The Issue Are the four notices of violation against Respondents valid, and if valid, may the Department of Transportation require that the allegedly offending signs be removed?
Findings Of Fact On or about September 21, 2000, DOT became aware that two trucks bearing written material were parked adjacent to DOT's right-of-way on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) in St. Johns County in such a manner that the written material was visible from the main-traveled way of I-95. DOT issued four Notices of Violation against the two trucks. Notice of Violation number 10B TS 2000 539 was issued to Café Erotica of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Café Erotica on September 21, 2000, against a truck located adjacent to I-95, 2.015 miles north of SR 207, at milepost 15.823. This violation notice became DOAH Case No. 00-4188T. Notice of Violation number 10B TS 2000 540 was issued to Café Erotica of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Café Erotica on September 21, 2000, against a truck located adjacent to I-95, 2.041 miles north of SR 207, at milepost 15.849. This violation notice became DOAH Case No. 00-4189T. Notice of Violation number 10B BB 2000 539 was issued to Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc., c/o Gary Edinger, the registered agent for the corporation, on October 10, 2000, against the truck located adjacent to I-95, 2.015 miles north of SR 207. This violation notice became DOAH Case No. 00-4423T. Notice of Violation number 10B BB 2000 540 was issued to Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc., c/o Gary Edinger, the registered agent for the corporation, on October 10, 2000, against the truck located adjacent to I-95, 2.041 miles north of SR 207. This violation notice became DOAH Case No. 00-4424T. All of the foregoing notices alleged that the trucks are in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, in that they are unpermitted signs. On October 24, 2000, DOT issued a letter to Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc., advising it that the trucks which were issued the above- referenced notices of violation had been moved temporarily out of view and then returned to visibility at each other's previous milepost location. The letter advised that notwithstanding the movement of the trucks within their general location, the trucks remained illegal signs pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. I-95 is part of the Interstate Highway System. The two trucks are located at times within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of I-95. The trucks can be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity traveling on I-95. Admitted Fact Four of the parties' prehearing stipulation was that at the time the notices of violation were issued, the trucks displayed the words "Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc." However, their Admitted Fact Five, incorporating photographs, and other photographs in evidence reveal that one truck had the foregoing display without the slashes and one truck juxtaposed the phrases "Great Food" and "Adult Toys," also without the slashes. The trucks were located within 15 feet of the right-of-way fence and were parked on raised mounds of dirt, elevating them above the surrounding terrain. Immediately adjacent to the trucks were light fixtures with halogen lights aimed at the sides of the trucks. If electricity had been available, the lights could have illuminated the vehicles. The trucks were intentionally placed at their locations. As of January 5, 2001, additional verbiage was added to the trucks which states, "Hunt & Fish Camp." As of the March 7, 2001, date of hearing, the trucks still contained this additional verbiage. On both trucks, the letters are all capitalized; the size of the letters and the paint colors used call the viewer's attention to the phrases, "CAFE? EROTICA," "WE DARE TO BARE," "ADULT TOYS," "GREAT FOOD," and "EXIT 94." The abbreviation "INC.," is the phrase smallest in size, located at the very bottom right, relatively inconspicuous, and the words, "hunt & fish camp," follow, vertical to the rest of the verbiage. There are no addresses, telephone numbers, arrows, or other identifying information. Respondent Cafe Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc., is a Florida corporation. At all times material, Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc., has been a corporation in good standing with the Florida Department of State, which has registered and approved its corporate name pursuant to Section 607.0401, Florida Statutes. Asher G. Sullivan, Jr., a/k/a Jerry Sullivan, is incorporator, President, shareholder, and Director of the corporation, which will hereafter be referred to as "Exit 94, Inc." Exit 94, Inc., owns, insures, and maintains the two trucks which are the subject of this proceeding. Exit 94, Inc., likewise owns the real property on which the trucks are located, which parcel consists of approximately 11 acres situated between I-95 exits 94 and 95. Exit 94, Inc., does not sell food or adult toys. It does not offer dancers for public viewing. The business of Exit 94, Inc., is developing a hunting and fishing camp at the property it owns, the property where its trucks were cited by DOT, between I-95 exits 94 and 95. Respondent Café Erotica of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Café Erotica, is a Florida corporation which holds the license and owns the assets of the Café Erotica restaurant. Jerry Sullivan also is president, shareholder, and owner of Café Erotica of Florida, Inc., which will hereafter be referred-to as "Café Erotica." The St. Johns Management Company manages the Café Erotica restaurant. Jerry Sullivan also is the President and shareholder of the St. Johns Management Company. The Café Erotica restaurant is a 24-hour per day, full-service restaurant which features dancers clad in bathing suits and which sells adult toys. The Café Erotica restaurant is located at 2620 State Road 207 (SR-207), at the intersection of SR 207 and the exit 94 off-ramps from I-95. The real property owned by Café Erotica is not contiguous to the subject real property owned by Exit 94, Inc. The real property owned by Exit 94, Inc., which is the subject of DOT's notices of violation is approximately seven miles from the Café Erotica restaurant. The Café Erotica restaurant currently advertises on its premises and on a billboard at exit 94 of I-95. In the past, Café Erotica has advertised "we dare to bare," "adult toys," and "exit 94" on other billboards located adjacent to I- 95 in St. Johns County. Café Erotica no longer rents