correspondence serves as written documentation that your case is being referred to the Agency for Health Care Administration for appropriate action. This referral is the result of serious allegations brought forth and your unwillingness to fully cooperate with the evaluation process to resolve same. On October 4, 1999, Dr. Raymond Pomm also wrote to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). Dr. Pomm's letter to the AHCA summarized the information he had received regarding the allegations against the Respondent, summarized efforts to have the Respondent submit to an evaluation, summarized the Respondent's failures to cooperate, and concluded with the opinion that the Respondent was "unsafe to practice his profession with reasonable skill and safety." As of March 24, 2000 (the last day of the final hearing in this case), the Respondent had not completed a psychological evaluation or a chemical dependency evaluation. However, during March of 2000, the Respondent voluntarily submitted several urine samples for drug screen testing. These more recent urine samples were tested by the same lab that performed the drug screen test on February 17, 1998. The more recent samples were submitted on each of the following dates: March 7, 10, 13, 17, and 20, 2000. All five of the urine samples submitted by the Respondent during March of 2000 were negative for cocaine metabolite. They were also negative for all of the other drugs for which the tests screened. Under Section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner has "the authority to issue an order to compel a licensee to submit to a mental or physical examination by physicians designated by the department." No such order was issued to compel the Respondent to submit to such a examination.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case concluding that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the Respondent is unable to practice with skill and safety, dismissing the Administrative Complaint in its entirety, and vacating the previously issued Emergency Suspension Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2000.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs ANTHONY E. RICE, 89-004537 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 22, 1989 Number: 89-004537 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1990

The Issue The issue for determination at the formal hearing was whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by unlawfully and knowingly possessing cocaine and introducing cocaine into his body in violation of Subsections 943.13(7) and 943.1395(5), (6), Florida Statutes. 1/

Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the "Commission") on April 4, 1982. Respondent was employed as a police officer by the Metro- Dade Police Department for approximately seven and a half years as of September 15, 1988. 2/ During 1988, Respondent was assigned to the Miami International Airport. Metro-Dade police officers were subject to annual physical examinations as part of the terms of their employment. The examinations were routinely scheduled on an alphabetical rotation system. Respondent was notified by his employer approximately three weeks prior to the date of his annual physical for 1988. Respondent reported to Mount Sinai Medical Center, Industrial Medicine, for his annual physical on March 2, 1988. In the course of his physical, Respondent was given a sterile specimen cup by Nurse Linda Arama for collection of a urine sample. Respondent provided the urine sample as directed. Respondent's urine sample was processed in a routine manner and tested at about 10 p.m. on March 2, 1988. At the time it was given, Respondent's urine sample was poured into two smaller cups and capped (the "two smaller sample cups"). Each cap was sealed with special security evidence tape designed to disclose any evidence of tampering. Respondent's urine sample was assigned a unique identification number (116958). Respondent's name, date of birth, social security number and identification number were placed on each of the two smaller sample cups and entered on a chain of custody transmittal form. The two smaller sample cups were then stored in a locked metal specimen box. The specimen box was picked up by courier and transferred to Toxicology Testing Service on the afternoon of March 2, 1988. Israel Sanchez, a forensic toxicologist technician employed at Toxicology Testing Service, inspected the two smaller sample cups at about 10 p.m. on March 2, 1988. Mr. Sanchez assigned an additional number (30658) to the two smaller sample cups and noted that the sealed special security evidence tape was in tact. Mr. Sanchez opened one of the two smaller sample cups and dispensed a small portion of Respondent's urine for drug testing. Mr. Sanchez used a Hitashi 705 screening instrument to conduct the drug test. Respondent's urine tested positive for cocaine in two separate tests conducted