The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Respondent as a licensed citrus fruit dealer breached an agreement with Petitioner relating to the purchase of citrus fruit during the 1991-1992 shipping season and further whether the breach of such agreement constitutes a violation of the Florida Citrus Code for which the proceeds of the citrus fruit dealer's bond should be paid to Petitioner pursuant to section 601.66, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lykes Pasco, Inc., is a Florida corporation located in Pasco County, Florida, in the business of citrus fruit processing. Respondent, L & M Fruit Company, Inc., is a dissolved Florida corporation that formerly was in the business of selling and delivering citrus fruit. Jerry M. Mitchell was the past president of Respondent. During the 1991-1992 shipping season, Respondent was a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. Co-Respondent, American Surety and Casualty Company, a registered surety company, during the 1991-1992 shipping season executed a citrus fruit dealer's bond to Respondent in the amount of $49,000 pursuant to the provisions of section 601.66, Florida Statutes. On or about September 20, 1991, Petitioner entered into an express written contract with Respondent for the sale and delivery of citrus fruit. Specifically, the contract provided for the sale and delivery of 35,000 boxes of early and midseason oranges at $0.85 pounds net delivered, and 35,000 boxes of valencia oranges at $1.05 pounds net delivered. The contract was executed by Tom O'Neal on behalf of Petitioner, and by Jerry M. Mitchell on behalf of Respondent. Of the 35,000 boxes of early and midseason oranges provided for in the contract, Respondent delivered 21,706 boxes leaving a shortage of 13,294 boxes. Of the 35,000 boxes of valencia oranges provided in the contract, Respondent delivered 1,180 boxes, leaving a shortage of 33,820 boxes. Because of the Respondent's breach of contract Petitioner was required to purchase fruit solids on the open market to cover its business needs. Petitioner incurred costs in the amount of $91,980.53 to replace the fruit which Respondent failed to deliver under the terms of the contract. In addition to the costs incurred by the Petitioner in replacing the fruit, Petitioner also made an advancement of funds against the contract to the Respondent. The funds advanced to Respondent which have not been repaid nor applied against the fruit delivered total $15,567.55. The damages incurred by the Petitioner resulting from Respondent's breach of contract total $107,548.08.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order adjudicating that the amount of indebtedness owed to Petitioner from Respondent is $107,548.08, that Respondent shall have thirty (30) days in which to satisfy such indebtedness, and that upon failure of the respondent to make satisfaction of this claim, any remaining proceeds of the citrus fruit dealer's bond executed by Co-Respondent shall be distributed to Petitioner. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of May, 1995. RICHARD HIXSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX Petitioner' Proposed Findings: Paragraphs 1 through 7 are adopted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Commissioner Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, P1-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Patrick T. Lennon, Esquire H. Vance Smith, Esquire Attorneys for Lykes Pasco, Inc. Post Office Box 1531 Tampa, Florida 33601 Mr. Jerry M. Mitchell, President L & M Fruit Company, Inc. Post Office Box 1048 Bartow, Florida 33880 F. J. Manuel, Jr. Sears & Manual, P.A. Attorneys for American Surety & Casualty Company 511 North Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 Clerk Department of Citrus Post Office Box 148 Lakeland, Florida 33802-0148 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether the Respondent Alilev Corporation failed to pay amounts owing to the Petitioner for the shipment of citrus fruit, as set forth in the Complaint dated April 30, 2001, and, if so, the amount the Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Fresh Fruit Express and Bay Harbor Fine Foods were "citrus fruit dealers" licensed by the Department. Bay Harbor Fine Foods is a retail grocery store. As part of its business, it sells to its retail customers "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit for shipment to third persons identified by the customers. Arthur C. Bergen is an owner of Bay Harbor Fine Foods and acted on its behalf with respect to the transactions that are the subject of this proceeding. Fresh Fruit Express is in the business of packaging and shipping "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit pursuant to orders placed by other citrus fruit dealers. Barbara Spiece is the president of Fresh Fruit Express and acted on its behalf with respect to the transactions that are the subject of this proceeding. In November and December 1999, Fresh Fruit Express received via facsimile transmittal a number of orders for "gift fruit" from Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Most of the orders were for single shipments of fruit, although a few orders were for 12 monthly shipments of fruit. This was the first year Bay Harbor Fine Foods had done business with Fresh Fruit Express, and Bay Harbor Fine Foods and Fresh Fruit Express did not execute a written contract governing their business relationship. On the night of Sunday, December 12, 1999, Fresh Fruit Express's packinghouse was destroyed by fire, and its offices were substantially damaged. The fire could not have happened at a worse time because it was at the peak of the holiday fruit- shipping season. Fresh Fruit Express was able to move into temporary offices and to obtain the use of a packinghouse very quickly. It had telephone service at approximately noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, and it began shipping "gift fruit" packages on Friday, December 17, 1999, to fill the orders its had received. Mr. Bergen, the owner of Bay Harbor Fine Foods, learned of the fire at Fresh Fruit Express and attempted to contact its offices for an update on the orders Bay Harbor Fine Foods had placed for shipment during the holidays. Mr. Bergen was unable to contact anyone at Fresh Fruit Express for three or four days after the fire, and he was worried that his customers' orders for "gift fruit" would not be shipped on time.1 Mr. Bergen called two other packinghouses and placed orders duplicating some of the orders Bay Harbor Fine Foods had placed with Fresh Fruit Express. Mr. Bergen directed these packinghouses to ship the duplicate orders via expedited Federal Express and United Parcel Service shipping, and Bay Harbor Fine Foods incurred extra costs for the expedited shipping. Meanwhile, Fresh Fruit Express was giving priority to its smaller wholesale customers such as Bay Harbor Fine Foods, and it shipped all of the orders it had received from Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Bay Harbor Fine Foods did not cancel its orders with Fresh Fruit Express or otherwise notify Fresh Fruit Express that it should not ship the fruit; Mr. Bergen assumed that Fresh Fruit Express would contact him if it intended to ship the fruit ordered by Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Fresh Fruit Express prepared invoices for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated January 24, 2000, in the amounts of $60.01, $599.43, and $511.80, respectively, for "gift fruit" shipments made in November and December 1999; it prepared an invoice for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated February 18, 2000, in the amount of $92.00 for "gift fruit" shipments made in January and February 2000; it prepared an invoice for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated March 21, 2000, in the amount of $69.34 for "gift fruit" shipments made in February and March 2000; and it prepared an invoice for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated April 17, 2000, in the amount of $44.40 for "gift fruit" shipments made in April 2000. According to the invoices, Bay Harbor Fine Foods owed Fresh Fruit Express $1,376.98 as of April 17, 2000. All of the invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods that were submitted by Fresh Fruit Express contain the following: "Terms: Net 14 days prompt payment is expected and appreciated. A 1½% monthly service charge (A.P.R. 18% per annum) may be charged on all past due accounts. " By late April 2000, Fresh Fruit Express had not received payment for any of the "gift fruit" shipped pursuant to the orders placed by Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Ms. Spiece contacted Bay Harbor Fine Foods in late April 2000 and inquired about payment of the amounts owing. Ms. Spiece was told that Bay Harbor Fine Foods had no invoices from Fresh Fruit Express. Ms. Spiece sent duplicate invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods, and she called to confirm that the invoices had been received. After several attempts by Fresh Fruit Express to collect the amounts invoiced to Bay Harbor Fine Foods, Mr. Bergen tendered a check dated July 11, 2000, to Fresh Fruit Express on the Bay Harbor Fine Foods account in the amount of $591.90. The check was accompanied by a letter signed by Mr. Bergen, in which he stated: Enclosed is a check in the amount of $591.90 covering the shipments that we know were not duplicated due to your fire in late December. This amount reflects a deduction of $341.95 in freight charges paid by us to U.P.S. and Fed. Ex. to make our promised Christmas deadline. In the statement attached to the complaint filed with the Department, Fresh Fruit Express claims that Bay Harbor Fine Foods owes it a total of $1,034.62, which amount includes a credit for the $591.90 paid by Bay Harbor Fine Foods in July 2000 and amounts shown as "Finance" charges for the months of February 2000 through April 2001. Bay Harbor Fine Foods does not dispute Fresh Fruit Express's claim that $1,376.98 worth of "gift fruit" was shipped by Fresh Fruit Express pursuant to orders Bay Harbor Fine Foods placed in November and December 1999. Bay Harbor Fine Foods' position is that it need not pay Fresh Fruit Express for the fruit because Fresh Fruit Express did not notify it after the December 12, 1999, fire that it would ship the orders and because Bay Harbor Fine Foods had to make sure that its customers' orders were filled. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Bay Harbor Fine Foods was, at the times material to this proceeding, a Florida-licensed and -bonded citrus fruit dealer; that, in November and December 1999, Bay Harbor Fine Foods submitted orders to Fresh Fruit Express for the shipment of "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit; that Fresh Fruit Express shipped all of the "gift fruit" ordered by Bay Harbor Fine Foods in November and December 1999; that the price of the "gift fruit" shipped by Fresh Fruit Express pursuant to Bay Harbor Fine Foods' orders totaled $1,376.98; that Bay Harbor Fine Foods paid Fresh Fruit Express $591.90 on its account on July 11, 2000; and that Fresh Fruit Express timely filed its complaint alleging that Bay Harbor Fine Foods failed to promptly pay its indebtedness to Fresh Fruit Express for citrus products shipped pursuant to orders placed by Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Fresh Fruit Express is, therefore, entitled to payment of the principal amount of $785.08, plus pre-judgment interest. Fresh Fruit Express presented no evidence to establish that it actually sent the invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods on or about the dates stated on the invoices. Therefore, payment of the $1,376.98 was due on May 1, 2000, after Ms. Spiece sent duplicate invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods and confirmed that they had been received, and pre-judgment interest on this amount would begin accruing on May 1, 2000. The payment of $591.90 on July 11, 2000, reduced the principal balance owing to Fresh Fruit Express to $785.08, and pre-judgment interest on this amount would begin accruing on July 12, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Alilev Corporation, d/b/a Bay Harbor Fine Foods, to pay $785.08 to Spyke's Grove, Inc., d/b/a Fresh Fruit Express, Emerald Estate, and Nature's Classic, together with pre-judgment interest calculated at the rate specified in Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, on the amounts owing. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Donnie Selph, d/b/a The Citrus Store and D & D Citrus (Donnie Selph), failed to pay amounts owning to Petitioner for citrus fruit harvested from Petitioner's groves, as set forth in the Complaint dated October 13, 2003, and, if so, the amount Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; stipulations by the parties; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: At all times material to this proceeding Russ Putnal was a "producer of citrus fruit" and owner of Putnal Groves located at 10755 Russ Road, Myakka City, Florida. A producer of citrus is one that grows citrus in this state for market. At all times material to this proceeding, Donnie Selph was a "Florida-licensed [License Number 756] citrus fruit dealer" operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. Donnie Selph admitted that he is owner of and does business under the names of The Citrus Store and D & D Citrus. On October 13, 2002, Donnie Selph entered into a written contract with Russ Putnal under which Donnie Selph agreed to harvest 10,000 boxes of mid-season oranges on or before June 1, 2003. Donnie Selph agreed to pay $4.35 per box for the mid-season oranges and agreed to pay $6.35 per box for the late-season (grove production) Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. The form contract, dated January 29, 2003, entered into by Donnie Selph and Russ Putnal contained the following terms and conditions: [T]he Grower, for and in consideration of the payment this date received and to be received as herein provided, has agreed and do by these presents agree to sell to the Buyer all citrus fruits, of merchantable quality at the time of picking, from the grove or groves hereinafter mentioned. The price to be paid to the Grower by the Buyer for said fruit per standard field crate by volume or weight ["weight" was circled] at election of buyer on the trees, for all fruit of merchantable quality at the time of picking, shall be as follows: Oranges, mids, 10,000 boxes (or production), $4.35 [per] box Valencia Oranges, 40,000 boxes (or production), $6.35 [per] box The term "merchantable" as used herein shall be defined as that standard of quality required by the United States Department of Agriculture for interstate shipment in fresh/juiced ["juiced" was circled] fruit form. . . . * * * It is agreed that the advance payment hereby receipted for is to be deducted from said payment as follows: As fruit is harvested, $12,000.00, ck# 6318 * * * Note: Less all state taxes owned by Grower. Mutual YES[?] NO[ ] A bond or certificate of deposit posted with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services does not necessarily ensure full payment of claims for any nonperformance under this contract. . . . (emphasis added) The undisputed evidence established that Donnie Selph harvested mid-season oranges from Russ Putnal's groves and paid Russ Putnal for those mid-season oranges harvested per the terms of the written contract. According to Russ Putnal, the contract was for mid-season oranges "which are basically a pineapple variety." "Mid-season juice oranges and Valencia oranges are late--late-season oranges. The mids were all paid for--the balance is on the Valencia oranges." The undisputed evidence also established that in the contract hereinabove Donnie Selph also agreed to harvest 40,000 boxes (or production) of late-season Valencia oranges and agreed to pay $6.35 per box for the Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. The undisputed evidence likewise established that Donnie Selph harvested 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges pursuant to terms of the written contract with Russ Putnal. During the harvesting of the Valencia oranges, Donnie Selph raised no objection or complaints with Russ Putnal regarding the quality or quantity of late-season Valencia oranges that were harvested. The parties recalled discussing one load that was "light," meaning the average weight per box was less than the average weight per box of the other loads of Valencia oranges picked from the same grove. According to the evidence presented, it is not uncommon in the citrus business to have a few "light" loads when picking 11,251 boxes of fruit. Donnie Selph is obligated to pay Russ Putnal for the 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves and sold for processing. The net payment due and owning Russ Putnal Groves is computed as follows: Total Purchase Price [Valencia oranges]: $71,443.85 Less Harvesting, Mutual, Taxes, etc.: $2,373.57 Less Amount Received [on September 30, 2003]: $5,000.00[2] Net Amount or Claim [Balance Due]: $64,070.28 Donnie Selph did not pay Russ Putnal for the 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. Russ Putnal made repeated demands upon Donnie Selph for the past due amount of $64,070.28, and Donnie Selph refused and failed to pay Russ Putnal the past due amount of $64,070.28. This debt of $64,070.28 was due and owing on October 1, 2003, the date Donnie Selph made his last payment of $5,000 to Russ Putnal. Regarding this contractual transaction, Russ Putnal testified: I regret that we all have to be here for this, and I've put it off as long as I could and tried every way I knew to avoid coming to this, but basically -- or in simple terms Donnie Selph, Donnie Selph Fruit Company and I had a contract, a written contract for mid-season and late-season oranges for last year (2002/2003). Basically, it hadn't been paid and it's my understanding the bond is for situations of this nature. And I realize the bond is less than half of what's owed, but I think if Donnie had the money he'd pay me. We're all in -- the citrus industry is in some serious throws so I'm just trying to get what I can to try and keep my bills paid. Donnie Selph admitted entering into a written contract with Russ Putnal. Both men acknowledged their experience in the business of selling and buying citrus fruit and doing business with each other over the years. Russ Putnal is a seasoned producer of fruit and well versed in the business of selling his fruit to citrus dealers. Donnie Selph is a seasoned purchaser and dealer of citrus fruit, having been in the business for over 20 years, and well versed in the business of buying fruit from citrus fruit producers and selling fruit to plants and other outlets. Donnie Selph set the stage of this transaction by first testifying that he is in the business of "buying and selling [fruit], by contract, to the concentration plants." Regarding the sale of Russ Putnal's Valencia oranges, he testified that "based on $1.10 a pound what I got out of [the sale of] Putnal's fruit and taking out the costs I forwarded [to Russ Putnal] what was left up to the point of where we're at now [i.e. $64,070.28]." Donnie Selph's refusal to pay Russ Putnal for the Valencia oranges, "because I received only $1.10 per pound," does not relieve him of his contractual obligations to pay $6.35 per box for the Valencia oranges harvested. At the conclusion of the hearing and in lieu of submitting a proposed recommended order, Russ Putnal elected to make the following summation of his case that has been considered: We have a simple contract and a simple problem where fruit was contracted for, harvested, marketed and not paid for by the specifics of the contract. We have a bond in place to cover these discrepancies. The bond is only $30,000; the amount owed is some $64,000 plus. The defense has pretty much put up a smokescreen off the subject of the contract. The focusing in on pound solids and there's nothing in the contract about pound solids. The contract is simply in weight boxes. Donnie Selph's first defense, to the debt claimed in the Complaint, was oral modification of the written contract. Donnie Selph's evidence to support his oral modification defense consisted solely of his recollection, "Mr. Putnal agreed with me that the contract price to be paid would be based on pound solid [unknown at the time of entering the contract]." Donnie Selph testified that he and Russ Putnal discussed, and agreed, that the encircled word "juiced" on the written contract meant that he would pay Russ Putnal at the price Donnie Selph received when he sold the Valencia oranges "as juiced." Russ Putnal emphatically denied making the alleged oral modification of the written contract of $6.35 per box for his Valencia oranges. Russ Putnal insisted that throughout this entire episode with Donnie Selph the written contract called for "weight boxes." In his post-hearing Memorandum of Law, Donnie Selph admitted entering into a written contract with Russ Putnal, but raised as a defense to payment of the debt Russ Putnal "is going against the bond of The Citrus Store." Donnie Selph argued that Russ Putnal offered no evidence of entering into a written contract with The Citrus Store or personally with Donnie Selph. Donnie Selph's argument is without a foundation in fact and law in this proceeding and is, therefore, rejected. Donnie Selph's second defense, a claim of "detrimental reliance on fraudulent statements made by Russ Putnal," is without foundation in fact. Russ Putnal adamantly denied making a verbal agreement with Donnie Selph that he would accept as payment for his Valencia oranges some amount Donnie Selph may receive when, and if, he sold the Valencia oranges to processing plants as "juiced" rather than by "pound per box." This defense to the contractual debt obligation is without foundation in fact or law in this proceeding and is likewise rejected. The documentary evidence presented by Russ Putnal in support of his demand for payment is uncontroverted. The majority of the documents submitted by Russ Putnal reflected that the fruit described therein was harvested from Russ Putnal's groves in Manatee County. Likewise, the documents from the processing plants reflected that the fruit from Russ Putnal's Manatee County groves averaged a "pound solids per box weight of 6.03676 pound[s] per box." The undisputed evidence established that Donnie Selph picked 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges from Russ Putnal's grove. The agreed contract price for each box of Valencia oranges picked was $6.35 per box. Likewise, the undisputed evidence established Donnie Selph entered into a written contract with Russ Putnal to purchase a specific citrus fruit (Valencia oranges) at a specific price ($6.35) per box. The evidence established that Donnie Selph picked Russ Putnal's Valencia oranges, sold those Valencia oranges, and failed and refused to pay Russ Putnal the agreed contracted price of $6.35 per box for his Valencia oranges. The evidence of record demonstrated clearly that Donnie Selph is indebted to Russ Putnal for the net sum of $64,070.28 due and owing as of October 1, 2003. This outstanding debt is computed from the gross sum of $71,443.85, less: harvesting, mutual, and taxes for a subtotal of $2,373.57, and less $5,000.00 money paid and received from Donnie Selph. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Donnie Selph was, at the times material to this proceeding, a Florida- licensed and bonded citrus fruit dealer and that, as of October 1, 2003, Donnie Selph harvested 11,521 boxes of Valencia oranges from Putnal Groves. Russ Putnal timely filed a complaint alleging that Donnie Selph failed to promptly pay its indebtedness to Russ Putnal for the Valencia oranges harvested pursuant the contract. Russ Putnal is, therefore, entitled to payment of the principal amount of $64,070.28 plus pre-judgment interest. Based on the date of the last payment made by Donnie Selph to Russ Putnal, pre-hearing interest would run from October 1, 2003.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Respondent, Donnie Selph, d/b/a The Citrus Store and d/b/a D & D Citrus, to pay to Petitioner, Russ Putnal, d/b/a Putnal Groves, the sum of $64,070.28, together with pre-judgment interest calculated by the Department pursuant to Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, from October 1, 2003, until paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2004.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to all or part of $12,732.61 he claims as a result of eight loads of watermelons brokered by Respondent Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company between June 17, 1996 and June 21, 1996?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Respondent Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida is surety for Respondent Sunny Fresh. Petitioner's father had long done business with Kelly Marinaro's father, Frank Marinaro, before each father's retirement. Upon what basis the fathers traded is not clear on the record. Petitioner approached Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh on three occasions with written proposals, two of which involved some front money being put up by Kelly Marinaro to help Petitioner grow and sell watermelons. One proposal suggested a standard broker's fee to be taken off loads. In each instance, Kelly Marinaro rejected the proposals, explaining that he was not a grower or a buyer but only "brokered" melons other people grew. On or about June 15, 1996, Petitioner telephoned and requested that Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh assist him in the sale of watermelons he had already grown on a 40 acre field near Wildwood, Florida. Earlier in the 1996 watermelon season, Carr Hussey had taken two loads of melons from Petitioner's field. Hussey had advanced Petitioner $3,000 for harvesting of the melons. Although Petitioner claimed that Mr. Hussey bought his melons in the field, he also conceded that the melons he sold Mr. Hussey did not net that amount when sold to the ultimate purchaser, and therefore, neither Mr. Hussey nor Petitioner made any profit on those two loads. Mr. Hussey did not require reimbursement of the $3,000 he had advanced and proposed that Petitioner and he "work it out" the following season. However, Mr. Hussey took no more loads of Petitioner's melons and "went off to Georgia." This left Petitioner in need of some immediate help in selling his remaining melons. In the June 15, 1996 phone call, Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh agreed to "broker" Petitioner's remaining watermelons to ultimate buyers in the north and northeast United States whom Marinaro lined up by telephone before shipping the melons. That is, he agreed to use his best efforts to sell the watermelons on Petitioner's behalf to ultimate consumers, charging Petitioner one cent per pound or $1.00 per hundred weight sales charge. The parties' arrangement depended upon the sale of the watermelons and the price actually paid at the ultimate destination, rather than the price the watermelons ideally could be sold for on the day they left Petitioner's field. The parties' agreement by telephone was not reduced to writing, but Findings of Fact 8 and 9 are made contrary to Petitioner's assertion that "they (Sunny Fresh) inspected; they bought the melons as is" for the following reasons. Kelly Marinaro had previously rejected any different risk for his company than selling the melons at the ultimate destination. He produced a written notation he had made contemporaneously with his telephone negotiation with Petitioner. Despite Petitioner's vague testimony to the contrary, it appears that Petitioner had had arrangements with other brokers in the past whereby he knew no profit would be made if the melons did not arrive in good condition, and he should have been aware that the actual sale price received at the point of delivery was the standard of doing business. Petitioner did not dispute that the sales charge was to be deducted by Kelly Marinaro from the ultimate price obtained. This is consistent with a dealer selling on behalf of a grower at the ultimate destination. Petitioner relied on prices given in the standard "Watermelon Reports" as F.O.B. (F.O.B. usually signifies delivery at a certain price at the seller's expense to some location.) I also find that the parties agreed to the price of the melons being based upon the amount they netted at the melons' ultimate destination for the reasons set out in Findings of Fact 13 and 16-21. Frank Marinaro, the father of Kelly Marinaro, is retired and regularly resides outside the State of Florida. He is unable to drive himself due to age and infirmity. He has a hired driver named James Hensley. The senior Mr. Marinaro is not a principal or employee of Sunny Fresh, but he likes to visit his son and his old cronies in Florida's watermelon belt during the growing season, for old times' sake. He was visiting his son in June, 1996. Kelly Marinaro arranged for Frank Marinaro to be driven by Mr. Hensley to Wildwood. Kelly Marinaro then transferred $6,300 of Sunny Fresh's money to a Wildwood bank where it was withdrawn in cash by Frank Marinaro. Frank Marinaro, driven by Mr. Hensley, then delivered the cash in three incremental payments authorized by Kelly Marinaro to Petitioner to pre-pay Petitioner's harvesting costs. The senior Mr. Marinaro also helped with the incidental duties of meeting trucks at the Wildwood weighing station or local truck stops and directing them to Petitioner's farm. He was not paid by Sunny Fresh or by Petitioner for these services. Petitioner testified that Frank Marinaro was present in his field for the loading of several truckloads of melons on different days, that he cut open some melons in the field and pronounced them "good" after sampling them, and that Frank Marinaro asked Petitioner to pay Mr. Hensley $50.00 for helping around the field and with physically loading some melons while they were there. This testimony is not evidence of Frank Marinaro's "apparent agency" to engage in the more complicated and technical process of "grading" watermelons on behalf of Sunny Fresh. These activities of Frank Marinaro did not alter Petitioner's agreement with Kelly Marinaro on behalf of Sunny Fresh so that Frank Marinaro's and James Hensley's actions constituted a direct sale to Sunny Fresh of all the melons loaded at Petitioner's farm (the point of embarkation) because both Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro clearly testified that the $6,300 cash harvesting costs constituted advances against receipts of the sale of watermelons when sold by Sunny Fresh at the ultimate destination. Further, the request that Petitioner pay Mr. Hensley for helping load the watermelons is in the nature of Petitioner paying a casual laborer for harvesting rather than it is evidence that any Sunny Fresh authority resided in Mr. Hensley. Between June 17, 1996 and June 21, 1996, Petitioner loaded eight truckloads of watermelons onto trucks for sale to various customers in the north and northeast United States. Of the eight truckloads loaded, the breakdown of actual costs and expenses worked out as follows: ACCOUNTING OF R. BASS LOADS Sunny Fresh #93775 Sold to: Frankie Boy Produce Frankie Boys #96095 New York, NY Weight shipped: 41,250 Unloaded weight: 40,400 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 - ½ cents/lb Net return $1,212.00 Sales charge: (404.00) Watermelon promotion board tax: (8.08) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 2 cents/lb $ 799.92 Sunny Fresh #93791 Sold to: Fruitco Corp. Fruitco #1880 Bronx, NY Weight shipped: 40.800 Unloaded weight: 39,180 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 - ½ cents/lb Net return $ 974.71 Sales charge: (391.81) Watermelon promotion board tax: (7.84) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 2.49 cents/lb $ 575.06 Sunny Fresh #81312 Crosset Co. #67012 Sold to: Crosset Co. Cincinnati, OH Weight shipped: 45,860 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to 41,762 grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $4,134.42 Shipping charges (freight): (1,712.63) Net return: 2,421.79 Sales charge: (438.48) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.75 cents/lb (8.35) $1,974.96 Sunny Fresh #93804 Sold to: Tom Lange Co. Lange #3344 St. Louis, MO Weight shipped: 44,550 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 39,760 5 cents/lb Gross return $2,584.40 Shipping charges (freight): (1,455.96) Net return: 1,128.44 Sales charge: (445.50) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 1.72 cents/lb (7.95) $ 674.99 Sunny Fresh #93802 M.A. Fruit #N/G Sold to: M.A. Fruit Trading Corp New York, NY Weight shipped: 40,130 Unloaded weight: 36,720 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $3,797.40 Shipping charges (freight): (1,758.55) Net return: 2,038.85 Sales charge: (401.30) Watermelon promotion board tax: (7.34) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.46 cents/lb $1,630.21 Sunny Fresh #93817 Sold to: C. H. Robinson Company C.H. Robinson #379035 Cleveland, OH Weight shipped: 43,300 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to 42,147 grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $4,440.21 Shipping charges (freight): (1,930.27) Net return: 2,509.94 Sales charge: (411.02) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 5 cents/lb (8.43) $2,090.49 Sunny Fresh #93819 Sold to: Isenberg #N/G Joseph Isenberg, Inc. Buffalo, NY Weight shipped: Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 45,100 5 cents/lb Gross return $ 500.00 Shipping charges (freight): (1,877.98) Net return: (1,377.98) Sales charge: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.06 cents/lb (451.00) $(1,828.98) Sunny Fresh #81334 Sold to: Palazzola . Palazzola #N/G Memphis, TN Weight shipped: 47,700 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $ 0.00 Shipping charges (freight): (1,553.30) Net return: (1,553.30) Inspection: (65.00) Bins: (30.00) Sales charge: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.46 cents/lb (477.00) $(2,125.90) Kelly Marinaro testified credibly that the resultant low prices paid by the ultimate purchasers was the result of the poor quality of Petitioner's melons upon their arrival at their ultimate destination. Exhibits admitted in evidence without objection verified the poor condition of five of the loads. In those instances in which there were United States Department of Agriculture Inspection Reports, I accept those reports as clearly dispositive of the issue of the melons' poor condition upon arrival. Petitioner's more vague testimony that he doubted any load could ever pass such an inspection as "A-1," does not refute them. Kelly Marinaro testified credibly and without contradiction that each time he was informed by a potential buyer that a load of melons was in poor condition upon arrival at their destination, he faxed, mailed, or telephoned Petitioner with the "trouble report" information as soon as feasible and tried to involve him in the decision as to what should be done. This is consistent with a sale at the ultimate destination. Kelly Marinaro further testified credibly and without contradiction that for two loads he recommended to Petitioner that they not obtain a federal inspection because it was not cost efficient. He made this recommendation for one of these two loads because it reached its destination on a Friday and the fruit would have to stand and deteriorate further in quality and price over the weekend if they waited on an inspection. Petitioner agreed to waive at least one inspection. Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro did not agree as to the number of times they spoke on the phone about "trouble reports", but Petitioner acknowledged at least four such phone conversations. Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro did agree that in each phone call, Petitioner told Kelly Marinaro to "do the best you can," and stated he did not want to pay any freight. This type of conversation is not indicative of a relationship in which the melons have been purchased outright at the site of embarkation, Petitioner's field. I have considered the testimony of Petitioner and of Kelly Marinaro, respectively, on the issue of whether or not Petitioner was required to pay the freight on the watermelons from their first oral contract by telephone call on June 15, 1996. Without attributing any ill-motive to either party- witness, I find they did not initially have a meeting of the minds as to how the cost of freight was to be handled, and that Petitioner assumed at some point he would not have to pay freight. However, it is clear from the evidence as a whole that Kelly Marinaro did everything possible to avoid freight charges to Petitioner and would not have meticulously informed and received oral waivers of inspections from Petitioner if there had been any clear agreement either that Sunny Fresh was purchasing the watermelons "as is" in Petitioner's field or that Sunny Fresh Produce was paying all the freight. Indeed, Petitioner was not charged for freight when Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh provided the trucks. It is also clear from the evidence as a whole that Petitioner was informed on or about the date that each load arrived at its ultimate destination that he was going to be charged for at least some freight charges out of the ultimate price received for the melons. Bill Ward has acted as a broker of watermelons for many years. I accept his testimony that there can be varying grades of watermelon within one field or one harvest. The several "Watermelon Reports" admitted without objection show that the demand for Florida watermelons was light or fairly light in June 1996, that the price was down or to be established, and that all quotations were for stock of generally good quality and condition. There had been a lot of rain in Florida during the 1996 watermelon season and rain unfavorably affects the quality of melons. Melons from further north where there had been less rain were able to be shipped to northern and northeastern buyers in less time than were Florida melons. Northern and northeastern buyers did not have to select from inferior melons that year. Petitioner's testimony and supporting documentation that he sold to other purchasers two truckloads of good quality, top price melons from the same field between June 17 and June 21, 1996 does not overcome all the evidence that the majority of melons he sold through Sunny Fresh were of the poor quality reported by the ultimate buyers and federal inspectors or that the melons sold to Sunny Fresh deteriorated due to slow transport.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint.RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Bass 32510 Sumter Line Road Leesburg, FL 34748 Arthur C. Fulmer, Esquire Post Office Box 2958 Lakeland, FL 33806 Mr. Robert Waldman American Bankers Insurance Company Claims Management Services 11222 Quail Roost Drive Miami, FL 33157-6596 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent H & R Packing & Sales Company, LLC, must pay Petitioner the full contract price for citrus fruit that said Respondent accepted upon tender despite knowing that the goods were nonconforming.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Betty H. Shinn, d/b/a Shinn Groves ("Shinn"), is in the business of growing citrus fruit and hence is a "producer" within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). Respondent H & R Packing & Sales Company, LLC ("HRPS"), is a "citrus fruit dealer" operating within the Department's jurisdiction. On November 3, 2004, Shinn and HRPS entered into a contract (the "Contract") whereby HRPS agreed to harvest "fresh fruit quality" navel oranges from a particular section of Shinn's grove, which oranges Shinn agreed to sell to HRPS for the price of $8.00 per field box. The Contract provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The SELLER [that is, Shinn] shall take all reasonable and normal precautions to maintain fresh fruit quality during the life of this agreement. Failure to exercise close control to mites and other pests shall constitute a violation of this agreement. Further, the BUYER [i.e. HRPS] may at his option cancel this contract or renegotiate the price to be paid and the conditions of sale. In addition, the parties agreed that HRPS would pick the fruit no later than January 1, 2005, and pay for the oranges "within 45 days of the week of the harvest." An agent of HRPS's named Frederick Gaines inspected the crop identified to the Contract on a couple of occasions in November and December 2004. At some point he notified Shinn that the oranges were being damaged by rust mites. Shinn arranged to have the crop sprayed with Thiolux (a miticide), which was done around December 6, 2004. HRPS harvested the crop on January 3, 2005. (HRPS's performance in this regard was nonconforming, because the oranges were to be picked no later than January 1, 2005. By allowing HRPS to proceed after the deadline, however, Shinn waived HRPS's untimely performance.) At or about the time of the harvest, Mr. Gaines orally notified Charles Shinn (who is the son——and an agent——of Petitioner Betty Shinn) that the oranges had been damaged by rust mites and consequently were not fresh fruit quality. Mr. Shinn suggested that the oranges be "run through" the packing house (where the fruit would be graded on its quality), after which the parties could renegotiate the price, if necessary, to adjust for any material deficiencies in the quality of the crop. This proposal was evidently acceptable to HRPS, for it proceeded to harvest the oranges with knowledge that the crop was (or might not be) fresh fruit quality. HRPS picked 790 field boxes of oranges from Shinn's grove pursuant to the Contract. When these oranges were graded at the packing house, an unusually small percentage (approximately 34%) could be "packed out," that is, packaged and delivered for sale as fresh fruit.i The rest "graded out," i.e. failed to meet the standards for sale as fresh fruit, and were sold, at a loss, to juice processors. HRPS was obligated under the Contract to pay Shinn for the oranges on or before February 22, 2005, but HRPS let the deadline pass without either paying for the oranges or notifying Shinn of a breach with respect thereto. By letter dated March 17, 2005, Shinn demanded that HRPS pay the full contact price of $6,320 for the fruit harvested under the Contract.ii HRPS responded to Shinn's demand-letter via correspondence dated March 24, 2005. In this letter, HRPS acknowledged the Contract's existence but disclaimed the duty to pay in full due to the fruit's generally poor quality. HRPS expressed some willingness to resolve the matter amicably but offered no payment. Shinn was not satisfied and initiated this administrative proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations HRPS harvested and hauled away the oranges identified to the Contract. This performance constituted acceptance of the goods, and such acceptance was made with knowledge of a (possible) nonconformity, namely that the oranges were not fresh fruit quality due to rust mite damage. The apparent nonconformity was made manifest to HRPS shortly after the harvest, when an unusually small percentage of the pertinent crop was "packed out." HRPS failed, however, to notify Shinn of the breach within a reasonable time after confirming the nonconformity. Consequently, HRPS is barred from any remedy for breach. HRPS's failure to pay for the oranges at the Contract rate constituted a breach of the Contract entitling Shinn to recover the full price, together with pre-award interest. Accordingly, HRPS is obligated to pay Shinn the principal amount of $6,320.00, together with statutory interest of $378.20 (for the period 02/22/05 - 12/31/05). Interest will continue to accrue on the outstanding balance of $6,320.00 in the amount of $1.56 per day from January 1, 2006, until the date of the final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Shinn the sum of $6,320.00, together with pre-award interest in the amount of $378.20 (through December 31, 2005), plus additional interest from January 1 2006, until the date of the final order, which will accrue in the amount of $1.56 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2005.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Ingram Grove Services, Inc., (Ingram), was a commercial grower of citrus fruit and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. Mark Fetzer, Inc. (Fetzer), was also a grower and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Fetzer's bond for the transaction in issue herein. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Ingram's bond for the transaction herein. By contract number 518, dated January 14, 1992, and drafted on the letterhead of Mark Fetzer, Inc., Ingram, the grower, sold and conveyed to Fetzer, the buyer, approximately 20,000 boxes of valencia oranges at a price of $10.50 per box, with a moving date of April 30, 1992. This description was intended to cover all valencia oranges grown by Ingram and contained in Suncrest #11 field in Sebring, Florida and included transportation to Polk County. Ingram was authorized to, and did, request a deposit of $1.00 per box, and by check dated April 27, 1992, Fetzer paid Ingram the sum of $20,000. The oranges were to be delivered by Ingram to the Commercial Carriers Cold Storage, (CCCS), facility in Auburndale, Florida. The entire crop of fruit covered by this contract was to be paid for within 30 days of delivery to CCCS. The contract did not prohibit Fetzer from re-selling the fruit covered thereby. Ingram and Fetzer had done business together for several years, since 1985. In every case, each had paid what was owed to the other, but it is admitted that on occasion, such payment was delayed for a short time. Neither had ever failed to ultimately pay what was owed the other, however. Sometime after delivery of the fruit to CCCS by Ingram, Fetzer sold 3,000 of the boxes to Vero Beach Groves, Inc., (VB), a producer of commercial orange juice for commercial sales. At that time, and at all times pertinent to the issues herein, VB was having financial difficulties. Evidence of record indicates that at the time, VB owed approximately $32,000 to Fetzer, somewhat more than $60,000 to Ingram, and over $600,000 to Florida Growers, another entity not pertinent to the issues herein. The terms of Fetzer's sale to VB called for a payment of $13.65 per box. This included $11.65 per box for the oranges then delivered, including 15 brokerage, and $2.00 per box to satisfy VB's antecedent debt to Fetzer. If all the Ingram fruit were resold by Fetzer to VB, this procedure would have paid off VB's debt to Fetzer before all the Ingram fruit was pulled out of storage. When the antecedent debt was liquidated, the price per box would have been reduced to $11.65. Fetzer had not allowed VB's debt to it to grow very large, and the above practice, which had been followed for several years, had to this point, been successful. There was no dispute under the terms of the contract between Ingram and Fetzer until sometime in mid-May, 1992 when, prior to the delivery of any fruit, Mr. Ingram called Mr. Fetzer and asked for a meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Ingram told Mr. Fetzer that unless an agreement was made to get him, Ingram, a debt reduction procedure similar to Fetzer's, he would not make available to Fetzer the fruit called for under the contract. Mr. Ingram indicated at the hearing that when he heard Fetzer had contracted with VB, in light of VB's tenuous financial condition, he was concerned about being able to get paid and this caused him to seek the meeting with Fetzer. However, he did not communicate this to Fetzer nor did he ask Fetzer for payment in advance or some security for the obligation. In fact, according to Fetzer, he had the money available, in cash, to pay the entire amount owed Ingram if necessary. In addition, Fetzer told Ingram that even if VB could not take the fruit, there were at least 3 -5 other "juicers" to whom he could sell the fruit and pay Ingram. In point of fact, the fruit was subsequently sold, by Ingram, to other juice processors at a per box price which varied from $12.50 to $13.35. Nonetheless, Fetzer tried to work the situation out for all concerned with no consideration given him for any purported change to the contract. Faced with the potential for not being able to get the fruit for sale to VB, the contract with whom was worth in excess of $200,000 to him, Fetzer met with a representative of VB and reached an agreement with it whereby VB would pay an additional $3.35 over the $13.65 so that Ingram could be paid. At this meeting he was told by Mr. Kordick, VB's vice president, that VB would work something out with Ingram for the remaining fruit. Thereafter, VB agreed with Ingram to make additional payments to Ingram. It appears, however, that this agreement to pay the extra on Ingram's antecedent debt was more acquiescence to coercion than voluntary agreement. Fetzer then released the first shipment of oranges to VB. VB paid for the shipment of oranges when it came in.It also issued four checks in the amount of $1,680.00 each fdor payment on VB's antecedent debt to Ingram which were made payable to Ingram or Fetzer. These four checks were cashed by Fetzer and were dishonored. They were ultimately redeemed by VB after several weeks, but none of the funds were transmitted by Fetzer to Ingram. Fetzer kept them as compensation for the amount of profit he lost because of Ingram's refusal to release any more oranges after the first shipment. In addition, Fetzer did not pay Ingram for the first 3,000 box shipment. After the first shipment was delivered to VB, Mr. Fetzer was contacted by VB's representative, Mr. Kordick, who advised VB could not pay the amount asked for the fruit which included the "surcharge" to reimburse Ingram because the processed juice would not bring enough to cover it. Admittedly, Mr. Fetzer did not ask Mr. Ingram to rescind the requirement for the "surcharge" payment. Had he done so and had Ingram agreed, it is most likely that VB could have purchased all the oranges from the entire contract and paid for it. All Fetzer did was tell Ingram he should not place the extra burden on VB, and as it was, VB went out of business. Mr. Fetzer knew of the arrangements for the "surcharge" that Ingram wanted before the delivery of the one shipment to VB and requested that shipment knowing what was required. He decided to go along with Ingram to see what would happen even though he felt by then that Ingram had breached the contract. However, he did not put this in writing to Ingram. He felt he had no choice due to Mr. Ingram's representation to him at their May meeting that it would be Ingram's way or not at all. Fetzer went along with it because he saw it as the only way to potentially get the money owed him by VB. Considering the net amount paid by Fetzer as deposit, ($20,000 - $3,000 = $17,000); the amount of antecedent debt unrecoverable due to Ingram's actions, ($26,000) and the anticipated profit lost of the remaining boxes un- delivered by Ingram, ($14,950), Ingram owes Fetzer a gross total of $57,590. From this must be deducted the $6,720 which Fetzer collected from VB on Ingram's behalf but which was not delivered to Ingram, and the $31,500 unpaid for the 3,000 boxes delivered, leaving Ingram's net obligation to Fetzer as $19,730.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that A Final Order be issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture awarding the sum of $19730 to Mark Fetzer, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR FETZER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of the law. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of Law. Accepted as a restatement of the case history. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except that the debt of VB to Ingram was approximately $60,000. Accepted that no tripartite agreement was reached. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. Not a Finding of fact but a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that Ingram resold to others the fruit not released to Fetzer. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of law. Accepted and incorporated herein with amount stated. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR INGRAM: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected in so far as it indicates a tri-party agreement. VB's participation was more a matter of acquiescence than agreement. Second sentence accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected. Fetzer did not decline to take fruit as called for in the original contract. Second sentence accepted as it notes the sale to third parties but not "as a result" of Fetzer's failure to take the fruit. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of law. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected. Not a proper Finding of Fact but more a comment on the state of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Lockwood, III, Esquire Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews, Brandon & Puterbaugh, P.A. P.O. Drawer 7608 Lake Region Plaza, Suite 300 141 5th Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7608 C. Kennon Hendrix, Esquire Hendrix & Brennan P.O. Box 520- 2043 14th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32961-0520 Chester C. Payne Financial Examiner Analyst Office of Citrus Bond and License Division of Marketing Development Department of Agriculture P.O. Box 1072 500 Third Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent, IMG Citrus, Inc. (Respondent), owes Petitioner, Vero Beach Land Company, LLC, (Petitioner) the sum of $63,318.50 for citrus that was purchased but not harvested.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner and Respondent were involved in the growing and marketing of citrus fruit in the State of Florida. For purposes of this Order, Petitioner is also described as "the seller"; Respondent is described as "the buyer." On October 26, 2007, Respondent agreed to purchase fruit from Petitioner. The terms of their agreement were reduced to writing. The “Fresh Fruit Purchase Agreement” provided that Respondent would purchase from Petitioner all of the citrus fruits of the varieties of merchantable quality as delineated in the contract. More specifically, Respondent was entitled to purchase the following described citrus from Petitioner: Block Name Variety Est Field Boxes Price Unit of Measure Rise Movement Date Pepper Grove Red Grapefruit 16,000 $4.50 Floor FB ½ Rise to Grower March 15th, 2008 Pepper Grove White Grapefruit 20,000 $2.00 Floor FB All Rise to March 15th, Grower 2008 Pepper Grove Navels 2,500 $5.00 Floor FB All Rise to Grower January 1, 2008 The contract recognized that “only that fruit produced as the result of normal seasonal bloom” and not late maturing or out of season bloom would be included. Additionally, all of the fruit was to be for fresh shipment. Citrus intended for the fresh market must be visually appealing as well as having other attributes associated with the fresh fruit market. Discolorations or damage to the fruit makes it unsuitable for the fresh fruit market. In anticipation of the crop the buyer expected to harvest, Respondent advanced to Petitioner the sum of $34,500.00. Additional payments were to be made to Petitioner as described in paragraph 2 of the contract. Critical to this matter, however, were the terms of the contract set forth in paragraph 3. That paragraph provided: Merchantability of Fruit: Seller represents to Buyer that all fruit sold under this Agreement shall be sound and merchantable, in conformance with industry standards, and fit for their intended purpose of fresh packing and marketing. Grower shall keep said fruit sprayed sufficiently to keep the fruit bright and free from rust mite, disease and insect damage and shall not fertilize or cultivate the grove upon which the fruit is grown, during the term of this Agreement, in anyway that will deteriorate the quality of the fruit. In the event such fruit is rendered not merchantable by virtue of damage from cultivation, fertilization, re-greening, cold, hail, fire, windstorm, or other hazard, the Buyer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement and the Seller shall refund to the Buyer the advance payment this day made, or that portion thereof not applied in the payment for fruit picked prior to termination. The buyer shall have four weeks from the occurrence of such