billboards in these locations. The advertisements of Café Erotica currently at exit 94 of I-95 include the words, "private dances," and "great food/adult toys." The advertising is specifically directed at motorists, including truck drivers, on I-95. In addition to the real property where its trucks were cited by DOT, which real property Exit 94, Inc., holds by warranty deed, Exit 94, Inc., leases property at the southeast corner of I-95's exit 93, where SR-206 intersects with I-95. At that location, Exit 94, Inc., displays a 14-foot by 25-foot permanent billboard sign reading "Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Great Food/Adult Toys/Exit 94, Inc." (Note juxtaposition of part of the corporate name). Below this billboard, on the same leased property, is a smaller sign stating "Fish Camp" with a telephone number (P-11; TR 66-64, 73- 74, 183-184). Exit 94, Inc., claims to maintain an office and a telephone on this leased property. Mr. Sullivan's primary business is that of renting billboards for advertising purposes, which he owns. He has advertised on leased signs and has knowledge of DOT's sign permit requirements. At one time, Mr. Sullivan intended to place a billboard on the property owned by Exit 94, Inc. He has not done so. Neither Café Erotica nor Exit 94, Inc., has applied to DOT for sign permits for the subject trucks, nor paid any sign permit fees for them. No sign permits have been issued to any entity for the subject trucks. When the Notices of Violation were issued, DOT inspectors did not enter on the real property owned by Exit 94, Inc., or pull any business licenses for the property. They viewed the trucks from I-95. No improvements were visible from I-95. DOT did not undertake any investigation to determine the owner(s) of the subject trucks or subject real property. Café Erotica does not own any interest in the subject trucks or real property, and no citizen testified that the trucks had caused him/her to patronize the Café Erotica. DOT witnesses acknowledged that the Notices of Violation issued to Café Erotica were essentially issued in error because DOT did not know the identity of the owner of the subject trucks and real property. Upon discovering that Café Erotica did not own any interest in the subject trucks or real property, DOT made no effort to dismiss the violations against Café Erotica. Jerry Sullivan has decision-making authority for both Respondents as a corporate officer of both corporations. Jerry Sullivan makes management decisions concerning Café Erotica, including whether, and how, to advertise. Jerry Sullivan has directed all activity on the Exit 94, Inc., property. He anticipates creating, maintaining, and charging people for the privilege of using the subject property as a fishing and hunting camp. He also intends to reward employees and clients of his various enterprises with free privileges at the camp. Ninety percent of the time, the subject trucks are parked on the subject property. However, from time to time, the trucks, one of which was burned out and one of which has a "for sale" sign painted on its windshield, are driven off the Exit 94, Inc., property to haul equipment and corn to the subject property, for "truck maintenance," and for incidental uses in connection with Exit 94, Inc., and Mr. Sullivan's other business entities, including Café Erotica. On some of these occasions, the trucks are parked in the parking lot of the Café Erotica restaurant. The trucks are used off the Exit 94, Inc., property only two or three times per month. Except when under repair, they can be driven on the roads and highways. Exit 94, Inc., paid approximately $35,000 for the subject property on or about April 9, 1999, well before the notices of violation. Eight months prior to hearing (approximately three months before the notices of violation), Exit 94, Inc. dug a pond in a naturally low spot and/or a natural basin where Mr. Sullivan believed a pond originally had been on the subject property. A solar panel pump was installed to put water into the excavation because getting electricity run to the property was prohibitively expensive. Inspection of the subject property by DOT personnel only occurred about two-and-one-half weeks before the disputed- fact hearing. At that time, the solar pump used to fill the pond with water was not working well, so that the possibility of fish living in the rather shallow pond was highly unlikely. The pond was not stocked with fish. The property was not stocked with game animals. There was also one very ramshackle deer blind on the property and a permanent metal, utility pole had been erected to support another deer blind. There were no utilities, restrooms, offices, or facilities to clean game on the premises. No fishing equipment was available for purchase. This situation was memorialized by photographs in evidence. The Exit 94, Inc., property has only one entrance which is not directly accessible from a public roadway. To reach Exit 94, Inc.'s, only entrance, a car gets off I-95 at exit 94, where Café Erotica is located, and proceeds to a private dirt road created and owned by Georgia-Pacific timber company, and then drives approximately one mile along that dirt road over the timber company's land. Thousands of acres of scrub pine belonging to the timber company surround Exit 94, Inc.'s property. Entrance to the timber company land is through a fence/gate. The timber company gate is "posted," warning that hunting is not permitted on its land and that violators will be prosecuted. The Exit 94, Inc., property is also "posted," and therefore not open to the general public. There is a "Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc., Hunt & Fish Camp" sign at its entrance. It cannot be inferred, as urged by DOT, that if a real property owner "posts" its property so the owner may subsequently prosecute trespassers and poachers, the owner also cannot charge a fee to customers, invited guests, or business invitees who hunt or fish on its property with its permission. Travelling as described above, there are approximately nine and one-half miles between exit 94 of I-95 and the Exit 94, Inc., property. There are no signs advertising a "hunt and fish camp" on this stretch of land, but Exit 94, Inc., has its billboard and other sign at Exit 93. (See Finding of Fact 22.) Exit 94, Inc., presented accounts showing it spent over $7,003 maintaining its signs since 1999 and over $12,000 on the subject trucks. Exit 94, Inc., lists addresses and locations other than the subject property as its business address(es) for various purposes. It maintains no office or telephone on the