by Mr. Sanchez. Urine samples that screen positive using the Hitashi 705 screening instrument are also tested by the gas chromatography mass spectrometry method (the "chromatorgraphy test") as a routine procedure at Toxicology Testing Service. John de Kanel, an expert in forensic toxicology, performed the analysis of Respondent's urine sample using the chromatography test. The chromatography test revealed that Respondent's urine sample contained cocaine metabolite ecgonine methyl ester, which is also known as methyl ecgonine. This metabolite is a unique by-product of the processing of cocaine by the human body. Respondent's urine sample contained approximately 225 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine and its metabolites. The results of the chromatography test were consistent with cocaine use. Respondent was notified on March 11, 1988, that he had tested positive for cocaine during his annual physical. The same day, Respondent submitted two urine samples for drug testing on his own initiative. One sample was given to Toxicology Testing Service. The other sample was given to North Shore Hospital where Respondent was referred by Dr. Benton Perry, Respondent's personal physician. Respondent tested negative for both urine samples given on March 11, 1988. It is not likely that an habitual user would have no positive nanogram readings nine days after the habitual use had stopped. Nanogram readings of a sustained user would be approximately 80,000 to 100,000 if use was continued up to the time of testing. Patients undergoing drug rehabilitation typically have positive test results in the low 1000 ng/ml. The quantity of a substance found in a urine sample is estimated by comparing the numerical value found in the sample with the numerical value of a drug screening from a control sample. Control samples are run at 100 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml). A numerical value of 225 ng/ml indicates cocaine was ingested in some way but neither indicates the method of ingestion nor whether cocaine was knowingly ingested. The ingestion of milligram quantities of cocaine approximately 14 hours before a urine sample was given could produce a numerical value of 225 ng/ml. The Commission requires the employing agency to use an immunoassay screen that is capable of a minimum of 300 ng/ml of cocaine or cocaine metabolites. Screening tests are sold commercially with a minimum screening level of 300 ng/ml. The Metro Dade County maximum acceptable level for cocaine or cocaine metabolites is 50 ng/ml. Respondent has never knowingly used drugs or alcohol, and does not smoke cigarettes. Respondent never tested positive for drug use in any of his previous physical examinations during his seven and a half years as a police officer for the Miami Dade Police Department. Respondent never tested positive for drug use as a result of eight random drug tests administered to him after testing positive on March 2, 1988. 3/ Respondent did not drink excessive amounts of water or indulge in excessive exercise either before or after his test on March 2, 1988. The totality of the evidence refuted any inference that Respondent knowingly or unlawfully ingested cocaine prior to his annual physical on March 2, 1988. Respondent's testimony was credible and persuasive. Respondent's actions and conduct before and after his test on March 2, 1988, were not consistent with the actions and conduct of one who knowingly and unlawfully used cocaine.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of the charges in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of September, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1990.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.00225
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs DEBRA J. HOLLINGSWORTH, 04-000720PL (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Arcadia, Florida Mar. 09, 2004 Number: 04-000720PL Latest Update: Mar. 07, 2005

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d), by testing positive for marijuana; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating persons certified in Florida as law enforcement officers. On June 29, 2000, Petitioner certified Respondent as a law enforcement officer pursuant to Law Enforcement Certificate number 192064. Petitioner had previously certified Respondent as an auxiliary law enforcement officer on November 3, 1998, pursuant to Law Enforcement Certificate number 183207. Respondent has worked continuously as an auxiliary law enforcement officer and as a law enforcement officer for the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) from November 3, 1998. Respondent performed her jobs well and had no disciplinary action prior to this proceeding. On January 30, 2002, a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for the Sheriff's Office collected a urine specimen from Respondent in a random procedure conducted pursuant to