The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to sections 408.809 and 435.07, Florida Statutes,1/ should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is authorized to conduct certain background screenings for employees providing specific types of services within health care facilities licensed under chapters 400, 408, and 429, Florida Statutes. § 408.809, Fla. Stat. Petitioner seeks employment in a position providing direct services to residents of a health care facility licensed under chapter 429 and, as such, is required to participate in Respondent’s background screening process pursuant to section 408.809. Petitioner submitted to the required background screening, which revealed that in 1999, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Felony Grand Theft/Bank Fraud in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Panama City Division, Case No. 5:99CR165PM. This conviction is akin to a felony grand theft conviction under chapter 812, Florida Statutes. The above-referenced criminal conviction makes Petitioner ineligible to provide a service in a health care facility licensed by Respondent unless Petitioner receives an exemption from Respondent, pursuant to section 435.07. Petitioner was also arrested in 2001 for Felony Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. On that charge, Petitioner pled guilty to a lesser included charge of simple assault, in Leon County Circuit Court, Case No. 01-1020AM. In addition, Petitioner was arrested in 2009 for felony charges of larceny/grand theft and exploitation of the elderly, charges which were ultimately dismissed due to the alleged victim’s death. Petitioner submitted an application for exemption to Respondent in accordance with sections 408.809 and 435.07 on or about April 30, 2014, and attended a telephonic hearing conducted by Respondent on June 17, 2014. The results of the June 17, 2014, teleconference are not at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner submitted another application for exemption to Respondent in accordance with section 435.07 on or about September 29, 2014. A telephonic hearing was conducted by Respondent on that second application for exemption on December 9, 2014, during which Respondent and Petitioner agreed to utilize the information obtained in the June 17, 2014, hearing regarding the 1999 Grand Theft/Bank Fraud and the 2001 Assault convictions, and to only discuss the circumstances surrounding the 2009 allegations of Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly. A panel consisting of Respondent’s Operations and Consulting Manager for the Background Screening Unit, Sherry Ledbetter, and Respondent’s Health and Facilities Consultants, Kelley Goff and Zack Masters, also attended the telephonic hearing. Exhibit A-1, Respondent’s file for Petitioner’s exemption request, contains the exemption denial letter; internal Agency notes; panel hearing notes from both the June 17, 2014, and the December 9, 2014, teleconferences; Petitioner’s criminal history; Petitioner’s exemption application; arrest affidavits; conviction records; probation records; court records; and several letters in support of Petitioner’s requested exemption. Exhibits A-2 and A-3 are audio recordings of Petitioner’s teleconferences from her exemption hearings from June 17, 2014, and December 9, 2014. After the telephonic hearing, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request for an exemption, and Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. At the administrative hearing, Sherry Ledbetter testified that Respondent considered Petitioner’s entire case file, including all submissions received from Petitioner, and her explanations during the teleconferences when it determined that Petitioner’s request for an exemption should be denied. Respondent is legally authorized to consider all subsequent arrests or convictions, even if those arrests or convictions are not disqualifying offenses. Respondent considered Petitioner’s subsequent arrests and convictions during the review of Petitioner’s application for exemption. Respondent also considered the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s most recent arrest, 2009 Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly, even though the charges were dismissed. Petitioner admitted during the December 9, 2014, teleconference that the alleged victim made payments toward Petitioner’s bills while Petitioner was employed as her caregiver. Petitioner did not see any ethical issues with taking payments from a patient for whom she is caring, when she was already being paid by her employer for the services she rendered. Respondent explained, and it is found, that Petitioner did not appear to be totally candid and honest in her responses to the panel’s questions during the teleconferences and did not take responsibility for any of the criminal offenses. Although Respondent allows exemption applicants to have people speak on the applicants’ behalf at the teleconferences, Petitioner did not choose to have anyone speak on her behalf. Respondent considers any training, education, or certificates that an exemption applicant submits, but Petitioner did not have any such submissions, aside from Petitioner’s statement that she attended a budget class after her 1999 conviction. Based on Petitioner’s entire file and her responses during the teleconferences, Respondent determined that Petitioner did not satisfy her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence of demonstrating rehabilitation from her disqualifying offense. Respondent maintains that Petitioner still poses a risk to the vulnerable population she would serve if employed at another health care facility. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Mutaqee Akbar, her criminal defense attorney for her 2009 charges of Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly, who testified that the 2009 charges against Petitioner were dismissed by the prosecutor. On cross examination, Mr. Akbar admitted that the prosecutor cited the death of the alleged victim as the reason for the case’s dismissal. Mr. Akbar also admitted that law enforcement records reflect that the alleged victim made a statement to law enforcement prior to her death that she did not give her consent for the payments made toward Petitioner’s bills. In her testimony at the final hearing, Petitioner discussed how she is a changed person and has overcome a great deal of adversity to get to where she is now. Petitioner is presently involved in her community, specifically with her church and children’s schools, and takes care of her goddaughter and four children. Petitioner has a daughter who attends community college and Petitioner has been striving to set a good example for her daughter. Petitioner’s daughter, Sierra Thomas, who is in community college, gave credible testimony that she always favored her mother and did not believe the 2009 allegations against her mother. One of Petitioner’s good friends, Sheria Hackett, testified that Petitioner is a good person and deserves to be granted the exemption. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-1 is a composite exhibit consisting of additional information relating to Petitioner’s criminal cases and a letter from her probation officer. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-2 consists of a letter from Respondent dated May 22, 2014, requesting additional information from Petitioner during the exemption application process. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-3 consists of Petitioner’s petition for formal hearing. Although Petitioner appeared remorseful for her criminal convictions, considering all of the facts, circumstances, and evidence presented to AHCA and at the final hearing, it cannot be said that she proved by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated and should not be disqualified from employment. Moreover, AHCA’s intended action of denying Petitioner’s request for exemption was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Petitioner failed to meet her burden of showing that she is entitled to the exemption she seeks from Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification for employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2015.
Findings Of Fact The following facts are stipulated by the parties and are incorporated herein: The Respondent has been the clerk of court for Collier County since June of 1986. The Respondent was the clerk of court at all times material to this complaint. In July of 1990, the Respondent's wife was issued a citation for having glass bottles on the beach, a violation of municipal ordinance No. 16.30, City of Naples. On August 21, 1990, upon failure to timely pay the fine for the violation of the above-described ordinance or to appear in court on this date, an arrest warrant for Theresa Giles was issued. On August 30, 1990, on or about 4:30 p.m., police officers arrived at the Respondent's residence to arrest Ms. Giles for her failure to appear or to pay fine. The officers allowed Ms. Giles to make a telephone call to her husband at the clerk's office. The Respondent went to one of his deputy clerks, Lorraine Stoll and discussed the situation with her. As a result, Ms. Stoll called the officers at the Respondent's home and informed them that the bench warrant for Ms. Giles was recalled. Ms. Giles was not taken into custody as a result of Ms. Stoll's action. These facts are derived from the evidence presented, weighed and credited: Respondent, James Giles was the Collier County finance director, performing the pre-audit function for the county, when he was appointed county clerk to finish a two year term in 1986. He was then elected to a four year term ending in January 1993, and was not reelected. His prior employment experience was as a private certified public accountant, an employee of St. Johns County, and an auditor for the State of Florida. On August 30, 1990, when Theresa Giles called her husband, she was very upset. He had promised to pay the fine, but had forgotten. She was home alone with her young child and her elderly mother when the deputies came to serve the warrant and arrest her. The ticket, or "Notice to Appear" issued to Ms. Giles for her infraction plainly provides notice that if the fine is not paid or the person fails to appear in court at the appointed time, an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Advocate Exhibit No. 2) James Giles immediately called his misdemeanor division and Kathleen Heck answered the phone. After he briefly explained the situation, she went to find the supervisor, Lorraine Stoll. As the two women were at Ms. Stoll's desk, bringing Ms. Giles' case up on the computer, Mr. Giles appeared in person. This was a very unusual situation because the clerk rarely came back to the misdemeanor office. He was Lorraine Stoll's immediate supervisor. He asked if there was anything that could be done and Ms. Stoll responded that the warrant could be recalled. Before she could explain any further, he handed her a paper with his home phone and asked her to make the call. Ms. Giles answered the phone and put the deputy on; Ms. Stoll told him the warrant was recalled, and Ms. Giles was not arrested. Ms. Stoll then told Mr. Giles that the fine and court costs had to be paid. He said the whole thing was ridiculous, that he could not believe a warrant could be issued for such a minor offense. By this time it was after 5:00 p.m. and the cashier's office was closed. Giles paid the $36.50 fine the next day and paid the $100.00 court costs on September 13, some two weeks later. (Respondent's exhibits nos. 1 and 2). James Giles admits being upset at the time that the phone call was made, but was trying to calm down because he knew Lorraine Stoll to be excitable. He was flabbergasted that someone could be arrested for having bottles on the beach. He denies that he pressured Ms. Stoll, but claims he was trying to be rational and get sound advice. He wanted her to make the call because he felt it would "look bad" if he did. James Giles did not raise his voice but both Ms. Stoll and Ms. Heck perceived he was upset and in a pressure situation. Ms. Stoll had never been involved in a circumstance where the warrant was recalled while the deputies were getting ready to make an arrest. She has worked in the misdemeanor section of the clerk's office for eleven and a half years, as deputy clerk. No ordinary citizen could have received the advantage that the clerk and his wife received. Judge Ellis, a Collier County judge, has a written policy providing that a bench warrant may be set aside after payment of costs and fine. Another county judge, Judge Trettis, requires that his office or the State's Attorney be called, and does not have a written policy. Ms. Stoll does not have the authority to recall a warrant without following the proper procedure. This situation was out of the ordinary. She made the telephone call because her boss told her to, and their main concern was that the warrant needed to be recalled so Ms. Giles would not go to jail. On the other hand, Ms. Stoll did not tell Mr. Giles that he was pressuring her, nor did she have the opportunity to tell him the proper procedure before making the telephone call. James Giles' explanation that he was simply seeking advice of his staff and then acting on it without wrongful intent is disingenuous. Whatever his actual knowledge of proper procedures for recalling a warrant, he knew or should have known that what he was doing was not an opportunity available to other citizens. His experience in the clerk's office and in prior public service should have clued him that no one else could simply get a deputy clerk to intercept an arrest with a telephone call.