The Issue Petitioner claims that Respondent owes approximately $6,000.00 for the purchase of grass sod. Respondent argues that the funds claimed by Petitioner are for repairs on equipment, not sod, and that its only indebtedness to Petitioner is $6.00, mistakenly omitted from a payment. The issue is whether Petitioner's claim is proper and cognizable under section 604.31, F.S., related to complaints of breach of agreement by a licensed dealer in agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. (Hillside) produces grass sod for sale to landscaping firms and similar customers. Its business address is 1620 East State Road 46, Geneva, Florida. Bill Hatfield Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Bill's Landscaping (Hatfield) is a licensed dealer in agricultural products, bonded by Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety. Hatfield's business address is 1116 State Road 434, Winter Springs, Florida. Sometime around April 1989, Hatfield began purchasing sod from Hillside. Hatfield uses a lot of sod in his landscaping business. The arrangement between the parties was that Hillside would charge an extra 1/2 cent a square foot on his price for the sod for the use of heavy equipment (forklifts). Hillside owns twenty-seven such machines and loaned three out to Hatfield. The equipment stayed at Hatfield's job sites and was operated by Hatfield's crew. When the equipment broke down, Hatfield notified Hillside, who had it repaired. At least some of the repair bills were sent to Hatfield, who paid them. Sometime around the end of September 1989, Avery Wisdom complained to Bill Hatfield about what he thought was an excessive amount of repairs on his equipment. He felt Hatfield's workers were rough on the machines. He suggested several alternatives, including pulling the machines off the jobs and letting Hatfield provide his own machines. He also suggested that he could purchase new equipment and let Hatfield pay all its expenses over a period of time, ultimately buying the equipment, in a lease-purchase type of arrangement. Another suggestion was that he would get the equipment overhauled and let Hatfield pay all the repair bills. Suggestions one and two were apparently rejected, and it is not clear that suggestion three was formally accepted. Nothing was put in writing. Hatfield claims now that he offered to pay an additional 1/2 cent per square foot of sod for the use of the equipment. Avery Wisdom claims that he did raise the price of his sod, but that it was an across-the-board price increase for all of his customers due to increased costs of production, and not related to rental. The October 9, 1989 invoice #13290 from Hillside to Bill's Nursery reflects an increase of $2.00 per pallet of Bahia sod and $2.50 per pallet of Floratam sod, or 1/2 cent per square foot increase. Debra Ludewig, the bookkeeper and general office manager for Hatfield, asked Hatfield why the price" went up, and he told her it was for the equipment. Hillside continued to bill Hatfield for repairs on the equipment after October 1989. These repair costs are reflected on invoices to Bill's Landscaping and are backed up by separate special "repair order" forms itemizing each repair bill. The "special repair order" forms were also furnished to Bill's Landscaping. The repairs are listed on the invoices with a date, reference to the "special repair order" (SRO number), and a total cost which is calculated into the purchaser's running total at the bottom of the invoice. Payments were made on a continuing basis by Hatfield in varying amounts, and rarely in an exact amount to correspond to the total on an invoice. That is, Bill's Nursery maintained a running balance of its account with Hillside, sometimes totalling as much as $20,000.00. Each time she made a payment to Hillside, Debra Ludewig wrote the invoice number on the check. Sometimes more than one check would reflect a single invoice number. After October 1989, Debra Ludewig started deducting the repair bill portion of the invoices when she computed her payments to Hillside. She did this on her own initiative, without direction from Hatfield, because she understood that the 1/2 cent price increase was to cover the repairs. She did not question why the repair bills were being sent and were still being included on the invoices; she just deducted them without any notice to Hillside. In the meantime, the invoices kept coming from Hillside, showing the running balance on Hatfield's account. The top of the invoices reflected the prior outstanding balance, then payments since the last invoice, then additional charges for sod, then repair orders (if any), and then the total amount outstanding. It is clear from the invoices maintained by Hillside and provided to Hatfield, that Hillside was applying Hatfield's checks to the total outstanding balance, which balance included any repair bills, as well as sod delivered. On the other hand, the invoice numbers referenced on Hatfield's checks to Hillside substantiate that Ms. Ludewig was unilaterally deducting sums from certain invoices, which sums corresponded to the amounts being charged for repairs. It is not clear that Hillside was aware of the bookkeeping discrepancy, as nothing was said about deducting the repair bills until the parties' relationship came to an end in June 1990. Hatfield found a new sod producer, claiming that a customer complained about the quality of Hillside's sod. The total amount of repairs charged by Hillside to Hatfield between October 1, 1989, and June 1990, was $7150.25, compared to approximately $300,000.00 for sod,. The final invoice from Hillside to Bill's Landscaping reflected a total balance due of $13,872.59. This invoice #14070 is dated June 18, 1990. On June 21, 1990 and June 29, 1990, payments were made by Hatfield in the amounts of $3,000.70 and $4,641.00 respectively. This left a balance due of $6,230.89. Avery Wisdom concedes that this total should be adjusted: an invoice #13256 (9/22/89) charged $4.50 sales tax in error, and invoice #13406 (11/13/89) included a math error in the amount of $206.70. The proper adjusted total is $6,019.69. The last invoice to include repairs to equipment is dated April 16, 1990. After that date, according to invoices dated from April 23, 1990 to June 18, 1990, Hatfield purchased $39,943.98 in sod from Hillside. The most recent $6,019.69, therefore, is not attributable to repairs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order finding Respondent indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $6,019.69 and requiring payment within fifteen (15) days after the order becomes final as provided in Section 604.21(7), F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Avery P. Wisdom, President Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. 1620 E. State Road 46 Geneva, FL 32732 Bill Hatfield, President Bill Hatfield Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Bills Landscaping 1116 State Road 434 Winter Springs, FL 32708 Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 136 North Third Street Hamilton, OH 45025 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Senior Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent owes Petitioner money for watermelons and, if so, how much.