The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 550.235(1), 550.235(2), and 550.25415(8), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dr. Michael J. Carinda (Dr. Carinda), is a veterinarian licensed in the State of Florida. He holds pari- mutuel wagering occupational license number 0906873 1081 97, first issued by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division), in 1989. Petitioner is the agency responsible for the regulation of the horse racing industry in Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Carinda was an employee of Plante & Associates and performed his duties under the direction of Dr. Paul R. Plante, a veterinarian. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Carinda worked as a veterinarian at the Pompano Park Harness Track (Pompano Track) in Pompano Beach, Florida, as an employee of Plante & Associates. James Gabriel is and has been a detective with the Fort Lauderdale Police Department for 17 years. During 1993, Detective Gabriel worked undercover at the Pompano Track in an investigation of race fixing allegations at the Pompano Track. While undercover, Detective Gabriel posed as a convicted felon who was the owner in fact of the horse named Yankeeroughneck. A convicted felon is not allowed to register a horse in his name; therefore, Yankeeroughneck was registered under the name of Herman Berger, who was licensed by Petitioner. Mr. Berger, one of the targets of the undercover investigation, did not know that Gabriel was an undercover detective. Gabriel's undercover investigation lasted approximately one year and was electronically monitored so that conversations in which Gabriel was a part were taped recorded without the knowledge of the other participants in the conversations. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Yankeeroughneck was a standard bred horse, racing at the Pompano Track. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Dr. Plante held an occupational license issued by Petitioner and provided veterinary care to horses racing at the Pompano Track. On the morning of May 24, 1993, Detective Gabriel engaged in the following conversation with Dr. Plante and Herman Berger. Plante: If the horse the ah, had he been milkshaked before did he race well when he was milkshaked? Not every horse races well when they get bagged. (Unintelligible) Berger: He came, he raced but not the way he supposed to. Plante: I'll speak with Charlie tomorrow morning. Well, the only thing to do is to try it one start. Berger: Yes. Plante: Not that expensive to do. Berger: Exactly. Plante: If the horse improves. Berger: Alright. Gabriel: How long does it take before we do something like that for (Unintelligible.) Plante: Two and a half hours before the race. * * * Plante: Ok, the same thing that we used to, when used to pass the tube, you know, but now we can't pass the tube. What we're doing is giving it orally. Mix the stuff up put it in their dose syringes. Put it on the back of their tongue a hundred and eighty c.c. and (Unintelligible) even in the states where they have the black box, it won't test positive, pass the stomach tube and dump that whole big load in him show on the box. Dr. Plante, Herman Berger, and Detective Gabriel agreed to milkshake Yankeeroughneck before the horse's next race for the purpose of enhancing the horse's performance. On the morning of May 27, 1993, Dr. Plante advised Dr. Carinda that Dr. Carinda was to deliver an ionic boost to Yankeeroughneck's groom that afternoon. The ionic boost, which is also called a milkshake, consisted of approximately eight ounces of baking soda, and two to three ounces of confectioner's sugar mixed with water to the consistency of paste. Dr. Plante told Dr. Carinda that he had given instructions to the groom on May 24, 1993, on how to administer the milkshake. Yankeeroughneck was scheduled to and did race at the Pompano Track on May 27, 1993. Dr. Carinda testified that approximately two and one half hours before Yankeeroughneck was scheduled to race on May 27, 1993, he delivered a milkshake to Yankeeroughneck's groom for the purpose of having the groom administer the milkshake to Yankeeroughneck on the same day. The mixture was delivered in a ziplock bag. Detective Gabriel, Herman Berger, and Michael Metcalf, the groom, were present at the racetrack at the time Dr. Carinda delivered the milkshake. Dr. Carinda told them to administer the milkshake as close as possible to the time that horse was placed in confinement. Once a horse is placed in confinement prior to a race, nothing can be administered to the horse. When Dr. Carinda arrived at the track, Detective Gabriel, Herman Berger, and Michael Metcalf had a dose syringe ready for the milkshake. Dr. Carinda testified that he did not consider the mixture of baking soda, sugar, and water to be a drug because it was not administered intravenously. He also testified that the purpose of administering the milkshake was to alleviate the pain and fatigue associated with a horse "tying up." Tying up refers to the pain and injury caused by tearing muscles due to exertion. By relieving the pain that would be caused by tying up, the milkshake would enhance the horse's performance. After delivering the milkshake and prior to leaving the track on May 27, 1993, Dr. Carinda engaged in the following conversation with Detective Gabriel: Carinda: (Unintelligible) now boys. Gabriel: Okay. Carinda: The rest is up to you. Gabriel: I certainly appreciate it Mikey. Carinda: Now if you come home as fast as you can leave. Gabriel: You know the horse, you know the horse. About a minute after Dr. Carinda left, Michael Metcalf used a dosing syringe to force the mixture that Carinda had delivered down the throat of Yankeeroughneck. After Mr. Metcalf administered the milkshake to Yankeeroughneck, Detective Gabriel retrieved the ziplock bag and transferred it to Detective Piroth. The bag contained the residue of the milkshake. On June 10, 1993, Dr. Carinda delivered a milkshake, containing sodium bicarbonate, confectioner's sugar, and water to Yankeeroughneck's groom. After Dr. Carinda left, Charles Giamanco and Michael Metcalf used a dosing syringe to force the milkshake down Yankeeroughneck's throat. Detective Gabriel retrieved the ziplock bag with the residue of the milkshake and transferred it to Detective Reubottom. Approximately two and one-half hours after the milkshake was administered on June 10, 1993, Yankeeroughneck raced at the Pompano Track. Dr. Carinda admitted that during the 1993 season he had participated in milkshaking race horses at the Pompano Track on at least 150 occasions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered, finding that Dr. Michael Carinda violated Section 550.235(2), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Counts II and VII of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, suspending his occupational license for a period of two years, assessing an administrative fine of $2,000, and dismissing Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, and X of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Madeline McGuckin Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 James G. Brown, Jr., Esquire Law Offices of Brown & Brown 2700 West Atlantic Boulevard Suite 215 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent violated sections 550.105(4) and (7), Florida Statutes (2016),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-2.005, as applicable, by engaging in the following conduct, as alleged in the First Amended Administrative Complaint: (1) assisting an unlicensed person in working in a restricted area at a licensed pari-mutuel wagering facility, in violation of section 550.105(4) and rule 61D-2.005; and (2) accumulating unpaid obligations directly related to the sport of pari-mutuel racing, in violation of section 550.105(7); and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Licensure Status Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering in the state of Florida pursuant to chapter 550. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was the holder of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Individual Occupational License No. 2005775-1021, which authorizes him to own and train racing horses in this state pursuant to chapter 550. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent trained and raced horses at Gulfstream Park ("Gulfstream"), a facility operated by a permitholder authorized to conduct pari- mutuel wagering in this state pursuant to chapter 550. The Administrative Complaint At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was subject to chapter 550 and applicable rules codified in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61D-2. On or about March 29, 2017, Petitioner served its Administrative Complaint on Respondent, charging him with two counts of violating statutes and rules governing pari-mutuel racing. Count I of the Administrative Complaint charges Respondent with "conspiring with, soliciting, aiding, abetting, counseling, hiring, or procuring" Salvador Domingo Ramos to work in a restricted area of Gulfstream on or about July 25, 2016. If proved, this conduct would violate section 550.105(4), which makes it unlawful to take part in any way at any pari-mutuel facility without first having secured an occupational license and paid the occupational license fee; and also would violate rule 61D-2.005, which, among other things, prohibits a licensee from conspiring with, aiding, abetting, counseling, hiring, or procuring any other person or persons to engage in a violation of chapter 550. Count II of the Administrative Complaint charges Respondent with "accumulating unpaid obligations that directly relate to the sport of racing at a pari-mutuel facility in Florida." If proved, this conduct would violate section 550.105(7), which, among other things, makes a sanctionable offense the accumulation of unpaid obligations that directly relate to the sport of racing being conducted at a pari- mutuel facility in this state. The Evidence Adduced at Hearing Count I On July 25, 2016, Julio Minaya, an investigative supervisor employed by Petitioner, engaged in an inspection of the "backside" of Gulfstream. Specifically, Minaya and the investigative team he supervised inspected barn nos. 21, 22, and 23 at Gulfstream. The "backside" is a