The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is liable for the sales and use tax assessment issued by Respondent on February 21, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this proceeding, Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), has issued a proposed sales and use tax assessment in the amount of $24,546.54, plus $6,640.12 in penalties, plus interest from the date of the assessment, against Petitioner, Florida Truck Dock Company (Petitioner or taxpayer). As of March 20, 1997, the assessment totaled $55,195.27, and it continues to increase by $8.07 each day. The assessment constitutes taxes, penalties, and interest allegedly due from Petitioner for various materials and supplies purchased by Petitioner for use in the performance of real property contracts for Petitioner's customers. In its response to the assessment, Petitioner denied that it owed the money. Petitioner's business activities consisted primarily of purchasing truck loading dock equipment from suppliers, principally Kelly Company, Inc. (Kelly), and then installing such equipment as an improvement to real estate. Its records indicate that purchased equipment was generally brought into Florida and installed in real property in the state under a contract whereby parts and labor were furnished for one lump sum contract price. The foregoing contracts were Class A or lump sum contracts within the meaning of Rule 12A-1.051(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Class A contracts are considered contracts for the improvement of real estate, not contracts for the resale of tangible personal property. In addition, when the equipment was purchased, Petitioner had not issued resale certificates to its vendors. Under these circumstances, Petitioner was properly treated as an end-user of the equipment in question and owed use taxes on all such purchases of tangible personal property. This controversy began on March 30, 1992, when DOR issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records of the taxpayer in conjunction with a routine audit. The notice requested that Petitioner make available various corporate records pertaining to its sales and use tax and intangible tax liability. However, only the sales and use tax is in issue here. DOR later advised the taxpayer that the audit period would run from March 1, 1987, through February 29, 1992, and that instead of a detailed audit, only a three-month sampling of the full audit period would be necessary. An initial audit revealed that Petitioner was entitled to a refund. None was given, however, because of information supplied by an employee of the taxpayer regarding the possible destruction and alteration of certain records by the taxpayer, and the auditor's conclusion that a three-month sampling of the records was not representative for the full five-year audit period. In addition, the auditor concluded that the results of the sample period were not reasonable. For these reasons, the scope of the audit was expanded. The auditor then requested, among other things, that copies of all sales (summary) journals for the entire five-year period be produced. Although Petitioner has always contended that these journals were merely "commission" journals for transactions between its vendors and customers, the auditor's finding that they are records of cash transactions is consistent with the language on the face of the journals, referring to "deposits" and "total deposits." Further, a comparison of the journals with Petitioner's own bank statements confirms this finding. At least twelve months of the records were missing, and the taxpayer agreed to recreate the missing records. Once a copy of all journals (both original and recreated) was produced, the auditor tested their validity and then made various audit adjustments, which are reflected on Schedule A-2 of Exhibit 5. In those instances where inadequate cost price information concerning equipment purchases was provided by the taxpayer, the auditor properly used estimates in making his adjustments. The tax liability for each taxable transaction was recorded by the taxpayer under Account 367 on the sales journals. The auditor then examined the source documents (original invoices) to verify the accuracy of the recorded amounts. These numbers were then compared with the taxes paid by the taxpayer on its monthly tax returns filed with DOR. This comparison produced a deficiency which represents approximately 75 percent of the total assessment. However, in those instances where Petitioner collected sales tax from its customers, and remitted the same to DOR, Petitioner was not assessed with a tax for those same items. A sampling of the audit period established that Petitioner also had a number of lump-sum contracts with various governmental customers on which it neither paid taxes to the vendor when the equipment was purchased, nor did it collect taxes from the end-user when the equipment was resold. Thus, it was responsible for the use taxes on these transactions. The deficiency is detailed on Schedule B-3 of the final audit report (Exhibit 6), and it accounts for approximately 14 percent of the total assessment. The remaining part of the assessment is related to four miscellaneous transactions which are unrelated to the sales journals. Two of the transactions occurred during the short period of time when the service tax was in effect in 1987, while the remaining two relate to small purchases of equipment and supplies by the taxpayer for its own consumption. There was no evidence that the taxpayer paid the taxes due on these transactions. DOR met with the taxpayer, its accountant, and its original counsel on various occasions in an effort to obtain more documentation favorable to the taxpayer's position. In most cases, the taxpayer refused to provide more records. At one meeting, however, the taxpayer produced additional source documents (invoices) that appeared to be altered from the original invoices previously given to the auditor. These are shown in Exhibit 7 received in evidence. When asked by the auditor for copies of the same invoices sent to customers so that the discrepancy could be resolved, the taxpayer refused to comply with this request. During the audit process, the taxpayer contended that its primary supplier, Kelly, had already paid taxes on a number of the transactions. No documentation was produced, however, to support this contention. It also complained that there was bias on the part of DOR's auditor. As to this contention, the record shows that the auditor had no relationship with the taxpayer prior to this audit, and for the intangible personal property tax, the auditor's field work actually resulted in a refund for Petitioner. Finally, the taxpayer contended that rather than using the originally supplied records, the auditor should have used Petitioner's recreated or altered records in making the audit adjustments. This latter contention has been rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining its original assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Benjamin K. Phipps, Esquire Post Office Box 1351 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 L. H. Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue can levy on petitioner's bank accounts where the petitioner failed to challenge the final sales tax assessment and failed to remit the tax, penalties, and interest due pursuant to the assessment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Forest Hill Convenience, Inc., is a Florida corporation. It owns one convenience store in Palm Beach County, Kwik Stop number 320, and owned a second convenience store in Palm Beach County, One-Stop Food Mart, during the time relevant to this proceeding. Samson Abraham Francis is Forest Hill's President and only corporate officer. In December 1993, at the request of Forest Hill and a third party which was interested in purchasing the convenience stores, Van T. Ho, a Tax Auditor IV with the Department, performed an audit of Forest Hill's books and records for the period October 1, 1992 through November 31, 1993. As a result of the audit, the Department identified sales tax deficiencies. Forest Hill was notified on January 10, 1994, that the audit had revealed a tax deficiency of $1,046.78, exclusive of penalties and interest. On January 11, 1994, Mr. Francis met with Ms. Ho to go over the audit results. On January 13, 1994, Ms. Ho telephoned Mr. Francis and notified him that she had discovered an error in the initial audit and that Forest Hill's sales tax deficiency was $5,217.45, for a total tax liability of $7,354.86, with penalties and accrued interest. Mr. Francis did not object to the revision during this telephone conversation, and Ms. Ho sent Forest Hill the revised audit papers, together with a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated January 18, 1994. In this Notice, Forest Hill was advised that it must submit any objections to the proposed audit changes, in writing, by February 17, 1994, and that, if no objections were filed, a Proposed Notice of Deficiency would issue on March 21, 1994. In a letter dated February 22, 1994, Mr. Francis requested an extension of time to allow Forest Hill's accountant time to review the Notice and the audit papers. Mr. Francis did not register a protest to the tax deficiency identified in the revised audit papers in this letter. A two-week extension was granted. Even though the Department did not receive an objection to the proposed audit changes, it offered, in a letter dated March 25, 1994, to schedule a meeting to resolve any objections Mr. Francis might have to the proposed tax liability. The Department did not receive a response to this letter, and, in a letter dated September 9, 1994, Mr. Francis was advised that the audit file was being forwarded to Tallahassee. A Notice of Proposed Assessment dated October 6, 1994, was sent to Forest Hill via certified United States mail to Mr. Francis's then-current home address. In the Notice, the Department advised Forest Hill that it owed the Department $8,320.21, consisting of $5,217.45 in sales tax, $2,284.02 in penalties, and $818.74 in interest, with additional interest accruing at the rate of $1.72 per day. The Department further advised Forest Hill that, if it did not request informal proceedings, the assessment would become final on December 5, 1995, and that no relief could be granted by the Department, the Division of Administrative Hearings, or the courts beyond sixty days from the date the assessment became final, that is, by February 3, 1995. The Notice was returned to the Department unclaimed after two attempts at delivery. Forest Hill did not timely file a request for informal proceedings to challenge the proposed assessment, and the proposed assessment became a final assessment on December 5, 1994. On January 24, 1995, a Tax Warrant was filed by the Department with the Clerk of Court in Palm Beach County, Florida, and Forest Hill was so advised in a letter dated January 24, 1995. Forest Hill did not challenge the final assessment in circuit court or by petition to the Division Administrative Hearings by the date specified in the Notice of Proposed Assessment. The Department issued a Notice of Delinquent Tax dated March 24, 1995, to Forest Hill's bank. On April 13, 1995, the Department received a letter from Mr. Francis, dated March 9, 1995, protesting the amount of the assessment. In a letter dated May 4, 1995, Linda Howe, the Department's West Palm Beach Collection and Enforcement Administrator, notified Forest Hill that the audit could not be reopened because all protest rights had expired. Ms. Howe advised Forest Hill that it could pursue a compromise with the Department, and she stated that a written request for such relief had to be filed with the Department within fourteen days, during which time she would suspend collection and enforcement action on the warrant. Forest Hill failed to respond to the Department's letter of May 4, 1995, and a Notice to Freeze, dated May 31, 1995, was sent to Great Western Bank in Delray Beach, Florida, freezing Forest Hill's assets in the amount of $9,050.25. Forest Hill did not satisfy the warrant, and, on June 13, 1995, the Department sent the Notice of Intent to Levy via certified United States mail to Forest Hill at its business address. The only basis on which Forest Hill challenges the Notice of Intent to Levy is that the amount of the assessment is incorrect and unfair. Forest Hill has, however, waived any right to contest the correctness or validity of the assessment. The Department followed the procedures established by statute and rule in proceeding to issue a final tax assessment against Forest Hill. Mr. Francis did not participate on Forest Hill's behalf in the informal proceedings offered by the Department to resolve his objections to the correctness of the tax deficiency, nor did he timely request a hearing to contest either the proposed assessment or the final assessment. The Department has met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Forest Hill has an outstanding tax liability in the amount shown on the Notice of Intent to Levy. Forest Hill has failed to prove any ground upon which the Department's proposed levy is defective or illegal. It has, therefore, failed to establish that the Department cannot properly levy on the bank accounts and certificates of deposit subject to the Notice of Freeze and the Notice of Intent to Levy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order upholding the Department's Notice of Intent to Levy and allowing it to proceed with the garnishment of the bank accounts and certificates of deposit owned by Forest Hill Convenience, Inc., in the amount of $8,320.21, including tax, penalties, and interest, together with such interest as has accrued since October 7, 1994. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of March 1996. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March 1996.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner is liable for the sales and use tax, penalties, and interest assessed by the Department of Revenue and if so, what amount?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rowe's Supermarkets, LLC ("Petitioner" or "Rowe's"), is a Florida limited liability company. Robert Rowe was the president and primary shareholder in Rowe's. Respondent, Department of Revenue ("DOR" or "Respondent"), is an agency of the State of Florida authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. §§ 20.21 and 213.51, Fla. Stat. (2011) During the audit giving rise to this proceeding, Rowe's had its principal address at 5435 Blanding Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. Currently, Rowe's is located at 1431 Riverplace Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. Rowe's organized in Florida on May 4, 2005. Rowe's was a sales and use tax dealer registered with the Department to conduct business in this state. It was in business approximately four years. Rowe's acquired several former Albertson's grocery retail stores, including the adjacent liquor stores, in Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and Orange Park, Florida. During the audit period, Rowe's sold five stores with the adjacent liquor stores. Soon after beginning operation, Rowe's experienced significant financial difficulties which ultimately led to its demise. Its secured lender forced Rowe's to liquidate assets whenever possible, and all proceeds from the sale of the stores were paid directly into a locked account to Rowe's lender, Textron Financial. On October 29, 2008, the Department issued to Rowe's a Notification to Audit Books and Records, Form DR-840, bearing audit number 200048409, for sales and use tax, for the audit period beginning October 1, 2005, and ending September 30, 2008. On August 14, 2009, the Department issued to Rowe's a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, form DR-1215, for sales and use taxes, penalties and interest totaling $321,191.45, with additional interest accruing at $53.71 per day. On August 20, 2009, Rowe's canceled its sales and use tax Certificate of Registration. In a letter dated September 11, 2009, Rowe's requested an audit conference. The requested audit conference was held November 19, 2009. On January 8, 2010, the Department issued the taxpayer a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, form DR-1215, Revision #1, for sales and use tax, penalty and interest totaling $180,435.61, with additional interest accruing at $25.32 per day. On March 10, 2010, the Department issued a NOPA, which indicated Rowe's owed $137,225.27 in sales and use tax; $44,755.99 in interest through March 10, 2010; and $59.70 in penalties, with additional interest accruing at $26.32 per day. Prior to issuance of the NOPA, the Department compromised $34,246.663 in penalties, based upon reasonable cause. By letter dated May 6, 2010, Rowe's filed a protest to dispute the proposed assessment. The letter stated: I am submitting this informal protest on behalf of Rowe's Supermarkets, LLC (RS) as its past President. RS is no longer in business and has not assets. Before this audit began RS was unable to pay its bills. Also, its line of credit, which was secured by all of RS's assets, was in default and had been called by the lender. RS was unable to refinance the loan because of its poor financial condition. As a result, it sold all of its assets to a new company which was able to obtain financing and used the proceeds of that sale to repay its secured loan. RS not only has no assets but also is subject to an unsatisfied judgment lien against it in the amount of $324,936.33, which has been accruing interest at 8% per year from August 25, 2009, the date the judgment was entered by the Circuit Court here in Jacksonville. Even if Supermarkets was still in business and could pay its bills, we don't think it should be assessed with these taxes on the basis of the audit that was conducted. The auditor's lack of communication skills made it difficult for us to understand what information she needed. To the extent we understood her requests, we made every effort to provide her with the relevant information. But because most of the stores RS operated had already been closed, the only repository for obtaining accurate information was RS's general ledger, which she declined to review. She never explained why she made the proposed adjustments. We still don't know. We did our best when RS was operating to properly collect all sales taxes, we reflected all of the sale tax collections in the general ledger and we timely turned over all of the those taxes to the department of revenue, as is clear in the general ledger. We request that the proposed assessment be dropped. The Department issued a Notice of Decision on October 14, 2010, which sustained the assessment in full. In issuing its Notice of Decision, the Department did not review any issues related to the assessment other than doubt as to collectability. With respect to this issue, the Department stated, "[b]ased on our evaluation of all the factors of this case, including the financial information, we have concluded that it is not in the best interest of the State to accept your offer." Petitioner's challenge to the assessment presents five issues: 1) whether it was entitled to an exemption in section 212.12(14) for those additional taxes assessed for "rounding" up to the whole cent as opposed to using the bracket system in section 212.12(9); 2) whether the Department's assessment of additional taxes for expenses was erroneous where it was based on a sampling plan not presented to or agreed to by the taxpayer; 3) whether the additional tax on liquor sales was based on an incorrect application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A- 1.057(3)(a); 4) whether the Department violated the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights; and whether the Department was correct in determining that compromise of the assessment based on collectability was not in the best interest of the state. Each issue is treated separately below. The Exemption pursuant to section 212.12(14) Section 212.12(9) and (10), Florida Statutes, requires that sales taxes be paid on a "bracket system," and prescribes the amount of tax due for each portion of a dollar. Subsection (9) provides the tax brackets for those counties, such as St. Johns, which do not have a discretionary sales surtax and for which the tax rate is 6 percent. Subsection (10) provides the brackets for those counties, such as Duval and Clay, where a discretionary sales surtax of one percent has been adopted, making the sales-tax rate 7 percent. Section 212.12(14) provides a "safe harbor" from additional assessment of taxes for those dealers who fail to apply the tax brackets required by section 212.12. The taxpayer is not assessed additional taxes, penalty, and interest based on the failure to apply the bracket system if it meets three requirements: that it acted in a good faith belief that rounding was the proper method of determining the amount of tax due; if it timely reported and remitted all taxes collected on each taxable transaction; and if the taxpayer agrees in writing to future compliance with the law and rules concerning brackets applicable to the dealer's transactions. It is undisputed that Rowe's was not using the bracket system to calculate and collect sales taxes. The point-of-sale cash register system Rowe's purchased when opening its business was represented to Petitioner as compliant with Florida requirements when in fact it was not. The Department's auditor, Delaine Arrington, determined that assessment of additional taxes was appropriate because she believed that Rowe's had not timely reported and remitted all taxes collected on each taxable transaction, and that Rowe's had not agreed in writing to future compliance with respect to the bracketing system. The sales tax records for Rowe's were based upon the meshing of three different computer systems. First, there was a point-of-sale system at each cash register which collected the data, such as sales amounts, taxable sales, and sales tax collected, for each individual transaction. A software system called BR Data would then "pull" the sales data from the individual cash registers to create the cumulative sales register reports for each store. The cumulative data from BR Data was then automatically imported into Petitioner's accounting software, MAS 90, to populate the figures in Rowe's general ledger. Taxes collected were recorded in the general ledger under the credit column. The data in this column was transmitted from BR Data. It could not be adjusted manually, although other columns in the general ledger could be. There were sometimes problems with the transmission of information from BR Data, which generally occurred where there was a power surge or a thunderstorm that would affect the communication of information. As a result of these communication problems, there were times that the sales figure transmitted would be double or triple the actual sales for that day. When such an error was discovered, Rowe's staff would contact BR Data and have the report rebuilt, and the general ledger entry would be corrected. Rowe's informed Ms. Arrington that there had been numerous problems with the exporting process and the resulting need to correct journal entries. Ms. Arrington acknowledged at hearing that she had been advised that due to these problems, the sales figures were sometimes doubled or tripled. Ms. Arrington reviewed the general sales ledger, the cumulative sales register reports, and the sales and use tax returns for the audit period. According to her review, there were three days in August 2006 where the amount of collected tax reflected in the cumulative sales register was higher than what was reflected in the general ledger. Based upon this review, she assessed $1,193.98 in additional sales taxes. For August 1, 2006, the general ledger indicated that $263.48 in sales tax was collected. The cumulative sales report reflected that $790.44 in sales tax was collected. This second number in the cumulative sales report is exactly three times the amount reflected in the general ledger. The difference between the cumulative sales report amount and the general ledger amount is $526.96. For August 2, 2006, the general ledger indicated that $277.04 was collected. The cumulative sales report reflected that $554.08 in sales tax was collected, an amount exactly twice the amount recorded in the general ledger. The difference between the two documents is $277.04. For August 11, 2006, the general ledger indicated that $389.98 in sales tax was collected. The cumulative sales report reflected that $779.96 was collected, an amount exactly twice the amount recorded in the general ledger. The difference