the Drug Free Workplace testing program. The LPN sealed the specimen in the presence of Respondent and stored the specimen in a refrigerator regularly used for that and other purposes. Staff for the Sheriff's Office forwarded the specimen to LabCorp at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day that the LPN collected the specimen. The specimen arrived at LabCorp with the seals in tact. LabCorp would not have tested the specimen if the seals were broken. LabCorp staff observed two deficiencies in the chain of custody documents that accompanied the specimen. The collector signed as the collector but did not sign as the person who released the specimen. Nor did the chain of custody documents indicate the mode of shipment. LabCorp began testing the specimen and sent an affidavit to the LPN for her to sign. The LPN signed the affidavit, without understanding the content or purpose of the affidavit, and returned it to LabCorp. LabCorp would not have completed testing if the LPN had not returned the affidavit properly completed. LabCorp conducted an immunoassay. The specimen tested positive for propoxyphene. The reading for propoxyphene metabolite exceeded the minimum 300 required for a positive result. The specimen also tested positive for cannabinoids (marijuana). The reading for marijuana metabolite exceeded the minimum of 50 required for a positive result. LabCorp conducted a gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GCMS) to rule out a false-positive reading in the immunoassay. The specimen exceeded the minimums of 300 for propoxyphene and 15 nanograms per milliliter for marijuana. The specimen reading for marijuana was 32 nanograms per milliliter. LabCorp referred the test results to Dr. John Eustace, a certified medical review officer under contract with the Sheriff's Office to ensure the validity of test results for controlled substances. Dr. Eustace confirmed the test results and contacted Respondent. Respondent had a prescription for Darvocet. Darvocet contains propoxyphene. The Administrative Complaint does not charge Respondent with any violation based on propoxyphene. Respondent stated to Dr. Eustace that she was on other non-prescription pain medications. None of the pain medications would have caused a false-positive reading in the testing conducted by LabCorp. After concluding her conversation with Dr. Eustace, Respondent immediately submitted a second specimen for independent testing that was completed on February 14, 2002. The specimen did not test positive for any controlled substance. The independent test was conducted approximately 14 days after Respondent provided the original specimen. Tests may detect marijuana in chronic users for up to 14 days but generally cannot detect the drug in recreational users after three to five days. Respondent denies using marijuana and denies any willful or intentional ingestion of marijuana. The test conducted on the original specimen would have detected marijuana in Respondent's system if Respondent were to have ingested the drug unknowingly through food that she consumed or through second hand smoke. Respondent does not recall being around anyone smoking marijuana and has no knowledge of consuming food that contained marijuana. Respondent's only explanation for the positive test results is that someone tampered with the specimen tested by LabCorp. The refrigerator used to store the specimen is located in an area of the building that is not secure. Staff members of the Sheriff's Office as well as some inmates in the adjacent jail have access to the area where the refrigerator is located. Assuming arguendo that someone had access to the specimen, Respondent elicited no testimony from Petitioner's experts, and called no expert in her case, to show how those with access to the refrigerator could have added a substance to the specimen to cause it to test positive for marijuana. Nor did Respondent submit any evidence of how such tampering could have been accomplished without breaking the seal on the specimen tested by LabCorp.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4), and issuing a written reprimand in accordance with Subsection 943.1395(7)(e), Florida Statutes (2001). DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Pine Scott Price, Esquire Bank of America Building 126 East Olympia Avenue Suite 405 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.57465.023943.13943.139943.1395
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ST. LUCIE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs RENYA JONES, 17-004226TTS (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Providence, Florida Jul. 25, 2017 Number: 17-004226TTS Latest Update: Jun. 13, 2018

The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner, St. Lucie County School Board (Petitioner or the School Board), has just cause to terminate the employment of Respondent, Renya Jones (Respondent or Ms. Jones).

