The Issue Whether Petitioner, JWD Trees, Inc., is entitled to payment from Landscape Service Professionals, Inc., and the Gray Insurance Company, as Surety, pursuant to sections 604.15 through 604.34, Florida Statutes (2014), for the purchase of trees; and, if so, what amount.
Findings Of Fact The Parties JWD is a Florida licensed dealer in agricultural products pursuant to chapter 604, Florida Statutes. JWD’s primary business is buying and selling trees, but it also operates a tree farm in Lee County, Florida. JWD is principally located in North Fort Myers, Florida. J.W. Drott, III, is the president and Dennis Boddison is the vice-president of JWD Trees. Mr. Drott has 20 years of experience in buying and selling trees. Mr. Boddison has 16 years of experience in the tree business. Respondent Landscape is a Florida licensed dealer in agricultural products, pursuant to chapter 604. Landscape is a full-service landscape business located in Tamarac, Florida. Sandy Benton is the president and Tom Benton is vice-president of Landscape. Ms. Benton started Landscape in February 1998. Respondent Insurance Company filed a denial of the claim and was represented at hearing by Landscape’s counsel. Southeastern Shade is a registered nursery and has been in the business of growing trees for approximately nine years. John Nemcovic and his wife, Shelley, own and operate Southeastern Shade. Southeastern Shade supplied the 278 slash pines that JWD brokered to Landscape. JWD and Landscape had a prior business relationship. JWD was on Landscape’s list of pre-approved vendors. The Setting At all relevant times, Landscape was a contractor responsible for installing landscaping at the Palm Beach County Solid Waste Authority (SWA) site on Jog Road in Palm Beach County, Florida. Landscape was vetted for the SWA project, which was a big project for Landscape. In September 2014, Ed Conk,1/ Landscape’s plant buyer, sought bids on a list of plants for the SWA job. The list included slash pine trees. According to the bid sheet, the slash pines were to be 16 feet, 18 feet, and 20 feet in height, and in quantities of 176, 167, and 118 respectively. There was nothing in the request for bids, or JWD’s actual bid that addressed how long the slash pine trees were hardened off, or whether or how they had been root pruned. On or about October 1, 2014, Mr. Drott, on behalf of JWD, submitted a written bid to Mr. Conk to provide 461 slash pines.2/ Landscape accepted the JWD bid, but only ordered 210 slash pines. Other slash pines were bought through other vendors and delivered to the SWA site. The 210 slash pines were delivered over the course of three days: November 11, 12, and 13, 2014. Authorized personnel of Landscape received, inspected, and accepted the 210 slash pine trees. No problems or concerns were expressed regarding the delivery or condition of the slash pines. A week later, Mr. Conk ordered 68 additional slash pine trees from JWD. JWD delivered the additional slash pines on November 19, 2014. The Dispute Giving Rise to this Proceeding Landscape’s personnel documented receipt of the initial slash pines over a three-day period: November 11, 12, and 13, 2014. Once the slash pines were unloaded, they were “laid it on the ground and my water truck watered them down.” The personnel also documented the planting of the slash pines; however, the exact location of JWD’s trees in the SWA site map was not clearly established. The slash pines were planted at the SWA site either on the day of delivery or the day after delivery. There was an irrigation system in place for watering the newly planted trees; however, it was not fully functional when the initial slash pines were planted. A water truck was used to water the trees. The SWA site had significant rainfall at times, and the ground was underwater during part of the pertinent period. It is unclear when the additional slash pine trees were planted: either on the day of delivery (November 19) or the following day (November 20). Several weeks after the slash pines were planted, some of the slash pines started to deteriorate. Mr. Drott was notified that there was a beetle issue with the slash pines in early December 2014. Mr. Drott contacted Mr. Conk. Mr. Drott advised Mr. Conk to get the affected trees out of the area and to put a spray program in effect immediately to address the beetle infestation. On January 7, 2015, Mr. Boddison, Mr. Conk, Mr. Nemcovic, and Guy Michaud, Landscape’s foreman for the SWA site, conducted an SWA site visit. Mr. Nemcovic thought the beetle problem was causing the slash pines to deteriorate. Mr. Boddison noted that the SWA site was cut out of a large native pine wood flat, with a large retention area. Mr. Boddison also questioned Mr. Conk and Mr. Michaud about how the trees were unloaded, how they were handled and planted, and since there was an evident beetle infestation, what was being done as preventative maintenance. In March 2015, Lynn Griffith, an agricultural consultant, conducted an SWA site visit. Mr. Griffith noted that a majority of the pines were healthy, but there were some that were not doing well; that some had holes in them indicative of a pine beetle infestation. Upon receiving a written report from Mr. Griffith in mid-March 2015, Mr. Drott provided the report to Mr. Conk. In early April 2015, Landscape invited a Palm Beach County extension agent William Schall, the SWA project landscape architect Leo Urban, representatives of the prime contractor, Mr. Griffith, and selected Landscape employees to conduct a site visit at the SWA site. Mr. Drott was not invited to the inspection. Three dead trees were pulled out during this inspection. Only one of the dead trees was attributed to JWD. Mr. Schall admitted that he did not know of other stress factors on the SWA site, and had only been told (by Landscape personnel) about how the trees were handled. Mr. Schall acknowledged that the SWA site was a prior pine tree area, and that pine beetles could be in the area. Further, he observed that at least one of the trees was planted too deep, which could add stress to newly planted trees. Mr. Urban confirmed that there was an engineering problem at the SWA site, and the retention basin held water for longer periods of time than it should have. Mr. Urban confirmed that the SWA site was a prior pine forest. Additionally, during the April 2015 SWA site visit, Mr. Urban pointed out to Landscape personnel that there were four pines planted close to standing water. Landscape moved those four pines. When Mr. Griffith was invited to the April 2015 SWA site visit, he was under the impression that all the interested parties would be there. Neither JWD nor Mr. Nemcovic was present. Mr. Griffith theorized potential factors leading to the demise of the slash pine trees: once water stress is introduced to newly transplanted trees, especially field-grown trees as is this case, it is hard for the trees to recover; the over-watering of the newly transplanted trees may have inadvertently washed away a significant amount of the spray that was used to treat the beetle infestation; or poor roots. Mr. Griffith observed, from two trees “yanked” out of the ground, “very little in the way of new root initiation.” He went on to speculate that it was possible that any roots could have rotted off from over- irrigation, could have been knocked off during the unloading and planting of the trees, or could have been ripped off when the trees were pulled. However, no pathology diagnosis was conducted to determine what, if any, root disease was present or if the roots suffered from over watering. In April 2015, Mr. Drott received communications from Landscape indicating that the cause of the slash pine trees demise was attributed to the lack of hardening off or root issues. This was Mr. Drott’s first notice that “hardening off” of the roots, and not the beetle infestation, was the cause of the slash pines’ demise. Mr. Hoyt’s review of the case materials was extensive. He reviewed Landscape’s discovery responses, including the daily job reports, two reports by Mr. Griffith, Mr. Schall’s report, and photographs that were provided by JWD and Landscape. He participated in an SWA site visit in September 2015, as well as a site visit and interview of the principals of Southeastern Shades in October 2015. He attended Landscape’s expert deposition and