Findings Of Fact In May of 1980, the Petitioner, Peterson Outdoor Advertising purchased a sign from Lamar Advertising Company. This sign is located on the east side of State Road 434, approximately 350 feet north of State Road 50 in Orange County, Florida. This sign is a stacked, back to back structure, having two faces which face north and south. The face which is the subject of this proceeding is the south face which faces northbound traffic on State Road 434. This face is visible to traffic on the main-traveled way of State Road 50. When the Petitioner purchased the subject sign from Lamar, it checked the records of Lamar, and the records of the Department of Transportation and the orange County Building and Zoning Department, to ascertain that the sign had all required building permits, electrical permits, county permits and state permits, and that the sign site was a legal location. The sign had all the permits that were required. The relevant document from the Department of Transportation pertaining to the subject sign was a letter dated March 13, 1978, from the Department's district office to Lamar. This letter returned the permit applications that had been submitted by Lamar in February of 1978 seeking permits for the subject sign, for the reason that "your applications do not require a state permit". The parties stipulated that, prior to May of 1984, the personnel of the Department's Fifth District gave advice that signs along non-controlled roads within 660 feet of a federal-aid primary highway did not need a state sign permit. The Petitioner relied on the determination of the Department that the subject sign site did not require a state permit, and purchased the sign from Lamar. In May of 1984 the Fifth District personnel of the Department corrected their erroneous prior interpretation of the statutes and rules they administer, and permits were thereafter required for all signs within 660 feet of a federal-aid primary highway if they were visible from the main-traveled way of the controlled road. On July 1, 1985, the Department's outdoor advertising inspector advised the Petitioner that the south faces of the subject sign required a state permit. These are the faces in question in this proceeding. In compliance with this advice from the Department, the Petitioner filed permit applications for both the north faces and the south faces of the subject sign. The Department returned the applications for the north faces for the reason that a permit was not required. The north faces are not involved in this proceeding. The Department denied the Petitioner's applications for the south faces by memorandum dated October 8, 1985, for the reason that these faces conflicted with permits held by Maxmedia, Inc., in that they were not located more than 1,000 feet from the Maxmedia sign. The Maxmedia permits authorized a sign which was erected at a point 740 feet from the subject sign of the Respondent. The permits held by Maxmedia were issued by the Department on May 8, 1984. Prior to July 1, 1984, the spacing rule for signs on a federal-aid primary highway required 500 feet between signs. On July 1, 1984, this spacing requirement was increased to require 1,000 feet on a federal-aid primary highway. State Road 50 is a federal-aid primary highway, and the area within 660 feet from State Road 50 is a controlled area. The Petitioner's sign 350 feet north of State Road 50 was more than 500 feet from any other structure prior to July 1, 1984. It is not more than 1,000 feet from the Maxmedia signs now, however.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Peterson Outdoor Advertising for a permit on the east side of State Road 434, approximately 350 feet north of State Road 50, facing south, in Orange County, Florida, be GRANTED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 29th day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Thomas Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the subject outdoor advertising signs are illegal because they were erected without state permits from Petitioner. Whether the subject signs should be removed. Whether Petitioner is equitably estopped to assert that the signs are illegal and should be removed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 95 on Northwest 6th Court, which is between Northwest 75th Street and Northwest 76th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 95 sign. The Interstate 95 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 95. The Interstate 95 sign is located within 147 feet of the right-of-way of Interstate 95. Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 395 at the corner of Northwest 14th Street and Northwest 1st Court, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 395 sign. The Interstate 395 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 395. The Interstate 395 sign is located within 240 feet of the right- of-way of Interstate 395. Eugene A. (Andy) Hancock, Jr., is the President of the corporate Respondent and, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, controlled the activities of Respondent. Mr. Hancock caused the corporate Respondent to lease the respective properties on which the subject signs are located in November 1998. He thereafter caused the corporate Respondent to erect the two double-faced signs at issue in this proceeding. The subject signs were constructed during September and October 1999. Each sign was constructed without a state permit from Petitioner. Each sign is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that his company did not apply for permits from Petitioner because of a conversation he had with Bernard Davis, a former outdoor advertising administrator for Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that Mr. Davis represented to him that his company would not need permits from Petitioner if it had permits from the City of Miami. This testimony is rejected. 3/ Respondent has applied for state sign permits for the subject signs. Permits for these signs have not been issued because of their proximity to existing, permitted signs. 4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that the subject signs are illegal and must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute regarding the facts here involved. SR 60 is a federal aid primary highway and the signs are located within the city limits of Tampa, Florida. No permit has been issued and the sign structure is located 150 feet from a permitted sign. Accordingly the signs violate the spacing requirements of the statutes. This is really the only issue here involved; however, both parties presented evidence and Respondent submitted a proposed recommended order on whether or not an application for a permit for these signs should be approved. Resolving this issue would be premature and result in an advisory opinion. However, to preserve the evidence and save having to repeat the hearing when, and if, Respondent submits an application for a permit the following is submitted. The signs in question were erected within the city limits of Tampa in 1974. At the time these signs were erected no state permit was required. In 1976 an application was submitted for a permit for these signs. This application was returned to the applicant to resubmit on new forms and be sure to complete the application (Exhibit 2). The permitted sign, from which the instant sign is not the required spacing, is located on the right of way of the cross town expressway, and when construction starts, this sign will be removed.
Findings Of Fact Henderson Signs is a partnership which was initially owned and operated by Ladon Henderson and his wife, Margie Henderson. When Ladon Henderson became inactive, his son, Gene Henderson, became a partner and he now operates the business with Margie Henderson. Henderson Signs has been licensed by the Department of Transportation to engage in the outdoor advertising business since before the year 1976. This license was renewed annually as required, and Henderson Signs now holds Outdoor Advertising License Number 20157 reissued on November 16, 1982. Henderson Signs has operated in Washington, Gadsden and Jackson Counties, but in July of 1981 this business was sold to Tri-State Systems, Inc., and pursuant to the terms of this sale Henderson Signs may not now engage in the outdoor advertising business in these three counties. It may, however, operate elsewhere. Between the years 1978 and 1981 Henderson Signs has received 17 notices of violations from the Department of Transportation charging that signs at 20 locations on Interstate 10 in Jackson County were erected illegally. This resulted in the opening of 22 dockets in the Division of Administrative Hearings to litigate administratively the charges against Henderson Signs. In 14 of these dockets the findings and conclusions resulted in a determination that Henderson was guilty as charged. Some of these guilty findings were appealed to the District Court of Appeals, where they were affirmed on the merits. Some were affirmed by per curiam opinions. Ten other cases have been docketed in this Division involving