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that James Giles violated Section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending a civil penalty of $250.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4942EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Advocate's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. 8.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. A.-E. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 8 and 12. Rejected as the sequence suggested is contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as misleading. The evidence shows the process was incorrect and both staff knew it was incorrect. The clerk was informed about the correct procedure after the phone call. The procedure is set out in paragraph 13. The evidence is not clear that the fine and costs could not have been paid the same day. By the time Mr. Giles finished complaining, it was after 5:00. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the totality of Ms. Stoll's testimony as well as Ms. Heck's. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. 3. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. More specifically, this proposed finding suggests that the culpability was Ms. Stoll's rather than Respondent's. That suggestion is supported only by Ms. Stoll's timid admissions that she should not have made the phone call without having received the payment from her boss. Ms. Stoll's acceptance of blame does not relieve the Respondent of his responsibility. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig B. Willis Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Raymond Bass, Jr., Esquire Bass & Chernoff 849 7th Avenue, South - Suite 200 Naples, Florida 33940-6715 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be given an exemption from employment disqualification pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At the age of twenty-eight, Petitioner, Alexander Fonseca (Fonseca), was arrested for felony possession of marijuana on February 21, 1989. For this charge, adjudication was withheld, and Fonseca was credited for time served. Petitioner's other criminal history includes a 1983 arrest for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for which he was credited for time served; a 1988 arrest for driving with a suspended license for which adjudication was withheld; a 1988 arrest for driving with a suspended license for which he was found guilty; and a 1991 arrest for reckless driving for which adjudication was withheld. In April 1999, Fonseca sought employment as a Juvenile Probation Officer with the Department. In conjunction with his application for employment, Fonseca was required to submit to the Department's background screening process since he would be working with juveniles. Fonseca was told by a receptionist with the Department that if he had a criminal record he would not be hired. As part of the application and background screening process, Fonseca submitted a State of Florida application and an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. Fonseca failed to disclose on both of these documents his felony arrest for and adjudication withheld on felony possession of marijuana. The affidavit contained Fonseca's notarized signature dated April 27, 1999, attesting to the following statement: I attest that I have read the above carefully and state that my attestation here is true and correct that neither my adult nor juvenile record contains any of the listed offenses. I understand that it is my responsibility to obtain clarification on anything contained in this affidavit which I do not understand. I am aware that any omissions, falsifications, misstatements or misrepresentations may disqualify me from employment consideration and, if I am hired, may be grounds for termination at a later date. Fonseca did not disclose his criminal history because, based on what the receptionist told him, he did not believe that he would get the job if he revealed that he had a criminal history. His failure to disclose his criminal history was not an error or oversight. It was intentional. A Florida criminal history conducted by the Department revealed Fonseca's 1989 arrest for felony possession of marijuana. As a result, on May 6, 1999, Fonseca was determined to be disqualified and ineligible for a position in the Department working with juveniles. In a letter dated June 1, 1999, the Department advised Fonseca that he could request a desk review to pursue an exemption from employment disqualification. Fonseca was required to submit specified documentation, which he did. As Inspector General for the Department, Perry Turner makes the final departmental decision on exemption requests. In an interoffice memorandum dated July 29, 1999, Fonseca's exemption request was forwarded to Mr. Turner along with Fonseca's complete background screening file. In a desk review, Mr. Turner does not interview the applicant's seeking an exemption. Each applicant has an opportunity to submit to the Department documentation, which he desires the Department to consider in determining whether an exemption should be granted. In reaching his decision, Turner reviewed Fonseca's background screening file and the documentation submitted by Fonseca. On July 30, 1999, Turner denied Fonseca's request for an exemption. The denial was based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding Fonseca's prior criminal history and his falsification of the notarized Affidavit of Good Moral Character. Mr. Turner notified Fonseca of the denial in a letter dated August 1, 1999. From his early teens until approximately ten years ago, Fonseca was heavily involved with drug and alcohol use and was chemically dependent. He sought help for his dependency and has been clean and sober since 1991. Fonseca is actively involved in the 12-Step Programs of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. In 1992, Fonseca decided to go back to school. He graduated with a degree in criminal justice in 1998. Fonseca did not present any information to the Department concerning his addiction prior to the denial of his exemption request.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Alexander Fonseca's application for an exemption from disqualification from employment pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: William G. "Bill" Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Alan K. Marcus, Esquire 7300 North Kendall Drive, Suite 540 Miami, Florida 33156 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Inspector General's Office 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s request for exemption from disqualification should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers. Petitioner is seeking employment with Always Promoting Independence, LLC, and Supporting Independence/Honor Health Care Management, both service providers are regulated by Respondent. Petitioner wants to work as a direct service provider, which requires background screening. The results of Petitioner’s background screening revealed a history of criminal offenses. Respondent relies on the Department of Children and Families Background Screening Unit (“Department”) to initially receive exemption from disqualification requests and to compile documents related to such requests. On February 8, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire (“Questionnaire”), various criminal records, character references, and other various documents (the “Exemption Packet”), to the Department seeking to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. The Department subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to the Agency for review. To begin its exemption review, Respondent considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. In May 1991, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of “Fraudulent Use of Credit Card” (six counts). Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the disqualifying offense and adjudication was withheld. She was sentenced to 24 months’ probation and payment of fines and court costs. She completed her term of probation early. In its continued exemption review, Respondent considered the following non-disqualifying offenses, which Petitioner obtained subsequent to her May 1991 disqualifying offense: an arrest for “Aggravated Assault with a Firearm” in August 1997 (a violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes); an arrest for “Driving While License Suspended with Knowledge” in October 2007 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for “Driving While License Suspended with Knowledge” in September 2008 (another violation of section 322.34(2)); an arrest for “Possession of Cannabis” in March 2012 (a violation of section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes); and a conviction for “Possession of Drug Paraphernalia” in March 2012 (a violation of section 893.147(1)). Petitioner received notification by letters dated September 22, 2015, and January 12, 2016, from the Department, Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in both letters was “Fraud-Illegal Use of Credit Cards,” a violation of section 817.61, Florida Statutes. Petitioner provided details of the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense. In short, Petitioner indicated she gave three “associates” a ride to the mall in exchange for their promise to buy her a new pair of shoes. She left the Champs sports store with her shoes, expecting one of her companions to pay for them. She was in her car when her companions ran from the store with a security guard in pursuit. They told her to start the car which she refused because she believed she had not done anything wrong. Unfortunately for her, one of her companions had attempted to pay for her new shoes with a stolen credit card. She and her companions were arrested and charged with credit card fraud. Petitioner provided documentation of the charge, the disposition after her no contest plea, and the fact that her probation was terminated early. Petitioner provided explanations for all but one of the non-disqualifying offenses that ranged from the gun charge being at the end of a “bad relationship” (her then-girlfriend falsely accused her); to she was pulled over for a broken taillight, then charged with driving with a suspended license (she claimed she paid her tickets and the license was reinstated, although no records were provided on this point); to she was pulled over for having too dark a window tint in her car and cannabis was found (she testified it was not hers), but, since no one confessed to ownership, all were cited for possession; and finally to no explanation at all for the 2007 driving with a suspended license charge. Petitioner accepted little responsibility for her criminal offenses and concluded with the statement that she has no current involvement with any court system; she stated she is in “good standing.” Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that there was no harm to any victim or property, including damage or injury, in her past. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that there were no stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying offense. Regarding current stressors in her life, Petitioner testified she is unable to provide for her family and she is eager to obtain and keep steady employment. Petitioner listed her educational achievements as a diploma from Clearwater High School (1988), an Associate in Arts degree from Tampa Tech in computer engineering (1991), and an Associate in Science (“A.S.”) degree from St. Petersburg College in human services (2014). Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she has received no counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she has no history of alcohol and drug abuse. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she is involved with a community organization known as “Parents that Care.” As to expressing remorse or accepting responsibility for her actions, Petitioner testified she completed her probation early and that she no longer surrounds herself with negative influences and people. Petitioner’s recent work history has been stable. Her work history since 2009 indicates she has worked for two groups providing direct support/in-home support staff: Supporting Independence/Honor Health Care Management (2012-present) and Peaceful Dreams, Inc. (2009-2012). In addition to the criminal records submitted, Petitioner also offered affidavits of good moral character, written personal statements, IRS W-2 Forms, a copy of her A.S. degree from St. Petersburg College, and three letters of reference attesting to her character. The letters were written by people who have known Petitioner for many years and who believe her to be hard-working, reliable, and caring. Petitioner also submitted a copy of an exemption from disqualification she had received from the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) dated May 27, 2014. Jeffrey Smith, regional operations manager for the Suncoast Region, testified that the Agency reviewed all the provided documentation provided by Petitioner, the information provided on the Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her educational record, her character references, and her exemption from AHCA. Following a review of all the documentation included in the Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer advised Petitioner by a letter dated May 27, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Mr. Smith testified the Agency considered all the documentation submitted by Petitioner in her Exemption Packet, as well as the additional documents provided prior to and at the hearing. He did not find that the documentation negated or refuted the official records of the disqualifying and non- disqualifying offenses. Further, the fact that the non-disqualifying offenses related to Petitioner’s driving is relevant to the position for which she seeks an exemption from disqualification. A direct service provider is often called upon to transport individuals entrusted to her care. Petitioner’s statement that her license was reinstated and that she received no more driving citations after the offenses described above was refuted by Mr. Smith, based upon subsequent driving records regarding Petitioner. Mr. Smith also noted two additional reports from the Department in which Petitioner was named the alleged perpetrator. One report showed some indicators of child abuse (cuts/punctures/bites/excessive corporal punishment), and the other report involved allegations of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, specifically, one with a developmental disability, but resulted in no official findings of exploitation. The Agency’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of individuals whose developmental disabilities are defined as intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid syndrome. Without the Agency’s services, these clients would require institutionalization. Petitioner testified passionately that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities. Working in this field inspired her to return to school to earn a degree in human services. She testified that working with persons with disabilities is her long-term goal. She admitted she made some “foolish mistakes” when she was younger, but that she now accepts responsibility for her actions. She also testified that she believed her exemption should be granted because another agency, AHCA, had granted her an exemption from disqualification. Respondent countered with the fact that this vulnerable population requires being able to rely on the direct care provider’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals entrusted with the care of the disabled are often called upon to make decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. The Agency must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Petitioner’s history shows poor judgment on her part, and she provided testimony that was inconsistent with the documentation of her criminal history and the report and allegations of abuse or neglect from the Department. Petitioner admitted to use of a credit card of a vulnerable adult, which showed poor judgment on her part. Additionally, the close proximity of Petitioner’s most recent arrest (2012) to her request for exemption demonstrates her issues with the law are not limited to the distant past. Finally, Respondent, pursuant to section 435.07(5), Florida Statutes, considered the exemption given Petitioner by AHCA. The exemption from AHCA, however, is neither binding on the Agency nor does such exemption follow the same criteria or involve the same service population as the exemption sought from Respondent. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow Petitioner to be employed as a direct service provider to Agency clients. The undersigned appreciates Mr. Smith’s thoughtful and comprehensive assessment of Petitioner’s criminal history and fitness to hold a position of trust, and finds his testimony at hearing and reasons for recommending the denial to be credible and reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosemary Brinson 1010 Eldridge Street Clearwater, Florida 33755 Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 200 North Kentucky Avenue, Suite 422 Lakeland, Florida 33801 (eServed) Lori Oakley, Acting Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities’ (Agency) intended action to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification for employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Background Petitioner is a 41-year-old male residing in Gainesville, Florida. For the last four months Petitioner has been employed by Plane Techs, where he has been contracted out to Haeco Aviation for repair of interior aviation mechanics. Petitioner wishes to become employed by Successful Living II, an Agency provider which operates residential treatment group homes serving people with both moderate and severe behavioral disabilities. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust. Specifically, the Agency’s mission includes serving and protecting vulnerable populations, including children and adults with developmental disabilities. Disqualifying Offenses Petitioner’s record contains two felony offenses which automatically disqualify him from employment in any position of special trust with children or vulnerable adults. The first offense is the armed robbery of an Arby’s restaurant in Lake City, Florida, in May 1998. Petitioner conspired with his two male cousins, then employees of the subject Arby’s, to rob the restaurant. A first attempt was scrapped due to the number of customers in the restaurant, but Petitioner returned and finished the job just prior to closing. Petitioner was tried and convicted by a jury of both armed robbery and burglary of an occupied structure. He was sentenced to 32 months in prison, followed by eight months of probation. In the second offense the same month as the first, Petitioner and the same two cousins robbed a man in the parking lot of a hotel in Gainesville. The trio held up the man at gunpoint and deprived him of a duffle bag containing a computer and other valuables, as well as his wallet containing cash and credit cards. Petitioner was tried and convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 64 months in prison, to be served concurrently with the sentence from the first offense. Petitioner was 22-years old at the time of the disqualifying offenses. Petitioner served 64 months (approximately five years) in a state correctional facility and eight months’ probation. The Department of Corrections terminated his supervision on December 13, 2010. At hearing, Petitioner denied that he and his co- conspirators used a gun during the Arby’s robbery. He failed to appreciate that adjudication of the offense had established a weapon was utilized. At hearing, Petitioner downplayed his involvement in the robbery of the man in the hotel parking lot. Petitioner insisted that he had no idea his cousin was going to rob the man until the robbery was underway. However, Petitioner admitted that he participated in the robbery by ordering the victim to kick over his duffle bag, while his cousin threatened the victim at gunpoint. Subsequent Non-Disqualifying Offenses Petitioner’s background screening revealed several non- disqualifying offenses subsequent to Petitioner’s incarceration.1/ Respondent alleges Petitioner had three probation violations: (1) driving with a suspended license on October 14, 1998; (2) an unspecified violation on March 23, 2004; and (3) failure to appear on May 26, 2004.2/ No court records concerning these alleged probation violations were offered in evidence. According to a letter from the Columbia County Clerk’s office, no records of the alleged violations could be located. Respondent submitted no evidence of the source of information for the alleged probation violations. The record does contain an Affidavit of Probation Violation dated March 3, 2004, in which Probation Officer Aaron Robert attested to Petitioner’s violation of a condition of his probation requiring Petitioner to complete 100 hours of community service within one year of his release from prison. The affidavit states that, as of that date, Petitioner had submitted proof of completion of only 28 hours. The record also contains an Order of Modification of Probation entered on July 8, 2004, finding Petitioner admitted to the violation, was found in violation, and adjudicated guilty of the violation. However, the same terms of probation were reinstated. The record supports a finding that Petitioner is guilty of only one probation violation subsequent to commitment of the disqualifying offenses. 20. (DWLS) in Petitioner was cited for driving with license November and December 2006; October 2009; and suspended February, July, and August 2011. 21. With regard to the November and December 2006 DWLS adjudications, Petitioner’s license had been suspended for lack of insurance. Petitioner claimed not to have known his license had been suspended when he was first stopped in November 2006. For the November 2006 DWLS charge, Petitioner pled guilty and was sentenced to serve 12 months’ probation and ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees. Columbia County Court Judge Tom Coleman presided over Petitioner’s case, and terminated Petitioner’s probation on January 31, 2008, finding Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. Petitioner likewise plead guilty to the December 2006 DWLS charge, was placed on 12 months’ probation, and ordered by Judge Coleman to complete 50 hours of community service and produce a valid driver’s license within 10 months. Judge Coleman allowed the probation to run concurrent with the November sentence. Judge Coleman terminated Petitioner’s probation on January 31, 2008, finding Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. On October 4, 2008, Petitioner was cited for violating a municipal open container ordinance, and ordered to appear in Columbia County Court on October 30, 2008. Although the citation was admitted in evidence, no court record of the violation was produced in response to Petitioner’s records request. Again in 2009, Petitioner’s automobile insurance was canceled for nonpayment, leading to the suspension of his driver’s license. On October 27, 2009, Petitioner was again charged with DWLS and ordered to appear in county court on November 10, 2009. On March 11, 2010,3/ Petitioner was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees in the amount of $373.50 by September 9, 2010, or return to court on that date. On November 16, 2010, Petitioner appeared before Judge Coleman on the October 27, 2009 DWLS charge. Judge Coleman withheld adjudication and again sentenced Petitioner to 12 months’ probation and payment of court costs (of which $343.50 was remaining from the partial payment plan), allowing for early termination within six months, if all conditions were met. In 2011, Petitioner became employed at Target and assumed the risk of driving to and from work without a valid license in order to earn an income. Petitioner was stopped by police three separate times that year and cited for driving with a suspended license.4/ During the February 2011 traffic stop, Petitioner falsely identified himself as his cousin, and gave his cousin’s address, in an effort to avoid another citation. However, the police officer discovered Petitioner’s Target employee badge which revealed his correct identity. Petitioner was charged with both giving a false name to law enforcement (Count I) and DWLS (Count II). On March 29, 2011, Judge Coleman entered an order withholding adjudication on Count I, but adjudicating Petitioner guilty on Count II. As to Count I, Judge Coleman sentenced Petitioner to 12 months’ probation and ordered Petitioner to write a letter of apology to the arresting officer, pay court costs and fees, complete 15 community service hours per month until Petitioner either became employed or completed 150 hours, and produce a valid driver’s license within 10 months. As to Count II, Petitioner was also sentenced to 12 months’ probation to run concurrently with the sentence for Count I. Unfortunately for Petitioner, the March 29, 2011, adjudication constituted a violation of the probation order entered on September 16, 2010. On January 24, 2012, Judge Coleman entered a new judgement on the 2009 DWLS violation, sentencing Petitioner to 20 days in county jail, but allowing him to serve the sentence in consecutive weekly installments of 48 hours from 5 a.m. Sundays to 5 a.m. Tuesdays. On June 5, 2012, Judge Coleman terminated Petitioner’s probation under the September 16, 2010, judgement as Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. On April 30, 2013, Judge Coleman terminated Petitioner’s probation under the March 29, 2011, judgement as Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. For Petitioner’s subsequent July 12, 2011, DWLS charge, and August 27, 2011, DWLS charge, he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to two consecutive jail terms of 30 days, probation of 12 months, and ordered to pay court costs and fees. Judge Coleman allowed Petitioner to serve the jail time on subsequently designated weekends. Petitioner was released from probation on those charges on January 29 and March 31, 2015, respectively. Petitioner has subsequently obtained a restricted license which allows him to drive to and from work, as well as to pick up his children from school and other activities. Subsequent Employment History Petitioner has had varied employment since his release from prison. He worked for Hunter Panels in Lake City on the insulation assembly line for approximately two years, then Accurate Car Care as Assistant Manager of the detail shop for another year. Petitioner’s last job in Lake City was with Target, where he was terminated for tardiness. After his relocation to Gainesville, Petitioner worked for the Florida Farm Bureau in maintenance before becoming employed by Plane Techs. Petitioner anticipates being laid off by Plane Techs at the conclusion of the current contract with Haeco, due to lack of contract opportunities. In the summer of 2014, Petitioner was certified as a basketball referee by the Mid-Florida Officials’ Association. Petitioner officiates basketball games three to four times a week during basketball season, as well as post-season tournaments. Petitioner had to undergo background screening with Mid-Florida Officials’ Association, and was originally denied certification due to his