read his report, and inspected root balls and photographs of root balls, which Landscape purported to be from JWD. Mr. Hoyt also spoke with other JWD customers. He also attended the three-day hearing. Slash pine trees are very sensitive and can be easily stressed. Stress can be caused by a variety of factors including: transplanting; harsh handling; bark exposure to sunlight, including superficial wounds to the bark; too much or too little water; or planting too deeply. The stress will cause a tree to emit chemicals that attract beetles, which inhabit the trees and may kill a stressed tree within a week or two of the infestation. Based on the totality of his review, Mr. Hoyt opined that a combination of factors contributed to the SWA slash pines to deterioration: excess watering, planting to deep, rough handling, and the beetles. His testimony is found credible. Mr. Harris’ opinion centered on only one possible explanation for the trees’ demise: a failure to have an adequate root system or an inability of the roots to generate new growth. Landscape personnel were unable to definitively identify the dead trees as being trees supplied by JWD. There were photographs introduced at the hearing that were initially marked as being from one supplier, then changed to another. There is a lack of clarity in identifying which supplier actually supplied the now demised trees. Landscape has not paid for, and refuses to pay for the 210 slash pine trees reflected in JWD’s invoice no. 16707. The total amount of the invoice is $42,567.80. The additional 68 slash pines were on invoice no. 16818, which has been paid, and these are not the subject of this case. JWD is entitled to payment in the amount of $42,567.80 for the slash pine trees it provided to Landscape. Besides the amount set forth above, JWD claims the sum of $50.00 paid for the filing of the claim against Landscape and its bond. The total sum owed to JWD by Landscape is $42,617.80.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services: Approving the claim of JWD Trees, Inc., against Landscape Professional Services, Inc., in the total amount of $42,617.80 ($42,567.80 plus $50 filing fee); and if Landscape Professionals Services, Inc., fails to timely pay JWD Trees, Inc., as ordered, that Respondent, The Gray Insurance Company, as Surety, be ordered to pay the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as required by section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and the Department reimburse the Petitioner as set out in section 604.21, Florida Statutes; and Ordering Landscape Professional Services, Inc., to pay JWD Trees, Inc., reasonable costs and attorney's fees. Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of costs and attorney's fees, if the parties are unable to agree to the amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent owes Petitioner $1,673.00 as alleged in the complaint filed by Petitioner in July 1997.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Bigham Hide Company, Inc. (Petitioner), is a watermelon grower in Coleman and Lake Panasoffkee, Florida. Respondent, Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. (Respondent), is a licensed dealer in agricultural products having been issued License Numbers 7017 and 10367 by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Respondent has posted a bond in the amount of $60,000.00 written by Amwest Surety Insurance Company, as surety, to assure proper accounting and payment to producers such as Petitioner. In a complaint filed with the Department in July 1997, Petitioner alleged that it entered into an oral agreement with Monty Morris (Morris) on behalf of Respondent to market one truckload of small size watermelons. Under that alleged agreement, Morris agreed to pay five cents per pound when the melons were loaded. The complaint further alleged that while the truck was being loaded, Morris advised that final payment would not be made until the load was delivered and sold. Morris agreed, however, to advance Petitioner $700.00 to cover its labor costs. When Petitioner did not receive its final payment from Morris after the load was delivered, and it was unable to get Morris to respond to telephone calls, it filed this complaint. In its answer, Respondent has alleged that it purchased a truckload of melons from Morris at four and one-half cents per pound, and that Morris was fully paid, but it never entered into any dealings with Petitioner. It denies that any moneys are due. On June 7, 1997, Petitioner's president, Greg Bigham (Bigham), was contacted by Morris regarding the sale of one load of "pee wee" watermelons. After discussing the matter with Morris, Bigham was left with the impression that Morris represented Respondent, and he would be paid five cents per pound for his crop when it was loaded onto the truck. Bigham was satisfied with these terms and agreed to sell one load of small size watermelons. About the same time, Respondent was contacted by Morris regarding the sale of a truckload of small size watermelons. Morris was neither an employee or agent of Respondent, and Respondent considered Morris to be the seller. Respondent agreed to pay Morris four and one-half cents per pound for the load. This amount did not include a commission since Morris was treated as a producer in the transaction. While the truck was being loaded in Bigham's field, Bigham had a conversation with Morris and learned that he would not be paid until the crop was delivered. He would, however, be given a cash advance of $700.00 to cover his labor costs. At the same time, Respondent received an inquiry from Morris regarding reimbursement for labor costs. Respondent agreed to advance Morris his labor costs and sent Morris a check in the amount of $700.00 with the name of the payee left blank. Morris then gave the check to Bigham, who filled in his own name as payee and deposited the check. After the load was delivered and sold to a buyer in Canada three days later, Respondent issued a check to Morris in the amount of $1435.00 as full payment for the load. This constituted full payment under their agreement. When he received no payment from Morris within a reasonable period of time, Bigham repeatedly attempted to contact Morris by telephone. However, Morris refused to return his calls. Three weeks after the load was shipped, Bigham telephoned Respondent, who advised that Morris had already been paid for the shipment. Surprisingly, Bigham did not ask Respondent if Morris was its agent or employee, and he did not demand payment from Respondent. Shortly thereafter, Bigham filed a small claims action against Morris and obtained a default judgment against the debtor. Since that time, Morris has not been located. Morris was not an employee or agent of Respondent, and he was not authorized to use Respondent's name when he solicited business with Petitioner. Because Respondent has made a proper accounting and payment to Morris, as producer, Petitioner's appropriate remedy is against Morris, and not Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs enter a final order denying the claim by Petitioner against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Terry T. Neal, Esquire Post Office Box 490327 Leesburge, Florida 34749-0327 Roy Roman Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. 403 East Main Street Immokalee, Florida 34142 Amwest Surety Insurance Company 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Suite 540 Tampa, Florida 33609 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether the claims of $98,935.20 and $19,147.70, filed by Petitioner under the Agricultural Bond and License Law, are valid. §§ 604.15 - 604.34, Fla. Stat. (2008).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a producer of agricultural products located in Plant City, Florida. At all material times, American Growers has been a dealer in agricultural products. Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Company, as surety, issued a bond to American Growers, as principal. American Growers is licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("DACS"). Between December 16, 2008, and February 4, 2009, Petitioner sold strawberries to American Growers, each sale being accompanied by a Passing and Bill of Lading. Petitioner sent an Invoice for each shipment, and payment was due in full following receipt of the Invoice. Partial payments have been made on some of the invoices, and as of the date of this Recommended Order, the amount that remains unpaid by American Growers to Petitioner is $117,982.90, comprising: Invoice No. Invoice Date Amount Balance Due 103894 12/16/08 $7,419.00 $1,296.00 103952 12/22/08 $18,370.80 $1,944.00 103953 12/23/08 $3,123.60 $648.00 193955 12/26/08 $8,164.80 $1,728.00 103984 12/28/08 $28,764.40 $28,764.40 104076 12/31/08 $17,236.80 $17,236.80 104077 1/5/09 $17,658.00 $17,658.00 104189 1/5/09 $1,320.90 $1,320.90 104386 1/20/09 $16,480.80 $16,480.80 104517 1/29/09 $17,449.20 $17,449.20 104496 2/4/09 $13,456.80 $13,456.80 TOTAL $117,982.90