cold, hail, fire, windstorm or other hazard within which to notify Seller that the fruit has been rendered non merchantable and of the termination of this agreement. Seller shall reimburse the Buyer for all deposits and advances made on unpicked fruit within thirty (30) days of notification by Buyer. Paragraph 6 of the parties’ Fresh Fruit Purchase Agreement provided: Default: Should the Buyer, without lawful excuse, fail or refuse to pick and remove the fruit subject to this Agreement within the time specified or any extension thereof, the Seller hereby accepts and agrees to retain the deposit this day made less portion thereof applied and deducted as aforesaid, as his liquidated damages for such failure without any other claim for damage against the Buyer. In the event of any sale or attempted sale of the crop to a third party or other unexcused failure to deliver, Buyer shall be entitled to avail itself of all available legal and equitable remedied [sic] including injunctive relief. If either party fails to materially comply with the provisions of the agreement, the other party must give written notice of non- compliance, stating the nature of the violation or non-compliance and giving the other party thirty (30) days to bring themselves into compliance. If a disagreement exists regarding the interpretation of this Agreement, the parties agree to discuss the issues and negotiate in good faith to resolve the dispute. No waiver of any breach, right or remedy, shall constitute a continuing waiver, nor shall it be construed as a waiver of any other breach, right or remedy. Paragraph 7 of the contract provided, in pertinent part, that the agreement could be “supplemented or modified only by written agreement between the parties.” The parties did not provide any written supplements or modifications to their agreement. Petitioner wanted to have his fruit removed in a timely manner as he did not want the fruit left to potentially interfere with the next year's crop. It was Petitioner's desire to have the fruit picked as early and as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the contract provided for a pick or "movement date." With regard to the navel oranges, the movement date was January 1, 2008. The movement date for the grapefruit was March 15, 2008. Presumably, these dates were negotiated and agreed to by the parties. Had Petitioner wanted earlier movement dates, that was within a contractual option available at the time of contract negotiations. The "Pepper Grove" that is described in the parties' agreement is a 120 acre grove sectioned into four blocks. The white grapefruit are located on two interior blocks with the red grapefruit on the two outer blocks. The navels were located on a portion of one of the outer blocks adjacent to the roadway. All of the blocks border 122nd Avenue. Presumably, as the four blocks adjoin one another it would be fairly easy to move from one block to the next to complete picking the crop. The contract specified that Respondent would purchase 2,500 boxes of navels. Respondent picked 2,928 boxes of navels from Petitioner's grove. This fruit was harvested between December 6, 2007 and January 10, 2008. Respondent did not meet the "movement date" specified in the contract and Petitioner apparently did not complain, in writing, regarding this technical violation. Moreover, the buyer did not allege that the navels were not acceptable quality or merchantable. This fruit was in the same block as the grapefruit. The contract price for the navels was $5.00 with 100 percent of the rise to go to the seller. On or about December 19, 2007, Petitioner inquired as to whether Respondent wanted to be released from the contract. This request was not reduced to writing and Respondent did not accept the verbal offer. On or about December 22, 2007, Respondent started harvesting the Pepper Grove grapefruit. In total Respondent harvested 4,266 boxes of the white grapefruit. Respondent harvested 5,400 boxes of red grapefruit from the Pepper Grove. In total, Petitioner's Pepper Grove produced 13,077 boxes (out of the contract volume of 16,000) of red grapefruit. In total, Petitioner's Pepper Grove produced 19,289 boxes (out of the contract volume of 20,000) of white grapefruit. Based upon the volumes produced by the Pepper Grove and the contract prices with the rise going to Petitioner for the navels, Respondent owed Petitioner $25,034.40 for the navels harvested, $24,300 for the red grapefruit, and $8,532.00 for the white grapefruit. These amounts total $57,866.40. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent had paid Petitioner $59,126.48. Of the unpicked fruit left on the trees by Respondent, Petitioner was able to market 15,023 boxes of white grapefruit that went to the cannery and yielded $7,965.46. The red grapefruit that went to the cannery yielded $4,162.21. Red grapefruit that was harvested by Minton yielded 1,056 boxes, but only $168.96. Thus, Petitioner recovered only $12,296.63 for the 22,700 boxes of fruit that Respondent left on the Pepper Grove. Respondent maintained that it did not pick Petitioner's fruit because it was damaged by rust mite. If true, Respondent claimed that the fruit would not meet fresh fruit standards. Although Petitioner acknowledged that some of the fruit did have damage, Mr. Hornbuckle maintained that he offered fruit from another grove to make-up the difference in volume. None of the conversations that allegedly occurred regarding the rust mite issue were reduced to writing at the time. Petitioner maintains he had more than sufficient fruit to meet the amounts due under the parties' agreement. On March 6, 2008, Respondent issued a letter to Petitioner that provided, in part: We are very sorry however we are unable to continue to harvest the grapefruit from your groves due to the lack of merchantability of the fruit for the fresh market. Due to the disease and insect damage present on the fruit, the return on the fruit is unable to cover harvesting and packing charges for the fresh channel. On March 11, 2008, Petitioner wrote back to Respondent and stated, in part: Please be advised that refusal to harvest any additional fruit constitutes a breach of the contract, which requires IMG Citrus to harvest all of the red and white grapefruit no later than March 15, 2008. All of the navel fruit was to have been harvested by January 1, 2008. Contrary to your letter, the fruit is merchantable, and does not have disease or insect damage which unreasonably reduces the merchantability of the crop. At the time of the allegations of rust mite or other damage, Petitioner took pictures of his crop to demonstrate that it appeared to be healthy fruit. Respondent did not have pictures to demonstrate its claim that the fruit was not merchantable. Moreover, Respondent did not formally document that the fruit was unacceptable until March 6, 2008. Under the terms of the contract, the harvesting of the grapefruit was to be completed March 15, 2008. Respondent's claim that it purchased fruit from Duda Products, Inc. (Duda) to demonstrate the market price for grapefruit is not persuasive. The contract with Duda named a variety of "Ruby Reds." There is no evidence that the "Ruby Red" variety is comparable to the whites and reds depicted on Petitioner's contract. Respondent claims that the packout percentage for Petitioner's fruit did not support the harvesting of the crop. That is to say, that the percentage of fruit meeting a fresh fruit quality did not justify the harvesting and packing expense associated with Petitioner's fruit. If the fruit were not marketable in the fresh market, the fruit had no value to Respondent. The parties' agreement did not, however, specify what would be an acceptable packout percentage to support a notion that the fruit was merchantable. Taken to extreme, Respondent could claim any percentage short of 100 percent demonstrated fruit that was not merchantable. No evidence of an industry standard for an acceptable packout percentage was presented.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order approving Petitioner's complaint against Respondent in the amount of $51,021.87. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Collins Westchester Fire Insurance Company 436 Walnut Street, Routing WA10A Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, M-38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Melanie Sallin Ressler, COO IMG Citrus, Inc. 2600 45th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32967 Michel Sallin IMG Citrus, Inc. 7836 Cherry Lake Road Groveland, Florida 34736 Larmarcus E. Hornbuckle Rebecca Hornbuckle Vero Beach Land Company, LLC 6160 1st Street Southwest Vero Beach, Florida 32968 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE is whether Emergency Rules 20ER02-01, 20ER02-02, and 20ER02-03 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20- 15.002, and 20-15.003, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 and the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief:" [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 115. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the instant case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002 order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. They were published in the October 4, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 40, pp. 4271-4272). The full text of the Emergency Rules is: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20ER02-1 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial Rule 20ER02-01 and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., to implement a non-discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New 9-24-02. 20ER02-2 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New 9-24-02. 