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Renya Jones, is employed by the School Board of St. Lucie County, Florida. She has been employed by the School Board since the 2004-2005 school year, most recently as a music teacher at Village Green Environmental Studies School. Respondent has a professional services contract pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes. As a classroom teacher, she is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board and the Classroom Teachers Association. When Respondent was hired by the School Board, she participated in an orientation process whereby she received training on a variety of School Board policies, including the Code of Ethics/Professional Competency and the Drug-Free Workplace Policy. On July 28, 2004, she signed a New Employee Orientation Verification of Training form indicating that she had received training in the areas listed (including those named above), and that she had received a copy of the St. Lucie County School Board New Employee Handbook. Respondent also submitted to pre-employment drug screening on July 30, 2004. On May 8, 2017, Respondent was a music teacher at Village Green Environmental Studies School, also referred to as Village Green Elementary (Village Green). The contractual hours for teachers at Village Green during the 2016-2017 school year were from 7:45 a.m. to 3:20 p.m. There were clubs that met in the morning before classes began at approximately 8:30 a.m., and those teachers working with clubs were required to report earlier so that they were present when the clubs were to start. Respondent was the teacher working with the chorus club, which would require her to be present early. When teachers arrive at school, they normally sign in at the front desk. Cynthia Garcia is the executive secretary to the principal at Village Green. During the 2016-2017 school year, the principal was Ucola Barrett-Baxter. Ms. Garcia typically arrives at school before anyone else and sits at the front desk as teachers sign in, as opposed to sitting in her office, adjacent to Ms. Barrett-Baxter’s. On May 8, 2017, Ms. Garcia was present when Respondent signed in at sometime between 7:30 and 7:50 a.m. Ms. Garcia asked Respondent if she was alright, because her appearance was different than normal. While Respondent was usually dressed professionally and wore make-up, that morning she was wearing no make-up and her wig was not on straight. Respondent replied that she was running a little behind and was a little messed up, and still needed to put on her make-up. Ms. Garcia testified that Respondent was different than when she usually signed in, and described her as a bit “giddy,” flailing her arms and laughing. Actavis McQueen is a fourth-grade teacher at Village Green. As she approached her classroom on May 8, 2017, Respondent called to her in the hallway a little after 8:00 a.m. Ms. McQueen described Respondent as giggly and loud, and when Ms. McQueen approached Respondent, she noticed that Respondent was not properly dressed for work. For example, her wig was twisted, she was not wearing make-up as she usually does, her stomach was showing under the tank top she was wearing, and she was wearing flip flops or slides instead of shoes. Most importantly, Ms. McQueen could smell the strong odor of alcohol. Respondent was loud and laughing, saying that the children would not recognize her without her make-up. Students were starting to come in for practice on the school play, and Ms. McQueen did not want the students to see Respondent in her current condition, so Ms. McQueen told students that there would not be a rehearsal that day. She told Respondent to go to her office in the back of her classroom and fix herself up. Ms. McQueen was shocked by Respondent’s appearance, and after telling Respondent to go to her office, Ms. McQueen headed toward the school office. On her way, she ran into Verna Brown at the cafeteria. The chorus room that served as Respondent’s classroom is adjacent to or behind the cafeteria, and can be entered from the cafeteria area by way of the stage. Verna Brown2/ is a health paraprofessional employed at Village Green. On this particular morning, she was on duty in the cafeteria for those students eating breakfast. Ms. McQueen approached her and told Verna Brown that she had spoken to Respondent, and it appeared that Respondent had been drinking. Ms. McQueen reported that Respondent smelled of alcohol and asked Verna Brown to go check on Respondent, because Ms. McQueen was uncertain what to do. Verna Brown went to Respondent’s class, and when she arrived, two other staff members were in Respondent’s room, so she closed the door and said she would come back, which she did once the others left the room. Like Ms. McQueen, Verna Brown could smell alcohol and observed that Respondent’s eyes were swollen and red, her hair was “wild,” and her stomach was showing. Respondent indicated that she had been to a party. Verna Brown was concerned for Respondent’s well-being and told Respondent she needed to get herself together. While she was talking to Respondent, students were trying to come into the room through the stage, and were asking Respondent questions about