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order requiring Respondent, American Growers, Inc., and/or its surety, Respondent, Lincoln General Insurance Company, to pay Petitioner, Crown Harvest Produce Sales, LLC, the total amount of $117,982.90. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capital, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Glenn Thomason, President American Growers, Inc. 14888 Horseshoe Trace Wellington, Florida 33414 Katy Koestner Esquivel, Esquire Meuers Law Firm, P.L. 5395 Park Central Court Naples, Florida 34109 Renee Herder Surety Bond Claims Lincoln General Insurance Company 4902 Eisenhower Boulevard, Suite 155 Tampa, Florida 33634 Glenn C. Thomason, Registered Agent American Growers, Inc. Post Office Box 1207 Loxahatchee, Florida 33470
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification from employment with a private contractor providing adult day training to developmentally disabled clients of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact From April 2016 to October 2016, Petitioner Bertha Delaney ("Delaney") was employed by Cypress Place, Inc. ("Cypress"), a private, nonprofit corporation that provides services to developmentally disabled clients, and operates under the regulatory jurisdiction, of Respondent Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD"). Delaney was hired by Cypress as a receptionist, and her responsibilities included answering the phones, handling clerical tasks such as maintaining attendance sheets and filing, and assisting other employees as needed. Cypress operates an adult day training program, which offers "adult day training services" to APD clients. Such services include "training services that take place in a nonresidential setting, separate from the home or facility in which the client resides, and are intended to support the participation of clients in daily, meaningful, and valued routines of the community. Such training may be provided in work-like settings that do not meet the definition of supported employment." § 393.063(1), Fla. Stat. There is no persuasive evidence showing that, during her employment with Cypress, Delaney ever had face-to-face contact with a client while performing adult day training services. She was not, therefore, a "direct service provider" as that term is defined in section 393.063(13), Florida Statutes. Delaney did, however, have incidental, in-person interactions with clients, the evidence establishes, occasionally assisting clients in need of immediate help. Thus, although Delaney did not provide training services to clients, she provided some services in the broader sense of "helpful acts." In early August of 2016, an incident involving a client occurred at Cypress's facility, which the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") investigated. In the course of the investigation, the DCF investigator interviewed Delaney and learned that, because the subject client had appeared to be limping on the day in question, Delaney had helped the client walk from the bus to the building. At the time, Delaney had not yet undergone level 2 background screening because Cypress had not instructed her to do so. Rather, in or around April 2016, when she was hired, Cypress had required Delaney to go to the police department for a local criminal background check, which she did. Delaney, in fact, did everything that Cypress asked her to do with regard to background screening. Soon after (and perhaps because of) the DCF investigation, Cypress directed Delaney to submit to a level 2 background review, which she did.1/ And so it happened that in late August 2016, a search of Delaney's criminal history was performed, and the results were forwarded to DCF, which administers the background screening process for APD. By letter dated October 3, 2016, DCF notified Delaney that it had discovered her criminal conviction on a charge of grand theft of the third degree, to which she had pleaded no contest on June 13, 2001. This crime is a "disqualifying offense" under the applicable screening standards, which means that Delaney is ineligible to work as a direct service provider without an exemption from such disqualification. DCF advised Delaney that she needed to quit her job at Cypress and obtain an exemption from disqualification if she wanted to resume working there. Delaney promptly resigned her position with Cypress. Delaney then sought an exemption from disqualification from employment, submitting her Request for Exemption to DCF in November 2016. By letter dated March 17, 2017, APD informed Delaney that it intended to deny her request based solely on the ground that Delaney had "not submitted clear and convincing evidence of [her] rehabilitation." In other words, APD determined as a matter of ultimate fact that Delaney was not rehabilitated, which meant (as a matter of law) that the head of the agency had no discretion to grant an exemption.2/ APD did not, as an alternative basis for its proposed agency action, articulate any rationale for denying the exemption notwithstanding a showing of rehabilitation, assuming arguendo that such had been made. Delaney initiated the instant proceeding, hoping to prove her rehabilitation. The undersigned has considered the evidence as it relates to the statutory criteria for assessing rehabilitation, and makes the following findings of fact as a predicate for the ultimate determination. The Circumstances Surrounding the Criminal Incident. In or around September of 2000, Delaney stole cash receipts from her employer, Blockbuster Video, totaling approximately $13,800.00. She was soon arrested and charged with grand theft of the third degree, a felony offense as defined in section 812.014, Florida Statutes. At the time of the offense, Delaney, then 25 years old, was experiencing financial difficulties raising two young daughters. Although married, Delaney managed the household mostly on her own, as her husband, an interstate truck driver, was often on the road. Exercising what she now acknowledges was poor judgment, Delaney stole her employer's funds to ease her personal financial burden. On June 13, 2001, appearing before the Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, Delaney entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charge, was convicted by plea (adjudication withheld), and was sentenced to two years' probation with orders to make restitution in the amount of $13,778.00 to Blockbuster. Delaney completed her term of probation and complied with all of the other conditions imposed by the court, including the payment of restitution. The Time Period That Has Elapsed since the Incident. The disqualifying offense was committed about 17 years ago. Delaney thus has had ample time to restore her reputation and usefulness to society as a law abiding citizen following her conviction, and to mature into an older, more responsible adult. The Nature of the Harm Caused to the Victim. Delaney did not cause personal injury to any person in the commission of her crime. She was ordered to make restitution to the victim, and did, although the details of this transaction are not available in the record. Therefore, the economic harm caused by Delaney's theft appears to have been minimal. The History of the Applicant since the Incident. Since her conviction, Delaney has completed a training program to become a patient care technician and obtained a license to practice in Florida as a certified nursing assistant. She has held positions in these fields and performed admirably. Delaney lives with her two adult daughters, son-in-law, grandson, and fiancé; her current family situation is stable, both emotionally and financially. Her civil rights