The Issue The issue for determination is what should be the award to Petitioner as to back pay, interest on the amount awarded, retirement system contributions, attorney's fees, and costs.
Findings Of Fact Had Petitioner retained her employment with Respondent, she would have earned $161,014.11. However, she actually earned $125,865.87. As a result of Petitioner's being terminated by Respondent, she lost income in the amount of $35,148.24. As a result of Petitioner's being terminated by Respondent, she lost pension contributions in the amount of $7,110.16. Consequently, Petitioner incurred a total monetary loss in the amount of $42,258.41. As to whether Petitioner incurred a break in service, no one from the Division of Retirement was called to testify. Consequently, no evidence was presented as to that issue. Petitioner suggests that she should receive credit for retirement from October 8, 1993, the date of her termination when she was a career service employee, to January 1995, the date that she again became a career service employee. Petitioner's suggestion is a reasonable resolution to the issue of break in service and should be implemented if there exists a break in service. No argument was presented to contradict that the statutory interest rate is ten percent per annum. Petitioner's counsel testified that she expended 437.80 hours on this matter and Petitioner's expert opined that such hours are reasonable. Respondent's expert opined that 241.30 hours are reasonable. Petitioner's expert did not review the index of the official file of this matter, which was maintained by the Division of Administrative Hearings. Respondent's expert reviewed the index online. Further, Respondent's counsel reviewed the Verified Motion, but did not review the file of Petitioner's counsel. Respondent's expert questioned whether Petitioner's counsel personally performed the tasks in certain entries in the Verified Motion or whether a secretary performed the tasks, not whether the tasks were performed. However, Respondent's expert did not question, and did not indicate that he was required to question, Petitioner's counsel on such entries prior to hearing. Regarding such entries, Petitioner's counsel testified that she, not her secretary, performed the tasks in the entries. The testimony of Petitioner's counsel is found credible. Respondent's expert also questioned whether some entries contained adequate detail and specificity to support them, not whether the tasks were performed. The expert's testimony is found to be credible. The detail and specificity are inadequate in the entries identified by Respondent's expert. The lack of detail and specificity dictate a reduction in the number of hours requested by 98.30 hours. Consequently, the number of hours reasonably expended by Petitioner's counsel in this matter is 339.50. Petitioner and her counsel entered into a mixed agreement (Agreement) for representation at $250.00 per hour and for contingent fees. The Agreement provided in pertinent part as follows: agree to pay my attorneys from the proceeds of the gross recovery including costs and fees awarded attorney's fees, if applicable the following fee: * * * b. 40% of any recovery up to $1 million after the filing of an answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator through the trial of the case; 40% becomes immediately applicable as soon as the matter is set for trial; * * * My attorneys shall be entitled to choose the fee at the hourly rate [$250.00 per hour] if I am entitled to an award of attorneys fees from the client or the contingency, whichever is greater. In the event there is a court-awarded fee which is more than the contingency fee, the attorneys shall keep the court-awarded fee in lieu of the contingency fee provided it is greater than the contingency fee and provided the court-awarded fee is actually collected. The hourly rate of $250.00 by Petitioner's counsel is within the range of rates for this matter. The hourly rate of $250.00 is reasonable. Therefore, the amount of reasonable attorney's fees in this matter is $84,875. Petitioner requests an enhancement of attorney's fees by one-third because of the uniqueness or unusualness of this matter. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that this matter is a unique or unusual case involving employment discrimination. Petitioner's counsel requests costs in the amount of $3,094.49. The Verified Motion contains taxable and non-taxable costs.2 Costs identified as fax or facsimile, postage, cab fare, and transportation to and from the courthouse should be excluded as inappropriate. As a result, the reasonable amount of costs is $2,844.48. Petitioner's Verified Supplemental Motion indicates additional attorney's fees associated with this hearing in the amount of $11,200.00, representing 44.80 hours (out of a total of 65.30 hours indicated) at a rate of $250.00 an hour; and additional costs associated with this hearing in the amount of $12,100.91. Regarding the supplemental attorney's fees, no explanation was submitted as to why the entries from June 6, 2003 to August 20, 2003 were not available at hearing. Notwithstanding, the supplemental documentation is sufficiently detailed and specific. As a result, the number of supplemental hours reasonably expended by Petitioner's counsel is 44.80, and the reasonable amount of supplemental attorney's fees is $11,200.00. Regarding the supplemental costs, the cost for the services rendered by Petitioner's experts are included in the $12,100.91. Petitioner obtained the services of an expert on attorney's fees and an expert on lost wages and benefits. For the services rendered by the expert on attorney's fees, the cost was in the amount of $1,775.00. For the services rendered by the expert on lost wages and benefits, the cost was in the amount of $9,006.25. The total cost for the services rendered by the experts is in the amount of $10,781.25. Again, costs identified as fax or facsimile, postage, cab fare, and transportation to and from the courthouse should be excluded as inappropriate. Additionally, regarding costs, Petitioner represents that the parties agreed to equally share in the expense of the court reporter for the hearing, which is shown on the Verified Supplemental Motion as $663.00. Respondent did not refute the representation. Consequently, the reasonable amount of supplemental costs is $12,054.91.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order as to back pay, interest on the amount awarded, retirement system contributions, attorney's fees, and costs: Ordering the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services n/k/a Department of Children and Family Services (Department) to pay Gloria Garcia (Garcia) back pay in the amount of $35,148.24. Ordering the Department to make contributions to the Florida Retirement System on behalf of Garcia in the amount of $7,110.16. Ordering the re-evaluation of Garcia's break in service by the Division of Retirement. Further, ordering that, if it is in compliance with and satisfies applicable statutes and rules of the Division of Retirement, Garcia receive credit in time for retirement from October 8, 1993, the date of her termination, to January 1995, the date that she again became a career service employee. Ordering the Department to pay to Garcia's counsel attorney's fees in the amount of $96,075.00 and costs in the amount of $14,899.39, totaling $110,974.39. Ordering the statutory interest rate of ten percent per annum be applied to the amounts awarded. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2003.
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Kenneth Davis, made sexually harassing statements and made body contact with a female counselor so as to constitute sexual harassment and a hostile work environment, in violation of Pinellas County Sheriff Office Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: Respondent, Sheriff Everett S. Rice (Sheriff), is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida, responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within the geographic boundaries of Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, Detention Deputy Kenneth Davis (Deputy Davis), is a 23-year employee with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, having spent his entire career as a detention officer. As a result of years of training and experience, Deputy Davis is intimately familiar with the Sheriff's policy regarding sexual harassment, detention policies, operations, procedures, and the priority of security applicable to detention deputies. The evidence demonstrates that in the collective opinions of those detention deputies who worked longest with Deputy Davis, all agreed that his personality was that of one who "[was] loud and obnoxious--to pretty much everybody," "play[ed] around a lot," "never insulted anybody," and "[didn't] mean any harm." At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis held the rank of detention corporal until the Sheriff reduced his rank to Deputy and removed him from his position of detention corporal on March 10, 2003. Deputy Davis' chain-of-command consisted of Major Kirk Brunner, Detention and Correction Bureau commander; Captain Nesbitt; Lieutenant Keith George; and Sergeant Buckingham. Deputy Davis did not have authority over Lori Atwater (Ms. Atwater), the complainant in this cause. He was not in her chain-of-command nor was he one of her bosses in the sense that he could assign her tasks. At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis worked in detention barrack C, North Division. Barrack C is a two-storied structure divided into B block and C block, with each cellblock divided into an upper level and lower level. Deputy Davis had four deputies under his supervision in cellblock C. At all times pertinent to this cause, Control Deputy Salazar worked the control center at barrack C. The control deputy is stationed in a glassed enclosure with clear view of individuals desiring entrance into the waiting room of barrack C and with clear view of inmates desiring to leave the cellblock and enter the waiting room. On or about March 4, 2002, Ms. Atwater, an African- American and a long-time resident of St. Petersburg, Florida, commenced employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as an inmate-counselor. Ms. Atwater has an Associate of Science degree in Computer Technology Engineering and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems. Her inmate- counselor duties consisted of identifying inmates who had family, legal, and personal issues requiring her intervention. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employed Ms. Atwater for ten years before she began employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. While employed with DCFS, she worked in food stamps, Medicaid, protective services, adoptions, and several community recruitment programs. DCFS also has a policy against sexual harassment. The Sheriff has adopted Pinellas County Sheriff's Office General Order 3-4, which defines and prohibits sexual harassment. Pursuant to General Order 3-4, sexual harassment is defined as: All unwelcome or unwanted advances; including sexual advances or unwanted sexual attention, whether between person(s) of the opposite or same sex. This includes, but is not limited to, leering, touching, patting, brushing against, hugging, kissing, fondling, any other similar physical contact, or quid pro quo arrangements (i.e., a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in unwelcomed sexual conduct in order to protect or advance his/her job.) Unwelcome requests or demands for favors, including sexual favors. This consists of subtle or blatant expectations, pressures, or request for any type of favor, including sexual favor, including unwelcome requests for dates, whether or not the request is accompanied by an implied or stated promise of preferential treatment or negative consequences. Inappropriate third party comments or one time comments made which do not constitute a hostile work environment, language not directed at the offended member, jokes (spoken, printed or drawn) that are not directed at the offended member or joint banter of a sexual or offensive nature in which the offended member may or may not be a party. All employees of the Sheriff, including Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater, received instructions regarding the Sheriff's Sexual Harassment Policy. The evidence demonstrates that beginning in March of 2002 and continuing through the months of April and May 2002, Ms. Atwater noticed, without telling him to stop and without reporting her resulting complaint to her supervisor, that Lieutenant George would call her "Ms. Ashwood." At some unspecified time prior to March of 2002, Ms. Atwater concluded that the name "Ms. Ashwood" was offensive. Ms. Atwater based her conclusion on her interpretation and knowledge of the general reputation of a Ms. Ashwood (no first name given) within the African-American community of St. Petersburg. According to Ms. Atwater, Ms. Ashwood was known throughout the African- American community for engaging in sexual encounters with multiple partners. As a direct result of her superior, Lieutenant George, continuously calling her Ms. Ashwood, a name she considered to be sexually offensive, Ms. Atwater chose not to report her sexual harassment complaint against Lieutenant George through the proper protocol. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Atwater asked Lieutenant George what was his intended meaning by calling her Ms. Ashwood. The evidence demonstrates that Lieutenant George, having been involved in both the hiring of Ms. Atwater as well as involved in her performance evaluation, knew her name to be Ms. Atwater. Alleged statements made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria during a lunch period. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis initially enjoyed a rather cordial relationship at work during the period of March through May 2002, at least by outward appearances. Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater both attended read- off sessions; on occasions, they walked together from the read- off sessions back to barrack A; and on two separate occasions, they were seated at the same table in the compound's buffet- styled cafeteria. They did not have contact with each other beyond what was necessary in the performance of their respective duties. They did not have contact with each other outside the workplace. On some unspecified date during lunch in the compound cafeteria, Ms. Atwater chose to ask Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George kept calling her Ms. Ashwood. According to Ms. Atwater, Deputy Davis came over to the table where she sat and she allegedly initiated the following conversation: Atwater: I really don't appreciate that, him [Lieutenant George] calling me Ms. Ashwood. Davis: He's probably P-U-S-S-Y whipped and you probably remind him of her. Atwater: He just alluded to--and used the term inside whore. Atwater: What's an inside whore? Davis: That's when you sleep with someone that makes Decisions for your career. Atwater: If I ever get promoted around here it will not be because I've slept with anybody, but based on my own merits. At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied the allegations regarding the above statements attributed to him by Ms. Atwater. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis made those statements attributed to him with the intent of sexually harassing Ms. Atwater, and if the statements were, in fact, made, whether his answers were truthful responses to her question. The compound cafeteria has several long tables seating six to eight persons and several shorter tables seating four to six persons. It is significant that not a single witness, from among others who were seated at the same table with Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis in the cafeteria on that unspecified day, was called to corroborate the statements allegedly made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater. With knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy coupled with her prior knowledge of DCFS's similar sexual harassment policy, and having been highly offended by Deputy Davis' conversation, it is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job included accurate record keeping, made no attempt to record this first incident with Deputy Davis resulting from repeated incidents with Lieutenant George. Additionally, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and report to her immediate supervisor her complaint of sexual harassment by a relatively new co-worker. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity, thus proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Deputy Davis made unwelcome or unwanted sexual comments or advances and/or unwelcome unwanted sexual demands, nor created a hostile work environment as Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what was said or not said by Ms. Atwater or by Deputy Davis during the alleged conversation that took place on some unspecified date in the compound cafeteria. Alleged intentional body contact by Deputy Davis with Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria buffet serving line. Ms. Atwater further testified that on another unspecified day while she was in the cafeteria buffet serving line fixing her salad, she felt "a brazen--it felt maybe like his [Deputy Davis] radio or something-it was hard--and then he went in my ear 'boo.' It made me jumpy and I made a squealing noise-because I didn't expect anything to braze in the back on my----." Continuing, Ms. Atwater testified that Lieutenant George came in the cafeteria at that time, and she asked him "why don't you tell your friend to just cut it out?" The Sheriff did not call Lieutenant George to testify. No other witness testified to corroborate Ms. Atwater's statements. Deputy Davis denied this second allegation of intentionally making body contact with Ms. Atwater and speaking in her ear. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity and that Deputy Davis engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur on that unspecified date between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater in the buffet serving line in the compound cafeteria. It is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job required accurate and detailed daily record keeping, made no record of Deputy Davis' second alleged sexual harassment of her person. With firsthand knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy plus her ten-year experience with a similar sexual harassment policy during her employment with DCFS, Ms. Atwater chose again not to follow proper protocol. She chose not to properly report this second incident to her immediate supervisor. Her second decided refusal to report what she considered sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if Deputy Davis was guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve him from liability. Having chosen for the second consecutive occasion not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis does present a significant impediment regarding Ms. Atwater's memory, recall, and credibility. Alleged repeated harassing comments by Deputy Davis resulting from Ms. Atwater's frightened squealing. Concluding, Ms. Atwater testified that "for months" after the undated cafeteria serving line incident, "every time" she would see Deputy Davis (minimum twice a week in barrack C) he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." According to her, these statements allegedly resulted from the cafeteria serving line incident and from a subsequent work related discussion and disagreement between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater regarding the form "62" (a form used by inmates requesting to see the counselor). Ms. Atwater, when confronted with what she considered a third but continuing sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, again chose not to follow protocol and report this third incident to her supervisor. It is significant that according to Ms. Atwater, she was initially and had been continuously sexually offended by Lieutenant George calling her Ms. Ashwood. When she inquired of Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her Ms. Ashwood, she was again sexually offended by his alleged answer to her question. She turns then to Lieutenant George, who was continually sexual harassing her and (did not ask him to stop calling her Ms. Ashwood) asks his assistance (not to file a proper complaint) but to have Deputy Davis (whose answer to her question about Lieutenant George she considered sexual harassment) to "just knock it off." Regarding her third alleged sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis (Ms. Atwater with knowledge that Lieutenant George and Deputy Davis were friends and she admittedly intended to take advantage of their friendship), she went to Lieutenant George, who (1) had continuously called her Ms. Ashwood; (2) was in her chain-of-command; and (3) was also in Deputy Davis' chain-of-command (but not file a complaint against Deputy Davis) and asked if he would "talk to his friend [Deputy Davis]--I don't want to make waves over this-I don't want to make a big to do-if you could talk to him--just have him knock it off." At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied her third allegation that he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." It is significant that after months and three separate allegations of sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and make a sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis to Lieutenant George, who would have been obligated to initiate a formal investigation. She chose instead to ask a favor from one who had continuously called her the sexually harassing name of Ms. Ashwood. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis continually made the alleged sexual and harassing comments to Ms. Atwater during an unspecified number of months. The Sheriff presented no witness to corroborate Ms. Atwater's allegations on this issue. Lieutenant George was not called to testify, leaving Ms. Atwater's hearsay testimony regarding this particular issue without corroboration. For the third time, Ms. Atwater chose to not follow protocol and report her third sexual harassment incident. The fact finder acknowledges that her third decided refusal to report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a third time not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis to her immediate supervisor does present a significant obstacle in the evaluation of Ms. Atwater's credibility. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity that Deputy Davis for months engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur during unspecified months when Deputy Davis may have been in the presence of Ms. Atwater. Allegations that Deputy Davis intentionally delayed or caused delay of inmates desiring conference with Ms. Atwater. Regarding her final allegation of sexual harassment by retaliation against Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater recalled that on one occasion, Deputy Davis intentionally caused a "two-hour" delay in getting inmates on her list from their cells to the conference area where she awaited them. The purported intent of this alleged two-hour delay was to threaten or to produce a negative consequence regarding Ms. Atwater's performance of her duties. I find that Ms. Atwater's August 9, 2002, memo to her supervisor, Deputy Armsheimer, purporting to be a chronology of events that occurred on August 8, 2002, conclusively demonstrates that Deputy Davis was not the cause, directly or indirectly, for Ms. Atwater's two-hour delay in getting the two inmates she had requested. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Atwater gave her form "62" list (inmates to be pulled who had requested a conference with her) to the control deputy, Deputy Salazar, in barrack C and waited 40 minutes. Returning to the holding area and inquiring as to the whereabouts of her inmates, Deputy Davis and not Deputy Salazar informed Ms. Atwater that the top three inmates on her list were not there. Ms. Atwater asked Deputy Davis of the inmates' whereabouts, but he gave her no further explanation. Ms. Atwater thereafter called Deputy Hartfield, who is in her chain-of-command, to ask if he would look into the matter and Deputy Hartfield promised to get back to her. Ms. Atwater waited for Deputy Hartfield's return call. After waiting an unspecified period of time and not receiving Deputy Hartfield's returned message, she called Deputy Hartfield a second time and was told that he had relayed his message to control (Deputy Salazar) about one and one-half hours ago. In that message, Deputy Hartfield explained that her first requested inmate (no name given) had been moved to maximum security and her second inmate (Brandon) was written up earlier that morning by him. In her August 9, 2002, memo to Deputy Armsheimer, Ms. Atwater wrote, "the conversation concluded with me stating [to Deputy Hartfield] if I had known 1 1/2 hours ago, I would have just left out of here and could have eaten lunch." It is significant that Ms. Atwater authored her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Deputy Armsheimer, for the singular purpose of explaining the exact cause (and persons involved) of her two-hour plus wait for inmates who were not pulled for her. At the final hearing in May 2003, she contradicts her August 9, 2002, written statements by testifying that Deputy Davis caused her a "two-hour" delay in pulling her inmates. This obvious contradiction is a severe detriment upon her credibility. Ms. Atwater's memorandum to Sergeant Groff, dated October 30, 2002, was written to give a recount of her experiences with Deputy Davis during all times pertinent to this case. She began her memorandum with the statement: "[S]o for the whole story to be clear, I must tell you how we ended up here and start from the beginning." In her first sentence of the second paragraph appears the first conflict in the evidence of record. In that sentence, Ms. Atwater writes, "Shortly after starting to work here, I began to experience unpleasantness from Cpl. Kenneth Davis. His obnoxious gestures, comments and disposition could not be tolerated any longer." (This conclusion consisted of the three separate allegations against Deputy Davis made herein above.) With this opportunity to formally complain of sexual harassment in the work place, Ms. Atwater failed to include the fact that it was she who initially asked Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her the sexually offensive name of "Ms. Ashwood." Intentionally choosing to allege that Deputy Davis' answer to her question why Lieutenant George kept calling her "Ms. Ashwood" was the initial sexual harassment that created a hostile work place is contradictory to her testimony. Continuing, Ms. Atwater wrote--"I did tell him that I felt he 'played too much,' and need[ed] to stop moaning and groaning behind me." Even though she recounted moaning and groaning, she specifically omitted her alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis (Finding of Fact 12 hereinabove) when he answered her question "why Lieutenant George calls me Ms. Ashwood." This is significant in that Ms. Atwater's testimony was that Deputy Davis' alleged verbatim statements when he answered her question were so "sexually harassing" that she was "immediately" offended the moment she heard them. Yet, she omits any mention that it was Lieutenant George continuously calling her "Ms. Ashwood" that initially and repeatedly offended her. The name Ashwood she considered had such a negative sexual reputation in the community that she was immediately offended and sexually harassed when Lieutenant George first called her Ms. Ashwood and each time thereafter. She omits any mention that it was her inquiry of Deputy Davis, "why Lieutenant George [sexually harassing her] was calling her the offensive name of Ms. Ashwood" that produced the alleged response. Based upon Ms. Atwater's acknowledgement contained in her October 30, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Groff, I find that her allegations that Deputy Davis caused a delayed wait of two hours to get inmates pulled and, thus, "creat[ed] a hostile work environment" to be contrary to her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Armsheimer, admitting that had she known her inmates were not in barrack C, she would have left and had lunch "one and one-half" hours prior. Ms. Atwater further admits in writing that from May of 2002 forward, she and Deputy Davis "barely" spoke to one another. If Ms. Atwater's memory is presumed to be accurate and she and Deputy Davis discontinued speaking to one another during the March through May 2002 period, it was not logical to conclude that Deputy Davis repeatedly and continually moaned and groaned in her ear for "months" thereafter (i.e. June, July, August, and October). For the fourth time, Ms. Atwater chose not to and did not report this fourth incident to her immediate supervisor at or near the time it occurred. Her sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis was filed after her October 2002 complaint was filed against Lieutenant George. Her fourth decided refusal to immediately report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a fourth time not to report the initial alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis during the March through May period, when coupled with the contradiction between her testimony that Deputy Davis was the cause of a two-hour delay in pulling her inmates, and her memorandum wherein she acknowledges that her inmates had been written up by Sergeant Hartfield, presents a credibility obstacle. Ms. Atwater makes no further mention of Deputy Davis in her October 30, 2002, memoranda, devoting the remainder to Lieutenant George. She recounts in detail their initial friendly relationship, turning to a cold and unfriendly relationship, the keeping-your-distance treatment, their many phone conversations at work, their lunch dates away from the work place, and their private phone calls when at home, ending on October 24, 2002, with an incident of kissing and Lieutenant George rubbing his groin against her buttocks and her resisting his advances. (See Joint Exhibit J-1.) In her final paragraph, Ms. Atwater relates how, unbeknownst to Lieutenant George, she arranged for a three-way call between herself, Lieutenant George, and her uncle, a City of St. Petersburg employee. She arranged the three-way call for the purpose of securing a witness to corroborate her statements regarding the Lieutenant George sexual harassment encounter. Though her alleged initial sexual harassment was initiated by Deputy Davis and continued for months, Ms. Atwater made no similar attempt to corroborate her claims of sexual harassment against Deputy Davis. Knowing that Deputy Davis was not within her chain-of-command and not in a supervisory position over her, there was no logical reason for Ms. Atwater to fear promotions and job security. Ms. Atwater knew that filing a complaint against a lieutenant within her chain-of- command presented a greater risk than filing a complaint against Deputy Davis who was not in her chain-of-command. Her choosing not to record (or procure corroboration) the Deputy Davis incidents, when coupled with her delay of many months in reporting her compliant through proper channels because of fear of reprisal, rings hollow. It was after the Administrative Review Board had begun an investigation of Ms. Atwater's October 2002 complaint of sexual harassment against Lieutenant George that the Sheriff initiated an investigation of Deputy Davis. Only after her egregious October 24, 2002, incident involving Lieutenant George did she file a subsequent and separate sexual harassment compliant against Deputy Davis. In the absence of corroboration, Ms. Atwater's testimony of a single incident of intentional touching and her testimony of alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis and his unequivocal denial presents a "she said-he said" dilemma. Neither party's testimony is inherently more credible than the other party's testimony. Contrary to the opinion of Major Brunner, who sat on the Administrative Review Board, that when the Administrative Review Board questioned Deputy Davis regarding those allegations, Deputy Davis was "in denial." This assumption and by implication presumed guilt, thereby lending credibility to Ms. Atwater's allegations, is a conclusion not based on fact and is contrary to the evidence adduced during the de novo proceeding. Ms. Atwater's testimony of incidents having occurred over a four-month or more period and the lack of time or specific dates coupled with the contradictions between her testimony during the final hearing and her August 9, 2002, memorandum to her supervisor, creates an unfathomable chasm in the evaluation of her credibility. The Inspection Bureau of the Administrative Inspection Division investigated Ms. Atwater's complaint and submitted their investigative results to the Administrative Review Board, made up of various employees with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Petitioner, Deputy Davis, had violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4: violation of provisions of the law or rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' conduct was a violation of the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Rules 3-1.1 (level five violation) and 5.16, relating to sexual harassment and discrimination as defined in the Sheriff's General Order 3-4. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' available range of discipline was calculated in conformance with the matrix contained within General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office that allocates a point scale to various violations. The matrix provides that a level five offense, which includes sexual harassment, results in a 50- point assessment. Deputy Davis scored a total of 50 cumulative points with a discipline range of five-day suspension up to and including termination. Demotion is also authorized under the applicable General Order. After considering the evidence and available sanctions, the Sheriff notified Deputy Davis on March 10, 2003, that he was imposing a ten-day suspension without pay and demoting him from the rank of corporal to the rank of detention deputy. After weighing all the evidence, including the Sheriff's evidentiary presentation of Ms. Atwater's testimony of verbal comments made and intentional body conduct allegedly engaged in by Deputy Davis, this fact finder finds the uncorroborated hearsay evidence insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations that Deputy Davis made sexually harassing verbal comments to Ms. Atwater, and that he made intentional sexually harassing body contact with her, so as to create a hostile work environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a final order finding that: Petitioner did not commit the verbal and physical conduct alleged in the charging document and that there was no violation of the rules, regulations, and policies of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as alleged. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's demotion from his previous rank of detention corporal to the rank of detention deputy was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office be restored with full detention corporal's pay and benefits. Petitioner be restored to the rank of detention corporal2 and given full duties and responsibilities as previously held. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Cynthia Y. Pall is employed by the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office (HCSO) as a sergeant. Ms. Pall has been employed by the HCSO since May of 1977. She is a black female. In October, 1991, Ms. Pall applied for a promotion to detention lieutenant. She did not receive the promotion. The position went to Michael Sawyer, a white male. Applicants for promotion to detention lieutenant were reviewed by Colonel David Parrish, the HCSO Detention Department Commander. Mr. Parrish has a Master's degree in criminology and has worked for the HCSO since May, 1974. Since 1981, Mr. Parrish has been responsible for operation of the HCSO jail system. He was promoted to his current position in 1985 and is the highest ranking officer in the Detention Department. Mr. Parrish has historically sought recommendations for internal promotion from the supervisors in the Detention Department. Each supervisor is encouraged to nominate one employee from within the supervisor's squad and one employee from outside the supervisor's squad. Promotional candidates are required to have completed a sufficient period of time in their current positions and to have successfully passed an examination to be eligible for promotion. A list of "eligibles" is prepared identifying those employees eligible for the promotion. From those eligible, Mr. Parrish reviews the materials and prepares an information package about each candidate for the promotion. Each information package includes the resume submitted by each candidate. Twelve persons sought the position at issue in this proceeding. Seven of the twelve, including five white males, had been passed over for promotion to lieutenant previously. In reviewing candidates for promotion, Mr. Parrish considers the experience, test scores, annual performance evaluations, education and recommendations of the applicants. No one factor is determinative; the overall quality of the candidates is paramount in the decision making process. Some employees who lacked substantial college education have been promoted. Many individuals, male and female, black and white, have applied and been passed over for promotion. Mr. Parrish reviews the eligibles with two Detention Department majors. After review, Mr. Parrish makes a recommendation to the Sheriff as to which person should be promoted. The review and recommendation process has been utilized since 1981 and continues unchanged to the present. With rare exception, Mr. Parrish's recommendations have been followed by the Sheriff. Ms. Pall has been employed by the HCSO since May of 1977. She became a sergeant in 1982, served as an administrative sergeant until approximately 1984, and then became a detention sergeant, the position she presently holds. Most of Ms. Pall's experience has been in the care, custody and control of inmates. She has trained and supervised subordinate employees, and planned and coordinated their work assignments. She created the HCSO victim notification program. She developed a cash accounting system which resulted in increased accountability in the handling of cash within the Detention Department. During her employment as an administrative sergeant, she handled correspondence for Mr. Parrish. She was responsible for facility maintenance, bookkeeping, inspections and inactive records. Michael Sawyer has been employed by the HCSO since the end of 1980 or beginning of 1981. He was initially employed as a correctional officer, serving for about five years as a deputy and then as corporal for three more years. Thereafter, he was promoted to sergeant. During his HCSO employment, Mr. Sawyer worked in the records section for approximately one and a half years, during which time he trained civilians to assume the responsibilities of the position. He worked in the booking section for approximately two years. He thereafter worked on the detention floor for approximately four and a half years and was responsible for care, custody and control of inmates. As a sergeant, Mr. Sawyer was assigned to a special projects unit. During this period, he worked as an accreditation coordinator for two HCSO jail facilities and was responsible for assuring that the facilities would meet standards for accreditation. He also served as the HCSO fire safety officer for approximately two and a half years and was responsible for compliance with fire safety, health department, and worker's compensation regulations and OSHA requirements. At various times during his HCSO employment, Mr. Sawyer has been in a supervisory position, responsible for between five and 20 individuals. Five promotional candidates, including four white males, had worked for the HCSO longer than had the successful applicant, Mr. Sawyer. One white male applicant had worked for the HCSO longer than had Ms. Pall. As to the responsibilities Mr. Sawyer has successfully performed related to special projects and facility accreditation coordination, Ms. Pall has not been provided with similar opportunities. There is no evidence that, as to experience, Ms. Pall is more or less qualified than Mr. Sawyer for the position at issue in this proceeding. The HCSO administers a test of skills required in the lieutenant position to applicants. Of the 100 points available on the test, Ms. Pall scored a 78. Mr. Sawyer scored an 85. At the review immediately prior to the promotional decision at issue in this proceeding, Ms. Pall received a performance evaluation of 89 points. Her evaluator, a black male, wrote that Sgt. Pall needed to visit all areas of the pod more frequently and that she permitted some deputies to become to "familiar" with her. Although good, the performance evaluation score was lower than she had received in the preceding three year period when her scores were 92, 92.75, and 93. At the review immediately prior to the promotional decision at issue in this proceeding, Mr. Sawyer received a performance evaluation of 96.5 points. His evaluator, a white male, wrote that Sawyer was extremely qualified and should receive highest consideration for promotion at the earliest opportunity. At the time of application, Ms. Pall had a high school diploma and had completed one year of studies at Hillsborough Community College. She had completed eight advanced law enforcement training courses. According to Mr. Sawyer's application, he was two credits shy of receiving an Associate in Arts degree from Hillsborough Community College. This information was not correct. Mr. Sawyer needs more than two hours of additional credit to receive the degree. He had completed five advanced law enforcement training courses. Review of educational information was based solely on the information submitted by the applicants. There was no attempt made by the HCSO to verify the education information submitted. Applicants were not required to submit educational transcripts. Although Mr. Sawyer's educational information was apparently overstated on his application, there is no evidence that HCSO officials were aware of the misleading information. There is no evidence that Mr. Sawyer was encouraged by HCSO officials to misstate his educational credentials in order to receive the promotion. There is no evidence that the review of educational credentials was related to the race or gender of the applicants or that, as to the review of said credentials, Ms. Pall was discriminated against on the basis of race or gender. Mr. Sawyer received recommendations for promotion from six persons with whom he had worked. Ms. Pall received two similar recommendations. Based on his review of the foregoing factors and the information available, Mr. Parrish determined that Michael Sawyer was the best qualified candidate for promotion to detention lieutenant. The information was presented to the Sheriff. Michael Sawyer received the promotion. Although the evidence does not establish whether or not Mr. Parrish determined a "ranking" order for the promotional candidates, had Mr. Parrish established a ranking of the candidates, Ms. Pall would have ranked well. There is no evidence of any discord between Mr. Parrish and Ms. Pall. There is no evidence that any HCSO official has stated or implied that Ms. Pall was not qualified for promotion, but rather the evidence establishes that Ms. Pall is clearly qualified for promotion. The HCSO has implemented an affirmative action plan which provides for employment and promotion of female and African-American personnel. The HCSO does not utilize a quota system, but considers minority group status in making employment decisions. Mr. Parrish has previously recommended black females for employment and promotion, including two black women who were promoted to currently held lieutenant positions, Ms. Pall's promotion to sergeant, and a black woman promoted immediately prior to the time the hearing was conducted. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Ms. Pall's race or gender were considered in the determination of the best qualified candidate for promotion to detention lieutenant. The evidence establishes that in this case, both Michael Sawyer and Cynthia Y. Pall were qualified for promotion to the rank of detention lieutenant. Based on the information available to the Mr. Parrish and to the Sheriff at the time of the promotion, Michael Sawyer was determined to be the best qualified candidate for promotion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint filed by Cynthia Y. Pall. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6219 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, which are not supported by citations to the record as is required by Rule 60Q-2.031(3), Florida Administrative Code, are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected, twelve names were on the list of eligibles. Rejected as to supervision of Sawyer by Pall, irrelevant. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the credible and persuasive evidence. 8. Rejected, number of supervised employees is irrelevant. 11. Rejected, irrelevant. Although Mr. Sawyer's educational information was apparently overstated on his application, there is no evidence that HCSO officials were aware of the misleading information or that HCSO officials encouraged Sawyer to misstate his educational credentials in order to receive the promotion or to discriminate against other applicants on the basis of race or gender. 12-13. Rejected, irrelevant. 14. Rejected, subordinate. 15-16. Rejected, as to determination that Sawyer was "not qualified," not supported by the greater weight of the credible and persuasive evidence. 17. Rejected, subordinate. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Joe Episcopo, Esquire 1060 West Busch Boulevard Suite 103 Tampa, Florida 33612 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire THOMPSON, SIZEMORE & GONZALEZ Suite 200 109 North Brush Street Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Melvin Robinson, through sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 801.111, Florida Statutes (1975).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 4, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department had requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The final hearing in this cause was conducted on January 5 1982, following a continuance of the previously scheduled hearing of December 16, 1981, which was designed to allow the Petitioner to gain the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner was unable to make those arrangements and the hearing was held with the Petitioner appearing pro se. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner testified and offered as witnesses, Alice Butler, Section Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program, Florida State Hospital; Sterling George, Psychiatric Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; and Alfred Gerardo, a participant in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent offered as witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; Charles Shaffer, Clinical psychologist in the aforementioned program; Allison Dowling, Clinical social Worker in that program; and Lois Stevens, Clinal social Worker at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent presented two exhibits which were admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Petitioner has been in the custody of Respondent, in keeping with orders of court. During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in the program for the benefit of sex offenders, to include those persons committed under Chapter 801, Florida Statutes (1975), entitled "Child Molester Act." Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities his progress in the recognition of and the ability to deal with the underlying conditions which caused his placement in the program are at end. In the face of these circumstances, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. These opinions were made known to the Petitioner and when confronted with this information, the Petitioner requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. Robinson was admitted to the forensic service at Florida State Hospital on October 9, 1990, to begin his participation in the mentally disordered sex offender program. He had previously been enrolled in the program from March, 1979, through February, 1979, a commitment under the terms of Chapter 801, Florida Statutes. Following his initial release from the program, Robinson was accused of violating the terms and conditions of probation and was adjudicated guilty of the offense for which probation was granted. Imposition of a sentence in that case was withheld and the Petitioner was returned to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in keeping with the rationale expressed in his original commitment to the program at Chattahoochee, which original commitment had occurred by Order of Court on February 20, 1976. In the matter of the most recent offense which had caused the revocation of Robinson's probation, Robinson received a sentence of ten years in the Florida State Prison; however, service of that sentence was stayed pending release and discharge from the custody of the Respondent on this most immediate commitment for care and treatment in the mentally disordered sex offender program. Beginning with the October 9, 1980, hospital stay, the goals of the program have been to deal with the patient's problems concerning sexual deviation, pedophilia; alcoholism; inadequate and passive aggressive personality styles and cultural deprivation. Notwithstanding the efforts of the patient and those of the staff to deal with the underlying disorders, this success has not been complete. The treatment has been exhausted in this program and other similar programs in the system in the State of Florida, and the Petitioner still presents a danger based upon his sexual deviation and propensity to commit sexual acts involving children, in particular minor females. These determinations are reached in the face of the facts that follow. The program at Florida State Hospital has as its main focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs in recreational and occupational therapy, and this treatment regime relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. The Respondent's Exhibit 2 is a series of clinical summaries related to the patient's performance during the course of his treatment. The most recent evaluation points out, in general terms, the Petitioner's pattern of acting-out behavior and disregard for ward policy and, more importantly his lack of motivation and progress in the therapies which are essential to success in the program. In addition, testimony was given in the course of the hearing on the part of the Petitioner's therapist and other persons affiliated with the treatment team. Lois Stevens had been the Petitioner's primary therapist from October, 1980, to January, 1981. She observed in the Petitioner indications of low self- esteem; the fact that the Petitioner was easily disappointed; that he was easily influenced by others; that he had an inability to deal with abstract feedback and a problem of allowing himself to be abused. These were matters of concern which needed to be addressed as a prerequisite to dealing with the Petitioner's sexual deviation. In effect, this was a process of identifying the problems which underlie his sexual deviation. In this connection, Stevens found that the Petitioner had the desire to do better but evidenced poor judgment and impulse control. These circumstances were aggravated by the fact that the Petitioner had and has limited intellectual ability. During this phase no intense effort was made to discuss the sex offense, molestation of a young girl. While in this treatment situation, Robinson accepted staff criticism in an appropriate way and he did improve in personal hygiene, which had been a problem initially. After a period of time it was determined that the Petitioner should be placed with a separate therapist to go forward with his treatment. From January, 1981, to July, 1981, the Petitioner had Allison Dowling as his primary therapist. In the beginning Robinson performed reasonably well and had been given some freedom of movement within the facility and was granted a position as a patient volunteer on the ward. He was beginning to cope better in the institutional environment; however, he remained reluctant to examine, in therapy sessions, the problem of his sexual deviation. Specifically, that difficulty related to his ability to deal with insight oriented therapy. He would enter into a discussion of the offense in the therapy sessions, but tended to minimize the seriousness of his offense, demonstrating marginal understanding of the etiology and maintaining factors in his deviant sexual behavior. Moreover, between sessions with the group he tended to forget what had been dealt with on the prior occasion. He had to be prompted to participate, with one exception. As established by Dowling in this sequence of the treatment, the Petitioner began to act in an inappropriate way while on the ward and was tardy for group therapy sessions. In the connection with his misbehavior on the ward, it was necessary to force the Petitioner to engage in a discussion of those matters and the act of taking away his privileges of freedom of movement and position did not promote a change in the Petitioner. He attempted to manipulate staff members about the misbehavior and to have group members in the therapy sessions accept his side of the dispute as opposed to directly addressing problems. The items of misbehavior included homosexual activity with another participant of the program and sleeping in the nude, which were contrary to hospital policy. On another occasion the Petitioner attempted to get a staff aide to take him to an unauthorized activity, in violation of ward policy. Dowling has observed little progress in the Petitioner's attempts to control his sexual misbehavior and she correctly indicates that his sexual deviance still exists and no further progress can be made in dealing with this condition. Charles Shaffer, a clinical psychologist was the primary therapist for the Petitioner from November, 1981, to January, 1982. His observations concerning the progress of the Petitioner are in accord with those of Allison Dowling. He did note that the Petitioner has shown himself to be willing to help others with their daily problems but is unwilling to participate himself, and by way of explanation Robinson states that the other patients don't understand or can't understand his problem related to the sexual deviance. Shaffer's observations establish that the Petitioner is comfortable with his life style, and hasn't indicated any desire to change that pattern. Robert Alcorn, the director of the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital, through his testimony indicated agreement to the effect that the treatment had been exhausted in that program without success, which is an accurate depiction. Alcorn also established that conferences related to Robinson's potential placement in affiliated sex offender programs led to the conclusion that those programs could not assist the Petitioner, ergo, treatment has been exhausted in those other facilities. The Petitioner, through his testimony, acknowledged that he had participated in homosexual activities at the hospital and had been punished by the suspension of his grounds privileges and job opportunity. Following those episodes the Petitioner indicated that he lost interest in participating in the program but did in fact participate. He acknowledged that he attended occupational therapy, as well as the primary therapy, and was tardy at times. Robinson admits that he has difficulty explaining himself and has problems with impulse control. He says he can't find himself, is tired of being a nothing. Robinson believes he does not always think before acting. Finally, he has a fear of returning to court and facing the disposition of his case. Alice Butler, a witness for the Petitioner who was a co-therapist at the time that Stevens was assigned to Robinson's case, established that earlier in the treatment Petitioner was more motivated in his participation than he has been recently. And, in fact, the Petitioner has broken the rules as recently as two weeks prior to the hearing by sleeping nude. She also observed that the Petitioner has been in the so-called "observation section" for a long time and is satisfied with his placement. (This particular section is a more restricted area than some of the other advanced wards.) Sterling George, a psychiatric aide and witness for the Petitioner from his observation finds that as a general proposition the Petitioner takes part in activities with other patients and is not a problem on the ward. Finally, Alfred Gerardo, another participant in the mentally disordered sex offender program, gave testimony. He has known the Petitioner for approximately fifteen months. He has also participated in the same group with Robinson from October, 1980, through May, 1981. His initial impressions of Robinson were not favorable, but in the last few months he has gained a better appreciation of the Petitioner. In particular, he has observed Robinson to have made improvement in terms of his willingness to he concerned about matters of education and acting-out, and in the realm of the Petitioner's appearance. From this witness's understanding the Petitioner's participation in group activity is limited and particularly so in the area of the underlying sexual problem. In summary the Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner's sexual deviance, but that treatment has not been totally successful and the patient continues to be a sexual menace, and there is a likelihood that the Petitioner would commit other sexual crimes.
The Issue Whether Respondent, JR Conway Enterprises, LLC (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes,1 by terminating Petitioner, Tina Garner (Petitioner), in retaliation for her reporting sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, JR Conway Enterprises, LLC, owns a number of businesses. Jeff Conway is Respondent’s managing member. Petitioner was hired by Respondent near the end of July 2018, to work as a bookkeeper doing payroll and accounts for Respondent’s real estate office known as Sunshine State Deals. In September 2018, Respondent opened a Smoothie King in the Spring Hill, Florida area. As the date for opening the Smoothie King grew closer, Petitioner took on more responsibilities and helped open and operate that store. Morgan Katocs was hired in September 2018 to work at the Smoothie King. Ms. Katocs was 17 years old at the time she was hired. Ms. Katocs brother, Hunter McGhee, was also hired to work at the Smoothie King. The Smoothie King store opened on September 18, 2018. Petitioner had no authority to hire employees for Respondent. Apparently, all hires to work at the Smoothie King were made by Brandon Berlinrut, who was a friend of Jeff Conway and recruiter for Respondent. While Petitioner had no hiring authority, during the time she worked at the Smoothie King, she supervised Ms. Katocs. As the Smoothie King was opening, there was work that needed to be completed. Respondent hired his friend, Constantine Tremoularis, as an independent contractor to install security cameras, work on the point of sale, and conduct various work at the location. Mr. Tremoularis was given access to areas at the Smoothie King store where only employees were permitted. While working at the Smoothie King, Ms. Katocs had physical limitations due to a back condition caused by a car accident. When Ms. Katocs requested assistance in lifting a mop bucket, Mr. Tremoularis responded, “I bet men like to say that they broke