The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Laurel Oaks Apartments ("Laurel Oaks"), discriminated against Petitioner, Lawrence Jacobs, Jr., on the basis of his race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 22-year-old African-American male. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was residing at Laurel Oaks in Temple Terrace, Florida. Petitioner co-habited at Laurel Oaks with a woman, Sade Newton. Petitioner and Newton were expecting a child during the time they resided at Laurel Oaks. Laurel Oaks Apartments is the Respondent. It is a large apartment complex comprised of several buildings. Approximately 70 to 75 percent of the residents of Laurel Oaks are minorities. Petitioner moved into Laurel Oaks on or about November 3, 2009. Petitioner and Newton signed an Apartment Lease Contract (the "Lease") on that date. Petitioner was assigned apartment number 8704 (the "Initial Unit") at a rental fee of $589.00 per month. The term of the Lease was one year. Almost immediately upon taking possession of the Initial Unit, Petitioner began to have some sort of confrontation with a neighboring tenant and his family (hereinafter referred to as the "Neighbor"). Specifically, Petitioner felt that the Neighbor's children were too loud, and that they were disrupting Petitioner's quiet enjoyment of his residence. Petitioner and the Neighbor argued numerous times, and Petitioner reported these arguments to Respondent. Upon receiving Petitioner's complaints about the Neighbor, Respondent offered to let Petitioner out of his Lease or move him to another apartment. In fact, Respondent agreed to allow Petitioner to move into an upgraded apartment with no increase in the rental fee. Respondent also agreed to waive the transfer fee normally associated with moving from one apartment to another. Petitioner believes that Respondent was dilatory in helping him move to a different apartment. However, there is no evidence to support that contention. The assistant community manager, Makell, indicated that she provided Petitioner with four possible options for moving. Some of the units she offered were undergoing painting or repairs and were not immediately available. Makell remembers only one telephone call from Petitioner concerning his potential interest in one of the available units. Petitioner remembers calling regularly to inquire about the units. Makell also remembers Petitioner ultimately asking for a specific apartment, number 8716 (the "Second Unit"). Petitioner and Newton signed a new lease (referred to herein as the "New Lease") for the Second Unit on February 8, 2010, and moved in on that date. The New Lease was also for a term of one year. The Second Unit was an upgrade from the Initial Unit, but Petitioner was not charged a higher rental fee. The Second Unit was, inexplicably, directly "across the way"1 from the apartment where the Neighbor resided. The evidence as to why Petitioner chose that unit or why he agreed to move into that unit was contradictory and confusing. Nonetheless, it is clear that Petitioner at some point voluntarily moved into the Second Unit. Shortly after Petitioner and Newton moved into the Second Unit, they had some sort of domestic squabble. Newton was pregnant with Petitioner's child, and there were some tensions between them. As a result of the squabble, someone called the police. When the police arrived, they talked with Petitioner and Newton for about an hour and then arrested Newton for domestic violence. Petitioner believes Newton had to be arrested pursuant to police policy, i.e., once the police are called to investigate domestic violence, they have to arrest one of the parties. There was no persuasive, non-hearsay evidence to confirm that such a policy exists. All charges against Newton were apparently dropped. However, the significance of Newton's arrest is that it constituted a breach of the New Lease. Paragraph 28 of the New Lease prohibits conduct which infringes on the quiet enjoyment of the apartment complex by other tenants. As a result, Laurel Oaks gave Petitioner and Newton a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance Without Opportunity to Cure" (the "Notice"), which effectively evicted them from the Second Unit. Petitioner does not deny that the New Lease was breached; he admitted so in a letter to Respondent dated May 12, 2010, about a week after the domestic violence arrest occurred. In his letter, Petitioner asks Respondent to reconsider its decision to uphold the provision in the New Lease and to rescind the Notice. Despite Petitioner's plea, Respondent stood by its Notice, and Petitioner was forced to move out of the apartment. At some point thereafter, Petitioner and a representative from Laurel Oaks did a "walk-through" of the Second Unit. A tenant who defaulted under a Laurel Oaks lease would normally be liable for any damages and for all rent that came due until the unit was re-leased. Laurel Oaks suggested at the time of the walk-through that Petitioner would receive a prorated refund for the current month (May) and would not be charged for the remainder of the Lease term. However, Petitioner, thereafter, got into an argument with the community manager, Heckinger, and Heckinger decided to pursue all allowable charges against Petitioner. As a result, when Petitioner received his ultimate receipt from Laurel Oaks, it included a demand for payment in the amount of $589.00 for termination of the Lease, forfeiture of Petitioner's $99.00 security deposit, and the remaining May rent amount ($114.00). Petitioner believes Heckinger and other employees of Laurel Oaks did not take him as seriously as other tenants. He believes Heckinger was "nasty" to him, but not to other tenants. Petitioner believes his request to move to a different apartment was not responded to in a timely fashion. Petitioner provided no evidence that any other residents were, in fact, treated differently than he was treated. There was no evidence presented that persons of color, including Petitioner, were treated differently than similarly situated persons. There was no persuasive evidence that any person affiliated with Laurel Oaks treated Petitioner badly or discriminated against him in any fashion. Laurel Oaks actually did more for Petitioner than was required or mandated by the Lease or by law. Petitioner was given the benefit of the doubt, was provided extra accommodation for his problems, and was treated appropriately. Petitioner also admitted that he did not believe the Laurel Oaks employees were racist.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying Petitioner, Lawrence Jacob, Jr.'s, Petition for Relief in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent, Patricia Sue Shelley, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0454282 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was effective 3/10/92, with a home address of 2413 Euston Road, Winter Park, Florida 32789-3416. From July 9, 1990 to December 5, 1990, the Respondent was licensed as a real estate salesperson with Don Gallagher, Inc. t/a The Prudential Gallagher Properties (Petitioner's Exhibit #4). Her status was property manager. While employed as the property manager the Respondent collected $1,450 in rental funds during November and December 1990, but failed to deliver the rental funds to her employing broker. The Respondent and the broker had an ongoing commission dispute and the Respondent kept the $1,450 because she felt that the broker owed her the money. On December 7, 1990, the Respondent delivered a check from her personal account in the amount of $1,450, to the broker notated: "$ rent for Curry Ford and Dover Circle". These were properties being managed by the broker. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1). On December 8, 1990, the broker deposited the Respondent's check into escrow, but the check was returned annotated: "payment stopped do not redeposit." (Petitioner's Exhibit #2). On December 17, 1990, employing broker Don Gallagher sent the Respondent a demand letter, but the Respondent refused to deliver the trust funds to Don Gallagher. (Petitioner's Exhibit #3). Petitioner's husband recommended that she keep the rental money and get with Don Gallagher about the commission. He later recommended that she just give the money back and is not sure why she did not. She has been under a physician's care for manic depression for about 1 1/2 years. Ms. Shelley's license record includes no other alleged violations or discipline.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: that a Final Order be entered, finding Patricia Sue Shelley violated Sections 475.25(1)(e) and (k), F.S., suspending her license for two years, with the condition that the suspension be lifted anytime after 90 days, if restitution of $1,450 is made to her former employer/broker. After suspension is lifted, Respondent should be placed on probation for one year under such conditions as may be appropriate, including participation in continuing education courses regarding the handling of deposits and other funds received in trust. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of October, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Patricia Sue Shelley, pro se 2413 Euston Road Winter Park, FL 32789-3416 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
The Issue The issue to be determined in this bid protest matter is whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s, intended award of funding under Request for Applications 2017- 108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments To Be Used In Conjunction With Tax-Exempt Bond Financing And Non-Competitive Housing Credits” was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to provide and promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. As such, Florida Housing is authorized to establish procedures to distribute low income housing tax credits and to exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of these credits. § 420.5099, Fla. Stat. For purposes of this administrative proceeding, Florida Housing is considered an agency of the State of Florida. To promote affordable housing in Florida, Florida Housing offers a variety of programs to distribute housing credits. (Housing credits, also known as tax credits, are a dollar-for-dollar offset of federal income tax liability.) One of these programs is the State Apartment Incentive Loan program (“SAIL”), which provides low-interest loans on a competitive basis to affordable housing developers. SAIL funds are available each year to support the construction or substantial rehabilitation of multifamily units affordable to very low- income individuals and families. See § 420.5087, Fla. Stat. Additional sources of financial assistance include the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond program (“MMRB”) and non- competitive housing credits. Florida Housing administers the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits, SAIL funds, nontaxable revenue bonds, and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation. Florida Housing initiates the competitive application process by issuing a Request for Applications. §§ 420.507(48) and 420.5087(1), Fla. Stat.; and Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.009(4). The Request for Application at issue in this matter is RFA 2017-108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments to Be Used in Conjunction with Tax-Exempt Bond Financing and Non-Competitive Housing Credits.” Florida Housing issued RFA 2017-108 on August 31, 2017. Applications were due by October 12, 2017.6/ The purpose of RFA 2017-108 is to distribute funding to create affordable housing in the State of Florida. Through RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing intends to award approximately $87,000,000 for proposed developments serving elderly and family demographic groups in small, medium, and large counties. RFA 2017-108 allocates $46,279,600 to large counties, $32,308,400 to medium counties, and $8,732,000 to small counties. RFA 2017-108 established goals to fund: Two Elderly, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; Three Family, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; One Elderly, new construction Application located in a Medium County; and Two Family, new construction Applications located in Medium Counties. Thirty-eight developers submitted applications in response to RFA 2017-108. Of these applicants, Florida Housing found 28 eligible for funding, including all Petitioners and Intervenors in this matter. Florida Housing received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked applications pursuant to the terms of RFA 2017-108, Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67- 48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. RFA 2017-108 provided that applicants were scored based on certain demographic and geographic funding tests. Florida Housing sorted applications from the highest scoring to the lowest. Only applications that met all the eligibility requirements were eligible for funding and considered for selection. Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to review and score each application. On November 15, 2017, the Review Committee announced its scores at a public meeting and recommended which projects should be awarded funding. On December 8, 2017, the Review Committee presented its recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors for final agency action. The Board of Directors subsequently approved the Review Committee’s recommendations and announced its intention to award funding to 16 applicants. As a preliminary matter, prior to the final hearing, Florida Housing agreed to the following reassessments in the scoring and selection of the applications for funding under RFA 2017-108: SP Lake and Osprey Pointe: In the selection process, Florida Housing erroneously determined that SP Lake was eligible to meet the funding goal for the “Family” demographic for the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. (SP Lake specifically applied for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Consequently, Florida Housing should have selected Osprey Pointe to meet the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. Osprey Pointe proposed to construct affordable housing in Pasco County, Florida. Florida Housing represents that Osprey Pointe is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (While Osprey Pointe replaces SP Lake in the funding selection for the “Family” demographic, SP Lake remains eligible for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Sierra Bay and Northside II: In the scoring process, Florida Housing erroneously awarded Sierra Bay proximity points for Transit Services. Upon further review, Sierra Bay should have received zero proximity points. Consequently, Sierra Bay’s application is ineligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. By operation of the provisions of RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing should have selected Northside II (the next highest ranked, eligible applicant) for funding to meet the Elderly, Large County, New Construction Goal. Florida Housing represents that Northside II is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. Harbour Springs: Florida Housing initially deemed Harbour Springs eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108 and selected it to meet the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal. However, because Harbour Springs and Woodland Grove are owned by the same entity and applied using the same development site, under rule 67-48.004(1), Harbour Springs is ineligible for funding. (Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove for funding for the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal, is not affected by this determination.) The sole disputed issue of material fact concerns Liberty Square’s challenge to Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Liberty Square and Woodland Grove applied to serve the same demographic population under RFA 2017-108. If Liberty Square successfully challenges Woodland Grove’s application, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, will be selected for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal instead of Woodland Grove. (At the hearing on December 8, 2017, Florida Housing’s Board of Directors awarded Woodland Grove $7,600,000 in funding.) The focus of Liberty Square’s challenge is the information Woodland Grove provided in response to RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d., entitled “Latitude/Longitude Coordinates.” Liberty Square argues that Woodland Grove’s application is ineligible because its Development Location Point, as well as the locations of its Community Services and Transit Services, are inaccurate. Therefore, Woodland Grove should have received zero “Proximity” points which would have disqualified its application for funding. RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d(1), states, in pertinent part: All Applicants must provide a Development Location Point stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place. RFA 2017-108 set forth scoring considerations based on latitude/longitude coordinates in Section Four, A.5.e, entitled “Proximity.” Section Four, A.5.e, states, in pertinent part: The Application may earn proximity points based on the distance between the Development Location Point and the Bus or Rail Transit Service . . . and the Community Services stated in Exhibit A. Proximity points will not be applied to the total score. Proximity points will only be used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference ” In other words, the Development Location Point identified the specific location of an applicant’s proposed housing site.7/ Applicants earned “proximity points” based on the distance between its Development Location Point and selected Transit and Community Services. Florida Housing also used the Development Location Point to determine whether an application satisfied the Mandatory Distance Requirement under RFA 2017-108, Section Four A.5.f. To be eligible for funding, all applications had to qualify for the Mandatory Distance Requirement. The response section to Section Four, A.5.d., is found in Exhibit A, section 5, which required each applicant to submit information regarding the “Location of proposed Development.” Section 5 specifically requested: County; Address of Development Site; Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites?; Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Proximity; Mandatory Distance Requirement; and Limited Development Area. Section 5.d. (Latitude and Longitude Coordinates) was subdivided into: (1) Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place In its application, Woodland Grove responded in section 5.a-d as follows: County: Miami-Dade Address of Development Site: NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032. Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites? No. Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 25.518647 Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 80.418583 In plotting geographic coordinates, a “-” (negative) sign in front of the longitude indicates a location in the western hemisphere (i.e., west of the Prime Meridian, which is aligned with the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, England). A longitude without a “-” sign places the coordinate in the eastern hemisphere. (Similarly, a latitude with a negative value is south of the equator. A latitude without a “-” sign refers to a coordinate in the northern hemisphere.) As shown above, the longitude coordinate Woodland Grove listed in section 5.d(1) did not include a “-” sign. Consequently, instead of providing a coordinate for a site in Miami-Dade County, Florida, Woodland Grove entered a Development Location Point located on the direct opposite side of the planet (apparently, in India). At the final hearing, Florida Housing (and Woodland Grove) explained that, except for the lack of the “-” sign, the longitude Woodland Grove recorded would have fallen directly on the address it listed as its development site in section 5.b., i.e., the “NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032.” In addition to the longitude in section 5.d., Woodland Grove did not include a “-” sign before the longitude coordinates for its Transit Services in section 5.e(2)(b) or for any of the three Community Services provided in section 5.e(3). Again, without a “-” sign, the longitude for each of these services placed them in the eastern hemisphere (India) instead of the western hemisphere (Miami-Dade County). In its protest, Liberty Square contends that, because Woodland Grove’s application listed a Development Location Point in India, Florida Housing should have awarded Woodland Grove zero proximity points under Section Four, A.5.e. Consequently, Woodland Grove’s application failed to meet minimum proximity eligibility requirements and is ineligible for funding. Therefore, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, should be awarded funding for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108.8/ Liberty Square asserts that a correct Development Location Point is critical because it serves as the beginning point for assigning proximity scores. Waiving an errant Development Location Point makes the proximity scoring meaningless. Consequently, any such waiver by Florida Housing is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to competition. At the final hearing, Woodland Grove claimed that it inadvertently failed to include the “-” sign before the longitude points. To support its position, Woodland Grove expressed that, on the face of its application, it was obviously applying for funding for a project located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, not India. In at least five places in its application, Woodland Grove specified that its proposed development would be located in Miami-Dade County. Moreover, several attachments to Woodland Grove’s application specifically reference a development site in Florida. Woodland Grove attached a purchase agreement for property located in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 8). To satisfy the Ability to Proceed requirements in RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove included several attachments which all list a Miami-Dade address (Attachments 9-14). Further, Woodland Grove submitted a Local Government Verification of Contribution – Loan Form executed on behalf of the Mayor of Miami-Dade County, which committed Miami-Dade County to contribute $1,000,000.00 to Woodland Grove’s proposed Development (Attachment 15). Finally, to qualify for a basis boost under RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove presented a letter from Miami-Dade County’s Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources, which also referenced the address of the proposed development in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 16). In light of this information, Woodland Grove argues that its application, taken as a whole, clearly communicated that Woodland Grove intended to build affordable housing in Miami-Dade County. Nowhere in its application, did Woodland Grove reference a project in India other than the longitude coordinates which failed to include “-” signs. Accordingly, Florida Housing was legally authorized to waive Woodland Grove’s mistake as a “harmless error.” Thus, Florida Housing properly selected the