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Respondent M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. (Respondent) have done business for 20 years. Petitioner grows watermelons, and Respondent buys watermelons for resale. Petitioner's employees have always done business with Respondent by telephone with Morris Pagano. Following a telephone call between Mr. Pagano and Buddy Session, who is Petitioner's salesman, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at 14) per pound on May 9, 1995. The weight of the watermelons was 43,560 pounds. On May 10, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent two loads of watermelons at a preagreed price of 14) per pound. The weight of the first load was 40,080 pounds, and the weight of the second load was 44,940 pounds. On May 13, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent two loads of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the first load was 47,660 pounds, and the weight of the second load was 47,740 pounds. On May 14, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the load was 45,920 pounds. On May 15, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the load was 43,420 pounds. The total due for the seven truckloads of watermelons was $32,780.40. After a few days, Mr. Session telephoned Mr. Pagano and asked for payment. As in all other telephone calls that he initiated, Mr. Session called Mr. Pagano at Respondent's telephone number. At no time did Mr. Pagano or anyone else inform Mr. Session or anyone else employed by Petitioner that the sale was not to Respondent. Following the telephone call, Mr. Pagano sent his field representative to Petitioner's office to settle the account. The field representative was the same person who normally represented Respondent. The market for watermelons had deteriorated since the beginning of May. Respondent's field representative tried to negotiate the price down on this basis, but he did not mention anything about a change in the identity of the buyer. Mr. Session refused to reduce the price, noting that they did not have any complaints about the quality of the watermelons. The field representative then gave Mr. Session a check dated May 22, 1995, drawn on Morris Pagano, Inc., in the amount of $22,214, which Mr. Session accepted as part payment of the amount due. On June 7, 1995, Carlie Nolan Mancil, as president of Petitioner, sent a certified letter, return receipt requested, to Mr. Pagano at Respondent, advising of the unpaid balance of $10,566.40 and warning that he would file a complaint with the Department of Agriculture, if payment were not made within 10 days. Respondent never responded to the letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order determining that Respondent M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. owes Petitioner the sum of $10,566.40. ENTERED on October 19, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 19, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Buddy Session Nolan Farms, Inc. 3401 Sand Road Cape Coral, FL 33909 M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. 59 Brooklyn Terminal Market Brooklyn, NY 11236
The Issue The ultimate issue for determination at formal hearing was whether Lester Towell Distributors, Inc., is indebted to Carol Vreeland for produce, i.e., squash, sold to Lester Towell Distributors by Carol Vreeland's son, Kurt Vreeland, as grower.
Findings Of Fact Richard Vreeland and Carol Vreeland (Petitioner) are husband and wife. Kurt Vreeland is their adult son. Kurt Vreeland did not appear at the hearing. In prior years before the incident in this case, Richard Vreeland had grown and sold produce. However, for the 1992 season, because of a neck injury, he had decided not to grow and sell produce. Kurt Vreeland who had no experience in the growing of produce convinced his parents to allow him to grow and sell the produce, i.e., squash. Petitioner and her husband agreed but placed certain conditions on their son. The conditions were that Kurt Vreeland would rent the land from his parents and that from the proceeds of the sale of the squash, he would reimburse his parents for the expenses they incurred in growing the produce and that Kurt Vreeland would receive the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the squash. The squash was grown on land owned by Petitioner and her husband. Supervision for the crop of squash was performed by Rodney Willis. Willis had an oral agreement with Kurt Vreeland to supervise the growing of the crop of squash, and in return Kurt Vreeland would pay him for his services and labor expenses that he, Willis, incurred. Willis was aware that the squash would be transported to Lester Towell Distributors, Inc. (Respondent) for sale. Willis has never received any payment from Kurt Vreeland for his services or the labor expenses that he incurred. Respondent is a company in the business of selling produce for growers at a commission plus expenses. On or about April 1, 1992, an individual who identified himself as Kurt Vreeland, offered to sell squash to Respondent. Respondent had no reason to doubt that the individual was Kurt Vreeland. No evidence was presented that the individual was not Kurt Vreeland. On April 14, 1992, a "Packing and Sales Agreement" (Agreement) was entered into by Kurt Vreeland and Respondent, represented by Fred Towell who is Respondent's President. On April 16, 1992, the Agreement was executed by them. In the Agreement, Kurt Vreeland was specifically referred to as "Grower," and Respondent, at times, as "Grower's Agent." The Agreement states in pertinent part: [W]hereas, Grower desires to retain LESTER TOWELL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. as its agent for the purpose of sale of the Grower's produce and for the performance of such other services in connection therewith as may be specifically set forth, and whereas, * * * Now, therefore, it is agreed as follows: FIRST: Grower hereby retains Grower's Agent during 1992 farm year and entrust him from time to time for the purpose of sale, with the possession and control of Grower's produce. SECOND: Prior to delivering any produce to the Grower's Agent, Grower will apprise Grower's Agent whether Grower has pledged any of the crop proceeds or granted a security interest therein to any third party and if so the name and address of such third party. Grower will, at all times during the term of this agreement, apprise Grower's Agent of any such additional liens placed on his crops as soon as such has occurred. Grower shall indemnify Grower's Agent from all losses and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees incurred by Grower's Agent caused by (1) failure of Grower to promptly furnish such information and (2) any misstatements with regard to the information provided. THIRD: Grower's Agent shall receive at LESTER TOWELL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. located at 900 Lester Towell Blvd., in Belle Glade, Florida 33430, Growers, produce for the purpose of shipping and selling the same at the ten percent (10 percent) of sales charge established between the Grower and Grower's Agent which shall only be changed by mutual agreement. Grower's Agent shall be respon- sible for the INVOICING AND ACCOUNTING of all Grower's produce received by and or sold by Grower's Agent. * * * SIXTH: Accounting and/or payment shall be made to Grower within sixty (60) business days from the date Grower's produce