subject property. The only building on the subject property is a very small storage shack, placed there by Exit 94, Inc. The shack is not habitable as overnight lodging. It was designed to hold repair equipment and corn for seeding the pond for waterfowl and seeding the woods for deer. There is no evidence whether this method of luring game from the surrounding area is legal or illegal, but it is certainly feasible, given the location of the subject property. (See Finding of Fact 38.) Russell Market is General Manager for the Café Erotica restaurant. He was directed by Mr. Sullivan to check on Exit 94, Inc.'s, subject property, and he did so once a week and scattered corn for nine months. He saw wild turkeys on the subject property. Bill King is affiliated with Mr. Sullivan's companies. He has not hunted the subject property, but he sighted one of the deer stands. No witness testified to having camped overnight on the subject property. Bill Harry, who is employed by Mr. Sullivan, has hunted the subject property three or four times without success, despite once seeing a deer. Jerry Sullivan killed a deer on the subject property. There is no parking lot on the subject property. Respondents' witnesses testified that the subject trucks are parked on raised mounds of earth because the subject property is swampy. Only several hundred-by-60 feet have been cleared of brush. There is no telephone service to the subject property. If someone dials the telephone number listed for Exit 94, Inc. on its application to be a fish farm (see Finding of Fact 55) which is the same number on its sign at I-95's exit number 93 (see Finding of Fact 22), a recorded message relays the caller to a telephone number for the cell phone Mr. Sullivan carries on his person. No utilities are currently available on the subject property, but the solar pump is in use at the pond. Bill Harry repaired the pond pump a few days after showing DOT personnel around the subject property. (See Finding of Fact 36.) At hearing, he testified that the pond is now filling well with water. When the pond is full, Mr. Sullivan intends to stock it with fish. Exit 94, Inc., holds an occupational license from St. Johns County as a "fish camp." In issuing this license, the County accepted Exit 94, Inc.'s, designation of its business without further inquiry. Exit 94, Inc., has applied for a "fish farm" license from the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission. Exit 94, Inc., produced invoices sent to clients for hunting and fishing privileges on the subject property, corresponding checks in payment, and tax returns. Patricia Doorbar, bookkeeper for Exit 94, Inc. and all of Mr. Sullivan's other business entities, testified that she had drafted all of the invoices, and had prepared the tax returns. She further testified that she maintained Exit 94, Inc.'s corporate financial books in accord with generally accepted accounting principles. The invoices and payments reflect that other business entities controlled by Mr. Sullivan or his family members were billed and paid for use of the Exit 94, Inc., property. Exit 94, Inc., currently operates at a loss, made up as necessary by Mr. Sullivan. No legitimate reason was demonstrated to pierce the corporate veil of any of Mr. Sullivan's corporations. Approximately two weeks before the disputed-fact hearing, Exit 94, Inc., made improvements to the subject property. These included laying out feed corn on the ground, repairing a deer stand so it could support one or more hunters, and repairing the solar pump. See supra. These improvements were memorialized by photographs in evidence. Respondents asserted that DOT has selectively enforced the sign law against them on the basis of many photographs of trucks bearing written material which were admitted in evidence. The trucks typically carry a business name, address and telephone number. Some carried only a business name. DOT rarely issues notices of violations for trucks. Within the last three-and-one-half years, trucks constituted approximately five such notices out of 3500 sign violation notices of all kinds, not just off-premises signs. The notices to these two Respondents constitute four of the five notices. DOT has promulgated no rules or policies specifying the factors to be considered when evaluating whether an operational truck constitutes an "off-premises sign" worthy of a violation notice. In the normal course of business, DOT inspectors determine whether trucks constitute "on-premises signs" on a case-by-case analysis which weighs content of the sign, usage of the truck, location and length of time the truck is in a single location, and whether the sign content advertises the business at the location where the truck is parked, advertises another business, or advertises anything at all. Inspectors have wide discretion in issuing notices of violation. With respect to the majority of Respondents' photographs presented at hearing, DOT representatives gave reasonable explanations why the truck owners had not been notified of violations, usually because the truck was being operated on the highway, was not parked over-long away from the business premises which it named, or was parked on the property of the business to which it belonged or which it named. In one instance, a contractor's truck was not charged with a violation because it was parked at a construction site which also bore a sign proclaiming that the construction work was being done by that contractor. Sometimes the reason a truck had not been cited was because the truck had not been located. DOT does not research which corporations or persons own or operate trucks painted with business names, and apparently, precision in painting a business name on other operable trucks had no effect on DOT's decision to treat other operable trucks as "on-premises signs" so that no notices of violation were issued against them. Similar photographs of trucks which Mr. Sullivan had sent to DOT were personally evaluated by DOT's Assistant Right- of-Way Manager for Operations, but this measure was only in response to the Respondents' allegations of selective enforcement in the instant case. The Assistant Right-of-Way Manager directed DOT district personnel to take either further investigative or regulatory action as she instructed on a case- by-case basis. One truck for "Smiley's" was subsequently issued a violation notice.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent, Katherine Harris, violated the provisions of Section 106.08, Florida Statutes, by making payments of organizational dues from her campaign account prior to the 1998 election.