between the two documents is $389.98. The difference in the amounts reflected in the general ledger (which Rowe's claims is the more accurate document), and the cumulative sales register (which Ms. Arrington relied upon), is $1,193.98, the amount of additional tax assessed for this item. Ms. Arrington acknowledged at hearing that she credited the cumulative sales register numbers over Rowe's general ledger documents, and that she knew during the audit that there were issues relating to BR Data that occurred during the audit period. The only document upon which she relied was the cumulative sales register. Given the credible testimony by Robert Rowe and Neil Newman regarding the process and the problems encountered with the interface of data, and the fact that in each instance, the difference was an exact multiple of the amount reflected in the general ledger, the greater weight of the evidence presented at hearing supports the finding that the general ledger represents the amount of sales tax actually collected and paid by Rowe's. This finding means that not only is the assessment of additional sales tax for August 2006, in error, but also that means that Rowe's met the second requirement for avoiding the assessment of additional taxes under section 212.12(14) for failing to use the bracket system. Ms. Arrington also found that Rowe's had not agreed in writing to future compliance with the bracket system. On or about November 19, 2009, in conjunction with the Audit Conference, Ms. Arrington prepared an Agreement for Future Compliance (Agreement) and provided it to Mr. Rowe for signature. The text of the Agreement, which is on DOR letterhead and specifically references the Sales and Use Tax Audit number for Rowe's, states: The following dealer had demonstrated the proper actions required by Section 212.12(14),(a) and (b), F.S. (see attachment), and agree [sic] to sign the following suggested form to compliance with the laws concerning brackets applicable to the dealer's transactions in the future. Rowe's Supermarkets, LLC - BP#2134130, succeeded by Rowe's IGA, LLC - 3082649 agrees to future compliance with the laws and rules concerning the proper application of the tax bracket system to the dealer's transactions. Mr. Rowe did not sign the Agreement at the Audit Conference because he wanted to be able to confirm that the point of sale system his store operated could be properly programmed to comply with the bracket system before signing a document stating he would comply. After discussions with both the vendor and Ms. Arrington, and making sure the system was in fact operating in compliance with the requirement, Mr. Rowe signed the Agreement on December 7, 2009, and returned it to the Department. Ms. Arrington did not recall receiving the Agreement, but also admitted she had no specific memory as to whether she received it. Her Case Activity Record indicates that on December 3, 2009, she spoke with Mr. Rowe about whether he was able to input the brackets in his point-of-sale system, and that he indicated he was able to do so. The greater weight of the evidence supports the finding that Mr. Rowe executed and returned the Agreement, and it is so found. The Use Tax Assessment Based on a Sampling Plan Section 212.12 allows the Department to use a sample from the taxpayer's records and project audit findings from the sample to the entire audit period where the records of the taxpayer are "adequate but voluminous in nature and substance." The statute, which is discussed in more detail in the Conclusions of Law, contemplates the use of a sampling plan agreed to by the taxpayer, and in the absence of an agreement, the taxpayer's right to have a review by the Department's Executive Director. The work papers to the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated January 8, 2010, include a sampling plan that runs from January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2006 for the calculation of use tax for purchases by Rowe's where sales tax was not collected by the vendor. Ms. Arrington reviewed Rowe's' records for expense purchases for 2006 to determine the total amount of additional tax due for that period. She then took the total additional tax on expenses for that period, i.e., $14,981.26, and divided it by 12 to obtain a monthly average additional tax of $1,248.44. She then applied that number to the entire 36-month audit period to determine a total assessment of additional tax for expense purchases of $44,943.84. Ms. Arrington testified that at the initial audit conference, she discussed different audit techniques in terms of sampling. However, a specific sampling plan was not discussed with Mr. Rowe and no Sampling Agreement was presented to him. No sampling plan was reviewed by the Executive Director. Ms. Arrington did not tell Mr. Rowe that 2006 would be the year used as the sample. Mr. Rowe never would have agreed to the use of 2006 as a sampling plan, because it would not be representative of the expenses incurred during the audit period. Using 2006 as a sampling period did not take into account the store closures during the audit period, and the concomitant reduction in expenses. Rowe's closed two grocery stores by March 2006, and operated only four stores for the remaining three quarters of the year. A third store was closed in January 2007, a fourth in May 2007 and a fifth in 2008, leaving only one store open for the entire audit period. All of the liquor stores were also closed during the audit period, the last one being sold in May 2008. Ms. Arrington knew that Rowe's had closed almost all of its stores during the audit period, and included information regarding the closings in her Standard Audit Report. She acknowledged at hearing that as the stores decreased, the expenses related to those stores would also most likely decrease. For the 12 months of 2006, the Department determined that an additional tax of $14,981.26 would be due, based on purchases of $253,637.22. There has been no evidence presented to rebut the accuracy of the tax assessment for these 2006 purchases. Petitioner presented evidence establishing that, for the 21 months of the audit period following 2006, Rowe's made purchases from the same vendors reflected in the 2006 sample of only $51,073.72, which would result in additional taxes of $3,575.16. No evidence was presented by either party as to whether there were any other purchases from other vendors for which taxes had not been paid. The difference between the use tax assessed against Rowe's by using the sampling plan and taxes due based on the actual purchases demonstrated at hearing is $22,642.08. In addition, there was one vendor, Advo, Inc. (Advo), which accounted for a significant percentage of the tax due based on the sampling plan. While the audit sample period was for twelve months, payments to Advo for a seven-month period accounted for approximately 58% of the total additional taxes due for expenses. There were no purchases from Advo after July 2006 because of Rowe's shrinking assets and inability to pay for direct advertising. Further, 15 of the 23 vendors reflected in the sample period from whom purchases were made had no sales to Rowe's from January 2007 through September 2008. The Department's work papers indicate that, within the sample year, the purchases tapered off significantly as the year progressed. Given the known closure of five grocery stores and six liquor stores during the audit period, using a time period where the most stores were open is not representative of the expenses experienced by Petitioner, and use of the sampling plan to which the taxpayer had not agreed was inappropriate, and led to an inflated assessment of additional taxes. The Effective Tax Rate at the Liquor Stores During the audit period, Rowe's operated package liquor stores adjacent to the grocery stores. By the time the audit commenced, Rowe's no longer owned any of the liquor stores, and no longer had the cash register tapes from the liquor stores. Because of the lack of cash register tapes, the auditor was unable to determine the effective tax rate Rowe's was collecting. She did not, however, ask Rowe's what rate was collected. A review of the sales tax returns indicates that it remitted a flat rate of 6 or 7 percent, depending on the county. These rates were consistent with what Rowe's was collecting for the grocery store sales, and cash register tapes were available from the grocery store. Ms. Arrington applied the tax rates identified in Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.057(3)(a) and 12A- 15.012(2)(a), both of which identify the rate that should be collected where the dealer sells package goods but does not sell mixed drinks; does not separately itemize the sales price and the tax; and does not put the public on notice that tax is included in the total charge. The work papers paraphrase but do not quote the rules. With respect to the liquor store in St. Johns County, the work papers state: "[a]ccording to Rule 12A-1.057(3)(a), F.A.C., when the dealer is located in a county with no surtax and the public has not been put on notice through the posting of price lists or signs prominently displayed throughout the establishment that the tax is included in the total charge, package stores which sell no mixed drinks shall remit tax at the effective rate of .0635." With respect to the liquor stores in Clay and Duval Counties, the work papers state: "[a]ccording to Rule 12A- 15.012(2)(a)1., F.A.C., when a dealer, located in a county imposing a 1% surtax, sells package goods but does not sell mixed drinks and does not put the public on notice that tax is included in the total charge, the dealer is required to remit tax at the effective tax rate of .0730." The Department's auditor made the assumption that tax was not separately itemized for package store sales and assessed the additional tax accordingly. She did not ask the taxpayer whether this was the case and did not ask about signage in the package stores that were no longer owned by Rowe's. Mr. Rowe testified that the same point-of-sale program was used for the liquor stores as were used for the adjacent grocery stores. That program separately identified the tax due. His testimony is unrebutted and is credited. The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights At hearing, Petitioner took the position that the Department violated the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights as stated in section 213.015(5), by its failure to provide Petitioner with a "narrative description which explains the basis of audit changes, proposed assessments, assessments." In its Proposed Recommended Order, however, Petitioner candidly acknowledged that the evidence did not support a finding consistent with Petitioner's position. In light of this concession, no further findings of fact are necessary with respect to this issue. Collectibility Rowe's asserted in its challenge that it was unable to pay any taxes assessed because it was no longer in business and no longer had any assets. The Department declined to exercise its discretion to compromise the tax assessment based on collectability. While not specifically stated in its Notice of Decision, this position was apparently based upon the belief that the taxes could be paid by Rowe's IGA, LLC, to whom the assets of Rowe's was sold, and which shares the same managing member, Robert Rowe. The two companies share a managing member and one common location, which Rowe's sold to Rowe's IGA. However, no evidence was presented regarding the specifics of the assets sold to Rowe's IGA, and the only evidence presented indicates that any proceeds from the sale went to pay the secured lender for Rowe's, Textron Financial. Other than the involvement of Robert Rowe, no connection between the companies was established. Rowe's provided to the Department the copy of a judgment against it for $324,963.33, which bears interest at a rate of 8% annually. The Department did not identify any assets from which either the assessment or the judgment could be paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order that: Reduces the Department's assessment for additional taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to the failure to comply with the sales bracket system at Petitioner's grocery stores; Reduces the Department's assessment for additional use taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to the failure to remit all taxes due for the month of August 2006; Reduces the Department's assessment for additional use taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to expense purchases for the period January 2007 through September 2008; Sustains the assessment for additional use tax, penalties, and interest for expense purchases in calendar year 2006; Reduces the Department's assessment for additional use taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to the asserted basis that Petitioner should have collected tax at a higher effective tax rate at its liquor stores based upon the application of rules 12A-1.057(3)(a) or 12A-15.012(2)(a); Sustains the Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties, and interest against Petitioner for failure to pay tax on certain capital asset purchases identified in the audit; Sustains the Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties, and interest against Petitioner for failure to pay sales tax on commercial rent payments under certain of Petitioner's store leases identified in the audit; and Sustains the Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties, and interest against Petitioner for failure to pay sales tax on Petitioner's payment of ad valorem taxes under certain of Petitioner's store leases identified in the audit. In addition, it is Recommended that the Department reconsider its decision as to whether the remaining assessment is collectible, and whether it is in the best interest of the state to compromise the assessment, based on the record contained in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2012.