is deliv- ered and sold on the terms accepted, but only on the basis of the actual final selling price. By the execution of this agreement, Grower permits that there may be deducted from the actual selling price all actual ex- penses as described in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth, and the agreed upon charges set forth in paragraph Third. * * * GENERAL CONDITIONS AND STATEMENTS UNDER THE PERISHABLES AGRICULTURAL COMMODI- TIES ACT, 7 U.S.C. S499 (a)et seq AND REGU- LATIONS OF THE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL- TURE, IT IS REQUIRED THAT THERE BE MADE A STATEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GROWER'S AGENT WILL HANDLE PRODUCE FOR THE GROWER. THE FOLLOWING IS THAT AGREE- MENT BETWEEN THE GROWER AND THE GROWER'S AGENT, TOGETHER WITH THE CONTRACT TERMS OF THIS DOCUMENT. * * * 2. Grower shall haul and deliver all produce to Grower's Agent packing house at Grower's expense. Produce must be delivered either in crates, Grower's pallet box or such other containers as have been agreed to by the Grower's Agent. * * * Grower's Agent shall issue receipts to Grower for all produce received. A lot num- ber or other positive means of identification shall be assigned by Grower's Agent to each lot in order to segregate the various lots of produce received from different Growers for similar produce being handled at the same time, and each lot shall be so identified and segregated throughout all operations con- ducted by Grower's Agent. At the end of April 1992 or first of May 1992, Petitioner telephoned Respondent notifying Respondent that checks for the sale of the produce should be made payable to Petitioner and Kurt Vreeland. Petitioner spoke with Margaret Jeanne "Jeannie" Woodward. Petitioner was assured by Ms. Woodward that the checks would be made payable to Petitioner and her son. What Ms. Woodward had agreed to do was contrary to Respondent's standard operating procedure which was to issue checks for the sale of produce only to persons with whom Respondent had entered into a contract. In April 1992, Respondent sold squash supplied to it by Kurt Vreeland. On or about May 4, 1992, a check for squash sold was issued by Respondent and made payable to Petitioner and Kurt Vreeland and was mailed to an address other than Petitioner's address. The check was prepared and signed by Ms. Woodward. On or about May 19, 1992, Kurt Vreeland and another person appeared at Respondent's place of business, requesting another check, indicating that he had never received the original check. Ms. Woodward attempted to issue the check payable to Petitioner and Kurt Vreeland, but he objected, insisting that the check be made payable only to him, since the contract was with him and no one else. Ms. Woodward complied with the demand and issued another check payable only to Kurt Vreeland. Ms. Woodward complied with Kurt Vreeland's demand because: 1) The contract was in fact with Kurt Vreeland and no one else; 2) Respondent's standard operating procedure was to issue checks only to persons with whom Respondent had entered into a contract; and 3) Kurt Vreeland was demanding that Respondent comply with the contract that he, and only he, receive payment. On the same day the new check was issued, it was cashed at Respondent's bank, showing an endorsement by Kurt Vreeland. Subsequently, after not receiving any money from Respondent, Petitioner telephoned Respondent. Ms. Woodward notified Petitioner that the checks could only be made payable to Kurt Vreeland because the contract for sale of the squash was with him only. Further, Petitioner was informed by Ms. Woodward that she must present proof to Respondent that she, not Kurt Vreeland, owns the produce. This was the first time that Ms. Woodward had experienced this type of situation and was not sure what kind of evidence or proof Petitioner would need to submit. Petitioner and her husband telephoned Respondent several times attempting to convince Respondent that they, not their son, Kurt Vreeland, owned the produce and that checks should be made payable to Petitioner and her son. However, their efforts were to no avail. On May 9, 1992, Petitioner mailed a letter to Respondent, by certified mail, reiterating that the produce was owned by her and checks should be made payable to her and her son. Respondent received the certified letter on May 21, 1992. On May 19, 1992, prior to receiving Petitioner's certified letter, Respondent issued to Kurt Vreeland another check in the amount of $3,346.20 for the sale of additional squash delivered by Kurt Vreeland to Respondent. The check was prepared and signed on behalf of Respondent by Ms. Woodward. That same day, the check was cashed at Respondent's bank, showing an endorsement by Kurt Vreeland. After mailing the certified letter, Petitioner and her husband believed that the matter, regarding the checks, had been resolved, but shortly discovered that they were mistaken. Merchants to whom their son had written checks and with whom Petitioner and her husband did business, were complaining to Petitioner and her husband that their son's checks had been returned for insufficient funds. This new development caused Petitioner and her husband to again contact Respondent by telephone. At that time, Respondent informed Petitioner and her husband of the check issued on May 19, 1992, made payable only to Kurt Vreeland, reiterating that the contract was only with their son. Further, Respondent informed them that Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) had verbally made a claim on the proceeds from the squash on behalf of Kurt Vreeland's ex-wife for his children and that Respondent was not complying with HRS' request either because it had shown no proof that the ex-wife was entitled to the proceeds. On June 19, 1992, Ms. Woodward issued to Kurt Vreeland a check in the amount of $1,774.35 for more squash that it had sold in May 1992 on behalf of Kurt Vreeland. That same day, the check was cashed at Respondent's bank, showing an endorsement by Kurt Vreeland. Before the June 19, 1992 check was issued, Petitioner and her husband made numerous telephone calls to Respondent attempting to convince Respondent to make the checks payable to Petitioner and her son, Kurt Vreeland. Again, all to no avail. After the June 19, 1992 check, Kurt Vreeland did not provide Respondent with any more squash for it to sell. Consequently, no further checks were issued. At one point in time, out of frustration, Respondent requested Petitioner and her husband to remove some remaining squash that had been brought to Respondent by Kurt Vreeland. However, the squash was not removed. At all times material hereto, Petitioner and her husband were aware of the different periods that their son removed squash from the land to take to Respondent for sale. At all times material hereto, at no time did Kurt Vreeland inform Respondent that either Petitioner or her husband had ownership in the squash. Neither Petitioner nor her husband have received any money from their son, Kurt Vreeland, for the expenses they incurred with the 1992 crop of squash, nor for rent of their land to grow the produce.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services issue a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of August 1993. ERROLL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 1993.