criminal record. However, the association allowed him to proceed with certification following an exemption review. Subsequent Personal History Petitioner was divorced in late 2015. Petitioner has joint custody of his five children, who reside with him every other weekend, portions of each summer, and certain holidays. For the last ten years, Petitioner has volunteered as a football coach in Lake City (commuting from Gainesville) to remain involved in his son’s life. Additionally, Petitioner has volunteered as a coach for Columbia County little league football for approximately four years. In this capacity, he has worked with children ages five, six, and seven. Petitioner has completed some of his required community service by sharing his experiences with high school students, and encouraging them to make better life choices. Petitioner remarried on November 12, 2016. The couple met approximately four and a half years earlier. Petitioner revealed his criminal history to his new wife on their third date, approximately three years earlier. Petitioner met Diyonne McGraw a little over two years ago through her husband, who is also a volunteer football coach. Ms. McGraw became more familiar with Petitioner through his wife, who is Ms. McGraw’s hairdresser. Ms. McGraw owns Successful Living II, under which she operates three group homes and is working to license a fourth. She specializes in “intensive behavior focus,” meaning she serves clients with mental health issues, sexual issues, and physical and verbal aggression, some of whom have dual and triple diagnoses, and many of whom were recently released from incarceration. Ms. McGraw is a former probation officer. She testified, credibly, that, based on her observation of Petitioner’s interaction with her own children, as well as many other children involved in recreational sports, he has the patience to effectively deal with her clients. Further, she testified that Petitioner has demonstrated a commitment to her agency and a passion for the work it entails. Petitioner’s Exemption Request In his exemption request, in response to the question regarding the “degree of harm to victim or property (permanent or temporary), damage, or injuries,” Petitioner answered, “[n]one.” In response to the question regarding any stressors in his life at the time of the disqualifying offenses, Petitioner also stated, “[n]one.” Petitioner achieved a Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED) while incarcerated. Petitioner reported no further educational pursuits. In his exemption request, Petitioner accepted responsibility for “poor and wrong decision[s] [he] chose early in [his] life.” He admitted that he is embarrassed by his charges, but is not ashamed to talk about his history and advise young people that such mistakes can change the course of your life. Petitioner’s request also demonstrates a dedication to providing life lessons for his children and preventing them from going down the path he chose. In the employment history section, Petitioner listed only his employment with Target in Lake City. Petitioner’s exemption request included two personal reference letters--one from his wife, then Dawn Teasley, and one from Matthew Dillard, a teacher at Lake City Middle School in Columbia County. The letter from Petitioner’s wife described Petitioner as “reliable, honest and responsible” both in his capacity as maintenance and groundskeeper for her salon and as a head coach for her nephew’s football team in Lake City. She also commented on Petitioner’s “ability, patience and genuine concern and care for youth” and his ability to “bring out the very best of every youth he coaches regardless of their skill set of level.” His wife further described Petitioner as an “enthusiastic leader,” as well as “reliable, honest and responsible.” Mr. Dillard’s letter was brief. In the letter, he stated that he has known Petitioner for ten years, has played recreational basketball with Petitioner, and has worked with Petitioner at a local community center volunteering with youth. He noted that he “has never seen [Petitioner] become overwhelmed by a given task or assignment.” Along with his exemption application, Petitioner also submitted a personal letter from Judge Coleman. Petitioner received the unsolicited letter in April 2015 following Petitioner’s release from court supervision. In the letter, Judge Coleman acknowledged that he “cannot remember writing a letter like this before” but wanted to congratulate Petitioner. The letter reads, as follows: As you know, I made several decisions to give you additional time and chances to succeed despite the opposition of others. I had faith in you because I saw something in you - a determination and focus. By your actions you have justified my faith in you and I admire you for that. I am very proud of you and I know that you will go on to accomplish great things with your life. As you know, I see many people daily and I cannot always remember faces, so I request this of you. If you see me somewhere and recognize me, come and see me so I can congratulate you in person. I wish you all the best life has to offer. Keep working hard. Ultimate Facts Many of Petitioner’s recent decisions and pursuits demonstrate a commitment to a life of responsibility to family and community, concern and respect for others, and the importance of steady and reliable work. Petitioner’s volunteerism is commendable, as well as his remarriage and support of his children. Judge Coleman’s letter is evidence of Petitioner’s determination to better himself and to overcome his prior poor decisions. However, many of the facts established about Petitioner are grounds for the Agency to question his fitness to work with the most vulnerable clients. Petitioner’s attempts to downplay his involvement in the 1998 felonies evidence a lack of true remorse for his actions. His willingness to lie to a police officer, as recently as 2011, evidence a lack of respect for law enforcement, and his lack of separation from his cousins, who have been a bad influence in his past, supports the Agency’s uneasiness concerning Petitioner’s future decisions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2017.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities’ (Agency) intended decision to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification for employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 68-year-old female residing in Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner’s most recent employment is with Linda L. Curtis Health Care Agency (Curtis Agency), where she “sits with patients,” and provides entertainment and meals for patients. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust. Specifically, the Agency’s mission includes serving and protecting vulnerable populations, including children and adults with developmental disabilities. In connection with her employment at Curtis Agency, Petitioner underwent background screening on July 26, 2017, and was deemed automatically disqualified from employment based on a past offense. See § 435.06, Fla. Stat. Petitioner applied to the Agency for an exemption from disqualification, pursuant to section 435.07, which the Agency denied and which forms the basis of the instant Petition for Administrative Hearing. Disqualifying Offense On September 25, 1999, Petitioner was arrested and charged with misdemeanor battery for an incident at her home involving her 18-year-old cousin, Shanique Barner, whom she was raising, along with the cousin’s baby. The altercation began when Petitioner approached Ms. Barner about failing to keep her bedroom clean, an issue about which Petitioner had spoken to Ms. Barner repeatedly. The confrontation became physical and both parties began punching and hitting each other. When the fight ended, Petitioner took Ms. Barner to the hospital for a tetanus shot and treatment for a bite or bites inflicted by Petitioner during the altercation. An off-duty officer at the hospital was informed of the domestic violence incident and the arresting officer was dispatched to Petitioner’s residence. At Petitioner’s home, the arresting officer observed Ms. Barner with a swollen left eye and two bite marks on her left arm. After taking both parties’ statements, the officer arrested Petitioner and took her to a detention facility for booking. Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge of domestic battery and adjudication was withheld. On October 4, 1999, Petitioner was sentenced to four months’ probation and ordered to pay court costs of $104. Terms of Petitioner’s probation included no contact with Ms. Barner, completion of an anger control program, and payment of the costs of supervision. Petitioner’s probation was early-terminated on November 2, 1999, at which time Petitioner had completed the anger management program, paid her fine and court costs in full, and was current in the monthly cost of supervision. Petitioner was 50 years old at the time of the disqualifying offense, and Ms. Barner was 18. By Petitioner’s account, Ms. Barner was a rebellious and troubled teenager, who had become pregnant at age 17 despite Petitioner’s attempts to persuade Ms. Barner to begin using birth control at age 15. Subsequent Non-Disqualifying Offense Petitioner had no further involvement with law enforcement until April 8, 2008, almost nine years later, when she was arrested and charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. The details of the incident are unclear and disputed. The record supports the following findings: For a month prior to the incident, Petitioner had allowed a male friend, Mr. Jones, to temporarily live at her home. Mr. Jones was ill, had lost his employment, and had applied for social security disability, but had not received payments in time to pay his rent. Mr. Jones had a “roommate,” Ms. Green, who was identified only as Mr. Jones’ girlfriend’s daughter. Ms. Green also moved into Petitioner’s home, temporarily, at the request of the girl’s mother. Apparently, Ms. Green, like Ms. Barner, was not much of a housekeeper. Despite assurances from Mr. Jones that Ms. Green would “clean behind herself,” Ms. Green frequently left dirty dishes in the sink, with which Petitioner was met upon her return from work. On the date of the incident, Petitioner returned from a day at work to find dirty dishes in her sink, left there by an unwelcome, and apparently ungracious, guest whom Petitioner, no doubt, expected to be a short-term guest. Petitioner informed Mr. Jones that Ms. Green would have to leave. Ms. Green began removing her belongings, but not at a pace Petitioner found very efficient, so Petitioner “assisted” in removal of Ms. Green’s belongings. Ms. Green objected, telling Petitioner not to touch her belongings. Petitioner responded by informing Ms. Green she could not re-enter Petitioner’s home to remove the rest of her belongings. Petitioner told Mr. Jones to remove the remainder of Ms. Green’s belongings. Petitioner positioned herself to block Ms. Green’s entry to Petitioner’s home. When Ms. Green attempted to enter Petitioner’s home, a physical altercation ensued. The altercation was broken up by Mr. Jones and Ms. Barner,1/ but proved only a brief interlude in the fighting. A second physical altercation ensued but the evidence conflicted as to which party initiated the fight, and whether either party was armed with a weapon of some sort. Ms. Green emerged from this altercation with a deep cut above her left eye. Following Ms. Green’s injury, Petitioner left the scene in her vehicle. An officer who had been dispatched to the scene observed Petitioner’s vehicle on his way to the scene, conducted a traffic stop, and transported Petitioner back to the scene. After the investigation, Petitioner was arrested and transported to a detention facility for booking. The State Attorney’s office declined to prosecute Petitioner and the charge against Petitioner was dropped. Educational and Employment History Petitioner maintained consistent employment both prior and subsequent to the 2008 arrest. Between April 2004 and March 2007, Petitioner was employed as a shop foreman and an office manager for Air Distributors Inc., a metal and fiberglass fabricator. Petitioner was a part-time cashier at WalMart from March 2007 to November 2011. Petitioner was employed with River Region Human Services (River Region) from April 2009 through June 2014. River Region is a residential rehabilitation facility providing methadone maintenance treatment to recovering addicts. At River Region, Petitioner served as a Monitor Technician, observing client activities and medication administration, filing behavior and incident reports, conducting perimeter checks, and transporting clients to off-site services. The record does not support a finding of the exact date on which Petitioner’s subsequent employment with Curtis Agency commenced. In connection with Petitioner’s employment by River Region, Petitioner received an exemption from disqualification from the Department of Children and Families. While employed with River Region, Petitioner completed a number of trainings sponsored by that agency, including Non- Violent Practices in 2013, as well as HIV/AIDS Parts I and II, HIPAA, Clinical Documentation, and Security Awareness in 2014. Subsequent Personal History The record was devoid of any subsequent history on Petitioner. It is unknown whether Petitioner lives alone or with roommates of any sort. Petitioner’s Exemption Request In her application for exemption, Petitioner provided a lengthy account of both incidents. Notably, Petitioner prefaced her explanation as follows: “To start I want to relate both incidents occurred because I cared about others. I tried to deaden this concern for others, but it just wouldn’t