Woodland Grove’s development for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Florida Housing advocates for Woodland Grove’s selection to meet the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017- 108. Florida Housing considers the omission of the “-” signs before the longitude coordinates a “Minor Irregularity” under rule 67-60.002(6). Therefore, Florida Housing properly acted within its legal authority to waive, and then correct, Woodland Grove’s faulty longitude coordinates when scoring its application. In support of its position, Florida Housing presented the testimony of Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s current Director of Multifamily Allocations. In her job, Ms. Button oversees the Request for Applications process; although, she did not personally participate in the review, scoring, or selection decisions for RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button initially explained the process by which Florida Housing selected the 16 developments for funding under RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button conveyed that Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score the applications. Florida Housing selected Review Committee participants based on the staff member’s experience, preferences, and workload. Florida Housing also assigned a backup reviewer to separately score each application. The Review Committee members independently evaluated and scored their assigned portions of the applications based on various mandatory and scored items. Thereafter, the scorer and backup reviewer met to reconcile their scores. If any concerns or questions arose regarding an applicant’s responses, the scorer and backup reviewer discussed them with Florida Housing’s supervisory and legal staff. The scorer then made the final determination as to each application. Ms. Button further explained that applicants occasionally make errors in their applications. However, not all errors render an application ineligible. Florida Housing is authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities.” As delineated in RFA 2017-108, Section Three, A.2.C., Florida Housing may waive “Minor Irregularities” when the errors do not provide a competitive advantage or adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67- 60.002(6) and 67-60.008. Such was the case regarding Woodland Grove’s application. Heather Green, the Florida Housing staff member who scored the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, waived the inaccurate longitude coordinates as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green then reviewed Woodland Grove’s application as if the proposed development was located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Florida Housing assigned Ms. Green, a Multifamily Loans Manager, as the lead scorer for the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, which included the Development Location Point listed in Exhibit A, section 5.d. Ms. Green has worked for Florida Housing since 2003 and has scored proximity points for Request for Applications for over ten years. At the final hearing, Florida Housing offered the deposition testimony of Ms. Green. In her deposition, Ms. Green testified that she is fully aware that, to be located in the western hemisphere (i.e., Miami-Dade County), a longitude coordinate should be marked with a negative sign or a “W.” Despite this, Ms. Green felt that the longitude coordinates Woodland Grove used without negative signs, particularly its Development Location Point, were clearly typos or unintentional mistakes. Therefore, Ms. Green waived the lack of a negative sign in front of the longitude coordinates in section 5.d. and section 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green understood that she was authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities” by rule under the Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green felt comfortable waiving the inaccurate longitude coordinates because everywhere else in Woodland Grove’s application specifically showed that its proposed housing development was located in Miami-Dade County, not India. Accordingly, when scoring Woodland Grove’s application, Ms. Green corrected the longitude entries by including a negative sign when she plotted the coordinates with her mapping software. Ms. Green then determined that, when a “-” was inserted before the longitude, the coordinate lined up with the address Woodland Grove listed for the Development Location Point. Therefore, Woodland Grove received proximity points and was eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (See RFA 2017-108, Section Five.A.1.) However, Ms. Green acknowledged that if she had scored the application just as it was presented, Woodland Grove would not have met the required qualifications for eligibility. Ms. Button relayed that Florida Housing fully accepted Ms. Green’s decision to waive the missing negative signs in Woodland Grove’s response to section 5.d. and 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Button opined that Woodland Grove’s failure to place a “-” mark before the longitude was clearly an unintentional mistake. Ms. Button further commented that Florida Housing did not believe that scoring Woodland Grove’s development as if located in the western hemisphere (instead of India), provided Woodland Grove a competitive advantage. Because it was evident on the face of the application that Woodland Grove desired to develop a housing site in Miami-Dade County, Ms. Green’s decision to overlook the missing “-” sign did not award Woodland Grove additional points or grant Woodland Grove an advantage over other applicants. Neither did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. However, Ms. Button also conceded that if Ms. Green had scored the application without adding the “-” sign, Woodland Grove would have received zero proximity points. This result would have rendered Woodland Grove’s application ineligible for funding. Ms. Button also pointed out that Ms. Green waived the omission of “-” signs in two other applications as “Minor Irregularities.” Both Springhill Apartments, LLC, and Harbour Springs failed to include negative signs in front of their longitude coordinates. As with Woodland Grove, Ms. Green considered the development sites in those applications as if they were located in Miami-Dade County (i.e., in the western hemisphere). Ms. Green also waived a mistake in the Avery Commons application as a “Minor Irregularity.” The longitude coordinate for the Avery Commons Development Location Point (section 5.d(1)) was blank. However, Ms. Green determined that Avery Commons had placed the longitude in the blank reserved for Scattered Sites coordinates (section 5.d(2)). When scoring Avery Commons’ application, Ms. Green considered the coordinate in the appropriate section. According to Ms. Button, Florida Housing felt that this variation did not provide Avery Commons a competitive advantage. Nor did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. Finally, Ms. Button explained that the application Florida Housing used for RFA 2017-108 was a relatively new format. In previous Request For Applications, Florida Housing required applicants to submit a Surveyor Certification Form. On the (now obsolete) Surveyor Certification Form, Florida Housing prefilled in an “N” in front of all the latitude coordinates and a “W” in front of all the longitude coordinates. However, the application used in RFA 2017-108 did not place an “N” or “W” before the Development Location Point coordinates. Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, Liberty Square did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Florida Housing’s decision to award funding to Woodland Grove for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108 was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Florida Housing was within its legal authority to waive, then correct, the missing “-” sign in Woodland Grove’s application as “Minor Irregularity.” Therefore, the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law, that Petitioner did not meet its burden of proving that Florida Housing’s proposed action to select Woodland Grove for funding was contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the provisions of RFA 2017-108.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order dismissing the protest by Liberty Square. It is further recommended that Florida Housing Finance Corporation rescind the intended awards to Sierra Bay, SP Lake, and Harbour Springs, and instead designate Northside II, Osprey Pointe, and Pembroke Tower Apartments as the recipients of funding under RFA 2017-108.10/ DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in prohibited discriminatory conduct against Petitioners, Irene Cassermere (Ms. Cassermere) and Milagross Diaz (Ms. Diaz), within the terms and conditions, privileges, or provisions of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Diaz is a female of Hispanic ethnicity with a physical disability that limits one or more of her major life activities. At all times material, she lived in the State of New York. Ms. Diaz was in Florida during the month of February 2002. On February 20, 2002, she completed an application for lot rental in the Sherwood Forrest Mobile Home Park (Sherwood Forest) with the intent to purchase a mobile home located on a rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, owned by Beth Koze (Ms. Koze), who did not testify. Respondent informed Ms. Diaz that her credit check would be completed within a couple of days to ascertain her income and credit history. It was her understanding that Respondent had no interest in the potential purchase transaction between her and Ms. Koze. However, Respondent explained to Ms. Diaz, that ownership of a mobile home at the time of application was not required in order to be approved. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent eventually informed her that due to insufficient income shown on her application she had been disapproved for lot rental. Ms. Diaz testified that Respondent informed her that she needed approximately twice the amount of her reported monthly income to qualify for lot rental approval. Thereafter, Ms. Diaz submitted a second lot rental application to Respondent. On the second application, Ms. Diaz included a co-applicant, Ms. Cassermere, who intended to relocate to Florida with her when the mobile home purchase and the lot rental application were completed. No monthly income for Ms. Cassermere was included on the lot rental application. On the second lot rental application, Ms. Diaz testified that she listed her "Occupation of Applicant" as "disabled." In the column regarding "income," she included her income and listed a Mr. LaRosa as a source of monthly income of $400.00, the amount she claimed Respondent previously informed her she needed to qualify for lot rental. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent received her second lot rental application and called her to discuss the matter. During the conversation Respondent asked "[W]hat she was doing for Mr. LaRosa that he would put out $400.00 on her behalf." Ms. Diaz testified that she was offended by the tone of Respondent's voice and the implications that she believed prompted the question. She believed the question to have been irrelevant and did not answer. Ms. Diaz testified that in the "Assets and Income" column of her second lot rental application, she listed the amount of $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of the $10,000, which apparently was not initially included on her first lot rental application, she explained to Respondent she intended to make a cash purchase of the mobile home from Ms. Koze for $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of such a large sum, when her monthly income was insufficient to qualify for lot rental, she explained that she was to receive a lump sum, five years' retroactive social security benefit payment. Ms. Diaz testified that approximately one month after submitting her second rental lot application to Respondent and having received no response, she called Ms. Koze to ascertain the status of the mobile home sale. Ms. Diaz also testified that Ms. Koze advised her to call Respondent to find out what was holding up her second lot rental application. Believing the lot rental approval was a condition precedent to the mobile home sale, Ms. Diaz testified that at no time during her conversation with Ms. Koze did Ms. Koze advise her that she intended to take the mobile home off the market. Ms. Diaz then called Respondent and spoke with Andy Windfelder (Mr. Windfelder) about the rental lot application status. Mr. Windfelder told her to call Ms. Koze. Ms. Diaz's recollection of the telephone conversation between her and Ms. Koze follows: [A]t this point it's just too much trouble, that at this point she was going to keep the house. . . for a family member--So I told her at this point, she's been patient and she's been holding up with me for that whole time that we were waiting on this credit report, which is four weeks, that I'm not going to put her on the spot of going against them and tell me what transpired in that conversation for them to convince her not to sell to me. I told her that at that point I have no alternative but to tell her that I was going to go file a housing complaint, and I'm sorry that I would have to involve her, but that we had a contract and I gave her a deposit. So at that point she took my name and address and she mailed me my deposit back on a check, and at that point, I didn't contact Sherwood--I contacted Sherwood Forest only to tell them right after that that I filed this housing complaint, that I was going to file this housing complaint . . . As stated, Ms. Diaz filed her discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations and no longer communicated directly with Respondent regarding the matter. The core of Ms. Diaz's complaint is Respondent's failure, or refusal, to contact her by mail or by telephone about the result of her second lot rental application. Further, Ms. Diaz opined that Respondent pressured Ms. Koze not to sell her mobile home to her, which caused Ms. Koze to return Ms. Diaz's purchase contract deposit money. Ms. Diaz argued that Respondent's conduct, unreasonable delay in acting upon her lot rental application and pressure on Ms. Koze not to sell, had two direct effects: (1) she lost the opportunity to purchase the mobile home located on the rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, and (2) she was denied the right to reside in Respondent's facility because she was a dark, disabled, Hispanic female. At all times material, Jeff Leeds (Mr. Leeds) was general manager of Sherwood Forest in Kissimmee, Florida. In that position, Mr. Leeds supervised a staff of 28 persons, of whom many were Hispanic. The park consisted of approximately 1,600 rental sites. According to Mr. Leeds, approximately 30 percent of Sherwood Forest residents were Hispanic, and he had never met Ms. Diaz. According to Mr. Leeds, Ms. Diaz's background check reflected insufficient income that raised an alert. Her second application, based upon his conversation with Ms. Diaz, would include her sister, Ms. Cassermere, as co-applicant. Ms. Diaz was unaware that in October 2003, Ms. Koze placed her mobile home back on the market and was willing to sell to her. This information was made available to Ms. Diaz by and through Respondent through the report provided to Respondent by the Commission's investigator. Based on the evidence of record, Ms. Diaz failed to present any credible evidence to substantiate her claim of discrimination. Ultimate Factual Determinations Respondent rejected Ms. Diaz's initial lot rental application, not because of her handicap or her Hispanic ethnicity, but because through a reasonable process of credit check references, it was discovered that Ms. Diaz's disability income was insufficient to meet Respondent's requirements for lot rental. The additional income of $400.00, an apparent loan from her friend, entered on her second rental lot application raised reasonable concerns; and, when inquiry was made, she refused to respond. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent attempted to influence and/or pressure the mobile home owner, Ms. Koze, to take her mobile home off the market and/or cancel her contract for sale with Ms. Diaz. Ms. Koze voluntarily returned Ms. Diaz's deposit money. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent intentionally delayed processing Ms. Diaz's second lot rental application with the intent or for the purpose of denying her approval because of her disability, gender, or her Hispanic ethnicity. In short, Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Ms. Diaz; rather, the delay caused by her second lot rental application to Respondent was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and was not proven to be the reason Ms. Koze took her mobile home off the market.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioners', Irene Cassermere and Milagross Diaz, Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, Clifton Jerome Locke has held Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 361372 for the areas of psychology, administration and Junior ROTC, and has taught as a Junior Army ROTC instructor at Crestview High School. Major Jordan was the director of army instruction for the Okaloosa County School Board and Sgt. Locke's "superior officer" at all pertinent times. Ever since Sgt. Locke began as a Junior Army ROTC instructor at Crestview High School, in January or February of 1971, Major Clifton D. Jordan's job was "[t]o coordinate and to command, really, if you will, the Army ROTC operations within the county school system." (T. 39-40) TELEPHONE BILLS The Okaloosa County School Board relied on the ROTC program to secure reimbursement from the U. S. Army for long distance charges incurred by ROTC. When the School Board received telephone bills for the ROTC telephone at Crestview High School, the office of the assistant superintendent for finance paid them, and sent copies of the bills to Crestview High School's Junior ROTC program. As the monthly phone bills arrived, Sgt. Locke looked them over, then gave them to a cadet, who prepared DA Form 360 and DA Form 3953, for Major Jordan's signature. Major Jordan signed the Army form to which a copy of the monthly telephone bill was attached, DA Form 3953. This form and attachments were regularly sent to the signal officer at Fort Rucker, Alabama, until the practice ceased in the spring of 1978. Although unsure whether his office, the school principal or Major Jordan received the Army's reimbursement checks, Creel Richardson, Jr., assistant superintendent for finance for the Okaloosa County School Board, testified without contradiction that the U. S. Army had not reimbursed long distance charges incurred by the Junior ROTC program at Crestview High School over a 46-month period beginning in the spring of 1978. During this entire period, Major Jordan was "telephone control officer." Army regulations precluded Sgt. Locke's serving as telephone control officer. (T. 81) Some time in 1978 Sgt. Locke received a note from Mrs. Strauder of the signal office which read: Returning your bill to be corrected. Please mark calls on the phone bill that add up to fifty-three ninety- five ($53.95), all three copies, please. It was about this time that Sgt. Locke and Major Jordan discussed the use of the telephone for other than official long distance calls. Although Major Jordan did not recall this conversation, he did testify at hearing that he had made various personal long distance calls on the ROTC telephone and had sought Army reimbursement for them by failing to delete personal items from the phone bill copies forwarded to Fort Rucker. Without counting calls made in 1982, Major Jordan made more than two hundred personal, long distance calls on the ROTC telephone, between February 14, 1978, and May 26, 1983. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Eventually, the Federal Bureau of Investigation looked into Major Jordan's personal use of the ROTC telephone for long distance calls, but criminal charges were not brought. Other school personnel also made unauthorized use of the ROTC telephone. Major Jordan, who had never delegated any responsibility or duty in connection with telephone bill reimbursement to Sgt. Locke in writing, told him not to be concerned about which of the phone calls were in fact official calls. Sgt. Locke continued for a few months to give phone bills to cadets for preparation of the reimbursement request forms and the forms continued to be prepared. But Major Jordan stopped signing them and Sgt. Locke eventually stopped giving the phone bills to the cadets who prepared the forms. Of the 46 monthly bills for which no reimbursement was sought, 29 had not been opened in March of 1982, at the time Sgt. Locke was transferred from the ROTC department and Major Jordan went through respondent's desk drawers. At some point, Sgt. Locke told Major Jordan he would rather not be involved in preparation of the forms. He told the student cadets responsible for preparing the forms to deal directly with Major Jordan. In or about October of 1982, the signal office inquired about phone call reimbursement and charges for long distance. Phone calls billed to the ROTC number at Crestview High School aggregated $2,974.42 over the 46-month period. How much of this sum reflected official calls was not clear from the record. Another year elapsed after Sgt. Locke's transfer from the ROTC department before Major Jordan signed and transmitted any phone bill reimbursement forms to the signal office, with the result that reimbursement for any official calls was lost to the Okaloosa County School Board for much of that period as well. CANDY SALES Toward the beginning of the 1981-1982 school year, Jerry Pilgrim, a candy salesman from Milton, Florida, spoke to Major Jordan and Sgt. Locke about the ROTC students' selling candy to raise money. In October, it was agreed that a sale would take place later in the fall. Mr. Pilgrim discussed the candy sales with Major Jordan, who told him to deal with Sgt. Locke. Orders for candy to be delivered in November and December were not filled on time, so Sgt. Locke cancelled them, fearful the upcoming Christmas vacation would complicate matters. When Mr. Pilgrim stopped by the school to apologize for his failure to deliver the candy on time, Major Jordan said ROTC might sell candy some other time. In all, Mr. Pilgrim spoke to Major Jordan six to ten times and never got any indication that Major Jordan opposed a candy sale. It was Major Jordan who chose the particular kind of candy (Reese's candy bars) the day Mr. Pilgrim handed out samples. Major Jordan never told respondent not to conduct a candy sale. Major Jordan and Sgt. Stakley's testimony otherwise has not been credited. In January, Sgt. Locke placed another order for candy by telephone and Mr. Pilgrim delivered the candy the third week of January, 1982. He unloaded the trunk of his car at the ROTC office at Crestview High School, and returned two days later with 20 more cases of candy. Two weeks later he again called at the school, but Sgt. Locke told him that the principal was upset and that ROTC would not be ordering more candy. For the 1981-1982 school year and for some time previously, there was a written policy at Crestview High School requiring approval in advance of fund raising projects, and requiring, with respect to sales conducted by students, that a form be filed reflecting beginning inventory, cost per item, closing inventory, profit, total cost and total items sold. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Both Major Jordan and Sgt. Locke knew or should have known of this policy, even though there was no evidence that the ROTC program had followed it in the past. Approval was not obtained for the candy sale in advance, nor was the required form filed. On January 21, 1982, six students turned in a total of $89.50 to Sgt. Locke, money they had been paid for candy. On January 25, 1982, six students turned in more candy sale proceeds to the respondent, aggregating $86.00. On January 26, 1982, Sgt. Locke entered the hospital, having suffered a mild stroke. He had trouble seeing, was unable to change gears driving, and finally fainted, slumping over his typewriter at Crestview High School. In the hospital, he remembered the money in his desk and asked his daughter, Cynthia Faith, who was also a cadet in the ROTC program, to retrieve the cash from his desk drawer. Sgt. Locke could not see well enough to count the money, so his wife, his daughter and his parents, who were visiting at the hospital, counted it for him. His wife drew a check in the amount of $175.50 on a joint account she shared with respondent, and one of the respondent's daughters gave the check, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, along with the required "Report of Monies Collected" forms, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, to the school bookkeeper, Ms. Earlene Carter, on February 5, 1982. (T. 163) Proceeds from the candy sale totalled at least $1385.86 and there were no complaints about the handling of the rest of the money. Insofar as the evidence shows, all the money the students turned in was ultimately deposited with the school bookkeeper. School policy required that "teachers who receive money from students in a school related activity should . [t]urn the money into the bookkeeper the day it is collected or as soon thereafter as possible." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Pictures were taken of the ROTC students by James L. Davis of Stone Studio in Pensacola. Most of the students showed up with their money at the time pictures were taken in January of 1982. Others, including respondent's two daughters, did not pay for their photographs the day they were taken, but Cynthia Faith Locke later gave Sgt. Stakley $20 for the pictures taken of her sister and herself, and the photographer was eventually paid in full. Major Jordan testified at hearing that he found a "collection voucher" in Sgt. Locke's desk drawer reflecting that four ROTC students had made payments of ten dollars each for photographs, but that no money was attached to the voucher or present elsewhere in the drawer. Two of the students Major Jordan said were listed on the "voucher" were Sgt. Locke's daughters. The evidence was insufficient to show that Sgt. Locke ever received any money from any student for photographs. The "voucher" Major Jordan claimed he found was not produced at hearing. Aside from Major Jordan's testimony, which has not been credited in this regard, no evidence suggested any impropriety in the handling of any moneys respondent may have received in connection with the sale of photographs to ROTC students. APPLICATION LATE Dean Oliver Casey, a student enrolled in the ROTC program at Crestview High School, filled out an application for an ROTC scholarship in December of 1980. Major Jordan and Dean Casey had discussed the scholarship application two or three times between September 1, 1980, and mid-November of that year, and Major Jordan had told him to mail the completed application to Fort Monroe, Virginia, but he missed the December 15, 1980, deadline. Later Dean Casey gave the completed application to Sgt. Locke who asked Major Jordan if he could "pull any strings" to get the application considered, even though the deadline for submission had passed. After Major Jordan "relieved" Sgt. Locke of his ROTC assignment, respondent went to work in Okaloosa County School Board's finance department at the Carver Hill complex. On the assumption that the allegations against him were true, his effectiveness as a ROTC instructor had been impaired, the consensus of the testimony was, but there was no evidence of the impact on his effectiveness on the assumption that the charges were false, even in part; and no evidence as to his effectiveness while employed in the finance department. The parties' proposed findings of fact have been considered in preparation of the foregoing. To the extent they have not been adopted, they have been rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative or subordinate.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint filed against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esquire Post Office Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Pamela Cooper, Esquire Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald L. Griesheimer Executive Director Department of Education 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was and is a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida, having been issued license No. 0098626. Her address is U.S. Highway 1, Mile Marker 30, Big Pine Key, Florida. At some time during 1971, Joseph Kite met Respondent while she was employed as an associate in the office of Betty M. Brothers Real Estate on Little Torch Key, Monroe County, Florida. Mr. Kite apparently purchased some property through this real estate office, which occasioned his meeting Respondent. At some time during November of 1978, Mr. Kite contacted Respondent and requested that she find a renter for and manage the rental of his home on Big Pine Key, Florida. Respondent advised Mr. Kite that she would agree to find someone to rent the premises, but because of other business considerations, she no longer managed rental properties. Subsequently, Mr. Kite and Respondent discussed Mr. Kite's requirements concerning rental of his property. There were to be no pets or children, and any lease of the premises was to be for not less than six months duration and preferably for one year. Mr. Kite explained to Respondent that he was most concerned about vandals, since the property was to serve as his retirement home and he wanted it kept in good condition until such time as he retired and settled there. The parties agreed that Respondent would receive 15 percent of any rental charged and received by Mr. Kite on the property. Other than the above, there was no specific understanding between Mr. Kite and Respondent concerning Respondent's specific responsibilities. Kite wrote an undated letter to Respondent summarizing their agreement which provided, as follows: This is to confirm our telephone Conversation[sic] of Saturday, 25 November, 1978, in which I requested and you agreed to list my home on Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida, in your rental department. Subject to my instructions relative to the duration of the lease and the size of the family occuping[sic] the property you are to use your own judgement[sic] in all details pertinent to the lease and you are hereby authorized to do so. . . . Respondent rented the property to an initial tenant for a period of one year, collected the first and last months' rent and a security deposit, and forwarded the first and last months' rent to Mr. Kite. Subsequently, she sent the next two months' rent to Mr. Kite. Thereafter, the tenant became ill, vacated the property, and returned to his home in Philadelphia. The property stood vacant for approximately two months. Respondent then rented the premises for a period of three months. The tenants moved out of the house at the expiration of the three-month period. Respondent rented the property a third time in July of 1979 to a man who signed the lease under the name of "John Brown." At the time the lease was signed, Respondent had no reason to believe that the lessee had any name other than "John Brown." On July 28, 1979, "Brown" returned to Respondent's office with his mother and made an offer to purchase the property. The offer to purchase was submitted in the name of "Jeffrey Benz." At about this time, Respondent also learned that this individual had approximately one year previously used the name "Jeffrey Benn" or "John Benn." The record in this cause does not establish the true identity of this individual. However, Respondent attempted to communicate this difference in names directly to Mr. Kite by mail, but was apparently unsuccessful. Respondent did communicate this difference in names to Mr. Kite's sister-in-law, with whom she often communicated because Mr. Kite, who was engaged in the construction business, often could not be contacted. In any event, Mr. Kite learned in either August or September of 1979 that "Brown" and "Benz" were the same persons, and thereafter continued to accept rental payments from him. Further, Mr. Kite was not interested in selling the property, so the offer to purchase from "Benz" came to nothing. In early 1980 "Brown" or "Benz" ceased making rental payments under the terms of the lease. Thereafter, pursuant to instructions from Mr. Kite, Respondent instituted and successfully concluded eviction proceedings. In mid-April, 1980, a severe squall passed through the Big Pine Key area, doing extensive damage to the house located on the property. Respondent and her employees observed the damage, and performed some cursory cleanup, and secured the property so that it would not be vandalized until Mr. Kite's return. Upon resumption of possession of the house, Mr. Kite apparently was under the impression that damage to the home had been caused by the prior tenant. However, there is absolutely no direct evidence in this record that "Brown" or "Benz" in any way caused damage to the property. The only direct testimony of record in this proceeding concerning the source of damage is that it occurred as a result of the April storm.