Findings Of Fact As to the Merits: At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Commission was the state agency responsible for the oversight of public elections in this state. Respondent was a candidate for public office whose activities were subject to scrutiny by the Commission. The Division of Elections (Division) was a branch of the office of the Secretary of State. Respondent initially notified the Division on June 8, 1997 that she was seeking re-election to the Florida Senate seat she then held. However, on November 19, 1997, she filed the appropriate forms with the Division to signify her candidacy for the office of Florida Secretary of State. At or near each filing, Respondent filed with the Division a "Statement of Candidate" in which she stated she had received, read, and understood the requirements of Section 106, Florida Statutes. From April 1997, through mid-March 1998, 21 separate checks were written by her campaign treasurer on Respondent's campaign account with the Barnett Bank for dues payments to organizations. This is the issue here. The organizations to which the checks were written are organizations established for the public good. The checks in issue are as follows: CH # DATE PAYEE AMT 0101 04/03/97 Charlotte County 9.00 Republican Club 0102 04/03/97 Peace River Federated 5.00 Republican Women 0103 04/03/97 Manasota Republican 11.00 Women's Club Fed. 0104 04/03/97 Venice-Nokomis Fed. 11.00 Women's Club 0105 04/03/97 Sarasota Bay Republican 5.00 Women's Club 0106 04/03/97 West Charlotte 5.00 Republican Club 0108 06/05/97 Bernice Furrow 25.00 0109 07/03/97 Venice Area C of C 50.00 0110 08/06/97 Charlotte County C of C 65.00 0111 08/11/97 Republican Women's Club 10.00 of Sarasota 0112 09/04/97 Sarasota Bay Republican 15.00 Women's Club 0114 10/29/97 Taxpayer's Association of Sarasota County 12.00 0120 11/30/97 Sarasota Republican Club 15.00 0162 02/11/98 Mid-County Republican 15.00 0163 02/11/98 Club Venice-Nokomis Federated 7.50 0164 02/11/98 Republican Club West County Republican 5.00 0165 02/11/98 Club Siesta Key Republican 6.00 0189 03/03/98 Club Sarasota County Young 30.00 0199 03/09/98 Republicans Republican Women's Club 10.00 of Sarasota 0204 03/16/98 Republican Women's Club 15.00 0206 03/16/98 of Lakeland Federate Manasota Republican 10.00 Women's Club Federate All of the checks except number 0108 were for dues to the organization shown, and totaled $325.00. Check number 0108, in the amount of $25.00, was made to Bernice Furrow, and the memo space on the instrument indicates it was issued in reimbursement of dues to the Peace River Forum. These checks were written at the direction of Respondent. Clifford M. King, the maker of the checks in question, is an attorney admitted to practice in Florida in 1988. He served as campaign treasurer for Respondent during her successful campaign for the Florida Senate in 1994, and was her attorney and campaign treasurer during her campaign for Secretary of State. His major areas of practice include business transactions, estate planning, and probate. He has not worked for any other candidate nor has he ever been employed by any other client to give advice on elections law. Nonetheless, he considered himself to be qualified to advise Respondent on the Florida Election Code during her campaigns. It is so found. To prepare for giving that advice, Mr. King reviewed the Florida Statutes pertinent to elections and the campaign handbook prepared and issued by the Division of Elections. However, he did not read any opinions issued by the Division or opinions of the Attorney General dealing with elections law. When issues arose with which he did not feel comfortable, he would seek the advice of the Division of Elections. Mr. King cannot recall whether it was Respondent or one of her campaign workers who asked him if it were permissible to spend campaign funds for dues, but he is sure the question was asked. In response, he advised that to do so was a permissible expenditure of the campaign. Mr. King recalls that this same issue arose during the 1994 campaign at which time, based on his research of the statutes and the Division's campaign handbook, and after consultation with individuals involved in other campaigns, he concluded that expenditures for dues were permissible and he so advised Respondent. Though Mr. King recalls having discussed with Respondent the issue of the permissibility of writing these checks, he did not advise her of the specific provisions of the elections statute in issue here. He was satisfied at the time he advised Respondent and wrote the checks in issue, that it was lawful and permissible to do so. The Division's investigator, Mr. Smith, contacted representatives of most, if not all of the organizations to whom the checks in issue were written. All checks except the one to Ms. Furrow, were in payment of membership dues paid by all members. Mr. Young could find no instance where a specific benefit accrued to Respondent as a result of her payment of dues which was not received by every other member of the organization, candidate for public office or not. It is so found. As to the Motion for fees: After the Order of Probable Cause involving Respondent was served on Respondent, she requested a formal hearing. This hearing was initially denied by the Commission on the grounds that Respondent had failed to identify issues of fact requiring formal hearing. However, this decision was subsequently reversed and the matter was referred for formal hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. While the discovery process was being carried out, it became known that Respondent had twice been advised by Mr. King, her attorney, that the donations/dues payments from campaign funds in issue were permissible expenditures. When this information became known to the Commission's counsel, counsel prepared a Motion to Dismiss the Order of Probable Cause and recommended that action to the Commission. The basis for the recommendation was a lack of evidence to demonstrate that Respondent's actions were willfully illegal. Notwithstanding its counsel's advice, the Commission determined to proceed with the action on the basis that a majority of the Commissioners considered Respondent's counsel/campaign treasurer, the individual who had given the advice to Respondent, a "straw man" whose testimony by deposition was for the sole purpose of exonerating Respondent. That conclusion is not supported by the evidence of record, however.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing its Order of Probable Cause in this matter. An award of attorney's fees and costs to Respondent is unwarranted and rejected. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Phyllis Hampton, Esquire David F. Chester, Esquire Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Richard E. Coates, Esquire Christopher B. Lunny, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. 106 East College Avenue Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven K. Christensen, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue presented is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."