happen.” While there is some credibility in associating Petitioner’s actions in the first incident with a concern for her cousin, whom she was raising the record does not support a finding that the incident between Petitioner and Ms. Green, whom she was removing from her home for being untidy, is at all related to a concern for others. In her lengthy explanation of both incidents, Petitioner blamed the victim. With respect to her cousin, Petitioner explained that her cousin hit her first. With respect to Ms. Green, Petitioner explained that the victim came at her first with “something in her hand,” which Petitioner “immediately knocked out and caught.” Petitioner wrote: It was an unopened small red object. That’s when I recognized it was a small box cutter. As she kept coming I push [sic] it and cut her across her eyebrow. Petitioner’s account is troubling in many respects. First, if Petitioner recognized the object as a box cutter, she had time to drop the weapon, rather than use it against the victim, whether in self-defense or otherwise. Second, Petitioner’s account of the incident differs significantly from the accounts given by both Petitioner’s cousin and Mr. Jones to the officer at the scene. Both witnesses told the officer that, after the initial altercation between Petitioner and Ms. Green, Petitioner retrieved a scraper from her car, which she carried with her to her perch outside the door blocking Ms. Green’s reentry to her home.2/ If the witnesses’ accounts are accurate, Petitioner was untruthful on her application, and attempted to shift blame to the victim, when in actuality Petitioner was the party who intentionally armed herself for an anticipated second altercation with Ms. Green. Petitioner made no attempt to explain the discrepancy between her version of the 2008 incident and the version recounted in the police report. The lack of explanation is notable because Petitioner went out of her way to contradict other aspects of the police reports on both incidents. For example, while the police report noted Ms. Green suffered wounds on her chest, nose, and above her left eye, Petitioner insisted the 2008 report was incorrect and she cut Ms. Green only above the eye. As to the 1999 incident, the police report noted Ms. Barner had a swollen left eye and two bite marks on her left arm. Petitioner insisted the report was wrong, arguing that she bit Ms. Barner on the chest and not the arm. The remainder of Petitioner’s application is bereft of detail. In response to the question regarding the degree of harm to the victims or property, Petitioner noted only “Bite mark,” and “laceration over eyebrow.” Petitioner’s demeanor at hearing evidenced a complete lack of understanding of the seriousness of her actions against Ms. Green. Assuming Petitioner’s version of the events is accurate, Petitioner could have permanently blinded Ms. Green by intentionally striking her in the face with a box cutter. Regarding whether Petitioner had stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying offense, Petitioner responded “None.” That response is contrary to Petitioner’s detailed description of the 1999 incident, which evidences significant stress between her teenage cousin, who was rebellious in many respects, including refusing to pick up after herself, not to mention bringing into the household an unexpected mouth to feed. With regard to current stressors and support system, Petitioner responded that she had no stress in her life and that prayer is her support system. She described her current living arrangements as a “2 bedroom, 2 bath apartment,” and that she has maintained her own household since she was 17 years of age. Petitioner failed to grasp the importance of distinguishing her current life circumstances and living arrangements from those at the time of the disqualifying offense and subsequent non-disqualifying offense. Without any distinguishing circumstances, the Agency is justified in questioning whether Petitioner’s circumstances are more stable. Petitioner stated that she had never received any counseling for any reason, and that she had never used or abused drugs or alcohol. Petitioner’s response to the question regarding whether she feels remorse and accepts responsibility for her actions reads as follows: Regret was immediately felt during incidents. We are responsible for our actions so to keep this always in mind take on fruitage of God’s spirit faith, goodness, kindness, love, longsuffering, joy, peace, mildness and self- control. Petitioner’s response is telling--it uses passive language and avoids the first person. Petitioner did not state, nor did she testify, that she regretted her actions, or that she was responsible for the harm caused. Both her written account and her live testimony evidence her intent to shift blame to the victims and acknowledge responsibility only in the broadest sense. Personal References Petitioner included two reference letters in support of her application: one from Ms. Barner and one from someone named Trinette Simmons. In Ms. Barner’s letter, she refers to Petitioner as her mom and explains that Petitioner cared for her from two weeks of age until five years of age, that she came to live with Petitioner again at age 13, and that she has “periodically resided at [Petitioner’s] residence for some years.” Ms. Barner states that Petitioner encouraged her and helped her graduate from school after becoming pregnant at age 17, and that love has always been in her mom’s heart. Petitioner did not explain her relationship to Ms. Simmons. The letter from Ms. Simmons states that she has known Petitioner since 2002, that Petitioner is capable of handling any situation “with thoughtfulness and maturity,” and that Petitioner is “a team player, as well as a team leader, who can adjust to changes within any environment.” The references are from persons who knew her when the 2008 incident occurred, but neither letter addresses the incident or explains that Petitioner’s behavior at that time was uncharacteristic, or that it has changed significantly since that incident. Moreover, neither of the letters is from an employer or other authority figure who has observed Petitioner interact with River Region clients or Curtis Agency patients. The Agency is charged with protecting the most vulnerable populations in Florida--children and adults with developmental disabilities. Some members of this population are uncommunicative, can be hostile, and act out. The Agency must be confident that any applicant seeking to work directly with these clients has demonstrated self-control and maturity to handle difficult, and often stressful, interactions with the clients. Both Petitioner’s disqualifying, and subsequent non- disqualifying, offense evidence Petitioner’s lack of self-control and good judgment when faced with stressful situations involving individuals who are defiant and refuse to take a course of action requested by Petitioner. Neither of Petitioner’s personal references document Petitioner’s ability to control herself and her reactions when faced with similar difficulties more recently. Petitioner’s account of the incidents shifts the blame to the victims and fails to demonstrate true remorse or responsibility for her actions, the harm she inflicted, and the potential for more serious harm based on her choices at the time of the incidents. While Petitioner seems to truly interested in continuing to help vulnerable citizens, even in a volunteer capacity as she nears retirement, she did not present evidence sufficient to demonstrate her rehabilitation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact DFS is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating insurance adjusters and agents pursuant to chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes. On April 20, 2016, Petitioner filed with DFS his application to become licensed as an all-lines adjuster in the state of Florida. On the second page of the application form, Petitioner answered “yes” to the question asking whether he has ever pled nolo contendere, no contest, or guilty to, or ever had adjudication withheld for, or ever been convicted of or found guilty of, any felony crime under the laws of any state. Despite answering yes to that question, on the third and fourth pages of the application, Petitioner answered “no” to the following three questions: First, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) fell within the following categories: any first-degree felony; a capital felony; a felony involving money laundering, fraud of any kind, or embezzlement; or a felony directly related to the financial services business. Second, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s), if not falling in one of the above categories, were crimes involving moral turpitude. Lastly, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) were within the category of “all other felonies.” The questions asking how to categorize the felony crime(s) that Petitioner acknowledged on page two of the application correlate to the statute prescribing a range of consequences depending on the type of felony criminal background an applicant has. According to the statute, an applicant with felony criminal history falling in the first group above (first degree felony, etc.) is permanently barred from applying for licensure in Florida as an insurance agent or adjuster. For an applicant whose felony criminal history does not fall in the first group, but is categorized as a felony (or felonies) involving moral turpitude, the statute provides for a long period of disqualification. If an applicant’s felony criminal history does not fall in either of the first two categories, then a shorter period of disqualification is provided by the statute. See § 206.207, Fla. Stat., adopted in its current form in 2011 (with one immaterial amendment in 2014 to change a statutory cross-reference). Petitioner’s admitted felony history must, of necessity, fall within one of the three groups: the felony history must have involved one or more felonies identified for permanent bar, other felonies involving moral turpitude, and/or all other felonies. The application answers were internally inconsistent and at least one of the answers on pages three and four was wrong. At hearing, Petitioner did not offer any explanation for his incorrect answer(s).1/ Petitioner did not file with his April 2016 application submitted to DFS, and did not offer into evidence at hearing any proof of the felony criminal history to which he admitted in his application. Petitioner gave little information at all about his criminal background at hearing. He testified that he identified his prior criminal history on page two of the application (by answering “yes” to the question asking whether he had ever been convicted, etc. of any felony crimes). The only detail he was asked by his counsel to address was as follows: Q: Now the criminal history that you identified, is that something that occurred a while ago? A: Yes, sir. Q: And can you give me the approximate time period? A: The offense? It was in 1994, I believe. Q: Okay. And do you recall when you finished all your restitution and probation concerning any of these prior convictions? A: 1999. (Tr. 32). Petitioner later acknowledged on cross-examination, as suggested by his attorney’s attempted correction in his follow-up question, that there was not just one (“the”) offense--there was more than one offense and more than one conviction. Other than correcting that error, Petitioner volunteered no information regarding his prior convictions. He did, however, offer into evidence documentation generally corroborating his testimony regarding when he completed probation for his prior convictions. Two letters from New Jersey Superior Court personnel state that court records reflect that Mr. Bivona completed three different probationary terms associated with three different indictment numbers, as follows: for indictment number 96-03-0031-I, probation was completed as of August 9, 1999; for indictment number 95-10-0453-I, probation was completed as of May 2, 1999; and for indictment number 95-05-0206-I, probation was completed as of September 27, 1998. Although Petitioner offered no details or documentation for his prior felony convictions, either with his application or at hearing (other than the letters documenting when he completed probation), Petitioner said that he had previously provided documentation to Respondent regarding his felony convictions, a fact confirmed by Respondent. Respondent had in its files certified copies of court records for Petitioner’s felony convictions in New Jersey, obtained by Respondent in 2010 in connection with a prior license application by Petitioner.2/ Respondent offered into evidence at hearing certified copies of court records regarding Petitioner’s felony criminal history, including indictments issued by grand juries setting forth the original charges, and the subsequent judgments of conviction issued by New Jersey Superior Court judges. Because Respondent was willing to use the criminal history documentation previously provided by Petitioner that was already in Respondent’s files, Respondent did not require Petitioner to obtain or submit the same documentation again in connection with his new license application.3/ The indictment numbers identified in the three judgments of conviction match the three indictment numbers contained in Petitioner’s exhibit offered to prove when he completed his probationary terms for his prior convictions. Thus, although Petitioner was evasive at hearing, unwilling to identify the court records of his prior convictions, the records themselves establish the missing information about Petitioner’s felony criminal history that Petitioner only alluded to at hearing. In