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, the Manatee County School Board (the "School Board"), may terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for "just cause" as defined in Section 6.11 of the School Board's Policies and Procedures Manual, based upon the conduct alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed at the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 9, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Stephanie Waiters was hired by the School Board as a bus driver on August 6, 1996. In 2005, she was promoted to the position of area coordinator. The five "area coordinators" are first-line supervisors responsible for overseeing the daily operations of the buses within their assigned geographical districts. In December 2008, Terry Palmer was promoted from assistant director to the position of director of transportation. Upon his promotion, he was informed by the School Board that, due to budget constraints, his former position would not be filled, nor would the open position of operations coordinator. On January 23, 2009, Mr. Palmer issued a memorandum to all transportation employees regarding the additional duties that transportation department employees would be required to undertake in response to the budget cuts. Mr. Palmer's memorandum stated that, because he would not have administrative assistance, the area coordinators would report directly to him and would assume certain "additional responsibilities": The expanded role of the Area Coordinators will include: 1. employee evaluations; 2. parent conferences; 3. coaching and assisting employees on their buses; 4. observing bus operations at stops, schools etc. when needed; 5. following through on complaints from schools, parents and/or citizens and coordinating action with others inside and outside the department; 6. counseling employees on performance issues and documenting employee discipline; 7. ensuring all employees assigned to them have all of the training and coaching they need to succeed; 8. initiating, in conjunction with the director, involvement of the Office of Professional Standards on extreme issues of poor performance and/or misconduct. Ms. Waiters was the area coordinator for District 5, which includes Palmetto High School. Bus 537 was assigned to District 5 and ran routes to, among other schools, Palmetto High School. The regular operator of Bus 537 during the 2008-2009 school year was Carol Hindman. Ms. Waiters testified that there had been a lengthy history of student disciplinary problems on Bus 537. On Thursday, February 5, 2009, Ms. Waiters phoned Jose Rodriguez, a substitute bus driver employed by the School Board, and informed him that he would be driving Bus 537 on Monday, February 9, 2009.1 On the morning of Friday, February 6, 2009, Mr. Rodriguez rode Bus 537 with Ms. Hindman driving in order to familiarize himself with the route. Mr. Rodriguez testified that there were no problems on the bus until it reached the stop at 29th Street and 9th Avenue Drive East ("29th and 9th"). The students at this stop were rowdy and disregarded his instructions to put away their cell phones and iPods and to carry their backpacks in front of their bodies. From that stop onward, it became a "party bus," according to Mr. Rodriguez. The students informed Mr. Rodriguez that they run the bus, and that the "racist cracker bitch" Ms. Hindman just drives it. The students claimed to have hurt Ms. Hindman, and threatened to hurt Mr. Rodriguez if he attempted to control their behavior. One student began calling Mr. Rodriguez "Chico." Mr. Rodriguez testified that the situation was even worse on the afternoon route, with noise, screaming, radios playing and general horseplay making the situation dangerous. That night, Mr. Rodriguez phoned Ms. Waiters to tell her the Palmetto High School students on Bus 537 were "off the chain" and he was not sure he could handle the situation. She advised him to drive the bus on Monday and see how it went when he was alone. Ms. Waiters told Mr. Rodriguez to "write referrals" on the students who made trouble and she would back him up in any way necessary. Mr. Palmer explained the disciplinary authority of bus drivers and the related referral process as follows: From the standpoint of what they can do, is obviously they should try to work with the student on the bus, they can counsel them, they can move their seat, they can work with them on the bus. If that's unsuccessful, they then write a referral which is given to the school for processing, describing what the behavior has been that is disruptive or that is [in] violation of the safety rules, and then that's given to the school to take care of... Typically, [upon receipt of the bus driver referral,] the principal will assign the assistant principal or have parent liaisons that will meet with the individual students regarding behavior, talk about what that behavior is, why it's dangerous, and so forth, counsel them the first time, and then go through a series of progressive disciplinary steps which can lead to suspension from the bus and ultimately expulsion if it's not corrected. The referral form indicates the disciplinary action taken by the principal or his designee. (Section 1006.10(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits the principal from delegating to bus drivers the authority to suspend students from riding the bus.) If the student is to be suspended from riding the bus, the student's parent must first be notified. The school bus operator is also notified of the discipline resulting from the referral. Before a suspended student may ride the bus again, he is required to present the pink carbon copy of the referral form to the driver.2 Mr. Rodriguez drove Bus 537 on the morning of Monday, February 9, 2009. He testified that it was "the same routine" on Monday. Mr. Rodriguez said that he did not even attempt to control the students because his efforts to do so the previous Friday had been such a failure. Mr. Rodriguez stated that he was concerned for his and the students' safety at the three railroad crossings the bus had to traverse on the way to Palmetto High School. The proper procedure is to put on the signal flashers when the bus comes within 50 feet of the railroad crossing. Then, when the bus is within 25 feet of the crossing, the driver turns off everything but the motor to achieve as complete a silence as possible, because he must be able not only to see but to hear whether a train is approaching the crossing. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he tried to silence the students at the railroad crossings, telling them it was for their own safety. They laughed and carried on with their screaming and horseplay. After finishing the morning route, Mr. Rodriguez reported to Ms. Waiters, who told him to write referrals on the students for their behavior at the railroad crossings and the general mayhem described by Mr. Rodriguez. Ms. Waiters told Mr. Rodriguez to take a School Board vehicle and drive to Palmetto High School to turn in the referrals. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he went to Palmetto High School and gave the referrals to the assistant principal, Carl Auckerman. Mr. Rodriguez testified that Mr. Auckerman told him he would take care of the matter. Mr. Rodriguez testified that the situation was at least as bad on the Monday afternoon route of Bus 537. Ms. Waiters phoned him at home that evening, and advised him to write more referrals on the misbehaving students. She asked him if he needed someone else on the bus, but Mr. Rodriguez said he could handle the situation. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he wrote referrals on Monday evening. He drove the bus on Tuesday morning, experienced the "party bus" situation again, and then wrote more referrals. He testified that he and Ms. Waiters drove to Palmetto High School with the new referrals. They met with Mr. Auckerman and the SRO, Officer Douglas Marston of the Palmetto Police Department. Mr. Rodriguez testified that Mr. Auckerman told them he was going to issue bus suspensions of eight-to-ten days to all of the students who received referrals. Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Waiters were satisfied with this outcome, and left the office. Ms. Waiters generally supported Mr. Rodriguez' version of the events occurring on Monday, February 9 and Tuesday, February 10. However, Mr. Auckerman, the assistant principal, testified that he did not know Mr. Rodriguez, did not meet with him on February 9 or 10, and received no referrals related to Bus 537 prior to February 11, 2009. Officer Marston testified that he knew nothing of the situation on Bus 537 prior to the morning of Wednesday, February 11. The testimony of Mr. Auckerman and Officer Marston was consistent and credible. The testimony of Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Waiters was inconsistent. Their chronology of events constantly shifted and was unsupported by the documentary evidence, which was consistent with the testimony of Mr. Auckerman and Officer Marston.3 Mr. Rodriguez testified that he alone met with Mr. Auckerman on the morning of Monday, February 9. In a deposition, Ms. Waiters testified that she accompanied Mr. Rodriguez to Palmetto High School on February 9 and was in Mr. Auckerman's office with Mr. Rodriguez. At the hearing, Ms. Waiters testified that her only meeting with Mr. Auckerman on February 9 occurred that afternoon at the Palmetto High School bus loop. During cross-examination, when she was confronted with her contradictory deposition testimony, Ms. Waiters testified: With all the dates, the 9th, the 10th and the 11th, it's very vague, everything. I probably did, probably didn't, but I did go in to see Mr. Auckerman. I don't know if he came to the bus loop on Monday or whether I went, but I did go there two consecutive days with Mr. Rodriguez. The above quote is typical of Ms. Waiters' testimony at the hearing. She would make a definite, affirmative statement as to where and when an event occurred, but when pressed by opposing counsel or contradicted by her own prior statements, she would retreat into vagueness and uncertainty. During her interview with Debra Horne, the OPS investigator, Ms. Waiters stated that referrals were submitted to Mr. Auckerman on Tuesday, February 10 and Wednesday, February 11, then changed her story to state that the referrals were not submitted until Wednesday, February 11 and Thursday, February 12. Both versions contradict her testimony at the hearing that she oversaw Mr. Rodriguez' writing of referrals on Monday, February 9 and Tuesday, February 10. Ms. Waiters attributed her confusion to Ms. Horne's interviewing style.4 Mr. Rodriguez was similarly subject to confusion as to the timing of events. As noted above, he testified that he and Ms. Waiters met with Mr. Auckerman on Tuesday, February 10 and that at this meeting Mr. Auckerman announced that the misbehaving students would be suspended for eight to ten days. During cross-examination, Mr. Rodriguez was presented with the referrals that he claimed to have written on February 10, and was forced to concede that these referrals described events that actually occurred on Wednesday, February 11. He unconvincingly continued to claim that the meeting occurred on February 10, and that there existed other referrals that were actually written on February 9 and 10 that were not part of the documentary evidence. Mr. Rodriguez claimed to have his own copies of these referrals, but was unable to produce them at the hearing. In her interview with Ms. Horne, Ms. Waiters claimed that on the morning of Wednesday, February 11, she was enforcing bus suspensions issued by Mr. Auckerman at their meeting on the previous day. At the hearing, she conceded that she could not remember whether the meeting with Mr. Auckerman occurred on February 10 or 11, and further conceded that no student had been suspended from Bus 537 prior to Wednesday, February 11, 2009. Mr. Rodriguez testified that Bus 537 was worse than ever on the afternoon of Tuesday, February 10, because the students knew they had received referrals and had nothing to lose. He was afraid for his personal safety when crossing railroad tracks. On the phone that evening, Ms. Waiters told Mr. Rodriguez that she would be riding the bus on Wednesday morning. As to the events leading up to Wednesday morning, Ms. Waiters testified that Mr. Rodriguez had difficulty writing his initial referrals on Monday because, as a substitute driver, he did not know the names of the students. Ms. Waiters lives in the area served by Bus 537, and drove many of the same students on her bus when they were in elementary school. She suggested that they "pull the tape" from Monday morning so that she could name the misbehaving students for Mr. Rodriguez. The School Board maintains recording video cameras on its school buses. However, the video camera on Bus 537 was broken and in need of repair. A written repair request submitted by Mr. Rodriguez at 10:13 a.m. on Tuesday, February 10, 2009, stated, "Camera & tape don't work; tape pops out & stays out; no red light indicating camera is on." Nonetheless, Mr. Rodriguez testified that he and Ms. Waiters watched a video recording from Bus 537 on Monday, February 9. Ms. Waiters testified that there was no video tape from February 9 because the tape was "popped