Findings Of Fact The following facts have been stipulated by the parties: Petitioner, Brian L. Blair, is a Respondent in a case before DOAH styled, Florida Elections Commission v. Brian L. Blair, Case No. 09-2069, wherein the Florida Elections Commission ("Commission") has charged Mr. Blair with two counts of willfully accepting campaign contributions in excess of $500.00 in violation of Subsection 106.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner filed a Petition to Determine Invalidity of Existing Rule on August 28, 2009, wherein he alleges that the Commission Rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. As a person subject to Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, and accused of willfully violating one of its prohibitions, Mr. Blair is substantially affected by the Commission's application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 to his case and, therefore, has the requisite standing to bring this action. In 2007, the Florida Legislature repealed Section 106.37, Florida Statutes (2006), which contained a definition of "willfulness" for purposes of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. That section was repealed by CS/HB 537 (Section 51, Chapter 2007-30, Laws of Florida), effective January 1, 2008. Contemporaneous with the repeal of Section 106.37, Florida Statutes, the same legislation amended Subsection 106.25(3), Florida Statutes, to provide that willfulness is "a determination of fact." (§ 48, Chap. 2007-30, Laws of Florida, effective January 1, 2008). Subsection 106.25(3), Florida Statutes, currently provides: (3) For the purposes of commission jurisdiction, a violation shall mean the willful performance of an act prohibited by this chapter or chapter 104 or the willful failure to perform an act required by this chapter or chapter 104. Willfulness is a determination of fact; however, at the request of the respondent, willfulness may be considered and determined in an informal hearing before the commission. (Emphasis added.) The 2007 Legislative Session ended on May 4, 2007; CS/HB 537 was signed and approved by the Governor on May 22, 2007. On May 24 and 25, 2007, Barbara Linthicum, executive director of the Commission at the time, engaged in the following exchange via email with the Commission's attorney, Edward A. Tellechea, counsel of record in this case, regarding Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002: Ms. Linthicum: "Do you think we have authority to add chapter 106 to the willfulness rule?" Mr. Tellechea: ". . . Someone will challenge it[,] but what the heck[,] I'm game." Ms. Linthicum: "But, if you are game, I think we should definitely go ahead before January 1 comes along. You certainly do have a good track record defending our rules" The amendment of Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 was effective December 25, 2007. The repeal of the definition of "willfulness" in Section 106.37, Florida Statutes, became effective January 1, 2008. The proposed rule amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 that is the subject of this proceeding was reviewed in 2007 by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee of the Florida Legislature, pursuant to Section 120.545, Florida Statutes, prior to its adoption, and the Committee made no written comments or filed any written objections. In order to determine whether willful violations of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, have occurred, the Commission employs the definition of "willful" contained in Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002, when making the factual determination of willfulness.
Findings Of Fact We find the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact to be supported by competent substantial evidence. FCHR Order No. 06-058 Page 2 We adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact. Conclusions of Law We find the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the law to the facts to result in a correct disposition of the matter. We adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law. Exceptions Petitioner filed four numbered exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order in a document entitled “Petitioner’s Exceptions to Filed Recommended Order.” There is no indication on Petitioner’s exception document that it was served on Respondent by Petitioner as is required by Fla, Admin. Code R. 28-106.110. The exceptions docurnent was received after the expiration of the 15-day period from the date of the Recommended Order for filing exceptions. See, Recommended Order, Notice of Right to Submit Exceptions; Section 120.57(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2005); and Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.217(1). The Recommended Order is dated March 23, 2006, the cover letter accompanying the exceptions document is dated April 10, 2006, and the exceptions document was received by the Commission on April 17, 2006. All exceptions relate to the elements for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Exceptions 1 and 4 deal with issues surrounding whether Petitioner was handicapped within the meaning of the law. Exception 2 deals with the issue of whether Petitioner was qualified for the position in question. Exception 3 deals with the issue of whether Petitioner was treated less favorably than other employees. In our view, if all these exceptions were granted, the outcome of the case would not change, since the Administrative Law. Judge concluded that, even if a prima facie case had been established, Respondent established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Petitioner from her position as a bus driver, namely Petitioner’s taking of the indicated prescription drugs and her inability to meet the lifting requirements of the position (Recommended Order, [42 and J 49), and that there was no showing that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination (Recommended Order, { 49). Further, the Commission has stated, “It is well settled that it is the Administrative Law Judge’s function ‘to consider all of the evidence presented and reach ultimate conclusions of fact based on competent substantial evidence by resolving conflicts, judging the credibility of witnesses and drawing permissible inferences therefrom. If the evidence presented supports two inconsistent findings, it is the Administrative Law Judge’s role to decide between them.’ Beckton v. Department of Children and Family Services, 21 F.A.L.R. 1735, at 1736 (FCHR 1998), citing Maggio v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 9 F.A.L.R. 2168, at 2171 (FCHR 1986).” Barr v. Columbia Ocala Regional FCHR Order No. 06-058 Page 3 Medical Center, 22 F.A.L.R. 1729, at 1730 (FCHR 1999). Accord, Bowles v. Jackson County Hospital Corporation, FCHR Order No. 05-135 (December 6, 2005). Petitioner’s exceptions are rejected. Dismissal The Petition for Relief and Complaint of Discrimination are DISMISSED with prejudice. The parties have the right to seek judicial review of this Order. The Commission and the appropriate District Court of Appeal must receive notice of appeal within 30 days of the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the Commission. Explanation of the right to appeal is found in Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110. DONE AND ORDERED this__20th _ day of June 2006. FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS: Commissioner Donna Elam, Panel Chairperson; Commissioner Onelia A. Fajardo; and Commissioner Mario M. Valle Filed this__20th day of June _, 2006, in Tallahassee, Florida. . eld baed iolet Crawford, Cler! Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 488-708 Copies furnished to: Lorraine C. Morris c/o Warren K. Anderson, Jr., Esq. c/o Michael L. Howle, Esq. Anderson & Howell, P.A. 2029 North Third Street Jacksonville Beach, FL 32250-7429 FCHR Order No. 06-058 Page 4 Lee County Government c/o Andrea R. Fraser, Esq. c/o Jack Peterson, Esq. Post Office Box 398 Fort Myers, FL 33902-0398 William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge, DOAH James Mallue, Legal Advisor for Commission Panel IHEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed to the above listed addressees this__20th _ day of June 2006. we Yat Can Clerk of the Commission Florida Commission on Human Relations