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent failed to remit taxes, interest, penalties and fees pursuant to a Compliance Agreement between Respondent and Petitioner; and if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondent’s sales tax registration certificate in consequence thereof.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Revenue (Department) is the agency of state government authorized to administer the sales and use tax laws of the State of Florida. Squid is a Florida corporation whose principal place of business is located in Alachua County, Florida. At all pertinent times, Squid sold tangible personal property at retail and consequently was required to collect from its customers, and remit to the Department, sales tax on every transaction which is taxable under chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In connection with this responsibility, Squid is an authorized “dealer,” holding sales tax Certificate of Registration No. 11-801-3974145-0 (Certificate), which the Department issued in February 2008. Squid has no other outstanding certificate of registration with the Department. By November 2009, Squid had a history of repeatedly writing checks to the Department that were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Squid also had a history of failing to consistently remit sales and use tax to the Department. As a result of Squid’s delinquencies, the Department began to issue warrants on the official records. On May 6, 2010, the Department issued a notice to Squid, which initiated a proceeding to revoke Squid’s Certificate for failure to remit taxes. Squid was invited to appear at an informal conference with the Department on June 22, 2010. At the informal conference, Squid would have the opportunity to avoid revocation either by presenting evidence refuting the charges regarding unpaid taxes, or by entering into a compliance agreement pursuant to which the outstanding liability would be satisfied. The informal conference took place as scheduled. Janet Hobson, Squid’s president, appeared on behalf of the corporation. At the conference, the Department and Squid entered into a written compliance agreement (Agreement). Under the Agreement, Squid admitted that it owed the State of Florida a grand total of $8,625.51, which is comprised of $6,842.64 tax, $265.23 interest, $625.22 penalty and $892.42 fees. Squid agreed to pay its debt in installments, in exchange for the Department’s promise to forbear from revoking Squid’s Certificate. The Agreement called for Squid to make a down payment of $800 on or before June 22, 2010, followed by eleven installment payments ranging in amount from $400 to $600, and culminating in a twelfth payment for the balance, in a balloon. The Agreement further provided that interest would continue to accrue on the outstanding tax balance at the rate of 7% per year, and that pursuant to section 213.75, payments would be applied to the outstanding balance in the following order: fees; interest; penalty; and tax. Squid successfully made the $800 down payment as required by the Agreement. At the same time, Squid notified the Department that it would soon be relocating to a new address, but within the same county, to wit: 3709 SW 42nd Avenue, Suite 10, Gainesville, Florida 32608. The Department made note of this address change, and consistent with its normal practices and procedures, did not require Squid to obtain a separate registration number for the new location. Although the Department does require dealers who open a second retail location or who move across county lines to apply for a new registration number, this has not been required for relocations within a single county. Those types of relocations are handled by updating the address of record pertaining to the existing certificate of registration. The Agreement did not specifically provide that time was of the essence concerning Squid’s duty to make the installment payments, nor state any grace period applicable to the payment deadlines. However, the Agreement did state: E. If the certificate holder fails to comply with any obligation under this agreement, the Department has the right to pursue revocation of the certificate holder’s certificate of registration by filing an Administrative Complaint pursuant to section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes. If a revocation proceeding is pursued, the certificate holder stipulates to the admission of this agreement in any jurisdiction as proof of all matters recited herein. G. If the certificate holder fails to perform any of the obligations under this agreement, including the timely filing of returns and payment of all taxes, penalties and interest as they become due, all amounts of the tax, interest and penalty settled under this agreement and any unpaid balance shall be immediately due, payable and collectible by all legal means. In addition to and including the promise to pay the outstanding indebtedness, the Agreement also required Squid: To accurately complete all past due sales tax returns and file them no later than 08/01/2010. To remit all past due payments to the Department as stated in the attached payment agreement. To accurately complete and timely file all required sales tax returns for the next 12 months, beginning with the return due on 6/1/2010 and ending on 05/31/2011. To timely remit all sales tax collections due for the next 12 months, associated with the periods stated in paragraph “C” above. To comply with all provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. On June 17, 2011, the Department served its "First Interlocking Discovery Request" on Respondent. The discovery request included a series of requests for admissions (RFA), interrogatories, and document requests. On July 14, 2011, Janet Hobson, as authorized representative of Squid, served responses to the Department' discovery request. At final hearing, those responses were received in evidence at the request of the Department. In response to requests for admissions, Squid admitted the following: -Squid failed to make the complete schedule of payments outlined in the payment schedule that appears in the Payment Agreement Schedule of the Compliance Agreement. (RFA No. 14). -Squid failed to timely remit payment for the sales tax due for the months July through November of 2009. (RFA No. 4). -Squid filed less than all past due sales tax returns by August 1, 2010. (RFA No. 6). -Squid remitted less than all past due payments. (RFA No. 7). -Squid timely filed less than all required sales tax returns for the time period of June 1, 2010, through May 31, 2011. (RFA No. 8). -Squid remitted less than all required sales tax collections for the time period of June 1, 2010, through May 31, 2011. (RFA No. 9). -Squid failed to timely remit payment for the sales tax due for the months of February through April and August through September of 2010. (RFA No. 11). -Squid has been delinquent with past tax remittances and interest payable to the Department. (RFA No. 12). -Squid failed to abide by the terms of the Agreement, within the meaning of the acceleration clause contained in the Agreement, at paragraph “G.” (RFA No. 13). On August 2, 2011, the Department served a Notice of Taking Corporate Deposition Duces Tecum of Squid, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(b)(6). That deposition took place on September 13, 2011, in Gainesville, Florida. Ms. Hobson appeared at the deposition as the authorized corporate representative of Squid. During the course of the deposition, Squid admitted that it used some of the sales tax moneys that it had collected in order to pay its own business operating expenses. Squid also acknowledged that it owed approximately $9,500 in overdue sales tax as of that date. The day before the final hearing, at 4:45 p.m., Petitioner delivered additional moneys to the Department, together with additional tax returns, which are used to report additional tax due. The Department’s witness testified that Squid still owed a balance but she had not yet had an opportunity to update the revolving balance. Ms. Sevez estimated that several thousand dollars remained due, but she was uncertain as to the amount. The determination of the precise amount due would be a material fact in a tax assessment challenge under sections 72.011, and 120.80, Florida Statutes, but this is a license revocation proceeding, not a tax assessment challenge. The totality of the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Squid defaulted under the Agreement (and that Squid remains in arrears in an undetermined amount, even to this date). It is not necessary for the undersigned to quantify the precise amount due on any given date1/, or even to determine whether an amount remains due, but only to determine whether Squid, at any pertinent time, fell into default under the compliance agreement. The Department has met its burden to clearly and convincingly prove that Squid materially failed to comply with the terms of the Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order revoking sales tax certificate of registration numbered 11-801- 3974145-0, which the Department issued in February 2008. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2012.