have been restored. She has not reoffended or otherwise run afoul of the law. APD severely faults Delaney for a so-called nondisclosure in her response to a question on the exemption request form concerning previous employment. The form asks the applicant to "provide your employment history for the last three years." Delaney answered, in relevant part, by stating: "I have not been employed for the last three (3) years." She followed this statement by describing employment predating "the last three (3) years" and explaining that an ankle injury in May 2013 (which required multiple surgeries to repair), together with the attendant convalescence and rehabilitation, had kept her out of the workforce for a couple of years. APD argues that Delaney lied about her employment history——it is undisputed that she had, in fact, worked (for Cypress) during the three years preceding her request for an exemption——and that this alleged "lie" proves Delaney had known not only that she was required to undergo level 2 background screening before taking the job with Cypress, but also that such screening would reveal her disqualifying criminal conviction, and that, therefore, to avoid detection, she had worked without being screened, in knowing violation of law. Put aside for the moment the issue of fact regarding whether Delaney "lied" about her employment history. APD's argument (that this "lie" is proof of Delaney's knowing violation of the background screening law) is illogical. For even if (as a matter of fact3/) Delany were required to be screened, and even if (as a matter of law4/) the background screening statutes were personally violable by an applicant or employee, Delaney's allegedly fraudulent answer to the employment history question does not rationally lead to the conclusion that she knew either of these premises to be true. Moreover, as discussed in endnote 1, it is unacceptable for an agency to rely upon an applicant's alleged violation of a regulatory statute as grounds to deny an exemption request where such alleged violation has never been proved in an enforcement proceeding. This is because any person charged with committing a disciplinable offense must be served with an administrative complaint and afforded clear notice of the right to a hearing, at which, if timely requested, the agency must prove the alleged wrongdoing by clear and convincing evidence. APD wants to skip all that and just have the undersigned find here, for the first time, that Delaney clearly violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. See Resp.'s PRO at 9. That's not happening. The only relevant finding in this regard, which the undersigned makes, is that Delaney has never been found to have violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. As for the alleged "lie," APD's position that Delaney's response to the employment history question was knowingly and intentionally false (by omitting reference to Cypress) does not make sense, because DCF already knew (from investigating an unrelated matter) that Delaney had worked for Cypress, and Delaney knew that DCF was aware of this fact when she filled out the form. That cat was out of the bag. At hearing, Delaney testified credibly and convincingly that she had not intended to mislead DCF. It is clear that she interpreted the question as asking about her employment during the three years before the job from which she had been disqualified (as opposed to the three years before completing the exemption request form). She misunderstood the question, to be sure, but it was an honest mistake, and the undersigned can appreciate how a person in Delaney's shoes could conclude that the job from which one has recently been disqualified does not "count" towards her employment history for purposes of seeking an exemption from disqualification. Delaney's testimony in this regard is corroborated by the fact that she submitted to DCF, as part of her exemption request package, two letters of recommendation from employees of Cypress, written on Cypress letterhead, attesting to her good character. These letters, taken together, make it clear that Delaney had recently been an employee of Cypress. Obviously, if Delaney had intended, knowingly, to deceive DCF by concealing her employment with Cypress, she would not have provided these letters. APD argues that one of these letters, from Rashard Williams, which is dated October 27, 2016, does not specifically indicate that Delaney ever worked at Cypress——and thus does not bolster Delaney's testimony that she never intended to conceal the fact that she had. To reach this conclusion one must discount the writer's statement that "Ms. Delaney has proven herself to be reliable, trustworthy, and compassionate both as a person and as an employee." If the Williams letter were the only written recommendation from a Cypress employee, however, the undersigned would consider APD's interpretation to be, while certainly not the best or most reasonable, at least plausible in view of Mr. Williams's additional comments about how well Delaney took care of his grandmother in a capacity, apparently, other than as an employee of Cypress. But the companion to the Williams letter, a recommendation from Mark Chmiel dated October 24, 2016, leaves no room for doubt that Delaney was a recent employee of Cypress. A short, two-sentence excerpt suffices to support this finding: "Bertha is an invaluable addition to our agency [i.e., Cypress,] and she has fulfilled the potential of her position far better than anyone before her. Her moral character is beyond reproach and I have no qualms about trusting her with our clients."5/ The letters of recommendation that Delaney furnished DCF refute the notion that she knowingly omitted Cypress from her employment history with the intent to mislead DCF. They prove, instead, that Delaney took for granted DCF's knowledge of her work for Cypress, for she was certain DCF already knew about it. In turn, that foundational assumption (which, in fact, was true) prompted Delaney to provide a history of her employment during the several years leading up to the job with Cypress. The undersigned finds that Delaney is not guilty of knowingly withholding material information from DCF in response to the question about her previous employment. Finally, the undersigned observes that APD, in its preliminary decision-making, impermissibly allowed speculation and conjecture to take the place of facts. In forming its intent to deny Delaney's application, APD took into account the "possibility that Ms. Delaney was trying to protect Cypress Place from demonstrating that they were in violation of the screening laws" as well as the "possibility that Rashard Williams might have tried to hide the fact [sic6/] that there was a violation of the screening requirements by Cypress Place." Resp.'s PRO at 10 (emphasis added). On the basis of this rank speculation, APD conjectured that "Ms. Delaney was willing to collude with [Cypress employees] in order not to spotlight their violation of the licensing law." Resp.'s PRO at 18. APD proved none of this imaginative guesswork. Circumstances Showing Applicant Poses No Danger. Yvonne Ginsberg, the executive director of Cypress, testified in support of Delaney's application. Ms. Ginsberg stated that Delaney was an "excellent" employee and affirmed that she had "no qualms" about Delaney's returning to work at Cypress once an exemption has been secured. The undersigned credits Ms. Ginsberg's testimony as to Delaney's character. In addition, Delaney submitted the written character references of Messrs. Chmiel and Williams, which were discussed above. These documents credibly attest to Delaney's trustworthiness, integrity, and ethical behavior. The undersigned finds without hesitation that Delaney would likely not present a danger in the future if an exemption from disqualification were granted. Ultimate Factual Determination The undersigned has determined, based on clear and convincing evidence, including sufficient persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, that Delaney should not be disqualified from employment because she is, in fact, rehabilitated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order granting Bertha Delaney the exemption from disqualification for which she is, in fact, eligible. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2017.