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a closely held corporation owned and operated by Salvatore Studiale and his family, including his wife, Celia, their son Jack Studiale and their daughter, Caroline Greenlaw. Respondent owns and operates Tropical Acres Steak House, a restaurant located in Broward County, Florida. Respondent erected a sign in 1975 in Broward County ninety feet north of Griffin Road adjacent to I-95 that is the subject of this proceeding. In a 1976 proceeding involving the same parties to this proceeding, Petitioner cited the same sign that is the subject of these proceedings for having been erected without certain permits in violations of Sections 479.02, 470.07(1), and 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Thereafter the case was referred to the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and assigned DOAH Case No. 76-473. A formal administrative hearing was held in Case No. 76- 473 by a DOAH Hearing Officer who entered a Recommended Order. The following findings of fact, taken from the Recommended Order entered in Case No. 76-473, are consistent with the evidence presented before me and are hereby adopted as my findings of fact: In July, 1975, Salvatore Studiale and his wife Celia purchased certain real estate located between Interstate Highway I-95 and Griffin Road, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On August 1, 1975, Salvatore Studiale, President of Respondent Corporation, and his wife, leased the property to Respondent. A variance for the erection of the sign was required from Broward County and this was approved on the condition that frontage of the property be deeded to the county. This was done on December 8, 1975. The property deeded to Broward County was of a value of approximately $18,000. Subsequently, Respondent had a sign erected which read "Tropical Acres Steaks [and] Seafood 1/2 Mile". Investigation by Petitioner's representatives in the Spring of 1976 revealed that no state permit had been applied for prior to erection of the sign and that no permit tag was affixed thereto. The premises of the business establishment advertised in Respondent's sign is located at a place other than the property on which the sign was erected. In early June, 1976, Respondent changed the copy on its sign to delete the words "1/2 Mile" and substitute therefor the word "Lessee". The Hearing Officer in Case 76-473 concluded that the subject sign was exempt from Petitioner's permitting requirements: ... because Section 479.16(11)1/ excepts from the provisions of Chapter 479 "Signs or notices erected or maintained upon property giving the name of the owner, lessee or occupant of the premises". The copy on the sign that reads "Tropical Acres Steaks Seafoods" (sic) adequately reflects the name of the lessee of the property. In fact, since the alleged violation was noted, Respondent has even added the word "Lessee" to the copy on the sign. It is concluded that Respondent properly falls with the exception stated above. The Hearing Officer in Case No. 76-473 recommended that "the allegations against Respondent be dismissed". Thereafter on August 12, 1976, Petitioner entered a Final Order in Case 76-473 which found that the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained in the Recommended Order were correct and adopted the Recommended Order as its Final Order. The site of the subject sign had been the location of a gasoline service station before the Studiales purchased the property. When the sign was erected, the site was located in unincorporated Broward County. In July 1990 the site was annexed so that at the time of the formal hearing the sign was located within an incorporated municipality. In 1978, Respondent's sign was damaged by a wind storm. With Petitioner's approval, the sign was restored. On June 13, 1991, Petitioner's investigators inspected the subject sign. At an undetermined time between 1978 and June 13, 1991, a strip was attached to the supporting posts beneath the main faces of the sign so that two additional sign faces, one facing north and the other south, were created. The message that was placed on each face of this smaller sign was "1/2 Mile West" together with directional arrows. This addition was for the purpose of directing traffic to Respondent's restaurant, which was located 1/2 mile west of the sign. The directional message on each face of the smaller sign was removed prior to the formal hearing that was held in this proceeding. No permit for the sign has been applied for by Respondent or the Studiales and no permit has been given by Petitioner. Petitioner does not charge any permit fee for a sign unless a permit has been issued. There was a dispute as to whether Respondent had been charged and had paid annual fees for the subject sign. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that in 1986 and 1987 Respondent received billings from Petitioner for the subject sign as a result of computer error and that Respondent paid those billings. It is clear, however, that the Studiales were aware that no permit had ever been issued for this sign and that they relied on the determination made in Case 76-473 that the sign was exempt from permitting. Respondent has attempted to establish that it has placed great reliance in making its business plans on Petitioner's representations and assurances that the subject sign was a legal structure. Although it is clear that the subject sign is important to Respondent's business because it serves to direct customers to the restaurant location, Petitioner's delay in challenging the legality of the sign has not prejudiced Respondent. Respondent has been benefitted by the continued existence of the subject sign. The size of the sign exceeds 10 square feet. On June 20, 1991, Petitioner issued a notice of alleged violation of Sections 479.07(1), 479.105, and 479.07(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1991), for the subject sign, based on its determinations that the sign was not exempt from pertinent permitting requirements, that it did not have a permit, and that it was improperly spaced.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that the status of Respondent's sign is "nonconforming" and which rejects Petitioner's contention that the sign is illegal. DONE AND ORDERED this 2 day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2 day of April, 1992.