The Issue The issue is whether Boyer Produce, Inc. and its surety, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, owe petitioner $1,751.80 as alleged in the complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In July 1993, petitioner, Patricia Thomas, was given authority by her brother to sell all remaining watermelons on his farm located in Citra, Florida. This amounted to approximately one truckload. She eventually sold them to respondent, Boyer Produce, Inc., a dealer (broker) in agricultural products located in Williston, Florida. Its owner and president is Kennedy Boyer (Boyer), who represented his firm in this proceeding. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and is in the amount of $75,000.00. Although the parties had never had business dealings before this transaction, through a mutual acquaintance, Randy Rowe, respondent learned that petitioner was interested in selling her watermelons. After Boyer visited the field and examined three watermelons which he described as "good," Boyer offered to purchase a truckload for 4 per pound if all melons were of the same quality. Thomas declined and counteroffered with a price of 5 per pound. The parties then agreed to split the difference and arrived at a sales price of 4 per pound. During the negotiations, Rowe acted as an intermediary between the parties and observed the formation of the contract as well as the loading of the goods onto the truck. Although the matter is in dispute, it is found that both parties agreed that Thomas would be paid 4 per pound for "good" watermelons delivered. This meant that petitioner would not be paid unless and until the watermelons were delivered to their final destination in "good" condition. In the trade, being in "good condition" meant that the watermelons would meet U. S. Grade No. 1 standards. Respondent also agreed to provide a truck and driver at petitioner's field and to transport the produce to Brooklyn, New York, the final destination. At the same time, petitioner was given the responsibility of loading the watermelons on the truck. To assist petitioner in meeting her up- front labor costs, respondent advanced $500.00 as partial payment for the shipment. Winston Smith was hired by respondent to transport the melons to New York. He arrived at petitioner's field on Saturday, July 16, 1993, and remained there while approximately 46,000 pounds of melons were loaded on an open top flat bed trailer. One of the loaders said the melons were "packed real tight," and four bales of straw were used in packing. According to Rowe, who observed the loading, the watermelons packed that day were in "good" condition, and any nonconforming watermelons were "kicked" off the truck. Also, by way of admission, the driver, as agent for Boyer, acknowledged to Rowe that the melons loaded were in "good" condition. Late that afternoon, a thunderstorm came through the area and, due to lightening, no further loading could be performed. Since around 46,000 pounds had already been loaded, petitioner desired for the truck to be sent on its way north. Smith, however, told petitioner he wanted 50,000 pounds in order to make his trip to New York worthwhile and he would not go with anything less. Acceding to his wishes, petitioner agreed to meet Smith the next morning and load an additional two hundred watermelons, or 4,000 pounds, on the truck. Smith then drove the loaded truck to a nearby motel where he spent the night. That evening it rained, and this resulted in the uncovered watermelons and straw getting wet. The next morning, Smith telephoned petitioner and advised her to meet him at 9:00 a. m. at a local Starvin' Marvin store, which had a weight scale that could certify the weight of the shipment. Petitioner carried two hundred watermelons to the store at 9:00 a. m., but Smith did not arrive. Around noon, she received a call from Smith advising that his truck was broken down at the motel and would not start. The watermelons were then taken to the motel and loaded onto the trailer. In all, 50,040 pounds were loaded. Smith's truck would still not start after the watermelons were loaded, and Smith refused to spend any money out of his own pocket to repair the truck. Not wanting to delay the shipment any longer, petitioner gave Smith $35.00 to have someone assist him in starting the vehicle. In order for the repairs to be made, the loaded trailer had to be jacked up and the truck unhooked from and later rehooked to the trailer. This was accomplished only with great difficulty, and Smith was forced to "jostle" the trailer with the power unit for some two hours altogether. According to Rowe, he warned Smith that such jostling could bruise the melons and "mess them up." Smith was also cautioned early on that he should make the necessary repairs as soon as possible so that the load of watermelons would not continue to sit uncovered in the sun. The truck eventually departed around 9:00 p. m., Sunday evening after the uncovered trailer had sat in the sun all day. The shipment was delivered to Brooklyn on the following Tuesday afternoon or evening, and it was inspected by a government inspector on Wednesday morning. According to the inspection report, which has been received in evidence, the load was split evenly between crimson and jubilee melons, and 23 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the two types of melons failed to meet grade. No greater than a 12 percent "margin" is allowed on government inspections. Almost all of the defects cited in the report were attributable to the melons being "over-ripe." The buyer in New York rejected the entire shipment as not meeting standards. Respondent then sold the shipment for only $1350.00 resulting in a loss of $350.00 on the transaction. In addition, respondent says the driver (Smith) accepted $1200.00 instead of the $2,000.00 he would have normally charged to transport a load to New York. When petitioner asked for her money a few weeks later, respondent declined, saying the goods had not met specification when delivered to their destination, and if she had any remedy at all, it was against Smith, the driver. If petitioner had been paid 4 per pound for the entire shipment, she would have been entitled to an additional $1,751.80, or a total of $2,251.80. Petitioner contends that the melons failed to meet grade because of the negligence of the driver. More specifically, she says the loaded melons sat in the sun for almost two days, including all day Sunday after being soaked from the Saturday evening rain. If wet melons are exposed to the hot sun for any length of time, they run the risk of "wet burning," which causes decay. But even if this occurred, only 1 percent of the shipment was found to have "decay" by the government inspector. Petitioner also says that by being jostled for two hours on Sunday, the melons were bruised. Again, however, the melons were rejected primarily because they were over-ripe, not bruised. Therefore, and consistent with the findings in the inspection report, it is found that the jostling and wet burning did not have a material impact on the quality of the melons. Respondent contended the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded. In this regard, Charles Strange, Sr. agreed that if the melons sat in the field for another four or five days, they would have started "going bad." By this, it may be reasonably inferred that, unless the melons were loaded and delivered in a timely manner, they would have become over-ripe and would not meet grade within a matter of days. Therefore, a timely delivery of the melons was extremely important, and to the extent respondent's agent, Smith, experienced at least a twenty-four hour delay in delivering the melons through no fault of petitioner, this contributed in part to their failure to meet grade. Petitioner is accordingly entitled to some additional compensation, a fair allocation of which is one-half of the value of the shipment, or $1125.90, less the $500.00 already paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioner $625.90 within thirty days from date of the agency's final order. In the event such payment is not timely made, the surety should be liable for such payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company Post Office Box 1985 Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1985 Patricia Thomas Post Office Box 522 Archer, Florida 32618 Kennedy Boyer 15A South West 2nd Avenue Williston, Florida 32696