out," but that they were able to watch video after the morning route on February 10. She stated that "the tape was working fine, but the audio was totally messed up." No video tape documenting the events of the morning of February 10 on Bus 537 was presented at the hearing. The video camera was repaired and fully functional on the morning of Wednesday, February 11, 2009, and a video recording of the events of that morning on Bus 537 was entered into evidence.5 The undersigned viewed the videotape at the final hearing, and viewed a DVD version of the videotape twice more during the preparation of this Recommended Order. Ms. Hindman, the regular driver, drove Bus 537 on the morning of February 11. Mr. Rodriguez was already on the bus as the video commenced at 6:44 a.m. Mr. Rodriguez thought he was to drive the bus on Wednesday morning, but for some reason Ms. Hindman showed up and drove. Mr. Rodriguez decided to ride the bus because Ms. Hindman had no control over the situation, and he would be free to watch the situation and continue writing referrals on the troublesome students. Ms. Waiters testified that she decided to ride Bus 537 on Wednesday morning because Mr. Palmer had ordered her to "take care" of the situation, which she took as permission to do whatever was needed to bring order to the bus.6 At 6:47 a.m., Ms. Waiters boarded Bus 537 at the corner of 22nd Street and 2nd Avenue, one stop before 29th and 9th. As the bus proceeded, Mr. Rodriguez consulted Ms. Waiters as he attempted to identify some of the troublemaking students. He held a sheaf of papers. Ms. Waiters admonished him not to discuss what they were about to do in front of the students7 already on the bus, and stated her intent to move those students to the back of the bus before the students boarded at 29th and 9th. The bus was scheduled to reach the stop at 29th and 9th at 6:50 a.m. On February 11, 2009, the bus stopped at 29th and 9th at 6:53 a.m. When the bus came to a stop, Ms. Waiters directed the students already on the bus to move to the rear seats. After the bus had been stopped for approximately ten seconds, a student at the 29th and 9th stop, whom Ms. Waiters identified as J.P., knocked on the door. Ms. Waiters moved to the door and out of camera range, but could be heard stating authoritatively, "Get your hands off the window." At the hearing, Ms. Waiters testified that she suspected J.P. was carrying a weapon and that she feared for her safety and that of the students on the bus, but believed that the safest course was to allow him to board the bus rather than confront him about the suspected weapon. This testimony cannot be credited, as Ms. Waiters made no mention of such a suspicion to the Sheriff's deputies who were later dispatched to the bus, to Mr. Auckerman or SRO Marston when they arrived at the bus, or to Ms. Horne during the later investigation. Ms. Waiters' testimony that she did not reveal her suspicions due to fear of reprisals from J.P. or his confederates, based in part on an apparently unrelated and unsolved break-in that occurred at her home five years earlier, is not credited. After admonishing J.P., Ms. Waiters stated, "Everybody that rode yesterday, let's get on the bus, come on." Then, only seconds later, she stated, "Everybody who rode this bus yesterday still thinks they are going to get on the bus. They're not riding anymore." She stood just inside the door and began allowing a few students on the bus one at a time, directing them to their assigned seats. Ms. Waiters could be heard telling one unseen student, "Off the bus, off the bus," while his voice could be heard saying, "But I ride this bus." She began reading out names from a list provided by Mr. Rodriguez. The named students, apparently those who did not make trouble for Mr. Rodriguez the previous day, were allowed to board the bus.8 After these students were boarded and seated, Ms. Waiters directed them to move to the back of the bus. Then, Ms. Waiters began letting the rest of the students from 29th and 9th onto the bus. As they boarded, she said, "Enjoy this ride. This is y'alls last day riding the bus ever." The videotape shows that these students boarded the bus in orderly fashion and were seated without incident. As the students were boarding, Ms. Waiters stated that the bus would not be stopping at 29th and 9th any more. "You're within walking distance, you'll walk," she said to an unseen student. By 6:59 a.m., all of the students had boarded the bus at the 29th and 9th stop. The bus remained stopped. The students talked loudly among themselves, but were otherwise well behaved. Ms. Waiters phoned her dispatcher and told her to request that the Manatee County Sheriff's Office send deputies to the bus stop at 29th and 9th. At approximately 7:02 a.m., a male student attempted to disembark, telling Ms. Waiters that he had phoned his mother and she was coming to pick him up. Ms. Waiters told him to be seated because they had to wait for the Sheriff's deputies to arrive. The student complained, "What Sheriff? Nobody didn't do nothing," but obeyed Ms. Waiters' instruction. While they waited, the students in the front of the bus could be heard laughing and joking about what various parents or step-parents might do when they came to the bus, such as breaking the windows or tearing off the door.9 At approximately 7:06 a.m., Ms. Waiters spoke to some unseen parents through the closed door of the bus, saying, "Wait a minute. We'll release them in a second." A few seconds later, she addressed the students: "We'll either be releasing you to your parents or the Sheriff. So if you have a cell phone, you want to call your parents. You can go ahead and call them." At this point, no Sheriff's deputy had arrived at the scene. The evidence established that the first deputy to arrive, Deputy Kenneth Warner, was not even dispatched until 7:07 a.m. This fact is significant because during her interview, Ms. Waiters told Ms. Horne that law enforcement had directed her to tell the student to call their parents. At the hearing, Ms. Waiters testified that a Sheriff's deputy told her to have the kids call their parents, and that she was just repeating what the deputy told her. Ms. Waiters' testimony on this point is clearly not true. At approximately 7:07 a.m., Ms. Waiters stated to the students, "We're waiting to release you to the Sheriff or your parents." At this point, the students were still in high spirits, talking loudly to each other but not noticeably upset. At approximately 7:08 a.m., a call was made to the Sheriff's Office by a parent. The caller informed the dispatcher that her son had used his cell phone to call her from Bus 537. Her son told her that the students were locked on the bus and the driver refused to speak to parents who had arrived at the bus stop in response to their children's calls. Deputy Warner arrived at 29th and 9th at 7:10 a.m. His view of the situation, which is entirely supported by the videotape, was as follows: [The students] were all sitting in their seats, no one was up, but they were vocal, they were expressing their concerns about comments and stuff like that Ms. Waiters was stating... She was kind of instigating an issue. She was walking up and down, and making comments. Like if they made a comment to her, she would reply with a comment which would fire them up, and then they would all have comments back and forth... [The four or five parents who arrived] just didn't know what was going on, as me, I didn't know what was going on, either. They were wondering why they were getting calls from their children. So, I don't know. They were upset. Deputy Warner credibly denied that he gave any directives to Ms. Waiters, or indeed had much idea why he had been summoned to the scene: "It was my impression when I arrived that she just needed me there as support, and that she was handling the situation." The videotape shows Ms. Waiters meeting Deputy Warner at the door of the bus, and stating that this was a situation similar to the "one we had a couple of weeks ago that I took care of."10 She told the deputy that certain students on the bus must either be taken to the juvenile detention center ("JDC") or be released to their parents, because there have been "a lot of problems" on the bus. Ms. Waiters offered Deputy Warner no further details as to why the students could not ride the bus to school. Because he was confused by the situation, Deputy Warner radioed dispatch and requested that SRO Marston respond to his call. At 7:12 a.m., Ms. Waiters announced to the students, "You need to call your parents because you will not be riding the bus. The ones that have parents at work, you'll need to get your aunts or something, because you will not ride the bus." Ms. Waiters began releasing students whose parents were waiting outside the bus. At 7:20 a.m. and at 7:22 a.m., Ms. Waiters again told the remaining students that they needed to call their parents for a ride to school. Deputy Daniel Whidden was dispatched by the Sheriff's Office and arrived at the scene after Deputy Warner. Deputy Whidden, who was also a football coach at Palmetto High School and knew several students on the bus, testified that he gave Ms. Waiters no direction on how to handle the situation. Ms. Waiters told him that there had been problems on the bus the day before, and she was calling parents and having them pick up their children. At 7:23 a.m., Deputy Whidden boarded the bus and explained to the students that they were not allowed to disembark because the School Board was responsible for their safety. He told the students that SRO Marston was on his way to the bus stop to assist in transporting to school those students who were not allowed to ride the bus. Deputy Whidden testified that when he boarded the bus, the students were all in their seats. Some were protesting that they had done nothing wrong, but no one needed to be calmed down. This testimony is consistent with the evidence of the videotape. At 7:26 a.m., Ms. Waiters told Deputy Whidden that the students in the rear would be transported to school on the bus. As to the others, she stated, "I told them yesterday at the school they might as well find transportation in the morning. Well, they came here, and we can't leave them standing out at the bus stop." In conversation with Deputy Whidden, a female student confirmed that some of the students had been told they would not be allowed on the bus for the rest of the year.11 Officer Marston and Mr. Auckerman arrived at the bus stop at 7:31 a.m. When they arrived, most of the students had already disembarked. At no time did Mr. Auckerman tell Ms. Waiters that the students on the bus should call their parents or be transported by Sheriff's deputies. Ms. Waiters' testimony to the contrary is not credited. Mr. Auckerman, Officer Marston, and Deputy Whidden drove students to Palmetto High School. The bus began to run again at 7:37 a.m., 44 minutes after it stopped at 29th and 9th. The bus made only one more stop before arriving at Palmetto High School. This stop occurred at 7:43 a.m. Two students boarded the bus. Bus 537 is scheduled to make five stops after 29th and 9th. Because of the delay, Ms. Waiters called the driver of Bus 534 to cover some of Bus 537's stops. However, not all of Bus 537's stops were covered, and Bus 534 was 15 to 20 minutes late picking up some of the students. Further, Bus 537 was scheduled to make an elementary school run after it dropped off students at Palmetto High School. The bus made only one of its nine scheduled stops for elementary school students because the parents of most of those students had given up on the bus and either driven their children to school or had the children walk.12 During the 2008-2009 school year, classes began at