Findings Of Fact By applications dated July 30, 1979, the Respondent National Advertising Company applied for eight permits to construct four double-faced outdoor advertising signs on U.S 41 and Pine Island Road, in Lee County, Florida. The applications in question stated that the signs were to be located in an unincorporated area of Lee County zoned commercial or industrial. This was consistent with the official zoning maps of Lee County, which reflected that the property upon which the signs were to be located was zoned commercial. The applications were approved by the Department on July 31, 1979, and one structure was erected. This structure bears permit numbers 11293-10 and 11294-10. Subsequently, it was determined that the zoning on the subject property was agricultural rather than commercial as stated on the permit applications. This problem was caused by a transposition error on the Lee County zoning maps which mistakenly classified the subject property as commercial. On November 1, 1979, notices of violation of Chapter 14-10.05, Florida Administrative Code were issued against the permits which alleged that the structures were in violation of law due to inappropriate zoning. The inspector who approved the Respondent's applications relied upon the representation made by the Respondent that the zoning on the property was commercial and did not independently verify this information. In reliance on the Lee County zoning maps, a representative of the Respondent entered into a lease agreement with the owner of the property on which the signs were to be located, secured Department of Transportation permits and, subsequently, county building permits. Following the erection of the first sign, the Department was informed by another sign company that the zoning on the property was improper. The Department "red-tagged" the completed sign and the remaining permitted structures, thus halting further construction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Petitioner Florida Department of Transportation revoking permit numbers 11293-10, 11294-10, 11296-10, 11295-10, 11299-10, 11297-10 and 11298-10, issued to the Respondent National Advertising Company to construct four double-faced outdoor advertising signs on U.S. 41 in Lee County, Florida. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30 day of June, 1983.
The Issue The issue for disposition is whether Mary McCarty, Respondent in a complaint to the Florida Commissions on Ethics, is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees from the complainant, Leslie F. McDermott, pursuant to Section 112.317(8), F.S.
Findings Of Fact Mary McCarty has resided in Delray Beach, Florida for approximately twenty years. She is politically active as a Republican; she served as a Delray Beach city commissioner from 1987 until 1990, and now currently serves as chairperson of the Palm Beach County Commission. William (Bill) Andrews, also a Republican, was elected to the Delray Beach City Commission approximately one year after Ms. McCarty. The two worked together on certain issues, including an issue regarding the firing of the city manager, and more often than not, they voted on the same side. Leslie F. McDermott lives in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, Florida. He has never resided in Delray Beach. He is employed as an engineer for a computer company and is well known and respected in the community as an active member of the NAACP. He served as president of the south county branch of the NAACP for seven or eight years until recently, and now serves on the executive board of that local branch. Jeanette (Jay) Slavin is a "grass roots" political activist in the south county area. As a Democrat she has been very involved in political campaigns and has openly supported candidates and issues in heated opposition to Mary McCarty. Malcolm Byrd, a Republican, served on the Delray Beach City Commission from 1979 until 1987, and was city manager from 1989-90. At first he supported Mary McCarty, but as city manager he had differing views of how the city should proceed and how the city manager should function. In early 1990, Malcolm Byrd learned that Bill Andrews had attended a Republican fund-raiser in Orlando, with transportation by chartered jet and limousine provided by a third party. Bill Andrews openly discussed the trip and how lavish it was. Andrews displayed a photograph of himself at the event with President Reagan or other noted Republicans. Malcolm Byrd became aware that Andrews had not reported that trip on his financial disclosure form, and shared that information with Jay Slavin. There was also some talk that Mary McCarty had attended the fund-raiser, as Andrews referred to "we" when discussing the trip. Mary McCarty's financial disclosure form for 1990 did not reflect the alleged gifts related to the trip. Jay Slavin had lunch with Leslie McDermott and urged him to file ethics complaints against both Andrews and McCarty. Ms. Slavin had obtained the requisite forms from the commission. She felt that Leslie McDermott's complaint would have more credibility as she, Slavin, was known to be politically opposed to Andrews and McCarty. Leslie McDermott was reluctant at first to file the complaint against McCarty, as the only basis that Jay Slavin gave him was that Bill Andrews said "we" went on the trip, and everyone knew that Mary McCarty frequently attended fund-raisers and political events. Leslie McDermott drafted the complaint based on information from Jay Slavin, and Ms. Slavin typed it for his signature, as he has a visual handicap. Before sending the complaint, McDermott spoke with Malcolm Byrd, who told him that he did not have the evidence on McCarty that he had on Andrews and that he could not encourage him to file on McCarty. McDermott heard rumors from other people who believed she had attended the function, but no one told him they had personal knowledge of the trip or had actually seen McCarty. At the hearing, and during the investigation by the commission, Leslie McDermott refused to divulge the names of those other persons who