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Eric Kachnycz, LLC d/b/a Done Right Irrigation and Lighting (“Done Right”), should have a penalty assessed against it by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department”), and, if so, the amount of such penalty or assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the State agency responsible for, inter alia, ensuring that all businesses operating in this State have workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Done Right is a duly-formed and validly-existing limited liability company in the State of Florida. It was formed on July 27, 2004, for the purpose of conducting any and all lawful business. At the time of its formation, Eric Kachnycz was the only listed manager or managing member of the company. His address was listed as 9 Twin River Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida. The registered agent for the company was listed as Betty C. Kachnycz, at the same address. In 2011, Daniel Dupuis was added as a managing member of the company. His address was listed as a post office box in Ormond Beach, Florida. By way of a document filed with the Secretary of State, Division of Corporations, on March 1, 2016, Daniel Dupuis was withdrawn as a managing member of the company. On January 14, 2016, Kent Howe, a compliance investigator with the Department, conducted an investigation at 316 Ocean Dunes Road in Daytona Beach, Florida. Upon arrival at the site at around 11:00 a.m., Mr. Howe noted the presence of a large white truck and work trailer parked in front of the residence. The truck and trailer were imprinted with the name and contact information for Done Right. Mr. Howe saw a person (later identified as Daniel Dupuis) engaged in repair work on a sprinkler or irrigation system in the front yard of the residence. After about ten minutes observing Mr. Dupuis, Mr. Howe approached and asked him for whom he worked. Mr. Dupuis responded that he worked for Done Right and that Mr. Kachnycz owned and operated the business. There was another person at the job site who Mr. Dupuis identified as the owner of the residence. That person, with whom Mr. Howe did not converse, was observed walking into and out of the house and, just before Mr. Howe left the site at 1:00 p.m., was seen using a shovel to back-fill some of the irrigation ditches that had been dug.1/ Mr. Howe tracked down and called Mr. Kachnycz to inquire as to the existence of workers’ compensation insurance for his employees, including Mr. Dupuis. Mr. Kachnycz said that the only two persons associated with Done Right, he and Mr. Dupuis, had existing exemptions from workers’ compensation coverage. Further, Mr. Kachnycz said the he had personally applied for the exemptions himself. Mr. Howe checked the Department’s compliance and coverage automated system (CCAS) to verify the exemptions. He found that Mr. Kachnycz had a current exemption, but Mr. Dupuis’ exemption had expired on April 26, 2015, approximately nine months previous. Exemptions have a two-year term once granted, but may be renewed on-line prior to their expiration. Mr. Kachnycz obtained an exemption in 2004 and has renewed it every two years thereafter. Mr. Dupuis obtained his first exemption in February 2011, but did not timely renew it before it expired two years later. He then obtained an exemption in April 2013, but it expired in 2015. He did not have an exemption in place on January 14, 2016, while working at the job site. He did, however, apply for an exemption just two days later, i.e., on January 16, 2016. After verifying the corporate information for Done Right and checking CCAS to see if any other insurance coverage was in place, Mr. Howe determined that Done Right was not in compliance with workers’ compensation insurance requirements. The information gathered by Mr. Howe was presented to his area district manager, who approved the issuance of a stop work order. Mr. Howe prepared the SWO (along with a request for business records) and hand-delivered the documents to Mr. Dupuis at the job site. Mr. Howe attempted to serve the registered agent of Done Right, Betty C. Kachnycz, at her residence but Mr. Kachnycz said she was working out of town at her job as a registered nurse. So, instead of hand-delivery, Mr. Howe sent a copy of the SWO and request for business records to Mrs. Kachnycz via certified mail. The documents were delivered and signed as accepted by Mrs. Kachnycz on January 23, 2016. Subsequently, Mr. Howe had a conversation with Mr. Kachnycz concerning the possibility of Mr. Kachnycz signing a Conditional Agreed Release from the SWO. A blank copy of that agreement was provided for Mr. Kachnycz’ review, but he never signed the agreement. Mr. Howe later had another conversation with Mr. Kachnycz during which the latter inquired about the “criminal” charges against him related to the SWO. Mr. Howe knew nothing of any criminal charges and no evidence of such was offered at final hearing. Mr. Howe had no further contact with Mr. Kachnycz. Mr. Kachnycz ultimately asked for a formal administrative hearing to contest the SWO and penalty assessment, resulting in the instant case. During the preparation phase prior to final hearing, the Department continued to attempt to obtain the business records for Done Right. The Department served interlocking discovery on Done Right to obtain the business records along with other information. Mr. Kachnycz, however, steadfastly refused to provide the records unless, in his words, “[the records are] not used against me in a court of law.” During his deposition in this matter, Mr. Kachnycz reiterated his demand that his business records not be used against him in this proceeding, a clear indication of Mr. Kachnycz’ lack of understanding of the administrative process. There is no basis in law for such a demand by a party to an administrative proceeding. Mr. Kachnycz also invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and otherwise refused to answer questions posed to him during the deposition.2/ Review of an entity’s business records by the Department allows it to assess the amount of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for the business. A review also allows the Department to determine whether a penalty should be imposed at all. Had Done Right provided its business records in the instant case, it may have resolved the dispute without the necessity of a final administrative hearing. We shall never know. Based upon the absence of business records for Done Right, the Department used its existing rule constructs to formulate the amount of the penalty to be assessed. Anita Proano, an employee in the Department’s bureau of compliance, established a penalty using standard guidelines. Since Done Right did not provide business records for review, the imputed method was employed.3/ First, the payroll was calculated by using the average weekly wage in effect at the time of the issuance of the SWO and, per statute, multiplying by two. Class Code 5183-–under the construction umbrella, but specifically including irrigation and lawn sprinkler systems-– was assigned to the work being done by Done Right. The period of non-compliance was set at September 3, 2015, through December 31, 2015, and January 1, 2016, through January 14, 2016. Those are the dates within the Department’s two-year audit period that Done Right was deemed to be out of compliance. The imputed gross payroll amount was $29,571.77 for the first period of non-compliance and $3,450.04 for the second period. Those figures, divided by 100, resulted in the amounts of $295.72 and $34.50, respectively. The approved manual rate set for the two periods was $5.46 and $5.11, reflecting the rates for Class Code 5183. The premium owed by the employer for the first period was calculated at $1,614.62 and the premium it should have paid for the second period was $176.30. Those amounts, multiplied by two, resulted in assessed penalties of $3,229.24 and $352.60, for a total penalty of $3,581.84. Done Right presented no evidence to contest the amount of the penalty or the calculation thereof. Instead, Mr. Kachnycz inquired of the Department’s witnesses whether they had signed loyalty oaths and, if so, if they remembered what was in the oath. He expressed his displeasure at the process for penalizing small businesses and invoked his Constitutional rights (State and Federal), but provided no evidence germane to the issues of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing a penalty of $3,581.84 against Respondent, Eric Kachnycz, LLC, d/b/a Done Right Irrigation and Lighting. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2016