rehearsal. Respondent told them there would be no rehearsal that morning and to come back at 3:00 p.m. Verna Brown was trying to keep the students from seeing Respondent because she did not want them to see her in that condition. Verna Brown asked Respondent if Respondent needed her to call someone to come get her, but Respondent indicated that she had a rental car, and left out the back door.3/ Despite having signed in upon her arrival at Village Green, Respondent did not sign out when she left. Verna Brown was not authorized to arrange for a substitute for Respondent, but told her she would speak with Ms. Garcia about one. No substitute was ever procured. Verna Brown returned to the cafeteria and confirmed to Ms. McQueen that she also smelled alcohol on Respondent. Ms. McQueen went to the office accompanied by Sherri Brown, the media specialist, in search of the principal, Ucola Barrett- Baxter. Ms. Garcia advised Ms. McQueen that Ms. Barrett-Baxter was at student drop-off duty, and Ms. McQueen told Ms. Garcia that she needed to speak to her about a staff member. Ms. Garcia asked if it was Respondent, and went to the drop-off area to advise Ms. Barrett-Baxter of Ms. McQueen’s need to see her. Ms. Garcia believed that Ms. McQueen was very upset about Respondent and took over Ms. Baxter-Barrett’s duties at the student drop-off area so that Ms. Barrett-Baxter could speak with Ms. McQueen. Ms. Barrett-Baxter found Ms. McQueen at the media center, where Ms. McQueen advised her that she had seen Respondent and that Respondent appeared to be drunk and smelled like alcohol. Ms. Barrett-Baxter asked where Respondent could be located, and was told that she had already left the campus. Ms. Barrett-Baxter immediately called Aaron Clements, the director of Employee Relations, and explained the situation. Upon learning that Ms. Barrett-Baxter had not seen Respondent personally and that Respondent was no longer at the school, Mr. Clements advised Ms. Barrett-Baxter that at that point, there was nothing that could be done. As noted above, Sherri Brown is a media specialist at Village Green. At Ms. McQueen’s request, she accompanied Ms. McQueen to the office to find Ms. Barrett-Baxter. She and Verna Brown were both concerned about whether Respondent made it home safely, and she tried to call Respondent. Respondent did not answer her phone when Sherri Brown called, and she and Verna Brown received permission from Ms. Barrett-Baxter to leave campus and drive by Respondent’s home to make sure she had arrived. Once they saw the rental car Respondent had been driving parked at her home, they returned to campus. Respondent returned Sherri Brown’s call at about 10:17 a.m., and stated that she had left early due to an unidentified emergency. Sherri Brown told Respondent to contact Ms. Barrett-Baxter before she came back to work, and not to come back to the school. Sherri Brown relayed the telephone conversation with Respondent to her media assistant, Mary Bergerman, and told Ms. Bergerman that she needed to go to the office and report the contact with Respondent. Ms. Bergerman had heard Sherri Brown’s side of the telephone conversation and confirmed that Sherri Brown had told Respondent not to return to the school, as opposed to advising her that she needed to come back. When Sherri Brown arrived at the office, Ms. Barrett- Baxter was in a meeting with a parent. She stepped into Ms. Garcia’s office to relay the message that Respondent was going to contact the principal, and while she was there, Respondent entered the office behind her. Sherri Brown said hello to Respondent and returned to the library. She covered Respondent’s classes for the day, and she and a co-worker covered the rehearsal that afternoon. While Ms. Barrett-Baxter was in the parent conference, at approximately 10:24 a.m., she received a text from a number she did not recognize. She responded, “I’m in a meeting. Who’s calling,” to which Respondent responded, “Jones I’m there in 5 minutes.” Respondent arrived in the office while Ms. Barrett- Baxter was still in the parent conference, so she went in Ms. Garcia’s office to wait. After somewhere between ten and 30 minutes, the parent conference concluded, and Respondent went in Ms. Barrett-Baxter’s office. Ms. Barrett-Baxter testified that Respondent is normally well put together in terms of make-up and hair, but when she came in the office she looked disheveled, and noticeably different from her normal appearance. She could detect the smell of alcohol and her eyes were puffy and red. Respondent told her she had gone home to clean up a little bit, and Ms. Barrett-Baxter replied that it did not work, because she could smell the alcohol from across the desk. She told Respondent that she would have to contact the district office, and left Respondent in her office while she went to Ms. Garcia’s office to call Mr. Clements. Sometime that day, she also completed a Human Resources Reporting Form and emailed it to Mr. Clements. The Reporting Form summarized the reports she had received regarding Respondent’s apparent intoxication and what she had observed when meeting with Respondent before calling Mr. Clements. Reasonable suspicion existed to warrant testing for