a September 28, 1995, judgment of conviction issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold, New Jersey Superior Court for Somerset County, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-05-0206-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: four counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; one count of unlawful theft or receipt of a credit card, a fourth-degree felony; four counts of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of theft by deception, a fourth-degree felony. For sentencing purposes, the court merged nine of the counts into count two (one of the charges for fraudulent use of a credit card), and imposed the following sentence: three years of probation, restitution of $271.60, a $500.00 fine, and other monetary assessments. On May 3, 1996, another judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold. The judgment of conviction shows that Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-10-0453-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; and one count of theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was incarceration for 180 days in the county jail, a three-year probationary term, restitution of $380.02, and monetary assessments. On August 9, 1996, a judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Marilyn Hess, New Jersey Superior Court for Hunterdon County. As shown on the judgment of conviction, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 96-03-00031-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: one count of theft by deception, a third-degree felony; one count of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of credit card theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was a three-year probationary term, restitution of $2,488.30, and monetary assessments. As noted, Mr. Bivona testified that he completed the probationary terms for his prior convictions in 1999. He provided documentation corroborating that he served the three probationary terms and completed them on three different dates in 1998 and 1999, the last of which was August 9, 1999. No evidence was presented to prove that Mr. Bivona has paid all restitution, fines, and other monetary assessments imposed in the three judgments of conviction, and, if so, when all payments were completed. Petitioner’s application was initially denied by DFS because of Petitioner’s felony criminal history. DFS determined that at least two of the judgments of conviction, and possibly all three, were for felony crimes involving fraud. DFS did not undertake a review of Petitioner’s rehabilitation from his past crimes or his present trustworthiness and fitness to serve as an insurance adjuster, because in DFS’s view, Petitioner was subject to the statutory permanent bar from applying for licensure. DFS did not determine that Petitioner did not otherwise meet the requirements for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster. At hearing, neither party went into any detail regarding the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Instead, the focus of both Petitioner and Respondent was on whether Petitioner’s criminal history renders him disqualified from applying for licensure as an adjuster, either permanently or for a period of time, and, if the latter, whether mitigating circumstances reduce the disqualifying period. No evidence was offered of aggravating circumstances. Respondent has not disputed whether, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal history, Petitioner otherwise qualifies for licensure. Therefore, it is inferred that Respondent was and is satisfied that, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal background (including questions about rehabilitation, trustworthiness, and fitness), Petitioner otherwise meets the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Petitioner presented evidence addressed to the mitigating factors in Respondent’s rule to shorten the period of disqualification in certain circumstances, where there is no permanent bar. Petitioner testified that he moved to Florida with his wife in 1998 (apparently before he had completed his probationary terms for at least two of his convictions). He and his wife started a business in the Sarasota area, a corporation that has operated under two different names, but has remained essentially the same since 1998. The business has always been small; although it has gone up and down in size over the years, Petitioner said that the business has had at least five employees for over three years. Since 1998, the nature of his business has been to provide technical support and assistance to insurance adjusters. The business has not been engaged in the actual adjuster work; instead, his clients are licensed adjusters who perform the actual adjuster work. Petitioner testified that he has been employed by the corporation he owns, working at least 40 hours per week for a continuous two-year period within the five years preceding the filing of his application. This parrots one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, and although no documentation of his employment hours was provided for any period of time, the undersigned accepts Petitioner’s testimony as sufficient under the mitigation rule. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. To meet another mitigation factor, Petitioner submitted five letters of recommendation in evidence. Three of those letters appear to be from someone who has known Petitioner for at least five years (one undated letter states that the author has known Petitioner for three years; another letter, more of a business reference from an insurance company representative in Maryland, does not state how long the author has known Petitioner). Those letters that are dated bear dates after the license application was submitted and initially denied, but there is no impediment to receiving and considering them in this de novo hearing. The letters meet the requirement in Respondent’s rule for mitigation. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. Although the letters satisfy one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, the contents of the letters are hearsay, as none of the authors testified. The matters stated in the letters, for the most part, do not corroborate any non- hearsay evidence, except in a few immaterial respects (such as that Petitioner runs his own business and has daughters who play volleyball). Petitioner did not present any testimony from witnesses at hearing who could attest to his character, his business reputation, or his trustworthiness. Petitioner testified that he does volunteer work on a “sporadic” basis. He is active as a volunteer for his three daughters’ schools and travel volleyball activities, and he also works with youth groups in his church. Although Petitioner testified that he believes he has volunteered at least 180 hours over the three years preceding the filing of his application, Petitioner did not present any documentation from one or more charitable organizations confirming the number of his volunteer hours. It is undisputed that Petitioner held an insurance adjuster license in Florida for some period of time, until, according to DFS, the license expired by operation of law. Although Petitioner admitted that since 1998, his business has not been engaged in insurance adjuster work, merely holding a license appears to at least superficially satisfy a mitigation factor in Respondent’s rule. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner has been arrested or charged with any criminal violations since he completed his third probation in August 1999, more than 17 years ago. The length of time without any additional criminal incidents is a positive consideration. Notably lacking from Petitioner were: an explanation for the circumstances underlying the multiple crimes he committed that involved fraud, theft, forgery, and deception, through use of other people’s credit cards and checks; express acceptance of responsibility for his criminal past; the expression of genuine remorse for his wrongdoing; and an explanation as to why his criminal history should not present concerns if Petitioner becomes authorized to engage in insurance adjusting. As Petitioner acknowledged, a licensed adjuster “would negotiate settlement [of claims under insurance policies], would offer payment, [and] would have authority to write payment and receive payments” (Tr. 35), placing the adjuster in a position of trust and responsibility in dealing with other people’s money. Simply noting that it has been a good number of years since Petitioner completed his probations, that he is running his own business (that does not engage in insurance adjusting), that he has a family, that he is involved with church, and that he does volunteer work is not enough, when Petitioner’s past crimes and the concerns they present go unexplained, to support a finding of rehabilitation, moral fitness, and trustworthiness today. It may well be that Petitioner could prove these things if he had addressed them; it may have been an unfortunate strategic choice to avoid any mention of Petitioner’s past crimes in anything but the most general and vague terms. Perhaps in light of decisional law discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, Respondent’s licensure application form asks applicants who disclose criminal history whether they have had their civil rights restored. Petitioner answered yes. He was asked to explain, and his response was: “Rights were restored and I have the ability to vote and act as a standard US Citizen.” (Pet. Exh. 11 at 4). In the initial review of Petitioner’s application, DFS staff apparently accepted Petitioner’s representation that his civil rights had, in fact, been restored.4/ However, in a “deficiencies” listing at the end of the application, DFS noted that Petitioner failed to provide a certificate of civil rights restoration, or other proof of restoration of his civil rights. Petitioner’s application was not denied because of these omissions, and Petitioner’s failure to provide such evidence in his application would not have been an impediment to receiving and considering proof of restoration of Petitioner’s civil rights at hearing, had such evidence been offered. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to prove that his civil rights were restored. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that he ever applied for restoration of his civil rights, or that his civil rights have been restored by order of the governor in the exercise of clemency power. Instead, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a Florida voter status printout showing that he is an active registered voter. The exhibit was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Petitioner was registered to vote in Florida. However, this fact is insufficient to support an inference that Petitioner’s civil rights must have been restored or he would not have been allowed to register to vote. If Petitioner has actually had his civil rights restored, there would be direct evidence of that, and Petitioner had no such evidence. It is equally or more plausible that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida by mistake; Petitioner acknowledged that he represented in his voter registration application that his civil rights were restored (just as he represented to DFS in his license application). Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida because Florida gave full faith and credit to what New Jersey had done. This argument was unsupported by evidence of how Petitioner became registered to vote in Florida. Regarding what was done in New Jersey, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a “voter restoration handbook” from the state of New Jersey, which indicates as follows: “In New Jersey, any person who is no longer in prison or on parole or probation, can register to vote. . . . In New Jersey, unlike some other states, those who have been convicted of felony offenses in the past are not forever barred from voting. . . . Any ex-felon who has satisfactorily completed the term of his or her sentence can register to vote.” (Pet. Exh. 7, admitted for a limited purpose, at 1 - 2). The rest of the handbook simply describes how one goes about registering to vote in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law, then, one particular civil right--the right to vote--is taken away from convicted felons only until they complete their sentence, parole, and probation. This is confirmed by a New Jersey statute that has been officially recognized, providing that the right of suffrage--the right to vote--is taken away from any person “[w]ho is serving a sentence or is on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this or another state or of the United States.” § 29:4-1(8), N.J. Stat.5/ The right to vote is only one of the civil rights that may be lost by reason of being convicted of a crime. For example, under another New Jersey law officially recognized in this proceeding, persons convicted of a crime are disqualified from serving on a jury. See § 2C:51-3b., N.J. Stat. Petitioner presented no evidence to prove that he ever sought or received a restoration of his civil rights by executive order of the governor pursuant to an exercise of executive branch clemency power, either in the state of New Jersey or in Florida. In New Jersey, restoration of civil rights and privileges (one of which may be the right to vote) is accomplished pursuant to section 2A:167-5, New Jersey Statutes, officially recognized in this proceeding and providing in pertinent part: Any person who has been convicted of a crime and by reason thereof has been deprived of the right of suffrage or of any other of his civil rights or privileges . . . may make application for the restoration of the right of suffrage or of such other rights or privileges . . . which application the governor may grant by order signed by him. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Florida Constitution vests in the executive branch the following clemency powers: [T]he governor may, by executive order filed with the custodian of state records, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of two members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses. (emphasis added). Art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const. Petitioner admitted that he did not apply to the governor for a restoration of civil rights in New Jersey, and he has no order from the governor restoring his civil rights. Similarly, Petitioner did not apply for and receive an order from the governor restoring his civil rights in Florida. Instead, he admitted that he is relying on whatever happened in New Jersey. The following testimony reveals Petitioner’s misconception of the process in New Jersey for restoration of civil rights: Q: Okay. Mr. Bivona, what’s your understanding of how your civil rights were restored in New Jersey? A: My understanding is that once probation and restitution and everything is completed, that civil rights are restored in the State of New Jersey. Q: And did that happen, to your knowledge? A: The completion? Q: Yes. A: Yes, sir. I also verified that with the State of New Jersey. I called them. The Court: I can’t consider that.[6/] A: I understand. I’m sorry. The Court: Do you have any exhibits that show that civil rights have been restored? Mr. Terrell: There’s a handbook from New Jersey that’s also how the rights are restored. [Pet. Exh. 8, in evidence for limited purpose] (Tr. 44).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines insurance adjuster. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2017.