The Issue The issue is whether the application filed by Mr. Johnson for a certificate of registration as a Florida Farm Labor Contractor should be issued by the Department.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Johnson had been the subject of a prior administrative complaint by the Department of Labor and Employment Security Case No. 88-3795. In that proceeding he was represented by Mr. Thomas Montgomery, Esquire, of Belle Glade, Florida. That proceeding involved an earlier application by Mr. Johnson for a certificate of registration as a Florida Farm Labor Contractor, which the Department denied because Mr. Johnson was liable for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes in the amount of $1,400, and under Rule 38B-4.06(5), Florida Administrative Code, he was ineligible for registration until those unemployment compensation taxes had been paid. The parties had reached a stipulated settlement in that action, under which Mr. Johnson agreed to pay $100.00 per month until the balance due had been paid in full. That stipulation had been signed by Mr. Montgomery, the lawyer for Mr. Johnson. The stipulation was filed on November 18, 1988, with the Division of Administrative Hearings, and consequently an Order Closing File was entered in Case No. 88-3795. Mr. Johnson failed to make payments in accordance with the stipulation agreement. Given the accrued interest and penalties, Mr. Johnson is currently indebted to the State of Florida for unpaid employment compensation taxes, interest, penalties and filing fees in the amount of $2,213.94. Mr. Johnson's failure to make payment as required under the stipulation which he entered into in settlement of Case No. 88-3795, his prior application for a certificate of registration as a Farm Labor Contractor, causes the Hearing Officer to disbelieve that Mr. Johnson was mistaken as to the location of the hearing. The Notice of Hearing was clear. Mr. Johnson has also failed to answer requests for admissions and interrogatories served upon him in this proceeding. Mr. Johnson is continuing to engage in a pattern of conduct designed to evade his responsibility to pay unemployment compensation taxes which he owes. His application for a certificate of registration filed June 4, 1990, should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application of James Johnson for a certificate of registration as a Florida Farm Labor Contractor. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1990. Copies furnished: Francisco Rivera, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Suite 307, Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0658 James Johnson 391 Shirley Drive Pahokee, Florida 33034 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building, Suite 200 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0658
The Issue The issue is whether the claims of $98,935.20 and $19,147.70, filed by Petitioner under the Agricultural Bond and License Law, are valid. §§ 604.15 - 604.34, Fla. Stat. (2008).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a producer of agricultural products located in Plant City, Florida. At all material times, American Growers has been a dealer in agricultural products. Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Company, as surety, issued a bond to American Growers, as principal. American Growers is licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("DACS"). Between December 16, 2008, and February 4, 2009, Petitioner sold strawberries to American Growers, each sale being accompanied by a Passing and Bill of Lading. Petitioner sent an Invoice for each shipment, and payment was due in full following receipt of the Invoice. Partial payments have been made on some of the invoices, and as of the date of this Recommended Order, the amount that remains unpaid by American Growers to Petitioner is $117,982.90, comprising: Invoice No. Invoice Date Amount Balance Due 103894 12/16/08 $7,419.00 $1,296.00 103952 12/22/08 $18,370.80 $1,944.00 103953 12/23/08 $3,123.60 $648.00 193955 12/26/08 $8,164.80 $1,728.00 103984 12/28/08 $28,764.40 $28,764.40 104076 12/31/08 $17,236.80 $17,236.80 104077 1/5/09 $17,658.00 $17,658.00 104189 1/5/09 $1,320.90 $1,320.90 104386 1/20/09 $16,480.80 $16,480.80 104517 1/29/09 $17,449.20 $17,449.20 104496 2/4/09 $13,456.80 $13,456.80 TOTAL $117,982.90
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order requiring Respondent, American Growers, Inc., and/or its surety, Respondent, Lincoln General Insurance Company, to pay Petitioner, Crown Harvest Produce Sales, LLC, the total amount of $117,982.90. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capital, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Glenn Thomason, President American Growers, Inc. 14888 Horseshoe Trace Wellington, Florida 33414 Katy Koestner Esquivel, Esquire Meuers Law Firm, P.L. 5395 Park Central Court Naples, Florida 34109 Renee Herder Surety Bond Claims Lincoln General Insurance Company 4902 Eisenhower Boulevard, Suite 155 Tampa, Florida 33634 Glenn C. Thomason, Registered Agent American Growers, Inc. Post Office Box 1207 Loxahatchee, Florida 33470
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, H.P. Sod, Inc., is entitled to payment from an Agricultural Bond issued to Respondent, PLS Landscape Services, Inc., and, if so, the amount owed to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensed producer of an agricultural product, i.e., sod. Petitioner is a duly incorporated for-profit corporation in the State of Florida and is in good standing. Horacio Pereira is the putative owner of the company, referring to himself at final hearing as “the boss, the guy who tells people what to do.” Respondent is a duly incorporated Florida corporation. Its business address is 6132 Snook Court, Port St. Lucie, Florida. The only officer or director of the corporation is George J. Kijewski. Respondent is a landscaping business. From the period July 23, 2012, through October 16, 2012, Respondent purchased quantities of Bahia sod from Petitioner on numerous occasions. The dates of purchase, quantity of sod purchased, and ticket numbers for each purchase are as follows: 23 – Ticket 36930 – 10 pallets 23 - Ticket 36983 – 16 pallets 30 – Ticket 37185 – 10 pallets 1 – Ticket 36818 – 16 pallets 1 – Ticket 37276 – 16 pallets 1 – Ticket 37283 – 16 pallets 6 – Ticket 36872 – 16 pallets 8 – Ticket 37319 – 16 pallets July July July August August August August August August 10 – Ticket 37339 – 16 pallets September 4 – Ticket 37727 – 16 pallets October 15 – Ticket 38712 – 16 pallets October 16 – Ticket 38720 – 16 pallets Petitioner issued the following invoices to Respondent concerning the aforementioned purchases of Bahia sod: Invoice 6615 – July 26 – Tickets 36930, 36983 $620.20 Invoice 6640 – August 2 – Tickets 36818, 37185, 37276, 37283 - $1,420.96 Invoice 6671 – August 16 – Tickets 36872, 37319, 37339 - $1,104.24 Invoice 6735 – September 6 – Ticket 37727 - $445.12 Invoice 6875 – October 18 – Tickets 38712, 38720 - $890.24 TOTAL - $4,481.11 Respondent did not remit payments on any of the aforementioned invoices. Respondent contends that some of the sod which it purchased from Petitioner was of inferior quality or was in less quantity than ordered. Specifically, Respondent said some of the sod was wet and fell apart when being installed. He also said the wet sod resulted in some pallets containing 370 to 390 square feet of sod rather than the 400 feet that is standard on a pallet. Respondent’s testimony was general in nature, not specific to any particular shipment, and flies in the face of his on-going purchases of sod from Petitioner. Further, there was no credible evidence presented at final hearing that Respondent ever complained to Petitioner about the quality or quantity of the sod. Had he done so, Petitioner said it would have corrected the problem. Respondent did reportedly tell one of his drivers, Mr. Calloway, on occasion that the sod was wet or otherwise not up to par. However, that