The Issue Whether sales tax and local government infrastructure surtax is due on the lingerie modeling session fees received by Petitioner, and, if so, whether the Department of Revenue should compromise any portion of the tax, interest, or penalty assessed against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner was established as a Florida corporation in November 1992. At the time of its incorporation, Petitioner's name was Ultimate Fantasy of Pinellas, Inc. Subsequently, the name was changed to U.F., Inc. Petitioner is an "S Corporation," having filed the required election pursuant to Section 1362 of the Internal Revenue Code in June 1994. Steve Smith was the sole shareholder and president of Petitioner during the audit period. Mr. Smith sold his interest in Petitioner in January 2002. Starting on October 1, 1994, Petitioner leased space for its business in a small shopping center at 8248 Ulmerton Road, in unincorporated Pinellas County. Petitioner's store was less than 1,000 square feet in size. Petitioner's lease included the following schedule of lease payments due from Petitioner to the lessor:1 Period Rent Sales Tax (7%) Total 10/1/94 - $585.00 $40.95 $625.95 9/30/96 10/1/96 - $605.00 $42.35 $647.35 9/30/98 10/1/98 - $630.00 $44.10 $674.10 9/30/99 4/1/00 - $670.00 $46.90 $716.90 3/31/02 The record does not include receipts showing that Petitioner actually made those lease payments. However, Mr. Smith testified that Petitioner made those payments, and the weight of the evidence clearly supports the inference that the payments were made. Specifically, Petitioner claimed a deduction for rent expenses on its federal income tax returns in amounts comparable to that set forth above, and Petitioner was actually operating its business at the location specified in the lease during the audit period. Petitioner made payments of $2,288.65 in sales tax to the lessor during the course of the audit period, computed as follows: Period Sales Tax Amount Months Total 5/1/95 - $40.95 17 $ 695.15 9/30/96 10/1/96 - $42.35 24 $1,016.40 9/30/98 10/1/98 - $44.10 12 $ 529.20 9/30/99 4/1/00 - $46.90 1 $ 46.90 4/30/00 8. Petitioner's lease stated that Petitioner would use the premises "as a retail store and for no other uses whatsoever." That limitation was apparently waived by the landlord because the lingerie modeling conducted in Petitioner's store required an adult entertainment permit from Pinellas County and the landlord's consent was required for Petitioner to obtain a permit. Petitioner's business includes the retail sale of lingerie as well as charging patrons a fee to watch lingerie modeling sessions which occur in Petitioner's store. Patrons are not charged to come into Petitioner's store. They are free to come in, look at merchandise, purchase merchandise, and/or leave. However, a patron who comes into Petitioner's store and wants to see a piece of lingerie modeled pays a fee to Petitioner. The fee is $30.00 per session, with a session lasting no more than a half hour. With a discount coupon, the fee was $20.00 per session. No sales tax was collected or remitted on those amounts. After the patron pays the fee to Petitioner, he then identifies the lingerie to be modeled and a model does so. The patron compensates the model for the session through tips. Neither Petitioner, nor any of its employees are involved in that transaction. The patron is not required to purchase the lingerie that is modeled and, as evidenced by the small amount of sales on which Petitioner paid tax during the audit period, such purchases rarely occurred. If the lingerie is purchased, Petitioner collects sales tax from the purchaser and remits it to the Department. If the lingerie is not purchased, it goes back into Petitioner's inventory. Almost all of Petitioner's income over the course of the audit period was derived from the lingerie modeling sessions. On the quarterly sales tax reports filed with the Department, Petitioner reported gross sales of $556,733.83 between May 1995 and December 1999. Of that amount, $554,829.88, or 99.65 percent, was from the fees for the lingerie modeling sessions and was reported as exempt sales. Only $1,978.57, or 0.35 percent, was reported as taxable lingerie sales. The women who model the lingerie are not employees of Petitioner. They are not paid anything by Petitioner, nor do they pay Petitioner anything. Petitioner did provide security for the models. The modeling sessions occurred in "segregated areas" of the store. They did not occur behind closed doors, behind a curtain, or in separate rooms, as that is prohibited by the Pinellas County Code.2 The "segregated areas" accounted for approximately 85 percent of the store's floor space. Thus, it is possible that a session could be observed from a distance by persons other than the patron who paid a fee to Petitioner. However, only the patron who pays the fee can view the modeling session in the "segregated areas" where the model performs. Before Petitioner opened for business, Mr. Smith contacted an accountant, Peter Ristorcelli, to provide accounting and tax services to Petitioner. Those services included compliance with Florida's sales tax laws. Mr. Ristorcelli had never worked for a client whose business was similar to that of Petitioner. Accordingly, Mr. Ristorcelli advised Petitioner to obtain guidance from the Department when he registered as a dealer and obtained a sales tax number. Mr. Smith went to the Department's Clearwater office pursuant to Mr. Ristorcelli's advice. While there, he explained the type and operation of Petitioner's business and asked whether sales tax was due on the receipts from the modeling sessions. Mr. Smith was told by an unknown Department employee that the receipts from the modeling sessions were not subject to the sales tax, but that they should be reported as exempt sales. Mr. Smith was also told that receipts from the sale of lingerie should be reported as taxable sales, and that sales tax should be collected on those sales. Mr. Smith conveyed this information to Mr. Ristorcelli who then confirmed it with Bonnie Steffes, an employee in the Department's sales tax collection division in the Clearwater office with whom Mr. Ristorcelli had prior dealings. In their conversations with the Department employees, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli fully explained the nature and manner of operation of Petitioner's business. Those explanations were not made in writing, nor were the Department's responses. Ms. Steffes is no longer employed by the Department, and she was not called as a witness at the hearing because she could not be located. Thus, the record does not contain any corroboration of the self-serving testimony of Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli on these events. Nevertheless, the undersigned finds their testimony to be credible. Petitioner followed the advice Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli received from the Department. Petitioner reported the receipts from the modeling sessions as exempt sales and did not collect or remit sales tax on those receipts. As stated above, Petitioner reported $554,829.88 in receipts from the modeling sessions for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. Petitioner reported the receipts from the sales of lingerie as taxable sales and collected and remitted sales tax on those receipts. As stated above, Petitioner reported taxable sales of $1,978.57, and it collected and remitted sales tax in the amount of $138.58 for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. Had Mr. Smith been told that the lingerie modeling sessions were taxable, he would have collected sales tax from the patron and remitted it to the Department. The Department's Audit On June 1, 2000, the Department gave Petitioner notice of its intent to conduct a sales tax audit on Petitioner's books and records for the audit period of May 1, 1995, to April 30, 2000. The audit was conducted by Jose Bautista, a tax auditor in the Department's Clearwater office. Mr. Bautista reviewed Petitioner's books and records and spoke with Mr. Ristorcelli and Mr. Smith on several occasions. In conducting the audit, Mr. Buatista utilized standard methods of assessment and followed the Department's rules and practices. He relied on the facts presented to him by Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli regarding the operation of Petitioner's business and, more specifically, the form and nature of the lingerie modeling transactions. The audit did not identify any underreporting of taxable lingerie sales, nor did it find any underreporting of the receipts from the modeling sessions. In this regard, the proposed assessment (discussed below) was simply based upon the Department's determination that the receipts from the lingerie modeling sessions were taxable, not exempt from taxation. The audit working papers indicate receipts of $573,642.89 upon which sales tax was not paid over the course of the audit period. That amount is solely attributable to the receipts from the modeling sessions over the audit period, as identified in the Department's audit. That amount does not correspond with the receipts for the modeling sessions reported to the Department by Petitioner on its periodic sales tax returns. As stated above, Petitioner reported exempt sales from the modeling sessions in the amount of $554,829.88 for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. For that same period, the audit working papers show receipts from the modeling sessions as being only $540,460.32, calculated as follows: Grand Total for Audit Period (5/95 - 4/00) Less: April 2000 ($7,177.49) $ 573,642.89 March 2000 ( 8,208.15) February 2000 ( 8,872.59) January 2000 ( 8,924.34) Total for Period ( 33,182.57) Of 5/95 - 12/99 $ 540,460.32 This discrepancy works in Petitioner's favor. Had the Department simply based its assessment on the amount reported by Petitioner as exempt sales between May 1995 and December 1999 ($554,829.88), and then added the receipts for the period of January 2000 through April 2000 ($33,182.57), the amount upon which Petitioner would have owed sales tax would have been $588,012.45 rather than $573,642.89 as found in the Department's audit. Based upon the audit conducted by Mr. Bautista, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Notice of Intent) on August 16, 2000. The Notice of Intent assessed a total tax deficiency of $40,155.29, which included a sales tax deficiency of $34,418.81 and a local government infrastructure surtax deficiency of $5,736.78. Those amounts were calculated in accordance with the standardized, statutory methods of calculation. Petitioner does not contest the calculation of the tax deficiency. The Notice of Intent also assessed interest and penalty. The interest and penalty were calculated on the amount of the tax deficiency pursuant to standardized, statutory methods of calculation. Petitioner does not contest the calculation of the interest or penalty. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, sought administrative review of the Notice of Intent. That review is conducted at the district office level, which in this case was Clearwater. George Watson supervised the review. No changes were made based upon the review, and on October 26, 2000, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment which formally assessed the tax deficiency, interest, and penalty described above against Petitioner. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, protested the Notice of Proposed Assessment, and on July 5, 2001, the Department issued its Notice of Decision rejecting the protest. The review which resulted in the Notice of Decision was conducted in Tallahassee by Charles Wallace. The Notice of Decision upheld the tax deficiency, interest, and penalty in full. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, sought reconsideration of the Notice of Decision. On December 17, 2001, the Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration which again upheld the proposed assessment in full and refused to compromise any portion of the tax, interest, or penalty. The legal basis for the assessments asserted by the Department in the Notice of Intent and Notice of Proposed Assessment was that the fee paid to Petitioner by a patron to view a lingerie modeling session was an admission charge. Based upon additional facts and clarifying information presented to the Department by Petitioner through the protest process, the Department concluded that the fee charged by Petitioner was more akin to a license to use real property and therefore taxable as such. That is the legal position asserted by the Department in its Notice of Decision and its Notice of Reconsideration. That legal position was also argued by the Department at the hearing and in its Proposed Recommended Order.3 Despite the change in the legal basis of the assessment, the amount of the assessment set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration is the same as the amount set forth in the Notice of Intent and Notice of Proposed Assessment. It was still based upon the full amount of the receipts from the lingerie modeling sessions (as determined by the audit) which had been reported as exempt sales.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order that assesses tax, interest, and penalties, against Petitioner in the amounts set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration dated December 17, 2001; and, if the tax assessed in the final order is based upon Section 212.031 (license to use) rather than Section 212.04 (admissions), the Department should grant Petitioner a credit in the amount of $1,945.35, for the sales tax paid by Petitioner to its landlord on that portion of Petitioner's store where the lingerie modeling sessions occurred. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002.