The Issue Does Respondent Horizon Produce Sales, Inc. (Horizon) owe Petitioner Richard Sapp, d/b/a Sapp Farms (Sapp Farms) $5,484.50 as alleged in the Amended Complaint filed herein by Sapp Farms?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. At times pertinent to this proceeding, Sapp Farms was a "producer" as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, of agricultural products in the State of Florida. Tomatoes come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. Horizon is a Florida Corporation, owned entirely by Donald E. Hinton, and located in Sydney, Florida. At times pertinent to this proceeding, Horizon was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Horizon was issued License Number 10584, supported by Bond Number 58 84 19 in the amount of $16,000 written by Gulf Life Insurance Company, as Surety, with an inception date of September 26, 1998, and an expiration date of September 25, 1999. By Invoice numbered 1262, Sapp Farms’ Exhibit numbered 6, dated June 18, 1999, with a shipping date of June 16, 1999, Sapp Farms sold and delivered to Horizon several varieties and sizes of tomatoes in 25-pound cartons at an agreed-upon price of $9.00 per 25-pound carton for 267 cartons and $8.00 per 25-pound carton for 104 cartons for a total amount of $3,235.00. Horizon was given the opportunity to inspect the tomatoes before or during loading and to reject those tomatoes not meeting the standard or condition agreed upon. Horizon furnished the truck driver and truck upon which the tomatoes were loaded. By check dated July 3, 1999, Horizon paid Sapp Farms $1,415.00 on these tomatoes leaving a balance owing of $1,820.00. By Invoice numbered 1263, Sapp Farms’ Exhibit numbered 10, dated June 22, 1999, with a shipping date of June 22, 1999, Sapp Farms sold and delivered to Horizon 122 25-pound cartons of extra large pink tomatoes at $8.00 per 25-pound carton, 51 25- pound cartons of large pink tomatoes at $8.00 per 25-pound carton, and 296 25-pound cartons of 125-150 count Roma tomatoes at $8.00 per 25-pound carton for a total invoiced price of $3,752.00. Horizon was given the opportunity to inspect the tomatoes before or during loading and to reject those tomatoes not meeting the standard or condition agreed upon. Horizon furnished the truck driver and truck upon which the tomatoes were loaded. Sapp Farms has not been paid for these tomatoes. By Invoice numbered 1272, Sapp Farms’ Exhibit numbered 15, dated June 24, 1999, with a shipping date of June 23, 1999, Sapp Farms sold and delivered to Horizon 70 25-pound cartons of extra large tomatoes at an agreed upon price of $8.50 per 25- pound carton for a total price of $595.00. Horizon was given the opportunity to inspect the tomatoes before or during loading and to reject those tomatoes not meeting the standard or condition agreed upon. Horizon furnished the truck driver and truck upon which the tomatoes were loaded. Sapp Farms has not been paid for those tomatoes. Sapp Farms agrees that it owes Horizon $682.50 in freight charges. See Sapp Farms’ Exhibit numbered 12 and the Amended Complaint filed by Sapp Farms. Horizon contends that it did not agree to purchase the tomatoes at an agreed upon price per 25-pound carton but agreed to "work" the tomatoes with Horizon’s customers and to pay Sapp Farms based on the price received for the tomatoes from its customers less any freight charges, etc. Additionally, Horizon contends that it made contact or attempted to make contact with Sapp Farms regarding each of the loads and was advised, except possibly on one load, by either Mark Davis or Richard Sapp that a federal inspection was not necessary and to "work" the tomatoes as best Horizon could. The more credible evidence is that neither Mark Davis nor Richard Sapp was timely advised concerning the alleged condition of the tomatoes. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to show that the condition of the tomatoes when delivered to Horizon’s customers had deteriorated to a point that resulted in rejection by Horizon’s customers. The more credible evidence shows that neither Mark Davis nor Richard Sapp advised Horizon that there was no need for a federal inspection or that Horizon could "work" the tomatoes with Horizon’s customers. The more credible evidence is that Horizon agreed to purchase Sapp Farms’ tomatoes at an agreed-upon price and that upon those tomatoes being loaded on Horizon’s truck, Horizon was responsible to Sapp Farms for the agreed-upon price. Sapp Farms timely filed its Amended Complaint in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes, and Horizon owes Sapp Farms for tomatoes purchased from Sapp Farms on Invoice numbered 1262, 1263, and 1272 less the partial payment on Invoice numbered 1262 of $1,415 and freight charges of $682.50 for total amount due of $5,484.50.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order granting Sapp Farms relief by ordering Horizon Produce Sales, Inc. to pay Sapp Farms the sum of $5,484.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Sapp Sapp Farms 4720 Gallagher Road Plant City, Florida 33565 Donald E. Hinton, Qualified Representative President, Horizon Produce Sales, Inc. 1839 Dover Road, North Post Office Box 70 Sydney, Florida 33587 Michael E. Riley, Esquire Rumberger, Kirk and Caldwell A Professional Association Post Office Box 1050 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue This case concerns the action brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent under the alleged authority found in Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, which attacks certain memoranda received by the Petitioner on July 24, 1980, directed to him by officials within the Respondent agency, the text of which purportedly caused the Petitioner's termination or dismissal from employment for reason that the Petitioner had failed to gain the permission of the Respondent to run for public office in the State of Florida. The proceeding is promoted as a rules challenge.