complaint was never provided to Petitioner so that action could be taken. Respondent acquired a bond in the sum of $5,000.00 through TD Bank, N.A. (also referred to in this matter as United States Corporation Company, as Surety). The bank was not represented at the final hearing held in this matter. No defense was raised by the bank concerning Petitioner’s attempt to attach the bond. Petitioner paid a fee of $50.00 to the Department of Agriculture to bring this action. Petitioner hired an attorney to represent its interest in this matter. The attorney charged $175.00 per hour and, as of the date of the final hearing, had billed approximately five hours of time or $875.00 in fees. Subsequent to the final hearing, the attorney submitted a post-hearing proposed order on behalf of Petitioner. The attorney expended $180.00 in costs for service of a subpoena and witness fees. The total sum demanded by Petitioner in its action against Respondent is $5,586.11. Respondent’s PRO filed in this matter asserts a number of “facts” which were not established by competent testimony at the final hearing. Those facts were not considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as follows: Respondent shall pay to Petitioner, within 15 days of the entry of the Final Order, the sum of $5,586.11; or If Respondent fails to timely make the aforementioned payment, the Department shall call upon TD Bank, N.A., to pay over to the Department the full amount of Respondent’s bond; and The Department shall then turn the entire proceeds of the bond over to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s performance under its lawn care service contract with the Department of Management Services was deficient, and, if so, whether the amounts deducted by the Department from the monthly payments made to Petitioner under the contract were reasonable and appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner provides lawn care services to residential and commercial properties in the central Florida area. Andre Smith is Petitioner’s owner and president. In November 2004, the Department entered into a contract with Petitioner for lawn care services at nine Department buildings. The contract was awarded to Petitioner through a competitive procurement process in which Petitioner was the low bidder. The contract number was ITN No. 26-991- 490-Z. Petitioner was to be paid a total of $7,384.92 per month under the contract. Each of the nine buildings was apportioned a specific amount of the total price in the contract. The scope of work under the contract generally included lawn care services, open field mowing, and irrigation system maintenance. The lawn care services required under the contract included mowing, edging, weed control, fertilizing, watering, shrub and tree pruning, mulching, and clean-up. The contract specified the frequency that the services were to be performed. Mowing was to be done weekly between April and November, and every two weeks between December and March; hedges and shrubs were to be trimmed at least monthly unless more frequent trimming was required for aesthetic reasons; and mulching was to be done in March and September. The contract required Petitioner to take soil samples at the beginning of the contract and annually thereafter. The results of the soil samples were to be used to determine whether Petitioner needed to apply iron, lime, or other minerals to the lawns. The contract required Petitioner to inspect each building’s irrigation system at the beginning of the contract, and required Petitioner to provide a report to the building manager regarding any repair work needed on the system. Petitioner was also required to check the irrigation system on every visit to ensure that it was operating properly. The contract required Petitioner to apply pre-emergent weed control and fertilizer. The weed control was to be applied in the spring and the fall, and the fertilizer was to be applied three times during the year on an agreed upon schedule. The mulching required by the contract was to be done in March and September. The mulch was to be maintained at a depth of four inches throughout the year. The contract required Petitioner to use cypress mulch. The day-to-day operation of the buildings subject to the contract was the responsibility of on-site building managers, not the Department staff in Tallahassee. The building managers were responsible for the direct oversight of Petitioner’s work under the contract, and they were also responsible for reviewing and evaluating Petitioner’s performance. Petitioner began providing services under the contract in December 2004. Petitioner received full payment from the Department for the services that it provided from December 2004 through March 2005, even though several of the building managers were not satisfied with Petitioner’s performance under the contract during that period. Several of the building managers spoke with Mr. Smith regarding their concerns with Petitioner’s performance under the contract. They also documented Petitioner’s performance deficiencies on the monthly summary report forms that the contract required Petitioner to submit in order to obtain payment. Starting in April 2005, the building managers were required to fill out evaluation forms in addition to the monthly summary report forms. The impetus for the creation and use of the evaluation forms was Petitioner’s continuing unsatisfactory performance under the contract. The building managers used the evaluation forms to rate Petitioner’s performance as “good,” “fair,” or “poor” on the 20 categories of service that Petitioner was required to perform under the contract. Each service was assigned an equal weight -- e.g., one twentieth or five percent of the contract -- and if all 20 services were not applicable to a particular building, the weight assigned to each service was adjusted accordingly. The evaluation form was developed by Kris Parks, who was the contract administrator for Petitioner’s contract. Ms. Parks developed the form on her own. She did not get the input of the building managers in developing the form, and Mr. Smith was not consulted regarding the development of the form. The evaluation forms were used by Ms. Parks in conjunction with the monthly summary report forms in order to reduce the payments made to Petitioner under the contract. Each service for which Petitioner was given a “poor” rating by a building manager resulted in a five percent deduction in the amount paid to Petitioner. Typically, a “poor” rating reflected work that was not performed at all by Petitioner, rather than work that was performed unsatisfactorily. In some situations, a smaller deduction was made if the comments on the evaluation form or the monthly summary report form reflected partial performance despite the “poor” rating. For example, if Petitioner received a “poor” rating for mowing, but the comments reflected that Petitioner provided services twice during the month rather than the required four times, the deduction was 2.5 percent rather than five percent. The reduction of payments under the contract for unsatisfactory performance or unperformed work is specifically authorized by Section 3.13 of the contract. Section 3.13 of the contract states that the monthly summary report form “will be used by [the building managers] to track performance of services, in order to determine a proportional deduction in payment for services that are not performed as agreed” in the contract. It does not mention any other form. The contract does not define “proportional deduction” and it does not include the methodology to be used in calculating the deduction. The contract is silent on those issues. Petitioner’s contract with the Department was amended in May 2005 to reduce the number of buildings that Petitioner served from nine to three. The three remaining buildings were the ones closest to Petitioner’s business location in Lakeland, i.e., the Hargrett and Trammel Buildings in Tampa and the Peterson Building in Lakeland. The reduction in the scope of the contract was the result of Petitioner’s continuing unsatisfactory performance under the contract, and it reflected the Department’s well- founded view that Petitioner was not able to handle all nine buildings. The Department staff was trying to help Mr. Smith by allowing Petitioner to retain a portion of the