secured area at a pari-mutuel facility that contains the barns and stables, where the racing horses are housed, and the race tracks. Only persons who hold occupational licenses or who are otherwise authorized are allowed to enter and engage in activities in the backside, and security officers are hired to guard the backside and ensure that unauthorized persons do not enter this area. As part of the inspection on July 25, 2016, Minaya requested each person encountered in barn nos. 21, 22, and 23 to provide his or her occupational license for inspection, in order to ensure that the person was licensed and that the license was valid. During the July 25, 2016, inspection of the backside at Gulfstream, a member of the Minaya's investigative team encountered a person in a storage room within barn no. 23. The man, who ultimately identified himself as Salvadore Domingo Ramos, told Minaya that he did not have his license with him. At that point, Minaya informed Ramos that he would have to leave the backside. As Minaya escorted him out of the backside, Ramos told Minaya that he worked for Respondent, that he did not have "any papers," and that he was just trying to work. Minaya interpreted Ramos's comments to mean that he (Ramos) was an undocumented immigrant, so would not have a valid occupational license. Minaya then contacted Respondent, who told him that Ramos had been working for him, exercising his horses, for approximately a month and a half. Respondent told Minaya that he did not know that Ramos was unlicensed, but that had seen Ramos exercising other trainers' horses, so assumed Ramos was licensed. At the final hearing, Respondent testified that Ramos had worked for him, for compensation, as an exerciser for the horses Respondent trained. Respondent further testified that he knew that unlicensed persons could not be hired to work in any capacity in the backside, and he acknowledged that he did not ask Ramos for his license before he hired him to exercise his horses. However, he noted that persons who go into the backside must pass through a security check at which they must show their license to gain entry. Because Respondent had seen Ramos on numerous occasions in the backside exercising other trainers' horses, he assumed that Ramos was licensed. The evidence, consisting of testimony by Petitioner's licensing administrator and supporting documentation from Petitioner's licensing computer database, confirmed that Ramos did not hold an occupational license on July 25, 2016, and had never held such a license. Count II Finish Line Feed, Inc. ("Finish Line"), is a business that sells animal food products. Ninety percent of its business is selling equestrian hand grain in Florida to race track facilities and to individuals who train and race horses at race tracks in Florida that hold pari-mutuel events. Doreen DeFonzono, office manager at Finish Line, is responsible for keeping records of all sales transactions for Finish Line. DeFonzono testified, and provided copies of customer account statements showing, that Respondent was a customer of Finish Line and that he purchased equestrian food products from Finish Line over a period of time. DeFonzono testified, credibly, that the food Respondent purchased was delivered to him at a pari-mutuel facility in Florida. The evidence shows that Respondent often was arrears in paying his account balance with Finish Line, but that he periodically would pay part of the outstanding balance. The customer account statements show on November 30, 2015, Respondent paid $500.00 toward his outstanding account balance. After this payment, Respondent's outstanding balance was $12,915.91. Thereafter, Respondent did not make any further payments toward his customer account balance. Finance charges on the outstanding balance accrued monthly, so that by July 31, 2016, Respondent's outstanding account balance was $13,986.06. Thereafter, Finish Line filed suit against Respondent to recover the amount Respondent owed. The court entered a Default and Final Judgment by Default ("Default Judgment") against Respondent in Case No. COCE-16-019754DIV 54, ordering Respondent to pay a total of $15,458.14 to Finish Line for the outstanding principal balance of $13,986.06, plus filing, process service, and attorney fees. The Default Judgment was recorded in the Broward County public records on December 14, 2016. DeFonzono credibly testified that to date, Respondent still owes Finish Line the amount of the Default Judgment, plus accrued interest, and that Finish Line and Respondent have not discussed or entered into any repayment agreements regarding the amount Respondent owes Finish Line. Respondent does not dispute that he did not fully pay off his balance with Finish Line or that a Default Judgment was entered against him. He testified that he had been a customer of Finish Line from 2004 to 2015. His credible testimony, supported by the customer account statements, showed that he made periodic payments in an effort to reduce his outstanding balance. He testified, credibly, that he fell on bad financial times, and that a number of unfortunate events and circumstances——including having an accident, breaking his hip, losing his driver's license, becoming unemployed, and being unable to pay workers' compensation insurance for any employees he may hire——rendered him unable to revive his horse training and racing business, so that he was, and remains, unable to pay the amount he owes Finish Line. Respondent currently is unemployed and does not train or race horses at Gulfstream or any other pari-mutuel facility. Findings Regarding Alleged Violations Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent hired an unlicensed person to work for him in a restricted area of Gulfstream on or about July 25, 2016. This conduct violates section 550.105(4), which makes it unlawful to take part in any way at any pari- mutuel facility without first having secured an occupational license and paid the occupational license fee. This conduct also violates rule 61D-2.005, which, among other things, prohibits a licensee from hiring any other person to engage in a violation of chapter 550. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent accumulated unpaid obligations that directly relate to the sport of racing at a pari-mutuel facility in Florida. This conduct violates section 550.105(7), which, among other things, makes a sanctionable offense the accumulation of unpaid obligations that directly relate to the sport of racing being conducted at a pari- mutuel facility in this state. Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstances There was no evidence presented showing that Respondent previously violated any laws or rules regarding pari-mutuel wagering or pari-mutuel wagering facilities in Florida. Additionally, the evidence shows that Respondent did not knowingly or willfully hire an unlicensed person. As Respondent persuasively testified, he had seen Ramos on the premises in the backside of Gulfstream working for other trainers, so assumed that he was licensed. Respondent did not know Ramos was unlicensed when he hired him. The evidence further shows that due, at least in part, to a series of significant, unfortunate events and setbacks, Respondent is unemployed, so is not in a financial position to purchase the insurance necessary for him to be able to restart his horse training business. These hardships have rendered Respondent unable to pay Finish Line the balance owed pursuant to the Default Judgment. The evidence does not show that Respondent is, or has been, financially able to pay Finish Line the balance he owes but has simply chosen not to do so.2/ The evidence also does not show that Respondent bought products from Finish Line, intending not to pay for them or knowing that he was not going to pay for them.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order finding and concluding that Respondent violated sections 550.105(4) and 550.105(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-2.005; imposing a fine of $100.00 to be paid over a period of six months of the date of the final order; and suspending Respondent's occupational license until such time as either: (1) Respondent has repaid his debt to Finish Line in full, or (2) Respondent has entered into an agreement with Finish Line to repay his debt and he has been in compliance with that agreement for a period of six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioners are entitled to exceed the twenty percent cap on simulcasts.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating pari-mutuel facilities within the State of Florida. The Department also regulates, pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, simulcast broadcasts of pari-mutuel events which are imported into the state at pari-mutuel facilities located within Florida. Such broadcasts are permissible and are subject to statutory taxes depending on the type of event and the applicable percentages of tax on the wagers received. Such amounts may vary depending on facility and type of event. Thoroughbred racing permit holders may simulcast thoroughbred races conducted at out-of-state thoroughbred tracks. Similarly, a harness racing facility may simulcast harness races conducted at out-of-state harness tracks. Theoretically, greyhound clubs may simulcast greyhound races conducted out-of- state and jai alai may simulcast jai alai matches from out-of-state. In each instance, the Florida pari-mutuel permit holder may send the simulcast signal to any pari-mutuel permit holder within the state. Historically, the number of the races which could be imported from out- of-state to be broadcast at a Florida permit holder location was capped at twenty percent. A permit holder could exceed this limitation with approval from the Department when it was in the best interests of racing and would promote live racing and purse distribution. Petitioner, Calder Race Course, Inc. (Calder), is a thoroughbred racing pari-mutuel permit holder fully authorized by the Department to conduct live races during its racing meet. Its racing facility is located in Miami, Florida. In June, 1995, Calder first requested permission to conduct full card simulcasting pursuant to Section 550.3551(6), Florida Statutes. That request, covering racing dates remaining for the 1995-1996 racing season, was