your back,” in a context inferring injury during sex. Ms. Katocs interpreted the comment as an unwelcome sexual comment and was offended and upset. Ms. Katocs reported the unwanted sexual comment to Ms. Garner within an hour after the comment was made. Later, while Petitioner was at Respondent’s real estate office, both Ms. Katocs and her mother called her on the telephone from the Smoothie King office and asked her to set up a meeting with Mr. Conway to discuss the unwanted sexual comment. They both expressed a desire for Petitioner to be present during the meeting. Ms. Garner told Mr. Conway of Ms. Katocs and her mother’s desire to have a meeting with him to discuss the unwanted sexual comment, and of their request that Petitioner be present at the meeting. Mr. Conway met with Ms. Katocs and Ms. Katocs’s mother on October 4, 2018, to discuss the incident. Mr. Conway did not invite Petitioner and Petitioner did not attend the meeting. Although he did not tell Ms. Katocs or her mother, the reason that Mr. Conway did not want Petitioner in the meeting is because he had already decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment for reasons unrelated to the reported unwanted sexual comment from Mr. Tremoularis. At the meeting, Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway discussed the unwanted sexual comment. During the meeting, Mr. Conway agreed to make changes and provide sexual harassment training for Respondent’s employees. On October 4, 2018, the day after the meeting between Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway, Mr. Tremoularis apologized to Ms. Katocs. Although he was allowed to stay at the Smoothie King location from several days to over a week to finish the job, Mr. Tremoularis made no further unwanted sexual comments to Ms. Katocs. On Saturday, October 6, 2018, Mr. Conway called Petitioner on the telephone and advised her that she was terminated. Mr. Conway terminated Petitioner because he perceived her as rude, argumentative, and combative. Mr. Conway also believed that Petitioner was responsible for hiring her daughter, Tina Rowlands, to work at the Smoothie King store even though Petitioner knew that Mr. Conway did not approve of the hire. Mr. Conway’s perceptions of Petitioner’s aberrant behavior were consistent with those observations reported by Karen Stapleton in her testimony at the final hearing. Karen Stapleton, who worked with Mr. Conway’s companies as a consultant and in accounting, worked with and helped train Petitioner at Respondent’s real estate office in September 2018. Ms. Stapleton also observed Petitioner scream at an employee at Respondent’s Smoothie King store. When Mr. Conway terminated Petitioner, he also terminated Petitioner’s daughter, Ms. Rowlands, as well as Petitioner’s daughter’s boyfriend, Jake Fryar. Although Mr. Conway approved of Jake Fryar’s hire, he decided to terminate Mr. Fryar as well because of his association with Petitioner and Petitioner’s daughter. Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was made because of Mr. Conway’s perceptions about Petitioner’s combative behavior and Mr. Conway’s belief that Petitioner was responsible for hiring her daughter. Although in close proximity to the time of Petitioner’s termination on October 6, 2018, Mr. Conway had already decided to fire Petitioner prior to Petitioner’s report of the unwanted sexual comment made to Ms. Katocs and Mr. Conway’s meeting with Ms. Katocs and her mother to discuss the incident. As confirmed by the testimony of a locksmith, who was contacted on September 28, 2018, to change locks on Respondent’s offices and the Smoothie King store, Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was made in late September 2018. Although the locks were not changed until October 6, 2018, the timing of the lock change request and Mr. Conway’s credible testimony confirm that the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment was unrelated to her report of unwanted sexual comments. Following the October 4, 2018, meeting between Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway, Morgan Katocs continued her employment at the Smoothie King store until she voluntarily left at the end of December 2018. Ms. Katocs testified that she left Smoothie King because, in her view, nothing changed; she felt uncomfortable about remaining employed there, the promised sexual harassment training never occurred, and another employee was making inappropriate sexual remarks to other female employees. Ms. Katocs also did not like a manager that was hired after Petitioner was terminated, who, according to Ms. Katocs, was a bully and abusive. Ms. Katocs further testified that neither she, nor her brother, who was also employed at the Smoothie King, received negative repercussions from her report of the unwanted sexual comment from Mr. Tremoularis. Ms. Katocs’s brother remained employed at the Smoothie King until voluntarily leaving in April 2019.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jeff Conway JR Conway Enterprises, LLC Post Office Box 15389 Brooksville, Florida 34604 William Sheslow, Esquire Whittle & Melton, LLC 11020 Northcliffe Boulevard Spring Hill, Florida 34608 Erik DeL'Etoile, Esquire DeL'Etoile Law Firm P.A. 10150 Highland Manor Drive, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33610
The Issue The first issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2011), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. If so, the second issue for consideration is what penalty should be imposed for such a violation.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer, having been issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 194525 by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. At the time of the incident in question, Respondent was employed by the FHP. For an unspecified time prior to July 11, 2011, Respondent was involved in a relationship with a woman named Tamarah Rasmussen. For some period, she shared his home with him. However, in the weeks or months preceding July 11, 2011, the couple’s relationship had deteriorated, and Respondent wanted it to end. He had, however, allowed her to remain in the home “as a friend.” On July 10, 2011, the couple had a fight, and Respondent left the house. On July 11, 2011, Respondent returned to the home after his work shift, and told Ms. Rasmussen that he wanted their relationship to end. Respondent told her he wanted to sleep in a separate bed, and took the mattress pad off of a bed in a bedroom downstairs and put it on a separate bed upstairs. Ms. Rasmussen reacted by taking the mattress pad off of the second bed and throwing it out the window. Respondent retrieved the mattress pad. Ms. Rasmussen then poured a container of water on the bed where Respondent intended to sleep. Respondent turned on the video function on his cellular phone and asked Ms. Rasmussen about her actions. She responded by telling him he was a fool and an idiot, and that he was crazy. In what can be gleaned from the tape, Respondent asked her to take her things and leave. Instead, Ms. Rasmussen approached Respondent trying to get his phone as he started to go upstairs, and began hitting him. He can be heard on the cell phone recording repeatedly asking her to stop. Ms. Rasmussen repeatedly answered “no,” and “this was good enough for you last night,” and the sound of her striking Respondent can be heard clearly. This altercation occurred as Respondent attempted to retreat up the stairs. At one point, Respondent exclaimed that Ms. Rasmussen had hit him in the face, and Ms. Rasmussen responds, “yeah, I did.” Respondent and Ms. Rasmussen end up in what appears to be a walk-in closet upstairs. At that point, Respondent told Ms. Rasmussen that she was “going down,” and that he would “arrest her myself.” Respondent appeared to be out of breath. Ms. Rasmussen responded by telling him repeatedly that she was not under arrest and he was not arresting her for anything. She told him several times to stop, and to “get off of her,” stating that she could not breathe. Eventually, she told him that he had won, and asked him to help her up. Ms. Rasmussen testified that Respondent dragged her up the stairs, hitting her head on the stairwell on the way up. She testified further that he slammed her against the wall, handcuffed her behind her back, and was sitting on top of her while he did so, and while she pleaded with him to stop. According to her, Respondent hit her several times during the time they were in the closet, and then dragged her back down the stairs by the chain on the handcuffs. She also stated that Respondent threatened to kill her, saying that if he did so he could dispose of her body in the pond on the property and no one would know unless they drained the pond. Respondent, on the other hand, testified that Ms. Rasmussen began hitting him around the head and neck, and he was retreating up the stairs in an effort to get away from her, telling her repeatedly to stop. He testified that once they reached the closet, he told her he was arresting her and placed her hands behind her back in order to handcuff her. When she told him he was not arresting her for anything, he warned her not to “make me Taze you,” and finished placing the handcuffs on her wrists, behind her back. Respondent denied sitting on Ms. Rasmussen, saying that he knelt on one knee with one foot flat on the floor, and with Ms. Rasmussen secured between his legs, as he learned in law enforcement training. While Ms. Rasmussen testified that he dragged her down the stairs of the house and then threw her down the outside steps, Respondent testified that he carried her down the stairs of the home so as not to injure her, but that she was resisting him. While the taped recording contained sounds indicating that Respondent was being hit by Ms. Rasmussen going up the stairs, the same is not true with respect to the descent. Ms. Rasmussen can be heard telling Respondent to stop, but there is no sound that can be attributed to her head banging against the wall or anyone being dragged down the stairs. Once they were both downstairs, Respondent called in a “1024” on his FHP radio, which means “officer in jeopardy, send help as soon as possible.” The consensus of those officers testifying was that this call is rarely used and is the equivalent of “calling the calvary,” because the officer needs help immediately. Both Rasmussen and Respondent exited the home once the 1024 call was placed. Rasmussen testified at hearing that Respondent offered to take the handcuffs off of her and she refused the offer, saying that she wanted the responding officers to “see me exactly this way.” She got in his truck, which was parked near his locked law enforcement vehicle, and shut the door to get out of the rain. Law enforcement responding to the 1024 call were Marcus Bailey, an investigator with the Bay County Sheriff’s Office; FHP Major Eddie Johnson; and Lieutenant Davis Ward of the Bay County Sheriff’s Office. Their arrival at the home was approximately twelve minutes from the call being received by the FHP dispatcher. The Bay County Sheriff’s Office conducted the investigation of the matter, and because a law enforcement officer was involved, the investigation was conducted by supervisors. As a result of the incident, Respondent was placed on administrative duty on July 11, 2012, and terminated from the FHP July 16, 2012. The officers who responded all saw the video of the cell phone recording, which was also played several times during the course of the hearing. While, curiously, two of the three refer to Respondent as “taunting” Ms. Rasmussen at the beginning of the video, the video does not display or record anything that the undersigned could describe as taunting. It portrayed Respondent expressing dismay at Ms. Rasmussen’s behavior; Respondent requesting that she get her things and leave; Ms. Rasmussen’s angry response; the sounds of Ms. Rasmussen hitting Respondent; Responding placing her under arrest and reciting her rights; and Ms. Rasmussen’s angry response and cries for help and for Respondent to let her