signs now owned by Tri-State Systems, Inc., pursuant to the sale by Henderson Signs. (This data has been taken from exhibits 1 and 2 offered by the Department.) This evidence demonstrates that the Respondent has repeatedly erected outdoor advertising signs along Inter-state 10 in Jackson County which were found to be illegal signs because of spacing violations, zoning violations, or lack of the required permit authorizing their erection. The legal position of Henderson Signs in many of the cases where administrative hearings were requested subsequent to the service of Notices of Violations, was that no state permits were necessary for varying reasons, one of which was that Interstate 10 had not become a part of the United States Interstate Highway System because it had not been opened to the public. Findings of not guilty were made in one Division of Administrative Hearings docket involving three sign violations, because of a failure of the evidence to prove that Interstate 10 was open to the public. (Data taken from exhibit 2 offered by the Department). The Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, affords parties whose substantial interests are affected by actions of Administrative Agencies the right to a hearing to resolve disputed issues. Henderson Signs utilized the provisions of this Act. When the disputes were resolved against the contentions of Henderson Signs, by agency order or by the Court after appeal, it removed the signs that were the subject of these proceedings. The Department of Transportation has never had to remove a Henderson sign for failure of the Respondent to comply with a final order determining it to be illegal. The Respondent contends that a genuine issue existed regarding the necessity of securing a permit prior to the erection of a sign along the site of Interstate 10 in Jackson County, until the time it became a part of the Federal Interstate Highway System by being opened for public traffic. There is no evidence from which a finding of fact can be made as to precisely when Interstate 10 in Jackson County was opened and in use by the public. The formal ceremony opening Interstate 10 was held in November of 1978. During the time between the erection of a sign by the Respondent and the order that it be removed after a determination that it was illegal, Henderson Signs received rental payments from the sign advertiser. Subsequent to July of 1981, when the Respondent sold its sign business in Jackson County, there have not been any notices of violation issued to Henderson Signs by the Department of Transportation.
Recommendation From the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against Henderson Signs be dismissed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 21 day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building; M.S . 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Charles M. Wynn, Esquire Post Office Box 793 Marianna, Florida 32446 Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Transportation's Notice of Denied Application for an outdoor advertising permit at State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, Leon County, issued to Lamar of Tallahassee on May 30, 2008, should be upheld pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes,1/ or whether the sign should be permitted as a nonconforming sign as defined by Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency empowered to regulate outdoor advertising signs along the interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems of Florida pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising within the state of Florida pursuant to Section 479.04, Florida Statutes. Lamar owns a V-shaped sign located on certain real property at 1940 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. Thomasville Road is also known as State Road 61. Lamar does not own the real property, but has the right to erect and maintain its sign on the property under a lease that Lamar executed with the landowner in 1998. Lamar's sign was erected in 1998, with the approval of the City of Tallahassee. The sign is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Thomasville and Betton/Bradford Road, behind the Southern Flooring showroom. The east side of the sign face is within 660 feet of and visible to State Road 61. State Road 61 is a federal-aid highway and thus a "controlled road" subject to the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the east side of the sign requires a permit from the Department. The west side is visible only to Bradford Road and does not require a permit from the Department. On February 10, 2008, Lisa Adams, an outdoor advertising inspector conducting an annual inventory on behalf of the Department, identified the subject sign as an unpermitted sign that is visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams completed a Department compliance checklist stating that the sign was possibly illegal because it lacked a Department permit and the east side of the sign was visible from State Road 61. On April 22, 2008, the Department issued a notice of violation stating that the sign was illegal and must be removed within 30 days of the date of the notice, pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Lamar did not file a request for hearing in response to the notice of violation, and does not contest the notice of violation in this proceeding. On May 16, 2008, Lamar filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for the sign. The Department reviewed the application and issued a Notice of Denied Application on May 30, 2008. The application was denied because the sign site does not meet the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes, in that it is closer than 1,000 feet from another permitted sign owned by Lamar. The other permitted sign was built in 1979. The 1,000 foot spacing requirement has been in the statute at all times since the 1998 construction of the sign at issue in this proceeding, meaning that it could never have met the spacing requirement of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Myron Laborde was Lamar Advertising Southeast's regional manager in 1998 when the sign was built. His area of authority included Tallahassee. Mr. Laborde testified that in 1998 the view of the sign from State Road 61 was obstructed by several palm trees, some scrub oaks, and a very tall tallow tree. Some of these trees were removed when Southern Flooring took over and remodeled the old Helms Exterminators building at 1940 Thomasville Road about four years ago. Mr. Laborde testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees, but only "if you . . .turn your head 90 degrees" while driving north on State Road 61. Loyd Childree has been the vice-president and general manager of Lamar of Tallahassee since 2003. Mr. Childree testified that the renovations to the Helms Exterminators building began some time after March 2005, and that the building's size was nearly doubled to accommodate the Southern Flooring showroom. Mr. Childree testified that a lot of trees were removed during the renovation, including palm trees and a "canopy-type tree" about 25 to 30 feet tall with a full crown similar to that of an oak. Mr. Childree testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees. Mr. Childree further stated that Lamar markets the sign to advertisers based on the traffic counts from Bradford Road, not those from State Road 61. Ms. Adams, the inspector who identified the possible illegality of the sign, has worked for the Department's contractor, TBE Group, since August 2004. Her job is to conduct an inventory of permitted signs on controlled roads such as State Road 61 and determine which unpermitted signs are visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams inventoried State Road 61 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 without identifying Lamar's sign as an unpermitted sign visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams testified that her predecessor in the position inventoried State Road 61 every year since Lamar's sign was erected and never identified the sign as one visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams testified that she might have seen the sign in a previous year but did not identify it as illegal because she believed it had "on-premise" advertising, i.e., it advertised Southern Flooring. With certain restrictions, a sign erected on the premises of a business establishment that bears advertising for that establishment is exempt pursuant to Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Adams frankly conceded that she was speculating and that her memory was unclear as to whether she had seen and noted this sign in past years. In any event, Lamar's log of advertisers showed that Southern Flooring never advertised on the sign. Lynn Holschuh is the Department's state outdoor advertising administrator, and had held this position since 1992. Ms. Holschuh testified that State Road 61 has been inventoried by an outdoor advertising inspector every year since Lamar's sign was erected in 1998. None of the inspectors noted