contract rather than canceling the contract altogether based upon Petitioner’s poor performance. The invoices submitted by Petitioner for April 2005 through July 2005 were as follows: $7,384.92 (April); $7,384.92 (May); $1,938.64 (June); and $1,938.64 (July). The April and May invoices were based upon the nine buildings served by Petitioner in those months. The June and July invoices were based upon the three buildings served by Petitioner in those months. The Department did not pay the invoices for April 2005 through July 2005 in full. It paid Petitioner $2,451.782 for April (33.2 percent of the invoice), $835.82 for May (11.6 percent), $453.393 for June (23.4 percent), and $904.66 for July (46.7 percent). The amounts deducted -- $4,933.14 for April; $6,531.10 for May; $1,485.25 for June; and $1,033.98 for July -- were based upon the Department’s determination that Petitioner failed to perform certain work under the contract. The amounts deducted were calculated by Ms. Parks using the information provided to her by the building managers on the evaluation forms, as described above. The letters by which the Department informed Petitioner of the payment reductions advised Petitioner that it “may have the right to an administrative hearing regarding this matter, pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.” The letters explained what Petitioner was required to do to request a hearing and advised Petitioner that the "[f]ailure to timely request a hearing will be deemed a waiver of [the] right to a hearing." Petitioner timely filed letters challenging the deductions for April, June, and July 2005. The total deductions for those months were $7,452.37. Petitioner did not file anything challenging the deduction for May 2005. Therefore, the $6,531.10 deduction for that month is not at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner is not entitled to the full amount billed to the Department for April, June, and July 2005 because all of the services required under the contract were not performed during those months. Mr. Smith conceded this point in his testimony at the final hearing.4 Mr. Smith contended at the hearing that the amounts deducted by the Department were not reasonable in light of the services that Petitioner did provide. However, Mr. Smith did not identify what he would consider to be a reasonable deduction for the work that Petitioner admittedly did not perform. Petitioner routinely failed to provide mowing services at each of the buildings at the intervals required under the contract. For example, Petitioner only mowed one time during the month of June 2005 at the Hargrett and Trammel Buildings, rather than the four times required under the contract. Petitioner did not put down mulch at any of the buildings in March 2005, as required by the contract. When the building managers asked Mr. Smith about the mulch, he told them that he would get to it. Mr. Smith testified that he was told by the Department staff in Tallahassee that the mulch could be put down in any month so long as it was done twice a year. That uncorroborated, self-serving testimony was not persuasive. Petitioner put down mulch at some, but not all of the buildings in April and May 2005. The mulch that Petitioner put down did not cover all of the areas requiring mulch and it was not put down at the required four-inch depth. At the Trammel Building, for example, the mulch put down by Petitioner was less than half of that required by the contract. No mulch was ever put down at the Hurston Building in Orlando or the Grizzle Building in Largo. Petitioner’s performance was often deficient in regards to trimming and clean-up of debris. For example, on one occasion at the Trammel Building, Petitioner left more than 60 bags of leaves in and around the building’s dumpster; at the Hargrett building, there were overhanging tree limbs that went untrimmed for an extended period; and Petitioner routinely failed to do trimming at the Grizzle Building, although he did a good job picking up debris at that building. The services provided by Petitioner at the Trammel Building got so bad that the building manager had to hire another company at a cost of approximately $1,800 to clean up the site so that it would be presentable for an event in the vicinity of the building that was attended by a U.S. Senator and other dignitaries. The building managers were never given the results of the soil samples that Petitioner was required to take at the beginning of the contract even though they repeatedly requested that information. When Mr. Smith was asked about the soil samples by the building managers, he told them that he would get them done. Mr. Smith claimed at the hearing that he sent the results of the soil samples to the Department staff in Tallahassee, although he could not recall whom specifically he sent the results to, and he offered no documentation to corroborate his testimony on this issue. Petitioner’s testimony regarding the soil samples was not persuasive. The Department’s witnesses credibly testified that they never received the results of the soil samples from Petitioner. Indeed, the evidence was not persuasive that Petitioner ever took the soil samples required by the contract. The print-outs presented at the final hearing, Exhibit DMS-11, do not have any identifying information that would corroborate Mr. Smith’s testimony that the samples described in the print- outs were from the buildings that were the subject of the contract.5 Moreover, the print-outs are dated March 8, 2005, which is more than four months after the samples were supposed to have been taken by Petitioner, and several of the soil samples had pH levels outside of the range set forth in the contract. Mr. Smith testified that Petitioner applied fertilizer and pre-emergent weed control at each of the buildings, as required by the contract. That uncorroborated, self-serving testimony was not persuasive. The more persuasive evidence establishes that Petitioner did not apply fertilizer or pre-emergent weed control. On this issue, the building managers credibly testified that they were never advised by Mr. Smith that the fertilizer or pre-emergent weed control was being applied, even though those services were to supposed be performed pursuant to a schedule agreed upon with the building managers; the building managers credibly testified that they did not observe any signs that fertilizer had been applied, such as the greening of the grass; and fertilizer could not have been applied at the Hurston Building without killing all of the grass because the fertilizer needs to be watered into the lawn, and the sprinkler system at the building was not working at the time. Petitioner failed to perform the required inspection of the irrigation system at several of the buildings, including the Hurston Building, at the beginning of the contract in order to determine whether any repairs needed to be done. The system at the Hurston Building did not work for an extended period of time, which caused large sections of grass around the building to die from a lack of water. The performance deficiencies described above were cited on the monthly summary report forms and the evaluation forms completed by the building managers, which in turn were used by Ms. Parks to calculate the amount deducted from the monthly payments made to Petitioner under the contract. Petitioner was responsible for the costs of the mulch, fertilizer, and pre-emergent weed control required under the contract. The money that Petitioner “saved” by not providing those services likely exceeds the amounts deducted by the Department pursuant to Section 3.13 of the contract. For example, the mulch purchased by Petitioner for the Trammell Building cost approximately $2,250, and that was only half of the mulch needed for that building alone. Petitioner is no longer providing lawn care services to the Department under the contract. The contract was revoked based upon Petitioner’s unsatisfactory performance. The revocation of the contract, which occurred at some point prior to August 2005, is not at issue in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services issue a final order rejecting Petitioner’s challenge to the payment reductions made by the Department for the months of April, June, and July 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd of November, 2006.