20ER02-3 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Additionally, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide notice of the calculation to the previously favored persons by certified mail. The notice of the calculation shall contain a statement including the following categories: (a) Tax liability; (b) Gallons; Brix; Type of product; (e) Total solids; (f) Conversion rate; (g) Total boxes; (h) Delineation of non-Florida, United States juice. (2)(a) Contained within the notice will be the various legal options available to those who previously enjoyed the exemption, set forth in proposed Rule 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C. (b) Persons who previously enjoyed the exemption may petition to intervene in the case of Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al, Consolidated Case No. GCG-003718, presently pending before the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County. A hearing to consider arguments made by any intervenor, the Plaintiffs and the Florida Department of Citrus is currently scheduled to be heard by the Honorable Dennis Maloney on November 12, 2002, in Bartow, Florida. (3) The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New 9-24-02. The Department's "Specific Reasons for Finding an Immediate Danger to the Public Health, Safety or Welfare" were set forth as follows: On March 18, 2002, the Court in the Tenth Judicial Circuit, State of Florida, in and for Polk County, entered a Partial Final Declaratory Judgment in the case of Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus, Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718. In this order the Court ruled that the exemption in Section 601.155, F.S., for non-Florida, United States juice was unconstitutional. On or about April 15, 2002, the Court severed the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice from section 601.155(5), F.S. On August 8, 2002, the Court held that the Florida Department of Citrus was required to cure the invalidity of the equalization taxing scheme. To cure this invalidity, the Florida Department of Citrus promulgates Rule 20ER02-1, F.A.C., which will serve to implement the Court's order for a nondiscriminatory tax scheme and provide due process protections for the previously favored taxpayers. These rules are being promulgated on an emergency basis to meet time constraints associated with litigation and to establish guidelines which protect the public's and state's interest for the orderly and efficient collection and payment of the tax liability. Without these guidelines, the welfare of the citizens and the state would be adversely affected because of the immediate and widespread impact of the failure of previously favored persons to properly remit the tax. The Department's "Reason for Concluding that the Procedure is Fair Under the Circumstances" was set forth as follows: Promulgation of these guidelines using the emergency rule procedures is the only available mechanism which adequately protects the public interests under the circumstances which require collection and payment of the tax liability. This procedure is fair to the public and to the previously favored persons. It permits promulgation of the necessary guidelines within a time frame which allows the industry to be adequately informed of their duties, responsibilities and rights with respect to the tax liability. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. The text of Proposed Rule 20-15.001, Florida Administrative Code, is identical to that of Emergency Rule 20ER02-1, set forth above. The text of Proposed Rule 20-15.002, Florida Administrative Code, is identical to that of Emergency Rule 20ER02-2, set forth above. The text of Proposed Rule 20- 15.003(1)&(3), Florida Administrative Code, is identical to that of Emergency Rule 20ER02-3(1)&(3), set forth above. The text of Proposed Rule 15.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, varies from the text of Emergency Rule 20ER02-3(2), and reads as follows: 20-15.003 Collection. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20-15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. Peace River is a Florida corporation and licensed citrus fruit dealer regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, Peace River is subject to the rules of the Department. Peace River buys, sells, and manufactures bulk citrus juices. By correspondence dated October 2, 2002, Peace River was notified by the Department that Peace River would be liable for payment of $86,242.41 in Equalization taxes for the tax period of October 6, 1997 through March 14, 2002 (the "tax period"), pursuant to the terms of the Emergency Rules. Fresh Juice is a Florida corporation and licensed citrus fruit dealer regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, Fresh Juice is subject to the rules of the Department. Fresh Juice buys, sells, and manufactures citrus juices. By correspondence dated October 2, 2002, Fresh Juice was notified by the Department that Fresh Juice would be liable for payment of $45,052.19 in Equalization taxes for the tax period, pursuant to the terms of the Emergency Rules. Sun Orchard is a Florida corporation and licensed citrus fruit dealer regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, Sun Orchard is subject to the rules of the Department. Sun Orchard buys, sells, and manufactures citrus juices. By correspondence dated October 2, 2002, Sun Orchard was notified by the Department that Sun Orchard would be liable for payment of $45,052.19 in Equalization taxes for the tax period, pursuant to the terms of the Emergency Rules. During the tax period, Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard imported, stored and blended non-Florida, United States citrus juices. Neither Peace River, Fresh Juice, nor Sun Orchard is a party to the lawsuit styled Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated). Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard contend that they relied on the tax exemption in making business decisions and had no notice that their activities regarding non-Florida, United States juice would be taxable upon the court's striking of the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard contend that, during the tax period, they had no opportunity to conform their conduct to avoid the tax or position themselves to claim a refund allowed by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard contend that they have not been obligated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, to keep specific records on their use of non-Florida United States citrus juices for the tax period, but admit they keep business records required by law, which may include some business records related to non-Florida United States juice during the tax period. Peace River, Fresh Juice, and Sun Orchard shipped products made with non-Florida, United States juice during the tax period without payment of the Equalization Tax.
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Respondent, as a licensed citrus fruit dealer, breached the terms of an oral contract for the purchase of citrus fruit during the 1992-1993 shipping season, whether Respondent misappropriated certain other citrus fruit owned by Petitioner during the 1992-1993 shipping season, and further, whether such actions by Respondent constitute violations of the Florida Citrus Code for which the proceeds of the citrus fruit dealer's bond executed by Co-Respondent should be paid to Petitioner in satisfaction of Petitioner's claim pursuant to Section 601.66, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Riverfront Groves, Inc., is a corporation with an office in Vero Beach, Florida. At all material times, Petitioner was in the business of selling and marketing citrus fruit. At all material times, Daniel R. Richey was vice-president of Petitioner, in charge of the fresh fruit packing operation. Respondent, Bagaley Groves, is a business with an office in Vero Beach, Florida. At all material times, Respondent operated a citrus fruit gift shipping packinghouse. At all material times, Robert G. Bagaley was the owner of Respondent. Co-Respondent, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, is an insurance company, which was authorized to write surety bonds during the 1992-1993 citrus fruit shipping season. On December 10, 1992, Co-Respondent executed, as surety, Citrus Fruit Dealer's Bond No. 77-LP-007-245-0002, in the principal sum of $10,000.00, binding Co-Respondent as surety, to the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture. The terms and conditions of the bond were that Respondent, as the principal executing such bond, would comply with the provisions of the Florida Citrus Code during the 1992-1993 citrus fruit shipping season, and with the terms and conditions of all contracts relating to the purchase, handling, sale, and accounting of citrus fruit. Respondent held a valid citrus fruit dealer's license issued by the Department of Citrus for the 1991-1992 shipping season. On July 16, 1992, Respondent, by and through its owner Robert Bagaley, filed with the Department of Citrus an application for license as a citrus fruit dealer for the 1992-1993 shipping season. As indicated above, Respondent's bond required for licensure was not executed until December 10, 1992, and it was not until January 25, 1993, that Respondent was issued citrus fruit dealer's license No. 0269 for the 1992-1993 shipping season. The license is not specifically retroactive, and merely states that Respondent is ". . . granted a license to engage in the business of Citrus Fruit Dealer through July 31, 1993." At all material times Respondent, by and through its owner Robert Bagaley, held itself out as a licensed citrus fruit dealer in the state of Florida. In the fall of 1992, Respondent learned from a mutual friend, Henry Schacht, that Petitioner had navel oranges located in a grove in Indian River County, Florida, suitable for use in Respondent's fresh fruit packinghouse. In mid-November 1992, Petitioner, through its authorized representative Daniel R. Richey, and Respondent, through its owner Robert Bagaley, agreed that Respondent would purchase approximately 2,400 boxes of navel oranges from Petitioner at $7.00 per box. Respondent did not hold a valid license as a citrus fruit dealer in the state of Florida at the time this oral contract was entered into with Petitioner. Respondent harvested a total of 150 boxes of these navel oranges during the period of November 13 - 17, 1992, for which Respondent paid Petitioner the agreed upon price of $7.00 per box. This payment in the amount of $1,050.00 was made by check dated November 18, 1992. On December 3, 1992, Petitioner delivered a written contract to Respondent setting forth Petitioner's understanding of the terms of their agreement. The contract was executed by Petitioner. Respondent declined to sign the written contract, and the contract was returned to Petitioner on December 10, 1992. In early December 1992, Respondent learned from James Earl Brantley that some of the navel oranges in Petitioner's grove had green mold, a condition that would make the fruit unsuitable for fresh fruit packing. On December 10, 1992, Respondent repudiated the oral contract and notified Petitioner that Respondent could not use, and did not need, any more of Petitioner's navel oranges. Respondent did not inform Petitioner that some of the navel oranges had developed green mold, or that the navel oranges were otherwise not merchantable. At the time Respondent repudiated the oral contract, Respondent did not hold a valid license as a citrus fruit dealer in the state of Florida. By December 10, 1992, the marketing conditions for navel oranges were substantially deteriorating. From December 11 and 15, 1992, Petitioner harvested and processed the balance of the navel orange crop from the grove, some 2,785 boxes. Petitioner attempted to pack the oranges as fresh fruit. The packout ratio of these 2,785 boxes was approximately 18 percent, yielding Petitioner a net return of $78.01, ($129.38 return for 640 boxes picked December 11 and 12, 1992, and a loss of $51.37 on the remainder picked between December 12 and 15, 1992. Petitioner incurred a loss of $19,365.62, as result of Respondent's failure to pay the agreed upon contract price of $7.00 per box for the balance of the navel oranges. At the time Respondent (through Bagaley) notified Petitioner (through Richey) that Respondent did not intend to harvest the balance of the fruit, Petitioner informed Respondent that the remaining fruit would be harvested, that an accounting of the net proceeds for the remaining fruit would be made, and that the parties could then review the matter as to any outstanding indebtedness which might be due under the terms of the oral agreement. Respondent stated that a review after harvesting and accounting was acceptable. Within sixty days thereafter Petitioner (through Richey) received the accounting and met with Respondent (through Bagaley). At that time Respondent did not acknowledge the indebtedness, nor promise to pay the indebtedness to Petitioner. Subsequent to January 25, 1993, Respondent mistakenly picked red grapefruit from a grove owned by Petitioner, which was adjacent to a grapefruit block Respondent had purchased from a different owner. The parties agree that Respondent owes Petitioner $375.00 or $2.50 for 150 boxes of grapefruit picked from this grove. Respondent tendered a check to Petitioner in the amount of $375.00 for payment of the grapefruit; however, Petitioner declined to accept payment for the grapefruit pending resolution of Petitioner's claim for the navel oranges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department enter a Final Order adjudicating the amount of indebtedness owed Petitioner by Respondent in accordance with Section 601.66, Florida Statutes, is $375.00 for 150 boxes of grapefruit mistakenly harvested. It is further recommended that Petitioner's claim for damages resulting from the contract for navel oranges entered into prior to Respondent's licensure as a citrus fruit dealer during the 1992-1993 shipping season be dismissed. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of August, 1995. RICHARD HIXSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX As to Petitioner's Proposed Findings: 1-9. Adopted and incorporated. Adopted, except to the extent that Respondent's repudiation of the contract was solely related to market conditions. Adopted except as to Respondent's promise to pay subsequent to January 25, 1993. 12-14. These paragraphs constitute conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Lockwood III, Esquire PETERSON, MYERS, CRAIG, CREWS BRANDON & PUTERBAUGH, P.A. Post Office Drawer 7608 Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7608 Eugene J. O'Neill, Esquire GOULD, COOKSEY, FENNELL, BARKETT, O'NEILL & MARINE, P.A. 979 Beachland Boulevard Vero Beach, Florida 32963 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Mr. David Z. Cutright Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 1324 16th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32960
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent Dooley Groves, Inc. owes Petitioner a sum of money for shipments of citrus fruit.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties and Their Problem Spyke's Grove and Dooley are "citrus fruit dealers" operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. As a wholesale shipper, Spyke's Grove packages and arranges for delivery of citrus products pursuant to purchase orders that retail sellers such as Dooley submit. The packages typically are labeled with the retail seller's name (e.g. Dooley), and thus the retail buyer (and the recipient, if the citrus is purchased as a gift) usually will not be aware of Spyke's Grove's involvement. The instant case involves a series of orders that Dooley placed with Spyke's Grove between November and December 1999 for packages of gift fruit. Under a number of informal, largely unwritten contracts, Spyke's Grove agreed, each time it received an order from Dooley, to ship a gift fruit box or basket to the donee designated by Dooley's retail customer, for which fruit shipment Dooley agreed to pay Spyke's Grove. Spyke's Grove alleges that Dooley failed to pay in full for all of the gift fruit packages that Dooley ordered and Spyke's Grove duly shipped. Dooley contends (though not precisely in these terms) that Spyke's Grove materially breached the contracts, thereby discharging Dooley from further performance thereunder. Dooley also claims, as an affirmative defense, that the alleged debt was extinguished pursuant to an accord and satisfaction. The Transactions From mid-November 1999 until around December 12, 1999, Dooley faxed to Spyke's Grove approximately 150 individual orders for gift fruit packages. Each order consisted of a shipping label that identified the product (e.g. the type of gift box or basket), the intended recipient, the destination, and a proposed shipping date. Spyke's Grove manifested its intent to fill these orders by faxing statements of acknowledgment to Dooley. Although the many contracts that arose from these transactions were thus documented, the writings left much unsaid. For example, contrary to Dooley's assertion, the parties did not agree in writing that Spyke's Grove would deliver the subject gift baskets to the donees before Christmas, nor did they make any express oral agreements to this effect. Further, the parties did not specifically agree that Spyke's Grove would be obligated to deliver the gift fruit into the hands of the donees and bear the risk of loss until such tender of delivery. Rather, the contracts between Spyke's Grove and Dooley were ordinary shipment contracts that required Spyke's Grove to put the goods into the possession of carriers (such as the U.S. Postal Service or United Parcel Service) who in due course would deliver the packages to the donees. For several weeks, until early December 1999, Dooley placed orders, and Spyke's Grove filled them, under the arrangement just described, without controversy. The Fire On the night of Sunday, December 12, 1999, a devastating fire at Spyke's Grove's premises caused substantial damage, temporarily disrupting its citrus packing and shipping operations at the peak of the holiday season. Working through and around the loss, Spyke's Grove soon recovered sufficiently to reopen for business. By around noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, its telephone service had been restored, and activities relating to shipping resumed on Friday, December 17, 1999. Dooley's Response Dooley did not immediately learn about the fire that had interrupted Spyke's Grove's operations. Continuing with business as usual on Monday, December 13, 1999, Dooley attempted then and throughout the week to fax orders to Spyke's Grove but consistently failed to connect because the lines were busy. With unplaced orders piling up, Dooley began to worry that the gift baskets its customers had ordered earlier in the month——orders that Sypke's Grove already had agreed to fill—— would not arrive by Christmas, as Dooley had guaranteed when taking those orders. Then, on December 16, word of the Spyke's Grove fire reached Dooley. Dooley's worry escalated into alarm. That same day, Dooley placed telephone calls to as many of its retail customers or their donees as it could reach, to ascertain whether Spyke's Grove had shipped any of the gift fruit baskets that Dooley had ordered before December 12, 1999. Dooley was unable to confirm the receipt of a single package—— and it panicked. Disregarding its existing contractual obligations and with no advance notice to Spyke's Grove, Dooley made alternative arrangements for filling all of the orders that it had faxed to Spyke's Grove in December 1999. Dooley packaged and shipped some of the subject gift boxes on its own, and it placed orders for the rest with another wholesale shipper. These substitute packages were being shipped as early as December 17 or 18, 1999. Even after the fact, Dooley failed to inform Spyke's Grove that it had, in effect, repudiated the existing shipment contracts between them. Having no knowledge of Dooley's actions, Spyke's Grove packaged and shipped all of the gift fruit that Dooley had ordered pursuant to the contracts entered into before December 12, 1999. The Inevitable Dispute On January 27, 2000, Spyke's Grove sent three invoices to Dooley seeking payment for most of the citrus shipped pursuant to Dooley's orders. These bills totaled $3,242.55. A fourth and final invoice, for $70.57, was sent on February 18, 2000. Combined with the other bills, this last brought the grand total to $3,313.12. Each of these invoices contained the following boilerplate "terms": Net 14 days prompt payment is expected and appreciated. A 1 1/2% monthly service charge (A.P.R. 18% per annum) may be charged on all past due accounts. Customer agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorneys [sic] fees and court costs, should collection efforts ever become necessary. Dooley did not remit payment or otherwise respond to Spyke's Grove's statements. Accordingly, on June 20, 2000, Spyke's Grove sent a letter to the Department requesting assistance. Dooley was provided a copy of this letter. On June 30, 2000, Dooley sent a letter to Spyke's Grove in which it explained the reasons why Dooley believed Spyke's Grove was not entitled to full payment of $3,313.12. Dooley had decided, unilaterally, that a deduction of $1,723.53 was in order. In its letter, Dooley described the remaining balance of $1,589.59 as the "final total payment," and a check for that amount was enclosed therewith. Nothing in Dooley's letter fairly apprised Spyke's Grove that the check for $1,589.59 was being tendered, in good faith, in full satisfaction of Spyke's Grove's demand for payment of $3,313.12. No language in that June 30, 2000, letter so much as hinted that Spyke's Grove's acceptance of the check would be considered a manifestation of assent to Dooley's position or an agreement to accept the lesser sum in satisfaction of a greater claim. In short, the parties did not make a mutual agreement, either expressly or by implication, to settle Spyke's Grove's claim for a total payment of $1,589.59. Spyke's Grove was entitled to accept Dooley's check for $1,589.59 as a partial payment against the total indebtedness, and it did. Shortly thereafter, Spyke's Grove filed a Complaint with the Department, initiating the instant proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations Dooley's refusal to pay in full for the goods it ordered from Spyke's Grove constituted a breach of the contracts between the parties. Spyke's Grove did not materially breach the agreements, nor was the indebtedness discharged pursuant to an accord and satisfaction. Spyke's Grove has suffered an injury as a result of Dooley's breach. Spyke's Grove's damages consist of the principal amount of the debt together with pre-award interest at the statutory rate, less the partial payment that Dooley made on June 30, 2000. Accordingly, Spyke's Grove is entitled to recover the following amounts from Dooley: Principal Due Date Statutory Interest $3,242.55 2/10/99 $ 18.66 (2/10/99 - 3/03/99) $ 70.57 3/04/99 $3,313.12 3/04/99 LESS: <$1,589.59> $ 437.56 (3/04/99 - 6/29/00) $1,723.53 6/30/00 $ 86.89 (6/30/00 - 12/31/00) $ 157.92 (1/01/01 - 10/31/01) $1,723.53 $ 701.03 Interest will continue to accrue on the outstanding balance of $1,723.53 in the amount of $0.52 per day from November 1, 2001, until the date of the final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Spyke's Grove the sum of $1,723.53, together with pre- award interest in the amount of $701.03 (through October 31, 2001), plus additional interest from November 1, 2001, until the date of the final order, which will accrue in the amount of $0.52 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 2001. Barbara Spiece, President Spyke's Grove, Inc. 7250 Griffin Road Davie, Florida 33314 Diane M. Houghtaling, Vice President Dooley Groves, Inc. 1651 Stephens Road Post Office Box 7038 Sun City, Florida 33586-7038 Reliance Insurance Company Three Parkway Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 500 Third Street Northwest Post Office Box 1072 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072