told him they believed Mary McCarty took the trip. After sending the complaints, McDermott gave Jay Slavin permission to give them to three newspapers which he specified: the Palm Beach Post, the Sun Times and the Fort Lauderdale Sentinel. He personally called the papers and told them that the matters in the complaints needed to be investigated. He also told the reporters that the complaints had no official connection with the NAACP. He considered the three papers to be responsible, non-sensational publications and he had experience in the past with issuing press releases. On February 6, 1992 the Sun-Sentinel published a story with the headline, "ETHICS COMPLAINTS FILED", stating that an NAACP official filed ethics complaints alleging that Mary McCarty and Bill Andrews attended a $1000 a plate fund-raiser paid for by a group of bond brokers, and failed to disclose the gifts. Mary McCarty contacted the NAACP, and Leslie McDermott was chastised for involving the organization. He did not call the newspaper to demand a corrective article as he did not want to "add fuel to the fire". He avowed distress, however, that people associated the issue with the NAACP. Meanwhile, the Ethics Commission conducted its investigation and found that, indeed, Mary McCarty did not attend the event. That was a conclusion that should have been reached by Mr. McDermott prior to his filing the complaint. Instead, on the complaint form, he signed the following statement under oath: COMPLAINT THAT THE COMMISSIONER NAMED ABOVE, THEN A DELRAY BEACH CITY COMMISSIONER DID VIOLATE FLORIDA STATUTE 112 IN THAT THE COMMISSIONER ACCEPTED GIFTS VALUED IN EXCESS OF $100.00 AND FAILED TO REPORT SAME IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAW. THE GIFTS WERE PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF A BOND UNDERWRITING GROUP HEADED BY SMITH BARNEY. THEY INCLUDED: ROUND TRIP TRANSPORTATION ON A CORPORATE JET FROM WEST PALM BEACH TO ORLANDO AND BACK; AND, ROUND TRIP LIMOUSINE SERVICE FROM THE ORLANDO AIRPORT TO THE ORANGE COUNTY CONVENTION AND CIVIC CENTER AND RETURN TO THE AIRPORT; AND, A TICKET TO ATTEND THE $1000 PER PERSON FUND RAISER DINNER BENEFITING GOV. MARTINEZ AND FEATURING PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH. THE FOREGOING GIFTS HAVE AN ESTIMATED VALUE OF $1350 TO 1500 WELL IN EXCESS OF THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. THE COMMISSIONERS FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORM FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1990 WHICH COVERS THE DATE OF THE SUBJECT EVENT ON FRIDAY APRIL 20 1990 SHOWS NO GIFTS RECEIVED. IN ADDITION TO COMMENTS MADE TO VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE TRIP, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT ALL EXPENSES HAD BEEN PAID BY THE BOND BROKERS, THE COMMISSIONER WAS OBSERVED AT THE EVENT BY NUMEROUS LOCAL OFFICIALS AND RESIDENTS. (Exhibit 1, Complaint dated February 2, 1992) Leslie McDermott did not ask Bill Andrews or Mary McCarty whether she attended the function. He did not contact anyone, including the sponsor of the event, who would likely have personal knowledge of her attendance. Instead, he relied on rumors and indirect reports, all which he knew were based on these tenuous connections: Bill Andrews used the term "we" in bragging about the trip. Mary McCarty frequently attended political events and was politically active. Mary McCarty and Bill Andrews, both Republicans (but not the only Republicans on the city council), often voted alike. Some unnamed persons overheard conversations which made them believe that Bill Andrews and Mary McCarty were on the trip together. Leslie McDermott's explanation that he released the complaint to the press so that an investigation could be conducted is simply not persuasive. He is an educated, articulate and experienced individual. He knew or should have known that public exposure of his complaint would injure the reputation of Ms. McCarty. Despite his own initial misgivings, Mr. McDermott allowed himself to be used by individuals who could only benefit from that injury. His failure, due to hubris or extraordinarily bad judgment, to make a reasonable attempt to check the veracity of the rumors, constitutes the reckless disregard by which malicious intent may be proven. In defending against the complaint and in pursuing relief in this proceeding, Mary McCarty has incurred costs and attorneys fees in the total amount of $12,876.55. Exhibit #4a), b), and c) appropriately itemizes the 50.9 hours and $2696.55 costs incurred. The hourly rate of $200.00 was stipulated as reasonable. Leslie McDermott contests the reasonableness of any time spent and costs incurred after the commission's order finding no probable cause was issued. Based upon the unrefuted testimony of Robert V. Romani, Esquire, an experienced litigator, past-president of the Palm Beach County Bar Association and member of the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar; and after considering relevant case law discussed below, I find that the hours and costs both before and after dismissal of the complaint are reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics issue its final order awarding fees and costs in the total amount $12,876.55 to Mary McCarty from Leslie McDermott. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5168EC The findings of fact proposed by both parties are substantially adopted here, with the exception of the following findings proposed by Leslie McDermott. Paragraph 13. The "reasonable" appearance or belief as to Ms. McCarty's guilt is rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Paragraph 15. The reason Mr. McDermott presents for signing the complaint is rejected as not credible, in the face of his inconsistent action in presenting the complaint to the press. Paragraphs 16-18 are rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Kenneth D. Stern, Esquire Post Office Box 3878 Boca Raton, Florida 33427-3878 James K. Green, Esquire One Clearlake Centre 250 South Australian Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