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, George Nelson, was a permanent status Career Service employee on July 14, 1980, working for the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Forestry. His specific employment was a firefighter. On the subject date, by correspondence directed to an official within the Division of Forestry, namely, Larry Wood, the Petitioner notified the Respondent of his intention to run for a School Board Seat, District IV, in Wakulla County, Florida. A copy of that notification may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. As stated in the correspondence, Nelson had made an attempt to determine the necessary steps to gain the approval of his agency before taking the oath of candidacy for the aforementioned position. (This request was made following a conversation with the same Larry Wood held on July 10, 1980, on the subject of Nelson's candidacy. On July 10, a letter was sent addressed only to "Larry" and at Mr. Wood's instigation the subsequent letter of July 14, 1980, was dispatched referring to Wood as "Mr. Larry Wood", for appearance sake.) As set forth in the Nelson correspondence, the last date for qualifying for the School Board position was July 22, 1980, at 12:00 Noon. Prior to that date, the Petitioner's request to run was forwarded through the decision-making channels within the Division of Forestry. At the time Nelson dispatched his letter of July 14, 1980, there was some concern expressed by Wood to the effect that there might be some scheduling conflict between Nelson's primary employment duties as a forest ranger and his duties as a School Board Member; however, Wood indicated that the scheduling matter could probably be accommodated. Wood offered no guarantee to the Petitioner that the request to run for office would be approved by the appropriate agency officials. On July 18, 1980, and again on July 21, 1980, officials with the Division of Forestry orally indicated to the Petitioner that he would not he allowed to run for the School Board. In view of the fact that the last day for qualifying was July 22, 1980, the Petitioner determined to offer his candidacy without the permission of his agency head and on that date he took the loyalty oath for public office for the School Board, District IV, Wakulla County, Florida, as may be seen by Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, which is a copy of the Loyalty Oath and the Oath of Candidacy and Statement of Candidacy. On July 23, 1980, Larry Wood, District Forester and supervisor to the Petitioner, contacted the Petitioner to inquire why the Petitioner had offered his candidacy without permission of the agency. The Petitioner responded that he did so because he did not feel that there was any conflict between school board duties and that of forest ranger. Wood informed him that he would hear from the Division of Forestry on the subject. Following the conversation with Wood, on July 24, 1980, the Petitioner received two items in response to his request. One of those items was dated July 21, 1980, from John M. Bethea, Director, Division of Forestry, addressed to Larry Wood, in which the subject of the Petitioner's candidacy was discussed and the indication given that it would not be approved due to scheduling problems and conflict and controversies "that are generated by any local governmental political body". The memorandum went on to say, "These controversies might affect the Forestry Division's ability to carry out the responsibilities with the very segments of the public." A copy of this memorandum may be found as petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The second item received by the Petitioner on July 24, 1980, was dated on that date, and addressed to George Nelson from Larry Wood, indicating a denial of the petitioner's request to run for public office. This correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, a copy of which has been admitted into evidence. After the Petitioner had received the memoranda discussed herein, there ensued a series of meetings between the Petitioner and various officials within the agency in which the agency tried to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy in view of the fact that he had not gained their permission to run for the school Board. Throughout these discussions, the Petitioner continued to assert the conviction that unless some conflict of interest could be shown to him, he did not intend to withdraw as a candidate. In the discussions, the agency further stated that the choices open to the Petitioner were ones of resignation from his position as A Forest Ranger or withdrawal from the School Board race. They also stated that if he were caused to resign, there could be no rights to appeal beyond that point. In the course of the process, the Petitioner met with Director Bethea, who explained the Director's position on the Petitioner's right to run for office and reiterated his opposition, based upon his problems of scheduling to accommodate the needs of the Division of Forestry and the needs of the school Board of Wakulla County and also the concern of possible conflicts and controversies arising out of the necessity for forest rangers to go on the property of the citizens of the several counties in the State of Florida and the fact that this might create a problem in view of the nature of the functions of a school board member. Although the Director generally held the philosophy that employees in positions such as the Petitioner's should not normally be allowed to run for local office, he did not absolutely foreclose the possibility that someone might persuade him to the contrary and thereby cause him to allow them to seek a local office. Each case would be reviewed on its own merits. The matter was also presented before representatives of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services, who took the same position as had been taken by the other authorities within the department, and again the Petitioner indicated that he would decline to withdraw as a candidate. Following the meeting with the Department officials, Wood made one other contact to ascertain if the Petitioner had changed his mind about withdrawing his name as a candidate and the Petitioner indicated that the had not. Subsequent to that latter conversation with Wood, the Petitioner was hand-delivered a letter dated August 12, 1980, which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This letter informed the Petitioner that he was deemed to have resigned his position as Forest Ranger effective August 15, 1990, and offered as a statement of authority Subsection 110.233(4)(a), Florida Statutes. After August 15, 1980, the Petitioner was removed as a permanent party Career Service employee with the Respondent. Following his dismissal, the Petitioner through his counsel in the subject case has attacked the Joint Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, by contending that those aforementioned exhibits constitute invalid rules for reason that they were not duly promulgated. The Petitioner continued to work beyond August 15, 1980, and was eventually reinstated as a probationary employee with the Division of Forestry and holds the position of probationary Forest Ranger at this time.