the visibility or possible illegality of the sign until Ms. Adams noted the sign on February 12, 2008. Ms. Holschuh lives in Tallahassee and has driven on State Road 61 hundreds of times over the years. In her deposition, she testified that she believed the sign was not visible when it was built, and only became visible from State Road 61 when a third party removed the obstructing trees. The testimony of Mr. Laborde, Mr. Childree, and Ms. Holschuh was credible and uncontroverted as to the history of the sign. It is found that the sign was not visible from State Road 61 when it was erected in 1998, but that it became visible from State Road 61 when trees were removed by the landowner during renovations to the old Helms Exterminators building at some point after March 2005. Lamar's sign, now visible from State Road 61, is subject to the Department's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 479.01, Florida Statutes, because State Road 61, as a federal- aid primary highway, is a "controlled road" under the statute. A sign visible from a controlled road must carry a Department permit. Lamar contends that the facts of this case establish that its sign meets the definition of a "nonconforming sign" set forth in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes: "Nonconforming sign" means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. Lamar's sign was not visible from State Road 61 in 1998 and therefore was "lawfully erected" in terms of the Department's licensing requirements. Lamar contends that the removal of trees by a third party constituted "changed conditions" that rendered the sign out of compliance with state law, and that the sign is therefore a nonconforming sign under Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has provided no definition of the term "changed conditions," and the Department has no rule to provide interpretive guidance to the words of the statute. On September 17, 2008, Lamar filed a motion for leave to amend its petition for hearing in this case to challenge the Department's alleged interpretation of the phrase "due to changed conditions" as an unadopted rule. In particular, Lamar alleged that the Department was applying an unadopted rule limiting "changed conditions" to those initiated by a government agency. On September 19, 2008, the Department filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency. The motion was granted on September 22, 2008. In the Florida Administrative Weekly dated November 26, 2008 (vol. 34, no. 48, p. 6228), the Department published a Notice of Development of Proposed Rule, with the following preliminary text of an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: 14-10.006 Additional Permitting Criteria. Each application for an outdoor advertising sign permit shall meet the requirements of Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S. In addition, an application must comply with the requirements of the agreement between the state and the United States Department of Transportation referenced in Section 479.02(1), F.S., which have not been duplicated in Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S., or superseded by stricter provisions in those statutes. The requirements are: through (8) No change. (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means only the actions of a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., which includes for example: Rezoning of a commercial area, reclassifying a secondary highway as a primary highway, or altering a highway's configuration causing a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) Ms. Holschuh testified that this draft rule language was written in direct response to Lamar's allegation that the Department's denial of its application was based on an unadopted rule. On December 16, 2008, the Department held a workshop on the draft rule. At the workshop, the Florida Outdoor Advertising Association ("FOAA") submitted the following suggested draft language for subsection (9) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means, and shall include, any of the following: An action taken by a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., such as the rezoning of a parcel of property fro commercial to noncommercial, reclassifying a secondary highway to a primary highway, altering a highway's configuration, or the taking of any other action within the powers of such governmental entity which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction; The action of a third party, who is not the owner of a preexisting sign, relating to modifications to the topography, vegetation, buildings or other physical characteristics of the property upon which the sign is located, or the property surrounding the sign, which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. an act of God which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. The Department rejected the FOAA's proposed language, and ultimately abandoned the effort to adopt a rule defining the term "changed conditions." On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a motion with DOAH to reopen this case and proceed to a fact-finding hearing regarding its proposed rejection of Lamar's application. In her deposition, Ms. Holschuh testified that the rulemaking effort was abandoned because the language proposed by the FOAA made it clear that it would be "nearly impossible" to arrive at a definition that would cover "every situation that might arise for when an existing sign might suddenly become visible." Ms. Holschuh testified in deposition that it is now the Department's policy to review these matters on a case-by- case basis. However, she also testified that the Department, as a matter of "policy," continues to limit its consideration of "changed conditions" to actions taken by a governmental entity. The Department bases this limitation on the examples provided by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707(b), defining "nonconforming signs" for purposes of the Federal Highway Administration: A nonconforming sign is a sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of State law or State regulations passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State law or State regulations due to changed conditions. Changed conditions include, for example, signs lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully erected on a secondary highway later classified as a primary highway. Ms. Holschuh stated that the Department's policy was applied to Lamar in the instant case, and would continue to be applied in the future unless some "extraordinary circumstance" in a specific case led the Department to revisit the policy. At the final hearing, Ms. Holschuh backed away somewhat from her flat statement that the Department's "policy" was to limit consideration of changed conditions to those caused by government action. She stated that FOAA's proposed rule language caused the Department to reconsider its position that governmental action should be the exclusive reason for granting a permit for "changed conditions," and testified that the Department will consider other circumstances in its case-by-case review of permit applications. Ms. Holschuh testified that, under the facts presented in this case, the Department would deny the permit because there is DOAH case law on point for the proposition that tree removal does not constitute "changed conditions," and because broadening the definition of "changed conditions" to include the situation presented by this case would open up the process to abuse. Ms. Holschuh testified, at more than one point in the proceeding, that the Department would have very likely granted the permit had the trees been removed by the Department rather than the private landowner. She gave no indication that Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes, or any other statute would prevent the Department from granting the permit for Lamar's nonconforming sign, should the Department find that the sign fell into nonconformity due to "changed conditions." The DOAH case law cited by Ms. Holschuh is Lamar of Tallahassee v. Department of Transportation, Case Nos. 08-0660 and 08-0661 (DOAH September 15, 2008), discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law below. Ms. Holschuh testified that Lamar's sign is not located in a Department right-of-way and is not a hazard to the public in its current location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of Lamar of Tallahassee for a state sign permit for a location described as State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, in Leon County, Florida (Application Number 57155). DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2010.