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether portions of Florida Administrative Code Rules 12D-9.020 and 12D-9.025 constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority; (2) whether sections of Modules Four and Six of the 2010 Value Adjustment Board Training are unpromulgated rules; and (3) whether Property Tax Oversight Bulletin 11-01 is an unpromulgated rule.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Turner is the Property Appraiser for Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioners Crapo, Higgs, and Smith are the Property Appraisers for Alachua, Monroe, and Okaloosa Counties, respectively. Respondent, the Department of Revenue ("DOR"), is an agency of the State of Florida that has general supervision over the property tax process, which consists primarily of "aiding and assisting county officers in the assessing and collection functions." § 195.002(1), Fla. Stat. DOR is also required to prescribe "reasonable rules and regulations for the assessing and collecting of taxes . . . [to] be followed by the property appraisers, tax collectors . . . and value adjustment boards." § 195.027(1). Petitioner-Intervenor Roger A. Suggs is the Clay County Property Appraiser. Petitioner-Intervenor Gary R. Nikolitis is the Palm Beach County Property Appraiser. Petitioner-Intervenor PAAF is a statewide nonprofit professional association consisting of 35 property appraisers in various counties throughout Florida. Petitioner-Intervenor FAPA is a statewide nonprofit professional organization of Florida property appraisers. Respondent-Intervenor FUTMA is a statewide nonprofit association consisting of 46 of the largest property taxpayers in Florida. Ms. Cucchi, the second Respondent-Intervenor, is a property owner and taxpayer in Hillsborough County. Background of Florida's Property Tax System Article VII, Section Four of the Florida Constitution mandates that all property be assessed at "just value," and further requires that the Legislature prescribe, by general law, regulations that "shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation." Pursuant to chapters 192 through 196 of the Florida Statutes, locally elected property appraisers in each of Florida's 67 counties develop and report property assessment rolls. The assessment rolls——which property appraisers prepare each year and submit to DOR by July 1——contain information such as the names and addresses of the property owners, as well as the just, assessed, and taxable values of the properties within each appraiser's respective county. DOR is responsible for reviewing and ultimately approving or disapproving the assessment rolls. § 193.1142, Fla. Stat. Once DOR approves the assessment rolls, the property appraiser mails a "Notice of Proposed Property Taxes and Non-ad Valorem Assessments" (known as a "TRIM" notice) to each property owner. § 200.069, Fla. Stat. The notices advise each owner of his property's assessment for that year, the millage (tax) rate set by the taxing authorities, and the dates of the budget hearing for those authorities. After receiving a TRIM notice, a property owner may request an informal conference with the property appraiser's office to discuss the assessment of his or her property. Alternatively, or in addition to the informal conference, a property owner may challenge the assessment by filing a petition with the county value adjustment board or by brining a legal action in circuit court. § 194.011(3), Fla. Stat.; § 194.171, Fla. Stat. Value Adjustment Boards Pursuant to section 194.015(1), Florida Statutes, each of Florida's 67 value adjustment boards is composed of two members of the county commission, one member of the school board, and two citizen members.1 Of particular import to the instant case, section 194.015(1) requires value adjustment boards to retain private counsel to provide advice regarding legal issues that may arise during value adjustment hearings.2 In counties with populations greater than 75,000, the value adjustment board must appoint special magistrates3 to conduct hearings and issue recommended decisions. § 194.035(1), Fla. Stat. Hearings in counties with 75,000 citizens or fewer may be conducted by either magistrates or the value adjustment board itself. Id. DOR has no involvement in the appointment or removal of board attorneys, magistrates, or the members of value adjustment boards. Should a property owner choose to contest an assessment through the value adjustment board process, the board's clerk schedules an administrative hearing and sends a notice of hearing to the property owner and the property appraiser. § 194.032(2), Fla. Stat. At the hearing, the determinative issue is whether the assessment of the particular property at issue exceeds just value. In the event that a property owner is dissatisfied with the outcome of a value adjustment hearing, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court, where a de novo hearing will be conducted. § 194.036(2) & (3), Fla. Stat. Under certain conditions, the property appraiser may likewise appeal an adverse value adjustment board decision to the circuit court. § 194.036(1).4 2008 Legislative Reforms Prior to 2008, DOR was not charged with the responsibility of training value adjustment boards or their magistrates. However, pursuant to chapter 2008-197, Laws of Florida, the Legislature enacted a series of changes to the VAB process, including a new requirement that DOR "provide and conduct training for special magistrates at least once each state fiscal year." See § 194.035(3), Fla. Stat. Immediately after enactment of the law, DOR initiated rulemaking and developed 2008 interim training for value adjustment boards and special magistrates. Persons required to take the training include all special magistrates, as well as value adjustment board members or value adjustment board attorneys in counties that do not use special magistrates. § 194.035(1) & (3), Fla. Stat. In addition to the new training requirement, chapter 2008-197 mandated that DOR develop a Uniform Policies and Procedures Manual for use by value adjustment boards and magistrates. The Uniform Policies and Procedures Manual ("The Manual"), which is posted on DOR's website and is separate and distinct from DOR's training materials for value adjustment boards, consists of relevant statutes, administrative rules, provisions of the Florida Constitution, as well as forms. The Manual is also accompanied by two sets of separate documents, which are likewise available on DOR's web page: (1) "Other Legal Resources Including Statutory Criteria; and (2) "Reference Materials Including Guidelines," consisting of guidelines and links to other reference materials, including DOR's value adjustment board training materials, bulletins, and advisements. The introduction to the "Reference Materials Including Guidelines" reads in relevant part as follows: The set of documents titled "Reference Materials Including Guidelines," contains the following items: Taxpayer brochure General description and internet links to the Department's training for value adjustment boards and special magistrates; Recommended worksheets for lawful decisions; The Florida Real Property Appraisal Guidelines; * * * 7. Internet links to Florida Attorney General Opinions, Government in the Sunshine Manual, PTO Bulletins and Advertisements, and other reference materials. These reference materials are for consideration, where appropriate, by value adjustment boards and special magistrates in conjunction with the Uniform Policies and Procedures Manual and with the Other Legal Resources Including Statutory Criteria. The items listed above do not have the force or effect of law as do provisions of the constitution, statutes, and duly adopted administrative rules. Revisions to Value Adjustment Board Procedural Rules Pursuant to section 194.011, Florida Statutes, the Legislature charged DOR with the responsibility to prescribe, by rule, uniform procedures——consistent with the procedures enumerated in section 194.034, Florida Statutes——for hearings before value adjustment boards, as well as procedures for the exchange of evidence between taxpayers and property appraisers prior to value adjustment hearings. On February 24, 2010, following a 12-month period of public meetings, workshops, and hearings, the Governor and Cabinet approved the adoption of chapter 12D-9, Florida Administrative Code, which is titled, "Requirements for Value Adjustment Board in Administrative Reviews; Uniform Rules of Procedure for Hearings Before Value Adjustment Boards." As discussed in greater detail in the Conclusions of Law of this Order, Petitioner Turner contends that portions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12D-9.020, which delineate the procedures for the exchange of evidence between property appraisers and taxpayers, contravene section 194.011. Petitioner Turner further alleges that section 194.011 is contravened by parts of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12D- 9.025, which governs the procedures for conducting a value adjustment hearing and the presentation of evidence. 2010 Value Adjustment Training Materials In 2010, following the adoption of Rule Chapter 12D-9, DOR substantially revised the value adjustment board training materials. After the solicitation and receipt of public comments, the 2010 VAB Training was made available in late June 2010 on DOR's website. The 2010 VAB Training is posted on DOR's website in such a manner that an interested person must first navigate past a bold-font description which explains that the training is not a rule: This training is provided to comply with section 194.035, Florida Statutes. It is intended to highlight areas of procedure for hearings, consideration of evidence, development of conclusions and production of written decisions. This training is not a rule. It sets forth general information of which boards, board attorneys, special magistrates and petitioners / taxpayers should be aware in order to comply with Florida law. (Emphasis in original). The 2010 VAB Training consists of eleven sections, or "modules," portions of two of which Petitioners allege constitute unadopted rules: Module 4, titled "Procedures During the Hearing"; and Module 6, titled "Administrative Reviews of Real Property Just Valuations." While words and phrases such as "must," "should," and "should not" appear occasionally within the materials, such verbiage is unavoidable——and indeed necessary——in carrying out DOR's statutory charge of disseminating its understanding of the law to magistrates and value adjustment board members. Although DOR is required to create and disseminate training materials pursuant to section 194.035, the evidence demonstrates that the legal concepts contained within the 2010 VAB Training are not binding. Specifically, there is no provision of law that authorizes DOR to base enforcement or other action on the 2010 VAB Training, nor is there a statutory provision that provides a penalty in situations where a value adjustment board or special magistrate deviates from a legal principle enumerated in the materials. Further, the evidence demonstrates DOR has no authority to pursue any action against a value adjustment board or magistrate that chooses not to adhere to the legal concepts contained within the training. PTO Bulletin 11-01 On January 21, 2011, DOR issued Property Tax Oversight Bulletin 11-01, titled "Value Adjustment Board Petitions and the Eighth Criterion," to the value adjustment board attorneys for all 67 counties. DOR also disseminated courtesy copies of the bulletin by e-mail to over 800 interested parties. The bulletin, the full text of which is reproduced in the Conclusions of Law section of this Summary Final Order, consisted of a non-binding advisement regarding the use of the eighth just valuation criterion (codified in section 193.011(8), Florida Statutes5) in administrative reviews. The bulletin advised, in relevant part, that the eighth just value criterion: "must be properly considered in administrative reviews"; "is not limited to a sales comparison valuation approach"; and "must be properly considered in the income capitalization and cost less depreciation approaches" to valuation. The bulletin further advised that when "justified by sufficiently relevant and credible evidence, the Board or special magistrate should make an eighth criterion adjustment in any of the three valuation approaches." Although certain interested parties (i.e., a special magistrate in Nassau County, the director of valuation for the Hillsborough County Property Appraiser's Office, and legal counsel for the Broward County value adjustment board) perceived the bulletin to be mandatory, the evidence demonstrates that value adjustment boards and magistrates were not required to abide by the bulletin's contents. As with the training materials, DOR possesses no statutory authority to base enforcement action on the bulletin, nor could any form of penalty be lawfully imposed against a magistrate or value adjustment board that deviates from the legal advice contained within the document. Further, there is no evidence that DOR has taken (or intends to take) any agency action in an attempt to mandate compliance with the bulletin.