denied. Moreover, Calder's request for an administrative hearing to challenge the denial was also denied. Calder's successful appeal to the district court of appeal ultimately resulted in this matter, DOAH case no. 95-6180, being referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. In December, 1995, Calder again filed an application to exceed the twenty percent full card simulcast limitation for its 1996-1997 racing season. Again, the Department denied the request. Having the benefit of the appellate decision, the Department referred the matter, DOAH case no. 96-1348, to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. Petitioner, Tampa Bay Downs, Inc. (TBD), is a thoroughbred racing pari-mutuel permit holder fully authorized to conduct live races during its racing season. Its racing facility is located in Oldsmar, Florida. In September, 1995 and January, 1996, TBD applied for full card simulcasting for its racing meet. Consistent with its response to Calder's request, the Department denied the TBD applications and referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings, DOAH case nos. 96-0025 and 96-1351. Petitioner, Tropical Park, Inc. (Tropical), is a thoroughbred racing pari-mutuel permit holder that is fully authorized to conduct live races during its racing season. It shares the Calder facility in Miami but has a different racing meet. Like Calder, Tropical filed for full card simulcasting for its 1996- 1997 racing meet and was denied by the Department. Its petition for formal proceedings has been designated DOAH case no. 96-1349. Petitioner, Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc. (Gulfstream) is a thoroughbred racing pari-mutuel permit holder fully authorized to conduct live races during its racing season. Gulfstream is located in Hallandale, Florida. On or about January 3, 1996, Gulfstream filed an application with the Department for authorization to exceed the twenty percent limitation on simulcasts. This application was for the 1996-1997 racing season with a race meet running from January 3, 1997 through March 16, 1997. The Department denied Gulfstream's application. Such denial, DOAH case no. 96-1350, was timely opposed by Gulfstream. Petitioner, PPI, Inc., d/b/a Pompano Park Racing (Pompano), is a harness racing pari-mutuel permit holder that is fully authorized to conduct live harness races during its racing season. Pompano is located in Pompano Beach, Florida. On or about December 20, 1995, Pompano filed an application with the Department for authorization to exceed the twenty percent limitation on simulcasts. This application was for Pompano's 1996-1997 racing season. The Department denied Pompano's application. Such denial, DOAH case no. 96-1392, was timely opposed by Pompano. Petitioner, the Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' Association, d/b/a the Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' and Owners' Association (Breeders), is a nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business located in Ocala, Florida. This Petitioner represents Florida owners and breeders of thoroughbred race horses. The Breeders maintain that denying simulcasting in excess of the twenty percent limitation adversely impacts the amounts which must be paid as the breeder's percentage of the wagers made at pari-mutuel facilities. Thus, Florida breeders lose income which simulcasting in excess of the cap would contribute to breeders' awards. The Intervenors are greyhound pari-mutuel permit holders who opposed full card simulcasting in excess of the statutory twenty percent limitation. Such Intervenors did not oppose the importation of the broadcast signals to a specific pari-mutuel location, but opposed its unbridled rebroadcast to pari- mutuel facilities within the state as allowed by law. Before the hearing in this cause was completed and on the last day of the 1996 regular session, the Legislature enacted CS/HB 337. Such bill became law without the Governor's signature and went into effect on July 1, 1996. The new law made numerous amendments to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. Among the changes was the removal of the twenty percent limitation on simulcast wagering for pari-mutuel permit holders. On May 16, 1996, the Department issued a letter to all pari-mutuel wagering permit holders that provided, in pertinent part: In light of this omnibus legislation which addressed the concerns of the entire pari- mutuel industry including the issues surrounding full-card simulcasting, the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division) believes it is in the best interest of Florida racing to immediately allow full- card simulcast wagering until June 30, 1996 pursuant to the Division's discretion set forth in subsection six of Section 550.3551, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, any pari-mutuel wagering permitholder whose annual license currently authorizes them to conduct live performances at any time during the period of May 17, 1996 through June 30, 1996 may receive broadcasts of like-kind events conducted at facilities outside this State at the race- track, dog track, or jai-alai enclosure of the licensee during any live performance authorized by the permitholder's annual license. On June 30, 1996 the privilege granted by this letter terminates; thereby, ending any authorization to exceed the twenty-percent limitation on simulcast wagering for all permitholders within the State. Full-card simulcast wagering authorized and regulated pursuant to the provisions in the Committee Substitute for House Bill 337 becomes effective on July 1, 1996. Thereafter, the Department filed a motion to dismiss Petitioners' requests for formal administrative hearing due to mootness. The Intervenors have supported the Department's motion to dismiss. The Petitioners, with the exception of Gulfstream which wanted the hearing and the administrative process to be completed, filed a motion to abate so that the 1996-1997 racing season may be completed before a determination is made as to the mootness of the issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order approving all full card simulcasting applications for which days remain in the Petitioner's racing meet. All other applications are deemed moot as the racing meets have expired. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Alexander H. Twedt, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Harry R. Detwiler, Jr., Esquire John M. Alford, Esquire ALFORD & DETWILER 1106-6 A Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Wilbur E. Brewton, Esquire Lee M. Killinger, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. 225 South Adams Street, Suite 250 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (Attorneys for Calder Race Course, Inc. and Tropical Park, Inc.) Howell L. Ferguson, Esquire Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire LANDERS & PARSONS Post Office Box 271 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (Attorneys for Tampa Bay Downs, Inc.) Gary R. Rutledge, Esquire Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (Attorneys for the Intervenors) David S. Romanik, Esquire ROMANIK, LAVIN, HUSS & PAOLI 1901 Harrison Street Hollywood, Florida 33020 (Attorneys for Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc.) Warren H. Husband, Esquire Messer, Caparello, Madsen, Goldman & Metz, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 (Attorneys for Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' Association) Alan B. Koslow, Esquire David H. Reimer, Esquire BECKER & POLIAKOFF, P.A. Post Office Box 9057 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33310-9057 (Attorneys for PPI, Inc.) Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Royal H. Logan Acting Director Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The Petitioner has accused the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, with a violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which reads: a) The running of a horse in a race with any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic is prohibited. If the stewards shall find that any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic has been administered or attempted to be administered, internally or externally, to a horse before a race, such stewards shall impose such punishment and take such other action as they may deem proper under any of the rules, including reference to the Division, against every person found by them to have administered, or to have attempted to administer, or to have caused to be administered, or to have caused an attempt to to administer, or to have conspired with another person to administer, such narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic. If the Division laboratory shall find a positive identification of any such medi- cation, such finding shall constitute prima facie evidence that such horse raced with the medication in its system. Under the accusation, the Respondent is made responsible pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, which indicates that "The trainer shall he responsible for, and be the insurer of the conditions of the horses he enters. Trainers are presumed to know the rules of the Division." Specifically, Respondent Joyce is accused under facts that allege that on October 16, 1978, the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, trained by the Respondent did race in the Second (2nd) race at Calder race course, finishing in the first (1st) position. Subsequent to the race on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, and assigned sample number S 08484 A, and that specimen was allegedly analyzed by the Petitioner's laboratory. It is further alleged that on December 22, 1978, the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering laboratory reported the results of a test and that report showed that the urine sample contained Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic compound.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon a Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) filed by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, against Francis Clifford Joyce. At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, Francis Clifford Joyce was the holder of license Nos. K-4547, K-4201 and K-2575 issued by the Petitioner to the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, to operate as a horse trainer for horses racing at the various race tracks located in the State of Florida. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty of the regulation of among other things, the matters pertaining to thoroughbred horse racing in the State of Florida. The authority for such regulation is found in Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and those rules promulgated to enforce the provisions of that chapter. Included in the body of rules are Rules 7E-1.00(11)(a) and 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, alluded to in the issue statement of this Recommended Order. These rules as set out in the issue statement shall serve as a basis for determining the facts and reaching the legal conclusions necessary to formulate a decision in this matter and official recognition is taken of the aforementioned rules. The facts in this case reveal that the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, was operating in his capacity as a horse trainer on October 16, 1978, at the Calder race course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, a horse for which he was the trainer, named Hawaiian Gardens, ran in the second race and finished in first place. Prior to the race, the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, had been in the custody and control of the Respondent in the sense that the horse was in the presence of the Respondent before the race. The horse was treated in the morning prior to the race by medications, ACTH, Steroids, Lasix and for Myopathy, as shown by the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence, which is a copy of the invoice of the treating veterinarian, Carl J. Meyer, D.V.M. The first of the medications was given around eight o'clock and further medication was given around nine or nine thirty and that medication was Lasix, which is a substance given for horses who have tendencies to bleed. Around eleven thirty or twelve o'clock an injection was given by Dr. Meyer for a condition which Dr. Meyer later described as Myopathy. Joyce saw the injection administered but did not question Dr. Meyer about what was in the injection. The second race occurred around 1:15 p.m. and, subsequent to the race, Hawaiian Gardens was taken to the detention barn for purposes of taking a urine sample for testing to detect any narcotics. The horse entered the area of the detention barn around 2:00 p.m. The horse started a cooling down period and walk-off around 2:05 p.m. and was back in the stall at 2:25 p.m., at which point the urine sample was taken and the horse was out of the detention barn at 2:30 p.m. The next day, on October 17, 1978, the Respondent inquired of Dr. Meyer about the previous day's treatment for Hawaiian Gardens. Dr. Meyer replied that he gave the horse a treatment for Myopathy, attention to the horse's nervous system. Joyce made no further inquiry of Meyer about the treatment for Myopathy. The urine sample of the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, was examined by a series of tests and the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl Citrate, a narcotic. This particular narcotic, Fentanyl Citrate, metabolizes to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, a central nervous system stimulant in horses. The trade name for Fentanyl Citrate is Sublimaze. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, had run in the second race at Calder race course on October 16, 1978, at a time the horse had the substance, Despropionyl Fentanyl, in its system and this had resulted from Dr. Meyer's injection of Sublimaze around eleven thirty or twelve o'clock on October 16, 1978, which he fraudulently called a treatment for Myopathy. Joyce had no knowledge of Meyer's intentions nor the act of injecting the horse with Sublimaze.
Recommendation It is recommended that the case against the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, related to the incident on October 16, 1978, involving the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: S. Frates, Esquire Frates, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richman & Greer, P.A. One Biscayne Boulevard, 25th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 David M. Maloney, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Francis Clifford Joyce 1015 South 17th Avenue Hollywood, Florida 33020 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 79-227 FRANCIS CLIFFORD JOYCE, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty of regulating, among other things, the harness horse racing industry in the State of Florida. On November 28, 1979, Charles Federman, holder of pari-mutuel trainer's license L-25378, trained and entered the standardbred horse, Hanker Chief, in the ninth race at Pompano Park in Florida, where Tourist Attractions, Inc., is licensed by the Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering to conduct horse racing. The horse ran in the race and won. Following the race a urine specimen was taken from the horse by Division personnel. Following collection, the sample, was sealed and was placed in a locked refrigerator in the office of the detention barn where the samples are customarily stored until transportation to the Division laboratory. A card bearing number 56969 was filled out, and the top of the card bearing the same number was taped to the sample. The bottom of the card, also bearing the number 56969 was filled out by the collector of the sample to contain information pertinent to where, when, by whom, and from what horse the sample was taken. The sample was picked up at the detention barn by Division personnel and transported to the Division laboratory. The sample was analyzed by personnel at the Division laboratory by means of seven thin layer chromotographies, gas chromotography, and mass spectrometry. These analyses corresponded precisely with analyses by identical tests of a standard derived from Stadol, a drug marketed by Bristol Laboratories whose active ingredient is "butorphanol". Accordingly, it is specifically concluded that the facts of record in this proceeding support the conclusion that the laboratory analyses performed by Division personnel were accurate, and that those analyses establish a positive identification of "butorphanol" to have been contained in the urine specimen taken from Respondent's horse following the ninth race on November 28, 1979. Butorphanol is marketed as a salt, butorphanol tartrate, under the brand name Stadol, by Bristol Laboratories. Butorphanol is a narcotic with potent analgesic properties approximately equivalent to that of morphine, although its exact mechanism is unknown. Butorphanol acts as a "depressant", in that two milligrams depresses respiration to a degree equal to ten milligrams of morphine, but also has "stimulant" effects on the cardiovascular system. Butorphanol is not recommended for humans physically dependent on narcotics because it has a physical dependence liability, although admittedly low. In horses, butorphanol acts as an analgesic and, depending on dosage, it either depresses or stimulates a horse. The drug would be of use in harness racing for its potent pain killing effects if a horse were sore or lame, or for its depressant effects if a horse were high-strung and likely to break its gait. The smallest dosage of Stadol marketed by Bristol Laboratories is a 1 milliliter vial containing 1 milligram of butorphanol. In the smallest administrable injection, butorphanol produces narcotic effects. Respondent was present on November 15, 1979, at a meeting of all drivers held before the start of the meet during which the offense charged occurred. At that meeting, Division personnel announced to all drivers and trainers in attendance that Stadol was a prohibited substance and was not to be used. Drivers are required to attend meetings such as that held on November 15, 1979, meetings under the harness racing Rules. See, Rule 7E-4.21 (8), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent holds a driver's/trainer's license. In addition, notices were posted around the track advising that the use of Stadol was prohibited. In particular, such a notice was posted in the Racing Secretary's office where every horseman must go to eater a horse in a race. On the day of the race in question Respondent allowed a person identified by him as "Dr. Rites" to examine and treat Hanker Chief for a sore leg which had been causing the horse to limp. During the treatment, "Dr. Rites" gave the horse injections, which the Respondent understood to be Lasix and a "pain killer". "Dr. Ritos" was not, at that time, licensed by the Division as a veterinarian as required by Rule 7E-4.31(7), Florida Administrative Code. The parties to this proceeding each submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact have not been included in this order, they have been rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues involved in this proceeding, or as not having been supported by evidence of record.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 61D-6.007 and/or 61D-6.012 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioners, Charles L. McClellan and Natasha Nemeth, hold suspended Pari-Mutuel Wagering Individual Occupational Licenses that authorize them to train racing greyhounds. As licensees, Petitioners are subject to the provisions of chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, specifically chapter 61D-6. The Division is a state agency delegated the responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of Florida’s pari-mutuel laws under chapter 550, including the licensing and regulation of all pari-mutuel activities in the state. As licensees subject to disciplinary action by the Division, Petitioners have standing to bring this action. Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibits the racing of an animal that has been impermissibly medicated or determined to have a prohibited substance in its system. To enforce section 550.2415, Division employees collect urine samples from racing greyhounds at the track prior to the greyhounds’ race. Fla. Admin. Code R. 61D-6.005(2). These samples are secured and shipped to the University of Florida Racing Laboratory (“UF Lab”) to be tested for impermissible substances. The Division and the UF Lab have entered into a contract pursuant to which the UF Lab conducts the drug testing analysis for all of the urine samples collected from racing animals at pari-mutuel tracks in Florida. At all relevant times, each of the Petitioners was working as the trainer of record for racing greyhounds in the Jacksonville area. The Division collected urine samples from Petitioners’ greyhounds and sent them to the UF Lab for testing. The UF Lab tested the urine samples and reported a total of 24 drug positives for benzoylecgonine (“BZE”) and/or ecgonine methyl ester (“EME”), both of which are metabolites of cocaine. Margaret Wilding, associate director of the UF Lab, testified that the lab currently reports as “positive” any reading for cocaine metabolites at or above 10 nanograms per milliliter (“ng/mL”), the UF Lab’s current limit of quantification. The Division filed Administrative Complaints against Petitioners alleging that they were the trainers of record for racing greyhounds whose urine was collected, tested, and found to contain BZE and/or EME. The proposed penalty would be imposed pursuant to rule 61D-6.012. Those complaints were referred to DOAH and are being held in abeyance pending the outcome of this proceeding.1/ Section 550.2415(1) provides, in relevant part: The racing of an animal that has been impermissibly medicated or determined to have a prohibited substance present is prohibited. It is a violation of this section for a person to impermissibly medicate an animal or for an animal to have a prohibited substance present resulting in a positive test for such medications or substances based on samples taken from the animal before or immediately after the racing of that animal. . . . It is a violation of this section for a race-day specimen to contain a level of a naturally occurring substance which exceeds normal physiological concentrations. The division may solicit input from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and adopt rules that specify normal physiological concentrations of naturally occurring substances in the natural untreated animal and rules that specify acceptable levels of environmental contaminants and trace levels of substances in test samples. The finding of a prohibited substance in a race-day specimen constitutes prima facie evidence that the substance was administered and was carried in the body of the animal while participating in the race. Section 550.2415(2) provides that the Division may take administrative action against an occupational licensee “responsible pursuant to rule of the division for the condition of an animal that has been impermissibly medicated or drugged in violation of this section.” Rule 61D-6.002(1) provides that the trainer of record “shall be responsible for and be the absolute insurer of the condition of the . . . racing greyhounds” that he or she enters in a race.2/ Section 550.2415(7) provides as follows: (7)(a) In order to protect the safety and welfare of racing animals and the integrity of the races in which the animals participate, the division shall adopt rules establishing the conditions of use and maximum concentrations of medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances identified in the Controlled Therapeutic Medication Schedule, Version 2.1, revised April 17, 2014, adopted by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. [referenced herein as the ARCI Medication Schedule].[3/] Controlled therapeutic medications include only the specific medications and concentrations allowed in biological samples which have been approved by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., as controlled therapeutic medications. The division rules must designate the appropriate biological specimens by which the administration of medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances is monitored and must determine the testing methodologies, including measurement uncertainties, for screening such specimens to confirm the presence of medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances. The division rules must include a classification system for drugs and substances and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations which incorporates the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, Version 8.0, revised December 2014, by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. [referenced herein as the ARCI Guidelines].[4/] The division shall adopt laboratory screening limits approved by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., for drugs and medications that are not included as controlled therapeutic medications, the presence of which in a sample may result in a violation of this section. The division rules must include conditions for the use of furosemide to treat exercise-induced pulmonary hemorrhage. The division may solicit input from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in adopting the rules required under this subsection. Such rules must be adopted before January 1, 2016. This section does not prohibit the use of vitamins, minerals, or naturally occurring substances so long as none exceeds the normal physiological concentration in a race-day specimen. Section 550.2415 does not define “medication,” “impermissibly medicated,” “prohibited substance,” “drug,” “naturally occurring substance,” “environmental contaminant,” or “laboratory screening limits,” except by reference to publications issued by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. (“ARCI”). ARCI is the umbrella organization of the official governing bodies for professional horse and greyhound racing in the United States. ARCI sets standards for racing regulation, medication policy, drug testing laboratories, and other matters pertaining to racing for participating jurisdictions. The ARCI “Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances and Recommended Penalties and Model Rule” (“ARCI Guidelines”) are intended to assist stewards, hearing officers, and racing commissioners in evaluating the seriousness of alleged violations of medication and prohibited substance rules in racing jurisdictions. The ARCI Guidelines employ a “Drug Classification Scheme” based on pharmacology, drug use patterns, and the appropriateness of a drug for use in the racing animal.5/ Drugs that are known to be potent stimulants or depressants are placed in higher classes, while those that have (or would be expected to have) little effect on the outcome of a race are placed in lower classes. Drugs that are clearly not intended for use in racing animals are placed in higher classes, particularly if they may affect the outcome of a race. The ARCI Guidelines do not set screening limits or testing thresholds for any of the listed substances. The ARCI Guidelines classify cocaine and/or its metabolites as “Class 1 drugs” which are defined as: [S]timulant and depressant drugs that have the highest potential to affect performance and that have no generally accepted medical use in the racing horse. Many of these agents are Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) schedule II substances. These include the following drugs and their metabolites: Opiates, opium derivatives, synthetic opioids, and psychoactive drugs, amphetamines and amphetamine-like drugs as well as related drugs. . . . The ARCI Guidelines state that Class 1 drugs “have no generally accepted medical use in the racing horse and their pharmacologic potential for altering the performance of a racing horse is very high.” Rule 61D-6.007, titled “Permitted Medications for Racing Greyhounds,” provides as follows: The following medications are permitted to be administered to racing greyhounds in the dosages and under the conditions listed below: The administration of testosterone or testosterone-like substances, when used for the control of estrus in female racing greyhounds, is permitted, subject to the following conditions: Track veterinarians may administer injectable testosterone on the grounds of the permitholder to female racing greyhounds for the control of estrus. Kennel owners may use their regular Florida licensed veterinarian or may enter into a collective agreement for the services of a Florida licensed veterinarian to administer injectable testosterone to female racing greyhounds for the control of estrus. The administration of oral testosterone shall be permitted provided it is validly prescribed and properly labeled. Veterinarians that administer injectable or oral testosterone shall be responsible for maintaining security, inventory, and a retrievable records/log in accordance with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) regulations pertaining to a Schedule III drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act and shall be accountable for all syringes and needles used therewith and their disposal in accordance with approved biomedical hazardous waste methods. Sulfa drug(s) is/are permitted to be administered to a racing greyhound providing: The racing greyhound is under the care of a veterinarian currently licensed pursuant to Chapters 474 and 550, Florida Statutes; and The sulfa drug(s) is/are prescribed by a veterinarian currently licensed pursuant to Chapters 474 and 550, Florida Statutes; and The sulfa drug(s) is/are not administered within 24 hours prior to the officially scheduled post time of the race. The following permitted medications shall not be reported by the racing laboratory to the division as a violation of Section 550.2415, F.S.: The detection of caffeine at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 200 nanograms per milliliter; The detection of theophylline and theobromine at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 400 nanograms per milliliter; The detection of procaine at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 2 micrograms per milliliter; and The detection of flunixin at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 250 nanograms per milliliter. All prescription medication, regardless of method of administration, shall be safeguarded under lock and key when not being actively administered. Rule 61D-6.012, titled “Penalty Guidelines for Class I-V Drug Violations in Greyhounds,” provides as follows: The penalties in this rule shall be imposed when the Division finds that the following substances have been identified by the state laboratory in a urine sample or blood