Palmetto High School at 7:45 a.m. Bus 537 typically arrived at Palmetto High School at 7:20 a.m. On Wednesday, February 11, 2009, Bus 537 arrived at Palmetto High School at 7:57 a.m., twelve minutes after the final bell. After the bus arrived at Palmetto High School, Ms. Waiters and Mr. Rodriguez went into the school and spoke to Mr. Auckerman. They presented him with the list of names that they had used to identify the misbehaving students on Bus 537. Mr. Auckerman told them that he would need referrals before he could take any disciplinary action against the students. Ms. Waiters and Mr. Rodriguez submitted some referrals on Wednesday, February 11, then submitted additional referrals on Thursday, February 12. The referrals described student misbehavior, such as failing to be silent at railroad crossings and using cell phones, but gave no indication that either Ms. Waiters or Mr. Rodriguez ever feared for their safety on Bus 537. Mr. Rodriguez testified that the only time he feared for his physical safety was when he had to drive the noisy bus over railroad crossings. He did not fear any sort of physical assault by the students on the bus.13 Mr. Auckerman passed on the referrals to Palmetto High School's parent liaisons, Robert Kelly and Kevin Jackson. "Parent liaisons" are School Board employees responsible for general disciplinary referrals and communicating with parents regarding student behavior and discipline. The principal of Palmetto High School has delegated the authority to issue bus suspensions to the parent liaisons. On Friday, February 13, Mr. Kelly interviewed some of the students. He decided that the referred students would be suspended from riding the bus, commencing Tuesday, February 17. However, as Mr. Kelly and Mr. Jackson were about to finalize the suspensions by entering the referrals into the computer system, Mr. Auckerman halted the suspension process pending a School Board investigation into the events of the morning of February 11. Mr. Auckerman was reacting to parent complaints about Ms. Waiters' actions on Bus 537. Mr. Palmer, the director of transportation, also began receiving complaints. Mr. Palmer spoke with Ms. Waiters, safety officer John Searles, and school personnel, and was unsettled by the inconsistency of their stories. On or about February 18, 2009, Mr. Palmer referred the matter to the OPS. Ms. Horne then began her investigation of the incident. At the conclusion of her investigation, Ms. Horne presented a written OPS investigatory report to her supervisor and scheduled a meeting of all persons in Ms. Waiters' chain of command, up to Mr. Palmer, the transportation director. At a meeting on March 19, 2009, the School Board personnel met and recommended to the Superintendent that Ms. Waiters' employment with the School Board be terminated. The Superintendent concurred with the recommendation. Aside from contending that she was merely carrying out suspensions issued by Mr. Auckerman, which was completely at odds with the credible evidence produced at the hearing, Ms. Waiters' chief defense was that her actions on February 11, 2009, were consistent with the action she took in an incident that occurred on Wednesday, January 28, 2009, for which the bus driver received a laudatory write-up in the local newspaper and the praise of law enforcement and school officials. In the earlier incident, a substitute driver on a morning route to Lakewood Ranch High School pulled the bus over on State Road 64 and refused to continue because she believed the students' actions were placing her and the students in danger. In particular, the students were rocking the bus back and forth to the point that the driver feared losing control. Ms. Waiters drove out to the scene, followed shortly by at least six Sheriff's deputies. Ms. Waiters described the students as "out of control," "hanging out of the windows, yelling and cursing, throwing stuff out of the windows, rocking the bus." Ms. Waiters boarded the bus and was able to calm some of the students. The Sheriff's deputies called the parents of the troublemaking students and gave them the choice of picking up their children or having them taken to the JDC. According to Ms. Waiters, some students actually fought with their parents and had to be forcibly taken to the juvenile detention center. The next day, the local newspaper ran an article containing praise for the substitute bus driver. The principal of Lakewood Ranch High School and a spokesman for the Sheriff's Office were both quoted saying that she "did the right thing." Though Ms. Waiters was not mentioned in the article, it is clear from her testimony that she believed the praise was reflected on her. The differences between the incidents of January 28 and February 11, 2009, are clear. In the earlier incident, law enforcement was summoned to deal with an immediate, on-going dangerous situation. Sheriff's deputies took charge of the matter, with some assistance from Ms. Waiters, and concluded that the bus driver had done the right thing in stopping the bus when it became too hazardous to continue. In the February 11 incident, the videotape makes plain there was no danger whatever. Once allowed to board the bus, the students took their seats and talked among themselves. There were no threats, no disturbances, no rocking of the bus. Ms. Waiters' claim that she felt threatened was unsupported and not credible. The students, with good reason, appeared mostly puzzled as to what was happening. From the incident of January 28, 2009, Ms. Waiters apparently took the lesson that she was authorized to stop the scheduled running of a school bus for nearly an hour and to call out Sheriff's deputies to assist her in disciplining students for misbehavior that occurred on previous days. This was the wrong lesson. Ms. Waiters acknowledged that she did not have authority to suspend students from the bus, and claimed that she was not "suspending" the students; rather, she was restoring "order and control" on the bus for the students' safety.14 Ms. Waiters' actions might have been partially justified had there been some imminent danger such as that on the Lakewood Ranch High School bus on January 28, 2009, though even in that situation it was Sheriff's deputies, not Ms. Waiters, who removed the problem students from the bus. On Bus 537 on February 11, 2009, in the absence of any immediate threat or even untoward behavior by the students, Ms. Waiters took it upon herself to halt the bus and require students to phone their parents for rides to school well before law enforcement arrived on the scene. Ms. Waiters' actions were disproportionate to the situation on the bus, and constituted "suspensions" of the students under any reasonable understanding of that term. Ms. Waiters' actions on the morning of February 11, 2009, might merit discipline short of termination had Ms. Waiters fully and honestly cooperated in the subsequent investigation. However, Ms. Waiters stubbornly told a convoluted and contradictory version of events that made little sense on its face and was at direct odds with the consistent and credible testimony of School Board personnel and law enforcement officers who were present during the relevant events, and at odds with the direct evidence of the videotape from Bus 537. Ms. Waiters lack of candor throughout the process, coupled with the extremely poor judgment she employed in stopping the bus and suspending students without immediate cause or authority, fully justifies the School Board's decision to terminate her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, the Manatee County School Board, enter a final order that terminates the employment of Respondent, Stephanie Waiters. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should terminate Respondent's employment with the Lee County School District for just cause.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the acting superintendent of schools for the Lee County School District. References to "Petitioner" shall include Petitioner's predecessors and the Lee County School Board. Petitioner originally hired Respondent as a school bus driver in September 1974. Respondent worked in this capacity for Petitioner for the ensuing 23 years, except for the 1988-89 school year. During the time in question, Respondent worked under an annual contract ending June 30, 1997. During the one-year period ending June 30, 1997, Petitioner entered into a contract with Child Care of Southwest Florida, Inc. (Child Care) for the use of school property, including school buses. The purpose of the contract is to establish a program under which Child Care transports and supervises schoolchildren in after-school and summertime daycare programs. Under the contract, Petitioner provides Respondent with school buses and bus drivers. The contract prohibits the operation of the buses by anyone other than drivers "assigned by [Petitioner]." The contract provides that Petitioner shall charge Child Care for the actual costs of operating the buses, the "drivers' hourly salary," and an additional mileage fee. The contract imposes on Child Care the responsibility of carrying motor vehicle liability insurance for Child Care and Petitioner. The contract requires that Child Care "observe all rules and regulations promulgated by the School Board for its operation of school buses." Petitioner's rules prohibit bus drivers from carrying firearms while on Petitioner's property. The employment contract between the parties also requires Respondent to abide by all state and local laws and rules. Petitioner assigned Respondent as one of the bus drivers under the Child Care contract for the Christmas break in December 1996. On the morning of December 30, 1996, Respondent carried a loaded .22-caliber pistol onto one of Petitioner's school buses. The pistol was in Respondent's jacket, which he placed beside the driver's seat. Respondent then drove his normal route, picking up children and transporting them to Petitioner's public school that, under the contract, Child Care was operating while school was not in session. After finishing his morning route, Respondent left the bus at the public school with the loaded pistol still inside the jacket beside the driver's seat. Late in the afternoon of the same day, Respondent reboarded the bus, allowed the schoolchildren to reenter the bus, and drove his normal route. The loaded pistol remained in the jacket on the bus throughout the afternoon route. Although not charged with the personal use of Petitioner's property, Respondent did not return the school bus after he completed his afternoon route. Instead, he transported his own children to the residence of his estranged wife where Respondent threatened the woman with the pistol. After threatening the woman, Respondent drove the school bus, while still armed with the loaded pistol, to Petitioner's bus lot, where Respondent parked the bus and was apprehended by police, who found the loaded pistol beside the driver's seat, but no longer in a jacket. Respondent knew throughout the day of December 30, 1996, that he was in possession of a loaded firearm while operating Petitioner's school bus.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Lee County School Board enter a final order terminating the employment contract of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of June, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: John M. Hament Kevin J. Hubbart Kunkel Miller and Hament 1800 Second Street, Suite 970 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Harry A. Blair Harry A. Blair, P.A. 2138-40 Hoople Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Jack Taylor, Acting Superintendent Lee County Public Schools 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3988