The Issue Whether Petitioners are liable for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue (the Department)?
Findings Of Fact Salma is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 2231 Del Prado Boulevard, Cape Coral, Florida, 33990. Gausia is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 11571 Gladiolus Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, 33908. Petitioners are in the business of operating gas stations with convenience stores. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. Petitioners were selected for audit because their reported gross sales were less than the total cost of items purchased (inventory) for the audit period. The Department issued Salma and Gausia each a Notice of Intent to Conduct a Limited Scope Audit or Self-Audit, dated April 26, 2013, for sales and use tax, for the period February 1, 2010, through January 31, 2013 (collectively referred to as the Notices). The Notices requested that Petitioners provide the Department: (a) a list of all their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) their total purchases of alcohol and tobacco, by vendor, for the period July 2010 to June 2011; (c) copies of their federal tax returns for the examination period; (d) purchase receipts for all purchases for the last complete calendar month; and (e) daily register (Z tapes) for the last complete calendar month. The Notices gave Petitioners 60 days to gather the requested documents before the audit was to commence. The Notices also requested that Petitioners complete an attached Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet. In response to the Notices, Petitioners requested a 30- day extension of time until July 18, 2013, to provide the requested documents and to designate a Power of Attorney. Petitioners did not provide the Department any books and records for inspection, nor did they complete and return the questionnaire and self analysis worksheets. As a result, the Department's auditor determined the sales tax due based upon the best information available. To calculate an estimated assessment of sales tax, the Department used the purchase data of Petitioners' wholesalers and distributors of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011; the 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and in-store sales percentages of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products; and historical audit data. After reviewing the purchase data for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, and for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012, the Department's auditor determined that the data was missing a few vendors. As a result, the Department's auditor estimated the amount of Petitioners' cigarette purchases, based on historical audit data that shows that cigarette sales are generally 4.31 times more than beer sales. The Department's auditor and audit supervisor testified that the estimated gross sales seemed reasonable and consistent with the national averages and the purchase data for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012. The Department estimated gross sales (i.e., the retail sale value of the goods sold) by marking up the taxable sales and exempt sales reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners. For example, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Salma purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $148,826.15, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $189,009.21. For July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Gausia purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $132,138.65, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $167,816.09. The Department's markup on the alcoholic beverage and tobacco products is reasonable because the Department's auditor testified that he used a combination of 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and the competitive pricing and information from audits of other convenience stores. The Department determined that the exemption ratio reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners was extremely high for their industry. The Department used an exemption ratio of 15 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry, to calculate Petitioners' estimated taxable sales. A review of Petitioners' sales and use tax returns revealed that they did not apply the tax bracket system to their taxable sales transactions, as required under sections 212.12(9) and (10), Florida Statutes. Instead, Petitioners remitted sales tax on their taxable sales based on their gross receipts at a flat tax rate. The Department's auditor testified that this method of reporting tax is inappropriate and does not accurately reflect the sales activity of the business. The Department calculated the average effective tax rate of 6.0856 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry. To calculate the estimated tax due, the Department multiplied the effective tax rate by the estimated taxable sales and gave Petitioners credit for any tax remitted with their tax returns. The Department issued Salma a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149872. The Department issued Gausia a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149749. The Department assessed Petitioners sales tax on their sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes gave Petitioners 30 days to request a conference with the auditor or audit supervisor, to dispute the proposed changes. Petitioners did not make such a request. The Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) to Salma on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $159,282.26; for penalty in the sum of $39,820.57; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $27,772.36. The Department issued a NOPA to Gausia on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $213,754.46; for penalty in the sum of $53,438.62; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $36,921.79. Additional interest accrues at $30.55 per day until the tax is paid. The NOPAs became final assessments on May 5, 2014. After filing a request for an administrative hearing, Petitioners completed the Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet and produced the following documents to the Department: (a) a list of all of their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) a list of vendors for alcohol and tobacco, for the examination period of July 2010 to June 2011; (c) a summary of their taxable sales, for the period February 2010 through December 2012; (d) copies of their federal tax returns, for the tax years 2010 through 2013; (e) copies of its purchase receipts for the months of July 2013; and (f) copies of their daily register (Z-tapes) for the month of July 2013. The Department's auditor testified that aside from being untimely, the records and information provided by Petitioners during these proceedings were not reliable because Petitioners did not provide any source documents that would allow the Department to reconcile the reported figures and confirm the supplied information. In addition, the purchase receipts and Z- tapes were not relevant because they were from outside of the audit period. The Z-tapes are also unreliable because the manager of the convenience store testified at the final hearing that employees purposely and routinely entered taxable sales into the cash registers as tax exempt sales. Petitioners argue that the Department did not use the best information available when estimating the taxes due. Petitioners claim that because their businesses are combination gas station/convenience stores, the national data for standalone convenience stores is inapplicable. However, notably absent from Petitioners' testimony or evidence was any alternative data upon which the Department could have relied for more accurate estimates.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioners' requests for relief and assessing, in full, the Department's assessments of sales tax, penalty, and interest against both Salma and Gausia. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether SNS Lakeland, Inc. (Petitioner), collected and remitted the correct amount of sales and use tax on its operations for the audit period.
Findings Of Fact DOR is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the tax laws of the state of Florida. In conjunction with that duty, DOR performs audits of business entities conducting sales and use transactions. At all times material to the issue of this case, Petitioner conducted business as a convenience store located at 811 East Palmetto Street, Lakeland, Florida. Petitioner was obligated to collect and remit sales and use tax in connection with the activities of its business enterprise. Petitioner’s Federal Identification Number is 26-0412370. Petitioner is authorized to conduct business within the state and its certificate of registration number is 63-8013863272-3. In order to properly perform its audit responsibilities, DOR requires that businesses maintain and present business records to support the collection of sales and use taxes. In this case, DOR notified Petitioner that it intended to audit the business operations for the audit period, June 1, 2007, through September 30, 2009. After the appropriate pre-audit notice and exchange of information, DOR examined Petitioner’s financial records. Since Petitioner did not maintain register tapes (that would track sales information most accurately), the Department examined all records that were available: financial statements, federal and state tax returns, purchase invoices/receipts, bank records, and register tapes that were available from outside the audit period. Petitioner’s reported tax payments with the amounts and types of taxes that it remitted should have been supported by the records it maintained. Theoretically, the sums remitted to the Department should match the records of the business entity. In this case, the amount remitted by Petitioner could not be reconciled with the business records maintained by the business entity. As a result, the auditor determined the sales tax due based upon the best information available. First, the auditor looked at the actual register tapes for the period November 10, 2010, through November 29, 2010 (sample tapes). Had Petitioner kept its sales receipts, the actual receipts for the audit period would have been used. Nevertheless, the sample tapes were used to estimate (based upon the actual business history of the company) the types and volumes of sales typically made at the store. Secondly, in order to determine the mark-up on the sales, the auditor used Petitioner’s purchase invoices, worksheets, profit and loss statements, and federal and state tax returns. In this regard, the auditor could compare the inventory coming in to the store with the reported results of the sales. Third, the auditor determined what percentage of the sales typically would be considered exempt from tax at the time of acquisition, but then re-sold at a marked-up price for a taxable event. Petitioner argued that 70 percent of its gross sales were taxable, but had no documentary evidence to support that conclusion. In contrast, after sampling records from four consecutive months, the Department calculated that the items purchased for sale at retail were approximately 78 percent taxable. By multiplying the effective tax rate (calculated at 7.0816) by the amount of taxable sales, the Department computed the gross sales tax that Petitioner should have remitted to the state. That gross amount was then reduced by the taxes actually paid by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the mark-up on beer and cigarettes used by the Department was too high (thereby yielding a higher tax). DOR specifically considered information of similar convenience stores to determine an appropriate mark-up. Nevertheless, when contested by Petitioner, DOR adjusted the beer and cigarette mark-up and revised the audit findings. Petitioner presented no evidence of what the mark-up actually was during the audit period, it simply claimed the mark-up assumed by DOR was too high. On March 30, 2011, DOR issued the Notice of Proposed Assessment for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest totaling $27,645.79. Interest on that amount accrues at the rate of $4.20, per day. In reaching these figures, DOR abated the penalty by 80 percent. The assessment was rendered on sales tax for sales of food, drink, beer, cigarettes, and tangible personal property. Petitioner continues to contest the assessment. Throughout the audit process and, subsequently, Petitioner never presented documentation to dispute the Department’s audit findings. DOR gave Petitioner every opportunity to present records that would establish that the correct amounts of sales taxes were collected and remitted. Simply stated, Petitioner did not maintain the records that might have supported its position. In the absence of such records, the Department is entitled to use the best accounting and audit methods available to it to reconcile the monies owed the state.