The Issue The issues in this cause are fashioned by an amended administrative complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent. By the first count to this complaint, Respondent is charged with knowingly employing and otherwise encouraging his wife, Nadia Said Helmy, to practice veterinary medicine in Florida without the benefit of a license. The second count to the amended administrative complaint was dismissed at the commencement of the hearing. By count three, the Respondent is charged with inappropriate advertising in association with his veterinary practice.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Veterinary Medicine (Petitioner) is empowered by Chapters 455 and 474, Florida Statutes, to regulate the practice of veterinary medicine in Florida. Samy H. Helmy, D.V.M (Respondent), is and has been a licensed veterinarian in Florida during the pendency of the allegations set forth in the amended administrative complaint. Respondent's wife, Nadia Said Helmy, is not now licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida, nor has she been during the time sequence contemplated by the amended administrative complaint. Respondent and his wife owned and operated Wildwood Animal Clinic in Wildwood, Florida, from a period before January 1985 until June 1985. Respondent and his wife were also the owners and operators of Citrus Fair Animal Hospital in Inverness, Florida, from January 1985 through September 19, 1986, the date upon which Respondent gave a deposition in this cause. During the time frame in which both animal clinics were open, Respondent was principally located at the Inverness facility, while his wife was working in the Wildwood facility. Nadia Helmy was working under the supervision of the Respondent in her activities at Wildwood. Sometime in May 1985, a Ms. Goheen took her cat to Dr. Leigh McBride, another veterinarian licensed to practice in Florida. Ms. Goheen claimed that her cat had been treated by a veterinarian at the Wildwood Animal Clinic. She described that veterinarian as being a female. Dr. McBride was unfamiliar with a female veterinarian at the Wildwood Animal Clinic, being of the understanding that Respondent, a man, was the practicing veterinarian in that facility. This circumstance in which it was possible that someone was practicing veterinary medicine without the benefit of a license led to an investigation of that possibility on the part of Petitioner. Eventually, A. L. Smith, an investigator for Petitioner, was assigned to undertake the investigation. Smith borrowed a cat from Dr. McBride. Stogie, the cat, had come into Dr. McBride's veterinary clinic with a broken shoulder which Dr. McBride had repaired. Following this episode, the cat walked with a slight limp. Around May 22 or 23, 1985, in furtherance of his investigation, Mr. Smith took Stogie to the Wildwood Animal Clinic. He had in mind ascertaining whether Nadia Helmy was practicing veterinary medicine without a license by seeing if she would practice on the cat. He deliberately picked an occasion in which Ms. Helmy was alone in the Wildwood Animal Clinic in his effort to determine her willingness to practice veterinary medicine. Once inside the Wildwood Animal Clinic, Mr. Smith confirmed that Nadia Helmy was the only person in attendance. Smith asked to see a veterinarian, remarking to Ms. Helmy that his cat was suffering lethargy and was limping more than usual and that he needed the cat to be examined by a veterinarian. Ms. Helmy directed Smith to take the cat to an examination room and showed him the location of that examination room. At that point, Smith said that Nadia Helmy commenced "the examination." He further described that while the cat was on the examining table ". . . she [Nadia Helmy] was looking at it and looking into its eyes." He indicated that the examination he was observing was what he would expect a veterinarian to give an animal. On the other hand, this is the first instance in which Mr. Smith had ever done undercover investigation of alleged unauthorized practice of veterinary medicine and there is no other information that has been presented which would lead to the conclusion that Mr. Smith knew what techniques would be employed in an examination conducted by a veterinarian. Under the circumstances, there being no further indication of the factual details of the examination, absent the remark concerning Nadia Helmy's looking into the eyes of the cat, it cannot be concluded what details were involved in the alleged examination process and whether in fact the kind of examination conducted by veterinarians was occurring. The telephone rang, and Nadia Helmy left the examination room and answered the phone. She was gone for. three or four minutes. Mr. Smith could hear Nadia Helmy's end of the conversation, in which she spoke in some foreign language. Nadia Helmy testified in the course of the hearing that she spoke with her husband on the telephone regarding the symptoms of Stogie, among other matters. Having examined her demeanor in the course of the hearing and all her answers provided under interrogation, no credence is afforded her version of the telephone conversation. Consequently, no facts are found as to the nature of that conversation. Nonetheless, it is concluded that a conversation was held between Nadia Helmy and Respondent. Following the telephone conversation, Nadia Helmy returned to the examination room and looked at the cat again. Mr. Smith admitted that the cat seemed to be better and Ms. Helmy agreed with him and stated that the cat was just suffering from extended travel. Nadia Helmy said that the cat would be better after returning home. This was in response to Mr. Smith's representation that he was travelling between Tallahassee and Naples, Florida. Mr. Smith described the remarks by Nadia Helmy, concerning the fact that the cat was suffering from extended travel to be some form of diagnosis. Again, it not being identified that the investigator could speak to matters of what constitutes a diagnosis and the nature of those remarks by Nadia Helmy not being clearly a form of diagnosis which might be recognized by a lay person, the remarks are not received as stating a diagnosis. Throughout the exchange between Mr. Smith and Nadia Helmy on the date that the cat was brought to the Wildwood Animal Clinic, Mr. Smith referred to Nadia Helmy as "doctor." Although Ms. Helmy did not correct Mr. Smith in his reference, she did not affirmatively state that she was in fact a veterinarian licensed by Florida to practice veterinary medicine. In the course of the events in the examination room, Nadia Helmy did not take the temperature of the cat, did not take a case history on the cat or provide any form of treatment. Following the conversation in the examination room, Investigator Smith asked Nadia Helmy "how much" for her service. She replied five dollars. Nadia Helmy gave Investigator Smith a receipt for the payment of the five dollars. A copy of the receipt may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. It is on a form of the Wildwood Animal Clinic, which has a portion related to the character of service. This portion of the receipt is not filled out. The only thing that is reflected is the amount of charges and Mr. Smith's name and a date, May 22, 1985. Under these circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the five dollar charge was for provision of veterinary services. After leaving Wildwood Animal Clinic, Investigator Smith went to Citrus Fair Animal Hospital at Inverness. While there, he discussed with Respondent the facts of his visit to the Wildwood Animal Clinic and the nature of events related to Respondent's wife and the fact that the investigation was in answer to allegations made about the wife's practice of veterinary medicine. In the course of this conversation, Respondent stated that his wife was a graduate of veterinary medicine and was qualified to examine animals and run the clinic but that he did all of the surgery. He stated that his wife was qualified to give shots and to determine what was wrong with animals. Concerning the wife's actions, Respondent stated that his wife was too busy raising three children to get all the classes and under this circumstance hadn't passed an examination. Nonetheless, according to Respondent, the wife was completely qualified in that she was a graduate of veterinary medicine school. This acknowledgment by Respondent as to the general arrangement between the Respondent and his wife concerning the operation of the Wildwood Animal Clinic does not revitalize the Petitioner's claim that the wife was practicing veterinary medicine on the specific day in question. Evidence was presented in the course of the hearing concerning the fact that Nadia Helmy would not treat an animal of one Ralph Benfield when the animal had been offered for treatment at the Wildwood Animal Clinic. However, this situation occurred at a time when the Wildwood Animal Clinic was being phased out and it is not clear what significance that fact had in the decision by Nadia Helmy not to offer assistance to the animal. In January 1985, Respondent entered into a one-year advertising contract with the Citrus County Chronicle, a local newspaper. This was for the placement of advertisements pertaining to his Citrus Fair Animal Hospital. One of the ads placed in the paper, at the instigation of the Respondent, can be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence. The date of the advertisement is March 31, 1985. It advertised free fecal check and a free office visit, but did not contain the 72-hour disclaimer language contemplated by Section 455.24, Florida Statutes. Having been advised of this problem related to the lack of disclaimer, Respondent, by correspondence of August 26, 1985, acknowledged his violation and modified the format of his advertising. The letter of August 26, 1985, and the new format of advertising may be found as Petitioner's second exhibit admitted into evidence. This letter had been dispatched based upon a complaint which was filed on August 9, 1985, by a Dr. Asaad. This led to action by the Petitioner attempting to have Respondent rectify the problems with his advertising. Following the circumstance in which Respondent had been made aware of the problem with his advertising, he took steps to ensure that the advertising was in compliance with law by contacting the Citrus County Chronicle. Although the employee of the Citrus County Chronicle who testified in the course of the final hearing was uncertain about whether the March 31, 1985, advertising copy was specifically approved by the Respondent, it was the practice of the newspaper to provide Respondent with a proof prior to publication. Circumstantially, it is concluded that Respondent did not oppose or question the acceptability of the March 31, 1985, advertising. Support for this position is found in the fact that Respondent conceded his violation by his August 25, 1985, correspondence.
Findings Of Fact Trees of Florida, Inc. by its president, Jerry K. Rigsby, contacted Everglades Tree and Plant Farm, Inc. to purchase 30 live oak trees. Rigsby saw the size trees he wanted and requested Petitioner to sell him those trees. Petitioner refused to sell the trees desired because they had not been root pruned. Some 60 to 90 days to recover from root pruning are required before trees can be safely uprooted and replanted. Other live oaks that had been sold by Petitioner to another company, Swanson and Coleman, were on the premises, had been root pruned, and Respondent inquired if it could buy those trees. Petitioner contacted Swanson and Coleman who did not need early delivery and Petitioner told Respondent it would sell Respondent 30 of those trees on a cash only basis. Respondent agreed and sent his truck to pick up the trees. They had not yet been dug and Respondent was advised it would be several days before the trees could be loaded. When the trees were dug, Respondent appeared with $2000 cash and a check for the $1360 balance owed. Despite telling Rigsby the deal was strictly for cash, Beaty accepted the check and Respondent took away the trees. Respondent stopped payment on the check and complained to Petitioner that the trees were below the 16 to 18 feet height Respondent had contracted for. Petitioner had its bank check with the payor bank on whom the check was written and was advised Respondent had insufficient funds on deposit to honor the $1360 check. After some negotiations between the parties, Petitioner agreed to take back the 30 trees and refund Respondent's payment if Respondent would replant the trees and they all lived. Respondent never returned any trees or paid the $1360 balance claimed by Petitioner.