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1982, outdoor advertising sign permits AR946-06 and AK947-06 were issued by the Department of Transportation to Sandy Advertising Company. The permits were for a location on the west (north) side of U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles east of its intersection with U.S. Highway 29 within the city limits of Pensacola, Florida. Sandy Advertising Company transferred those permits to Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. Annual renewal payments have been made each year in a timely manner by Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. No permit tags have been displayed at the Lamar sites and no sign has been built or maintained at the Lamar sites since issuance of the permits. Without having submitted an application for a permit to the Department of Transportation, Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc., obtained a building permit from the City of Pensacola for the erection of an outdoor advertising sign located in Escambia County approximately 3,790 feet east of State Road 296 on the north side of U.S. Highway 90. Pursuant to the building permit, Outdoor Media erected a sign at that location. The sign had an east and a west face and was less than 500 feet from the site for which permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 were issued. Each face of the sign required a separate permit from the Department of Transportation. Learning of the erection of Outdoor Media's sign, the Department notified Petitioner to remove it. Instead Outdoor Media applied for two sign permits for each face of the sign. On August 8, 1988, the Department of Transportation received Petitioner's applications for a state outdoor advertising permit. The applications were for each face of the sign located on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The applications were denied on the ground that two other permits, permit AK946- 06 and permit AK947-06, had been issued to Lamar Advertising of Pensacola, Inc., for a location on the same side of the highway within one thousand feet of Petitioner's site. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the sole basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by the Department of Transportation. Petitioner meets all other permit requirements. In 1984, the legislature extensively revised Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. See Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida. Of particular concern in this proceeding are the changes to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, and whether those changes apply to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The revisions to this section introduced very specific tag display as well as sign erection and maintenance requirements for all permits. The revisions increased the fee schedules and provided that all permits expire annually on January 15. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, as amended states in part: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other persons in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side- to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. The effective date(s) of the amendments to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, is stated in Section 27 of Law 84-227. Section 27 specifically and explicitly made permits issued prior to June 30, 1984 subject to the new provisions of Law 84-227. Section 27 states: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. In spite of the language of Section 27, it is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within thirty (30) days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with Sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. While DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes, it is applied statewide and has been held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule in Case NO. 5227R, Final Order issued December 29th, 1988. DOT relies upon the definition of "non-conforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes, states in part: `Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] 1/ DOT does not rely upon the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227. The exceptions are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits." It is DOT's view that permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained or displayed. These "secret signs" can only be discovered after the application is submitted and DOT checks its computer records. The effect of DOT's interpretation is that pre- 1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can exist into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as the permittee renews its permit. This interpretation is directly opposed to the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1984 amendments, i.e., the prevention of advertisers stockpiling unused sites and permits. Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the pre- or post-1984 statutory language and is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. DOT bases it's interpretation on the ground that the constitution prohibits the retroactive application of the 1984 amendments to permits existing prior to the effective date of those amendments. DOT did not offer any evidence as to the accuracy of its view on the requirements of the constitution. Failing such evidentiary support, DOT has failed to carry its burden of proof when utilizing an unpromulgated rule on a case by case basis. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this cause. Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida, to require that parties obtaining outdoor advertising permits post their permit tags within thirty (30) days and erect their signs within two hundred seventy (270) days or their permits would automatically become void. The amendment became effective July 1, 1984. The amendment also expressly and explicitly provided for treatment of pre-July 1, 1984 permits by stating" . . . any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. Section 479.01(12) only makes exceptions for nonconforming "signs lawfully erected." Section 479.07(9)(c) only provides that nothing in subsection (9), pertaining to spacing requirements or permitting of new signs after July 1, 1984, may be construed to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of the Act to become nonconforming. See the definition of "sign" contained in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes, and of "erect" contained in Section 479.01(4), Florida Statutes. However, in spite of the clear language of the statutes, DOT interprets the term "permitted signs" as including permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, but which have no sign erected on the site. DOT has placed an interpretation upon the statutes that is not apparent from their language. The plain language of Sections 479.01(12) and 479.07(9)(c) only applies to signs which have been constructed on the permit site. The sections do not apply where no sign has been constructed. Since no signs were ever erected on the sites covered by permit AK946-06 and AK947-06 neither Section 479.01(12) nor 479.07(9)(c) applies to Lamar's permits. Further, DOT interprets the amendment to Section 479.07, now codified as Section 479.07(5)(a), requiring permit display and sign erection within a specified time period, to be applicable only to permits initially issued after the effective date of July 1, 1984. The agency has not enforced that subsection against preexisting permits and renewals of such preexisting permits, irrespective of whether or not a sign has ever been erected on the permitted site. However, the agency has applied and enforced against preexisting permits all other portions of the amendments, including but not limited to the mandatory recurring uniform annual January 15 renewal date and increased renewal fee with regard to preexisting permits. The agency has taken this approach on the grounds that the constitution prohibited the amendment from being applied retroactively to such preexisting permits. In Administrative Case NO. 88-5227R, this interpretation was held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule. However, agencies have the choice of properly promulgating rules and applying them with the full force and effect of law or of fully explicating those policies by demonstrating the policies' reasonableness and factual accuracy on a case by case basis in Section 120.57 proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d (Fla, 1st DCA 1983); Gulf Coast Home Health Services Of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 513 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As noted earlier, the sole reason for DOT's policy was that it was required by the constitution. Such a bare bones claim as "the constitution requires it" is tantamount to the claim that was asserted in Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1980) that a previous statutory interpretation was "wrong as a matter of law." In Florida Cities, no record foundation was made for the non-rule policy being followed in that case. The Florida Supreme Court held that such a rationale was not sustainable absent adequate record support for the application of non-rule agency policy. In this case, DOT has failed to affirmatively show the reasonableness and factual accuracy of the policy that sign permits which were issued prior to July 1, 1984, should not be subject to Section 479.07(5), Florida