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the audit findings, and require Petitioner to remit the unpaid sales and use taxes, penalty, and interest as stated in the Department’s audit findings. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Ashraf Barakat SNS Lakeland, Inc 811 East Palmetto Street Lakeland, Florida 33801 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Revenue Litigation Bureau Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brent Hanson B and M Business Services, Inc. 6735 Conroy Road, Suite 210 Orlando, Florida 32835 Lisa Vickers, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue is whether petitioner's candidacy for the office of Tax Collector would conflict or interfere with his employment as an auditor for the Department of Revenue.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Robert M. Hendrick, a career service employee, is employed with respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), as a Tax Auditor IV in its Leesburg, Florida field office. He has been employed by DOR since September 1991. In his position, petitioner primarily audits tangible personal property assessments performed by the local Property Appraiser and, on occasion, he inspects the property which is the subject of the assessment. In March 1996, the Lake County Tax Collector publicly announced that he would not run for reelection. After learning of this decision, by letter dated March 19, 1996, petitioner requested authorization from his employer to run for that office. The letter was received by DOR's Executive Director on April 1, 1996. On April 10, 1996, the Executive Director issued a letter denying the request on the ground the candidacy would conflict with petitioner's job duties. More specifically, the letter stated in relevant part that: Under section 195.002, Florida Statutes, the Department of Revenue has supervision of the tax collection and all other aspects of the administration of such taxes. Your position with the Department may require you to review or audit the activities of the office you propose to seek. Also some of your duties in supervising other officials in the administration of property taxes may be affected by your proposed candidacy. Your job requires you to review appropriate tax returns, and other records to resolve complex issues related to taxing statutes administered by the Department of Revenue. It also requires you to identify and scrutinize transactions to ascertain whether taxpayers have escaped paying property taxes. In addition, it also requires you to review and audit procedures used by counties to identify and value tangible personal property and accomplish statutory compliance, to investigate taxpayer complaints, to conduct field review with county staff as appropriate, and to provide education and assistance to county taxing officials. Because of the Department's statutory supervision of the office of tax collector, there cannot be a certification that your candidacy would involve "no interest which conflicts or activity which interferes" with your state employment within the definitions in section 110.233(4), Florida Statutes. The letter went on to say that This letter is a specific instruction to you that you should not qualify or become a candidate for office while employed in your current position. If you wish to commence your campaign by performing the pre-filing requirements, the law requires that you first resign from the Department. Failure to do so shall result in disciplinary action to dismiss you from your position in accordance with the Department's disciplinary standards and procedures, and Rule 60K-4.010, F.A.C., on the grounds that you are in violation of the Department's Code of Conduct, Section 110.233, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60K- 13.002(3), F.A.C. After receiving the above decision, by letter dated April 15, 1996, petitioner requested that the Executive Director reconsider his decision. Thereafter, on April 24, 1996, petitioner filed a request for a formal hearing to contest the agency's decision. Both the Property Appraiser and Tax Collector play a role in the property tax program in the State of Florida. The Property Appraiser generally values or assesses property subject to taxation and applies the millage rate set by the taxing authority. After the tax roll is approved by DOR, it is certified to the Tax Collector who then collects the taxes and distributes them to the appropriate taxing authorities. It is noted that ad valorem taxes make up the lion's share of taxes at the local level while tangible personal property taxes are a very small source of revenues. DOR is charged with the duties of providing oversight to the property tax program and aid and assistance to the Property Appraiser and Tax Collector. In this regard, DOR views the two offices as an integral part of the property tax program rather than two separate entities. It characterizes the program as "a stream or process where (the) lines of delineation (between the two offices) are not as distinct as they might have been ten or fifteen years ago." Because of the highly sensitive nature of the tax program, it follows that a certain degree of trust and integrity must exist between DOR (and its employees) and the local offices. Petitioner does not interface with the office of Tax Collector in any respect, and his duties do not require that he audit any of that office's records. His only duties are to audit the tangible personal property assessments performed by the Property Appraiser. These facts were not controverted. Although he has never differed with a valuation of the Property Appraiser during his five year tenure at DOR, and no such disagreement has occurred in Lake County during the last twenty-five years, petitioner could conceivably disagree with an assessment while running for office during the next few months. If the matter could not be informally settled, the tax rolls would not be certified by DOR, and litigation against DOR could be initiated by the Property Appraiser. Under those unlikely circumstances, petitioner might be called as a witness in the case, although the general practice has always been for DOR to use personnel from the Tallahassee office in litigation matters. To the very minor extent that petitioner could affect the tax rolls by disagreeing with the Property Appraiser's valuations, this could also impact the amount of money collected by the Tax Collector. DOR cites these circumstances as potentially affecting in an adverse way the level of trust and integrity between DOR and the office of Tax Collector. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, this potential conflict is so remote and miniscule as to be wholly immaterial. The evidence also shows that in his audit role, petitioner has the "opportunity . . . to look and have access to tax returns," some of which "are of TPP (tangible personal property) nature (and) have attached to them federal tax returns" which might be used by the Property Appraiser for establishing the value of tangible personal property. Whether petitioner has ever had access to, or reviewed such, returns is not of record. In any event, to the extent this set of circumstances would pose a potential conflict with the Property Appraiser, as to the Tax Collector, it would be no more significant than the purported conflict described in finding of fact 7. Finally, DOR suggests that if petitioner was unsuccessful in his bid for office, it would likely damage the "relationship of trust" that now exists between DOR and the Tax Collector. Again, this purported conflict is so speculative as to be deemed immaterial. The parties have stipulated that, as of the date of hearing, petitioner's only option for qualifying to run for office is to pay a $6,173.00 qualifying fee no later than noon, July 19, 1996. The opportunity for submitting an appropriate number of signatures in lieu of a filing fee expired on June 24, 1996. On the few, isolated occasions during the last twenty-five years when the Lake County Tax Collector has requested information from DOR personnel, he has spoken by telephone with DOR legal counsel in Tallahassee. Those matters of inquiry, primarily relating to ad valorem taxes, do not concern any area related to petitioner's job duties. He also pointed out that his office always cooperates with the office of the Property Appraiser, especially when "corrections" must be made due to errors by that office. Even so, he described the two offices as being separate and with entirely different duties. This testimony is accepted as being the most persuasive on this issue. At least four persons have already announced that they would run for Tax Collector for Lake County. The parties have stipulated that one of those persons is a regional administrator for the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles who was not required to resign his position in order to run for office. According to the incumbent Tax Collector, that individual supervises other state employees who occasionally audit certain aspects of his office pertaining to automobile license plates and decals. Because of the time constraints in this case, and although not legally obligated to do so, respondent has voluntarily agreed to allow petitioner to take annual leave (or presumably leave without pay) commencing on the date he qualifies for local public office, or July 19, 1996, and to remain on leave until a final order is issued by the agency. At that time, if an adverse decision is rendered, petitioner must choose between resigning or withdrawing as a candidate. These terms are embodied in a letter from DOR's counsel to petitioner dated July 3, 1996. If petitioner is allowed to run for office without resigning, he has represented that he will campaign while on leave or after regular business hours. He has also represented, without contradiction, that his campaign activities will not interfere with his regular duties. If elected, he intends to resign his position with DOR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order granting petitioner's request that it certify to the Department of Management Services that his candidacy for the office of Lake County Tax Collector would involve no interest which conflicts, or activity which interferes, with his state employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. 3-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 7-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Rejected as being irrelevant since petitioner was not an employee of DOR in 1990. 13-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 18. Rejected as being unnecessary. 19-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 22-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, not supported by the evidence, unnecessary, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: L. H. Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Mr. Robert M. Hendrick 5022 County Road 48 Okahumpka, Florida 34762 Peter S. Fleitman, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