sample collected from a greyhound participating in a pari-mutuel event: (a) Any drug or medication that: Is not approved for veterinary use in the United States by the Food and Drug Administration; Cannot be detected by the state laboratory in a urine or blood sample unless the medication was administered within 24 hours of the race; or Is detected in urine or blood concentrations that indicate a level of dosage that would constitute a threat to the health and safety of the greyhound. First violation of this chapter Any subsequent violation of this chapter $1,000 to $2,500 fine and suspension of license zero to one year, or revocation of license; $2,500 to $5,000 fine and revocation of license. The penalty for any medication or drug which is not described in subsection (1) above shall be based upon the classification of the medication or drug found in the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, revised December 2014, as promulgated by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., which is hereby incorporated and adopted by reference, https://www.flrules.org/Gateway/ reference.asp?No=Ref-06400. A copy of this document may be obtained at www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/pmw or by contacting the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 2601 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The penalty schedule shall be as follows: Class I substances: First violation of this chapter $500 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to one year, or revocation of license; Any subsequent violation of this chapter $1,000 to $5,000 fine and suspension of license no less than one year, or revocation of license. Class II substances: First violation of this chapter $100 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 30 days; Second violation of this chapter $250 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license no less than 30 days, or revocation of license; Third violation or any subsequent violation of this chapter $500 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license no less than 60 days, or revocation of license. Class III substances: First violation of this chapter $50 to $500 fine; Second violation of this chapter Third violation or any subsequent violation of this chapter $150 to $750 fine and suspension of license zero to 30 days; $250 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 60 days. Class IV or V substances: First violation of this chapter $50 to $250 fine; Second violation of this chapter Third or subsequent violation of this chapter $100 to $500 fine; $200 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 30 days. The Division may consider mitigation or aggravation to deviate from these penalty guidelines. Circumstances which may be considered for the purposes of mitigation or aggravation of any penalty shall include the following: The impact of the offense to the integrity of the pari-mutuel industry. The danger to the public and/or racing animals. The number of repetitions of offenses. The time periods between offenses. The number of complaints filed against the licensee or permitholder, which have resulted in prior discipline. The length of time the licensee or permitholder has practiced. The deterrent effect of the penalty imposed. Any efforts at rehabilitation. Any other mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Absent mitigating circumstances, the division judge or the division shall order the return of any purse, prize, or award from any pari-mutuel event for redistribution when a postive test for a drug or medication described in paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(a), or (2)(b) is reported by the state laboratory and confirmed through the hearing process. The judges or the division shall specify in writing the reasons for requiring the return of any purse, prize, or award for redistribution when the positive test of a drug or medication reported by the state laboratory is not described in paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(a), or (2)(b) of this rule. Nothing in this rule modifies the provisions of Rule 61D-6.008 or 61D-3.002, F.A.C., or rules promulgated under Section 550.2415, F.S. Count II of the Petition alleges that the challenged rules arbitrarily and capriciously fail to address environmental contamination of racing greyhound urine samples. It also alleges that the rules deprive racing greyhound trainers of due process, are vague in that they fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and vest unbridled discretion in the agency. Finally, it alleges that the rules exceed and contravene the Division’s delegated legislative authority. Petitioners point out that section 550.2415(1)(b) acknowledges the presence of “naturally occurring substances” and “environmental contaminants” in an animal. The statute authorizes the Division to adopt rules that specify “normal physiological concentrations” of naturally occurring substances and that specify acceptable levels of environmental contaminants. Petitioners also observe that section 550.2415(7)(c) requires the Division to adopt rules that include a classification system for “drugs and substances” and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations in accordance with the ARCI Guidelines. The Division is also required to adopt ARCI-approved “laboratory screening limits” for drugs and medications that are not classified as controlled therapeutic medications. Petitioners note that, despite the statutory language, rule 61D-6.007 provides screening limits for only a few foreign substances. The rule addresses permitted administrations of testosterone and sulfa drugs to racing greyhounds and provides screening limits for caffeine, theophylline, procaine, and flunixin. Petitioners contend that this list is inconsistent with the ARCI Medication Schedule, which lists 26 medications and their recommended screening limits for the urine samples of racing animals. Petitioners further note that rule 61D-6.012 establishes a penalty schedule that incorporates the ARCI Guidelines without regard to the amount of the substance found in the urine sample. The Division counters that its rule follows the ARCI Guidelines, which do not contain laboratory screening limits (or thresholds) for cocaine, BZE, or EME. Cocaine, BZE, and EME are also not identified within the ARCI Medication Schedule. The Division reads the exclusions of laboratory screening limits for cocaine as evidencing ARCI’s “zero tolerance policy” for the presence of cocaine and its metabolites in the race-day sample of a racing animal. Rule 61D-6.012 incorporates the ARCI Guidelines and therefore the same “zero tolerance policy” for the presence of cocaine, BZE, and EME that the Division presumes, both the ARCI Guidelines and ARCI Medication Schedule recommend. However, the only laboratory screening limits found in any of the ARCI materials are those related to the 26 “controlled therapeutic medications” listed in the ARCI Medication Schedule. The ARCI Guidelines list approximately 750 “drugs/substances” and contain screening limits for none of them. Thus, the Division’s point about “zero tolerance” for cocaine based on the ARCI documents could be made as to several hundred other drugs/substances, including several items for which the Division’s own rule 6D-6.007(3) establishes screening limits well above zero.6/ The ARCI Schedule recommends that cocaine, almost alone among Class 1 drugs,7/ be given a “Class B” penalty rather than the typical “Class A” penalty. The ARCI-recommended Class B penalty for a licensed trainer’s first offense is a minimum 15-day suspension and $500 fine, absent mitigating circumstances. The presence of aggravating factors can increase the penalty to a 60-day suspension and a fine of $1,000. In contrast, the ARCI-recommended Class A penalty for a first offense is a minimum one-year suspension and minimum fine of $10,000. Aggravating factors can increase the Class A penalty to a three-year suspension and a fine of $25,000. The lesser recommended penalty indicates that if ARCI has singled out cocaine, it has been for more lenient treatment, and not for harsher treatment than for other Class 1 drugs. Dr. Cynthia Cole is a veterinarian and pharmacologist, who acted as the director of the UF Lab from 2003 to 2006. Dr. Cole testified that BZE and EME are “naturally occurring substances,” in the strict sense that they are metabolites of cocaine and would be naturally produced by any animal that has ingested cocaine. Dr. Cole also conceded that levels of cocaine below 100 (ng/mL) would be very unlikely to have any effect on a racing animal’s performance, and that such low levels could be the result of environmental contamination. Of the 24 positive tests cited against Petitioners, the highest concentration of a cocaine metabolite was 36.5 ng/mL. Even that appeared to be an outlier, as most of the concentrations were in the range of 10 to 15 ng/mL. Dr. Thomas Tobin, a veterinarian, pharmacologist, and toxicologist, testified that trace amounts of cocaine are present virtually everywhere in North American human society. Dr. Tobin stated that less than 50 ng/mL of urinary BZE is indicative of nothing more than that the subject lives in North America. Dr. Tobin testified that a very small concentration of cocaine metabolites in the urine is likely attributable to environmental contamination. Dr. Tobin stated that when the concentration is below pharmacological significance, it should not be called a positive. He noted that in human drug testing, a sample is first screened at 150 ng/mL and then confirmed at 100 ng/mL, at which point it is reported as positive. Dr. Tobin could think of no scientific reason why there should be a regulatory reporting threshold for humans but not for racing animals. Cocaine is rapidly absorbed and metabolized, and may enter a dog’s body through the mouth, the mucous membranes, or through the skin. Dr. Tobin opined that the very small concentrations of cocaine metabolites found in Petitioners’ greyhounds suggest exposure to the drug via touch, soon before the urine sample was taken. He found this significant because of the manner in which urine is collected from racing greyhounds in Florida. Shortly before the first race begins for each 15-race card, greyhound trainers customarily arrive