Statutes, enforcement and should be treated as if they constituted, erected and maintained signs for purposes of Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes. It is doubtful that DOT could ever show the accuracy of its view of the constitution. The case law in the area clearly establishes that permits such as these are not property in the constitutional sense. Such permits do not confer any right, estate or vested interest, and are revocable at the will of the legislature. Such permits are also subject to new permit conditions. State ex rel First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 187 So. 148 (Fla. 1939); City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp., 129 So.2d 185 ( Fla. 3d DCA 1961) and Kawasaki of Tampa, Inc. v. Calvin, 348 So.2d 897 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Moreover, the 1984 amendments to Chapter 479 do not require retroactive application to be applied to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The new permit conditions were applicable only upon the expiration of the old permits on January 15. Thereafter, the new permit conditions applied to the renewal. Therefore, since Lamar did not build any signs on the sites covered by either permit AK946-06 or AK947-06 within 270 days of its first renewal after the effective date of the statutory revisions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and has not posted the required tags at the sites, permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 are void and cannot be used as a basis for denying Petitioner's sign applications. As in Florida Cities, having failed to establish the reasonableness and accuracy of its policy, the foregoing policy cannot form the basis of the permit denials. This is especially true in light of the fact that DOT's policy ignores the clear language of the statutory amendments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order voiding Permits AK946-06 and AK947-06, held by Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company, Inc., and granting the applications of Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1990.
The Issue By a Petition filed October 21, 1988, Petitioner sought a determination, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, that a non-rule policy of the Department of Transportation was a rule that: (a) was not adopted properly under Chapter 120 Florida Statutes, and (b) was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner submitted application for state outdoor advertising permits which were received in the Department of Transportation (DOT) District Office on August 8, 1988, for a location on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. Petitioner was denied the permits on the ground that permits had been issued to another outdoor advertising company prior to July 1, 1984, for a location less than a thousand feet from Petitioner's proposed site on the same side of the highway. There have been no tags displayed or sign maintained at the earlier site since issuance of the permits. It is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within 30 days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is in the outdoor advertising business, particularly off- premises signs, and is so licensed. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the only basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by DOT as Petitioner meets all other requirements. Petitioner will have to confront the agency's "interpretation" with each permit application it makes. Petitioner is currently challenging the specific above-referenced permit denials in Section 120.57(1) proceedings which both parties herein opposed consolidating with the instant rule challenge when the undersigned suggested that possibility. Respondent has not challenged Petitioner's standing to bring this rule challenge, and Petitioner has demonstrated standing to bring it. The Petitioner asserts that the agency's acknowledged foregoing interpretation of the named statutes constitutes an arbitrary and capricious unpromulgated rule, applied without legislative authority and prejudicing Petitioner and all like-situated lessees of off-premises signs because it creates a perpetual grandfather clause for sign permits in existence prior to July 1, 1984, and new applicants post-1984 cannot know where earlier permits have been issued due to the lack of DOT enforcement of tag posting and sign maintenance requirements. Phil Brown, DOT Right of Way Specialist, testified by deposition that, indeed, if a pre-1984 permittee never erects a sign or posts tags, the spacing impediment can only be located through DOT records, in this case, a computer search. Phil Brown relied on DOT training sessions which advised him that Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes, requires the current agency interpretation/non-enforcement of Section 479.07(5)(a) to pre-1984 permittees, and he applied it to Petitioner's application. In so doing, he utilized Section 479.05(9) so as to count the thousand foot spacing requirement for the permit site which had been requested by the Petitioner not from a permitted sign (which is the statutory phrase contained in Section 479.09) or from a sign in existence, i.e. a sign already erected, or from a tagged erected sign, or from a displayed tag, but instead counted the thousand feet, as he had been directed, from the site described on the permit issued pre-1984. Gary Kissinger, designated by DOT as its employee most knowledgeable about the application of statutes and rules to outdoor advertising, testified by deposition that pre-1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can, absent a future law change, go into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as they keep renewing and paying their fees, even though Mr. Kissinger understood the purpose of the 1984 amendments to be the prevention of advertisers "stockpiling" unused sites/permits from the enactment date forward. No evidence established Mr. Kissinger as the drafter of the legislation or of the agency rules promulgated thereunder, and no evidence was submitted in the form of committee minutes, notes, legislative journals or by other means to clearly establish a legislative intent either coinciding or differing from Mr. Kissinger's perception. Mr. Kissinger relies for the DOT "interpretation" upon the definition of "nonconforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. He does not rely for DOT's interpretation on the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes. It is his view that notwithstanding Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)(7), Florida Administrative Code, those permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained/displayed. Even though DOT's current permit application form requires applicants such as Petitioner to state, to the best of their knowledge, the location of the permitted sign nearest to the site for which they are applying, there is no way any post-1984 applicant can find out about preexisting unutilized permits on its own without getting that information from DOT. Only after the application is submitted, does DOT run its own check and deny the new permit application if a permit for a site within the distance given in Section 479.09 exists regardless of whether there is a sign erected or a tag displayed at the earlier permit's site. DOT applies its interpretation statewide and asserts that all the agency is doing is to not apply the posting and erection requirements of Section 479.07(5)(a) retroactively to pre-1984 permits, upon recognized standards of prospective statutory construction, and that the agency has not established any policy or rule thereby. The statute in question came about as a substantial rewording of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, by way of amendments contained in Chapter 84- 227, Laws of Florida, which provided as follows: Sign permit required.