The Issue The issue presented in this case was whether the Petitioner had falsified his application for a licensure as an employee guard by failing to report his arrest and conviction of a felony and by not having had his civil rights restored.
Findings Of Fact James McClure applied for licensure as an employee guard to the Division of Licensing. In his application he stated that he had been arrested and indicated that the arrest was for driving with no driver's license. McClure stated that he had earlier been arrested for robbery in 1959 and subsequently convicted of that offense. He was sentenced to prison and served five years and six months for this offense. McClure failed to state that he had been arrested and convicted for this offense. McClure stated that he did not report this arrest and conviction because he did not think it was important. McClure stated that his record in now clean and that he has not been arrested since 1969 or '70 for driving without a license. McClure did not know whether his civil rights had been restored; however, he had taken no action to have them restored.
The Issue The issues are 1) whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s); and, if so, 2) whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from employment disqualification would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is seeking employment with The Arc of Alachua County, a service provider regulated by APD. Petitioner’s desired employment is to work as a direct service provider, which requires compliance with background screening requirements. The results of Petitioner’s background screening identified a history of criminal offenses. Petitioner received notification via letter dated April 4, 2016, from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to a criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in the letter was Larceny (a violation of section 810.014, Florida Statutes (2016)1/). Florida’s Legislature has designated certain criminal offenses as disqualifying offenses, which would prevent an individual from working as a direct service provider. However, an individual may seek an exemption from the employment disqualification. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow for Petitioner’s employment as a direct service provider to APD clients. APD’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of those individuals whose developmental disabilities are statutorily defined as: intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid Syndrome. See § 393.063(12), Fla. Stat. Without APD’s services, these clients would otherwise require institutionalization. APD’s clients often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. These clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve; consequently, employment as a direct service provider to APD clients is regarded as a position of special trust. APD is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. See §§ 110.1127(2)(c)1. and 393.0655, Fla. Stat. Many of the tasks direct service providers perform for, and/or assist individuals with disabilities with, include those of a social, personal needs, and/or financial nature. APD relies on DCF to initially receive exemption from employment disqualification requests and compile documents received related to such requests. On or around May 10, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire, a copy of her criminal record, character references, and other various documents (the Exemption Packet) to DCF in order to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. DCF subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to APD for review. In beginning its exemption review, APD considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. Specifically, in December 1982, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of Larceny/Grand Theft (a violation of section 810.014). The court’s final disposition of the case included the withholding of adjudication of guilt, two years’ probation, and payment of costs. In its continued exemption review pursuant to section 435.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, APD considered the following non- disqualifying offenses which Petitioner committed subsequent to her December 1982 disqualifying offense: an arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05, Florida Statutes); a second arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); a conviction for Worthless Check on December 24, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); an arrest for Driving While License Suspended/Revoked in June 1996 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for Worthless Check in January 2007 (a violation of section 832.05(4)(a)); and an arrest for Violation of Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court in August 2012 (a violation of section 741.31(4)(a), Florida Statutes). The Disqualifying Offense Petitioner provided an account of her disqualifying offense, Larcency/Grand Theft, in an addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire, dated August 3, 2015. Petitioner indicated in her account that she relocated to Tampa from Gainesville. She was 22 years old, single, and employed with the State of Florida. She became roommates with another female who was attending college at the University of South Florida. Petitioner stated “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner further explained that she received a two- year term of probation and completed all her court-ordered sanctions within a year. Petitioner also noted that “[s]ince that time, I have not committed any further crimes.” Petitioner provided the following record concerning her disqualifying offense: state attorney court record (13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, State Attorney). The Non-Disqualifying Offenses Court records received in evidence indicate a total of six non-disqualifying offenses as previously mentioned. Petitioner did not disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, nor did she provide accounts for such on the Exemption Questionnaire, despite the directions specifically requiring an applicant to do so. Petitioner did not provide records of her non- disqualifying offenses. Records of those offenses were obtained by APD as part of its detailed review process. Records of the non-disqualifying offenses obtained included: worthless check affidavit, witness form, copies of check, and no information filed court filing (Sears 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, and copy of check (Pic’n Save 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, and court judgment (Pic’n Save 12/24/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, copy of court diversion judgment and supporting documentation, and copy of dismissal of charge (Publix 1/30/2007); and warrant affidavit for arrest (Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, August 2012). Petitioner indicated that she has no current involvement with any court system; specifically, she stated “I have not experienced any criminal charges since my last event in 1982.” Regarding whether there was any degree of harm to any victim or property, including damage or injuries, Petitioner stated “I have not experienced any harm or damage to anyone or any property since my last event in 1982.” In answering the question about stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying incident, Petitioner indicated that there were none, other than being on probation. Regarding whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner stated “I have no current stressors with the law.” Petitioner indicated that her current support system and living arrangements include being married and having one daughter and numerous grandchildren. Petitioner also explained that her community activities/volunteer efforts include volunteering with the school system (field trips/activities) and attending church and performing functions for the church’s treasury department. Regarding educational and training achievements, Petitioner stated that she graduated from high school, started a career with the State of Florida, and attended a word processing/information course where she received the Most Outstanding Student Award. The Exemption Questionnaire asks whether an applicant has ever received counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated that she has not received counseling for any reason; if she felt stress, she would call the Employee Assistance Program. Petitioner noted she has not experienced any “major post- traumatic [stress].” As to whether she has used and/or abused drugs or alcohol, Petitioner replied that she has “not abused any type of drugs or alcohol in [her] life.” Petitioner indicated the following regarding feeling remorse/accepting responsibility for her actions: “I am the type of person to feel remorse towards everything and every person that I have contact with. I always take full responsibility for any action(s) that I encounter when I am in the wrong.” The Exemption Questionnaire asks for an applicant’s prior three years’ work history. Petitioner provided the following information: 4/2016 to 5/2016--The Arc of Alachua County (support tech/direct care); 11/2007 to 7/2014--DCF--North Florida Evaluation & Treatment Center (Human Services Worker III); 3/2004 to 7/2007—DCF--State of Florida Foster Care (word processor/data management specialist); 4/1998 to 9/2003-- American Psychiatric Association (membership coordinator/secretary). In addition to the criminal record submitted, Petitioner also provided the following additional documents that were included in her Exemption Packet: local law background checks, a volunteer award (Head Start), three letters of reference attesting to Petitioner’s character, and an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. The letters were written by persons who have known Petitioner for several years; they described Petitioner as devoted, loyal, honest, kind, and trustworthy. Finally, Petitioner submitted a copy of an exemption letter she received from DCF, dated February 12, 2016. Leslie Richards, regional operations manager for APD’s Northeast Region, advised that APD reviewed all documentation provided by Petitioner in her Request for Exemption, the information indicated in Petitioner’s Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her volunteer award, character letters, and exemption from DCF. Following a review of Petitioner’s Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer, advised Petitioner by a letter dated September 26, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Petitioner sent APD a request for hearing on or around October 11, 2016. APD received this request timely and subsequently forwarded this appeal to DOAH. Along with her request for hearing, Petitioner submitted a personal statement explaining her reasons for disputing the denial and requesting the hearing, a copy of the denial letter, and a copy of a training certificate summary for APD-approved courses through her former employer, the Arc of Alachua County. At hearing, Ms. Richards explained APD’s process of reviewing exemption requests and the consideration of Petitioner’s application for such. Per Ms. Richards, APD considers the disqualifying offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the incident, and finally, any other evidence indicating that the applicant will not present a danger if employment is allowed. Additionally, Ms. Richards testified that APD looks for consistency in the applicant’s account of events in his or her Exemption Questionnaire, the passage of time since the disqualifying incident, whether the applicant accepts responsibility for his/her actions, and whether the applicant expresses remorse for his or her prior criminal acts. Because an applicant will be occupying a position of special trust if granted an exemption, APD weighs