at the track detention facility with their greyhounds for weigh-in. The trainers then leave their greyhounds in the care of track personnel. Between weigh-in and the end of a greyhound's race, the dog has no physical contact with its trainer, while it has extensive contact with track personnel. After weigh-in, and approximately 30 minutes before the first race begins, track personnel identified as "lead- outs," take the greyhounds into a locked area called a "ginny pit." Track personnel supervise the dogs in this area; trainers and owners are not allowed to be present. The urine sampling of a racing greyhound takes place just prior to the greyhound's scheduled race. Depending on when a greyhound is scheduled to race, its urine may be sampled several hours after its last contact with its trainer. Veterinarian assistants employed by the Division catch racing greyhounds' urine during the sampling process. The Division does not drug-test its veterinarian assistants. David Tiffany is the quality assurance manager for the UF Lab. Mr. Tiffany testified in agreement with Ms. Wilding that the UF Lab’s current limit of quantification for cocaine, also called a “decision limit” or “cut-off,” is 10 ng/mL. Mr. Tiffany uses the term “cut-off” to describe the detection level at which the lab has informally decided not to expend the effort required to establish the quantity of a substance at a lower level. Mr. Tiffany stated that the UF Lab is able to detect cocaine down to 5 ng/mL, and that this “limit of detection”--the smallest concentration of a substance that can be confidently identified by a testing methodology--is one factor in determining the limit of quantification. He testified that several factors influence the ability to confidently see a drug all the way down to its limit of detection, including “noise” (other compounds) in the sample, and whether the testing instrument is in need of service and recalibration. Mr. Tiffany wrote the UF Lab’s procedures for determining measurement uncertainty. He explained that multiple measurements of an item yield small variations. The degree of that variation is the “precision of measurement.” The lab looks at various factors that affect the variation and sets a range of measurement uncertainty, i.e., the probability that the measurement for a certain substance will fall between an upper and a lower limit. Mr. Tiffany stated that the common level of a range is a 95-percent probability that the value of the sample is within the range. The standard format is to state the concentration of the substance, plus or minus the value of the range of measurement uncertainty. Mr. Tiffany testified that the UF Lab calculates and attaches to its report a measurement of uncertainty only when dealing with a “threshold drug,” meaning a drug for which a statute or rule sets an allowable level. For such drugs, the lab must be certain that the entire range of variation sits above the threshold. If the value of the measurement minus the measurement of uncertainty still exceeds the threshold, the lab calls it a positive finding. The UF Lab does not report a measurement of uncertainty for cocaine and its metabolites because no rule or statute sets a threshold for cocaine. Mr. Tiffany stated that a measurement of uncertainty is not needed to detect the mere presence of a substance, as opposed to making a precise measurement of the quantity of that substance. The lab can determine that something is present without giving it a number. Mr. Tiffany testified that the UF Lab used to simply report the qualitative results of its tests for cocaine, but that the Division then would ask whether there was a lot or a little cocaine in the sample. As an aid to the Division, the lab began reporting quantitative results for cocaine, with the proviso that the reported amounts were estimates. At some point, the lab began restricting its “positive” reports for cocaine metabolites to those results that met or exceeded the lab’s limit of quantification, 10 ng/mL. Ms. Wilding and Mr. Tiffany resisted calling this 10 ng/mL line a “threshold” because a “threshold” is an allowable level of a substance established by statute or rule. However, as a practical matter, the Division has allowed the limit of quantification for cocaine metabolites to act as a threshold for taking action against a licensee. If the Division’s policy were actually “zero tolerance,” it would require the UF Lab to report cocaine down to its limit of detection and would discipline licensees accordingly. In either event, the laboratory screening limit should be reflected in the Division’s rules, as required by section 550.2415(7)(c). It was never explained at the hearing how the UF Lab knows which drugs are “threshold” drugs for purposes of reporting positive results to the Division. The Division’s annual report includes a listing of positive drug tests for the previous fiscal year. Apart from cocaine and its metabolites, the drugs found in the positive drug tests for fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 were: acepromazine metabolite; methylprednisolone; amphetamine; betamethasone; caffeine; theophylline; theobromine; clenbuterol; dexamethasone; methocarbamol; phenylbutazone; 5-hydroxy dantrolene; despropionyl fentanyl; xylazine; dextrorphan; dimethyl sulfoxide; firocoxib; flunixin; ketoprofen; glycopyrrolate; ibuprofen; isoflupredone; methylprednisolone; triamcinolone acetonide; ketoprofen; lidocaine; 3-hydroxy lidocaine; mepivacaine; 3-hydroxy mepivacaine; omeprazole sulfide; oxycodone; oxymorphone; procaine; testosterone; nandrolone; boldenone; carprofen; isoxsuprine; naproxen; and zipaterol. Apart from caffeine, theophylline, theobromine, procaine, and flunixin, the Division’s rules (and the record of this proceeding) are silent as to the laboratory screening limits for these drugs. There appear to be three possibilities: the Division informally provided the UF Lab with a screening limit for these drugs; the Division instructed the UF Lab to report positive tests down to the limit of detection, i.e., “zero tolerance,” for these drugs; or the UF Lab was allowed to set its own “screening limit” by way of its limit of quantification, as Mr. Tiffany testified has been done for cocaine. However, the Division offered no evidence in support of any of the possibilities. Mr. Tiffany testified that measurements of uncertainty vary between labs and can change within a single lab upon review of the methodologies and current equipment. Mr. Tiffany testified that there is no technical reason why the UF Lab could not report measurement uncertainties for BZE and EME if the Division requested that information. He believed that adopting the current UF Lab’s measurement of uncertainty in a Division rule would become a “false restriction on the data,” as it would become a limitation on the lab’s ability to lower the uncertainty measurement with new equipment and techniques.8/ Several jurisdictions have established screening limits for BZE in racehorses. New Mexico, Ohio, Illinois, and Oklahoma prohibit disciplinary action unless the test sample results exceed 150 ng/mL. The state of Washington has set the screening limit at 50 ng/mL. Illinois and Oklahoma refer to BZE under the heading “environmental contaminants.” New Mexico references BZE under the heading “environmental contaminants and substances of human use.” Washington lists BZE under the heading “environmental substances.” Petitioners contend that the Division has effectively delegated to the UF Lab the setting of a threshold or screening limit for cocaine and its metabolites. The UF Lab’s limit of quantification operates as the screening limit for disciplinary action taken by the Division, and is subject to change whenever the lab alters its equipment or methods. In support of their contention, Petitioners point out that in 2014, the UF Lab employed a more sensitive testing technology than it currently uses, which resulted in the prosecution of a greyhound trainer whose dog’s urine yielded only 3.7 ng/mL of BZE. Petitioners argue that this 2014 case demonstrates that the lab’s limit of quantification serves as a de facto substitute for the screening limits that section 550.2415(7)(c) requires the Division to adopt by rule.9/ The evidence fully supports Petitioners’ argument on this point. In summary, section 550.2415(7) places several mandatory rulemaking requirements on the Division. Paragraph (a) expressly directs the Division to adopt rules establishing the conditions of use and maximum concentrations of “medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances” identified in the ARCI Medication Schedule, to ensure “the safety and welfare of racing animals.” “Controlled therapeutic medications” are limited to those medications and allowable concentrations as identified and approved by ARCI. The Division has not implemented this directive as to greyhounds. Rule 61D-6.007(3) prescribes allowable dosages for caffeine, theophylline, theobromine, procaine, and flunixin, of which only flunixin is listed in the ARCI Medication Schedule. The ARCI Medication Schedule lists dosage thresholds, withdrawal guidelines and dosing specifications for 26 “controlled therapeutic medications.” The ARCI Guidelines include caffeine (Drug Class 2, Penalty Class B), theophylline (Drug Class 3, Penalty Class B), theobromine (Drug Class 4, Penalty Class B), and procaine (Drug Class 3, Penalty Class B).10/ In its Proposed Final Order, the Division argues, for the first time, that the ARCI Medication Schedule does not apply to greyhounds at all. It concedes that section 550.2415(7)(a) mandates the adoption of rules establishing thresholds for medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances identified in the ARCI Medication Schedule, but argues that this provision applies only to racehorses. The Division has adopted rule 61D-6.008, applying the ARCI Medication Schedule to horses, but has not done so for greyhounds.11/ The Division’s assertion is not supported by the statute. In fact, section 550.2415(7)(a) is not limited to horses but expressly states that it applies to “racing animals.” The only textual support of any kind the Division offers is the assertion that the full title of the ARCI Medication Schedule is “ARCI Controlled Therapeutic Medication Schedule for Horses-- Version 2.1.” The copy