-- Except as provided in s. 479.16, no person shall erect, operate, use, maintain, or cause to be erected, operated, used, or maintained, any sign on the state highway system outside incorporated areas or any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway systems without first obtaining a permit there for from the department and paying the annual fee as provided herein. No person shall apply for a permit unless he has first obtained the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession or control of the site designated as the location of the sign in the permit application. (3)(a) Application for a sign permit shall be made on a form prescribed by the department and a separate application shall be submitted for each permit requested. A permit shall be required for each sign facing. As part of the application, the applicant or his authorized representative shall certify in a notarized signed statement that all information provided therein is true and correct and that, pursuant to subsection (2), he has obtained the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession of the site designated as the location of the sign in the permit application. Every permit application shall be accompanied by the appropriate permit fee; a signed statement by the owner or other person in lawful control of the site on which the sign is located or will be erected, authorizing placement of the sign on that site; and, where local government regulation of signs exists, a statement from the appropriate local government official indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements and that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to that applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the department. The annual permit fee for each sign facing shall be $25 for 20 lineal feet or less, and $35 for over 20 lineal feet. No fee may be prorated for a period less than the remainder of the permit year to accommodate short-term publicity features; however, all first-year fees may be prorated by payment of an amount equal to one-fourth of the annual fee for each remaining whole quarter or partial quarter of the permit year ending on January 15. Permit applications shall be acted on by the department within 30 days after receipt of the application by the department. Applications received after September 30 shall include fees for the last quarter of the current year and fees for the succeeding year. (4)(a) For every permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway, and shall be attached in such manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit shall become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit shall be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. A permit is valid only for the location specified thereon. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfers fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee is $100 for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction. If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued shall apply to the department for a replacement tag Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other person in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (5)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits of the permittee which were issued prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags not renewed shall be returned to the department for cancellation by January 15. Permit tags not renewed or returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If the permittee has not submitted his fee payments by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a violation notice or the permittee requiring fee payment within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due, or, in the alternative to these payments, the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his signs should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit shall be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement shall be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does net respond to the violation notice within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (6)(a) Any sign not granted a permit by the effective date of this act shall not be granted a permit unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway; One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway; The minimum spacing provided herein shall not preclude the permitting of V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked or double faced signs at the permitted sign site. No sign shall be granted a permit pursuant to this chapter to locate on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway systems that: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if outside an incorporate area; or Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign of facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. (7) Commercial or industrial zoning which is not comprehensively enacted or which is enacted primarily to permit signs shall not be recognized as commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of this provision and permits shall not be issued for signs in such areas. The department shall adopt rules within 130 days after this act takes effect which shall provide criteria to determine whether such zoning is comprehensively enacted or enacted primarily to permit signs. A Reviser's Bill renumbered and made scrivener's changes in the amendatory language so that the "interpreted" portions of Section 479.07 were codified as follows: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The, permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other person in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department for cancellation by January 15. Permit tags which are not renewed or returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. Section 479.01(12) as amended provides: 'Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions; of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was; lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] The effective date(s) of Section 479.07 is significant as provided in Section 27 of Law 84-227: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis Supplied.] Likewise, the exceptions set out in Section 479.16, Florida statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227, must be considered. They are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits," in that language. The new statue defines "erect" at Section 479.01(4) and "sign" at Section 479.01(14) as follows: (4) "Erect" means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix, attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being or establish; but it does not include any of the foregoing activities when performed as an incident to the change to advertising message or customary maintenance or repair of a sign. (14) "Sign" means any combination of structure and message in the form of an outdoor sign, display, device, figure, painting, drawing, message, placard, poster, billboard, advertising structure, advertisement, logo, symbol, or other form, whether placed individually or on a V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked, or double-faced display, designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, any part of the advertising message or informative contents of which is visible from any place on the main-traveled way. The term does not include an official traffic control sign, official marker, or specific information panel erected, caused to be erected, or approved by the department. Both of these foregoing subsections are substantially the same as their predecessors in the pre-1984 statute. There appears to be no dispute that DOT has lawfully promulgated the following rules in order to facilitate its administration of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, as amended 1984: Rule 14-10.004(2)(d)--The application shall be notarized and shall contain . . . The sign's distance from the right of way, the nearest permitted sign on the same side of the highway, and the nearest intersection on the same side of the highway. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.004(6)--Permits shall be renewed in accordance with Section 479.07(5). [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.004(9)--A sign granted a permit shall be erected and thereafter maintained in accordance with Section 479.07, F.S. and this Rule Chapter. [Emphasis Supplied. Rule 14-10.004(10)--The permanent metal tag issued by the Department shall be displayed and maintained in accordance with Section 479.07(5)(a) F.S. Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)(7)--The following shall apply to signs for which the initial valid permit application was submitted after July 1, 1984: Official signs, and signs exempt under Section 479.16 and structures that are not lawfully maintained shall not be counted nor shall measurements be made from them for purposes of determining compliance with spacing requirements. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.007(1) provides in pertinent part: . . . A sign which was conforming on June 30, 1984, but which does not comply with the size, spacing, and height requirements of Section 479.07(9) F.S. shall not be considered a nonconforming sign. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.007(2)(e) provides in pertinent part: (2) The following shall apply to nonconforming signs: (e) A sign face which remains void of advertising matter for 12 months or longer shall be deemed an abandoned or discontinued sign and shall lose its nonconforming status. [Emphasis supplied.] None of these duly promulgated rules has been challenged in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The outdoor advertising sign that is the subject of the instant proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the "Sign") is a billboard with steel "I" beams and iron stringers which sits perpendicular to U.S. Highway 1 approximately 1,800 feet south of Hypoluxo Road and approximately 1,000 feet north of Neptune Drive in Palm Beach County. Petitioner has owned the Sign since about 1978 or 1979, when it purchased the assets of the Sign's previous owner, Outdoor Media. The Sign was originally erected in 1963 by Ferrin Signs, Inc., pursuant to a permit issued by Palm Beach County. In 1967, Ferrin Signs, Inc., obtained a permit from Palm Beach County to perform further work on the sign. Shortly thereafter, Ferrin Signs, Inc., sold the Sign to Outdoor Media. Prior to March of 1970, the land on which the Sign is located was in the unincorporated area of Palm Beach County. In March of 1970, the land was annexed by the Town of Hypoluxo and has been within the Town's jurisdictional boundaries ever since. The Town of Hypoluxo has an ordinance currently in effect that regulates signs within the Town. The ordinance, like its predecessors dating back to 1961, prohibits "off premises signs." It also contains a section dealing with "nonconforming signs," which provides as follows: Signs or sign structures made nonconforming by this sign and signage code shall be governed by the following regulations: A sign existing within the town on or before November 30, 1992, which, because of its height, square foot area, location or other characteristics, does not conform to this article is hereby declared to be a nonconforming sign. A nonconforming sign under this subsection may be allowed to remain in existence, but if destroyed or allowed to deteriorate in excess of 50 percent of the depreciated value of the structure, it may not be replaced. The status afforded signs under this section shall not be applicable to any sign for which no sign permit was ever issued; such signs are deemed illegal signs and are subject to the provisions of this article governing illegal signs. No conforming sign or sign structure shall be permitted to be erected for the same property containing an existing nonconforming sign until the nonconforming sign has been removed or made conforming. An "off premises sign" that does not qualify for "nonconforming sign" status is subject to removal under the ordinance. The Town also has a building code. Under the code, a building permit is required before a sign within the Town may be altered or repaired. No building permit has ever been issued by the Town for any work to be performed on the Sign. On December 27, 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Violation alleging that Petitioner was maintaining the Sign without a state-issued outdoor advertising sign permit, as required by Section 497.07, Florida Statutes. In response to the Notice of Violation, Petitioner advised the Department that it would be filing an application for such a permit. Petitioner filed its application on January 12, 1993. The application was accompanied by, among other things, a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit referred to in Finding of Fact 3 above. The application package, however, contained neither a permit for the Sign issued by the Town of Hypoluxo, nor a statement from any Hypoluxo official indicating that the Sign was eligible for such a permit or was otherwise allowable under the Town's sign ordinance. Accordingly, after receiving the application package, the Department contacted the Mayor of the Town, the Honorable Al Merion, to ascertain the Town's position on the matter. In conjunction therewith, it provided Mayor Merion with a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit that had accompanied Petitioner's application. By letter dated January 25, 1993, Mayor Merion responded to the Department's inquiry. In his letter, he wrote: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your fax transmittal containing a permit issued by Palm Beach County to the Ferrin Signs, Inc. on January 24, 1963. The permit issued by Palm Beach County is not valid because it is not within their [sic] jurisdiction to issue sign permits for property lying within the territorial boundaries of the Town of Hypoluxo. To the best of our knowledge, the Town of Hypoluxo has no record of a permit being issued to Ferrin Signs Inc. It should be noted that, in the past years, on numerous occasions, the billboard in question has been illegally constructionally altered by virtue of no permit having been obtained from the Town. On or about February 2, 1993, the Department returned Petitioner's application to Petitioner. In the Memorandum of Returned Application that it sent to Petitioner, the Department gave the following reason for denying the application: "local permit not provided for Town of Hypoluxo." Although the Town no longer contends that Palm Beach County was without authority to issue the 1963 pre-annexation permit for construction of the Sign, the Town still takes the position that, because of unpermitted post- annexation repairs and alterations, the Sign is prohibited and subject to removal under the Town's current sign ordinance. 1/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a state outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of January, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1994.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's sign permits and retrieve Petitioner's permit tags because Petitioner violated Sections 479.07(5) and 479.08, Florida Statutes, 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 10.004(7), 2/ by allegedly removing its sign from its property and by failing to display the permit tag prior to removing the sign.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation formed in 1983 by Mr. Rodney Forton. Mr. Forton is the president and sole shareholder of Petitioner. Sometime in 1987, Petitioner entered into a management agreement with Cotee River Outdoor Advertising Company ("Cotee River"). The management agreement provided that Cotee River would construct a sign on property owned by Petitioner on U.S. highway 19 in New Port Richey, Florida (the "Cotee River sign"). Cotee River agreed to pay Petitioner a portion of the advertising revenues from the sign. The Cotee River Permit On May 26, 1987, Cotee River applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit from Respondent. The application described the Cotee River sign as a rectangular wood sign measuring 10 feet by 20 feet, with its lowest point approximately 15 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 25 feet above the crown of the road. Respondent approved the application and mailed the approval to Cotee River on May 29, 1987. On June 3, 1987, Respondent located the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory at, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.06 in F/N." The number "5.06" indicates that the sign is located at milepost 5.06 on U.S. 19. 3/ Mileposts describe the location of each sign by the distance of the sign from a fixed point. Each of Respondent's outdoor advertising inspectors measures the milepost for each sign in his or her territory using a distance measuring instrument. Respondent then enters the milepost for each sign in Respondent's sign inventory. The milepost of 5.06 that Respondent assigned to the Cotee River permit was incorrect. In May 1987, Cotee River constructed a sign on Petitioner's property pursuant to the permit granted by Respondent. The sign was a metal monopole sign rather than the wood sign described in the application. The Cotee River sign was not constructed at milepost 5.060. Cotee River rented the sign to outdoor advertisers. However, Cotee River failed to pay any portion of the advertising revenue to Petitioner, and the parties resolved the matter by mutual agreement. Petitioner and Cotee River agreed that Cotee River would release its right to manage the Cotee River sign in consideration for the right to manage a sign located on other property owned by Petitioner. The agreement provided that Petitioner would pay Cotee River a prescribed sum in exchange for the performance of specific duties by Cotee River. Cotee River failed to perform the duties specified in the agreement. Petitioner refused to pay the balance of payments. Petitioner sued Cotee River. Cotee River went into bankruptcy and was dissolved. Petitioner's Permit On July 14, 1992, Petitioner applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the Cotee River sign. The application described the sign as an existing rectangular, metal, monopole "sign in place," measuring approximately 10 feet by 20 feet. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Petitioner and mailed the approval to Petitioner on October 12, 1992. Respondent again incorrectly listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.060 in F/N." Respondent issued permit tag number BG341-25 to Petitioner. Although Petitioner used the Cotee River sign to generate advertising revenue, Petitioner never displayed any tag numbers on the sign. The tag numbers remained in Petitioner's files until sometime in 1995. Dr. Goluba's Permit At about the same time that Cotee River went out of business in 1992, Robert L. Goluba, D.D.S., owned property immediately adjacent to Petitioner's property. Prior to March 1993, an unidentified representative of Respondent contacted Dr. Goluba. The representative told Dr. Goluba that there were two signs on Dr. Goluba's property that were going to be taken down if the sign permits were not renewed. The representative mistakenly identified one of the two signs as the Cotee River sign. The representative went on to explain that Respondent could avoid the expense of taking down the two signs if Dr. Goluba obtained permits for the signs. Dr. Goluba wanted the advertising revenues and agreed to obtain the necessary permits. On March 2, 1993, Dr. Goluba applied for a sign permit for the Cotee River sign he mistakenly believed to be located on his property. The application described the sign as an "existing" rectangular, metal, monopole sign measuring approximately 10 feet by 24 feet, with its lowest point approximately 18 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 30 feet above the crown of the road. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Dr. Goluba and mailed the approval to him on March 8, 1993. Respondent listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/M.P. 4.870 in F/N." Respondent incorrectly listed Dr. Goluba's permit in the sign inventory at milepost 4.870. On March 24, 1993, Respondent issued permit number BG960-35 to Dr. Goluba. Although Dr. Goluba never derived advertising revenue from the Cotee River sign, he did display his permit on the sign. Dr. Goluba inadvertently failed to pay the fee required to renew the sign permit in 1994 and, therefore, failed to display current permits on the sign. On April 11, 1994, Respondent issued a Notice of Violation, Failure To Display Permit Tag. The New Outdoor Advertising Inspector In early 1995, a new outdoor advertising inspector assumed responsibility for the territory in which the Cotee River sign was located. On April 11, 1995, the inspector conducted a field inspection to verify the mileposts and signs in the territory for which he was responsible. The inspector correctly identified the milepost of the Cotee River sign as milepost 4.980. He found no sign subject to regulation by Respondent 4/ located at milepost 5.060. Milepost 5.060 and 4.980 are approximately 422 feet apart. Relevant law prohibits the location of regulated signs within 1,000 feet of each other. 5/ No exceptions to 1,000 foot prohibition applied to the Cotee River sign. The inspector concluded that Petitioner had removed the wood sign originally permitted to Cotee River in 1987 and which Respondent had incorrectly listed in its sign inventory as being located at milepost 5.060. On July 12, 1995, Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice Of Violation -- Removed Sign. On August 22, 1995, Respondent ordered the revocation of Petitioner's tag permit because Petitioner had allegedly removed the Cotee River sign from milepost 5.060. Respondent never issued a Notice of Violation to Petitioner for failure to display his tag numbers on the Cotee River sign. Petitioner protested the revocation of its permit and refused to return the permit tags to Respondent. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. In the meantime, Dr. Goluba's accountant had inadvertently failed to pay the permit fee for the Cotee River sign. Respondent placed the Cotee River sign on Respondent's "cutdown list" for failure to pay the required fees. On June 20, 1995, Respondent had the Cotee River sign cut down and removed. Respondent sent Dr. Goluba a bill in the amount of $4,990 for the cost of cutting the sign down and removing it. Prior to the date Respondent cut down and removed the Cotee River sign, Petitioner notified the inspector verbally and with written documentation that the sign was owned by Petitioner, located on Petitioner's property, and permitted to Petitioner. The inspector found that Respondent's records did not agree with Petitioner's records. The inspector informed Petitioner that the "cutdown order" came from Tallahassee and there was nothing the inspector could do. Dr. Goluba's tags were displayed on the Cotee River sign at the time it was cut down and removed. Ms. Maria Passanisi was the broker who managed the sign for Dr. Goluba. Ms. Passanisi was at the site when the sign was cut down and removed. She protested Respondent's action so vehemently that the police officers regulating traffic at the scene had to intervene to quell the disturbance. After Respondent cut down the Cotee River sign, Petitioner drove a stick into the ground where the sign had been located and displayed the permit tags for the removed sign on the stick. The tags were displayed on the stick at the time of the hearing. The Computerized Sign Inventory Respondent uses a computer system to maintain its sign inventory. The computer system does not accept the same milepost for two or more regulated signs. When Petitioner applied for its sign permit in 1992, Respondent was required to carry the Cotee River permit in the inventory as a void permit. The computer system would not accept the same milepost for Petitioner's permit and the void Cotee River permit. In order to circumvent the computer system, Respondent's supervisor of property management arbitrarily changed the milepost number entered for the Cotee River permit from milepost 5.060 to milepost 4.970. As late as September 20, 1993, Respondent's computerized sign inventory identified the Cotee River sign as being located at three incorrect mileposts. The inventory located the same sign permitted to Cotee River, Petitioner, and Dr. Goluba, respectively, at mileposts 4.970, 5.060, and 4.870. In 1995, the new outdoor advertising inspector correctly located the Cotee River sign at milepost 4.980. However, he mistakenly assumed that milepost 5.060 was the correct milepost for Petitioner's sign and erroneously concluded that Petitioner had removed its sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not remove the permitted sign and that the permits issued to Petitioner are valid. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1997.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007(6)(b), which provides for revocation of outdoor advertising permits for nonconforming signs that are abandoned or discontinued, is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" as alleged by Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation is the state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the outdoor advertising program in accordance with chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The Department adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-10, which provides for the permitting and control of outdoor advertising signs visible to and within controlled areas of interstates and federal-aid highways. Rule 14-10.007 provides regulations for nonconforming signs. Section 479.01(17), Florida Statutes, defines nonconforming signs as signs that were lawfully erected but which do not comply with later enacted laws, regulations, or ordinances on the land use, setback, size, spacing and lighting provisions of state or local law, or fail to comply with current regulations due to changed conditions. Rule 14-10.007 provides in part that: (6) A nonconforming sign may continue to exist so long as it is not destroyed, abandoned, or discontinued. "Destroyed," "abandoned," and "discontinued" have the following meanings: * * * (b) A nonconforming sign is "abandoned" or "discontinued" when a sign structure no longer exists at the permitted location or the sign owner fails to operate and maintain the sign, for a period of 12 months or longer. Signs displaying bona fide public interest messages are not "abandoned" or "discontinued" within the meaning of this section. The following conditions shall be considered failure to operate and maintain the sign: Signs displaying only an "available for lease" or similar message, Signs displaying advertising for a product or service which is no longer available, Signs which are blank or do not identify a particular product, service, or facility. Carter is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida and holds an outdoor advertising permit for a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign bearing Tag No. AS 228. The outdoor advertising sign for the referenced tag number is located in Lee County, Florida ("Carter Sign"). On February 22, 2010, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit to Carter for sign bearing Tag No. AS 228. The notice advises that "this nonconforming sign has not displayed advertising copy for 12 months or more, and is deemed abandoned, pursuant to s. 14-10.007(6)(b), Florida Administrative Code." Petitioner Nissi is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida and holds outdoor advertising signs bearing Tag Nos. BK 731 and BK 732, which signs are located in Pasco County, and BN 604, BN 605, AR 261, AR 262, AT 485 and AT 486, which signs are located in Hernando County ("Nissi Signs"). In June and July 2013, the Department issued notices of intent to revoke sign permits, pursuant to rule 14-10.007(6)(b), based on the signs not displaying advertising for 12 months or longer. The notice issued to Nissi advised that the Department deemed the signs as having been abandoned. Carter and Nissi, as owners of nonconforming signs receiving violations under rule 14-10.007(6)(b), have standing and timely challenged the rule in dispute herein.