all of these factors in its determination. Ms. Richards testified that all of Petitioner’s submissions were reviewed and taken into consideration; she noted that the starting point of APD’s review began with the date of the disqualifying offense and any criminal conduct occurring thereafter. Ms. Richards emphasized that in APD’s review, it was noted that Petitioner failed to disclose sufficient details of the account of her disqualifying offense. Specifically, Petitioner provided what appeared to be background information about the time frame surrounding the offense and the person whom she committed the offense with, but indicated in her statement “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner provided other details about this time in her life, but nothing specific about the crime itself. Ms. Richards stated that it left APD with a concern that Petitioner was not forthright with disclosure of the circumstances involving the crime. Ms. Richards also explained that APD took note that Petitioner failed to disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, and that this fact was also of concern. APD obtained records of the non-disqualifying offenses and considered them in its review. Ms. Richards noted that the nature of the offenses, particularly the Worthless Checks and the Violation of the Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court, were troubling because those offenses involved monetary transactions and interpersonal relations. Ms. Richards observed that the individuals APD serves are highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and a person who is in a role as a direct service provider would be assisting those individuals in a social and financial capacity. APD reviewed Petitioner’s involvement with three DCF investigations involving allegations of abuse toward a vulnerable adult, Petitioner’s spouse. Although there were no findings against Petitioner in these cases, based on the issues presented, DCF did make the recommendation for Petitioner to pursue family counseling. Ms. Richards noted that there is no evidence that Petitioner followed through with DCF’s recommendation, and by Petitioner’s own admission on the Exemption Questionnaire, has “not received counseling for any reason.” In addition to both the criminal offense and DCF- related information, APD noted Petitioner’s less than stellar driving record. Ms. Richards advised that a direct service provider will often be in a position to transport clients, and Petitioner’s driving record reflects a series of both moving and non-moving violations, which pose a concern. The record reflects a total of five driving-related violations: driving while license suspended/revoked (previously mentioned); tag not assigned (criminal traffic); red light camera citation; unlawful speeding; and a second red light camera citation. Ms. Richards testified regarding APD’s consideration of Petitioner’s prior employment history with DCF, and the subsequent exemption for employment granted to Petitioner by DCF. At hearing, APD presented employment evaluations and records of written disciplinary action taken against Petitioner by DCF while in its employ. Ms. Richards specifically noted that some of the disciplinary issues for which Petitioner was cited included: sleeping on the job while employed at a forensic facility; not securing the front door of a building at a forensic facility; tardiness; inappropriately streaming media on a state-owned computer; insubordination (refusal to work a shift); failure to report to work; and poor performance/negligence (failure to answer phones/answer front door of facility). Petitioner ultimately was dismissed from DCF due to her inability to perform her job functions because of an injury. Ms. Richards explained that these disciplinary issues gave APD great pause in considering granting Petitioner an exemption, as they were indicators for potential behaviors that could pose a great risk to individuals served by APD, many of whom are unable to communicate their wants and needs. The setting in which Petitioner committed these workplace violations mirrors those in which clients of APD are served. Ms. Richards did state that APD considered the exemption granted by DCF to Petitioner, however, the weight of the prior disciplinary issues outweighed that decision when compared to the possible jeopardy in which APD clients could be placed. Should Petitioner obtain future successful employment with DCF, APD would consider that in a subsequent exemption application review. Petitioner testified on her own behalf at the hearing. She spoke about the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense, reiterating her statement from the addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire. She provided no new information or surrounding details about the crime. Again, she stated that she has not had any legal issues since 1982. Regarding her non- disqualifying offenses, Petitioner remarked that she “didn’t consider those bad checks as crimes,” and though she denied being convicted of such, she admitted having overdrafted checks. Petitioner also stated that regarding the DCF investigations and the Injunction Violation/Contempt of Court charge, “that’s not why we are here today, so I am not going to talk about that.” Petitioner did admit to the driving infractions on her record, but stated that two of them, running red lights, were due to the fault of her daughter, as she was the driver at the time, rather than Petitioner. Petitioner stated that she is older and wiser and has changed. She enjoyed working at the adult day care program with the Arc of Alachua County. She indicated that any bad checks she has written, she “took care of.” Petitioner offered explanations for the disciplinary situations involving her prior employment with DCF, attempting to minimize her role. She explained that she and her husband, who Petitioner described as a vulnerable, disabled adult, no longer have domestic issues; however, they are currently homeless. Petitioner stated that APD’s denial is keeping her in an adverse financial situation, stating “I cannot find a job right now because of this denial.” When cross- examined by counsel regarding her ability to obtain gainful employment with DCF and its covered providers, Petitioner admitted that she can seek a job under DCF’s purview. Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses. Her sister, Sherry McCrae, a retired police officer, stated that she lived with her sister the entire time she was in college; Petitioner provided a source of support to her during this period. Ms. McCrae stated that her sister has been working all the years since the disqualifying incident. She affirmed that their maiden name is Williams, Petitioner’s last name at the time of the disqualifying incident. Petitioner’s second witness, Faye Williams, testified that after Petitioner’s disqualifying incident, she got a job and was active in the community. Petitioner has a desire “to be a part of something.” She loves people, especially children. Petitioner asserted that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities; at her last place of employment, she believed she found her “purpose and mission.” She loves helping people. She admits she made some mistakes, but that was long ago. Petitioner argued that she “really only committed one crime”; she has rehabilitated herself and that should be enough for APD. She believes APD abused its discretion in denying her request for exemption. The individuals APD serves are vulnerable and highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, due to their developmental disabilities. APD’s representative observed that APD’s clients must be assigned to direct care providers without fear of their endangerment. This necessarily requires reliance on a caregiver’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals who provide direct care are frequently responsible for assisting individuals in making decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. APD must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Ms. Richards cautioned that Petitioner’s criminal history reflects a pattern of poor judgment. Petitioner’s failure to disclose certain details in her account regarding her disqualifying offense calls into question her trustworthiness. Additionally, failure to disclose her non-disqualifying offenses, along with a failure to recognize that those offenses are truly crimes, is not only troubling, but calls into question Petitioner’s trustworthiness. It also demonstrates a complete lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her actions. Petitioner did not admit to any of the harm she caused to her victims. Petitioner’s minimization of the discipline she received while employed by DCF also gives great pause, as the individuals she was charged with caring for were clients in a forensic setting, a clear parallel to the clients she would serve should an exemption be granted by APD. Petitioner’s multiple driving citations are concerning as well, and demonstrate a pattern of questionable decision- making, especially when considering her for a position where she could potentially transport clients. All of the aforementioned factors, along with proximity in time of her application to her last arrest (2012), caused APD to question Petitioner’s fitness for providing services to the vulnerable individuals for which it is responsible, the most vulnerable population in the state. Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation, and therefore, the denial of the exemption was proper.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities issue a final order upholding the denial of Petitioner’s exemption request. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2017.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, and is presently serving a sentence in the custody of the State of Florida on that conviction. He is currently incarcerated at Glades Correctional Institution in Belle Glade, Florida. The Respondent is responsible for establishing "presumptive parole release dates" for prisoners such as the Petitioner. Petitioner was interviewed on July 19, 1979, for the purpose of setting his presumptive parole release date. By action dated August 8, 1979, the Respondent set the date at May 1, 1984. Petitioner requested a special review, but the Commission did not change its decision. The Respondent has adopted guidelines for setting presumptive parole release dates by rule. Chapter 23-19, Florida Administrative Code. The rule originally became effective March 20, 1979. When first promulgated, the guidelines established a "matrix" which provided that second degree murder fell within the offense severity rating of "VI--Greatest Most Serious." A prisoner convicted of second degree murder would have the presumptive release date computed according to the following matrix, which was set out at Rule 23-19.05, Florida Administrative Code: 18-39 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 0. 38-59 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 1. 58-79 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was between 2 and 6. 78-120 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 7-11. The salient factor score is a number computed by looking at past criminal behavior. The Respondent has amended its Rule 23-19.05, and increased the offense severity rating of second degree murder from VI to "VII--Greatest Most Serious II." Under the amended rule, an inmate convicted of second degree murder has the presumptive parole release date computed according to the following matrix: 60-84 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 0. 83-107 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 106-130 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 2 to 6. 129-183 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 7 to 11. Petitioner's salient factor score was zero, and in accordance with the amended rule, his presumptive parole release date was set in the sixty to eighty-four month range, and specifically at the top of that range. The amendment to Rule 23-19.05 which changed the matrix time range for the offense of second degree murder is the subject of this rule challenge proceeding. Had the Petitioner's presumptive release date been computed according to the rule prior to the amendment, his presumptive parole release date would have been set in the eighteen to thirty-nine month range. The amendment to Rule 23-19.05 became effective June 25, 1979. The Respondent prepared a document entitled "Economic Impact Statement" in support of the amendment. The statement provided: The objective parole criteria rules to which this statement is attached, have been promulgated in response to legislation which demanded the same. See Chapter 78-417, Laws of Florida. Therefore, the economic impact, if any, presently flows from the statutes, not from the rules. In its notice of the amended rule published in the "Florida Administrative Weekly," the Respondent stated that the estimate of economic impact on all affected persons of the amendment was "$0." The instant rule challenge proceeding was initiated by a petition filed at the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 13, 1981. In adopting the amendment to its Rule 23-19.05, the Respondent Commission relied upon the collective experience of its individual members. This experience includes the Commissioners' experience in reviewing individual cases as well as each Commissioner's background. Neither the Commission nor its staff had any statistical data available. The Commission did not formally notify the Department of Corrections of the need for any statistical information, and it does not appear that the Department of Corrections provided any such data.