of the ARCI Medication Schedule entered into evidence in this proceeding does not contain the words “for Horses,” or any language excluding greyhounds. Even if the ARCI Medication Schedule were limited to horses, the same point could be made as to the ARCI Guidelines, the classification definitions of which describe the impact of the listed drugs on “the racing horse.” The Division makes much of the fact that the word “greyhound” does not even appear in the ARCI Medication Schedule; neither does the word occur in the ARCI Guidelines. The record evidence in no way supports the Division’s contention that the statute’s provisions as to the ARCI Medication Schedule are inapplicable to greyhounds. Section 550.2415(7)(b) expressly directs the Division to adopt rules that designate the appropriate biological specimens for testing and that “determine the testing methodologies, including measurement uncertainties, for screening such specimens” for medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances. (emphasis added). The Division has not implemented this directive. As set forth in the above Findings of Fact, the Division has left it to the UF Lab to establish measurement uncertainties. The UF Lab determines measurement uncertainties only for threshold substances, and these measurement uncertainties change over time. While the Division offered a cogent and reasonable explanation as to why it makes sense for the UF Lab to set measurement uncertainties, the statute does not give the Division discretion to entirely delegate this responsibility to another entity. The Division’s rules must determine the testing methodologies, including measurement uncertainties, not hand off that determination to a laboratory. The Division’s rules must make this determination for all “medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances” that are screened by the lab, not only those substances it and/or the UF Lab deem “threshold” substances.12/ Section 550.2415(7)(c) expressly directs the Division to adopt rules that include a classification system for “drugs and substances” and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations. The classification system and penalty schedules must incorporate the ARCI Guidelines. The Division has implemented this requirement in rule 61D-6.012(2), which expressly adopts the classifications of the ARCI Guidelines and sets forth penalties based on the ARCI classifications. However, section 550.2415(7)(c) also expressly directs the Division to adopt rules that include laboratory screening limits approved by ARCI for drugs and medications that are not included in ARCI’s Medication Schedule as “controlled therapeutic medications.” The statute states that the presence of such drugs and medications in a sample “may result in a violation of this section.” The Division has not implemented this requirement. The ARCI Guidelines do not approve laboratory screening limits for drugs and medications other than “controlled therapeutic medications.” The Division has argued that the lack of screening limits for cocaine and its metabolites is evidence that ARCI supports a “zero tolerance” policy for cocaine. However, the same argument would apply to any of several hundred substances listed in the ARCI Guidelines that are not also listed as “controlled therapeutic medications” in the ARCI Medication Schedule. The Division has offered no principled distinction between cocaine and, for example, caffeine. Caffeine also appears in the ARCI Guidelines, with the same recommended penalty as cocaine. The ARCI Guidelines prescribe no screening limit for caffeine. Caffeine is not a controlled therapeutic medication. By the Division’s stated rationale, caffeine should be a “zero tolerance” substance. However, rule 61D-6.007(3)(a) allows up to 200 ng/mL of caffeine in the urine before the lab must report the finding to the Division. It could be objected that caffeine is merely a Class 2 drug, unlike cocaine, which is Class 1 and has no generally accepted medical use in racing animals. However, rule 61D- 6.012(2) provides penalties for substances all the way down to Class 5. If there were a “zero tolerance” policy for caffeine, a prosecution for a Class 2 substance violation could result in a $1,000 fine and a 30-day suspension. Fla. Admin. Code R. 61D- 6.012(2)(b). The point remains that neither the Division’s rule nor the Division’s arguments at hearing articulate a principled distinction as to which substances the Division will, in practice,13/ treat with a “zero tolerance” policy. The literal terms of the laboratory screening limits portion of section 550.2415(7)(c) require the Division to obtain ARCI’s approval of a list of laboratory screening limits for drugs and medications that are not included as controlled therapeutic medications. Despite the mandatory language of the statute, nothing in the record suggests that the Division has made any effort to implement this provision, either by submitting a list to ARCI or even by making an inquiry to ARCI as to whether it would consider such a submission. Rather, the Division has passively chosen to interpret the lack of ARCI- approved laboratory screening limits as endorsing a “zero tolerance” policy for all ARCI Guideline substances not included in the ARCI Medication Schedule. It is patently arbitrary for the Division to use the lack of screening limits as an opportunity to pick cocaine from among 700-plus substances in the ARCI Guidelines for “zero tolerance” treatment. Some distinguishing principle must be articulated to separate cocaine from the other substances in the ARCI Guidelines, given the lack of evidence that the Division in fact treats all drugs and substances that are not on the ARCI Medication Schedule with a “zero tolerance” policy. The Division could eliminate this ambiguity by following its statutory directive to adopt a rule setting laboratory screening limits for drugs and medications that are not included as controlled therapeutic medications. Section 550.2415(1) includes some permissive rulemaking actions that the Division may choose to take. Paragraph (1)(b) provides that the Division may solicit input from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and may adopt rules that specify “normal physiological concentrations of naturally occurring substances in the natural untreated animal.” The Division also may adopt rules that specify acceptable levels of environmental contaminants and trace levels of substances in test samples. Several other states have chosen to treat BZE as an environmental contaminant and to set acceptable concentration levels for the drug in the system of a racing animal. This practice appears sensible and consistent with the accepted science, but the statute does not require the Division to follow it. However, the Division fails to adopt rules at its own enforcement peril.14/ In its Proposed Final Order, the Division uses paragraph (1)(b) to defend its failure to adopt thresholds for cocaine and its metabolites, arguing that the statute is permissive as to adopting rules that establish screening limits for environmental contaminants such as cocaine. Throughout the hearing, the Division resisted the notion that BZE or EME are environmental contaminants, and thus its late embrace of that categorization is somewhat disingenuous. In any event, the Division fails to read paragraph (1)(b) in its entirety. The first sentence provides: “It is a violation of this section for a race-day specimen to contain a level of a naturally occurring substance which exceeds normal physiological concentrations.” To find a violation, the Division must first determine what level of a naturally occurring substance is excessive. Due process for the licensee requires no less. The Division fails to explain how it can enforce the quoted prohibition without a rule that specifies “acceptable levels of environmental contaminants and trace levels of substances in test samples.” However, the permissive language of the statute gives the Division discretion to avoid such an explanation until it attempts to enforce the prohibition. A rule is not required. Finally, the Division attempts to justify its failure to establish screening limits by reference to section 550.2415(13), which provides: The division may implement by rule medication levels for racing greyhounds recommended by the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine developed pursuant to an agreement between the Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering and the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine. The University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine may provide written notification to the division that it has completed research or review on a particular drug pursuant to the agreement and when the College of Veterinary Medicine has completed a final report of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the division. The Division argues that subsection (13) means that any medication levels adopted in the Division’s rules must be based on a recommendation from the UF Lab, and that the UF Lab has not recommended a threshold for cocaine or its metabolites. The Division argues that it would be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority to adopt any threshold for racing greyhounds without a recommendation from the UF Lab. This argument is not well taken. Subsection (13) does not refer narrowly to the UF Lab but to the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine (“College”). The statute contemplates a contract between the Division and the College under which the College would use its medical knowledge to recommend “medication levels for racing greyhounds.” There is at least an implication that a medical opinion beyond the laboratory testing expertise of the UF Lab is contemplated. Also, subsection (13) is entirely permissive. It allows the Division to implement by rule medication levels recommended by the College, should the Division and the College choose to enter into a contract for that purpose. If the Division’s argument were accepted, then it could evade any responsibility for adopting rules by the simple expedient of never entering a contract with the College. In fact, nothing in the language of subsection (13) exempts the Division from the mandatory rulemaking requirements of subsection (7).