drugs and alcohol based upon Respondent’s appearance, behavior, and the smell of alcohol emanating from her person and noted by nearly every person with whom she came in contact. Mr. Clements advised that he would send someone from security to transport Respondent for testing. Ms. Barrett-Baxter had Respondent go sit in the conference room in the office area to wait for transport, and resumed her other duties. Ken Rodriguez is a security officer for the St. Lucie County School District (School District) and a retired police officer from New York City, and he has worked at the School District for the last nine years. He arrived at Village Green between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m. Once he arrived, he went to the conference room where Respondent was waiting. He identified himself to Respondent and explained that he would be transporting her to the district office where she would meet with Aaron Clements, who would explain to her the procedures that were going to take place. Mr. Rodriguez asked Respondent about any personal affects she might have, and then asked someone in the office to retrieve her purse for her. Upon receiving the purse, Respondent placed it on the table and started looking for something. From his vantage point standing by the table, he could see a large ziplock bag of capsules in her purse, as well as a box of box cutters. He did not search her purse, but asked her about the bag of capsules, and Respondent told Mr. Rodriguez that they were vitamins. Mr. Rodriguez took her explanation at face value, but advised her that he was going to hold onto both the bag of capsules and the box cutters as a safety measure while she was transported, and return them to her when they were finished. Mr. Rodriguez and Respondent arrived at the School District offices sometime after noon. Mr. Rodriguez directed Respondent to sit in the reception area while he went in to see Mr. Clements. Mr. Rodriguez reported to Mr. Clements that he had taken possession of the capsules and the box cutter as a safety measure and gave them to Mr. Clements, and then brought Respondent in to meet with him. Mr. Rodriguez did not sit in on the meeting between Mr. Clements and Respondent. Mr. Clements advised Respondent that she was going to be taken to the lab for drug/alcohol testing, and now would be the time for her to tell him if the pills were something illegal or would cause her to have a negative result from the test, and she again stated that they were vitamins. Mr. Clements reiterated that they were sending her for drug and alcohol testing, and she indicated that she understood. She was provided with the standard forms related to testing that are used for all employees being tested, and she signed them. Respondent did not ask Mr. Clements any questions, and appeared to understand what she was told. Mr. Clements is not the medical resource officer for St. Lucie County Schools. The medical resource officer is identified on the form for drug testing, along with his telephone number. No evidence was presented to indicate that Respondent asked to speak to the medical resource officer or was prohibited from doing so. The School District typically tests for both drugs and alcohol on a reasonable suspicion test. While there may be reasonable suspicion that someone is under the influence of either drugs or alcohol, without the testing, it is difficult to know for sure the source of the influence. After meeting with Mr. Clements, Respondent was provided with a St. Lucie Public Schools Drug & Alcohol Testing notification form that identifies the time Respondent left the School District and instructs her to report to the identified testing location no later than 30 minutes from receiving the form. Respondent and Mr. Clements both signed this form at 1:10 p.m. Mr. Rodriguez drove Respondent to Absolute Testing/Consulting (Absolute Testing), where he provided the paperwork to a technician, Gina Dinello, who took her back for testing while he waited in the reception area. Absolute Testing provides alcohol testing to St. Lucie County using a breathalyzer, and provides drug testing using a urine sample. Ms. Dinello holds the appropriate certifications to conduct the breathalyzer test and to collect the urine sample for the drug test. The sample for the urine test is obtained on premises and then transported to a laboratory for processing. The breathalyzer that Absolute Testing uses is DOT- certified, and is calibrated in accordance with DOT standards. Ms. Dinello took Respondent into the back room at Absolute Testing, and explained how the procedure for the breathalyzer works. She showed Respondent the documents related to the test, and Respondent signed them. With breathalyzer tests, where there is a positive test result, it is standard procedure to wait 15 minutes and then have the person being tested blow into the breathalyzer a second time. The theory is that, by waiting the 15 minutes, any extraneous influence, such as mouthwash, that might have affected the first test would have dissipated by the second test. Respondent cooperated with the first administration of the breathalyzer test, which resulted in a reading of .186 at 1:40 p.m. Once she learned