The Issue Whether Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc., is liable to Petitioner for the purchase of landscaping trees; and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Southeastern Trees, LLC (Petitioner or Southeastern Trees), is a Florida Limited Liability Corporation located in Gainesville, Florida, engaged in the business of commercial tree farming. Keith Lerner is the President of Southeastern, and David Lerner is the Vice President. Respondent, Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc. (Respondent or Grandview), is a Florida corporation headquartered in Ocala, Florida, engaged in commercial landscaping. Grandview is licensed by the Department as a dealer in nursery products, flowers, and sod. In August 2015, John Sapp, Grandview’s owner, visited Petitioner’s tree farm and selected 27 live oak trees to purchase. On December 11, 2014, Mr. Sapp returned to Southeastern Trees and took possession of the 27 live oak trees. Mr. Sapp used his own equipment to haul the trees. Petitioner sent an invoice to Respondent on December 11, 2014, in the amount of $5,724.00 for the 27 live oak trees. The invoice term was “net 30,” allowing 30 days for Respondent to pay in full. After 30 days had elapsed without payment, David Lerner contacted Mr. Sapp to request payment. Mr. Lerner also requested the location of the trees in order to place a lien thereon. According to Mr. Lerner, Mr. Sapp refused to divulge the location of the trees. After 60 days had elapsed without payment, Keith Lerner contacted Mr. Sapp via telephone. According to Keith Lerner, he spoke with Mr. Sapp on March 1, 2015, who informed him the trees were beautiful and Mr. Sapp would “get him a check.” Keith Lerner attempted to reach Mr. Sapp via telephone again on March 10, 2015, and left messages with Grandview’s office and on Mr. Sapp’s personal mobile phone. Mr. Lerner did not receive a return call. On March 25, 2015, Petitioner sent Respondent, via certified mail, a letter requesting payment of $5,724.00 for the 27 live oak trees and “any interest available to us beyond the 30 days of credit that were extended to you.” The letter was delivered to both Grandview’s business address and Mr. Sapp’s home address. The certified mail receipts were returned to Southeastern Trees, signed and dated March 26, 2015. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department on March 31, 2015, against Southeastern Trees. Petitioner paid a filing fee of $50.00 As of the date of the hearing, Southeastern Trees had not responded to Petitioner’s request for payment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Southeastern Trees, LLC, against Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc., in the amount of $5,774.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's license to operate an assisted living facility should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the agency responsible for the licensing and regulation of assisted living facilities in Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. Orchard Meadows is an assisted living facility (ALF) which is owned by Nathaniel Gallon, and is located in Monticello, Florida. Prior Case and Administrative Fine In a prior case involving AHCA and Nathaniel Gallon, d/b/a Orchard Meadows, AHCA issued a Final Order dated September 27, 2001. The Final Order incorporated by reference a Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties, which read in pertinent part: The Respondent agrees to pay half of the administrative fine imposed, in the amount of seven thousand eight hundred seventy-five ($7,875) dollars, to be paid within sixty (60) days of entry of the Final Order adopting this settlement stipulation agreement. The Respondent agrees to maintain the facility in substantial compliance with all applicable statutes and rules governing assisted living facilities, as determined by the Agency field office manager, for a period of one year from the entry of the Final Order incorporating this settlement stipulation agreement. In the event that the conditions in paragraph 6 and 7 are not met, the following consequences shall result: the remaining seven thousand eight hundred seventy-five ($7,875) dollars outstanding from the administrative fine initially imposed by the Agency in the amount of fifteen thousand seven hundred fifty ($15,750) dollars, shall become due immediately. the Agency shall consider Respondent ineligible for renewal of licensure as an assisted living facility based on the demonstrated inability to comply with requirements of continued licensure. Eula Fogle is the Administrator of Orchard Meadows and has been in that position since May of 2000. According to both Mr. Gallon and Ms. Fogle, Orchard Meadows made efforts to acquire the funds to pay the $7,875.00 administrative fine referenced in paragraph 6 of the stipulation but acknowledge that they were unable to do so within the 60 days following the entry of the Final Order referenced above. However, a few days after the 60-day time period expired, they were able to acquire the funds and Ms. Fogle personally took a check for $7,875.00 to Mr. Rice at AHCA. AHCA did not accept the check but referred Ms. Fogle to the agency's lawyers. Ms. Fogle attempted to get in touch with the appropriate agency lawyer(s) in an effort to pay the fine but was unsuccessful in doing so. License renewal Orchard Meadows first received a license to operate an ALF by AHCA effective December 23, 1994. Orchard Meadows renewed its license and was issued a conditional license from December 23, 1996 through March 22, 1997. Orchard Meadows received a standard license for the period March 23, 1997 through December 22, 1998. On August 18, 1999, AHCA sent a letter to Orchard Meadows enclosing a standard renewal license #AL8362 issued for the period December 23, 1999 to December 22, 2002. Greg Rice is a Government Operations Consultant III in the Assisted Living Licensing Office of AHCA. According to Mr. Rice, ALF licenses are issued for two-year periods. Thus, the license issued from December 23, 1999 until December 22, 2002, was issued in error. On October 25, 1999, AHCA sent another letter to Orchard Meadows with a standard renewal license enclosed. The letter stated that the enclosed license was being issued to correct the dates of the one previously sent. The letter also requested that Orchard Meadows return the license previously issued. The renewal standard license #AL8362 was issued for the period December 23, 1998 until December 22, 2000, which resulted in a two-year licensure period beginning one year prior to the first renewal license and ending two years earlier. On July 31, 2000, AHCA sent a letter to Orchard Meadows notifying Petitioner that the license to operate expired December 22, 2000. The letter instructed Orchard Meadows to complete an enclosed application and return it with the appropriate fee 90 days before the expiration date. The letter further stated that failure to file a renewal application within that time frame will result in a late fee as allowed by law. The return-receipt card was signed by Demetria Poe on August 2, 2000. Ms. Poe is a former employee of Orchard Meadows and did not testify at the hearing. There is no evidence of any correspondence from AHCA to Orchard Meadows regarding the license status between the July 31, 2000 letter and a January 11, 2002 letter, a period of approximately one and one-half years. Despite the position by AHCA that the license expired December 22, 2000, AHCA continued to come to the facility to conduct surveys during the period of time in which AHCA contends that Orchard Meadows was operating without a license. According to Ms. Fogle, AHCA's most recent survey of the facility was conducted four to six months prior to the final hearing date. Mr. Rice's explained why Orchard Meadows was permitted to operate: Q. And even though that renewal was not submitted, they were permitted to continue to operate because they were in litigation; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And so, because they were in litigation and because there was a settlement that needed to be complied with, is that the reason that there was no further notice to the facility after the July 2000? A. Yes. On January 11, 2002, AHCA sent a letter to Eula Fogle, Administrator of Orchard Meadows. The letter notified Ms. Fogle that the license to operate Orchard Meadows expired on December 22, 2000, and that no renewal application had been filed nor had the license fee been paid. The letter instructed Ms. Fogle to cease and desist operating Orchard Meadows. Ms. Fogle was surprised to receive the January 11, 2002 letter as the license with the 2002 expiration date was on the wall of the office in Orchard Meadows. According to Ms. Fogle, she was unaware of the July 31, 2000 letter signed for by the former employee, Demetria Poe, or of the license with the expiration date of December 22, 2000, that was issued in 1999. It was her understanding that Orchard Meadows' license was current until December 2002. Orchard Meadows filed a renewal application in early 2002. The record is not clear as to the exact date it was filed. However, Mr. Rice established that it was filed sometime subsequent to the January 11, 2002 letter from AHCA to Orchard Meadows. On February 27, 2002, AHCA issued the subject Notice Of Intent to Deny Orchard Meadows' renewal of their ALF license, which states as follows: Dear Ms. Fogle: It is the decision of this Agency that your renewal application for an assisted living facility (ALF) license be DENIED. The Specific Basis for this determination is: The applicant's failure to submit a completed renewal license application within the specified time frames pursuant to Section 400.414(1)(i), Florida Statutes (F.S.), and Section 400.417, F.S. Specifically, the applicant failed to provide proof of liability insurance and failed to pay an outstanding fine in final order status (AHCA Case No's: 02-00-063-ALF, 02-00-004-ALF, 02-00-016-ALF and 02-00-053- ALF). The omitted information was requested by the Agency in a certified letter dated February 4, 2002, received by the applicant on February 6, 2002. The applicant failed to submit the required information to the Agency by February 25, 2002. No proof was presented at hearing describing any omissions request as referenced in the Notice of Intent to Deny. Nonetheless, Orchard Meadows' current liability insurance is with United National Insurance Company with an effective date of March 27, 2002 until March 27, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order requiring Orchard Meadows to pay the $7,875.00 fine and any renewal application fees, including any appropriate late fees, within 30 days of the issuance of the final order. Upon payment of the fine and license fees, Orchard Meadows' license should be renewed. If the fine and license fees are not paid within 30 days of the final order, the renewal application of Orchard Meadows should be denied and Orchard Meadows should cease operations as a licensed assisted living facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine T. Messana, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Lee Dougherty, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Leland McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Valinda Clark Christian, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