go. Respondent’s supervisor, Sergeant Ronnie Baker, testified that Respondent was a great employee who went “above and beyond,” and who prior to this incident (which Sergeant Baker did not witness), had no complaints against him. Sergeant Baker, among others, testified that Ms. Rasmussen had a reputation for untruthfulness. The undersigned reviewed the tape several times. It is of limited assistance in deciphering what is, in reality, an event where the only witnesses are the participants, Respondent and Ms. Rasmussen. However, after listening to the tape and observing the demeanor of witnesses (both at hearing and in the tape), Ms. Rasmussen’s account of the incident is simply not credible. The sounds on the tape clearly support the testimony that Ms. Rasmussen was hitting Respondent repeatedly as they went up the stairs. There are no corresponding sounds to support her contention that he slammed her head into the wall or dragged her down the stairs. Moreover, the pictures of Ms. Rasmussen do not clearly depict bruising or swelling consistent with her description of the incident. There are slight red marks on Ms. Rasmussen’s wrists, but they do not provide clear and convincing evidence that he dragged her anywhere, much less down the stairs. The marks on her arms are just as likely to indicate her resisting his efforts to carry her down the stairs. Moreover, her claim that he threatened to kill her and dispose of her body in the pond on the property is totally inconsistent with Respondent’s actions in placing a 1024 request for assistance, and waiting at the front of the property for assistance to arrive. The Administrative Complaint charges Respondent with use of excessive force by slamming Ms. Rasmussen’s head and/or placing handcuffs on the victim tightly and/or dragging her down the stairs while handcuffed. There is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent slammed Ms. Rasmussen’s head against anything; that he put the handcuffs on her too tightly; or that he dragged her down the stairs while handcuffed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Philip S. Spaziante (Address of record) Sandra Renee Coulter, Esquire Room A432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gerald M. Bailey, Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto the Defendant was a registered real estate broker in the State of Florida, and held License Number 0060094. On or about December 5, 1978 Defendant pleaded no contest in Case No. 78-2506CF in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, to the offenses of criminal attempt, as defined in Section 777.04(1), Florida Statutes, and indecent assault upon a female child, within the contemplation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes. Thereafter, on or about February 9, 1979, the Defendant was committed by Judge James M. Reasbeck to the department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for care, treatment, and rehabilitation as a mentally disordered sex offender in accordance with the provisions of Section 917.19, Florida Statutes. In his order Judge Reasbeck specifically found that the Defendant "... suffers from a non-psychotic mental or emotional disorder, yet is competent and that the Defendant would be likely to commit further sex offenses if permitted to remain at liberty." Subsequently, on or about April 17, 1979, Defendant was admitted to the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at South Florida State Hospital in Pembroke Pines, Florida. Defendant has remained in the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at South Florida State Hospital since that time. The Defendant has made admirable efforts, both during his confinement at South Florida State Hospital and, prior to that time, in the Broward County jail to address both his problems with alcohol consumption and with his sexual deviation. The Defendant has been placed in positions of trust and responsibility in both these institutions, and has, apparently, discharged his duties in exemplary fashion. Although the Defendant has made some progress in the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at South Florida State Hospital, he has not, as yet successfully completed that program. The Defendant remains within the jurisdiction of the committing court until such time as he is released from the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program and criminal proceedings involving the offenses to which he pleaded no contest have been concluded in the Circuit Court. In short, the Defendant is not free to come and go as he pleases, nor would he be automatically allowed to remain at liberty should he choose not to participate further in the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program. The Defendant did not advise The Board of the fact that he had pleaded no contest to the offenses with which he was charged within thirty days after the entry of his plea.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, on the stipulations of the parties, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following factual findings are made: Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Duval County School Board (DCSB) employed Petitioner as a teacher at Ribault High School. As a teacher, Petitioner was subject to the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.001. Petitioner also was subject to the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006. Petitioner’s employment with the DCSB began on or about August 19, 1986. By reason of this employment, Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS as a Regular Class member. On or about December 7, 2001, Petitioner was arrested in connection with Officer David Coarsey's sworn information, which provided as follows in relevant part: On 12-07-01, Lt. Remolde called the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office Sex Crimes Office and stated that a student at Ribault High School had reported to the principal, Mr. Ken Brockington, that she had penile/vaginal intercourse with this suspect. On 12-07-01, I arrived at Ribault High School and interviewed the victim. She stated that approximately three weeks ago, she went to the suspect’s classroom at his request after school hours. The suspect asked the victim to help him with some of his work. While she was there, the suspect put his arm around the victim and began rubbing her waist. The suspect then began talking to the victim about sex. The suspect then put his hand up the victim’s skirt and inserted his finger in her vagina. The suspect also pulled the victim’s shirt and bra down and “sucked” on her breast. The victim said that she did not attempt to stop the suspect. The victim then told the suspect, “I don't think we should do this”, and she walked out of the room. Approximately one week later, the suspect asked the victim to come back to his classroom after school. When the victim arrived at the room, the suspect began “rubbing” on the victim’s body. The victim stated that the suspect retrieved a condom from a “grey file cabinet” and then sat down in a chair. The suspect pulled his penis out and the victim put the condom on his penis. The victim pulled her shorts down and sat on the suspect’s lap, at which time the suspect put his penis in the victim’s vagina. After having penile/vaginal intercourse with the suspect for a short period of time, the victim stood up and the suspect masturbated until he ejaculated. On 12-07-01, the victim met the suspect in the “Book Room”. The suspect pulled the victim’s shirt and bra down and “sucked” on her breast. The suspect then pulled his penis out of his pants and asked the victim to masturbate him. The victim masturbated the suspect until he ejaculated. The victim wiped the suspect’s semen off of her hands with a paper towel and threw it in the trash can in the “Book Room”. The victim then left the room and reported the incident to a substitute teacher, Mr. Carlos Bowers (12-25- 59, 3701 Winton Dr., B/M), who in turn, reported it to the principal, Mr. Brockington. The victim stated to me that all of the sexual encounters with the suspect were consensual. I retrieved the trash bag that contained the above mentioned paper towel from the “Book Room” and put it in the JSO Property Room. The suspect was transported to the JSO Sex Crimes Office by Officer D.W. Holsey #6044 and I transported the victim to the Sex Crimes Office. I contacted the victim’s mother and asked her to come to the JSO Sex Crimes Office. When she arrived, she transported the victim to the Child Crisis Center for a medical exam (swabs of the victim’s breasts). I advised the suspect of his constitutional rights and asked him to sign the rights form. The suspect signed the form and agreed to speak to me and Det. Romano #7527 about the allegations. The suspect admitted to having penile/vaginal intercourse with victim one time, “sucking” on the victim’s breast on two different occasions, and rubbing on her vagina once. The suspect stated that all of the sexual encounters happened at the school. The suspect stated, “It was a huge mistake, my life is fucked”. The suspect gave a written statement in regards to having penile/vaginal intercourse with the victim. The suspect was arrested and transported to the PTDF. The information reported in the sworn information truly and accurately recounts the events that occurred and to which Petitioner admitted. The arrest and booking report is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Arthur John Marsland, Jr., Case No. 2002-599-CFA. Petitioner resigned his employment with the DCSB on or about December 27, 2001, effective on or about January 15, 2002. By reason of his employment with DCSB, Petitioner earned approximately 15.80 years of service credit in the FRS. On or about February 14, 2002, Petitioner was charged, by amended information, in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in case number 2002-599-CFA, with (a) one count of sexual battery, a second-degree felony, in violation of Section 794.011(8)(b), Florida Statutes; and (b) one count of lewd or lascivious molestation, a second-degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(5)(c)2., Florida Statutes. The amended information provided in relevant part: HARRY.L. SHORSTEIN, State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Duval County, charges that ARTHUR JOHN MARSLAND, JR, on or between the 1st day of November, 2001 and the 7th day of December, 2001, in the County of Duval and the State of Florida, did, while in a position of familial or custodial authority, engage in an act which constitutes Sexual Battery with * * * a person 12 years of age or older, but less than 18 years of age, by placing his penis in or upon the vagina of * * * contrary to the provisions of Section 794.011(8)(b), Florida Statutes. SECOND COUNT And for the second count of this information, your informant further charges that ARTHUR JOHN MARSLAND, JR., a person 18 years of age or older, on or between the 1st day of November, 2001 and the 7th day. Of December, 2001, in the County of Duval and the State of Florida, did in a lewd or lascivious manner force or entice * * * a child l2 years of age or older, but less than 16 years of age, to touch the genital area or clothing covering the genital area of Defendant, contrary to the provisions of Section 800.04(5)(c)2, Florida Statutes. The amended information is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Arthur John Marsland, Jr., Case No. 2002-599-CFA. The victim of the alleged crimes was a student at the school where Petitioner taught. The alleged crimes took place in Petitioner's classroom or in the book room at the school where Petitioner taught. On or about April 8, 2002, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the second count of the amended information. Petitioner pled guilty because he was in fact guilty. Petitioner made the plea freely and voluntarily. On or about April 29, 2002, judgment was entered on Petitioner’s guilty plea. He was adjudicated guilty. The judgment and corrected order of sex offender probation are filed in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Arthur John Marsland, Jr., Case No. 2002-599-CFA. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that, but for his job position as a teacher, he “probably [would] not” have had an opportunity to have sexual relations with a student in the school’s classroom or book room. Petitioner also admitted that having sexual relations with one of his students was “obviously not” one of his duties and responsibilities as a teacher. Petitioner wrote three letters of apology in connection with the matter. He apologized in writing to the victim, to his spouse, and the DCSB. On or about September 27, 2002, Charlie Crist, as Commissioner of Education, filed an Administrative Complaint, before the Education Practices Commission of the State of Florida, in case number 02-0681-RT. The complaint sought disciplinary action against Petitioner’s educator’s certificate. The Administrative Complaint charged Petitioner in part with the following statutory and rule violations: STATUTORY VIOLATIONS COUNT 1: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 1012.795(1)(c), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude. COUNT 2: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has been convicted of a misdemeanor, felony, or other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic violation. COUNT 3: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(f), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent, upon investigation, has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the school board. COUNT 4: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(i), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida prescribed by State Board of Education. COUNT 5: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(j), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has otherwise violated the provisions of law, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate. COUNT 6: Section 231.2615(2), Florida Statutes, provides that the plea of guilty in any court or a decision of guilty by any court is prima facie proof of grounds for the revocation of the certificate. RULE VIOLATIONS COUNT 7: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has failed to have his primary professional concern always be for the student and for the development of the student’s potential and has failed to seek to exercise the best judgment and integrity. COUNT 8: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, in the Respondent has failed to be aware of the importance of maintaining the respect and confidence of his colleagues, of students, of parents, and of other members of the community and that Respondent has failed to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct. COUNT 9: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.006(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has failed to make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student’s mental health and/or physical safety. COUNT 10: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.006(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has intentionally exposed a student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. COUNT 11: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.006(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has exploited a relationship with a student for personal gain or advantage. The Administrative Complaint is filed with the Education Practices Commission of the State of Florida in case number 02-0681-RT. In consideration of the Administrative Complaint, the Education Practices Commission entered a Final Order permanently revoking Petitioner’s educator’s certificate. The Final Order is filed with the Education Practices Commission of the State of Florida in case number 02-0681-RT. On or about October 20, 2003, Petitioner applied for early service retirement. Petitioner’s effective date of retirement was established as November 1, 2003. By certified letter dated May 2, 2008, Respondent notified Petitioner of the intended action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of his guilty plea. The Division suspended payment of Petitioner’s monthly retirement benefits in May 2008. Petitioner had received approximately $41,309.56 in FRS retirement benefits from November 2003 through April 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner was convicted of a specified offense pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his FRS rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Arthur J. Marsland, Jr. 1856 B Hereford Road Middleburg, Florida 32068-3104 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee,, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Richard L. Wahl submitted an application for an instructional position in the Pinellas County school system on December 5, 1973 (Exhibit 10), and was subsequently hired in 1974 to teach middle grade science. In Section IX of his application (Exhibit 10) Question 8 asking if he had ever been convicted of a misdemeanor, felony, or offense involving moral turpitude was left blank. By application dated January 3, 1984 (Exhibit 1), for certification by the State Department of Education as a general science teacher, in Section V inquiring if the applicant had ever been arrested or involved in a criminal offense, Wahl checked the "yes," gave the date and place of arrest for the offense of larceny-misdemeanor, and showed the disposition as "convicted conviction set aside" with notation "(see enclosures)." No enclosures were attached to Exhibit 1. By order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dated October 25, 1973 (Exhibit 3), Wahl's conviction entered December 15, 1972, was set aside and he was unconditionally discharged from probation. The conviction was for larceny of coins from coin changing machines at a bank where Wahl worked as supervisor, night maintenance (Exhibit 9). Wahl started teaching in Pinellas County schools in 1974 and continued until he was suspended in 1984. During this period he had no evaluation less than satisfactory. He was liked and respected by his peers who considered him to be a very good science teacher. Respondent and his first wife, Shirley Jones, were divorced in 1975 and have one daughter. Respondent, shortly after his divorce from Shirley, married his present wife who had a nine or ten year old daughter by a previous marriage. The daughter, Lisa Beck, lived with her mother. In 1978 Respondent began "tucking in" Lisa when she went to bed. On occasion he rubbed her back. This led to rubbing her buttocks and subsequently her vaginal area. On occasion Respondent placed his genitals in contact with Lisa's genitals, but no intercourse was attempted or contemplated by Respondent. This went on for several weeks on an irregular basis in late 1978. At this time Lisa was 10 or 11 years old. Respondent initially thought Lisa enjoyed the incidents or at least did not object until Lisa finally told him she wished he wouldn't do that. From that time forward no further abuse by Respondent of Lisa occurred. Some five years later Lisa told her mother that Respondent had fondled her, the mother told the Bishop of her church, and the Bishop accosted Respondent with the charge. Respondent readily admitted the incident to the Bishop and he and his wife were referred to a Family Services program run by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services with this problem as well as with other marital problems they were having. Respondent, his wife, and Lisa voluntarily participated in family counseling to improve the family relationship. After family counseling had begun Respondent was contacted by a detective in the St. Petersburg Police Department to ask him about his earlier fondling of Lisa. Again, Respondent readily admitted his transgressions. Word that a teacher was being investigated filtered back to the school system and the investigation leading to the charges here involved began. Two short articles appeared in the inside pages of the St. Petersburg Times on January 30, 1984, and July 20, 1984, reporting the allegations of child molestation made against Wahl and of his suspension without pay from his position as a teacher. Respondent was subsequently brought to trial on a charge of handling and fondling a child under the age of 14, to which he pleaded nolo contendere, adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was placed on five years probation (Exhibit 7). Subsequent to his divorce from Shirley Jones, which was an acrimonious one, Respondent has been sued by Jones when late on child support payments and has had difficulty in visitation rights with his daughter by that marriage. Jones, who apparently has also remarried, has attempted to induce Respondent to allow his daughter to be adopted which, so far, Respondent has refused. Following publication of the allegations involving Respondent's stepdaughter, Shirley Jones advised Petitioner that Wahl had in 1972 molested Jones' then 14 year old sister and that he had been convicted of larceny in Indiana in 1972. Shirley Jones' sister, Leslie Miskove, now 26 years old and married, testified that while she was visiting her sister, then married to Respondent, Wahl, on two occasions, touched her genital area. According to Miskove the first incident occurred while she and Wahl were lying on a couch watching television and Wahl touched her vaginal area with his hand. At this time her sister was in the bedroom. Miskove did not say anything to Wahl nor did she tell her sister. The second incident occurred while enroute to Florida. While Shirley and her baby were asleep on the back seat, Wahl was driving, and Miskove was lying on the front seat with her head on Wahl's leg. According to Miskove, Wahl put his hand inside her pants and inserted a finger in her vagina. Again she did not say anything and his hand remained inside her pants until she sat up a short time later. After Shirley Jones told Miskove about the child molestation charge against Wahl, which was filed in 1984, Miskove first revealed the 1972 incidents to her sister. Respondent denies either of those incidents occurred. No evidence was presented of any improper conduct involving Respondent with any of his students; and his principal did not consider Respondent a threat to any of the girls at his school even after he became aware of the charges against Respondent then being investigated. Exhibit 11, the deposition of Dr. Machler, was admitted as a late- filed exhibit. Several days after the transcript arrived but Exhibit 11 had not, a telephone call to the attorney revealed that he thought the original had been sent but that a second copy would be forwarded. Accordingly, all of the above findings were made without the benefit of the expert testimony contained in Exhibit 11. Dr. Machler's opinion of Respondent, based upon his psychiatric evaluation and counseling involving eight sessions for a total of five or six hours, is that Respondent is not now, and never has been, a pedophile; that Respondent is an honest, sincere individual who truly enjoys and strives to excel at, his role as a teacher; that Respondent is a passive aggressive person who has been intimidated by his two wives; that his current wife's rejection coupled with the proximity of Lisa as an extension of his wife, led to the fondling of Lisa; that this was an isolated situation and is unlikely to ever recur; that Respondent has never been a threat to female pupils in his classes and is not likely ever to be such a threat; and that the embarrassment and indignities brought on by these charges will make Respondent more circumspect than ever in the classroom because now he will feel like he is living in a fishbowl. Dr. Machler's deposition further confirms the Hearing Officer's conclusion that someone in the HRS Department of Family Services reported to the police the transgressions involving Respondent and Lisa when the family went to them for counseling after Lisa had disclosed the incidents to her mother and Respondent admitted they occurred. The conclusions of law were also prepared before Exhibit 11 was read by this Hearing Officer.