the results of the first test, however, she did not want to wait for the second administration. Ms. Dinello asked Mr. Rodriguez to help explain the process to her, and he did so, telling her that a second test was a standard part of the process. Both Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Dinello explained to Respondent that she had a right to refuse the test, but her refusal would be documented. Respondent then consented to the second administration, which resulted in a reading of .191 at 1:56 p.m. After the breathalyzer test was complete, Ms. Dinello explained that Respondent needed to provide a urine sample for the drug test. Respondent declined to do so, saying she had already blown the breathalyzer test, so there was no point to proceed with the urine test. Both Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Dinello explained again that if she chose to refuse the test, the refusal would be documented and reported to the School District. Respondent refused to submit, and Ms. Dinello submitted paperwork to that effect. Mr. Rodriguez was not informed of the results of the breathalyzer test. When the testing was finished, he took Respondent to her home, returned her belongings to her, and she walked into her home. He did not allow her to drive her car home, which remained at Village Green, because he believed that she could still be under the influence of alcohol. He testified that when he transported her to the testing facility, he could smell the heavy odor of alcohol on her, and he did not believe she was physically capable of driving home. Respondent was paid a salary for May 8, 2017, and had not requested annual or sick leave. She was on duty when she arrived at the school that morning, and she remained on duty, despite the fact that she chose to go home without signing out for the day. On May 9, 2017, Respondent received a letter by hand- delivery notifying her that she was under investigation for having a breath alcohol level of .186 and .191 while at her work location, and for refusing the drug test. She was placed on temporary duty assignment. While on temporary duty, Respondent received all of her pay and benefits. Moreover, Respondent was paid for the entire term of her contract for the 2016-2017 school year, from August 12, 2016, through June 30, 2017. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Clements provided to Respondent a Meeting Notice, scheduling a meeting regarding the charges that she refused the drug test and had unacceptable breath alcohol test results. Respondent acknowledged receiving the notice in writing and attended the meeting with her union representative. The purpose of the meeting was to provide Respondent with “due process” and give her the opportunity to provide any information she might choose regarding the allegations against her. On May 15, 2017, Respondent received written notice of a second meeting, to be held on May 22, 2017. The purpose of this meeting was to provide Respondent the results of the School District’s investigation. Respondent and her representative attended this meeting as well. On May 22, 2017, Rafaal Sanchez, Jr., Mr. Clements’ supervisor and executive director of Human Resources for the School District, recommended to Superintendent Gent that Respondent’s employment be terminated. Superintendent Gent accepted Mr. Sanchez’s recommendation and by letter dated May 22, 2017, notified Respondent of his intent to recommend to the School Board that her employment be terminated, as well as the procedure available to her to contest that recommendation. The letter also advised Respondent that if she chose to request a hearing, the superintendent would recommend that she be suspended without pay pending the outcome of the hearing. That same day, counsel for Respondent wrote to Superintendent Gent regarding the allegations against Respondent. He advised the superintendent that Respondent was relieved of duty on May 8, 2017, and was later called and told to return to Village Green, and that she voluntarily complied with this directive. He also contended that she was not presented with any drug testing policies and she had no knowledge of the consequences of failing to submit to the drug test at that time. As a result of this letter, Mr. Clements opened a second investigation to see whether anyone had told Respondent to return to school. At that time, he gathered statements from staff members, who had seen Respondent at school on the morning of May 8, 2017, and ultimately closed the investigation as unsubstantiated.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the School Board finding that Respondent’s conduct as identified in the Findings of Fact constitute just cause for terminating her position as a teacher. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2018.

Florida Laws (14) 1001.301001.331001.421012.221012.231012.271012.331012.3351012.34112.0455120.56120.569120.57440.102
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs HEATHER OLIVIA JORDAN, L.P.N., 09-001269PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 12, 2009 Number: 09-001269PL Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024
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